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An assessment of the United States Navys strategy shift from a Mahanian strategy to
a more modern one during World War II, specifically between Pearl Harbor and Midway.
The time frame of Pearl Harbor to Midway is defined as December 7, 1941 to June 6,
1942. A Mahanian strategy is defined as one following the tenets propounded by Alfred T.
Mahan in his book The Influence of Sea Power upon World History, namely a battleship-
centric one. A modern strategy is defined as an aircraft carrier centric strategy. Academic
secondary sources will be consulted and analyzed in order to demonstrate how the Navys
strategy shifted during World War II, and why the shift occurred. Finally, the analysis of
The attack on Pearl Harbor led to the near complete destruction of the US Pacific
Fleet, with the exception of its aircraft carriers, the battleship Colorado, a handful of cruisers,
and most of the destroyer flotillas.1 Under the Mahanian strategy, this attack was nothing
short of disastrous.2 However, this attack failed to destroy significant portions of the
against the Japanese.3 Consequently, a shift in strategy began; this strategy was first put to the
1
Prange, Gordon W. At Dawn We Slept :New York, NY: Penguin. p. 565
2
Miller, Edward War Plan Orange :Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. p.285
3
Morrison, Samuel Eliot. The Rising Sun in the Pacific: 1931-April 1942. Vol. 3 of
test at the Battle of the Coral Sea. 4 The Battle of the Coral Sea was an American strategic
victory, despite suffering heavier losses. However, the Mahanian plan of the Japanese had
failed. 5 Furthermore, the Japanese had lost their light carrier Shoho, a significant moral
victory on the part of the Americans.6 However, while the Shoho had been lost, so had the
Lexington, a significant portion of the US Pacific Fleet. 7 This left the Saratoga, Enterprise,
and Hornet as the only operational carriers in the Pacific.8 However, this put the Americans
in a dangerous position, as they had little ability to repel Japanese thrusts. 9 Without carriers,
the Allied forces were liable to get butchered, as was seen at the Battle of the Java Sea.10
Coral Sea had been strategically inconclusive at best, and the Japanese felt that they
had won by a large margin. 11 In fact, they claimed no fewer than six major warships, and a
mixed bag of others.12 American intelligence learned about this, and was able to formulate a
strategy to deceive the Japanese, leading them directly to Midway. 13 The Americans were
vastly outgunned, and consequently forced to rely on the strength of their carriers. 14
However, they had another advantage over the Japanese: the submarine Nautilus was on
station, and prepared to attack the Japanese when ready. 15 While Nautilus played a very
dive bombers. These dive bombers played a far more significant role than any other weapon
throughout the war. In fact, Coral Sea was a textbook Mahanian encounter.17 Midway was
intended to be another one, with the battleship Yamato and the cruiser Mikuma supposedly
smashing an outgunned American force. 18 However, the Americans were relying on their
carriers to prevent the secondary battle line from getting that close. 19 As previous experience
had shown with ABDACOM, the Japanese would butcher the Allied forces with superior
Consequently, the American plan revolved around air power, knowing that there is
little if any chance in a ship to ship confrontation21. Therefore, the Navy bulked up fighter,
dive bomber, and torpedo planes both on Midway and on the three carriers. 22 However,
the Americans were still extremely afraid of losing their aircraft carriers, as they had Langley
and Lexington. 23 Losing any of the three would represent a 33% loss in carrier strength in the
However, as luck would have it, the motley crew of Americans managed to hold off
16
Prange 1982 p. 264
17
Morrison 1949 p.6
18
Prange 1982, p. 59
19
Morrison 1949 p. 98
20
Morrison 1948 p. 294
21
Toll, Ian W. Pacific Crucible. New York, NY: Norton, 2012. p.423
22
Morrison 1949 p. 94
23
Morrison 1948 p. 385
24
Prange 1982 p. 69
the Japanese, sinking Hiryu, Soryu, Akagi, and Kaga. These ships represented approximately
70 percent of the Combined Fleets modern carrier strength. 25 Finally, the American strategy
proved ultimately victorious when the Japanese invasion fleet destined for Midway was
forced to turn back under the threat of submarine and air attacks. 26 However, Toll states
Luck led to the bombing of three Japanese aircraft carriers, rather than two. 27
Katherine V. Dillon. However, Gordon W. Prange had died two years prior to its publication.
academic audience, though it was originally on the New York Times best seller list for a
number of weeks. This books purpose is to evaluate the events from the aftermath of Pearl
battle and explain precisely why the miracle of Midway occurred. It is valuable because it
is an unbiased, relatively personal account. Prange uses either interviews or the personal
diaries of Mitsuo Fuchida, the air commander for the Akagi, Commander Minuro Genda, the
architect of the Pearl Harbor attack, and Rear Admiral Ukagi, Yamamotos chief of staff. He
makes good use of American sources as well, attempting to create a truly balanced narrative.
Also, Gordon Prange was Gen. McArthurs staff historian during World War II, giving him a
tremendous resource to pull from in order to write his books. However, there are some rather
25
Morrison 1949 p. 88
26
Toll p. 476
27
Toll p. 476
significant limitations. First and foremost, Gordon W. Prange had died two years prior to the
publication date. Therefore, this book does not completely reflect Pranges views, as the
manuscript was undoubtedly altered by the two who finished it. Secondly, this book was
written between 30 and 40 years after the Battle of Midway. Therefore, this book has a very
large subjective component, due to the fallibility of human memory. Important events are
Coral Sea, Midway, and Submarine Actions was written in 1949 by Samuel Eliot
Morison. This is a secondary source, and a book intended for an academic audience. It is
part of a collection entitled History of US Naval Operations in World War II. This is the
third volume in a set of 15. Its purpose is to discuss the actions taken by the United States
Navy and the Japanese Combined Fleet between 1931 and April 1942. Its value is twofold.
Samuel Eliot Morison was the official historian of the United States Navy during World War
II, giving him unparalleled access to sensitive documents and high-ranking officers.
Secondly, Samuel Eliot Morison was a naval officer during World War II, and served in the
Pacific theater. He experienced many of these events firsthand. However, the limitations are
several in number. First, there is an inherent bias throughout the book. Japanese sources are
infrequently considered. In some cases, Morrison ignores the Japanese accounts for the sake
of the Navys official reports. Secondly, the book ignores the ability of the Americans to read
the Combined Fleets codes, which was a huge factor in the American victory at Midway, as
Part D: Analysis
With the British attack on Taranto, the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the successful
destruction of Force Z off of Singapore, it became more and more clear that the time of the
battleship was passing. No longer could navies expect to win battles based on the strength of
their battleships. After the disastrous attack on Pearl Harbor, the US Navy was left with one
operational battleship on the West Coast: the Colorado. Consequently, the Americans were
forced to turn to the aircraft carrier, which had been expected to serve in an auxiliary, rather
than primary role. The aircraft carriers capabilities had their first major test in the crucible of
Coral Sea.
During Coral Sea, the Americans proved that they would be able to hold their own
against the Japanese Combined Fleet. While the end result was a tactical draw, the new
strategy of torpedo bombers, dive bombers, and CAP (Combat Air Patrol) had proven to
reduce losses as well as divide Japanese air power during attacks. However, this new strategy
had been implemented at a heavy cost; the Lexington was sunk, and the Yorktown heavily
damaged. Moreover, it was far from perfect. The Americans would frequently spend nearly
an hour forming up. A number of aviators were forced to ditch for lack of fuel; the Navy
At Midway, the Americans had learned from the lessons of Coral Sea, and were able
to produce a far more coordinated attack than they originally thought was possible. The
improvements made as a result of Coral Sea led to a combined attack, one that the Japanese
could not defend against without severely compromising their ability to defend their carriers.
While this had been attempted at Coral Sea, it had not met with much success, due to the
logistical difficulties of coordinating such an attack. Therefore, the Kaga, Akagi, and Soryu
Morison states that it was a combination of the submarine Nautilus and Lt. Richard Bests
bombing division. Prange states Kaga was only hit by bombs, and Hiryu was the ship
Nautilus attacked. Japanese accounts vindicate Prange, stating that Nautilus likely attacked
Hiryu. However, these two sources both indicate the importance of Bests decision to bomb
Kaga, due to Akagi and Hiryu being aflame. Both sources indicate that Best at least helped to
destroy Kaga, if not ensure it completely. This revelation lends credence to the idea that the
more modern strategy was responsible for the victory at Midway, rather than the Miracle of
Midway alluded to by historians such as Toll. However, to some extent, Toll is correct. The
location of the Combined Fleet was a function of luck; if Lt. Cmdr. Wade C. McCluskey had
continued along an alternate route, he would not have discovered the Combined Fleets
carriers, and the invasion of Midway would have been inevitable. Moreover, the SBD
Dauntless group from Hornet (Bombing 8) never found the Japanese aircraft carriers.
While the Americans were very successful at Midway, it was the death knell for the
Mahanian strategy that had shaped American naval strategy since the Spanish-American War.
The Americans had proven that the aircraft carrier would be the new battleship, and that
naval strategy now would revolve around it. The implementation of the coordinated attack
prevented the Japanese from being able to react appropriately. While some groups were
butchered, such as Waldrons Torpedo 8 (Hornet), the Japanese were forced to divide their
response between the TBD Devastators and the SBD Dauntless groups. The Dauntless groups
were able to break through and bomb the Japanese carriers through an inventive new tactic
called Hell Diving, a result of the modern strategy. Therefore, the Kaga, Akagi, and Soryu
Section E: Conclusion
Though American naval strategy was originally a Mahanian one at the outset of
World War II, the destruction of the fleet at Pearl Harbor forced it to change. This was for the
best, as the Mahanian strategy proved unfeasible against air power. This led to the Americans
adapting a more modern strategy, centering around the aircraft carrier and airplane, rather
than the battleship and battle line. Therefore, the Americans were far better equipped to fight
a modern war, seeing as how the modern strategy was far more flexible than the Mahanian
one. While the flaws exposed during Coral Sea took time to correct, Midway revealed that
Miller, Edward S. War Plan Orange. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991.
Morison, Samuel Eliot. Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions. Vol. 4 of History of US
Naval Operations in World War II. New York, NY: Atlantic, n.d.
. The Rising Sun in the Pacific: 1931-April 1942. Vol. 3 of US Naval Operations in
World War II. Edison, NJ: Castle, 1948.
Prange, Gordon W. At Dawn We Slept. New York, NY: Penguin, 1980.