Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
the city of Manila dismissing the complaint on the merits filed in
an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff's
automobile by reason of defendant's negligence in causing a
collision between his automobile and that of plaintiff. The court in
its judgment also dismissed a cross-complaint filed by the
defendant, praying for damages against the plaintiff on the ground
that the injuries sustained by the defendant's automobile in the
collision referred to, as well as those to plaintiff's machine, were
caused by the negligence of the plaintiff in handling his
automobile.
The court found upon the evidence that both the plaintiff and the
defendant were negligent in handling their automobiles and that
said negligence was of such a character and extent on the part of
both as to prevent either from recovering.1awphil.net
Upon the facts, as they appear of record, the judgment must be
affirmed, as the evidence clearly supports the decision of the trial
court. The law applicable to the facts also requires an affirmance of
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Republic of the Philippines short), an independent contractor which undertook the
SUPREME COURT construction of the manhole and the conduit system. 3
Manila Accordingly, PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte
SECOND DIVISION alleging that, under the terms of their agreement, PLDT should in
G.R. No. L-57079 September 29, 1989 no manner be answerable for any accident or injuries arising from
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., INC., petitioner, the negligence or carelessness of Barte or any of its employees. 4 In
vs. answer thereto, Barte claimed that it was not aware nor was it
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ANTONIO ESTEBAN and notified of the accident involving respondent spouses and that it
GLORIA ESTEBAN, respondents. had complied with the terms of its contract with PLDT by installing
the necessary and appropriate standard signs in the vicinity of the
REGALADO, J.: work site, with barricades at both ends of the excavation and with
This case had its inception in an action for damages instituted red lights at night along the excavated area to warn the traveling
in the former Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental 1 by public of the presence of excavations. 5
private respondent spouses against petitioner Philippine Long On October 1, 1974, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT, for brevity) for the private respondents, the decretal part of which reads:
injuries they sustained in the evening of July 30, 1968 when IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING considerations the
their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open defendant Philippine Long Distance Telephone
trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the Company is hereby ordered (A) to pay the plaintiff
installation of its underground conduit system. The complaint Gloria Esteban the sum of P20,000.00 as moral
alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the damages and P5,000.00 exemplary damages; to
open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping plaintiff Antonio Esteban the sum of P2,000.00 as
darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. As a result moral damages and P500.00 as exemplary damages,
of the accident, respondent Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained with legal rate of interest from the date of the filing
injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar of the complaint until fully paid. The defendant is
on her cheek, while the respondent husband suffered cut lips. hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of
In addition, the windshield of the jeep was shattered. 2 P3,000.00 as attorney's fees.
PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the (B) The third-party defendant is hereby ordered to
injuries sustained by respondent spouses were the result of reimburse whatever amount the defendant-third
their own negligence and that the entity which should be held party plaintiff has paid to the plaintiff. With costs
responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte and Company (Barte, for against the defendant. 6
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From this decision both PLDT and private respondents appealed, Justice Mariano A. Zosa, setting aside the decision dated
the latter appealing only as to the amount of damages. Third-party September 25, 1979, as well as the resolution dated, January
defendant Barte did not appeal. 24,1980, and affirming in toto the decision of the lower court. 17
On September 25, 1979, the Special Second Division of the Court On September 19, 1980, petitioner PLDT filed a motion to set aside
of Appeals rendered a decision in said appealed case, with Justice and/or for reconsideration of the resolution of September 3, 1980,
Corazon Juliano Agrava as ponente, reversing the decision of the contending that the second motion for reconsideration of private
lower court and dismissing the complaint of respondent spouses. It respondent spouses was filed out of time and that the decision of
held that respondent Esteban spouses were negligent and September 25, 1979 penned by Justice Agrava was already final. It
consequently absolved petitioner PLDT from the claim for damages. further submitted therein that the relationship of Barte and
7 A copy of this decision was received by private respondents on petitioner PLDT should be viewed in the light of the contract
October 10, 1979. 8 On October 25, 1979, said respondents filed a between them and, under the independent contractor rule, PLDT is
motion for reconsideration dated October 24, 1979. 9 On January not liable for the acts of an independent contractor. 18 On May 11,
24, 1980, the Special Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals denied 1981, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its resolution
said motion for reconsideration. 10 This resolution was received by denying said motion to set aside and/or for reconsideration and
respondent spouses on February 22, 1980. 11 affirming in toto the decision of the lower court dated October 1,
On February 29, 1980, respondent Court of Appeals received 1974. 19
private respondents' motion for leave of court to file a second Coming to this Court on a petition for review on certiorari,
motion for reconsideration, dated February 27, 1980. 12 On March petitioner assigns the following errors:
11, 1980, respondent court, in a resolution likewise penned by 1. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not denying private
Justice Agrava, allowed respondents to file a second motion for respondents' second motion for reconsideration on the ground that
reconsideration, within ten (10) days from notice thereof. 13 Said the decision of the Special Second Division, dated September 25,
resolution was received by private respondents on April 1, 1980 1979, and the resolution of the Special Ninth Division, dated
but prior thereto, private respondents had already filed their January 24, 1980, are already final, and on the additional ground
second motion for reconsideration on March 7, 1980. 14 that said second motion for reconsideration is pro forma.
On April 30,1980 petitioner PLDT filed an opposition to and/or 2. Respondent court erred in reversing the aforesaid decision and
motion to dismiss said second motion for reconsideration. 15 The resolution and in misapplying the independent contractor rule in
Court of Appeals, in view of the divergent opinions on the holding PLDT liable to respondent Esteban spouses.
resolution of the second motion for reconsideration, designated two A convenient resume of the relevant proceedings in the respondent
additional justices to form a division of five. 16 On September 3, court, as shown by the records and admitted by both parties, may
1980, said division of five promulgated its resolution, penned by be graphically presented as follows:
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(a) September 25, 1979, a decision was rendered by notice of the order or judgment deducting the time in which the
the Court of Appeals with Justice Agrava as ponente; first motion has been pending. 20 Private respondents having filed
(b) October 10, 1979, a copy of said decision was their first motion for reconsideration on the last day of the
received by private respondents; reglementary period of fifteen (15) days within which to do so, they
(c) October 25, 1979, a motion for reconsideration had only one (1) day from receipt of the order denying said motion
was filed by private respondents; to file, with leave of court, a second motion for reconsideration. 21
(d) January 24, 1980, a resolution was issued In the present case, after their receipt on February 22, 1980 of the
denying said motion for reconsideration; resolution denying their first motion for reconsideration, private
(e) February 22, 1980, a copy of said denial respondents had two remedial options. On February 23, 1980, the
resolution was received by private respondents; remaining one (1) day of the aforesaid reglementary period, they
(f) February 29, 1980, a motion for leave to file a could have filed a motion for leave of court to file a second motion
second motion for reconsideration was filed by for reconsideration, conceivably with a prayer for the extension of
private respondents the period within which to do so. On the other hand, they could
(g) March 7, 1980, a second motion for have appealed through a petition for review on certiorari to this
reconsideration was filed by private respondents; Court within fifteen (15) days from February 23, 1980. 22 Instead,
(h) March 11, 1980, a resolution was issued allowing they filed a motion for leave to file a second motion 'for
respondents to file a second motion for reconsideration on February 29, 1980, and said second motion for
reconsideration within ten (10) days from receipt; reconsideration on March 7, 1980, both of which motions were by
and then time-barred.
(i) September 3, 1980, a resolution was issued, Consequently, after the expiration on February 24, 1980 of the
penned by Justice Zosa, reversing the original original fifteen (15) day period, the running of which was
decision dated September 25, 1979 and setting suspended during the pendency of the first motion for
aside the resolution dated January 24, 1980. reconsideration, the Court of Appeals could no longer validly take
From the foregoing chronology, we are convinced that both the further proceedings on the merits of the case, much less to alter,
motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and, modify or reconsider its aforesaid decision and/or resolution. The
consequently, said second motion for reconsideration itself were filing of the motion for leave to file a second motion for
filed out of time. reconsideration by herein respondents on February 29, 1980 and
Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, which had procedural the subsequent filing of the motion itself on March 7, 1980, after
governance at the time, provided that a second motion for the expiration of the reglementary period to file the same, produced
reconsideration may be presented within fifteen (15) days from no legal effects. Only a motion for re-hearing or reconsideration
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filed in time shall stay the final order or judgment sought to be re- errors should be exercised before the finality of the decision or
examined. 23 order sought to be corrected, otherwise litigation will be endless
The consequential result is that the resolution of respondent court and no question could be considered finally settled. Although the
of March 11, 1980 granting private respondents' aforesaid motion granting or denial of a motion for reconsideration involves the
for leave and, giving them an extension of ten (10) days to file a exercise of discretion, 27 the same should not be exercised
second motion for reconsideration, is null and void. The period for whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, but prudently in conformity
filing a second motion for reconsideration had already expired with law, justice, reason and equity. 28
when private respondents sought leave to file the same, and Prescinding from the aforesaid procedural lapses into the
respondent court no longer had the power to entertain or grant the substantive merits of the case, we find no error in the findings
said motion. The aforesaid extension of ten (10) days for private of the respondent court in its original decision that the
respondents to file their second motion for reconsideration was of accident which befell private respondents was due to the lack
no legal consequence since it was given when there was no more of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not
period to extend. It is an elementary rule that an application for imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner
extension of time must be filed prior to the expiration of the period PLDT. Such findings were reached after an exhaustive assessment
sought to be extended. 24 Necessarily, the discretion of respondent and evaluation of the evidence on record, as evidenced by the
court to grant said extension for filing a second motion for respondent court's resolution of January 24, 1980 which we quote
reconsideration is conditioned upon the timeliness of the motion with approval:
seeking the same. First. Plaintiff's jeep was running along the inside
No appeal having been taken seasonably, the respondent court's lane of Lacson Street. If it had remained on that
decision, dated September 25, 1979, became final and executory inside lane, it would not have hit the ACCIDENT
on March 9, 1980. The subsequent resolutions of respondent MOUND.
court, dated March 11, 1980 and September 3, 1980, allowing Exhibit B shows, through the tire marks, that the
private respondents to file a second motion for reconsideration and ACCIDENT MOUND was hit by the jeep swerving
reversing the original decision are null and void and cannot disturb from the left that is, swerving from the inside lane.
the finality of the judgment nor restore jurisdiction to respondent What caused the swerving is not disclosed; but, as
court. This is but in line with the accepted rule that once a the cause of the accident, defendant cannot be made
decision has become final and executory it is removed from the liable for the damages suffered by plaintiffs. The
power and jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further accident was not due to the absence of warning
alter or amend, much less revoke it. 25 The decision rendered anew signs, but to the unexplained abrupt swerving of the
is null and void. 26 The court's inherent power to correct its own jeep from the inside lane. That may explain plaintiff-
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husband's insistence that he did not see the Fourth. If the accident did not happen because the
ACCIDENT MOUND for which reason he ran into it. jeep was running quite fast on the inside lane and
Second. That plaintiff's jeep was on the inside lane for some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly
before it swerved to hit the ACCIDENT MOUND to the right and had to climb over the ACCIDENT
could have been corroborated by a picture showing MOUND, then plaintiff-husband had not exercised
Lacson Street to the south of the ACCIDENT the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the
MOUND. accident. With the drizzle, he should not have run
It has been stated that the ditches along Lacson on dim lights, but should have put on his regular
Street had already been covered except the 3 or 4 lights which should have made him see the
meters where the ACCIDENT MOUND was located. ACCIDENT MOUND in time. If he was running on
Exhibit B-1 shows that the ditches on Lacson Street the outside lane at 25 kilometers an hour, even on
north of the ACCIDENT MOUND had already been dim lights, his failure to see the ACCIDENT MOUND
covered, but not in such a way as to allow the outer in time to brake the car was negligence on his part.
lane to be freely and conveniently passable to The ACCIDENT MOUND was relatively big and
vehicles. The situation could have been worse to the visible, being 2 to 3 feet high and 1-1/2 feet wide. If
south of the ACCIDENT MOUND for which reason he did not see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time, he
no picture of the ACCIDENT MOUND facing south would not have seen any warning sign either. He
was taken. knew of the existence and location of the ACCIDENT
Third. Plaintiff's jeep was not running at 25 MOUND, having seen it many previous times. With
kilometers an hour as plaintiff-husband claimed. At ordinary precaution, he should have driven his jeep
that speed, he could have braked the vehicle the on the night of the accident so as to avoid hitting the
moment it struck the ACCIDENT MOUND. The jeep ACCIDENT MOUND. 29
would not have climbed the ACCIDENT MOUND The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent
several feet as indicated by the tiremarks in Exhibit Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and
B. The jeep must have been running quite fast. If the those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the
jeep had been braked at 25 kilometers an hour, accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes
plaintiff's would not have been thrown against the their right to recover damages. 30 The perils of the road were known
windshield and they would not have suffered their to, hence appreciated and assumed by, private respondents. By
injuries. exercising reasonable care and prudence, respondent Antonio
Esteban could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act,
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even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on scene of the accident. The absence of a police report of the incident
the part of petitioner. and the non-submission of a medical report from the hospital
The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented where private respondents were allegedly treated have not even
the accident; the only purpose of said signs was to inform and been satisfactorily explained.
warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The As aptly observed by respondent court in its aforecited extended
private respondents already knew of the presence of said resolution of January 24, 1980
excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations (a) There was no third party eyewitness of the
which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but accident. As to how the accident occurred, the Court
the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane can only rely on the testimonial evidence of plaintiffs
towards the accident mound. As opined in some quarters, the themselves, and such evidence should be very
omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs carefully evaluated, with defendant, as the party
on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only being charged, being given the benefit of any doubt.
when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the Definitely without ascribing the same motivation to
injury. 31 It is basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT plaintiffs, another person could have deliberately
for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due and engineered a similar accident in the hope and
reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm expectation that the Court can grant him
and necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of substantial moral and exemplary damages from the
caution for his own protection. Furthermore, respondent Antonio big corporation that defendant is. The statement is
Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the made only to stress the disadvantageous position of
accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner defendant which would have extreme difficulty in
PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street contesting such person's claim. If there were no
almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of witness or record available from the police
the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and department of Bacolod, defendant would not be able
his wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the to determine for itself which of the conflicting
consequences of his imprudence. testimonies of plaintiffs is correct as to the report or
Moreover, we also sustain the findings of respondent Court of non-report of the accident to the police department.
Appeals in its original decision that there was insufficient evidence 32
to prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. We have for A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has
consideration only the self-serving testimony of respondent Antonio the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence
Esteban and the unverified photograph of merely a portion of the causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be
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affirmatively established by competent evidence. 33 Whosoever
relies on negligence for his cause of action has the burden in
the first instance of proving the existence of the same if
contested, otherwise his action must fail.
WHEREFORE, the resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals,
dated March 11, 1980 and September 3,1980, are hereby SET
ASIDE. Its original decision, promulgated on September 25,1979,
is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
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EN BANC fees from P3,000 to P1,000 with costs. The electric company has
[G.R. No. L-8328. May 18, 1956.] appealed said decision to us.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, vs. SOTERO The findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals which are
REMOQUILLO, in his own behalf and as guardian of the minors conclusive are stated in the following portions of its decision which
MANUEL, BENJAMIN, NESTOR, MILAGROS, CORAZON, we reproduce below:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CLEMENTE and AURORA, all surnamed MAGNO, SALUD The electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary
MAGNO, and the COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), wire stretched between poles on the street and carrying a charge of
Respondents. 3,600 volts. It was installed there some two years before Pealozas
house was constructed. The record shows that during the
DECISION construction of said house a similar incident took place, although
MONTEMAYOR, J.: fortunate]y with much less tragic consequences. A piece of wood
On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of which a carpenter was holding happened to come in contact with
Antonio Pealoza, his stepbrother, located on Rodriguez the same wire, producing some sparks. The owner of the house
Lanuza Street, Manila, to repair a media agua said to be in a forthwith complained to Defendant about the danger which the
leaking condition. The media agua was just below the wire presented, and as a result Defendant moved one end of the
window of the third story. Standing on said media agua, wire farther from the house by means of a brace, but left the other
Magno received from his son thru that window a 3 X 6 end where it was.
galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion, turned At any rate, as revealed by the ocular inspection of the premises
around and in doing so the lower end of the iron sheet came ordered by the trial court, the distance from the electric wire to the
into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric edge of the media agua on which the deceased was making repairs
Company (later referred to as the Company) strung parallel to was only 30 inches or 2 1/2 feet. Regulations of the City of Manila
the edge of the media agua and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing required that all wires be kept three feet from the building.
his death by electrocution. His widow and children fled suit to Appellant contends that in applying said regulations to the case at
recover damages from the company. After hearing, the trial court bar the reckoning should not be from the edge of the media agua
rendered judgment in their favor P10,000 as compensatory but from the side of the house and that, thus measured, the
damages; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryP784 as actual damages; distance was almost 7 feet, or more then the minimum prescribed.
chan roblesvirtualawlibraryP2,000 as moral and exemplary This contention is manifestly groundless, for not only is a media
damages; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand P3,000 as attorneys fees, agua an integral part of the building to which it is attached but to
with costs. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed exclude it in measuring the distance would defeat the purpose of
the judgment with slight modification by reducing the attorneys the regulation. Appellant points out, nevertheless, that even
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assuming that the distance, within the meaning of the city house; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat it was the company that
regulations, should be measured from the edge of the media agua, was at fault and was guilty of negligence because although the
the fact that in the case of the house involved herein such distance electric wire in question had been installed long before the
was actually less than 3 feet was due to the fault of the owner of construction of the house and in accordance with the ordinance
said house, because the city authorities gave him a permit to fixing a minimum of 3 feet, mere compliance with the regulations
construct a media agua only one meter or 39 1/2 inches wide, but does not satisfy the requirement of due diligence nor avoid the
instead he built one having a width of 65 3/4 inches, 17 3/8 need for adopting such other precautionary measures as may be
inches more than the width permitted by the authorities, thereby warranted; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat negligence cannot be
reducing the distance to the electric wire to less than the determined by a simple matter of inches; chan
prescribed minimum of 3 feet. roblesvirtualawlibrarythat all that the city did was to prescribe
It is a fact that the owner of the house exceeded the limit fixed in certain minimum conditions and that just because the ordinance
the permit given to him by the city authorities for the construction required that primary electric wires should be not less than 3 feet
of the media agua, and that if he had not done so Appellants wire from any house, the obligation of due diligence is not fulfilled by
would have been 11 3/8 (inches) more than the required distance placing such wires at a distance of 3 feet and one inch, regardless
of three feet from the edge of the media agua. It is also a fact, of other factors. The appellate court, however, refrained from
however, that after the media agua was constructed the owner stating or suggesting what other precautionary measures could
was given a final permit of occupancy of the house cralaw . and should have been adopted.
cralaw The wire was an exposed, high tension wire carrying a After a careful study and discussion of the case and the
load of 3,600 volts. There was, according to Appellant, no circumstances surrounding the same, we are inclined to agree to
insulation that could have rendered it safe, first, because there is the contention of Petitioner Company that the death of Magno was
no insulation material in commercial use for such kind of wire; primarily caused by his own negligence and in some measure by
chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand secondly, because the only the too close proximity of the media agua or rather its edge to the
insulation material that may be effective is still in the experimental electric wire of the company by reason of the violation of the
stage of development and, anyway, its costs would be prohibitive original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of
said illegal construction of the media agua. We fail to see how the
The theory followed by the appellate court in finding for the Plaintiff Company could be held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due
is that although the owner of the house in constructing the media diligence. Although the city ordinance called for a distance of 3 feet
agua in question exceeded the limits fixed in the permit, still, after of its wires from any building, there was actually a distance of 7
making that media agua, its construction though illegal, was feet and 2 3/4 inches of the wires from the side of the house of
finally approved because he was given a final permit to occupy the Pealoza. Even considering said regulation distance of 3 feet as
Page 10 of 205
referring not to the side of a building, but to any projecting part edge of the media agua and the yawning 2-story distance or
thereof, such as a media agua, had the house owner followed the height from the ground, and possibly if not probably avoided the
terms of the permit given him by the city for the construction of his fatal contact between the lower end of the iron sheet and the wires.
media agua, namely, one meter or 39 3/8 inches wide, the We realize that the presence of the wires in question quite close to
distance from the wires to the edge of said media agua would the house or its media agua was always a source of danger
have been 3 feet and 11 3/8 inches. In fixing said one meter width considering their high voltage and uninsulated as they were, but
for the media agua the city authorities must have wanted to the claim of the company and the reasons given by it for not
preserve the distance of at least 3 feet between the wires and any insulating said wires were unrefuted as we gather from the findings
portion of a building. Unfortunately, however, the house owner of the Court of Appeals, and so we have to accept them as
disregarding the permit, exceeded the one meter fixed by the same satisfactory. Consequently, we may not hold said company as
by 17 3/8 inches and leaving only a distance of 2 1/2 feet between guilty of negligence or wanting in due diligence in failing to insulate
the Media agua as illegally constructed and the electric wires. said wires. As to their proximity to the house it is to be supposed
And added to this violation of the permit by the house owner, was that distance of 3 feet was considered sufficiently safe by the
its approval by the city through its agent, possibly an inspector. technical men of the city such as its electrician or engineer. Of
Surely we cannot lay these serious violations of a city ordinance course, a greater distance of say 6 feet or 12 feet would have
and permit at the door of the Company, guiltless of breach of any increased the margin of safety but other factors had to be
ordinance or regulation. The Company cannot be expected to be considered such as that the wires could not be strung or the posts
always on the lookout for any illegal construction which reduces supporting them could not be located too far toward the middle of
the distance between its wires and said construction, and after the street. Thus, the real cause of the accident or death was the
finding that said distance of 3 feet had been reduced, to change the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. When he was called by
stringing or installation of its wires so as to preserve said distance. his stepbrother to repair the media agua just below the third
It would be much easier for the City, or rather it is its duty, to be story window, it is to be presumed that due to his age and
ever on the alert and to see to it that its ordinances are strictly experience he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or
followed by house owners and to condemn or disapprove all illegal carpenter and had training and experience for the job. So, he could
constructions. Of course, in the present case, the violation of the not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger
permit for the construction of the media agua was not the direct lurking in them. But unfortunately, in the instant care, his training
cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it. Had said media and experience failed him, and forgetting where he was standing,
agua been only one meter wide as allowed by the permit, Magno holding the 6-feet iron sheet with both hands and at arms length,
standing on it, would instinctively have stayed closer to or hugged evidently without looking, and throwing all prudence and
the side of the house in order to keep a safe margin between the
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discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his arms with nevertheless such companies are not insurers of the safety of the
the motion of his body, thereby causing his own electrocution. public.
In support of its theory and holding that Defendant-Appellant was But even assuming for a moment that under the facts of the
liable for damages the Court of Appeals cites the case of Astudillo present case the Defendant electric company could be considered
vs. Manila Electric Co., 55 Phil., 427. We do not think the case is negligent in installing its electric wires so close to the house and
exactly applicable. There, the premises involved was that elevated media agua in question, and in failing to properly insulate those
portion or top of the walls of Intramuros, Manila, just above the wires (although according to the unrefuted claim of said company
Sta. Lucia Gate. In the words of the Court, it was a public place it was impossible to make the insulation of that kind of wire),
where persons come to stroll, to rest and to enjoy themselves. The nevertheless to hold the Defendant liable in damages for the death
electric company was clearly negligent in placing its wires so near of Magno, such supposed negligence of the company must have
the place that without much difficulty or exertion, a person by been the proximate and principal cause of the accident,
stretching his hand out could touch them. A boy named Astudillo, because if the act of Magno in turning around and swinging the
placing one foot on a projection, reached out and actually grasped galvanized iron sheet with his hands was the proximate and
the electric wire and was electrocuted. The person electrocuted in principal cause of the electrocution, then his heirs may not
said case was a boy who was in no position to realize the danger. recover. Such was the holding of this Court in the case of Taylor
In the present case, however, the wires were well high over the vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company, 16 Phil., 8. In that
street where there was no possible danger to pedestrians. The only case, the electric company was found negligent in leaving scattered
possible danger was to persons standing on the media agua, but on its premises fulminating caps which Taylor, a 15- year old boy
a media agua can hardly be considered a public place where found and carried home. In the course of experimenting with said
persons usually gather. Moreover, a person standing on the media fulminating caps, he opened one of them, held it out with his
agua could not have reached the wires with his hands alone. It hands while another boy applied a lighted match to it, causing it to
was necessary as was done by Magno to hold something long explode and injure one of his eyes eventually causing blindness in
enough to reach the wire. Furthermore, Magno was not a boy or a said eye. Said this Tribunal in denying recovery for the
person immature but the father of a family, supposedly a tinsmith injury:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
trained and experienced in the repair of galvanized iron roofs and cralaw, so that while it may be true that these injuries would
media agua. Moreover, in that very case of Astudillo vs. Manila not have been incurred but for the negligent act of the
Electric Co., supra, the court said that although it is a well- Defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises,
established rule that the liability of electric companies for damages nevertheless Plaintiffs own act was the proximate and
or personal injuries is governed by the rules of negligence, principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.
Page 12 of 205
To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the thoroughfares may greatly minimize danger to pedestrians because
electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, drivers of motor vehicles may expect danger and slow down or even
but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning stop and take other necessary precaution upon approaching said
around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any lanes, so, a similar way may possibly be found. Since these high
precaution, such as looking back toward the street and at the wire voltage wires cannot be properly insulated and at reasonable cost,
to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the latters they might perhaps be strung only up to the outskirts of the city
length of 6 feet. For a better understanding of the rule on where there are few houses and few pedestrians and there step-
remote and proximate cause with respect to injuries, we find down to a voltage where the wires carrying the same to the city
the following citation helpful:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary could be properly insulated for the better protection of the public.
A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an In view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Court of
action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the Appeals is hereby reversed and the complaint filed against the
condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was Company is hereby dismissed. No costs.
made possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated,
and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury
would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If
no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate
cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the circumstances which result
in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. (45 C.J.
pp. 931-332.).
We realize that the stringing of wires of such high voltage (3,600
volts), uninsulated and so close to houses is a constant source of
danger, even death, especially to persons who having occasion to
be near said wires, do not adopt the necessary precautions. But
may be, the City of Manila authorities and the electric company
could get together and devise means of minimizing this danger to
the public. Just as the establishment of pedestrian lanes in city
Page 13 of 205
Republic of the Philippines favor but deducted from the total damages awarded 25% thereof
SUPREME COURT for the decedent's contributory negligence and the total pension of
Manila P41,367.60 private respondent and her children would be receiving
FIRST DIVISION from the SSS for the next five years. The dispositive portion of the
G.R. No. 83491 August 27, 1990 decision read:
MA-AO SUGAR CENTRAL CO., INC. and GUILLERMO ARANETA, WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts and
petitioners, circumstances present in this case, the Court order,
vs. as it does hereby order the defendant Ma-ao Sugar
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HERMINIA FAMOSO, Central thru its Manager Mr. Guillermo Y. Araneta
respondents. to pay plaintiff the following amount:
Jalandoni, Herrera, Del Castillo & Associates for petitioners. P30,000.00 for the death of plaintiff's husband,
Napoleon Corral for private respondent. the late
Julio Famoso
CRUZ, J.: P30,000.00 for actual, exemplary and moral
To say the least, the Court views with regret the adamant refusal of damages
petitioner Ma-ao Sugar Central to recompense the private P10,000.00 loss of earnings for twenty (20) years
respondent for the death of Julio Famoso, their main source of P3,000.00 funeral expenses
support, who was killed in line of duty while in its employ. It is not
only a matter of law but also of compassion on which we are called P73,000.00 Total Damages
upon to rule today. We shall state at the outset that on both Less: P18,250.00 25% for the deceased's
counts the petition must fail. contributory
On March 22, 1980, Famoso was riding with a co-employee in the negligence
caboose or "carbonera" of Plymouth No. 12, a cargo train of the Less: P41,367.60 pension plaintiff and her minor
petitioner, when the locomotive was suddenly derailed. He and his children would
companion jumped off to escape injury, but the train fell on its
side, caught his legs by its wheels and pinned him down. He was be receiving for five (5) years from the SSS
declared dead on the spot. 1 Pl3,382.40
The claims for death and other benefits having been denied by the Plus: P3,000.00 Attorney's fees and cost of this
petitioner, the herein private respondent filed suit in the Regional suit
Trial Court of Bago City. Judge Marietta Hobilla-Alinio ruled in her
Page 14 of 205
Pl6,382.40 Total amount payable to the plaintiff. thick which are attached to the rails by 4 bolts, two on each side,
to keep the rails aligned. Although they could be removed only with
SO ORDERED. special equipment, the fish plates that should have kept the rails
The widow appealed, claiming that the deductions were illegal. So aligned could not be found at the scene of the accident.
did the petitioner, but on the ground that it was not negligent and There is no question that the maintenance of the rails, for the
therefore not liable at all. purpose inter alia of preventing derailments, was the responsibility
In its own decision, the Court of Appeals 2 sustained the rulings of of the petitioner, and that this responsibility was not discharged.
the trial court except as to the contributory negligence of the According to Jose Treyes, its own witness, who was in charge of the
deceased and disallowed the deductions protested by the private control and supervision of its train operations, cases of derailment
respondent. Thus, the respondent court declared: in the milling district were frequent and there were even times
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is when such derailments were reported every hour. 3 The petitioner
MODIFIED by ordering the defendant-appellant to should therefore have taken more prudent steps to prevent such
pay the plaintiff-appellee the following amounts: accidents instead of waiting until a life was finally lost because of
P30,000.00, for the death of Julio Famoso its negligence.
P30,000.00, for actual, exemplary and moral The argument that no one had been hurt before because of such
damages derailments is of course not acceptable. And neither are we
P10,000.00, for loss of earnings for twenty (20) years impressed by the claim that the brakemen and the conductors
P3,000.00, for funeral expenses were required to report any defect in the condition of the railways
P3,000.00, for attorney's fees and to fill out prescribed forms for the purpose. For what is
important is that the petitioner should act on these reports and not
P76,000.00 Total Amount merely receive and file them. The fact that it is not easy to detect if
======== the fish plates are missing is no excuse either. Indeed, it should
In this petition, the respondent court is faulted for finding the stress all the more the need for the responsible employees of the
petitioner guilty of negligence notwithstanding its defense of due petitioner to make periodic checks and actually go down to the
diligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code and for disallowing railroad tracks and see if the fish plates were in place.
the deductions made by the trial court. It is argued that the locomotive that was derailed was on its way
Investigation of the accident revealed that the derailment of the back and that it had passed the same rails earlier without
locomotive was caused by protruding rails which had come loose accident. The suggestion is that the rails were properly aligned
because they were not connected and fixed in place by fish plates. then, but that does not necessarily mean they were still aligned
Fish plates are described as strips of iron 8" to 12" long and 3 1/2" afterwards. It is possible that the fish plates were loosened and
Page 15 of 205
detached during its first trip and the rails were as a result already We also do not see how the decedent can be held guilty of
mis-aligned during the return trip. But the Court feels that even contributory negligence from the mere fact that he was not at his
this was unlikely, for, as earlier noted, the fish plates were assigned station when the train was derailed. That might have
supposed to have been bolted to the rails and could be removed been a violation of company rules but could not have directly
only with special tools. The fact that the fish plates were not found contributed to his injury, as the petitioner suggests. It is pure
later at the scene of the mishap may show they were never there at speculation to suppose that he would not have been injured if he
all to begin with or had been removed long before. had stayed in the front car rather than at the back and that he had
At any rate, the absence of the fish plates whatever the cause or been killed because he chose to ride in the caboose.
reason is by itself alone proof of the negligence of the petitioner. Contributory negligence has been defined as "the act or
Res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine was described recently in Layugan omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 4 thus: the person injured which, concurring with the defendant's
Where the thing which causes injury is shown to negligence, is the proximate cause of the
be under the management of the defendant, and injury." 5 It has been held that "to hold a person as having
the accident is such as in the ordinary course of contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he
things does not happen if those who have the performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard
management use proper care, it affords of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and
reasonable evidence, in the absence of an body." 6 There is no showing that the caboose where Famoso
explanation by the defendant, that the accident was riding was a dangerous place and that he recklessly dared
arose from want of care. to stay there despite warnings or signs of impending danger.
The petitioner also disclaims liability on the ground of Article 2176 The last point raised by the petitioner is easily resolved. Citing the
of the Civil Code, contending it has exercised due diligence in the case of Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation, 7 it argues that the
selection and supervision of its employees. The Court cannot agree. respondent court erred in disauthorizing the deduction from the
The record shows it was in fact lax in requiring them to exercise total damages awarded the private respondent of the amount of
the necessary vigilance in maintaining the rails in good condition P41,367.60, representing the pension to be received by the private
to prevent the derailments that sometimes happened "every hour." respondent from the Social Security System for a period of five
Obviously, merely ordering the brakemen and conductors to fill out years. The argument is that such deduction was quite proper
prescribed forms reporting derailments-which reports have not because of Art. 173 of the Labor Code, as amended. This article
been acted upon as shown by the hourly derailments is-not the provides that any amount received by the heirs of a deceased
kind of supervision envisioned by the Civil Code. employee from the Employees Compensation Commission, whose
funds are administered by the SSS, shall be exclusive of all other
Page 16 of 205
amounts that may otherwise be claimed under the Civil Code and
other pertinent laws. S
The amount to be paid by the SSS represents the usual pension .
received by the heirs of a deceased employee who was a member of
the SSS at the time of his death and had regularly contributed his S
premiums as required by the System. The pension is the benefit I
derivable from such contributions. It does not represent the death S
benefits payable under the Workmen's Compensation Act to an O
employee who dies as a result of a work-connected injury. Indeed, N
the certification from the SSS 8 submitted by the petitioner is R
simply to the effect that: e
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: g
This is to certify that Mrs. Herminia Vda. de Famoso i
is a recipient of a monthly pension from the Social o
Security System arising from the death of her late n
husband, Julio Famoso, an SSS member with SSS a
No. 07-018173-1. l
This certification is issued to Ma-ao Sugar Central
for whatever legal purpose it may serve best. M
Issued this 8th day of April 1983 in Bacolod City, a
Philippines. n
G a
O g
D e
O r
F B
R y
E :
D
O (
Page 17 of 205
S f
G ,
D
. B
) e
n
C e
O f
S i
M t
E s
Q B
. r
a
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R h
It doesMnot indicate that the pension is to be taken from the funds
of theEECC. The certification would have said so if the pension
represented
O the death benefits accruing to the heirs under the
Workmen's
, Compensation Act.
This conclusion is supported by the express provision of Art. 173
as amended,
J which categorically states that:
R Art. 173. Exclusiveness of liability. Unless
. otherwise provided, the liability of the State
C Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive
h and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to
i the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise
e entitled to receive damages on behalf of the
Page 18 of 205
employee or his dependents. The payment of arising in the course of the employment because the
compensation under this Title shall not bar the industry is supposed to be responsible therefore;
recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of whereas, under the Social Security Act, payment is
the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act being made because the hazard specifically covered
Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, by the membership, and for which the employee had
Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred eighty- put up his own money, had taken place. As this
six, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Six Court had said:
hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered . . . To deny payment of social
Forty-eight hundred sixty-four, as amended and security benefits because the death or
other laws whose benefits are administered by the injury or confinement is compensable
System or by other agencies of the government. under the Workmen's Compensation
(Emphasis supplied). Act would be to deprive the employees
Rep. Act No. 1161, as amended, is the Social Security Law. members of the System of the
As observed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Valencia v. statutory benefits bought and paid for
Manila Yacht Club, 9 which is still controlling: by them, since they contributed their
. . . By their nature and purpose, the sickness or money to the general common fund
disability benefits to which a member of the System out of which benefits are paid. In
may be entitled under the Social Security law (Rep. other words, the benefits provided for
Act No. 1161, as amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 1792 in the Workmen's Compensation Act
and 2658) are not the same as the compensation accrues to the employees concerned
that may be claimed against the employer under the due to the hazards involved in their
Workmen's Compensation Act or the Civil Code, so employment and is made a burden on
that payment to the member employee of social the employment itself However, social
security benefits would not wipe out or extinguish security benefits are paid to the
the employer's liability for the injury or illness System's members, by reason of their
contracted by his employee in the course of or membership therein for which they
during the employment. It must be realized that, contribute their money to a general
under the Workmen's Compensation Act (or the Civil common fund . . . .
Code, in a proper case), the employer is required to It may be added that whereas social
compensate the employee for the sickness or injury security benefits are intended to
Page 19 of 205
provide insurance or protection deprive the employees-members of the System of the
against the hazards or risks for which statutory benefits bought and paid for by them,
they are established, e.g., disability, since they contribute their money to the general
sickness, old age or death, common fund out of which benefits are paid. In
irrespective of whether they arose other words, the benefits provided for in the
from or in the course of the Workmen's Compensation Act accrues to the
employment or not, the compensation employees concerned, due to the hazards involved in
receivable under the Workmen's their employment and is made a burden on the
Compensation law is in the nature of employment itself However, social security benefits
indemnity for the injury or damage are paid to the System's members, by reason of their
suffered by the employee or his membership therein for which they contributed their
dependents on account of the money to a general common fund.
employment. (Rural Transit Famoso's widow and nine minor children have since his death
Employees Asso. vs. Bachrach Trans. sought to recover the just recompense they need for their support.
Co., 21 SCRA 1263 [19671]) Instead of lending a sympathetic hand, the petitioner has sought to
And according to Justice Jesus G. Barrera in Benguet frustrate their efforts and has even come to this Court to seek our
Consolidated, Inc. v. Social Security System:" 10 assistance in defeating their claim. That relief-and we are happy to
The philosophy underlying the Workmen's say this must be withheld.
Compensation Act is to make the payment of the WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto. The
benefits provided for therein as a responsibility of petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
the industry, on the ground that it is industry which SO ORDERED.
should bear the resulting death or injury to
employees engaged in the said industry. On the
other hand, social security sickness benefits are not
paid as a burden on the industry, but are paid to
the members of the System as a matter of right,
whenever the hazards provided for in the law occurs.
To deny payment of social security benefits because
the death or injury or confinement is compensable
under the Workmen's Compensation Act would be to
Page 20 of 205
Republic of the Philippines as "novel" by the petitioner: whether Article 2185 of the New
SUPREME COURT Civil Code, which presumes the driver of a motor vehicle
Manila negligent if he was violating a traffic regulation at the time of
SECOND DIVISION the mishap, should apply by analogy to non-motorized
G.R. No. 130003 October 20, 2004 vehicles.1
JONAS AONUEVO, Petitioner. As found by the RTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the
vs. accident in question occurred on 8 February 1989, at around nine
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JEROME VILLAGRACIA, in the evening, at the intersection of Boni Avenue and Barangka
Respondent. Drive in Mandaluyong (now a city). Villagracia was traveling along
DECISION Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while Aonuevo, traversing the
TINGA, J.: opposite lane was driving his Lancer car with plate number PJJ
The bicycle provides considerable speed and freedom of movement 359. The car was owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer
to the rider. It derives a certain charm from being unencumbered of Aonuevos brother, Jonathan. Aonuevo was in the course of
by any enclosure, affording the cyclist the perception of relative making a left turn towards Libertad Street when the collision
liberty. It also carries some obvious risks on the part of the user occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result, which
and has become the subject of regulation, if not by the government, necessitated his hospitalization several times in 1989, and forced
then by parental proscription. him to undergo four (4) operations.
The present petition seeks to bar recovery by an injured cyclist of On 26 October 1989, Villagracia instituted an action for damages
damages from the driver of the car which had struck him. The against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and Aonuevo before the
argument is hinged on the cyclists failure to install safety devices RTC.2 He had also filed a criminal complaint against Aonuevo
on his bicycle. However, the lower courts agreed that the motorist before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong, but the latter
himself caused the collision with his own negligence. The facts are was subsequently acquitted of the criminal charge. 3 Trial on the
deceptively simple, but the resolution entails thorough civil action ensued, and in a Decision dated 9 March 1990, the RTC
consideration of fundamental precepts on negligence. rendered judgment against Procter and Gamble and Aonuevo,
The present petition raises little issue with the factual findings of ordering them to pay Villagracia the amounts of One Hundred Fifty
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 160, of Pasig City, as Thousand Pesos (P150, 000.00). for actual damages, Ten Thousand
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Both courts adjudged petitioner, Pesos (P10,000.00) for moral damages, and Twenty Thousand
Jonas Aonuevo ( Aonuevo ), liable for the damages for the Pesos (P20,000.00) for attorneys fees, as well as legal costs. 4 Both
injuries sustained by the cyclist, Jerome Villagracia (Villagracia). defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Instead, the petition hinges on a sole legal question, characterized
Page 21 of 205
In a Decision5 dated 8 May 1997, the Court of Appeals Fourth Notwithstanding, the present petition presents interesting
Division affirmed the RTC Decision in toto6. After the Court of questions for resolution. Aonuevos arguments are especially
Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution7 fixated on a particular question of law: whether Article 2185 of the
dated 22 July 1997, Procter and Gamble and Aonuevo filed their New Civil Code should apply by analogy to non-motorized
respective petitions for review with this Court. Procter and vehicles.17 In the same vein, Aonuevo insists that Villagracias
Gambles petition was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated own fault and negligence serves to absolve the former of any
24 November 1997. Aonuevos petition, 8 on the other hand, was liability for damages.
given due course,9 and is the subject of this Decision. Its is easy to discern why Aonuevo chooses to employ this line of
In arriving at the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed argument. Aonuevo points out that Villagracias bicycle had no
the factual findings of the RTC. Among them: that it was safety gadgets such as a horn or bell, or headlights, as invoked by
Aonuevos vehicle which had struck Villagracia;10 that Aonuevos a 1948 municipal ordinance.18 Nor was it duly registered with the
vehicle had actually hit Villagracias left mid-thigh, thus causing a Office of the Municipal Treasurer, as required by the same
comminuted fracture;11 that as testified by eyewitness Alfredo ordinance. Finally, as admitted by Villagracia, his bicycle did not
Sorsano, witness for Villagracia, Aonuevo was "umaarangkada," have foot brakes.19 Before this Court, Villagracia does not dispute
or speeding as he made the left turn into Libertad; 12 that these allegations, which he admitted during the trial, but directs
considering Aonuevos claim that a passenger jeepney was our attention instead to the findings of Aonuevos own
obstructing his path as he made the turn. Aonuevo had enough negligence.20 Villagracia also contends that, assuming there was
warning to control his speed;13 and that Aonuevo failed to contributory negligence on his part, such would not exonerate
exercise the ordinary precaution, care and diligence required of Aonuevo from payment of damages. The Court of Appeals likewise
him in order that the accident could have been avoided. 14 Notably, acknowledged the lack of safety gadgets on Villagracias bicycle,
Aonuevo, in his current petition, does not dispute the findings of but characterized the contention as "off-tangent" and insufficient to
tortious conduct on his part made by the lower courts, hinging his obviate the fact that it was Aonuevos own negligence that caused
appeal instead on the alleged negligence of Villagracia. Aonuevo the accident.21
proffers no exculpatory version of facts on his part, nor does he Aonuevo claims that Villagracia violated traffic regulations when
dispute the conclusions made by the RTC and the Court of he failed to register his bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon. He
Appeals. Accordingly, the Court, which is not a trier of facts, 15 is posits that Article 2185 of the New Civil Code applies by analogy.
not compelled to review the factual findings of the lower courts, The provision reads:
which following jurisprudence have to be received with respect and Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
are in fact generally binding.16 presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
Page 22 of 205
negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any Article 2185 with the use of the term "motorized vehicles." If
traffic regulation. Aonuevo seriously contends that the application of Article 2185
The provision was introduced for the first time in this jurisdiction be expanded due to the greater interaction today of all types of
with the adoption in 1950 of the New Civil Code.22 Its applicability vehicles, such argument contradicts historical experience. The
is expressly qualified to motor vehicles only, and there is no ground ratio of motorized vehicles as to non-motorized vehicles, as it stood
to presume that the law intended a broader coverage. in 1950, was significantly lower than as it stands today. This will
Still, Aonuevo hypothesizes that Article 2185 should apply by be certainly affirmed by statistical data, assuming such has been
analogy to all types of vehicles23. He points out that modern-day compiled, much less confirmed by persons over sixty. Aonuevos
travel is more complex now than when the Code was enacted, the characterization of a vibrant intra-road dynamic between motorized
number and types of vehicles now in use far more numerous than and non-motorized vehicles is more apropos to the past than to the
as of then. He even suggests that at the time of the enactment of present.
the Code, the legislators "must have seen that only motor vehicles There is a fundamental flaw in Aonuevos analysis of Art. 2185, as
were of such public concern that they had to be specifically applicable today. He premises that the need for the distinction
mentioned," yet today, the interaction of vehicles of all types and between motorized and non-motorized vehicles arises from the
nature has "inescapably become matter of public concern" so as to relative mass of number of these vehicles. The more pertinent basis
expand the application of the law to be more responsive to the for the segregate classification is the difference in type of these
times.24 vehicles. A motorized vehicle operates by reason of a motor engine
What Aonuevo seeks is for the Court to amend the explicit unlike a non-motorized vehicle, which runs as a result of a direct
command of the legislature, as embodied in Article 2185, a task exertion by man or beast of burden of direct physical force. A
beyond the pale of judicial power. The Court interprets, and not motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical
creates, the law. However, since the Court is being asked to exertion. is capable of greater speeds and acceleration than non-
consider the matter, it might as well examine whether Article 2185 motorized vehicles. At the same time, motorized vehicles are more
could be interpreted to include non-motorized vehicles. capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of an
At the time Article 2185 was formulated, there existed a whole accident or collision. This is due to a combination of factors
array of non-motorized vehicles ranging from human-powered peculiar to the motor vehicle, such as the greater speed, its relative
contraptions on wheels such as bicycles, scooters, and animal- greater bulk of mass, and greater combustability due to the fuels
drawn carts such as calesas and carromata. These modes of that they use.
transport were even more prevalent on the roads of the 1940s and There long has been judicial recognition of the peculiar dangers
1950s than they are today, yet the framers of the New Civil Code posed by the motor vehicle. As far back as 1912, in the U.S. v.
chose then to exclude these alternative modes from the scope of Juanillo25, the Court has recognized that an automobile is capable
Page 23 of 205
of great speed, greater than that of ordinary vehicles hauled by ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules and regulations. If such
animals, "and beyond doubt it is highly dangerous when used on were indeed the evil sought to be remedied or guarded against,
country roads, putting to great hazard the safety and lives of the then the framers of the Code would have expanded the provision to
mass of the people who travel on such roads."26 In the same case, include non-motorized vehicles or for that matter, pedestrians. Yet,
the Court emphasized: that was not the case; thus the need arises to ascertain the
A driver of an automobile, under such circumstances, is required peculiarities attaching to a motorized vehicle within the dynamics
to use a greater degree of care than drivers of animals, for the of road travel. The fact that there has long existed a higher degree
reason that the machine is capable of greater destruction, and of diligence and care imposed on motorized vehicles, arising from
furthermore, it is absolutely under the power and control of the the special nature of motor vehicle, leads to the inescapable
driver; whereas, a horse or other animal can and does to some conclusion that the qualification under Article 2185 exists precisely
extent aid in averting an accident. It is not pleasant to be obliged to to recognize such higher standard. Simply put, the standards
slow down automobiles to accommodate persons riding, driving, or applicable to motor vehicle are not on equal footing with other
walking. It is probably more agreeable to send the machine along types of vehicles.
and let the horse or person get out of the way in the best manner Thus, we cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should
possible; but it is well to understand, if this course is adopted and apply to non-motorized vehicles, even if by analogy. There is factual
an accident occurs, that the automobile driver will be called upon and legal basis that necessitates the distinction under Art. 2185,
to account for his acts. An automobile driver must at all times use and to adopt Aonuevos thesis would unwisely obviate this
all the care and caution which a careful and prudent driver would distinction.
have exercised under the circumstances. 27 Even if the legal presumption under Article 2185 should not apply
American jurisprudence has had occasion to explicitly rule on the to Villagracia, this should not preclude any possible finding of
relationship between the motorist and the cyclist. Motorists are negligence on his part. While the legal argument as formulated by
required to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to avoid collision Aonuevo is erroneous, his core contention that Villagracia was
with bicyclists.28 While the duty of using ordinary care falls alike negligent for failure to comply with traffic regulations warrants
on the motorist and the rider or driver of a bicycle, it is obvious, for serious consideration, especially since the imputed negligent acts
reasons growing out of the inherent differences in the two vehicles, were admitted by Villagracia himself.
that more is required from the former to fully discharge the duty The Civil Code characterizes negligence as the omission of
than from the latter.29 that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation
The Code Commission was cognizant of the difference in the and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the
natures and attached responsibilities of motorized and non- time and of the place.30 However, the existence of negligence
motorized vehicles. Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or in a given case is not determined by the personal judgment of
Page 24 of 205
the actor in a given situation, but rather, it is the law which violated, whether the act or omission constituting such violation
determines what would be reckless or negligent.31 would have been regarded as negligence in the absence of any
Aonuevo, asserts that Villagracia was negligent as the latter had statute on the subject or whether there was, as a matter of fact,
transgressed a municipal ordinance requiring the registration of any reason to anticipate that injury would result from such
bicycles and the installation of safety devices thereon. This view violation. x x x." (65 C.J.S. pp.623-628)
finds some support if anchored on the long standing principle of "But the existence of an ordinance changes the situation. If a driver
negligence per se. causes an accident by exceeding the speed limit, for example, we
The generally accepted view is that the violation of a statutory duty do not inquire whether his prohibited conduct was unreasonably
constitutes negligence, negligence as a matter of law, or negligence dangerous. It is enough that it was prohibited. Violation of an
per se.32 In Teague vs. Fernandez,33 the Court cited with approval ordinance intended to promote safety is negligence. If by
American authorities elucidating on the rule: creating the hazard which the ordinance was intended to avoid it
"The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an brings about the harm which the ordinance was intended to
inference that such violation was the proximate cause of the injury prevent, it is a legal cause of the harm. This comes only to saying
complained. However, if the very injury has happened which was that in such circumstances the law has no reason to ignore the
intended to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that causal relation which obviously exists in fact. The law has
violation of the statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause of excellent reason to recognize it, since it is the very relation which
the injury." (65 C.J.S. 1156) the makers of the ordinance anticipated. This court has applied
"The generally accepted view is that violation of a statutory duty these principles to speed limits and other regulations of the
constitutes negligence, negligence as a matter of law, or, according manner of driving." (Ross vs. Hartman, 139 Fed. 2d 14 at 15).
to the decisions on the question, negligence per se, for the reason "x x x However, the fact that other happenings causing or
that non-observance of what the legislature has prescribed as a contributing toward an injury intervened between the violation of a
suitable precaution is failure to observe that care which an statute or ordinance and the injury does not necessarily make the
ordinarily prudent man would observe, and, when the state regards result so remote that no action can be maintained. The test is to
certain acts as so liable to injure others as to justify their absolute be found not in the number of intervening events or agents,
prohibition, doing the forbidden act is a breach of duty with but in their character and in the natural and probable
respect to those who may be injured thereby; or, as it has been connection between the wrong done and the injurious
otherwise expressed, when the standard of care is fixed by law, consequence. The general principle is that the violation of a
failure to conform to such standard is negligence, negligence per se statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an
or negligence in and of itself, in the absence of a legal excuse. injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence
According to this view it is immaterial, where a statute has been of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the
Page 25 of 205
very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to avoided injury had his bicycle been up to par with safety
prevent." (38 Am Jur 841)34 regulations, especially considering that Aonuevo was already
In Teague, the owner of a vocational school stricken by a fire speeding as he made the turn, or before he had seen Villagracia.
resulting in fatalities was found negligent, base on her failure to Even assuming that Aonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because
provide adequate fire exits in contravention of a Manila city the bicycle was not equipped with headlights, such lapse on the
ordinance.35 In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals 36, the cyclists part would not have acquitted the driver of his duty to
failure of the petitioner to construct a firewall in accordance with slow down as he proceeded to make the left turn.
city ordinances sufficed to support a finding of negligence. 37 In This court has appreciated that negligence per se, arising from the
Cipriano v. Court of Appeals, 38the Court found that the failure of mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in
the petitioner to register and insure his auto rust proofing shop in establishing liability for damages. In Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc.
accordance with the statute constituted negligence per se, thus v. Court of Appeals,39 a collision between a truck and a privately-
holding him liable for the damages for the destruction by fire of a owned Cimarron van caused the death of three of the vans
customers vehicle garaged therein. passengers. The petitioner therein, the owner of the truck, argued
Should the doctrine of negligence per se apply to Villagracia, that the driver of the Cimarron was committing multiple violations
resulting from his violation of an ordinance? It cannot be denied of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code40 at the time of the
that the statutory purpose for requiring bicycles to be equipped accident. Among these violations: the Cimarron was overloaded at
with headlights or horns is to promote road safety and to minimize the time of the accident; the front seat of the van was occupied by
the occurrence of road accidents involving bicycles. At face value, four adults, including the driver; and the van had only one
Villagracias mishap was precisely the danger sought to be guarded functioning headlight. Similar as in this case, petitioner therein
against by the ordinance he violated. Aonuevo argues that invoked Article 2185 and argued that the driver of the Cimarron
Villagracias violation should bar the latters recovery of damages, should be presumed negligent. The Court, speaking through
and a simplistic interpretation of negligence per se might vindicate Justice Mendoza, dismissed these arguments:
such an argument. [It] has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron
But this is by no means a simple case. There is the fact which we driver contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Indeed,
consider as proven, that Aonuevo was speeding as he made the petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection
left turn, and such negligent act was the proximate cause of the between the injury received and the violation of the Land
accident. This reckless behavior would have imperiled anyone Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the
unlucky enough within the path of Aonuevos car as it turned into violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the
the intersection, whether they are fellow motorists, pedestrians, or injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence
cyclists. We are hard put to conclude that Villagracia would have consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any
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other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it
contributing cause of the injury. Petitioner says that "driving an seeks to impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to
overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight during perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the
nighttime certainly increases the risk of accident," that because the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when
Cimarron had only one headlight, there was "decreased visibility," in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation
and that the fact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat and the injury sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient,
overcrowded "decreased its maneuverability." However, mere are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all,
allegations such as these are not sufficient to discharge its burden tort law is remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide compensation
of proving clearly that such alleged negligence was the contributing for the harm suffered by those whose interests have been invaded
cause of the injury.41 owing to the conduct of others.44
Sanitary Steam42 is controlling in this case. The bare fact that Under American case law, the failures imputed on Villagracia
Villagracia was violating a municipal ordinance at the time of the are not grievous enough so as to negate monetary relief. In the
accident may have sufficiently established some degree of absence of statutory requirement, one is not negligent as a
negligence on his part, but such negligence is without legal matter of law for failing to equip a horn, bell, or other warning
consequence unless it is shown that it was a contributing cause of devise onto a bicycle.45 In most cases, the absence of proper
the injury. If anything at all, it is but indicative of Villagracias lights on a bicycle does not constitute negligence as a matter
failure in fulfilling his obligation to the municipal government, of law46 but is a question for the jury whether the absence of
which would then be the proper party to initiate corrective action proper lights played a causal part in producing a collision with
as a result. But such failure alone is not determinative of a motorist.47 The absence of proper lights on a bicycle at night, as
Villagracias negligence in relation to the accident. Negligence is required by statute or ordinance, may constitute negligence barring
relative or comparative, dependent upon the situation of the parties or diminishing recovery if the bicyclist is struck by a motorist as
and the degree of care and vigilance which the particular long as the absence of such lights was a proximate cause of the
circumstances reasonably require.43 To determine if Villagracia was collision;48 however, the absence of such lights will not preclude or
negligent, it is not sufficient to rely solely on the violations of the diminish recovery if the scene of the accident was well illuminated
municipal ordinance, but imperative to examine Villagracias by street lights,49 if substitute lights were present which clearly
behavior in relation to the contemporaneous circumstances of the rendered the bicyclist visible,50 if the motorist saw the bicycle in
accident. spite of the absence of lights thereon,51 or if the motorist would
The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may have been unable to see the bicycle even if it had been equipped
arise from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the with lights.52 A bicycle equipped with defective or ineffective brakes
mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is may support a finding of negligence barring or diminishing
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recovery by an injured bicyclist where such condition was a should, as he made the turn, Aonuevo would have had ample
contributing cause of the accident.53 opportunity to avoid hitting Villagracia. Moreover, the fact that
The above doctrines reveal a common thread. The failure of the Aonuevo had sighted Villagracia before the accident would negate
bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety practices, any possibility that the absence of lights on the bike contributed to
whether or not imposed by ordinance or statute, is not the cause of the accident.56 A motorist has been held liable for
sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery unless a causal injury to or death of a bicyclist where the motorist turned suddenly
connection is established between such failure and the injury into the bicyclist so as to cause a collision. 57
sustained. The principle likewise finds affirmation in Sanitary Neither does Aonuevo attempt before this Court to establish a
Steam, wherein we declared that the violation of a traffic causal connection between the safety violations imputed to
statute must be shown as the proximate cause of the injury, or Villagracia and the accident itself. Instead, he relied on a putative
that it substantially contributed thereto.54 Aonuevo had the presumption that these violations in themselves sufficiently
burden of clearly proving that the alleged negligence of established negligence appreciable against Villagracia. Since the
Villagracia was the proximate or contributory cause of the onus on Aonuevo is to conclusively prove the link between the
latters injury. violations and the accident, we can deem him as having failed to
On this point, the findings of the Court of Appeals are well-worth discharge his necessary burden of proving Villagracias own
citing: liability.
[As] admitted by appellant Aonuevo, he first saw appellee Neither can we can adjudge Villagracia with contributory
Villagracia at a distance of about ten (10) meters before the negligence.1wphi1 The leading case in contributory negligence,
accident. Corrolarily, therefore, he could have avoided the accident Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf 58 clarifies that damages may be mitigated
had he [stopped] alongside with an earlier (sic) jeep which was if the claimant "in conjunction with the occurrence,
already at a full stop giving way to appellee. But according to [contributes] only to his injury."59 To hold a person as having
[eyewitness] Sorsano, he saw appellant Aonuevo "umaarangkada" contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he
and hit the leg of Villagracia (TSN March 14, 1990 p. 30). This performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard
earlier (sic) jeep at a full stop gave way to Villagracia to proceed but of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and
Aonuevo at an unexpected motion (umarangkada) came out body.60 To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary
hitting Villagracia (TSN March 9, 1990 p. 49). Appellant Aonuevo to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the
admitted that he did not blow his horn when he crossed Boni negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal
Avenue (TSN March 21, 1990 p. 47).55 sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes
By Aonuevos own admission, he had seen Villagracia at a good proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its
distance of ten (10) meters. Had he been decelerating, as he occurrence.61
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As between Aonuevo and Villagracia, the lower courts adjudged
Aonuevo as solely responsible for the accident. The petition does
not demonstrate why this finding should be reversed. It is hard to
imagine that the same result would not have occurred even if
Villagracias bicycle had been equipped with safety equipment.
Aonuevo himself admitted having seen Villagracia from ten (10)
meters away, thus he could no longer claim not having been
sufficiently warned either by headlights or safety horns. The fact
that Aonuevo was recklessly speeding as he made the turn
likewise leads us to believe that even if Villagracias bicycle had
been equipped with the proper brakes, the cyclist would not have
had opportunity to brake in time to avoid the speeding car.
Moreover, it was incumbent on Aonuevo to have established that
Villagracias failure to have installed the proper brakes contributed
to his own injury. The fact that Aonuevo failed to adduce proof to
that effect leads us to consider such causal connection as not
proven.
All told, there is no reason to disturb the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
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Republic of the Philippines feet. This posed a great threat to passersby who were exposed to
SUPREME COURT the danger of electrocution especially during the wet season.
Manila As early as 1991, the leaders of Ampucao, Itogon made verbal and
THIRD DIVISION written requests for NPC to institute safety measures to protect
G.R. No. 165969 November 27, 2008 users of the trail from their high tension wires. On June 18, 1991
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, and February 11, 1993, Pablo and Pedro Ngaosie, elders of the
vs. community, wrote Engr. Paterno Banayot, Area Manager of NPC, to
HEIRS OF NOBLE CASIONAN, respondents. make immediate and appropriate repairs of the high tension wires.
DECISION They reiterated the danger it posed to small-scale miners especially
REYES, R.T., J.: during the wet season. They related an incident where one boy was
PETITIONING power company pleads for mitigation of awarded nearly electrocuted.
damages on ground of contributory negligence. But is the victim in In a letter dated March 1, 1995, Engr. Banayot informed Itogon
this case partly to blame for his electrocution and eventual demise? Mayor Cresencio Pacalso that NPC had installed nine additional
This is a review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of poles on their Beckel-Philex 60 KV line. They likewise identified a
Appeals (CA) which found the National Power Corporation (NPC) possible rerouting scheme with an estimated total cost of 1.7
liable for damages for the death of Noble Casionan due to million pesos to improve the distance from its deteriorating lines to
electrocution from the companys high tension transmission lines. the ground.
The Facts On June 27, 1995, Noble and his co-pocket miner, Melchor
The facts, as found by the trial court are as follows: Jimenez, were at Dalicno. They cut two bamboo poles for their
Respondents are the parents of Noble Casionan, 19 years old at the pocket mining. One was 18 to 19 feet long and the other was 14
time of the incident that claimed his life on June 27, 1995. He feet long. Each man carried one pole horizontally on his shoulder:
would have turned 20 years of age on November 9 of that year. Noble carried the shorter pole while Melchor carried the longer
Noble was originally from Cervantes, Ilocos Sur. He worked as a pole. Noble walked ahead as both passed through the trail
pocket miner in Dalicno, Ampucao, Itogon, Benguet. underneath the NPC high tension transmission lines on their way
A trail leading to Sangilo, Itogon, existed in Dalicno and this trail to their work place.
was regularly used by members of the community. Sometime in the As Noble was going uphill and turning left on a curve, the tip of the
1970s, petitioner NPC installed high-tension electrical bamboo pole he was carrying touched one of the dangling high
transmission lines of 69 kilovolts (KV) traversing the trail. tension wires. Melchor, who was walking behind him, narrated that
Eventually, some of the transmission lines sagged and dangled he heard a buzzing sound when the tip of Nobles pole touched the
reducing their distance from the ground to only about eight to ten wire for only about one or two seconds. Thereafter, he saw Noble
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fall to the ground. Melchor rushed to Noble and shook him but the At the trial, NPC witnesses testified that the cause of death could
latter was already dead. Their co-workers heard Melchors shout not have been electrocution because the victim did not suffer
for help and together they brought the body of Noble to their camp. extensive burns despite the strong 69 KV carried by the
A post-mortem examination by Dra. Ignacia Reyes Ciriaco, transmission lines. NPC argued that if Noble did die by
Municipal Health Officer of Itogon, Benguet, determined the cause electrocution, it was due to his own negligence. The company
of death to be cardiac arrest, secondary to ventricular fibulation, counter-claimed for attorneys fees and cost of litigation.
secondary to electrocution.2 She also observed a small burned area RTC Disposition
in the middle right finger of the victim. On February 17, 1998, the RTC decided in favor of respondents.
Police investigators who visited the site of the incident confirmed The fallo of its decision reads:
that portions of the high tension wires above the trail hung very WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
low, just about eight to ten feet above the ground. They noted that plaintiffs and against the defendant NPC as follows:
the residents, school children, and pocket miners usually used the 1. Declaring defendant NPC guilty of Negligence
trail and had to pass directly underneath the wires. The trail was (Quasi-Delict) in connection with the death of Noble
the only viable way since the other side was a precipice. In Casionan;
addition, they did not see any danger warning signs installed in the 2. Ordering NPC as a consequence of its negligence,
trail. to pay the plaintiffs Jose and Linda Casionan, as
The elders and leaders of the community, through Mayor Cresencio heirs of the deceased, Noble Casionan, the following
Pacalso, informed the General Manager of NPC in Itogon of the Damages:
incident. After learning of the electrocution, NPC repaired the a. P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of
dangling and sagging transmission lines and put up warning signs their son Noble Casionan;
around the area. b. P100,000.00 as moral damages;
Consequently, the heirs of the deceased Noble filed a claim for c. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
damages against the NPC before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in d. P52,277.50 as actual damages incurred
Benguet. In its answer, NPC denied being negligent in maintaining for the expenses of burial and wake in
the safety of the high tension transmission lines. It averred that connection with the death of Noble Casionan;
there were danger and warning signs installed but these were e. P720,000.00 as the loss of unearned
stolen by children. Excavations were also made to increase the income; and
necessary clearance from the ground to about 17 to 18 feet but f. P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and the cost
some towers or poles sank due to pocket mining in the area. of suit; and
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3. Dismissing the counter claim of the NPC for lack NPC has already been called by several requests and
of merit.3 demands in 1991, 1993 and 1995 by elders and leaders of
The RTC gave more credence to the testimony of witnesses for the community in the area to the fact that their transmission
respondents than those of NPC who were not actually present at lines were dangling and sagging and the clearance thereof
the time of the incident. The trial court observed that witnesses for from the line to the ground was only 8 to 10 feet and not
NPC were biased witnesses because they were all employed by the within the standard clearance of 18 to 20 feet but no safety
company, except for the witness from the Department of measures were taken. They did not even put danger and
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The RTC found: warning signs so as to warn persons passing underneath. 5
Melchor Jimenez was very vivid in his account. He declared (Emphasis added)
that he and Noble Casionan cut two bamboo poles, one 14 Disagreeing with the ruling of the trial court, NPC elevated the case
feet and the other about 18 feet. The shorter bamboo pole to the CA. In its appeal, it argued that the RTC erred in ruling that
was carried by Noble Casionan and the longer bamboo pole NPC was liable for Nobles death. Further, even assuming that
was carried by him. And they walked along the trail Noble died of electrocution, the RTC erred in not finding that he
underneath the transmission lines. He was following Noble was guilty of contributory negligence and in awarding excessive
Casionan. And when they were going uphill in the trail and damages.
Noble Casionan was to turn left in a curve, the bamboo pole CA Disposition
of Casionan swung around and its tip at the back touched On June 30, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision, disposing as
for one or two seconds or for a split moment the follows:
transmission line that was dangling and a buzzing sound WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED,
was heard. And Casionan immediately fell dead and simply with the MODIFICATION that the amount of moral damages
stopped breathing. What better account would there be than is REDUCED to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); and the
this? Melchor Jimenez was an eye witness as to how it all award of attorneys fees in the sum of Twenty Thousand
happened.4 (Emphasis added) Pesos (P20,000.00) is DELETED.6
The RTC ruled that the negligence of NPC in maintaining the high- The CA sustained the findings of fact of the trial court but reduced
tension wires was established by preponderance of evidence. On the award of moral damages from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00. The
this score, the RTC opined: CA further disallowed the award of attorneys fees because the
2. On the matter of whether plaintiffs have a cause of action reason for the award was not expressly stated in the body of the
against defendant NPC, obviously, they would have. x x x decision.
This negligence of the NPC was well established and cannot Issues
be denied because previous to this incident, the attention of
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The following issues are presented for Our consideration: (i) is especially true because other people traversing the trail have not
Whether the award for damages should be deleted in view of the been similarly electrocuted.
contributory negligence of the victim; and (ii) Whether the award Petitioners contentions are absurd.
for unearned income, exemplary, and moral damages should be The sagging high tension wires were an accident waiting to happen.
deleted for lack of factual and legal bases.7 As established during trial, the lines were sagging around 8 to 10
Our Ruling feet in violation of the required distance of 18 to 20 feet. If the
I transmission lines were properly maintained by petitioner, the
That the victim Noble died from being electrocuted by the high- bamboo pole carried by Noble would not have touched the wires.
tension transmission wires of petitioner is not contested by He would not have been electrocuted.
petitioner. We are, however, asked to delete or mitigate the Petitioner cannot excuse itself from its failure to properly maintain
damages awarded by the trial and appellate courts in view of what the wires by attributing negligence to the victim. In Ma-ao Sugar
petitioner alleges to be contributory negligence on the part of the Central Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,9 this Court held that the
victim. responsibility of maintaining the rails for the purpose of preventing
As a rule, only questions of law may be entertained on appeal by derailment accidents belonged to the company. The company
certiorari under Rule 45. The finding of negligence on the part of should not have been negligent in ascertaining that the rails were
petitioner by the trial court and affirmed by the CA is a question of fully connected than to wait until a life was lost due to an accident.
fact which We cannot pass upon since it would entail going into Said the Court:
factual matters on which the finding of negligence was based. 8 In this petition, the respondent court is faulted for finding
Corollary to this, the finding by both courts of the lack of the petitioner guilty of negligence notwithstanding its
contributory negligence on the part of the victim is a factual issue defense of due diligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code
which is deemed conclusive upon this Court absent any compelling and for disallowing the deductions made by the trial court.
reason for Us to rule otherwise. Investigation of the accident revealed that the derailment of
But even if We walk the extra mile, the finding of liability on the locomotive was caused by protruding rails which had
the part of petitioner must stay. come loose because they were not connected and fixed in
Petitioner contends that the mere presence of the high tension place by fish plates. Fish plates are described as strips of
wires above the trail did not cause the victims death. Instead, it iron 8" to 12" long and 3 " thick which are attached to the
was Nobles negligent carrying of the bamboo pole that caused his rails by 4 bolts, two on each side, to keep the rails aligned.
death. It insists that Noble was negligent when he allowed the Although they could be removed only with special
bamboo pole he was carrying to touch the high tension wires. This equipment, the fish plates that should have kept the rails
aligned could not be found at the scene of the accident.
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There is no question that the maintenance of the rails, for the damages. This is in consonance with the Civil Code provision that
purpose, inter alia, of preventing derailments, was the liability will be mitigated in consideration of the contributory
responsibility of the petitioner, and that this responsibility negligence of the injured party. Article 2179 of the Civil Code is
was not discharged. According to Jose Reyes, its own explicit on this score:
witness, who was in charge of the control and supervision When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate
of its train operations, cases of derailment in the milling and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
district were frequent and there were even times when such damages. But if his negligence was only contributory,
derailments were reported every hour. The petitioner should the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being
therefore have taken more prudent steps to prevent such the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may
accidents instead of waiting until a life was finally lost recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the
because of its negligence.10 damages to be awarded.
Moreover, We find no contributory negligence on Nobles part. In Ma-ao Sugar Central, it was held that to hold a person as having
Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an
interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby signs on an impending danger to health and body. This Court held
such other person suffers injury.11 On the other hand, then that the victim was not guilty of contributory negligence as
contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured there was no showing that the caboose where he was riding was a
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has dangerous place and that he recklessly dared to stay there despite
suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required warnings or signs of impending danger.16
to conform for his own protection.12 There is contributory In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly
negligence when the partys act showed lack of ordinary care and used by members of the community. There were no warning signs
foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in to inform passersby of the impending danger to their lives should
danger.13 It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary they accidentally touch the high tension wires. Also, the trail was
care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the the only viable way from Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble should
defendants negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury. 14 not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other
The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a workers in the area.
plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be Petitioner further faults the victim in engaging in pocket mining,
entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences which is prohibited by the DENR in the area.
of his own negligence.15 If indeed there was contributory negligence In Aonuevo v. Court of Appeals,17 this Court ruled that the
on the part of the victim, then it is proper to reduce the award for violation of a statute is not sufficient to hold that the violation was
Page 34 of 205
the proximate cause of the injury, unless the very injury that constitute negligence as a matter of law but is a question
happened was precisely what was intended to be prevented by the for the jury whether the absence of proper lights played a
statute. In said case, the allegation of contributory negligence on causal part in producing a collision with a motorist. The
the part of the injured party who violated traffic regulations when absence of proper lights on a bicycle at night, as required by
he failed to register his bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon was statute or ordinance, may constitute negligence barring or
struck down. We quote: diminishing recovery if the bicyclist is struck by a motorist as
x x x The bare fact that Villagracia was violating a municipal long as the absence of such lights was a proximate cause of
ordinance at the time of the accident may have sufficiently the collision; however, the absence of such lights will not
established some degree of negligence on his part, but such preclude or diminish recovery if the scene of the accident was
negligence is without legal consequence unless it is shown well illuminated by street lights, if substitute lights were
that it was a contributing cause of the injury. If anything at present which clearly rendered the bicyclist visible, if the
all, it is but indicative of Villagracias failure in fulfilling his motorist saw the bicycle in spite of the absence of lights
obligation to the municipal government, which would then thereon, or if the motorist would have been unable to see the
be the proper party to initiate corrective action as a result. bicycle even if it had been equipped with lights. A bicycle
But such failure alone is not determinative of Villagracias equipped with defective or ineffective brakes may support a
negligence in relation to the accident. Negligence is relative finding of negligence barring or diminishing recovery by an
or comparative, dependent upon the situation of the parties injured bicyclist where such condition was a contributing
and the degree of care and vigilance which the particular cause of the accident.
circumstances reasonably require. To determine if The above doctrines reveal a common thread. The failure of
Villagracia was negligent, it is not sufficient to rely solely on the bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety practices,
the violations of the municipal ordinance, but imperative to whether or not imposed by ordinance or statute, is not
examine Villagracias behavior in relation to the sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery unless a causal
contemporaneous circumstances of the accident. connection is established between such failure and the injury
xxxx sustained. The principle likewise finds affirmation in
Under American case law, the failures imputed on Sanitary Steam, wherein we declared that the violation of a
Villagracia are not grievous enough so as to negate traffic statute must be shown as the proximate cause of the
monetary relief. In the absence of statutory requirement, injury, or that it substantially contributed thereto.
one is not negligent as a matter of law for failing to equip a Aonuevo had the burden of clearly proving that the alleged
horn, bell, or other warning devise onto a bicycle. In most negligence of Villagracia was the proximate or contributory
cases, the absence of proper lights on a bicycle does not cause of the latters injury.18 (Emphasis added)
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That the pocket miners were unlicensed was not a justification for (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in the American Expectancy
petitioner to leave their transmission lines dangling. We quote with Table of Mortality or the Actuarial Combined Experience Table of
approval the observation of the RTC on this matter: Mortality. The second factor is computed by multiplying the life
The claim of NPC that the pocket miners have no right to expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, i.e., the total
operate within the area of Dalicno, Itogon, Benguet as there earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings
was no permit issued by DENR is beside the point. The fact or income and less living and other incidental expenses. The net
is that there were not only pocket miners but also there earning is ordinarily computed at fifty percent (50%) of the gross
were many residents in the area of Dalicno, Ampucao, earnings. Thus, the formula used by this Court in computing loss
Itogon, Benguet using the trail. These residents were using of earning capacity is: Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80 age at
this trail underneath the transmission lines x x x. They time of death) x (gross annual income reasonable and necessary
were using this trail even before the transmission lines were living expenses)].20
installed in the 1970s by NPC. The pocket miners, although We sustain the trial court computation of unearned income of the
they have no permit to do pocket mining in the area, are also victim:
human beings who have to eke out a living in the only way x x x the loss of his unearned income can be computed as
they know how. The fact that they were not issued a permit follows: two-thirds of 80 years, minus 20 years, times
by the DENR to do pocket mining is no justification for NPC to P36,000.00 per year, equals P1,440,000.00. This is because
simply leave their transmission lines dangling or hanging 8 Noble Casionan, at the time of his death, was 20 years old
to 10 feet above the ground posing danger to the life and limb and was healthy and strong. And, therefore, his life
of everyone in said community. x x x19 (Emphasis added) expectancy would normally reach up to 80 years old in
In sum, the victim was not guilty of contributory negligence. accordance with the above formula illustrated in the
Hence, petitioner is not entitled to a mitigation of its liability. aforesaid cases. Thus, Noble Casionan had 60 more years
II life expectancy since he was 20 years old at the time of his
We now determine the propriety of the awards for loss of death on June 27, 1995. Two-thirds of 60 years times
unearned income, moral, and exemplary damages. P36,000.00 since he was earning about P3,000.00 a month
From the testimony of the victims mother, it was duly established of P36,000.00 a year would be P1,440,000.00.
during trial that he was earning P3,000.00 a month. To determine However, in determining the unearned income, the basic
the compensable amount of lost earnings, We consider (1) the concern is to determine the damages sustained by the heirs
number of years for which the victim would otherwise have lived or dependents of the deceased Casionan. And here, the
(life expectancy); and (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of damages consist not of the full amount of his earnings but
the deceased. Life expectancy is computed by applying the formula the support they would have received from the deceased
Page 36 of 205
had he not died as a consequence of the unlawful act of the the wrongdoer. It is not meant to enrich the complainant but to
NPC. x x x The amount recoverable is not the loss of the enable the injured party to obtain means to obviate the moral
entire earnings but the loss of that portion of the earnings suffering experience. Trial courts should guard against the award
which the heirs would have received as support. Hence, of exorbitant damages lest they be accused of prejudice or
from the amount of P1,440,000.00, a reasonable amount corruption in their decision making.24 We find that the CA correctly
for the necessary expenses of Noble Casionan had he lived reduced the award from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00.
would be deducted. Following the ruling in People v. As for the award for attorneys fees, well-settled is the rule that the
Quilaton, 205 SCRA 279, the Court deems that 50 percent reason for the award must be discussed in the text of the courts
of the gross earnings of the deceased of P1,440,000.00 decision and not only in the dispositive portion. 25 Except for the
should be deducted for his necessary expenses had he fallo, a discussion on the reason for the award for attorneys fees
lived, thus leaving the other half of about P720,000.00 as was not included by the RTC in its decision. The CA thus correctly
the net earnings that would have gone for the support of his disallowed it on appeal.
heirs. This is the unearned income of which the heirs were WHREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed decision of
deprived of.21 the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
In quasi delicts, exemplary damages are awarded where the SO ORDERED.
offender was guilty of gross negligence.22 Gross negligence has
been defined to be the want or absence of even slight care or
diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of
person or property. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of
consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.23
Petitioner demonstrated its disregard for the safety of the members
of the community of Dalicno who used the trail regularly when it
failed to address the sagging high tension wires despite numerous
previous requests and warnings. It only exerted efforts to rectify
the danger it posed after a death from electrocution already
occurred. Gross negligence was thus apparent, warranting the
award of exemplary damages.
As to the award of moral damages, We sustain the CA reduction of
the award. Moral damages are designed to compensate the
claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on
Page 37 of 205
Republic of the Philippines Respondents, the heirs of Ray Castillon, thus filed an action for
SUPREME COURT damages with prayer for preliminary attachment against the
Manila petitioner Nelen Lambert. The complaint was docketed as Civil
FIRST DIVISION Case No. 06-2086 of the RTC of Iligan City, Branch 06.4 The
G.R. No. 160709 February 23, 2005 complaint was subsequently amended to include the claim by Joel
NELEN LAMBERT, assisted by her husband, GLENROY Castillon for the damages caused to the motorcycle. 51vvphi1.nt
ALOYSUIS LAMBERT, petitioners, On June 29, 1993, after a full-blown trial, the court a quo rendered
vs. a decision in favor of herein private respondents but reduced
HEIRS OF RAY CASTILLON, Represented by MARILOU T. petitioners liability by 20% in view of the contributory negligence
CASTILLON and SERGIO LABANG, respondents. of Ray. The dispositi ve portion of the decision reads:
DECISION WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: plaintiffs and against the defendants, directing the latter, jointly
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and severally, to pay the former the following:
seeking the reversal of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 1. The sum of SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE THOUSAND
October 21, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 43734, which affirmed the AND NINETY-ONE (P633,091) PESOS, representing loss of
June 29, 1993 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, support, death indemnity, funeral and related expenses,
Branch 06, in Civil Case No. 06-2086. moral damages and attorneys fees and
In the evening of January 13, 1991, Ray Castillon visited the house 2. Costs of the suit.
of his brother Joel Castillon at Tambo, Iligan City and borrowed his For lack of merit, defendants counterclaim is dismissed.
motorcycle. He then invited his friend, Sergio Labang, to roam On the claim of Joel Castillon, the evidence shows that he is not
around Iligan City. Ray drove the motorcycle with Sergio as the the real owner of the motorcycle. He is not the real party in
backrider.2 interest. Accordingly, his complaint is dismissed.
At around past 10:00 p.m., after eating supper at Honas On the third-party complaint, the third-party defendant Zenith
Restaurant and imbibing a bottle of beer, they traversed the Insurance Corporation is ordered to pay the sum of P16,500.00
highway towards Tambo at a high speed. Upon reaching Brgy. Sto. directly to the plaintiffs. This sum, if paid, should be deducted
Rosario, they figured in an accident with a Tamaraw jeepney, from the amount adjudged in par. 1 above.
owned by petitioner Nelen Lambert and driven by Reynaldo Gamot, SO ORDERED.6
which was traveling on the same direction but made a sudden left The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. 7
turn. The incident resulted in the instantaneous death of Ray and Hence the present petition, based on the following arguments:
injuries to Sergio.3
Page 38 of 205
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious error computation is contrary to the formula enunciated by this
of law and grave abuse of discretion when it did not apply Honorable Court in the case of Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs.
the ruling of this Honorable Court in the case of Philippine The Honorable Court of Appeals [31 SCRA 511 (1970)].
Rabbit Bus Lines vs. The Honorable Intermediate Appellate 5. The Honorable Trial Courts award of moral damages is
Court and Casiano Pascua, Et. Al., [189 SCRA 168, August contrary to the pronunciation of this Honorable Court in
30, 1990], as reiterated recently in the case of Edna A. the case of Ace Haulers Corporation vs. The Honorable
Raynera vs. Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla [306 SCRA Court of Appeals and Abiva [338 SCRA 572, August 23,
102, April 21, 1999], in which this Honorable Court 2000], wherein the award of moral damages was disallowed
enunciated that drivers of vehicles "who bump the rear of absent any evidence of bad faith or ill-motive.8
another vehicle" are presumed to be the cause of the Petitioner insists that the negligence of Ray Castillon was the
accident. proximate cause of his unfortunate death and therefore she is not
2. The erroneous conclusion of the Honorable Trial Court as liable for damages.
affirmed by the Honorable Court of Appeals that the act of In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
tailgating, at high speed, constitutes contributory Court, only questions of law may be put into issue. Questions of
negligence only, is contrary to the rulings of this Honorable fact cannot be entertained. The finding of negligence by the Court
Court in the case of Sanitary Steam Laundry, INC. vs. The of Appeals is a question of fact which we cannot pass upon as it
Honorable Court of Appeals [300 SCRA 20, December 10, would entail going into factual matters on which the finding of
1998] and the case of Edna A. Raynera vs. Freddie Hiceta negligence was based. As a rule, factual findings of the trial court,
and Jimmy Orpilla [306 SCRA 102, April 21, 1999]. especially those affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals grossly erred in its this Court when supported by the evidence on record. 9
conclusion that petitioners driver was negligent, without Our examination of the records shows that both the trial court and
taking into consideration the presumptions enunciated by the Court of Appeals carefully considered the factual backdrop of
this Honorable Court in the case of Philippine Rabbit Bus the case. No cogent reason exists for disturbing the following
Lines vs. The Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court and findings of the trial court, which the Court of Appeals affirmed:
Casiano Pascua, Et. Al., [189 SCRA 168, August 30, 1990], To the mind of the court, this is exactly what happened. When
and the case of Edna A. Raynera vs. Freddie Hiceta and Reynaldo Gamot was approaching the side road, he slightly veered
Jimmy Orpilla [306 SCRA 102, April 21, 1999]. to the right for his allowance. Ray Castillon, who was following
4. As an alternative relief, petitioner most respectfully closely behind, instinctively veered to the left but it was also the
assigns as error the Honorable Trial Courts computation as moment when Reynaldo Gamot sharply turned to the left towards
to the loss of earning capacity of Ray Castillon. Such the side road. At this juncture both were moving obliquely to the
Page 39 of 205
left.l^vvphi1.net Thus the motorcycle sliced into the side of the In Raynera, the death of the victim was solely attributable to his
jeepney throwing the driver forward so that his forehead hit the own negligence in bumping the rear of the trailer truck which was
angle bar on the left front door of the jeepney even as the traveling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. Raynera,
motorcycle shot forward and the jeepney veered back to the right being the driver of the rear vehicle, had full control of the situation
and sped away. as he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. The
trailer truck therein did not make a sudden left turn as in the case
The testimonies of the witnesses Frias, Opada, Labang and Sumile at bar. Thus, the theory that drivers of vehicles "who bump the
show that he did not stop even for a second, or less before making rear of another vehicle" are presumed to be the cause of the
the left turn. On the contrary, he slightly veered to the right accident is, as in this case, sufficiently contradicted by evidence,
immediately followed by the abrupt and sudden turn to the left in which is the sudden left turn made by Reynaldo which proximately
order to enter the side road. It is apparent that Reynaldo Gamot caused the collision.
did not keep a lookout for vehicles or persons following him before While we agree with the trial court that Ray was likewise guilty of
proceeding to turn left. He failed to take into account the possibility contributory negligence as defined under Article 2179 of the Civil
that others may be following him. He did not employ the necessary Code, we find it equitable to increase the ratio of apportionment of
precaution to see to it that the road was clear. 10 damages on account of the victims negligence.
Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo, without first Article 2179 reads as follows:
establishing his right of way, was the proximate cause of the When the plaintiffs negligence was the immediate and proximate
mishap which claimed the life of Ray and injured Sergio. cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence
Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be
not have occurred.11 The cause of the collision is traceable to the awarded.
negligent act of Reynaldo for, as the trial court correctly held, The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a
without that left turn executed with no precaution, the mishap in all plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not
probability would not have happened.12 be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the
Petitioner misunderstood our ruling in Raynera v. Hiceta.13 That consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus
case also involved a motorcycle crashing into the left rear portion of be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his
another vehicle, and we declared therein that drivers of vehicles negligence.15 The determination of the mitigation of the defendants
"who bump the rear of another vehicle" are presumed to be "the liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case. The
cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence".14 Court had sustained a mitigation of 50% in Rakes v. AG & P;1620%
Page 40 of 205
in Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court17 and creation of such earnings or income and less living and other
LBC Air Cargo, Inc. v. Court of Appeals;18 and 40% in Bank of the incidental expenses. The net earning is ordinarily computed at
Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals19 and Philippine Bank of fifty percent (50%) of the gross earnings. Thus, the formula
Commerce v. Court of Appeals.201awphi1.nt used by this Court in computing loss of earning capacity is: Net
In the case at bar, it was established that Ray, at the time of the Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80 age at time of death) x (gross
mishap: (1) was driving the motorcycle at a high speed; (2) was annual income reasonable and necessary living expenses)].22
tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has imbibed one or two bottles It was established that Ray was 35 at the time of his death and
of beer; and (4) was not wearing a protective helmet. 21 These was earning a gross annual income of P31,876.00 as a driver at the
circumstances, although not constituting the proximate cause of Mindanao State University. In arriving at the net earnings, the trial
his demise and injury to Sergio, contributed to the same result. court deducted from the gross annual income the annual living
The contribution of these circumstances are all considered and expenses in the amount of P9,672.00, broken down as follows:
determined in terms of percentages of the total cause. Hence, P20.00 a day for travel or P520.00 per month; P60.00 a month for
pursuant to Rakes v. AG & P, the heirs of Ray Castillon shall cigarettes; P26.00 for drinks; and other personal expenses like
recover damages only up to 50% of the award. In other words, 50% clothing, toiletries, etc. estimated at P200.00 per month. 23 The
of the damage shall be borne by the private respondents; the amount of P9,672.00, however, appears unrealistic, and
remaining 50% shall be paid by the petitioner. constitutes only 30.34% of the gross earnings. It even includes
Anent the award of loss of earning capacity, we agree with the expenses for cigarettes which by no means can be classified as a
petitioner that the trial court erred in the computation of the net necessary expense. Using the cited formula with the net earnings
earnings. computed at 50% of the gross earnings, a detailed computation is
In considering the earning capacity of the victim as an element of as follows:
damages, the following factors are considered in determining the 1vvphi1.nt
compensable amount of lost earnings: (1) the number of years for = LIFE
which the victim would otherwise have lived; and (2) the rate of NET x GROSS
EXPECTANCY - LIVING
loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased. Jurisprudence EARNING ANNUAL
[2/3 (80-age at EXPENSES
provides that the first factor, i.e., life expectancy, is computed by CAPACITY INCOME
the time of (50% of GAI)
applying the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in the (X) (GAI)
death)]
American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial Combined
Experience Table of Mortality. As to the second factor, it is x -50% x
X = [2/3 (80-35)]
computed by multiplying the life expectancy by the net earnings of [P31,876.00 P31,876.00]
the deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses necessary in the
X = [2/3 (45)] x - P15,938.00]
Page 41 of 205
[P31,876.00 damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased.
X = 30 x 15,938.00 However, the amount has been gradually increased through the
years. At present, prevailing jurisprudence fixes the amount at
X = P478,140.00
P50,000.00.26
We sustain the awards of P33,215.00 as funeral and burial Paragraph 3 of the same provision also serves as the basis for the
expenses being supported with receipts;24 P50,000.00 as death award of moral damages in quasi-delict. The reason for the grant of
indemnity; and P50,000.00 as moral damages. However, the award moral damages has been explained, thus:
of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees must be deleted for lack of basis. the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration,
The indemnity for death caused by a quasi-delict used to be pegged within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and
at P3,000.00,25 based on Article 2206 of the Civil Code, which therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
reads: The intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim
ART. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or is proportionate to the intensity of affection for him and bears no
quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender. 27
there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition: While it is true that there can be no exact or uniform rule for
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the measuring the value of human life and the measure of damages
earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity cannot be arrived at by a precise mathematical calculation, 28 we
shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity hold that the trial courts award of moral damages of P50,000.00
shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, for the death of Ray Castillon is in accord with the prevailing
unless the deceased on account of permanent physical jurisprudence.29
disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning With respect to attorneys fees, it is well settled that the same
capacity at the time of his death; should not be awarded in the absence of stipulation except under
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according the instances enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. The
to the provisions of article 291, the recipient who is trial court did not indicate the basis for its award. As we have held
not an heir called to the decedents inheritance by the in Rizal Surety and Insurance Company v. Court of Appeals:30
law of testate or intestate succession, may demand "Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows attorneys fess to be awarded
support from the person causing the death, for a by a court when its claimant is compelled to litigate with third
period of not exceeding five years, the exact duration to persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an
be fixed by the court; unjustified act or omission of the party from whom it is
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants sought.l^vvphi1.net While judicial discretion is here extant, an
and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral
Page 42 of 205
award thereof demands, nevertheless, a factual, legal or equitable
justification.1a\^/phi1.net The matter cannot and should not be
left to speculation and conjecture (Mirasol vs. De la Cruz, 84 SCRA
337; Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 173
SCRA 619).
In the case at bench, the records do not show enough basis for
sustaining the award for attorneys fees and to adjudge its payment
by petitioner"
Likewise, this Court held in Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals that:
"In Abrogar v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 67970,
January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 57] the Court had occasion to state
that [t]he reason for the award of attorneys fees must be
stated in the text of the courts decision, otherwise, if it is
stated only in the dispositive portion of the decision, the same
must be disallowed on appeal. 1awphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED.
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the net earnings is computed at 50% of
the gross annual income to conform with the prevailing
jurisprudence, and the FURTHER MODIFICATION that petitioner
NELEN LAMBERT is ordered to pay the heirs of Ray Castillon only
50% of the damages herein awarded, except attorneys fees which
is DELETED for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.
Page 43 of 205
Republic of the Philippines Tarlac. Mercelita, driving at approximately 70 km/hr, drove past a
SUPREME COURT vehicle, unaware of the railroad track up ahead and that they were
Manila about to collide with PNR Train No. T-71. Mercelita was instantly
FIRST DIVISION killed when the Mercedes Benz smashed into the train; the two
G.R. No. 169891 November 2, 2006 other passengers suffered serious physical injuries.5 A certain
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, Petitioner, James Harrow6 brought Rhonda Brunty to the Central Luzon
vs. Doctors Hospital in Tarlac, where she was pronounced dead after
ETHEL BRUNTY and JUAN MANUEL M. GARCIA, Respondents. ten minutes from arrival. Garcia, who had suffered severe head
DECISION injuries, was brought via ambulance to the same hospital. He was
CALLEJO, SR., J.: transferred to the Manila Doctors Hospital, and later to the Makati
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision 1 of the Medical Center for further treatment.7
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 47567 and its Resolution2 On July 28, 1981, Ethel Brunty sent a demand letter8 to the PNR
denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. The assailed demanding payment of actual, compensatory, and moral damages,
decision affirmed with partial modification the ruling3 of the as a result of her daughters death. When PNR did not respond,
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 20, directing Ethel Brunty and Garcia, filed a complaint9 for damages against
petitioner Philippine National Railways (PNR) to indemnify the PNR before the RTC of Manila. The case was raffled to Branch
respondents Ethel Brunty and Juan Manuel M. Garcia for the 20 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 83-18645. They alleged that
death of Rhonda Brunty, and to pay actual and moral damages, the death of Mercelita and Rhonda Brunty, as well as the physical
attorneys fees and cost of suit. injuries suffered by Garcia, were the direct and proximate result of
Rhonda Brunty, daughter of respondent Ethel Brunty and an the gross and reckless negligence of PNR in not providing the
American citizen, came to the Philippines for a visit sometime in necessary equipment at the railroad crossing in Barangay Rizal,
January 1980. Prior to her departure, she, together with her Municipality of Moncada, Tarlac. They pointed out that there was
Filipino host Juan Manuel M. Garcia, traveled to Baguio City on no flagbar or red light signal to warn motorists who were about to
board a Mercedes Benz sedan with plate number FU 799, driven by cross the railroad track, and that the flagman or switchman was
Rodolfo L. Mercelita. It was about 12:00 midnight, January 25, only equipped with a hand flashlight.10 Plaintiffs likewise averred
1980. By then, PNR Train No. T-71, driven by Alfonso Reyes, was that PNR failed to supervise its employees in the performance of
on its way to Tutuban, Metro Manila4 as it had left the La Union their respective tasks and duties, more particularly the pilot and
station at 11:00 p.m., January 24, 1980. operator of the train.11 They prayed for the payment of the following
By 2:00 a.m., Rhonda Brunty, Garcia and Mercelita were already damages:
approaching the railroad crossing at Barangay Rizal, Moncada,
Page 44 of 205
1.) P200,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages to accident. The driver disregarded the warning signs, the whistle
plaintiff Ethel Brunty; blasts of the oncoming train and the flashlight signals to stop given
2.) P2,800,000.00 for compensatory damages to plaintiff by the guard.15 As counterclaim, it prayed that it be awarded
Ethel Brunty representing lost or unearned income of actual and compensatory damages, and litigation expenses. 16
Rhonda Brunty; Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint17 dated July 28, 1986 to
3.) Such amounts of moral and exemplary damages as may include, as party plaintiff, Chemical Industries of the Philippines,
be warranted by the evidence adduced, to plaintiff Ethel Inc. (Chemphil), Garcias employer, who claimed to have paid for
Brunty; the latters medical and hospitalization expenses, the services
4.) At least P64,057.61 as actual damages representing rendered by the funeral parlor of the deceased, and the expenses in
medical expenses to plaintiff Juan Manuel M. Garcia and at transferring the remains of Rhonda Brunty to the United States. 18
least P1,000,000.00 as unearned or lost income of said After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision 19 on May
plaintiff; 21, 1990 in favor of plaintiffs. The fallo reads:
5.) At least P72,760.00 as actual damages representing cost WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
of the Mercedes Benz car to plaintiff Juan Manuel M. plaintiffs Ethel Brunty and Juan Manuel M. Garcia and against the
Garcia; defendant Philippine National Railways directing the latter to pay
6.) Such amounts of moral and exemplary damages as may the former the sum of:
be warranted by the evidence adduced, to plaintiff Juan 1. Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) Philippine Currency,
Manuel M. Garcia; and for the death of Rhonda Brunty formerly a resident of 1595
7.) Attorneys fees equivalent to at least 15% of the total Ashland Avenue, Des Plaines, Illinois, U.S.A.;
award to plaintiffs herein.12 2. One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) Philippine Currency
In its Answer,13 PNR claimed that it exercised the diligence of a for moral and actual damages due the heirs of Rhonda
good father of a family not only in the selection but also in the Brunty;
supervision of its employees.14 By way of special and affirmative 3. Seventy-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty Pesos
defense, it stressed that it had the right of way on the railroad (P72,760.00) Philippine Currency for damages sustained by
crossing in question, and that it has no legal duty to put up a bar the Mercedes Benz;
or red light signal in any such crossing. It insisted that there were 4. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) Philippine Currency
adequate, visible, and clear warning signs strategically posted on as and for attorney's fees, and;
the sides of the road before the railroad crossing. It countered that 5. Costs of suit.
the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was Mercelitas SO ORDERED.20
negligence, and that he had the last clear chance to avoid the
Page 45 of 205
Aggrieved, the PNR appealed the case to the CA, raising the appellant was negligent in not exercising due diligence of a good
following errors: father of a family in the supervision of its employees, particularly
I. the train operator Alfonso Reyes;29 the car was driven in a careful
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING DEFENDANT- and diligent manner, and at a moderate speed, with due regard to
APPELLANT PNR LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF RHONDA all traffic rules and regulations at that particular time; 30 the
BRUNTY AND THE CONSEQUENT AWARD OF DAMAGES doctrine of "last clear chance" is not applicable;31 Ethel Brunty is a
DUE THE HEIRS OF RHONDA BRUNTY. non-resident alien who can rightfully file the instant case;32 and
II. they are entitled to recover damages from appellant. 33
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING DEFENDANT- The CA rendered the assailed Decision34 on August 15, 2005. The
APPELLANT PNR LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGES SUFFERED dispositive portion reads:
BY PLAINTIFF-APPELLEES MERCEDES BENZ IN THE WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is hereby
AMOUNT OF SEVENTY-TWO THOUSAND SEVEN AFFIRMED with PARTIAL MODIFICATIONS, increasing the death
HUNDRED AND SIXTY PESOS (P72,760.00). indemnity award from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, and deleting the
III. award for damages sustained by the Mercedes Benz.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS SO ORDERED.35
FEES TO THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES.21 The appellate court affirmed the findings of the RTC as to the
In its Brief, PNR insisted that the sole and proximate cause of the negligence of the PNR. Considering the circumstances prevailing at
accident was the negligence and recklessness of Garcia and the time of the fatal accident, it ruled that the alleged safety
Mercelita.22 It insisted that it had provided adequate warning measures installed by the PNR at the railroad crossing were not
signals at the railroad crossing23 and had exercised due care in the merely inadequate they did not satisfy the well-settled safety
selection and supervision of its employees.24 The RTC erred in standards in transportation.36 However, the CA did not agree with
awarding damages to Rhonda Brunty as she cannot be allowed to the RTCs findings on the contributory negligence of Mercelita, the
receive what she is not in a position to give, having been a non- driver of the Mercedes Benz. It held that Mercelita could not have
resident alien who did not own a property in the Philippines. 25 It foreseen the harm that would befall him and the two other
likewise questioned the award of damages on the Mercedes Benz as passengers under the prevailing circumstances, thus, could not be
well as the grant of attorneys fees.26 At the very least, Mercelita considered guilty of contributory negligence.37
was guilty of contributory negligence.27 The PNR, now petitioner, comes before this Court in this Petition
For their part, appellees countered that appellant was grossly and for Review on Certiorari on the following grounds:
recklessly negligent in not properly providing the necessary I.
equipment at the railroad crossing in Rizal, Moncada, Tarlac; 28
Page 46 of 205
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MANIFESTLY and equipment within the area or scene of the accident was the
OVERLOOKING CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS NOT DISPUTED BY proximate cause of the mishap.43 While it is true that as a general
THE PARTIES AND WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD rule, the trial court is in the best position to evaluate and observe
JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION SUCH AS: the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses presented during the
THE RESPONDENTS DRIVER OVERTOOK ANOTHER VEHICLE BY trial, the CA, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, has the
ACCELERATING AT 70 KILOMETERS PER HOUR WITHIN JUST 50 vested right to modify, reject, or set aside the trial courts
YARDS AWAY FROM THE RAILROAD TRACKS. evaluation and findings.44 As to the application of the doctrine of
II. last clear chance, respondents claim that said issue is being raised
THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE for the first time in this petition.45 Lastly, respondents cite foreign
CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE TRIAL COURT REGARDING jurisprudence stating that if the violation is one which gives rise to
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF THE RESPONDENTS DRIVER. liability per se for any resulting injury, the defenses ordinarily
III. available in actions for diligence are barred and the contributory
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE negligence of the person injured is no defense.46
DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE IN THE INSTANT CASE. 38 The Court is thus tasked to answer the following factual
Petitioner insists that the proximate cause of the mishap was questions: (1) As between petitioner and Mercelita, whose
Mercelitas disregard of traffic rules and regulations. Had the court negligence resulted in the unfortunate collision? (2) Is
considered the fact that Mercelita had overtaken another vehicle a Mercelita (the driver of the Mercedes Benz) guilty of
few yards before the railroad track, it would have reached a contributory negligence? Finally, the application in this case
different conclusion.39 Moreover, petitioner asserts, considering of the doctrine of last clear chance is likewise in question.
that the decisions of the RTC and the CA vary as to whether or not Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable
Mercelita was guilty of contributory negligence, the findings of the man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate
RTC should prevail. Thus, Mercelitas contributory negligence the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
should not have been ignored.40 Lastly, petitioner avers that since something which a prudent and reasonable man would not
there is freedom of control and greater maneuverability on the part do.47 In Corliss v. Manila Railroad Company,48 this Court held that
of motor vehicles, it is obvious that in railroad crossings, they have negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is a
the last clear chance to prevent or avoid an unwanted accident relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application
from taking place.41 depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care
In their Comment42 on the petition, respondents reiterate the and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require.49 In
findings of the RTC and the CA that the breach by petitioner of its determining whether or not there is negligence on the part of the
legal duty to provide adequate and necessary public safety device parties in a given situation, jurisprudence50 has laid down the
Page 47 of 205
following test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use In a long line of cases, the Court held that in order to sustain a
that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must
person would have used in the same situation? If not, the person is concur: (1) damage to plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or
guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the standard omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts
supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet he must respond was guilty; and (3) connection of cause and
pater familias of the Roman law. effect between such negligence and damage.53 Applying the
The issue of who, between the parties, was negligent was foregoing requisites, the CA correctly made the following
thoroughly discussed by both the RTC and the CA. In petitions for conclusions:
review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, only questions It was clearly established that plaintiffs-appellees (respondents
of law may be put into issue, and questions of fact as a general herein) sustained damage or injury as a result of the collision. That
rule, cannot be entertained. The finding of negligence by the RTC, there was negligence on the part of PNR is, likewise, beyond cavil.
as affirmed by the CA, is a question of fact which this Court cannot Considering the circumstances prevailing at the time of the fatal
pass upon as it would entail going into factual matters on which accident, the alleged safety measures installed by the PNR at the
the finding of negligence was based.51 The established rule is that railroad crossing is not only inadequate but does not satisfy well-
factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial court are settled safety standards in transportation. x x x
conclusive and binding on this Court.52 xxxx
The records of the instant case show that both the RTC and the CA x x x An examination of the photographs of the railroad crossing at
carefully examined the factual circumstances surrounding the Moncada, Tarlac presented as evidence by PNR itself would yield
case, and we find no cogent reason to disturb the same. It is, the following: (1.) absence of flagbars or safety railroad bars; (2.)
however, worthy to emphasize that petitioner was found inadequacy of the installed warning signals; and (3.) lack of proper
negligent because of its failure to provide the necessary safety lighting within the area. Thus, even if there was a flagman
device to ensure the safety of motorists in crossing the stationed at the site as claimed by PNR (petitioner), it would still be
railroad track. As such, it is liable for damages for violating the impossible to know or see that there is a railroad crossing/tracks
provisions of Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, viz: ahead, or that there is an approaching train from the Moncada side
Article 2176. Whoever, by act or omission, causes damage to of the road since ones view would be blocked by a cockpit arena. x
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for x x54
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre- Moreover, the CA held that a vehicle coming from the Moncada side
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a would have difficulty in knowing that there is an approaching train
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. because of the slight curve, more so, at an unholy hour as 2:00
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a.m. Thus, it is imperative on the part of the PNR to provide danger to health and body.60 To prove contributory negligence, it is
adequate safety equipment in the area.55 still necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate,
It may broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to the public between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a
a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes
persons and property at railroad crossings, which duties pertain proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its
both in the operation of trains and in the maintenance of the occurrence.61
crossings.56 Moreover, every corporation constructing or operating The court below found that there was a slight curve before
a railway shall make and construct at all points where such approaching the tracks; the place was not properly illuminated;
railway crosses any public road, good, sufficient, and safe ones view was blocked by a cockpit arena; and Mercelita was not
crossings and erect at such points, at a sufficient elevation from familiar with the road. Yet, it was also established that Mercelita
such road as to admit a free passage of vehicles of every kind, a was then driving the Mercedes Benz at a speed of 70 km/hr and, in
sign with large and distinct letters placed thereon, to give notice of fact, had overtaken a vehicle a few yards before reaching the
the proximity of the railway, and warn persons of the necessity of railroad track. Mercelita should not have driven the car the way he
looking out for trains.57 did. However, while his acts contributed to the collision, they
This Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for nevertheless do not negate petitioners liability. Pursuant to Article
damages for its failure to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman 217962 of the New Civil Code, the only effect such contributory
or switchman, or semaphores. Such failure is evidence of negligence could have is to mitigate liability, which, however, is not
negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is applicable in this case, as will be discussed later.1wphi1
no law or ordinance requiring it because public safety demands As to whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable,
that said device or equipment be installed.58 we rule in the negative. The doctrine of last clear chance states
In view of the foregoing, we affirm the factual findings of the CA as that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of
well as its conclusion on petitioners negligence. one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is
As to whether or not Mercelita was guilty of contributory impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the
negligence, we agree with petitioner. Contributory negligence is loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss. Stated
legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the differently, the antecedent negligence of plaintiff does not preclude
standard to which he is required to conform for his own him from recovering damages caused by the supervening
protection.59 To hold a person as having contributed to his negligence of defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent
injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.63 The
about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an impending proximate cause of the injury having been established to be the
Page 49 of 205
negligence of petitioner, we hold that the above doctrine finds no would be unfair for the victims heirs to get nothing, despite the
application in the instant case. death of their kin, for the reason alone that they cannot produce
We note that the damages awarded by the appellate court consist receipts.66
of (1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Rhonda Brunty; (2) The relatives of the victim who incurred physical injuries in a
P1,000,000.00 as actual and moral damages due the heirs of quasi-delict are not proscribed from recovering moral damages in
Rhonda Brunty; and (3) P50,000.00 as and by way of attorneys meritorious cases.67 We, therefore, sustain the award of moral
fees. No damages, however, were awarded for the injuries suffered damages in favor of the heirs of Rhonda Brunty.
by Garcia, yet, the latter never interposed an appeal before the CA Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to
nor even before this Court. The record is, likewise, bereft of any compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering,
allegation and proof as to the relationship between Mercelita (the mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
driver) and Rhonda Brunty. Hence, the earlier finding of reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
contributory negligence on the part of Mercelita, which generally and similar injury unjustly caused a person. Although
has the effect of mitigation of liability, does not apply. incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages must
As to the amount of damages awarded, a modification of the same nevertheless be somehow proportional to and in approximation
is in order, specifically on the award of actual and moral damages of the suffering inflicted.68 In the instant case, the moral
in the aggregate amount of P1,000,000.00. suffering of the heirs of Rhonda Brunty was sufficiently established
Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to by Ethel Brunty in her deposition, 69 viz:
compensate a party for an injury or loss he suffered. They Q: What have you felt as a result of the death of Rhonda?
arise out of a sense of natural justice, aimed at repairing the A: I felt earnest anguish and mixed feelings of anger and extreme
wrong done. To be recoverable, they must be duly proved with sorrow because she died so far away and alone, and because her
a reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on death could so easily be prevented if there had been adequate and
speculation, conjecture, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of appropriate warning signals at the railroad crossing and it is just
damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have an unbearable and irreparable loss. In so many ways, she was my
suffered, and on evidence of the actual amount thereof. 64 life. It seemed to me that losing her was just like losing my own
Respondents, however, failed to present evidence for such life, or worst, and even now, there is no end to our bereavement. I
damages; hence, the award of actual damages cannot be sustained. am still on constant medication to be able to sleep and to be able to
However, as the heirs of Rhonda Brunty undeniably incurred perform my duties effectively in my job but it does not take away
expenses for the wake and burial of the latter, we deem it proper to the pain of loss.70
award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 pursuant In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,71 and in Metro Manila Transit
to prevailing jurisprudence.65 This is in lieu of actual damages as it Corporation v. Court of Appeals,72 we awarded moral damages in
Page 50 of 205
the amount of P1,000,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased. In
Victory Liner, Inc. v. Heirs of Malecdan, 73 the award of
P100,000.00 as moral damages was held in keeping with the
purpose of the law, while in Macalinao v. Ong, 74 the amount of
P50,000.00 was held sufficient.1wphi1
Considering the circumstances attendant in this case, we find that
an award of P500,000.00 as moral damages to the heirs of Rhonda
Brunty is proper. In view of recent jurisprudence, indemnity of
P50,000.00 for the death of Rhonda Brunty and attorneys fees
amounting to P50,000.00 is likewise proper.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated August 15, 2005 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. The award of actual damages is deleted, and in
lieu thereof, temperate damages of P25,000.00 is awarded to the
heirs of Rhonda Brunty. The award of moral damages is reduced to
P500,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Page 51 of 205
Republic of the Philippines one Vicente Mangyao, who just closed his store in
SUPREME COURT market in order to celebrate the coming of the New
Manila Year, and who saw the incident right before him,
FIRST DIVISION shouted at the appellant to stop. He ran after
G.R. No. L-40452 October 12, 1989 appellant when the latter refused to stop.
GREGORIO GENOBIAGON, petitioner, Overtaking the appellant, Mangyao asked him why
vs. he bumped the old woman and his answer was, 'it
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, was the old woman that bumped him.' The appellant
respondents. went back to the place where the old woman was
Mario D. Ortiz for petitioner. struck by his rig. The old woman was unconscious,
and the food and viands she was carrying were
GRIO-AQUINO, J.: scattered on her body. The victim was then loaded in
This is a petition for review of the Court of Appeals' decision in CA- a jeep and brought to the hospital where she died
G.R. No. 09949-CR, dated October 10, 1974, affirming the three hours later (Exh. C). The findings after an
conviction of the petitioner of the crime of homicide thru reckless autopsy are as follows:
imprudence. Contusion with Hematoma Left,
As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts of this case are: Frontal and Occipito-Parietal
On December 31,1959, at about 7:30 o'clock in the Regionas Fracture Occipito-Parietal
evening, a rig driven by appellant bumped an old Bone Cerebral Hemorrhage.
woman who was crossing T. Padilla St., Cebu City, The deceased was an eighty-one-year old woman
at the right side of T. Padilla Market. The appellant's named Rita B. Cabrera. (pp. 31-32, Rollo.)
rig was following another at a distance of two Petitioner was charged with homicide thru reckless imprudence in
meters. The old woman started to cross when the the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Crim. Case No. V7855). The
first rig was approaching her, but as appellant's trial court found petitioner guilty of the felony charged and
vehicle was going so fast not only because of the sentenced him to "suffer an indeterminate penalty of three (3)
steep down-grade of the road, but also because he months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year, one (1)
was trying to overtake the rig ahead of him, the month and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum, to
appellant's rig bumped the old woman, who as a indemnify the heirs of Rita Banzon Cabrera the sum of P6,000 with
consequence, fell at the middle of the road. The subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to exceed 1/3 of
appellant continued to drive on, but a by-stander,
Page 52 of 205
the principal penalty and to pay the costs" (p. 3, Appellant's Brief, that findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are
p. 56, Rollo). binding upon us (Bernardo vs. Bernardo, 101 SCRA 351; Vda. De
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. 09949- Roxas vs. IAC, 143 SCRA 77; Republic vs. IAC, 144 SCRA 705).
CR)which,on October 10,1974,conviction of the accused but The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not
increased his civil liability to P12,000. The dispositive portion of its exonerate the accused. "The defense of contributory negligence
decision reads: does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the judgment imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another
appealed from except in the amount of indemnity to to evade the effects of his own negligence (People vs. Orbeta,
be paid to the heirs of the deceased, Rita B. Cabrera, CA-G.R. No. 321, March 29,1947)." (People vs. Quinones, 44 O.G.
which is the sum of P6,000.00 with subsidiary 1520).
imprisonment in case of insolvency which should be The petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals unjustly
raised to P12,000.00 (People vs. Pantoja, G.R. No. L- increased his civil liability to P12,000, is devoid of merit. The
18793, October 11, 1968, 25 SCRA 468) but without prevailing jurisprudence in fact provides that indemnity for death
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the in homicide or murder is P30,000 (People vs. De la Fuente,
same should be, as it is hereby affirmed in all other [1983]126 SCRA 518; People vs. Centeno, 130 SCRA 198).
respects with costs. (P. 37, Rollo.) Accordingly, the civil liability of the petitioner is increased to
After his motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' P30,000.
decision was denied, he filed a petition for review in this Court, WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed with modification
alleging that the Court of Appeals erred: as to the civil liability of the petitioner which is hereby increased to
1. in not finding that the reckless negligence of the P30,000. Costs against petitioner.
victim was the proximate cause of the accident SO ORDERED.
which led to her death;
2. in not acquitting the petitioner on the ground of
reasonable doubt; and
3. in unjustly increasing the civil liability of the
petitioner from P6,000.00 to P12,000.00, although
the circumstances of the victim and the accused
(petitioner) do not warrant such increase.
It is quite evident that all the issues raised in the petition for
review are factual. Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule
Page 53 of 205
Republic of the Philippines (2) poked his gun toward Divina Mata and Isabelita
SUPREME COURT Rodriguez and ordered them to lay (sic) face flat on the
Manila floor. Suspects asked forcibly the case and assorted pawned
THIRD DIVISION jewelries items mentioned above.
G.R. No. 159617 August 8, 2007 Suspects after taking the money and jewelries fled on board
ROBERTO C. SICAM and AGENCIA de R.C. SICAM, INC., a Marson Toyota unidentified plate number.3
petitioners, Petitioner Sicam sent respondent Lulu a letter dated October 19,
vs. 1987 informing her of the loss of her jewelry due to the robbery
LULU V. JORGE and CESAR JORGE, respondents. incident in the pawnshop. On November 2, 1987, respondent Lulu
DECISION then wrote a letter4 to petitioner Sicam expressing disbelief stating
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: that when the robbery happened, all jewelry pawned were
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Roberto C. deposited with Far East Bank near the pawnshop since it had been
Sicam, Jr. (petitioner Sicam) and Agencia de R.C. Sicam, Inc. the practice that before they could withdraw, advance notice must
(petitioner corporation) seeking to annul the Decision 1 of the Court be given to the pawnshop so it could withdraw the jewelry from the
of Appeals dated March 31, 2003, and its Resolution 2 dated August bank. Respondent Lulu then requested petitioner Sicam to prepare
8, 2003, in CA G.R. CV No. 56633. the pawned jewelry for withdrawal on November 6, 1987 but
It appears that on different dates from September to October 1987, petitioner Sicam failed to return the jewelry.
Lulu V. Jorge (respondent Lulu) pawned several pieces of jewelry On September 28, 1988, respondent Lulu joined by her husband,
with Agencia de R. C. Sicam located at No. 17 Aguirre Ave., BF Cesar Jorge, filed a complaint against petitioner Sicam with the
Homes Paraaque, Metro Manila, to secure a loan in the total Regional Trial Court of Makati seeking indemnification for the loss
amount of P59,500.00. of pawned jewelry and payment of actual, moral and exemplary
On October 19, 1987, two armed men entered the pawnshop and damages as well as attorney's fees. The case was docketed as Civil
took away whatever cash and jewelry were found inside the Case No. 88-2035.
pawnshop vault. The incident was entered in the police blotter of Petitioner Sicam filed his Answer contending that he is not the real
the Southern Police District, Paraaque Police Station as follows: party-in-interest as the pawnshop was incorporated on April 20,
Investigation shows that at above TDPO, while victims were 1987 and known as Agencia de R.C. Sicam, Inc; that petitioner
inside the office, two (2) male unidentified persons entered corporation had exercised due care and diligence in the
into the said office with guns drawn. Suspects(sic) (1) went safekeeping of the articles pledged with it and could not be made
straight inside and poked his gun toward Romeo Sicam and liable for an event that is fortuitous.
thereby tied him with an electric wire while suspects (sic)
Page 54 of 205
Respondents subsequently filed an Amended Complaint to include Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, is hereby
petitioner corporation. REVERSED and SET ASIDE, ordering the appellees to pay
Thereafter, petitioner Sicam filed a Motion to Dismiss as far as he appellants the actual value of the lost jewelry amounting to
is concerned considering that he is not the real party-in-interest. P272,000.00, and attorney' fees of P27,200.00.8
Respondents opposed the same. The RTC denied the motion in an In finding petitioner Sicam liable together with petitioner
Order dated November 8, 1989.5 corporation, the CA applied the doctrine of piercing the veil of
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision 6 dated corporate entity reasoning that respondents were misled into
January 12, 1993, dismissing respondents complaint as well as thinking that they were dealing with the pawnshop owned by
petitioners counterclaim. The RTC held that petitioner Sicam could petitioner Sicam as all the pawnshop tickets issued to them bear
not be made personally liable for a claim arising out of a corporate the words "Agencia de R.C. Sicam"; and that there was no
transaction; that in the Amended Complaint of respondents, they indication on the pawnshop tickets that it was the petitioner
asserted that "plaintiff pawned assorted jewelries in defendants' corporation that owned the pawnshop which explained why
pawnshop"; and that as a consequence of the separate juridical respondents had to amend their complaint impleading petitioner
personality of a corporation, the corporate debt or credit is not the corporation.
debt or credit of a stockholder. The CA further held that the corresponding diligence required of a
The RTC further ruled that petitioner corporation could not be held pawnshop is that it should take steps to secure and protect the
liable for the loss of the pawned jewelry since it had not been pledged items and should take steps to insure itself against the
rebutted by respondents that the loss of the pledged pieces of loss of articles which are entrusted to its custody as it derives
jewelry in the possession of the corporation was occasioned by earnings from the pawnshop trade which petitioners failed to do;
armed robbery; that robbery is a fortuitous event which exempts that Austria is not applicable to this case since the robbery
the victim from liability for the loss, citing the case of Austria v. incident happened in 1961 when the criminality had not as yet
Court of Appeals;7 and that the parties transaction was that of a reached the levels attained in the present day; that they are at
pledgor and pledgee and under Art. 1174 of the Civil Code, the least guilty of contributory negligence and should be held liable for
pawnshop as a pledgee is not responsible for those events which the loss of jewelries; and that robberies and hold-ups are
could not be foreseen. foreseeable risks in that those engaged in the pawnshop business
Respondents appealed the RTC Decision to the CA. In a Decision are expected to foresee.
dated March 31, 2003, the CA reversed the RTC, the dispositive The CA concluded that both petitioners should be jointly and
portion of which reads as follows: severally held liable to respondents for the loss of the pawned
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is jewelry.
GRANTED, and the Decision dated January 12, 1993,of the
Page 55 of 205
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution (2) The issue resolved against petitioner Sicam was not
dated August 8, 2003. among those raised and litigated in the trial court; and
Hence, the instant petition for review with the following assignment (3) By reason of the above infirmities, it was error for the CA
of errors: to have pierced the corporate veil since a corporation has a
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND WHEN IT DID, IT personality distinct and separate from its individual
OPENED ITSELF TO REVERSAL, WHEN IT ADOPTED stockholders or members.
UNCRITICALLY (IN FACT IT REPRODUCED AS ITS OWN Anent the second error, petitioners point out that the CA finding on
WITHOUT IN THE MEANTIME ACKNOWLEDGING IT) WHAT their negligence is likewise an unedited reproduction of
THE RESPONDENTS ARGUED IN THEIR BRIEF, WHICH respondents brief which had the following defects:
ARGUMENT WAS PALPABLY UNSUSTAINABLE. (1) There were unrebutted evidence on record that
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED, AND WHEN IT DID, IT petitioners had observed the diligence required of them, i.e,
OPENED ITSELF TO REVERSAL BY THIS HONORABLE they wanted to open a vault with a nearby bank for
COURT, WHEN IT AGAIN ADOPTED UNCRITICALLY (BUT purposes of safekeeping the pawned articles but was
WITHOUT ACKNOWLEDGING IT) THE SUBMISSIONS OF discouraged by the Central Bank (CB) since CB rules
THE RESPONDENTS IN THEIR BRIEF WITHOUT ADDING provide that they can only store the pawned articles in a
ANYTHING MORE THERETO DESPITE THE FACT THAT vault inside the pawnshop premises and no other place;
THE SAID ARGUMENT OF THE RESPONDENTS COULD (2) Petitioners were adjudged negligent as they did not take
NOT HAVE BEEN SUSTAINED IN VIEW OF UNREBUTTED insurance against the loss of the pledged jelweries, but it is
EVIDENCE ON RECORD.9 judicial notice that due to high incidence of crimes,
Anent the first assigned error, petitioners point out that the CAs insurance companies refused to cover pawnshops and
finding that petitioner Sicam is personally liable for the loss of the banks because of high probability of losses due to
pawned jewelries is "a virtual and uncritical reproduction of the robberies;
arguments set out on pp. 5-6 of the Appellants brief."10 (3) In Hernandez v. Chairman, Commission on Audit (179
Petitioners argue that the reproduced arguments of respondents in SCRA 39, 45-46), the victim of robbery was exonerated from
their Appellants Brief suffer from infirmities, as follows: liability for the sum of money belonging to others and lost
(1) Respondents conclusively asserted in paragraph 2 of by him to robbers.
their Amended Complaint that Agencia de R.C. Sicam, Inc. Respondents filed their Comment and petitioners filed their Reply
is the present owner of Agencia de R.C. Sicam Pawnshop, thereto. The parties subsequently submitted their respective
and therefore, the CA cannot rule against said conclusive Memoranda.
assertion of respondents; We find no merit in the petition.
Page 56 of 205
To begin with, although it is true that indeed the CA findings were all bear the words "Agencia de R. C. Sicam," notwithstanding that
exact reproductions of the arguments raised in respondents the pawnshop was allegedly incorporated in April 1987. The
(appellants) brief filed with the CA, we find the same to be not receipts issued after such alleged incorporation were still in the
fatally infirmed. Upon examination of the Decision, we find that it name of "Agencia de R. C. Sicam," thus inevitably misleading, or at
expressed clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is the very least, creating the wrong impression to respondents and
based as required by Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution. The the public as well, that the pawnshop was owned solely by
discretion to decide a case one way or another is broad enough to petitioner Sicam and not by a corporation.
justify the adoption of the arguments put forth by one of the Even petitioners counsel, Atty. Marcial T. Balgos, in his letter 16
parties, as long as these are legally tenable and supported by law dated October 15, 1987 addressed to the Central Bank, expressly
and the facts on records.11 referred to petitioner Sicam as the proprietor of the pawnshop
Our jurisdiction under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to notwithstanding the alleged incorporation in April 1987.
the review of errors of law committed by the appellate court. We also find no merit in petitioners' argument that since
Generally, the findings of fact of the appellate court are deemed respondents had alleged in their Amended Complaint that
conclusive and we are not duty-bound to analyze and calibrate all petitioner corporation is the present owner of the pawnshop, the
over again the evidence adduced by the parties in the court a quo.12 CA is bound to decide the case on that basis.
This rule, however, is not without exceptions, such as where the Section 4 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an
factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
conflicting or contradictory13 as is obtaining in the instant case. proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
However, after a careful examination of the records, we find no admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
justification to absolve petitioner Sicam from liability. through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
The CA correctly pierced the veil of the corporate fiction and Thus, the general rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon
adjudged petitioner Sicam liable together with petitioner the party making it and does not require proof, admits of two
corporation. The rule is that the veil of corporate fiction may be exceptions, to wit: (1) when it is shown that such admission was
pierced when made as a shield to perpetrate fraud and/or confuse made through palpable mistake, and (2) when it is shown that no
legitimate issues. 14 The theory of corporate entity was not meant such admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows
to promote unfair objectives or otherwise to shield them.15 one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such
Notably, the evidence on record shows that at the time respondent an admission.17
Lulu pawned her jewelry, the pawnshop was owned by petitioner The Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court explained the
Sicam himself. As correctly observed by the CA, in all the second exception in this wise:
pawnshop receipts issued to respondent Lulu in September 1987,
Page 57 of 205
x x x if a party invokes an "admission" by an adverse party, corporation. In paragraph 1 of his Answer, he admitted the
but cites the admission "out of context," then the one allegations in paragraph 1 and 2 of the Complaint. He
making the "admission" may show that he made no "such" merely added "that defendant is not now the real party in
admission, or that his admission was taken out of interest in this case."
context. It was defendant Sicam's omission to correct the pawnshop
x x x that the party can also show that he made no tickets used in the subject transactions in this case which
"such admission", i.e., not in the sense in which the was the cause of the instant action. He cannot now ask for
admission is made to appear. the dismissal of the complaint against him simply on the
That is the reason for the modifier "such" because if the mere allegation that his pawnshop business is now
rule simply states that the admission may be contradicted incorporated. It is a matter of defense, the merit of which
by showing that "no admission was made," the rule would can only be reached after consideration of the evidence to
not really be providing for a contradiction of the admission be presented in due course.19
but just a denial.18 (Emphasis supplied). Unmistakably, the alleged admission made in respondents'
While it is true that respondents alleged in their Amended Amended Complaint was taken "out of context" by petitioner Sicam
Complaint that petitioner corporation is the present owner of the to suit his own purpose. Ineluctably, the fact that petitioner Sicam
pawnshop, they did so only because petitioner Sicam alleged in his continued to issue pawnshop receipts under his name and not
Answer to the original complaint filed against him that he was not under the corporation's name militates for the piercing of the
the real party-in-interest as the pawnshop was incorporated in corporate veil.
April 1987. Moreover, a reading of the Amended Complaint in its We likewise find no merit in petitioners' contention that the CA
entirety shows that respondents referred to both petitioner Sicam erred in piercing the veil of corporate fiction of petitioner
and petitioner corporation where they (respondents) pawned their corporation, as it was not an issue raised and litigated before the
assorted pieces of jewelry and ascribed to both the failure to RTC.
observe due diligence commensurate with the business which Petitioner Sicam had alleged in his Answer filed with the trial court
resulted in the loss of their pawned jewelry. that he was not the real party-in-interest because since April 20,
Markedly, respondents, in their Opposition to petitioners Motion to 1987, the pawnshop business initiated by him was incorporated
Dismiss Amended Complaint, insofar as petitioner Sicam is and known as Agencia de R.C. Sicam. In the pre-trial brief filed by
concerned, averred as follows: petitioner Sicam, he submitted that as far as he was concerned,
Roberto C. Sicam was named the defendant in the original the basic issue was whether he is the real party in interest against
complaint because the pawnshop tickets involved in this whom the complaint should be directed.20 In fact, he subsequently
case did not show that the R.C. Sicam Pawnshop was a moved for the dismissal of the complaint as to him but was not
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favorably acted upon by the trial court. Moreover, the issue was person shall be responsible for those events which could
squarely passed upon, although erroneously, by the trial court in not be foreseen or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
its Decision in this manner: Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not
x x x The defendant Roberto Sicam, Jr likewise denies foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the event
liability as far as he is concerned for the reason that he should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly
cannot be made personally liable for a claim arising from a believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The
corporate transaction. mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to
This Court sustains the contention of the defendant foresee the same. 22
Roberto C. Sicam, Jr. The amended complaint itself asserts To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must
that "plaintiff pawned assorted jewelries in defendant's concur: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence
pawnshop." It has been held that " as a consequence of the or of the failure of the debtor to comply with obligations must be
separate juridical personality of a corporation, the corporate independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee the
debt or credit is not the debt or credit of the stockholder, event that constitutes the caso fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it
nor is the stockholder's debt or credit that of a must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to
corporation.21 render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill obligations in a normal
Clearly, in view of the alleged incorporation of the pawnshop, the manner; and, (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in
issue of whether petitioner Sicam is personally liable is inextricably the aggravation of the injury or loss. 23
connected with the determination of the question whether the The burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil should or should not apply to rests on him who invokes it.24 And, in order for a fortuitous event
the case. to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed
The next question is whether petitioners are liable for the loss of no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. 25
the pawned articles in their possession. It has been held that an act of God cannot be invoked to protect a
Petitioners insist that they are not liable since robbery is a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse
fortuitous event and they are not negligent at all. consequences of such a loss. One's negligence may have concurred
We are not persuaded. with an act of God in producing damage and injury to another;
Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides: nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one
when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the from liability. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a
nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person's participation -- whether by active intervention, neglect or
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failure to act -- the whole occurrence is humanized and removed third parties and that neither the claimant nor the
from the rules applicable to acts of God. 26 person alleged to be negligent has any participation. In
Petitioner Sicam had testified that there was a security guard in accordance with the Rules of Evidence, the burden of
their pawnshop at the time of the robbery. He likewise testified that proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests
when he started the pawnshop business in 1983, he thought of on him who invokes it which in this case is the
opening a vault with the nearby bank for the purpose of private respondent. However, other than the police report
safekeeping the valuables but was discouraged by the Central of the alleged carnapping incident, no other evidence was
Bank since pawned articles should only be stored in a vault inside presented by private respondent to the effect that the
the pawnshop. The very measures which petitioners had allegedly incident was not due to its fault. A police report of an
adopted show that to them the possibility of robbery was not only alleged crime, to which only private respondent is privy,
foreseeable, but actually foreseen and anticipated. Petitioner does not suffice to establish the carnapping. Neither does it
Sicams testimony, in effect, contradicts petitioners defense of prove that there was no fault on the part of private
fortuitous event. respondent notwithstanding the parties' agreement at the
Moreover, petitioners failed to show that they were free from any pre-trial that the car was carnapped. Carnapping does not
negligence by which the loss of the pawned jewelry may have been foreclose the possibility of fault or negligence on the part of
occasioned. private respondent.28
Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event. It Just like in Co, petitioners merely presented the police report of the
does not foreclose the possibility of negligence on the part of herein Paraaque Police Station on the robbery committed based on the
petitioners. In Co v. Court of Appeals,27 the Court held: report of petitioners' employees which is not sufficient to establish
It is not a defense for a repair shop of motor vehicles to robbery. Such report also does not prove that petitioners were not
escape liability simply because the damage or loss of a at fault.
thing lawfully placed in its possession was due to On the contrary, by the very evidence of petitioners, the CA did not
carnapping. Carnapping per se cannot be considered as a err in finding that petitioners are guilty of concurrent or
fortuitous event. The fact that a thing was unlawfully and contributory negligence as provided in Article 1170 of the Civil
forcefully taken from another's rightful possession, as Code, to wit:
in cases of carnapping, does not automatically give rise Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their
to a fortuitous event. To be considered as such, obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and
carnapping entails more than the mere forceful taking those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are
of another's property. It must be proved and established liable for damages.29
that the event was an act of God or was done solely by
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Article 2123 of the Civil Code provides that with regard to guilty of negligence in the operation of their pawnshop business.
pawnshops and other establishments which are engaged in making Petitioner Sicam testified, thus:
loans secured by pledges, the special laws and regulations Court:
concerning them shall be observed, and subsidiarily, the provisions Q. Do you have security guards in your pawnshop?
on pledge, mortgage and antichresis. A. Yes, your honor.
The provision on pledge, particularly Article 2099 of the Civil Code, Q. Then how come that the robbers were able to enter the
provides that the creditor shall take care of the thing pledged with premises when according to you there was a security
the diligence of a good father of a family. This means that guard?
petitioners must take care of the pawns the way a prudent person A. Sir, if these robbers can rob a bank, how much more a
would as to his own property. pawnshop.
In this connection, Article 1173 of the Civil Code further provides: Q. I am asking you how were the robbers able to enter
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in despite the fact that there was a security guard?
the omission of that diligence which is required by the A. At the time of the incident which happened about 1:00
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon and it happened on a
circumstances of the persons, of time and of the place. Saturday and everything was quiet in the area BF Homes
When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles Paraaque they pretended to pawn an article in the
1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply. pawnshop, so one of my employees allowed him to come in
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to and it was only when it was announced that it was a hold
be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a up.
good father of a family shall be required. Q. Did you come to know how the vault was opened?
We expounded in Cruz v. Gangan30 that negligence is the omission A. When the pawnshop is official (sic) open your honor the
to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those pawnshop is partly open. The combination is off.
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human Q. No one open (sic) the vault for the robbers?
affairs, would do; or the doing of something which a prudent and A. No one your honor it was open at the time of the robbery.
reasonable man would not do.31 It is want of care required by the Q. It is clear now that at the time of the robbery the vault
circumstances. was open the reason why the robbers were able to get all
A review of the records clearly shows that petitioners failed to the items pawned to you inside the vault.
exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent A. Yes sir.32
person would have used in the same situation. Petitioners were revealing that there were no security measures adopted by
petitioners in the operation of the pawnshop. Evidently, no
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sufficient precaution and vigilance were adopted by petitioners to Under Section 17 of Central Bank Circular No. 374, Rules and
protect the pawnshop from unlawful intrusion. There was no clear Regulations for Pawnshops, which took effect on July 13, 1973,
showing that there was any security guard at all. Or if there was and which was issued pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 114,
one, that he had sufficient training in securing a pawnshop. Pawnshop Regulation Act, it is provided that pawns pledged must
Further, there is no showing that the alleged security guard be insured, to wit:
exercised all that was necessary to prevent any untoward incident Sec. 17. Insurance of Office Building and Pawns- The place
or to ensure that no suspicious individuals were allowed to enter of business of a pawnshop and the pawns pledged to it
the premises. In fact, it is even doubtful that there was a security must be insured against fire and against burglary as well
guard, since it is quite impossible that he would not have noticed as for the latter(sic), by an insurance company accredited
that the robbers were armed with caliber .45 pistols each, which by the Insurance Commissioner.
were allegedly poked at the employees. 33 Significantly, the alleged However, this Section was subsequently amended by CB Circular
security guard was not presented at all to corroborate petitioner No. 764 which took effect on October 1, 1980, to wit:
Sicam's claim; not one of petitioners' employees who were present Sec. 17 Insurance of Office Building and Pawns The office
during the robbery incident testified in court. building/premises and pawns of a pawnshop must be
Furthermore, petitioner Sicam's admission that the vault was open insured against fire. (emphasis supplied).
at the time of robbery is clearly a proof of petitioners' failure to where the requirement that insurance against burglary was
observe the care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances deleted. Obviously, the Central Bank considered it not feasible to
justly demanded. Petitioner Sicam testified that once the pawnshop require insurance of pawned articles against burglary.
was open, the combination was already off. Considering petitioner The robbery in the pawnshop happened in 1987, and considering
Sicam's testimony that the robbery took place on a Saturday the above-quoted amendment, there is no statutory duty imposed
afternoon and the area in BF Homes Paraaque at that time was on petitioners to insure the pawned jewelry in which case it was
quiet, there was more reason for petitioners to have exercised error for the CA to consider it as a factor in concluding that
reasonable foresight and diligence in protecting the pawned petitioners were negligent.
jewelries. Instead of taking the precaution to protect them, they let Nevertheless, the preponderance of evidence shows that petitioners
open the vault, providing no difficulty for the robbers to cart away failed to exercise the diligence required of them under the Civil
the pawned articles. Code.
We, however, do not agree with the CA when it found petitioners The diligence with which the law requires the individual at all
negligent for not taking steps to insure themselves against loss of times to govern his conduct varies with the nature of the situation
the pawned jewelries. in which he is placed and the importance of the act which he is to
perform.34 Thus, the cases of Austria v. Court of Appeals,35
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Hernandez v. Chairman, Commission on Audit36 and Cruz v. the evening carrying jewelry of considerable value would have been
Gangan37 cited by petitioners in their pleadings, where the victims negligence per se and would not exempt her from responsibility in
of robbery were exonerated from liability, find no application to the the case of robbery. However we did not hold Abad liable for
present case. negligence since, the robbery happened ten years previously; i.e.,
In Austria, Maria Abad received from Guillermo Austria a pendant 1961, when criminality had not reached the level of incidence
with diamonds to be sold on commission basis, but which Abad obtaining in 1971.
failed to subsequently return because of a robbery committed upon In contrast, the robbery in this case took place in 1987 when
her in 1961. The incident became the subject of a criminal case robbery was already prevalent and petitioners in fact had already
filed against several persons. Austria filed an action against Abad foreseen it as they wanted to deposit the pawn with a nearby bank
and her husband (Abads) for recovery of the pendant or its value, for safekeeping. Moreover, unlike in Austria, where no negligence
but the Abads set up the defense that the robbery extinguished was committed, we found petitioners negligent in securing their
their obligation. The RTC ruled in favor of Austria, as the Abads pawnshop as earlier discussed.
failed to prove robbery; or, if committed, that Maria Abad was In Hernandez, Teodoro Hernandez was the OIC and special
guilty of negligence. The CA, however, reversed the RTC decision disbursing officer of the Ternate Beach Project of the Philippine
holding that the fact of robbery was duly established and declared Tourism in Cavite. In the morning of July 1, 1983, a Friday, he
the Abads not responsible for the loss of the jewelry on account of went to Manila to encash two checks covering the wages of the
a fortuitous event. We held that for the Abads to be relieved from employees and the operating expenses of the project. However for
the civil liability of returning the pendant under Art. 1174 of the some reason, the processing of the check was delayed and was
Civil Code, it would only be sufficient that the unforeseen event, completed at about 3 p.m. Nevertheless, he decided to encash the
the robbery, took place without any concurrent fault on the check because the project employees would be waiting for their pay
debtors part, and this can be done by preponderance of evidence; the following day; otherwise, the workers would have to wait until
that to be free from liability for reason of fortuitous event, the July 5, the earliest time, when the main office would open. At that
debtor must, in addition to the casus itself, be free of any time, he had two choices: (1) return to Ternate, Cavite that same
concurrent or contributory fault or negligence. 38 afternoon and arrive early evening; or (2) take the money with him
We found in Austria that under the circumstances prevailing at the to his house in Marilao, Bulacan, spend the night there, and leave
time the Decision was promulgated in 1971, the City of Manila and for Ternate the following day. He chose the second option, thinking
its suburbs had a high incidence of crimes against persons and it was the safer one. Thus, a little past 3 p.m., he took a passenger
property that rendered travel after nightfall a matter to be jeep bound for Bulacan. While the jeep was on Epifanio de los
sedulously avoided without suitable precaution and protection; Santos Avenue, the jeep was held up and the money kept by
that the conduct of Maria Abad in returning alone to her house in Hernandez was taken, and the robbers jumped out of the jeep and
Page 63 of 205
ran. Hernandez chased the robbers and caught up with one robber In Cruz, Dr. Filonila O. Cruz, Camanava District Director of
who was subsequently charged with robbery and pleaded guilty. Technological Education and Skills Development Authority
The other robber who held the stolen money escaped. The (TESDA), boarded the Light Rail Transit (LRT) from Sen. Puyat
Commission on Audit found Hernandez negligent because he had Avenue to Monumento when her handbag was slashed and the
not brought the cash proceeds of the checks to his office in contents were stolen by an unidentified person. Among those
Ternate, Cavite for safekeeping, which is the normal procedure in stolen were her wallet and the government-issued cellular phone.
the handling of funds. We held that Hernandez was not negligent She then reported the incident to the police authorities; however,
in deciding to encash the check and bringing it home to Marilao, the thief was not located, and the cellphone was not recovered. She
Bulacan instead of Ternate, Cavite due to the lateness of the hour also reported the loss to the Regional Director of TESDA, and she
for the following reasons: (1) he was moved by unselfish motive for requested that she be freed from accountability for the cellphone.
his co-employees to collect their wages and salaries the following The Resident Auditor denied her request on the ground that she
day, a Saturday, a non-working, because to encash the check on lacked the diligence required in the custody of government property
July 5, the next working day after July 1, would have caused and was ordered to pay the purchase value in the total amount of
discomfort to laborers who were dependent on their wages for P4,238.00. The COA found no sufficient justification to grant the
sustenance; and (2) that choosing Marilao as a safer destination, request for relief from accountability. We reversed the ruling and
being nearer, and in view of the comparative hazards in the trips to found that riding the LRT cannot per se be denounced as a
the two places, said decision seemed logical at that time. We negligent act more so because Cruzs mode of transit was
further held that the fact that two robbers attacked him in broad influenced by time and money considerations; that she boarded the
daylight in the jeep while it was on a busy highway and in the LRT to be able to arrive in Caloocan in time for her 3 pm meeting;
presence of other passengers could not be said to be a result of his that any prudent and rational person under similar circumstance
imprudence and negligence. can reasonably be expected to do the same; that possession of a
Unlike in Hernandez where the robbery happened in a public cellphone should not hinder one from boarding the LRT coach as
utility, the robbery in this case took place in the pawnshop which Cruz did considering that whether she rode a jeep or bus, the risk
is under the control of petitioners. Petitioners had the means to of theft would have also been present; that because of her relatively
screen the persons who were allowed entrance to the premises and low position and pay, she was not expected to have her own vehicle
to protect itself from unlawful intrusion. Petitioners had failed to or to ride a taxicab; she did not have a government assigned
exercise precautionary measures in ensuring that the robbers were vehicle; that placing the cellphone in a bag away from covetous
prevented from entering the pawnshop and for keeping the vault eyes and holding on to that bag as she did is ordinarily sufficient
open for the day, which paved the way for the robbers to easily cart care of a cellphone while traveling on board the LRT; that the
away the pawned articles.
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records did not show any specific act of negligence on her part and
negligence can never be presumed.
Unlike in the Cruz case, the robbery in this case happened in
petitioners' pawnshop and they were negligent in not exercising the
precautions justly demanded of a pawnshop.
WHEREFORE, except for the insurance aspect, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated March 31, 2003 and its Resolution dated
August 8, 2003, are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
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Republic of the Philippines sitting at the front seat was thrown out of the
SUPREME COURT vehicle. Upon landing on the ground, the plaintiff
Manila momentarily lost consciousness. When he came to
FIRST DIVISION his senses, he found that he had a lacerated wound
G.R. No. L-45637 May 31, 1985 on his right palm. Aside from this, he suffered
ROBERTO JUNTILLA, petitioner, injuries on his left arm, right thigh and on his back.
vs. (Exh. "D"). Because of his shock and injuries, he
CLEMENTE FONTANAR, FERNANDO BANZON and BERFOL went back to Danao City but on the way, he
CAMORO, respondents. discovered that his "Omega" wrist watch was lost.
Valentin A. Zozobrado for petitioner. Upon his arrival in Danao City, he immediately
Ruperto N. Alfarara for respondents. entered the Danao City Hospital to attend to his
injuries, and also requested his father-in-law to
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: proceed immediately to the place of the accident and
This is a petition for review, on questions of law, of the decision of look for the watch. In spite of the efforts of his
the Court of First Instance of Cebu which reversed the decision of father-in-law, the wrist watch, which he bought for
the City Court of Cebu and exonerated the respondents from any P 852.70 (Exh. "B") could no longer be found.
liability arising from a vehicular accident. xxx xxx xxx
The background facts which led to the filing of a complaint for Petitioner Roberto Juntilla filed Civil Case No. R-17378 for breach
breach of contract and damages against the respondents are of contract with damages before the City Court of Cebu City,
summarized by the Court of First Instance of Cebu as follows: Branch I against Clemente Fontanar, Fernando Banzon and Berfol
The facts established after trial show that the Camoro.
plaintiff was a passenger of the public utility jeepney The respondents filed their answer, alleging inter alia that the
bearing plate No. PUJ-71-7 on the course of the trip accident that caused losses to the petitioner was beyond the
from Danao City to Cebu City. The jeepney was control of the respondents taking into account that the tire that
driven by defendant Berfol Camoro. It was registered exploded was newly bought and was only slightly used at the time
under the franchise of defendant Clemente Fontanar it blew up.
but was actually owned by defendant Fernando After trial, Judge Romulo R. Senining of the Civil Court of Cebu
Banzon. When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner and against the
the right rear tire exploded causing the vehicle to respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
turn turtle. In the process, the plaintiff who was
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WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor the doctrine laid down by the Honorable Supreme
of the plaintiff and against the defendants and the Court in the case of Necesito et al. v. Paras, et al.
latter are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to We find the petition impressed with merit.
pay the plaintiff the sum of P750.00 as The City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu found that
reimbursement for the lost Omega wrist watch, the the right rear tire of the passenger jeepney in which the petitioner
sum of P246.64 as unrealized salary of the plaintiff was riding blew up causing the vehicle to fall on its side. The
from his employer, the further sum of P100.00 for petitioner questions the conclusion of the respondent court drawn
the doctor's fees and medicine, an additional sum of from this finding of fact.
P300.00 for attorney's fees and the costs. The Court of First Instance of Cebu erred when it absolved the
The respondents appealed to the Court of First Instance of Cebu, carrier from any liability upon a finding that the tire blow out is a
Branch XIV. fortuitous event. The Court of First Instance of Cebu ruled that:
Judge Leonardo B. Canares reversed the judgment of the City After reviewing the records of the case, this Court
Court of Cebu upon a finding that the accident in question was finds that the accident in question was due to a
due to a fortuitous event. The dispositive portion of the decision fortuitous event. A tire blow-out, such as what
reads: happened in the case at bar, is an inevitable
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered accident that exempts the carrier from liability,
exonerating the defendants from any liability to the there being absence of a showing that there was
plaintiff without pronouncement as to costs. misconduct or negligence on the part of the operator
A motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of First in the operation and maintenance of the vehicle
Instance. involved. The fact that the right rear tire exploded,
The petitioner raises the following alleged errors committed by the despite being brand new, constitutes a clear case of
Court of First Instance of Cebu on appeal caso fortuito which can be a proper basis for
a. The Honorable Court below committed grave exonerating the defendants from liability. ...
abuse of discretion in failing to take cognizance of The Court of First Instance relied on the ruling of the Court of
the fact that defendants and/or their employee Appeals in Rodriguez v. Red Line Transportation Co., CA G.R. No.
failed to exercise "utmost and/or extraordinary 8136, December 29, 1954, where the Court of Appeals ruled that:
diligence" required of common carriers contemplated A tire blow-out does not constitute negligence unless
under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. the tire was already old and should not have been
b. The Honorable Court below committed grave used at all. Indeed, this would be a clear case of
abuse of discretion by deciding the case contrary to fortuitous event.
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The foregoing conclusions of the Court of First Instance of Cebu petitioner stated that there were three (3) passengers in the front
are based on a misapprehension of overall facts from which a seat and fourteen (14) passengers in the rear.
conclusion should be drawn. The reliance of the Court of First While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good
Instance on the Rodriguez case is not in order. In La Mallorca and because the grooves of the tire were still visible, this fact alone does
Pampanga Bus Co. v. De Jesus, et al. (17 SCRA 23), we held that: not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous event. No evidence
Petitioner maintains that a tire blow-out is a was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road
fortuitous event and gives rise to no liability for conditions or that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to
negligence, citing the rulings of the Court of Appeals compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents. The
in Rodriguez v. Red Line Transportation Co., CA sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been caused by too
G.R. No. 8136, December 29, 1954, and People v. much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the
Palapad, CA-G.R. No. 18480, June 27, 1958. These jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident.
rulings, however, not only are not binding on this In Lasam v. Smith (45 Phil. 657), we laid down the following
Court but were based on considerations quite essential characteristics of caso fortuito:
different from those that obtain in the case at bar. xxx xxx xxx
The appellate court there made no findings of any ... In a legal sense and, consequently, also in
specific acts of negligence on the part of the relation to contracts, a caso fortuito presents the
defendants and confined itself to the question of following essential characteristics: (1) The cause of
whether or not a tire blow-out, by itself alone and the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the
without a showing as to the causative factors, would failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation,
generate liability. ... must be independent of the human will. (2) It must
In the case at bar, there are specific acts of negligence on the part be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes
of the respondents. The records show that the passenger jeepney the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be
turned turtle and jumped into a ditch immediately after its right impossible to avoid. (3) The occurrence must be
rear tire exploded. The evidence shows that the passenger jeepney such as to render it impossible for the debtor to
was running at a very fast speed before the accident. We agree with fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. And (4) the
the observation of the petitioner that a public utility jeep running obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation
at a regular and safe speed will not jump into a ditch when its right in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the
rear tire blows up. There is also evidence to show that the creditor. (5 Encyclopedia Juridica Espanola, 309.)
passenger jeepney was overloaded at the time of the accident. The In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
occurrence was not independent of the human will. The accident
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was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because privity whatever with the manufacturer or vendor of
of mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach the defective equipment, the passenger has no
their drivers not to overload their vehicles, not to exceed safe and remedy against him, while the carrier usually has. It
legal speed limits, and to know the correct measures to take when is but logical, therefore, that the carrier, while not
a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times. an insurer of the safety of his passengers, should
Relative to the contingency of mechanical defects, we held in nevertheless be held to answer for the flaws of his
Necesito, et al. v. Paras, et al. (104 Phil. 75), that: equipment if such flaws were at all discoverable. ...
... The preponderance of authority is in favor of the It is sufficient to reiterate that the source of a common carrier's
doctrine that a passenger is entitled to recover legal liability is the contract of carriage, and by entering into the
damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from said contract, it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as
a defect in an appliance purchased from a human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence
manufacturer, whenever it appears that the defect of a very cautious person, with a due regard for all the
would have been discovered by the carrier if it had circumstances. The records show that this obligation was not met
exercised the degree of care which under the by the respondents.
circumstances was incumbent upon it, with regard The respondents likewise argue that the petitioner cannot recover
to inspection and application of the necessary tests. any amount for failure to prove such damages during the trial. The
For the purposes of this doctrine, the manufacturer respondents submit that if the petitioner was really injured, why
is considered as being in law the agent or servant of was he treated in Danao City and not in Mandaue City where the
the carrier, as far as regards the work of accident took place. The respondents argue that the doctor who
constructing the appliance. According to this theory, issued the medical certificate was not presented during the trial,
the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve and hence not cross-examined. The respondents also claim that
the carrier from liability' (10 Am. Jur. 205, s, 1324; the petitioner was not wearing any wrist watch during the accident.
see also Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Roy, 102 U.S. 451; It should be noted that the City Court of Cebu found that the
20 L. Ed. 141; Southern R. Co. v. Hussey, 74 ALR petitioner had a lacerated wound on his right palm aside from
1172; 42 Fed. 2d 70; and Ed Note, 29 ALR 788.: injuries on his left arm, right thigh and on his back, and that on
Ann. Cas. 1916E 929). his way back to Danao City, he discovered that his "Omega" wrist
The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that watch was lost. These are findings of facts of the City Court of
the passenger has neither choice nor control over Cebu which we find no reason to disturb. More so when we
the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment consider the fact that the Court of First Instance of Cebu impliedly
and appliances in use by the carrier. Having no
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concurred in these matters when it confined itself to the question
of whether or not the tire blow out was a fortuitous event.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch IV appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and the decision of the City Court of Cebu, Branch I is
REINSTATED, with the modification that the damages shall earn
interest at 12% per annum and the attorney's fees are increased to
SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00). Damages shall earn interests
from January 27, 1975.
SO ORDERED.
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Republic of the Philippines official, Engr. Jesus L. Reyna. Pertinent aspects of the latter's
SUPREME COURT Report 5 dated October 18, 1989 stated, as follows:
Manila 5. One of the factors that may have led to this
THIRD DIVISION calamitous event is the formation of the building in
the area and the general direction of the wind.
G.R. No. 126389 July 10, 1998 Situated in the peripheral lot is an almost U-shaped
SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE INC., petitioner, formation of 4-storey building. Thus, with the strong
vs. winds having a westerly direction, the general
COURT OF APPEALS, JUANITA DE JESUS VDA. DE DIMAANO, formation of the building becomes a big funnel-like
EMERITA DIMAANO, REMEDIOS DIMAANO, CONSOLACION structure, the one situated along College Road,
DIMAANO and MILAGROS DIMAANO, respondents. receiving the heaviest impact of the strong winds.
Hence, there are portions of the roofing, those
PURISIMA, J.: located on both ends of the building, which
Petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to remained intact after the storm.
set aside the Decision 1 promulgated on July 31, 1996, and 6. Another factor and perhaps the most likely reason
Resolution 2 dated September 12, 1996 of the Court of Appeals 3 in for the dislodging of the roofing structural trusses is
CA-G.R. No. 41422, entitled "Juanita de Jesus vda. de Dimaano, et the improper anchorage of the said trusses to the
al. vs. Southeastern College, Inc.", which reduced the moral roof beams. The 1/2' diameter steel bars embedded
damages awarded below from P1,000,000.00 to P200,000.00. 4 The on the concrete roof beams which serve as truss
Resolution under attack denied petitioner's motion for anchorage are not bolted nor nailed to the trusses.
reconsideration. Still, there are other steel bars which were not even
Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road, bent to the trusses, thus, those trusses are not
Pasay City, while petitioner owns a four-storey school building anchored at all to the roof beams.
along the same College Road. On October 11, 1989, at about 6:30 It then recommended that "to avoid any further loss and
in the morning, a powerful typhoon "Saling" hit Metro Manila. damage to lives, limbs and property of persons living in the
Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of petitioner's building was vicinity," the fourth floor of subject school building be
partly ripped off and blown away, landing on and destroying declared as a "structural hazard."
portions of the roofing of private respondents' house. After the In their Complaint 6 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection of the destroyed building Branch 117, for damages based on culpa aquiliana, private
was conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building respondents alleged that the damage to their house rendered the
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same uninhabitable, forcing them to stay temporarily in others' c) P100,000.00 as
houses. And so they sought to recover from petitioner P117,116.00, attorney's fees;
as actual damages, P1,000,000.00, as moral damages, d) Costs of the instant
P300,000.00, as exemplary damages and P100,000.00, for and as suit.
attorney's fees; plus costs. The claim for exemplary damages is denied for the
In its Answer, petitioner averred that subject school building had reason that the defendants (sic) did in a wanton
withstood several devastating typhoons and other calamities in the fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
past, without its roofing or any portion thereof giving way; that it manner.
has not been remiss in its responsibility to see to it that said school In its appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner assigned as errors,
building, which houses school children, faculty members, and 8 that:
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SUIT TO DIMAANOS WHEN THEY HAVE NOT 4. Whether or not the award of attorney's fees when
INCURRED ACTUAL DAMAGES AT ALL AS the case was already moot academic [sic] legally
DIMAANOS HAVE ALREADY SOLD THEIR justified.
PROPERTY, AN INTERVENING EVENT THAT 5. Whether or not petitioner is liable for damage
RENDERS THIS CASE MOOT AND ACADEMIC. caused to others by typhoon "Saling" being an act of
IV God.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE 6. Whether or not the issuance of a writ of execution
ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION INSPITE pending appeal, ex-parte or without hearing, has
OF THE PERFECTION OF SOUTHEASTERN'S support in law.
APPEAL WHEN THERE IS NO COMPELLING The pivot of inquiry here, determinative of the other issues, is
REASON FOR THE ISSUANCE THERETO. whether the damage on the roof of the building of private
As mentioned earlier, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed with respondents resulting from the impact of the falling portions of the
modification the trial court's disposition by reducing the award of school building's roof ripped off by the strong winds of typhoon
moral damages from P1,000,000.00 to P200,000.00. Hence, "Saling", was, within legal contemplation, due to fortuitous event?
petitioner's resort to this Court, raising for resolution the issues of: If so, petitioner cannot be held liable for the damages suffered by
1. Whether or not the award of actual damages [sic] the private respondents. This conclusion finds support in Article
to respondent Dimaanos on the basis of speculation 1174 of Civil Code, which provides:
or conjecture, without proof or receipts of actual Art 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the
damage, [sic] legally feasible or justified. law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation,
2. Whether or not the award of moral damages to or when the nature of the obligation requires the
respondent Dimaanos, with the latter having assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible
suffered, actual damage has legal basis. for those events which could not be foreseen, or
3. Whether or not respondent Dimaanos who are no which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
longer the owner of the property, subject matter of The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is found in the
the case, during its pendency, has the right to Partidas which defines it as "an event which takes place by
pursue their complaint against petitioner when the accident and could not have been foreseen." 9 Escriche elaborates
case was already moot and academic by the sale of it as "an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be
the property to third party. foreseen nor resisted." 10 Civilist Arturo M. Tolentino adds that
"[f]ortuitous events may be produced by two general causes: (1) by
nature, such as earthquakes, storms, floods, epidemics, fires, etc.
Page 73 of 205
and (2) by the act of man, such as an armed invasion, attack by There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event,
bandits, governmental prohibitions, robbery, etc." 11 a natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable
In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, despite any amount of foresight, diligence or care. 15 In order to be
it is necessary that he be free from any previous negligence or exempt from liability arising from any adverse consequence
misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned. engendered thereby, there should have been no human
12 An act of God cannot be invoked for the protection of a person participation amounting to a negligent act. 16 In other words; the
who has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its person seeking exoneration from liability must not be guilty of
possible adverse consequences. When a person's negligence negligence. Negligence, as commonly understood, is conduct which
concurs with an act of God in producing damage or injury to naturally or reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others. It
another, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that may be the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and
the immediate or proximate cause of the damages or injury was a vigilance which the circumstances justify demand, 17 or the
fortuitous event. When the effect is found to be partly the result of omission to do something which a prudent and reasonable man,
the participation of man whether it be from active intervention, guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
or neglect, or failure to act the whole occurrence is hereby human affairs, would
humanized, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. do. 18 From these premises, we proceed to determine whether
13 petitioner was negligent, such that if it were not, the damage
In the case under consideration, the lower court accorded full caused to private respondents' house could have been avoided?
credence to the finding of the investigating team that subject At the outset, it bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages
school building's roofing had "no sufficient anchorage to hold it in for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the
position especially when battered by strong winds." Based on such existence of fault or negligence causative of his injury or loss. The
finding, the trial court imputed negligence to petitioner and facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by
adjudged it liable for damages to private respondents. competent evidence, 19 not merely by presumptions and
After a thorough study and evaluation of the evidence on record, conclusions without basis in fact. Private respondents, in
this Court believes otherwise, notwithstanding the general rule that establishing the culpability of petitioner, merely relied on the
factual findings by the trail court, especially when affirmed by the aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an ocular
appellate court, are binding and conclusive upon this Court. 14 inspection of petitioner's school building after the typhoon. As the
After a careful scrutiny of the records and the pleadings submitted term imparts, an ocular inspection is one by means of actual sight
by the parties, we find exception to this rule and hold that the or viewing. 20 What is visual to the eye through, is not always
lower courts misappreciated the evidence proffered. reflective of the real cause behind. For instance, one who hears a
gunshot and then sees a wounded person, cannot always definitely
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conclude that a third person shot the victim. It could have been unqualified imprimatur, the city building official is presumed to
self-inflicted or caused accidentally by a stray bullet. The have properly performed his duties 23 in connection therewith.
relationship of cause and effect must be clearly shown. In addition, petitioner presented its vice president for finance and
In the present case, other than the said ocular inspection, no administration who testified that an annual maintenance
investigation was conducted to determine the real cause of the inspection and repair of subject school building were regularly
partial unroofing of petitioner's school building. Private undertaken. Petitioner was even willing to present its maintenance
respondents did not even show that the plans, specifications and supervisor to attest to the extent of such regular inspection but
design of said school building were deficient and defective. Neither private respondents agreed to dispense with his testimony and
did they prove any substantial deviation from the approved plans simply stipulated that it would be corroborative of the vice
and specifications. Nor did they conclusively establish that the president's narration.
construction of such building was basically flawed. 21 Moreover, the city building official, who has been in the city
On the other hand, petitioner elicited from one of the witnesses of government service since 1974, admitted in open court that no
private respondents, city building official Jesus Reyna, that the complaint regarding any defect on the same structure has ever
original plans and design of petitioner's school building were been lodged before his office prior to the institution of the case at
approved prior to its construction. Engr. Reyna admitted that it bench. It is a matter of judicial notice that typhoons are common
was a legal requirement before the construction of any building to occurrences in this country. If subject school building's roofing was
obtain a permit from the city building official (city engineer, prior to not firmly anchored to its trusses, obviously, it could not have
the passage of the Building Act of 1977). In like manner, after withstood long years and several typhoons even stronger than
construction of the building, a certification must be secured from "Saling."
the same official attesting to the readiness for occupancy of the In light of the foregoing, we find no clear and convincing evidence
edifice. Having obtained both building permit and certificate of to sustain the judgment of the appellate court. We thus hold that
occupancy, these are, at the very least, prima facie evidence of the petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the
regular and proper construction of subject school building. 22 construction and maintenance of its school building in question
Furthermore, when part of its roof needed repairs of the damage and that typhoon "Saling" was the proximate cause of the damage
inflicted by typhoon "Saling", the same city official gave the go- suffered by private respondents' house.
signal for such repairs without any deviation from the original With this disposition on the pivotal issue, private respondents'
design and subsequently, authorized the use of the entire fourth claim for actual and moral damages as well as attorney's fees must
floor of the same building. These only prove that subject building fail. 24 Petitioner cannot be made to answer for a purely fortuitous
suffers from no structural defect, contrary to the report that its "U- event. 25 More so because no bad faith or willful act to cause
shaped" form was "structurally defective." Having given his damage was alleged and proven to warrant moral damages.
Page 75 of 205
Private respondents failed to adduce adequate and competent proof
of the pecuniary loss they actually incurred. 26 It is not enough
that the damage be capable of proof but must be actually proved
with a reasonable degree of certainty, pointing out specific facts
that afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages
are borne. 27 Private respondents merely submitted an estimated
amount needed for the repair of the roof their subject building.
What is more, whether the "necessary repairs" were caused ONLY
by petitioner's alleged negligence in the maintenance of its school
building, or included the ordinary wear and tear of the house itself,
is an essential question that remains indeterminable.
The Court deems unnecessary to resolve the other issues posed by
petitioner.
As regards the sixth issue, however, the writ of execution issued on
April 1, 1993 by the trial court is hereby nullified and set aside.
Private respondents are ordered to reimburse any amount or
return to petitioner any property which they may have received by
virtue of the enforcement of said writ.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the challenged
Decision is REVERSED. The complaint of private respondents in
Civil Case No. 7314 before the trial court a quo is ordered
DISMISSED and the writ of execution issued on April 1, 1993 in
said case is SET ASIDE. Accordingly, private respondents are
ORDERED to return to petitioner any amount or property received
by them by virtue of said writ. Costs against the private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Page 76 of 205
Republic of the Philippines This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should
SUPREME COURT arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who
Manila may have suffered it.
EN BANC The question presented is whether the owner of the animal is liable
G.R. No. L-2075 November 29, 1949 when damage is caused to its caretaker.
MARGARITA AFIALDA, plaintiff-appellant, The lower court took the view that under the above-quoted
vs. provision of the Civil Code, the owner of an animal is answerable
BASILIO HISOLE and FRANCISCO HISOLE, defendants- only for damages caused to a stranger, and that for damage caused
appellees. to the caretaker of the animal the owner would be liable only if he
Nicolas P. Nonato for appellant. had been negligent or at fault under article 1902 of the same code.
Gellada, Mirasol and Ravena for appellees. Claiming that the lower court was in error, counsel for plaintiff
REYES, J.: contends that the article 1905 does not distinguish between
This is an action for damages arising from injury caused by an damage caused to the caretaker and makes the owner liable
animal. The complaint alleges that the now deceased, Loreto whether or not he has been negligent or at fault. For authority
Afialda, was employed by the defendant spouses as caretaker of counsel cites the following opinion which Manresa quotes from a
their carabaos at a fixed compensation; that while tending the decision of the Spanish Supreme Court:
animals he was, on March 21, 1947, gored by one of them and El articulo 1905 del codigo Civil no consienta otra
later died as a consequence of his injuries; that the mishap was interpretacion que la que, clara y evidentemente, se deriva
due neither to his own fault nor to force majeure; and that plaintiff de sus terminos literales, bastando, segun el mismo, que
is his elder sister and heir depending upon him for support. un animal cause perjuicio para que nasca la
Before filing their answer, defendants moved for the dismissal of responsibilidad del dueno, aun no imputandose a este
the complaint for lack of a cause of action, and the motion having ninguna clase de culpa o negligencia, habida,sin duda,
been granted by the lower court, plaintiff has taken this appeal. cuenta por el lgislador de que tal concepto de dueno es
Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under article 1905 of the suficiente para que arrastre las consecuencias favorables o
Civil Code, which reads: adversas de esta clase de propiedad, salvo la exception en el
The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, mismo contenida. (12 Manresa, Commentaries on the
is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal Spanish CivilCode, 573.)
should escape from him or stray away. This opinion, however, appears to have been rendered in a case
where an animal caused injury to a stranger or third person. It is
therefore no authority for a case like the present where the person
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injured was the caretaker of the animal. The distinction is There being no reversible error in the order appealed from, the
important. For the statute names the possessor or user of the same is hereby affirmed, but without costs in view of the financial
animal as the person liable for "any damages it may cause," and situation of the appellant.
this for the obvious reason that the possessor or user has the
custody and control of the animal and is therefore the one in a
position to prevent it from causing damage.
In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the
control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such.
Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the
animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including
himself. And being injured by the animal under those
circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he
had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the
consequences.
In a decision of the Spanish Supreme Court, cited by Manresa in
his Commentaries (Vol. 12, p. 578), the death of an employee who
was bitten by a feline which his master had asked him to take to
his establishment was by said tribunal declared to be "a veritable
accident of labor" which should come under the labor laws rather
than under article 1905 of the Civil Code. The present action,
however, is not brought under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
there being no allegation that, among other things, defendant's
business, whatever that might be, had a gross income of P20,000.
As already stated, defendant's liability is made to rest on article
1905 of the Civil Code. but action under that article is not tenable
for the reasons already stated. On the other hand, if action is to be
based on article 1902 of the Civil Code, it is essential that there be
fault or negligence on the part of the defendants as owners of the
animal that caused the damage. But the complaint contains no
allegation on those points.
Page 78 of 205
Republic of the Philippines From the evidence of plaintiffs it appears that in the
SUPREME COURT evening of June 28 until the early morning of June
Manila 29, 1967 a strong typhoon by the code name
SECOND DIVISION "Gening" buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte,
G.R. No. L-53401 November 6, 1989 bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding in its
THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, wake. Between 5:30 and 6:00 A.M. on June 29,
vs. 1967, after the typhoon had abated and when the
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (First Division) LILIAN floodwaters were beginning to recede the deceased
JUAN LUIS, JANE JUAN YABES, VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called Nana Belen, ventured
JUAN CARAG, and PURISIMA JUAN, respondents. out of the house of her son-in-law, Antonio Yabes,
Herman D. Coloma for petitioner. on No. 19 Guerrero Street, Laoag City, and
Glicerio S. Ferrer for private respondents. proceeded northward towards the direction of the
Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the owner
PARAS, J.: and proprietress, to look after the merchandise
Sought to be reversed in this petition is the Decision * of the therein that might have been damaged. Wading in
respondent Court of Appeals' First Division, setting aside the waist-deep flood on Guerrero, the deceased was
judgment of the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Ilocos Norte, followed by Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl at the Five
with the following dispositive portion: Sisters Grocery, also owned by the deceased, and by
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby set Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller at the YJ
aside and another rendered in its stead whereby Cinema, which was partly owned by the deceased.
defendant is hereby sentenced to pay plaintiffs Aida and Linda walked side by side at a distance of
actual damages of P30,229.45; compensatory between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased,
damages of P50,000.00; exemplary damages of Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly
P10,000.00; attorney's fees of P3,000.00; plus the sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help,
costs of suit in both instances. (p. 27 Rollo) but fear dissuaded them from doing so because on
Basically, this case involves a clash of evidence whereby both the spot where the deceased sank they saw an
patties strive for the recognition of their respective versions of the electric wire dangling from a post and moving in
scenario from which the disputed claims originate. The respondent snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shouts
Court of Appeals (CA) summarized the evidence of the parties as for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of
follows: Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased,
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but at four meters away from her he turned back lineman, he decided to go to the INELCO Office at
shouting that the water was grounded. Aida and the Life Theatre on Rizal Street by way of Guerrero.
Linda prodded Ernesto to seek help from Antonio As he turned right at the intersection of Guerrero
Yabes at the YJ Cinema building which was four or and Rizal, he saw an electric wire about 30 meters
five blocks away. long strung across the street "and the other end was
When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that seeming to play with the current of the water." (p.
his mother-in law had been electrocuted, he acted 64, TSN, Oct. 24, 1972) Finding the Office of the
immediately. With his wife Jane, together with INELCO still closed, and seeing no lineman therein,
Ernesto and one Joe Ros, Yabes passed by the City he returned to the NPC Compound.
Hall of Laoag to request the police to ask the people At about 8:10 A.M., Engr. Juan went out of the
of defendant Ilocos Norte Electric Company or compound again on another inspection trip. Having
INELCO to cut off the electric current. Then the learned of the death of Isabel Lao Juan, he passed
party waded to the house on Guerrero Street. The by the house of the deceased at the corner of
floodwater was receding and the lights inside the Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar streets to which the
house were out indicating that the electric current body had been taken. Using the resuscitator which
had been cut off in Guerrero. Yabes instructed his was a standard equipment in his jeep and employing
boys to fish for the body of the deceased. The body the skill he acquired from an in service training on
was recovered about two meters from an electric resuscitation, he tried to revive the deceased. His
post. efforts proved futile. Rigor mortis was setting in. On
In another place, at about 4:00 A.M. on that fateful the left palm of the deceased, Engr. Juan noticed a
date, June 29, 1967, Engineer Antonio Juan, Power hollow wound. Proceeding to the INELCO Office, he
Plant Engineer of the National Power Corporation at met two linemen on the way. He told them about the
the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed certain grounded lines of the INELCO In the afternoon of the
fluctuations in their electric meter which indicated same day, he went on a third inspection trip
such abnormalities as grounded or short-circuited preparatory to the restoration of power. The
lines. Between 6:00 and 6:30 A.M., he set out of the dangling wire he saw on Guerrero early in the
Laoag NPC Compound on an inspection. On the morning of June 29, 1967 was no longer there.
way, he saw grounded and disconnected lines. Many people came to the house at the corner of
Electric lines were hanging from the posts to the Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar after learning that the
ground. Since he could not see any INELCO deceased had been electrocuted. Among the
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sympathizers was Dr. Jovencio Castro, Municipal supplying electric current to the public, defendant
Health Officer of Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. Upon the had installed safety devices to prevent and avoid
request of the relatives of the deceased, Dr. Castro injuries to persons and damage to property in case
examined the body at about 8:00 A.M. on June 29, of natural calamities such as floods, typhoons, fire
1967. The skin was grayish or, in medical parlance, and others. Defendant had 12 linesmen charged
cyanotic, which indicated death by electrocution. On with the duty of making a round-the-clock check-up
the left palm, the doctor found an "electrically of the areas respectively assigned to them.
charged wound" (Exh. C-1: p. 101, TSN, Nov. 28, Defendant asserts that although a strong typhoon
1972) or a first degree burn. About the base of the struck the province of Ilocos Norte on June 29,
thumb on the left hand was a burned wound. (Exh. 1967, putting to streets of Laoag City under water,
C-2, pp. 102-103, Ibid.) The certificate of death only a few known places in Laoag were reported to
prepared by Dr. Castro stated the cause of' death as have suffered damaged electric lines, namely, at the
,'circulatory shock electrocution" (Exh. I; p. 103, southern approach of the Marcos Bridge which was
Ibid.). washed away and where the INELCO lines and posts
In defense and exculpation, defendant presented the collapsed; in the eastern part near the residence of
testimonies of its officers and employees, namely, the late Governor Simeon Mandac; in the far north
Conrado Asis, electric engineer; Loreto Abijero, near the defendant's power plant at the corner of
collector-inspector; Fabico Abijero, lineman; and Segundo and Castro Streets, Laoag City and at the
Julio Agcaoili, president-manager of INELCO far northwest side, near the premises of the Ilocos
Through the testimonies of these witnesses, Norte National High School. Fabico Abijero, testified
defendant sought to prove that on and even before that in the early morning before 6 o'clock on June
June 29, 1967 the electric service system of the 29, 1967 he passed by the intersection of Rizal and
INELCO in the whole franchise area, including Area Guerrero Streets to switch off the street lights in
No. 9 which covered the residence of Antonio Yabes Area No. 9. He did not see any cut or broken wires
at No. 18 Guerrero Street, did not suffer from any in or near the vicinity. What he saw were many
defect that might constitute a hazard to life and people fishing out the body of Isabel Lao Juan.
property. The service lines, devices and other A witness in the person of Dr. Antonio Briones was
INELCO equipment in Area No. 9 had been newly- presented by the defense to show that the deceased
installed prior to the date in question. As a public could not have died of electrocution Substantially,
service operator and in line with its business of the testimony of the doctor is as follows: Without an
Page 81 of 205
autopsy on the cadaver of the victim, no doctor, not due trial, the CFI found the facts in favor of petitioner and
even a medicolegal expert, can speculate as to the dismissed the complaint but awarded to the latter P25,000 in
real cause of death. Cyanosis could not have been moral damages and attorney's fees of P45,000. An appeal was filed
found in the body of the deceased three hours after with the CA which issued the controverted decision.
her death, because cyanosis which means lack of In this petition for review the petitioner assigns the following errors
oxygen circulating in the blood and rendering the committed by the respondent CA:
color of the skin purplish, appears only in a live 1. The respondent Court of Appeals
person. The presence of the elongated burn in the committed grave abuse of discretion
left palm of the deceased (Exhibits C-1 and C-2) is and error in considering the purely
not sufficient to establish her death by hearsay alleged declarations of
electrocution; since burns caused by electricity are Ernesto de la Cruz as part of the res
more or less round in shape and with points of entry gestae.
and exit. Had the deceased held the lethal wire for a 2. The respondent Court of Appeals
long time, the laceration in her palm would have committed grave abuse of discretion
been bigger and the injury more massive. (CA and error in holding that the strong
Decision, pp. 18-21, Rollo) typhoon "Gening" which struck Laoag
An action for damages in the aggregate amount of P250,000 was City and Ilocos Norte on June 29,
instituted by the heirs of the deceased with the aforesaid CFI on 1967 and the flood and deluge it
June 24, 1968. In its Answer (Vide, Record on Appeal, p. 55, Rollo), brought in its wake were not
petitioner advanced the theory, as a special defense, that the fortuitous events and did not
deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by exonerate petitioner-company from
electrocution due to negligence attributable only to herself and not liability for the death of Isabel Lao
to petitioner. In this regard, it was pointed out that the deceased, Juan.
without petitioner's knowledge, caused the installation of a burglar 3. The respondent Court of Appeals
deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gravely abused its discretion and
gate and fence of steel matting, thus, charging the latter with erred in not applying the legal
electric current whenever the switch is on. Petitioner then principle of "assumption of risk" in
conjectures that the switch to said burglar deterrent must have the present case to bar private
been left on, hence, causing the deceased's electrocution when she respondents from collecting damages
tried to open her gate that early morning of June 29, 1967. After from petitioner company.
Page 82 of 205
4. That the respondent Court of that the deceased had clutched a live wire of the petitioner. This
Appeals gravely erred and abused its was corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Jovencio Castro who
discretion in completely reversing the actually examined the body of the deceased a few hours after the
findings of fact of the trial court. death and described the said burnt wounds as a "first degree burn"
5. The findings of fact of the (p. 144, TSN, December 11, 1972) and that they were "electrically
respondent Court of Appeals are charged" (p. 102, TSN, November 28, 1972). Furthermore,
reversible under the recognized witnesses Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida Bulong added that after
exceptions. the deceased screamed "Ay" and sank into the water, they tried to
6. The trial court did not err in render some help but were overcome with fear by the sight of an
awarding moral damages and electric wire dangling from an electric post, moving in the water in
attorney's fees to defendant a snake-like fashion (supra). The foregoing therefore justifies the
corporation, now petitioner company. respondent CA in concluding that "(t)he nature of the wounds as
7. Assuming arguendo that petitioner described by the witnesses who saw them can lead to no other
company may be held liable from the conclusion than that they were "burns," and there was nothing else
death of the late Isabel Lao Juan, the in the street where the victim was wading thru which could cause a
damages granted by respondent burn except the dangling live wire of defendant company" (CA
Court of Appeals are improper and Decision, p. 22, Rollo).
exhorbitant. (Petitioners But in order to escape liability, petitioner ventures into the theory
Memorandum, p. 133, Rollo) that the deceased was electrocuted, if such was really the case
Basically, three main issues are apparent: (1) whether or not the when she tried to open her steel gate, which was electrically
deceased died of electrocution; (2) whether or not petitioner may be charged by an electric wire she herself caused to install to serve as
held liable for the deceased's death; and (3) whether or not the a burglar deterrent. Petitioner suggests that the switch to said
respondent CA's substitution of the trial court's factual findings for burglar alarm was left on. But this is mere speculation, not backed
its own was proper. up with evidence. As required by the Rules, "each party must prove
In considering the first issue, it is Our view that the same be his own affirmative allegations." (Rule 131, Sec. 1). Nevertheless,
resolved in the affirmative. By a preponderance of evidence, private the CA significantly noted that "during the trial, this theory was
respondents were able to show that the deceased died of abandoned" by the petitioner (CA Decision, p. 23, Rollo).
electrocution, a conclusion which can be primarily derived from the Furthermore the CA properly applied the principle of res gestae.
photographed burnt wounds (Exhibits "C", "C-1", "C-2") on the left The CA said:
palm of the former. Such wounds undoubtedly point to the fact
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Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller, and Aida on the grounds of trustworthiness and necessity. "Trustworthiness"
Bulong, a salesgirl, were with the deceased during because the statements are made instinctively (Wesley vs. State, 53
that fateful morning of June 29, 1967. This Court Ala. 182), and "necessity" because such natural and spontaneous
has not been offered any sufficient reason to utterances are more convincing than the testimony of the same
discredit the testimonies of these two young ladies. person on the stand (Mobile vs. Ascraft 48 Ala. 31). Therefore, the
They were one in the affirmation that the deceased, fact that the declarant, Ernesto de la Cruz, was not presented to
while wading in the waist-deep flood on Guerrero testify does not make the testimony of Linda Alonzo Estavillo and
Street five or six meters ahead of them, suddenly Aida Bulong hearsay since the said declaration is part of the res
screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. gestae. Similarly, We considered part of the res gestae a
When they approached the deceased to help, they conversation between two accused immediately after commission of
were stopped by the sight of an electric wire the crime as overheard by a prosecution witness (People vs. Reyes,
dangling from a post and moving in snake-like 82 Phil. 563).
fashion in the water. Ernesto dela Cruz also tried to While it may be true that, as petitioner argues (vide petitioner's
approach the deceased, but he turned back Memorandum, p. 135, Rollo), Ernesto de la Cruz was not an actual
shouting that the water was grounded. These bits of witness to the instant when the deceased sank into the waist-deep
evidence carry much weight. For the subject of the water, he acted upon the call of help of Aida Bulong and Linda
testimonies was a startling occurrence, and the Alonzo Estavillo with the knowledge of, and immediately after, the
declarations may be considered part of the res sinking of the deceased. In fact the startling event had not yet
gestae. (CA Decision, p. 21, Rollo) ceased when Ernesto de la Cruz entered the scene considering that
For the admission of the res gestae in evidence, the following the victim remained submerged. Under such a circumstance, it is
requisites must be present: (1) that the principal act, the res undeniable that a state of mind characterized by nervous
gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) that the statements were excitement had been triggered in Ernesto de la Cruz's being as
made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; (3) that anybody under the same contingency could have experienced. As
the statements made must concern the occurrence in question and such, We cannot honestly exclude his shouts that the water was
its immediately attending circumstances (People vs. Ner, 28 SCRA grounded from the res gestae just because he did not actually see
1151; People vs. Balbas, 122 SCRA 959). We do not find any abuse the sinking of the deceased nor hear her scream "Ay."
of discretion on the CA' part in view of the satisfaction of said Neither can We dismiss the said declaration as a mere opinion of
requisites in the case at bar. Ernesto de la Cruz. While We concede to the submission that the
The statements made relative to the startling occurrence are statement must be one of facts rather than opinion, We cannot
admitted in evidence precisely as an exception to the hearsay rule agree to the proposition that the one made by him was a mere
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opinion. On the contrary, his shout was a translation of an of petitioner's negligence that death took place. We subscribe to the
actuality as perceived by him through his sense of touch. conclusions of the respondent CA when it found:
Finally, We do not agree that the taking of Ernesto de la Cruz' On the issue whether or not the defendant incurred
testimony was suppressed by the private respondents, thus, is liability for the electrocution and consequent death
presumed to be adverse to them pursuant to Section 5(e), Rule of the late Isabel Lao Juan, defendant called to the
131. For the application of said Rule as against a party to a case, it witness-stand its electrical engineer, chief lineman,
is necessary that the evidence alleged to be suppressed is available and lineman to show exercise of extraordinary
only to said party (People vs. Tulale, L-7233, 18 May 1955, 97 Phil. diligence and to negate the charge of negligence. The
953). The presumption does not operate if the evidence in question witnesses testified in a general way about their
is equally available to both parties (StaplesHowe Printing Co. vs. duties and the measures which defendant usually
Bldg. and Loan Assn., 36 Phil. 421). It is clear from the records adopts to prevent hazards to life and limb. From
that petitioner could have called Ernesto de la Cruz to the witness these testimonies, the lower court found "that the
stand. This, precisely, was Linda Alonzo Estavillo's suggestion to electric lines and other equipment of defendant
petitioner's counsel when she testified on cross examination: corporation were properly maintained by a well-
Q. And that Erning de la Cruz, how far did trained team of lineman, technicians and engineers
he reach from the gate of the house? working around the clock to insure that these
A. Well, you can ask that matter from him sir equipments were in excellent condition at all times."
because he is here. (TSN, p. 30, 26 Sept. (P. 40, Record on Appeal) The finding of the lower
1972) court, however, was based on what the defendant's
The foregoing shows that petitioner had the opportunity to verify employees were supposed to do, not on what they
the declarations of Ernesto de la Cruz which, if truly adverse to actually did or failed to do on the date in question,
private respondent, would have helped its case. However, due to and not on the occasion of the emergency situation
reasons known only to petitioner, the opportunity was not taken. brought about by the typhoon.
Coming now to the second issue, We tip the scales in the private The lower court made a mistake in assuming that
respondents' favor. The respondent CA acted correctly in disposing defendant's employees worked around the clock
the argument that petitioner be exonerated from liability since during the occurrence of the typhoon on the night of
typhoons and floods are fortuitous events. While it is true that June 28 and until the early morning of June 29,
typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no 1967, Engr. Antonio Juan of the National Power
person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which Corporation affirmed that when he first set out on
directly caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention an inspection trip between 6:00 and 6:30 A.M. on
Page 85 of 205
June 29, 1967, he saw grounded and disconnected he had taken his family for refuge. (pp. 510-511,
electric lines of the defendant but he saw no INELCO Ibid.)
lineman. The INELCO Office at the Life theatre on In times of calamities such as the one which
Rizal Street was still closed. (pp. 63-64, TSN, Oct. occurred in Laoag City on the night of June 28 until
24, 1972) Even the witnesses of defendant the early hours of June 29, 1967, extraordinary
contradict the finding of the lower court. Conrado diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in
Asis, defendant's electrical engineer, testified that he constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable
conducted a general inspection of the franchise area incident that might imperil life or limb. The evidence
of the INELCO only on June 30, 1967, the day does not show that defendant did that. On the
following the typhoon. The reason he gave for the contrary, evidence discloses that there were no men
delay was that all their vehicles were submerged. (p. (linemen or otherwise) policing the area, nor even
337, TSN, July 20, 1973) According to Asis, he manning its office. (CA Decision, pp. 24-25, Rollo)
arrived at his office at 8:00 A.M. on June 30 and Indeed, under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was
after briefing his men on what to do they started negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the general
out. (p. 338, lbid) One or two days after the typhoon, public"... considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and
the INELCO people heard "rumors that someone was deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be
electrocuted" so he sent one of his men to the place commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of
but his man reported back that there was no exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every
damaged wire. (p. 385, Id.) Loreto Abijero, chief place where persons have a right to be" (Astudillo vs. Manila
lineman of defendant, corroborated Engr. Juan. He Electric, 55 Phil. 427). The negligence of petitioner having been
testified that at about 8:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967 shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that
Engr. Juan came to the INELCO plant and asked the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an
the INELCO people to inspect their lines. He went act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the
with Engr. Juan and their inspection lasted from defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury
8:00 A.M. to 12:00 noon. (pp. 460, 465, TSN, Jan. would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or
28, 1975) Fabico Abijero lineman of defendant, omission" (38 Am. Jur., p. 649).
testified that at about 6:00 on June 29, 1967 the Likewise, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by
typhoon ceased. At that time, he was at the main petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. It is imperative to
building of the Divine Word College of Laoag where note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased
to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. As
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testified by Linda Alonzo Estavillo (see TSN, p. 5, 26 Sept. 1972) that said wires were just hooked to the electric post (petitioner's
and Aida Bulong (see TSN, p. 43, 26 Sept. 1972), the deceased, Memorandum, p. 170, Rollo). However, as the CA properly held,
accompanied by the former two, were on their way to the latter's "(t)he finding of the lower court ... was based on what the
grocery store "to see to it that the goods were not flooded." As such, defendant's employees were supposed to do, not on what they
shall We punish her for exercising her right to protect her property actually did or failed to do on the date in question, and not on the
from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption occasion of the emergency situation brought about by the typhoon"
that she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not. For it (CA Decision, p. 25, Rollo). And as found by the CA, which We have
has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule, already reiterated above, petitioner was in fact negligent. In a like
that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide manner, petitioner's denial of ownership of the several wires
by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life cannot stand the logical conclusion reached by the CA when it held
or property of another is in peril (65A C.S.C. Negligence(174(5), p. that "(t)he nature of the wounds as described by the witnesses who
301), or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property (Harper saw them can lead to no other conclusion than that they were
and James, "The Law of Torts." Little, Brown and Co., 1956, v. 2, p. 'burns', and there was nothing else in the street where the victim
1167). Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's was wading thru which could cause a burn except the dangling live
property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending wire of defendant company" (supra).
loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident "When a storm occurs that is liable to prostrate the wires, due care
occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without regard requires prompt efforts to discover and repair broken lines" (Cooley
to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her on Torts, 4th ed., v. 3, p. 474). The fact is that when Engineer
merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be Antonio Juan of the National Power Corporation set out in the early
barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by morning of June 29, 1967 on an inspection tour, he saw grounded
petitioner's negligence (ibid., p. 1165, 1166). and disconnected lines hanging from posts to the ground but did
But petitioner assails the CA for having abused its discretion in not see any INELCO lineman either in the streets or at the INELCO
completely reversing the trial court's findings of fact, pointing to office (vide, CA Decision, supra). The foregoing shows that
the testimonies of three of its employees its electrical engineer, petitioner's duty to exercise extraordinary diligence under the
collector-inspector, lineman, and president-manager to the effect circumstance was not observed, confirming the negligence of
that it had exercised the degree of diligence required of it in petitioner. To aggravate matters, the CA found:
keeping its electric lines free from defects that may imperil life and . . .even before June 28 the people in Laoag were
limb. Likewise, the said employees of petitioner categorically already alerted about the impending typhoon,
disowned the fatal wires as they appear in two photographs taken through radio announcements. Even the fire
on the afternoon of June 29, 1967 (Exhs. "D" and "E"), suggesting department of the city announced the coming of the
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big flood. (pp. 532-534, TSN, March 13, 1975) At the of P12,000 to P30,000, thus, increasing the total actual damages to
INELCO irregularities in the flow of electric current P48,229.45.
were noted because "amperes of the switch volts The exclusion of moral damages and attorney's fees awarded by the
were moving". And yet, despite these danger signals, lower court was properly made by the respondent CA, the charge of
INELCO had to wait for Engr. Juan to request that malice and bad faith on the part of respondents in instituting his
defendant's switch be cut off but the harm was case being a mere product of wishful thinking and speculation.
done. Asked why the delay, Loreto Abijero answered Award of damages and attorney's fees is unwarranted where the
that he "was not the machine tender of the electric action was filed in good faith; there should be no penalty on the
plant to switch off the current." (pp. 467-468, Ibid.) right to litigate (Espiritu vs. CA, 137 SCRA 50). If damage results
How very characteristic of gross inefficiency! (CA from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque
Decision, p. 26, Rollo) injuria (Auyong Hian vs. CTA, 59 SCRA 110).
From the preceding, We find that the CA did not abuse its WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the respondent, except
discretion in reversing the trial court's findings but tediously for the slight modification that actual damages be increased to
considered the factual circumstances at hand pursuant to its P48,229.45 is hereby AFFIRMED.
power to review questions of fact raised from the decision of the SO ORDERED.
Regional Trial Court, formerly the Court of First Instance (see sec.
9, BP 129).
In considering the liability of petitioner, the respondent CA
awarded the following in private respondent's favor: P30,229.45 in
actual damages (i.e., P12,000 for the victim's death and
P18,229.45 for funeral expenses); P50,000 in compensatory
damages, computed in accordance with the formula set in the
Villa-Rey Transit case (31 SCRA 511) with the base of P15,000 as
average annual income of the deceased; P10,000 in exemplary
damages; P3,000 attorney's fees; and costs of suit. Except for the
award of P12,000 as compensation for the victim's death, We affirm
the respondent CA's award for damages and attorney's fees.
Pusuant to recent jurisprudence (People vs. Mananquil, 132 SCRA
196; People vs. Traya, 147 SCRA 381), We increase the said award
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Republic of the Philippines was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned
SUPREME COURT by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As
Manila a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture of the "distal
SECOND DIVISION third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying
skin." Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting,
G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000 and case wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, the hospital lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her
vs. attending physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon,
COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and certified she would remain on a cast for a period of three months
FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents. and would have to ambulate in crutches during said period.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against
MENDOZA, J.: Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common
Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1991, reversing the contrary carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City, against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.
and awarding damages instead to private respondent Eliza The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party
Jujeurche Sunga as plaintiff in an action for breach of contract of defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the
carriage. driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows: took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by
At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which
respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena
majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney.
passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court
Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 was reversed on the ground that Sunga's cause of action was based
passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common
a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil
vehicle. Code. The appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.
stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she
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WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one is second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon
entered ordering defendant-appellee Vicente Calalas the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.
to pay plaintiff-appellant: Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be
(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in
damages; breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages; the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this
(3) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to
(4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and his destination.2 In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art.
(5) to pay the costs. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are
SO ORDERED. presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in
Case No. 3490 that the negligence of Verena was the proximate Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts
cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule to the common carrier the burden of proof.
otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer of the There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil
safety of its passengers. He contends that the bumping of the Case No. 3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the
jeepney by the truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito. Petitioner damage to petitioner's jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is
further assails the award of moral damages to Sunga on the immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the
ground that it is not supported by evidence. jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The
The petition has no merit. doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-
The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a
3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi- device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation
delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and, between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is
therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply. created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create
the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the
his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are
to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those
whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to
quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra
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the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as
cases of death or injury to passengers. It provides: required by Art. 1755? We do not think so. Several factors militate
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of against petitioner's contention.
their business and for reasons of public policy, are First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not
bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of
passengers transported by them, according to all the the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No.
circumstances of each case. 4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over which provides:
the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. No person shall
1735, and 1746, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the drive his motor vehicle in such a manner as to
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the obstruct or impede the passage of any vehicle, nor,
passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and while discharging or taking on passengers or loading
1756. or unloading freight, obstruct the free passage of
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the other vehicles on the highway.
passengers safely as far as human care and Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a
very cautious persons, with due regard for all the violation of 32(a) of the same law. It provides:
circumstances. Exceeding registered capacity. No person
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to operating any motor vehicle shall allow more
passengers, common carriers are presumed to have passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless than its registered capacity.
they prove that they observed extraordinary The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in
diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755. a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the
presumption of negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained
petitioner to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent
the care of his passengers. in transporting passengers.
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention
care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very that Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied
Page 91 of 205
assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while
many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be she was under confinement, she cried in pain
compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater because of her injured left foot. As a result of her
risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true injury, the Orthopedic Surgeon also certified that
of petitioner's contention that the jeepney being bumped while it she has "residual bowing of the fracture side." She
was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is likewise decided not to further pursue Physical
an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, Education as her major subject, because "my left leg
was inevitable.3 This requires that the following requirements be . . . has a defect already."
present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings,
will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is the inevitable bedfellows of the injuries that she
such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his suffered. Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, she is
obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part entitled to recover moral damages in the sum of
in causing the injury to the P50,000.00, which is fair, just and reasonable.
creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his
4 As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for
jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway. damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the
Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.5 As an
that it is excessive and without basis in law. We find this exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the
contention well taken. mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art.
In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated: 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the
Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as
first-year college student in that school year 1989- provided in Art. 2220. 6
1990 at the Silliman University, majoring in Physical In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages
Education. Because of the injury, she was not able since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that
to enroll in the second semester of that school year. petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of
She testified that she had no more intention of carriage. Sunga's contention that petitioner's admission in open
continuing with her schooling, because she could court that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to a
not walk and decided not to pursue her degree, nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith.
major in Physical Education "because of my leg The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to
which has a defect already." the hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to
Page 92 of 205
the plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied
recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault for the accident.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March
31, 1995, and its resolution, dated September 11, 1995, are
AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral
damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 93 of 205
Republic of the Philippines sat with the party of Dr. Filart.10 After a couple of hours, when the
SUPREME COURT buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but,
Manila to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by
SECOND DIVISION petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko
G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005 as Executive Secretary thereof.11 In a loud voice and within the
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue
vs. at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent. nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang").12 Mr. Reyes
DECISION tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart. 13 Dr. Filart, who
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: was within hearing distance, however, completely ignored him thus
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel adding to his shame and humiliation.14 Not long after, while he was
Manila Garden (Hotel Nikko)1 and Ruby Lim assail the Decision2 of still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman
the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 reversing the approached and asked him to step out of the hotel.15 Like a
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the
104, as well as the Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals dated 09 policeman.16 Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million
July 2002 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary
The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages damages and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorneys fees. 17
brought under the human relations provisions of the New Civil Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave
Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more the party but not under the ignominious circumstance painted by
popularly known by the screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotels Executive
at around 6:00 oclock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he Secretary for the past twenty (20) years.18 One of her functions
was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,5 he was spotted by included organizing the birthday party of the hotels former General
his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.19 The year 1994 was no different. For Mr.
him.6 Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotels Tsuruokas party, Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list and
penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotels manager, extended invitations accordingly. 20 The guest list was limited to
Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.7 Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruokas closest friends and some
him for which she replied: "of course."8 Mr. Reyes then went up hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited. 21
with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter
the latters present for the celebrant.9 At the penthouse, they first ordering a drink.22 Mindful of Mr. Tsuruokas wishes to keep the
had their picture taken with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller, the "captain
Page 94 of 205
waiter," to inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes who was not celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator, not to the
invited.23 Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group of penthouse but to Altitude 49.35 When they reached the penthouse,
Dr. Filart.24 As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with another she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not properly dressed
guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she inquired and was not invited.36 All the while, she thought that Mr. Reyes
instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told already left the place, but she later saw him at the bar talking to
her that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.25 Ms. Lim then Col. Batung.37 Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes
requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was shouting.38 She ignored Mr. Reyes.39 She was embarrassed and did
not invited.26 Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to not want the celebrant to think that she invited him. 40
inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,41
leave.27 When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes giving more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim that she was
conversing with a Captain Batung whom she later approached. 28 discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court
Believing that Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being
Lim requested from him the same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for thrown out of the party as he was uninvited:
Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a
invited.29 Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday celebrant. He assumed the
Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as risk of being asked to leave for attending a party to which he was
there were no other guests in the immediate vicinity. 30 However, as not invited by the host. Damages are pecuniary consequences
Mr. Reyes was already helping himself to the food, she decided to which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation
wait.31 When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. of some right. Thus, no recovery can be had against defendants
Lim approached him and said: "alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim because he himself was at fault
nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na (Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was
lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo."32 not the party of defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to
She then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show join her and took responsibility for his attendance at the party. His
enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming action against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must
and making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on therefore fail.42
her.331awphi1.nt On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial
Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the court as it found more commanding of belief the testimony of Mr.
lower court, also gave her version of the story to the effect that she Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice within
never invited Mr. Reyes to the party.34 According to her, it was Mr. hearing distance of several guests:
Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended for the
Page 95 of 205
In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him violates this duty becomes liable for damages, especially if said acts
that he should not finish his food and to leave the place within the were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply
hearing distance of other guests is an act which is contrary to connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest
morals, good customs . . ., for which appellees should compensate purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a
the appellant for the damage suffered by the latter as a breach of a known duty to some motive or interest or ill-will that
consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The liability arises partakes of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309
from the acts which are in themselves legal or not prohibited, but SCRA 603).44
contrary to morals or good customs. Conversely, even in the Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko,
exercise of a formal right, [one] cannot with impunity intentionally Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart the solidary obligation to pay Mr.
cause damage to another in a manner contrary to morals or good Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the amount of Two Hundred
customs.43 Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral damages in the amount of
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorneys fees
in approaching several people to inquire into the presence of Mr. in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000). 45 On motion for
Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as she reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier decision
should have approached Dr. Filart first and both of them should as the argument raised in the motion had "been amply discussed
have talked to Mr. Reyes in private: and passed upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered." 46
Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim
done by appellee Lim was to approach appellee Mrs. Filart and contend that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in
together they should have told appellant Reyes in private that the I.
latter should leave the party as the celebrant only wanted close NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA
friends around. It is necessary that Mrs. Filart be the one to CONSIDERING THAT BY ITS OWN FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS
approach appellant because it was she who invited appellant in A GATE-CRASHER
that occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filarts invitation, appellant II.
could not have suffered such humiliation. For that, appellee Filart HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND
is equally liable. SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DR. FILART FOR DAMAGES SINCE BY
... ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA "COULD NOT HAVE SUFFERED
The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated SUCH HUMILIATION," "WERE IT NOT FOR DR. FILARTS
upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which INVITATION"
calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such III.
dignity. Under Article 20 of the Civil Code, every person who
Page 96 of 205
DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby
COURT AS REGARDS THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
CAUSED THE HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not
IV. Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with her.
IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and
UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS POVERTY, CONSIDERING THAT irreconcilable conclusions concerning the same facts and evidence
THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE WAS of the case, this Court is left without choice but to use its latent
PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD power to review such findings of facts. Indeed, the general rule is
V. that we are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to
IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF reviewing and revising errors of law.51 One of the exceptions to this
THE APPELLANTS BRIEF, THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE general rule, however, obtains herein as the findings of the Court of
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court. 52 The lower court
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to
doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The
damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for
leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him
was a "gate-crasher." not to finish his food and to leave the place within hearing distance
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is of the other guests. Both courts, however, were in agreement that it
not esteemed in law as injury"47 ) refers to self-inflicted injury48 or was Dr. Filarts invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.
to the consent to injury49 which precludes the recovery of damages The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?
by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the
danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.50 As formulated by lower courts findings of fact.
petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the First, let us put things in the proper perspective.
case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel,53 for-
being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and invitation-only, thrown for the hotels former Manager, a Japanese
21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him national. Then came a person who was clearly uninvited (by the
fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and celebrant)54 and who could not just disappear into the crowd as his
shame. face is known by many, being an actor. While he was already
Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted spotted by the organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very person who
abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya," to leave generated the guest list, it did not yet appear that the celebrant
Page 97 of 205
was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the celebrants years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated,
instruction to keep the party intimate, would naturally want to get the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not
rid of the "gate-crasher" in the most hush-hush manner in order inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was
not to call attention to a glitch in an otherwise seamless affair and, correct in observing that
in the process, risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her former Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the
boss. To unnecessarily call attention to the presence of Mr. Reyes request for the latter to leave the party was made such that they
would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lims ability to follow the nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by
instructions of the celebrant to invite only his close friends and him only and there could have been no intention on her part to
some of the hotels personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiffs reaction to the
rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered him request that must have made the other guests aware of what
to leave, could not offer any satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim transpired between them. . .
would do that and risk ruining a formal and intimate affair. On the Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need
contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed for the police to take him out.56
his fate by admitting that when Ms. Lim talked to him, she was Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyess version of the story is
very close. Close enough for him to kiss: that it is unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who
Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented any witness
you while you were at the buffet table? How close was she to back his story up. All his witnesses Danny Rodinas, Pepito
when she approached you? Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved only that it was Dr. Filart
A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other. who invited him to the party.57
Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the
close and she shouted? party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for
A: Yes. She said, "wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily,
bumaba ka na lang." neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability
Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice? springs from that of its employee. 58
... Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many. 55 principle of abuse of rights,59 is not a panacea for all human hurts
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to and social grievances. Article 19 states:
humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty and observe honesty and good faith.1awphi1.nt
Page 98 of 205
Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a for an explanation for Ms. Lims alleged abusive conduct except the
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in statement that Ms. Lim, being "single at 44 years old," had a "very
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible."60 by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign
The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards businessmen."69 The lameness of this argument need not be
which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19
also in the performance of ones duties.61 These standards are the and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to
following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.
honesty and good faith.62 Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to
evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: leave was likewise acceptable and humane under the
(1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. 63 When the appellate courts declaration that Ms. Lims act of personally
Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if
Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action
arising from a violation of law64 which does not obtain herein as "predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one
Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but
Article 21, on the other hand, states: respect of such dignity."70 Without proof of any ill-motive on her
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another part, Ms. Lims act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs.
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Filarts companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr.
Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following Reyes.71 If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if
elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.
contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can
and (3) it is done with intent to injure.66 petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made answerable for exemplary
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,67 and that is, damages72 especially for the reason stated by the Court of Appeals.
the act complained of must be intentional. 68 The Court of Appeals held
As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because
not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him. of the latters lowly station in life.l^vvphi1.net This has to be limited
These two people did not know each other personally before the somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit must be established.
evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer Social equality is not sought by the legal provisions under
Page 99 of 205
consideration, but due regard for decency and propriety (Code
Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of example or correction for
public good and to avert further commission of such acts,
exemplary damages should be imposed upon appellees. 73
The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it
runs counter with the very facts of the case and the evidence on
hand.l^vvphi1.net It is not disputed that at the time of the incident
in question, Mr. Reyes was "an actor of long standing; a co-host of
a radio program over DZRH; a Board Member of the Music Singer
Composer (MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a
showbiz Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992 official
candidate of the KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an awardee
of a number of humanitarian organizations of the Philippines." 74
During his direct examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that
he had income75 and nowhere did he say otherwise. On the other
hand, the records are bereft of any information as to the social and
economic standing of petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the
conclusion reached by the appellate court cannot withstand
scrutiny as it is without basis.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any
damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lims
exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety
and good faith, must be his to bear alone.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim
and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated
09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26
April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
The pertinent fact are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library All the victims and/or their surviving heirs except herein private
respondents settled the case amicably under the "No Fault"
At about 7:00 oclock in the morning of June 12, 1981, the spouses insurance coverage of PANTRANCO.
Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children Harold Jim,
Marcelino and Maricar, together with spouses David Ico and Fe O. Maricar Baesa through her guardian Francisca O. Bascos and Fe
Ico with their son Erwin Ico and seven other persons, were aboard O. Ico for herself and for her minor children, filed separate actions
a passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic at Malalam River, for damages arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO,
Ilagan, Isabela, to celebrate the fifth wedding anniversary of Ceasar respectively docketed as Civil Case No. 561-R and 589-R of the
and Marilyn Baesa. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
The group, numbering fifteen (15) persons, rode in the passenger In its answer, PANTRANCO, aside from pointing to the late David
jeepney driven by David Ico, who was also the registered owner Icos alleged negligence as the proximate cause of the accident,
thereof. From Ilagan, Isabela, they proceeded to Barrio Capayacan invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and
to deliver some viands to one Mrs. Bascos and thenceforth to San supervision of its driver, Ambrosio
Felipe, taking the highway going to Malalam River. Upon reaching Ramirez.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
the highway, the jeepney turned right and proceeded to Malalam
River at a speed of about 20 kph. While they were proceeding On July 3, 1984, the CFI of Pangasinan rendered a decision
towards Malalam River, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, against PANTRANCO awarding the total amount of Two Million
on its regular route to Manila, encroached on the jeepneys lane Three Hundred Four Thousand Six Hundred Forty-Seven
while negotiating a curve, and collided with it. (P2,304,647.00) as damages, plus 10% thereof as attorneys fees
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by II. The plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 589-R, the following
ordering the defendant PANTRANCO North Express, Inc. to damages:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
pay:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A) As compensatory damages for the death of David Ico
I. The plaintiff in Civil Case No. 561-R, Maricar Bascos Baesa, the P30,000.00;
following damages:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
B) For loss of earning capacity of David Ico P252,000.00;
A) As compensatory damages for the death of Ceasar Baesa
P30,000.00; C) As moral damages for the death of David Ico and the injury of Fe
Ico P30,000.00
B) As compensatory damages for the death of Marilyn Baesa
P30,000.00; D) As payment for the jeepney P20,000.00;
C) As compensatory damages for the death of Harold Jim Baesa E) For the hospitalization of Fe Ico P12,000.000;
and to pay the costs in both cases. The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the
negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the
The amount of P25,000 paid to Maricar Bascos Baesa, plaintiff in negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by
Civil Case No. 561-R, and the medical expenses in the sum of exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided
P3,273.55, should be deducted from the award in her injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his
favor.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary negligence.
All the foregoing amounts herein awarded except the costs shall The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was
earn interest at the legal rate from date of this decision until fully guilty of prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had
paid. [CA Decision, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 57-58.] the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do
so, is made liable for all the consequences of the accident
PANTRANCO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff [Picart v.
Appeals decision, but on June 26, 1987, it denied the same for Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918); Glan Peoples Lumber and Hardware,
lack of merit. PANTRANCO then filed the instant petition for Et. Al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, Cecilia Alferez Vda. de
review. Calibo, Et Al., G.R. No. 70493, May 18, 1989]. The subsequent
I negligence of the defendant in failing to exercise ordinary care to
avoid injury to plaintiff becomes the immediate or proximate cause
of the accident which intervenes between the accident and the
Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for not applying the doctrine more remote negligence of the plaintiff, thus making the defendant
of the "last clear chance" against the jeepney driver. Petitioner liable to the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, supra].
claims that under the circumstances of the case, it was the driver
of the passenger jeepney who had the last clear chance to avoid the Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose
collision and was therefore negligent in failing to utilize with of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or
reasonable care and competence his then existing opportunity to antecedent negligence, although it may also be raised as a defense
avoid the harm. to defeat claim for damages.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
The doctrine of the last clear chance was defined by this Court in To avoid liability for the negligence of its driver, petitioner claims
Contrary to the petitioners contention, the doctrine of "last clear Moreover, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that
chance" finds no application in this case. For the doctrine to be at the time of the accident the Pantranco bus was speeding
applicable, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly towards Manila [CA Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 45]. By the time David
had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the Ico must have realized that the bus was not returning to its own
existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due care, have lane, it was already too late to swerve the jeepney to his right to
been aware of it. One cannot be expected to avoid an accident or prevent an accident. The speed at which the approaching bus was
injury if he does not know or could not have known the existence running prevented David Ico from swerving the jeepney to the right
of the peril. In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney shoulder of the road in time to avoid the collision. Thus, even
driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. When he saw at a assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few
distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he seconds before the actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid
did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his it. This Court has held that the last clear chance doctrine "can
right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return never apply where the party charged is required to act
the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching from instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the
the opposite direction. As held by this Court in the case of Vda. De application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have
Bonifacio v. BLTB, G.R. No. L-26810, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA been discovered" [Ong v. Metropolitan Water District,
618, a motorist who is properly proceeding on his own side of the supra].chanrobles.com : virtual law library
highway is generally entitled to assume that an approaching
vehicle coming towards him on the wrong side, will return to his Petitioner likewise insists that David Ico was negligent in failing to
proper lane of traffic. There was nothing to indicate to David Ico observe Section 43 (c), Article III Chapter IV of Republic Act No.
Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that the negligence of When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there
petitioners driver in encroaching into the lane of the incoming instantly arises a presumption that the employer has been
jeepney and in failing to return the bus to its own lane immediately negligent either in the selection of his employees or in the
upon seeing the jeepney coming from the opposite direction was supervision over their acts. Although this presumption is only a
the sole and proximate cause of the accident without which the disputable presumption which could be overcome by proof of
collision would not have occurred. There was no supervening or diligence of a good father of a family, this Court believes that the
intervening negligence on the part of the jeepney driver which evidence submitted by the defendant to show that it exercised the
would have made the prior negligence of petitioners driver a mere diligence of a good father of a family in the case of Ramirez, as a
remote cause of the accident. company driver is far from sufficient. No support evidence has
II been adduced. The professional drivers license of Ramirez has not
been produced. There is no proof that he is between 25 to 38 years
old. There is also no proof as to his educational attainment, his
SO ORDERED.