Intro To Law 1st Half Cases

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 70443 September 15, 1986
BRAULIO CONDE, RUFINA CONDE, GERARDO CONDE, CONCHITA C. LUNDANG, and ALFREDO
VENTURA, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. CESAR C. PERALEJO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch LXVI, Third Judicial Region, Capas, Tarlac, and MARCELO GUTIERREZ, respondents.
Tomas P. Matic, Jr. for petitioners.
Adelaido G. Rivera for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
On January 16, 1984, the petitioners filed an action to annul the judgment of the Court of Appeals dated September 23, 1981,
which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court and ordered the petitioners and/or their successors-in-interest to
deliver immediately the ownership and possession of the property in question to the then plaintiff-appellant Marcelo Gutierrez.
In their complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, the petitioners alleged that through fraud, Gutierrez
was able to make it appear that he was the son of Esteban Gutierrez and Fermina Ramos and as a necessary consequence of
such filiation, was the absolute owner by succession of the property in question.
On February 27, 1984, the trial court dismissed the petitioners' complaint on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to annul the
judgment of the Court of Appeals. Upon the denial of their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari, mandamus and a writ of injunction before the appellate court. The said court in turn, dismissed the petition and a
subsequent motion for reconsideration on the grounds that a Regional Trial Court is without jurisdiction to annul the judgment
of the Court of Appeals and that only the Supreme Court is empowered to review the judgment of said appellate court. Hence,
the petitioners elevated the case before this Court.
On August 31, 1984, we issued a resolution dated August 22, 1984, remanding the case to the appellate court for decision on
the merits.
The resolution reads as follows:
The respondent intermediate Appellate Court erred when it declared that the complaint for annulment of
judgment in this case should be filed with the Supreme Court. This Court has no original jurisdiction to look
into allegations of fraud upon which the complaint for annulment is based. In January, 1984, the petitioners
filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac seeking among other things the annulment of a
decision which had already passed, on appeal, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 60139-R. On February
17, 1984, the lower court dismissed the petitioners' complaint for annulment of judgment. The petitioners
appealed the dismissal to the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court which denied due course to the
petition stating that what is sought to be annulled is a decision of the Court of Appeals over which the
regional trial court is obviously without jurisdiction. The decision sought to be annulled calls for the turning
over of possession to the original respondent of the disputed properties. While the judgment being enforced
may have been that of the Court of Appeals, it was actually an appellate judgment rendered on a review of
the trial court's decision. Considering that Section 9 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980-B.P. No. 129
gives the Intermediate Appellate Court exclusive jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of
regional trial courts, the COURT RESOLVED to REMAND this case to the Intermediate Appellate Court for it
to hear and decide the action.
On January 29, 1985, the appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction and for lack of
merit. In its decision on the issue of jurisdiction, the respondent court ruled that since the decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court can be annulled by the Regional Trial Court and a decision of the latter is annullable by the Court of Appeals, then
logically the decision of the appellate court should be annullable only by the Supreme Court. Moreover, the appellate court
ruled that it is but logical to conclude that it cannot annul its own decision unless there is an express grant under the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. Finding none, it stated that it must perforce dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
INTRO TO LAW Page 1

On the merits of the petition, the appellate court ruled that the fraud relied upon by the petitioners is only intrinsic and thus,
even on the assumption that it has jurisdiction to decide the case, still the same has no merit. It dismissed the petition. The
petitioners elevated this decision to us.
On June 5, 1985, we resolved to require the respondents to comment on the petition. Notwithstanding proof that a copy of the
petition was served on the respondents' counsel on June 24, 1985, no comment has been filed.
We decide the petition.
We need not emphasize the rule that this Court decides appeals which only involve questions of law and that "it is not the
function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited to receiving errors
of law that might have been committed by the lower court." (Baniqued v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 596, 601; citing Tiongco
v. de la Merced, 58 SCRA 89). It was, thus, totally pointless for the Intermediate Appellate Court to delve into the question of
whether or not it has jurisdiction to pass upon the merits of the petition which then alleged the perpetration of fraud by one of
the parties in the original case, and which thereby called for a review of the factual findings of the court. Furthermore, the fact
that this Court already remanded the case to the appellate court for decision on the merits should have prompted the latter to
limit its decision only to the merits of the case.
There are instances when this Court desires a further review of facts or a detailed analysis and systematic presentation of
issues which the appellate court is in a more favored position to accomplish. Standing between the trial courts and the
Supreme Court, the appellate court was precisely created to take over much of the work that used to be previously done by
this Court. It has been of great help to the Supreme Court in synthesizing facts, issues, and rulings in an orderly and intelligible
manner and in Identifying errors which ordinarily might have escaped detection. Statistics will show that the great majority of
petitions to review the decisions of the appellate court have been denied due course for lack of merit in minute resolutions.
The appellate court has, therefore, freed this Court to better discharge its constitutional duties and perform its most important
work which, in the words of Dean Vicente G. Sinco, "is less concerned with the decision of cases that begin and end with the
transient rights and obligations of particular individuals but is more intertwined with the direction of national policies,
momentous economic and social problems, the delimitation of governmental authority and its impact upon fundamental rights."
(Philippine Political Law, 10th Edition, p. 323). It is, therefore, difficult to understand why a Division of the Intermediate
Appellate Court should hesitate to help the Supreme Court and to act on an action which it was specifically ordered to hear
and decide.
If its initial hesitation was due to doubts about the correctness of our action, then it should recall the admonition in Tugade v.
Court of Appeals (85 SCRA 226, 230-231) that:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all It could not have ruled in any other way
on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as simple as that. There
is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera (34 SCRA 98): 'The delicate task of ascertaining the
significance that attaches to a constitutional or statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or
a municipal ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that
appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure stability in legal
relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does so with finality, logically and rightly,
through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then should be definitive and authoritative,
binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit.' (Ibid.
107. The opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] was cited.) The ensuing paragraphs
of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: 'Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion of
Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these words: 'Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be
reminded that the Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word
on what the law is it is the final arbiter of any justifiable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from
whose decisions an other courts should take their bearings. (Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v.
Court of First Instance of Manila [Br. VI], 23 SCRA 948, 961).
The fault of the Intermediate Appellate Court is mitigated by the fact that it still decided the remanded case on the merits. It
stated:
On February of 1950 an original complaint for recovery of possession of a parcel of land was filed before the
Court of First Instance of Tarlac, which was subsequently amended on March 19, 1951.
INTRO TO LAW Page 2

On May 20, 1976, after a full blown trial the Regional Trial Court Branch 64 (formerly Court of First Instance)
of Tarlac, rendered a decision dismissing the complaint and ordering plaintiff Marcelo Gutierrez to pay the
defendants the costs of the suit. The dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint and ordering plaintiff Marcelo
Gutierrez to pay the defendants the costs of this suit. He (sic) pronouncement as to damages for want of
proof.
From the above judgment an appeal was filed with the Court of Appeals.
On September 23, 1981, the then Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
64, this time ordering the ten appellees (now petitioners) to deliver the ownership and possession of the
litigated property to then appellant (now respondent Marcelo Gutierrez), which decision became final and
executory on December 20, 1982, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the decision appealed from, not being in accordance with the
applicable law and evidence and finding validity in the errors assigned, is hereby reversed and set aside. In
lieu thereof, another one is entered ordering defendants-appellees and/or their successors-in-interest to
deliver immediately the ownership and possession of the property described under par. 3 of the complaint to
herein plaintiff- appellant Marcelo Gutierrez. With costs.
On January 16, 1984, an action to annul the judgment of the former Court of Appeals was filed before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, Third Judicial Region in Capas, Tarlac.
On February 27, 1984, the respondent Court (Regional Trial Court), dismissed the case for annulment of
judgment on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to annul the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
On March 19, 1984, the motion for reconsideration filed by herein petitioner was denied by the respondent
court. Accordingly, a petition for certiorari, mandamus and a writ of injunction was filed before the
Intermediate Appellate Court and raffled to the Third Special Cases Division, The court dismissed the
petition for lack of merit on the ground that a Regional Trial Court is without jurisdiction to annul a judgment
of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this case should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED OUTRIGHT. With costs against the
petitioners.
On June 14, 1984, the motion for reconsideration filed by herein petitioner was denied by this Court.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, a judgment based on alleged false testimony is not an extrinsic fraud by which an action for
annulment of judgment could be grounded. The Supreme Court in Ilacad v. Court of Appeals (supra, p. 302),
declared that:
xxx xxx xxx
... and speaking of extrinsic fraud, it is that fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant which prevents a party from having his
day in court from presenting his case. Fraud has been regarded as extrinsic or collateral, within the meaning of the rule 'where
it is one of the effect of which prevents a party from having a trial, or real contests, or from presenting all of his case to the
court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself, but to the manner by which it was procured so
that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the
prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, where the defeated party has been
prevented from presenting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent.
The resort to fraud in introducing fabricated evidence is definitely an intrinsic fraud, hence false testimony
being a matter of evidence is definitely intrinsic and not extrinsic. Fraud consisting in acting fictitious cause
of false testimony is intrinsic (sic) (Francisco v. David, 38 CG 714). Intrinsic fraud takes the form of acts of a
INTRO TO LAW Page 3

party in a litigation during the trial such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which did not
affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the case (Libudan v.
Palma, [S1, 45 SCRA 17]). Intrinsic fraud is not sufficient to attack a judgment (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R,
July 31, 1971).
Petitioners stand that extrinsic fraud was employed by the respondents, is bereft of any factual basis, hence,
even on the assumption that this court has jurisdiction to decide this issue, still the petitioners cause of
action must fail.
A careful review of the present petition and of the records of the appellate court on this case shows that even on the
assumption that all the facts alleged in the petition are true, the petition should be dismissed for lack of merit because the
fraud allegedly perpetrated by the private respondent in AC-G.R. SP No. 03301 is only intrinsic in nature and not extrinsic.
Fraud is regarded as extrinsic or collateral where it has prevented a party from having a trial or from presenting an of his case
to the court. (Asian Surety and Insurance Co. v. Island Steel, Inc., 118 SCRA 233, 239; citing Amuran v. Aquino, 38 Phil. 29). In
the case at bar, the fraud was in the nature of documents allegedly manufactured by Marcelo Gutierrez to make it appear that
he was the rightful heir of the disputed property, Hence, the Intermediate Appellate Court is correct in finding the fraud to be
intrinsic in nature.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The respondents' counsel, Atty. Adelaido G. Rivera is fined
Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) for his failure to act on the order to file comment.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur,
INTRO TO LAW Page 4

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172409 February 4, 2008
ROOS INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION, INC. and OSCAR TOCMO, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JOSE MARTILLOS, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners Roos Industrial
Construction, Inc. and Oscar Tocmo assail the Court of Appeals 2 Decision dated 12 January 2006 in C.A. G.R. SP No. 87572
and its Resolution3 dated 10 April 2006 denying their Motion for Reconsideration.4
The following are the antecedents.
On 9 April 2002, private respondent Jose Martillos (respondent) filed a complaint against petitioners for illegal dismissal and
money claims such as the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement plus full backwages, service incentive leave,
13th month pay, litigation expenses, underpayment of holiday pay and other equitable reliefs before the National Capital
Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), docketed as NLRC NCR South Sector Case No. 30-
04-01856-02.
Respondent alleged that he had been hired as a driver-mechanic sometime in 1988 but was not made to sign any employment
contract by petitioners. As driver mechanic, respondent was assigned to work at Carmona, Cavite and he worked daily from
7:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. at the rate of P200.00 a day. He was also required to work during legal holidays but was only paid an
additional 30% holiday pay. He likewise claimed that he had not been paid service incentive leave and 13 th month pay during
the entire course of his employment. On 16 March 2002, his employment was allegedly terminated without due process.5
Petitioners denied respondents allegations. They contended that respondent had been hired on several occasions as a
project employee and that his employment was coterminous with the duration of the projects. They also maintained that
respondent was fully aware of this arrangement. Considering that respondents employment had been validly terminated after
INTRO TO LAW Page 5

the completion of the projects, petitioners concluded that he is not entitled to separation pay and other monetary claims, even
attorneys fees.6
The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent had been illegally dismissed after finding that he had acquired the status of a regular
employee as he was hired as a driver with little interruption from one project to another, a task which is necessary to the usual
trade of his employer.7 The Labor Arbiter pertinently stated as follows:
x x x If it were true that complainant was hired as project employee, then there should have been project employment
contracts specifying the project for which complainants services were hired, as well as the duration of the project as
required in Art. 280 of the Labor Code. As there were four (4) projects where complainant was allegedly assigned,
there should have been the equal number of project employment contracts executed by the complainant. Further, for
every project termination, there should have been the equal number of termination report submitted to the
Department of Labor and Employment. However, the record shows that there is only one termination [report]
submitted to DOLE pertaining to the last project assignment of complainant in Carmona, Cavite.
In the absence of said project employment contracts and the corresponding Termination Report to DOLE at every
project termination, the inevitable conclusion is that the complainant was a regular employee of the respondents.
In the case of Maraguinot, Jr. v. NLRC, 284 SCRA 539, 556 [1998], citing capital Industrial Construction Group v.
NLRC, 221 SCRA 469, 473-474 [1993], it was ruled therein that a project employee may acquire the status of a
regular employee when the following concurs: (1) there is a continuous rehiring of project employees even after the
cessation of a project; and (2) the tasks performed by the alleged "project employee" are vital, necessary and
indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer. Both factors are present in the instant case. Thus, even
granting that complainant was hired as a project employee, he eventually became a regular employee as there was a
continuous rehiring of this services.
xxx
In the instant case, apart from the fact that complainant was not made to sign any project employment contract x x x
he was successively transferred from one project after another, and he was made to perform the same kind of work
as driver.8
The Labor Arbiter ordered petitioners to pay respondent the aggregate sum of P224,647.17 representing backwages,
separation pay, salary differential, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay.9
Petitioners received a copy of the Labor Arbiters decision on 17 December 2003. On 29 December 2003, the last day of the
reglementary period for perfecting an appeal, petitioners filed a Memorandum of Appeal 10 before the NLRC and paid the
appeal fee. However, instead of posting the required cash or surety bond within the reglementary period, petitioners filed a
Motion for Extension of Time to Submit/Post Surety Bond. 11 Petitioners stated that they could not post and submit the required
surety bond as the signatories to the bond were on leave during the holiday season, and made a commitment to post and
submit the surety bond on or before 6 January 2004. The NLRC did not act on the motion. Thereafter, on 6 January 2004,
petitioners filed a surety bond equivalent to the award of the Labor Arbiter.12
In a Resolution13 dated July 29, 2004, the Second Division of the NLRC dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
The NLRC stressed that the bond is an indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer and that the
perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is mandatory and jurisdictional. In
addition, the NLRC restated that its Rules of Procedure proscribes the filing of any motion for extension of the period within
which to perfect an appeal. The NLRC summed up that considering that petitioners appeal had not been perfected, it had no
jurisdiction to act on said appeal and the assailed decision, as a consequence, has become final and executory. 14 The NLRC
likewise denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration 15 for lack of merit in another Resolution. 16 On 11 November 2004, the
NLRC issued an entry of judgment declaring its resolution final and executory as of 9 October 2004. On respondents motion,
the Labor Arbiter ordered that the writ of execution be issued to enforce the award. On 26 January 2005, a writ of execution
was issued.17
Petitioners elevated the dismissal of their appeal to the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil action of certiorari. They
argued that the filing of the appeal bond evinced their willingness to comply and was in fact substantial compliance with the
Rules. They likewise maintained that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in failing to consider the meritorious grounds for
their motion for extension of time to file the appeal bond. Lastly, petitioners contended that the NLRC gravely erred in issuing
INTRO TO LAW Page 6

an entry of judgment as the assailed resolution is still open for review. 18 On 12 January 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
challenged resolution of the NLRC. Hence, the instant petition.
Before this Court, petitioners reiterate their previous assertions. They insist on the application of Star Angel Handicraft v.
National Labor Relations Commission, et al.19where it was held that a motion for reduction of bond may be filed in lieu of the
bond during the period for appeal. They aver that Borja Estate v. Ballad,20which underscored the importance of the filing of a
cash or surety bond in the perfection of appeals in labor cases, had not been promulgated yet in 2003 when they filed their
appeal. As such, the doctrine in Borja could not be given retroactive effect for to do so would prejudice and impair petitioners
right to appeal. Moreover, they point out that judicial decisions have no retroactive effect.21
The Court denies the petition.
The Court reiterates the settled rule that an appeal from the decision of the Labor Arbiter involving a monetary award is only
deemed perfected upon the posting of a cash or surety bond within ten (10) days from such decision. 22 Article 223 of the Labor
Code states:
ART. 223. Appeal.Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the
Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders.
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
xxx
Contrary to petitioners assertion, the appeal bond is not merely procedural but jurisdictional. Without said bond, the NLRC
does not acquire jurisdiction over the appeal.23 Indeed, non-compliance with such legal requirements is fatal and has the effect
of rendering the judgment final and executory.24 It must be stressed that there is no inherent right to an appeal in a labor case,
as it arises solely from the grant of statute.25
Evidently, the NLRC did not acquire jurisdiction over petitioners appeal within the ten (10)-day reglementary period to perfect
the appeal as the appeal bond was filed eight (8) days after the last day thereof. Thus, the Court cannot ascribe grave abuse
of discretion to the NLRC or error to the Court of Appeals in refusing to take cognizance of petitioners belated appeal.
While indeed the Court has relaxed the application of this requirement in cases where the failure to comply with the
requirement was justified or where there was substantial compliance with the rules, 26 the overpowering legislative intent of
Article 223 remains to be for a strict application of the appeal bond requirement as a requisite for the perfection of an appeal
and as a burden imposed on the employer.27 As the Court held in the case of Borja Estate v. Ballad:28
The intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the
employer is underscored by the provision that an appeal may be perfected "only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond." The word "only" makes it perfectly clear that the LAWMAKERS intended the posting of a cash or surety bond
by the employer to be
the exclusive means by which an employers appeal may be considered completed. The law however does not
require its outright payment, but only the posting of a bond to ensure that the award will be eventually paid should the
appeal fail. What petitioners have to pay is a moderate and reasonable sum for the premium of such bond.29
Moreover, no exceptional circumstances obtain in the case at bar which would warrant a relaxation of the bond requirement as
a condition for perfecting the appeal. It is only in highly meritorious cases that this Court opts not to strictly apply the rules and
thus prevent a grave injustice from being done30 and this is not one of those cases.
In addition, petitioners cannot take refuge behind the Courts ruling in Star Angel. Pertinently, the Court stated in Computer
Innovations Center v. National Labor Relations Commission:31
Moreover, the reference in Star Angel to the distinction between the period to file the appeal and to perfect the appeal
has been pointedly made only once by this Court in Gensoli v. NLRC thus, it has not acquired the sheen of
INTRO TO LAW Page 7

venerability reserved for repeatedly-cited cases. The distinction, if any, is not particularly evident or material in the
Labor Code; hence, the reluctance of the Court to adopt such doctrine. Moreover, the present provision in the NLRC
Rules of Procedure, that "the filing of a motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect
appeal" flatly contradicts the notion expressed in Star Angel that there is a distinction between filing an appeal and
perfecting an appeal.
Ultimately, the disposition of Star Angel was premised on the ruling that a motion for reduction of the appeal bond
necessarily stays the period for perfecting the appeal, and that the employer cannot be expected to perfect the
appeal by posting the proper bond until such time the said motion for reduction is resolved. The unduly stretched-out
distinction between the period to file an appeal and to perfect an appeal was not material to the resolution of Star
Angel, and thus could properly be considered as obiter dictum.32
Lastly, the Court does not agree that the Borja doctrine should only be applied prospectively. In the first place, Borjais not a
ground-breaking precedent as it is a reiteration, emphatic though, of long standing jurisprudence. 33 It is well to recall too our
pronouncement in Senarillos v. Hermosisima, et al.34 that the judicial interpretation of a statute constitutes part of the law as of
the date it was originally passed, since the Courts construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that
the interpreted law carried into effect. Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the passage of a new law but consists merely
of a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one, as is the situation in this case.35
At all events, the decision of the Labor Arbiter appears to be well-founded and petitioners ill-starred appeal untenable.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing,Chairperson Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44717 August 28, 1985
THE CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as the Incumbent Secretary of Labor, and THE CHARTERED BANK, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the respondent Secretary, now Minister of Labor which denied
the petitioner's claim for holiday pay and its claim for premium and overtime pay differentials. The petitioner claims that the
INTRO TO LAW Page 8

respondent Minister of Labor acted contrary to law and jurisprudence and with grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Sec.
2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and in issuing Policy Instruction No. 9, both referring to holidays with pay.
On May 20, 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association, in representation of its monthly paid employees/members,
instituted a complaint with the Regional Office No. IV, Department of Labor, now Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE)
against private respondent Chartered Bank, for the payment of ten (10) unworked legal holidays, as well as for premium and
overtime differentials for worked legal holidays from November 1, 1974.
The memorandum for the respondents summarizes the admitted and/or undisputed facts as follows:
l. The work force of respondent bank consists of 149 regular employees, all of whom are paid by the month;
2. Under their existing collective bargaining agreement, (Art. VII thereof) said monthly paid employees are
paid for overtime work as follows:
Section l. The basic work week for all employees excepting security guards who by virtue of the nature of
their work are required to be at their posts for 365 days per year, shall be forty (40) hours based on five (5)
eight (8) hours days, Monday to Friday.
Section 2. Time and a quarter hourly rate shall be paid for authorized work performed in excess of eight (8)
hours from Monday through Friday and for any hour of work performed on Saturdays subject to Section 5
hereof.
Section 3. Time and a half hourly rate shall be paid for authorized work performed on Sundays, legal and
special holidays.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. The provisions of Section I above notwithstanding the BANK may revert to the six (6) days work
week, to include Saturday for a four (4) hour day, in the event the Central Bank should require commercial
banks to open for business on Saturday.
3. In computing overtime pay and premium pay for work done during regular holidays, the divisor used in
arriving at the daily rate of pay is 251 days although formerly the divisor used was 303 days and this was
when the respondent bank was still operating on a 6-day work week basis. However, for purposes of
computing deductions corresponding to absences without pay the divisor used is 365 days.
4. All regular monthly paid employees of respondent bank are receiving salaries way beyond the statutory or
minimum rates and are among the highest paid employees in the banking industry.
5. The salaries of respondent bank's monthly paid employees suffer no deduction for holidays occurring
within the month.
On the bases of the foregoing facts, both the arbitrator and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled in favor of
the petitioners ordering the respondent bank to pay its monthly paid employees, holiday pay for the ten (10) legal holidays
effective November 1, 1974 and to pay premium or overtime pay differentials to all employees who rendered work during said
legal holidays. On appeal, the Minister of Labor set aside the decision of the NLRC and dismissed the petitioner's claim for
lack of merit basing its decision on Section 2, Rule IV, Book Ill of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9, which
respectively provide:
Sec. 2. Status of employees paid by the month. Employees who are uniformly paid by the month,
irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established
minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.
INTRO TO LAW Page 9

POLICY INSTRUCTION NO. 9
TO: All Regional Directors
SUBJECT: PAID LEGAL HOLIDAYS
The rules implementing PD 850 have clarified the policy in the implementation of the ten (10) paid legal
holidays. Before PD 850, the number of working days a year in a firm was considered important in
determining entitlement to the benefit. Thus, where an employee was working for at least 313 days, he was
considered definitely already paid. If he was working for less than 313, there was no certainty whether the
ten (10) paid legal holidays were already paid to him or not.
The ten (10) paid legal holidays law, to start with, is intended to benefit principally daily employees. In the
case of monthly, only those whose monthly salary did not yet include payment for the ten (10) paid legal
holidays are entitled to the benefit.
Under the rules implementing PD 850, this policy has been fully clarified to eliminate controversies on the
entitlement of monthly paid employees. The new determining rule is this: 'If the monthly paid employee is
receiving not less than P240, the maximum monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from
January to December, he is presumed to be already paid the ten (10) paid legal holidays. However, if
deductions are made from his monthly salary on account of holidays in months where they occur, then he is
still entitled to the ten (10) paid legal holidays.
These new interpretations must be uniformly and consistently upheld.
This issuance shall take effect immediately.
The issues are presented in the form of the following assignments of errors:
First Error
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor erred and acted contrary to law in promulgating
Sec. 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9.
Second Error
Whether or not the respondent Secretary of Labor abused his discretion and acted
contrary to law in applying Sec. 2, Rule IV of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction
No. 9 abovestated to private respondent's monthly-paid employees.
Third Error
Whether or not the respondent Secretary of Labor, in not giving due credence to the
respondent bank's practice of paying its employees base pay of 100% and premium pay
of 50% for work done during legal holidays, acted contrary to law and abused his
discretion in denying the claim of petitioners for unworked holidays and premium and
overtime pay differentials for worked holidays.
The petitioner contends that the respondent Minister of Labor gravely abused his discretion in promulgating Section 2, Rule IV,
Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9 as guidelines for the implementation of Articles 82 and 94 of the
Labor Code and in applying said guidelines to this case. It maintains that while it is true that the respondent Minister has the
authority in the performance of his duty to promulgate rules and regulations to implement, construe and clarify the Labor Code,
such power is limited by provisions of the statute sought to be implemented, construed or clarified. According to the petitioner,
the so-called "guidelines" promulgated by the respondent Minister totally contravened and violated the Code by excluding the
employees/members of the petitioner from the benefits of the holiday pay, when the Code itself did not provide for
their expanding the Code's clear and concise conclusion and notwithstanding the Code's clear and concise phraseology
defining those employees who are covered and those who are excluded from the benefits of holiday pay.
INTRO TO LAW Page 10

On the other hand, the private respondent contends that the questioned guidelines did not deprive the petitioner's members of
the benefits of holiday pay but merely classified those monthly paid employees whose monthly salary already includes holiday
pay and those whose do not, and that the guidelines did not deprive the employees of holiday pay. It states that the question to
be clarified is whether or not the monthly salaries of the petitioner's members already includes holiday pay. Thus, the
guidelines were promulgated to avoid confusion or misconstruction in the application of Articles 82 and 94 of the Labor Code
but not to violate them. Respondent explains that the rationale behind the promulgation of the questioned guidelines is to
benefit the daily paid workers who, unlike monthly-paid employees, suffer deductions in their salaries for not working on
holidays. Hence, the Holiday Pay Law was enacted precisely to countervail the disparity between daily paid workers and
monthly-paid employees.
The decision in Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong (132 SCRA 663) resolved a similar
issue. Significantly, the petitioner in that case was also a union of bank employees. We ruled that Section 2, Rule IV, Book III
of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction No. 9, are contrary to the provisions of the Labor Code and, therefore, invalid
This Court stated:
It is elementary in the rules of statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear and
unequivocal the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says. In the case at bar, the provisions of the
Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear and explicit it provides for both the
coverage of and exclusion from the benefit. In Policy Instruction No. 9, the then Secretary of Labor went as
far as to categorically state that the benefit is principally intended for daily paid employees, when the law
clearly states that every worker shall be paid their regular holiday pay. This is flagrant violation of the
mandatory directive of Article 4 of the Labor Code, which states that 'All doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be
resolved in favor of labor.' Moreover, it shall always be presumed that the legislature intended to enact a
valid and permanent statute which would have the most beneficial effect that its language permits (Orlosky
v. Hasken, 155 A. 112)
Obviously, the Secretary (Minister) of Labor had exceeded his statutory authority granted by Article 5 of the
Labor Code authorizing him to promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations.
We further ruled:
While it is true that the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by executive officers whose
duty is to enforce it should be given great weight by the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, as
in the instant case, the same must be declared as null and void. It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and,
when necessary correct constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context of the interactions of
the three branches of the government, almost always in situations where some agency of the State has
engaged in action that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power (The Supreme
Court in Modern Role, C.B. Swisher 1958, p. 36).
xxx xxx xxx
In view of the foregoing, Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to implement the Labor Code and Policy
Instruction No. 9 issued by the then Secretary of Labor must be declared null and void. Accordinglyl public
respondent Deputy Minister of Labor Amado G. Inciong had no basis at all to deny the members of petitioner
union their regular holiday pay as directed by the Labor Code.
Since the private respondent premises its action on the invalidated rule and policy instruction, it is clear that the employees
belonging to the petitioner association are entitled to the payment of ten (10) legal holidays under Articles 82 and 94 of the
Labor Code, aside from their monthly salary. They are not among those excluded by law from the benefits of such holiday pay.
Presidential Decree No. 850 states who are excluded from the holiday provisions of that law. It states:
ART. 82. Coverage. The provision of this Title shall apply to employees in all establishments and
undertakings, whether for profit or not, but not to government employees, managerial employees, field
personnel members of the family of the employer who are dependent on him for support, domestic helpers,
persons in the personal service of another, and workers who are paid by results as determined by the
Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations. (Emphasis supplied).

The questioned Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and the Secretary's Policy Instruction No. 9 add another
excluded group, namely, "employees who are uniformly paid by the month." While the additional exclusion is only in the form
of a presumption that all monthly paid employees have already been paid holiday pay, it constitutes a taking away or a
deprivation which must be in the law if it is to be valid. An administrative interpretation which diminishes the benefits of labor
more than what the statute delimits or withholds is obviously ultra vires.
It is argued that even without the presumption found in the rules and in the policy instruction, the company practice indicates
that the monthly salaries of the employees are so computed as to include the holiday pay provided by law. The petitioner
contends otherwise.
One strong argument in favor of the petitioner's stand is the fact that the Chartered Bank, in computing overtime compensation
for its employees, employs a "divisor" of 251 days. The 251 working days divisor is the result of subtracting all Saturdays,
Sundays and the ten (10) legal holidays from the total number of calendar days in a year. If the employees are already paid for
all non-working days, the divisor should be 365 and not 251.
The situation is muddled somewhat by the fact that, in computing the employees' absences from work, the respondent bank
uses 365 as divisor. Any slight doubts, however, must be resolved in favor of the workers. This is in keeping with the
constitutional mandate of promoting social justice and affording protection to labor (Sections 6 and 9, Article II, Constitution).
The Labor Code, as amended, itself provides:
ART. 4. Construction in favor of labor. All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of
this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.
Any remaining doubts which may arise from the conflicting or different divisors used in the computation of overtime pay and
employees' absences are resolved by the manner in which work actually rendered on holidays is paid. Thus, whenever
monthly paid employees work on a holiday, they are given an additional 100% base pay on top of a premium pay of 50%. If the
employees' monthly pay already includes their salaries for holidays, they should be paid only premium pay but not both base
pay and premium pay.
The contention of the respondent that 100% base pay and 50% premium pay for work actually rendered on holidays is given in
addition to monthly salaries only because the collective bargaining agreement so provides is itself an argument in favor of the
petitioner stand. It shows that the Collective Bargaining Agreement already contemplated a divisor of 251 days for holiday pay
computations before the questioned presumption in the Integrated Rules and the Policy Instruction was formulated. There is
furthermore a similarity between overtime pay, which is computed on the basis of 251 working days a year, and holiday pay,
which should be similarly treated notwithstanding the public respondents' issuances. In both cases overtime work and holiday
work- the employee works when he is supposed to be resting. In the absence of an express provision of the CBA or the law to
the contrary, the computation should be similarly handled.
We are not unmindful of the fact that the respondent's employees are among the highest paid in the industry. It is not the intent
of this Court to impose any undue burdens on an employer which is already doing its best for its personnel. we have to resolve
the labor dispute in the light of the parties' own collective bargaining agreement and the benefits given by law to all workers.
When the law provides benefits for "employees in all establishments and undertakings, whether for profit or not" and lists
specifically the employees not entitled to those benefits, the administrative agency implementing that law cannot exclude
certain employees from its coverage simply because they are paid by the month or because they are already highly paid. The
remedy lies in a clear redrafting of the collective bargaining agreement with a statement that monthly pay already includes
holiday pay or an amendment of the law to that effect but not an administrative rule or a policy instruction.
WHEREFORE, the September 7, 1976 order of the public respondent is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 24,
1976 decision of the National Labor Relations Commission which affirmed the October 30, 1975 resolution of the Labor Arbiter
but deleted interest payments is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, C.J., Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo, JJ.,
concur.
Teehankee, J., in the result.

Aquino, J., took no part.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-48437. September 30, 1986.]
MANTRADE/FMMC DIVISION EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS UNION (represented by PHILIPPINE SOCIAL SECURITY
LABOR UNION PSSLU Fed. TUCP), Petitioner, v. ARBITRATOR FROILAN M. BACUNGAN and MANTRADE
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; VOLUNTARY ARBITRATORS; DECISIONS SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL
REVIEW. The contentions of respondent corporation have been ruled against in the decision of this court in the case of
Oceanic Bic Division (FFW) v. Romero, promulgated on July 16, 1984, wherein it stated: . . . "A voluntary arbitrator by the
nature of her functions acts in a quasijudicial capacity. There is no reason why her decisions involving interpretation of law
should be beyond this courts review. Administrative officials are presumed to act in accordance with law and yet we do not
hesitate to pass upon their work where a question of law is involved or where a showing of abuse of discretion in their officials
acts is properly raised in petitions for certiorari." (130 SCRA 392, 399, 400-401)
2. ID.; ID.; GRANT FOR HOLIDAY PAY MONTHLY PAID EMPLOYEES; ISSUE SETTLED IN THE CASES OF INSULAR
BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA EMPLOYEES UNION VS. INCIONG, [132 SCRA 633], AND CHARTERED BANK
EMPLOYEES UNION VS. OPLE [141 SCRA 9]. Respondent arbitrator opined that respondent corporation does not have
any legal obligation to grant its monthly salaried employees holiday pay, unless it is argued that the pertinent section of the
Rule and Regulations implementing Section 94 of the Labor Code is not in conformity with the law, and thus, without force and
effect. This issue was subsequently decided on October 24, 1984 by a division of this court in the case of Insular Bank of Asia
and American Employees Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong, wherein it held as follows: "We agree with petitioners contention that
Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the implementing rules and Policy Instruction No. 9 issued by the then Secretary of Labor are
null and void since in the guise of clarifying the Labor Codes provisions on holiday pay, they in effect amended them enlarging
the scope of their exclusion (p. 11, rec.). . . . "From the above-cited provisions, it is clear that monthly paid employees are not
excluded from the benefits of holiday pay. However, the implementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the then Secretary
of Labor excludes monthly paid employees from the said benefits by inserting under Rule IV, Book III of the implementing
rules, section 2, which provides that: employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working
days therein , with the salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all
days in the month whether worked or not." (132 SCRA 663, 672-673) This ruling was reiterated by the court en banc on August
28, 1985 in the case of Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople, wherein it added that: "The questioned Sec. 2, Rule
IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and the Secretarys Policy Instruction No. 9 add another excluded group, namely
employees who are uniformly paid by the month. While additional exclusion is only in the form of a presumption that all
monthly paid employees have already been paid holiday paid, it constitutes a taking away or a deprivation which must be in
the law if it is to be valid. An administrative interpretation which diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the statute
delimits or withholds is obviously ultra vires." (138 SCRA 273, 282. See also CBTC Employees Union v. Clave, January 7,
1986, 141 SCRA 9.)
3. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; MANDAMUS; APPROPRIATE EQUITABLE REMEDY IN CASE AT BAR.
Respondent corporation contends that mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of an act which the law does not
clearly enjoin as a duty. True it is also that mandamus is not proper to enforce a contractual obligation, the remedy being an
action for specific performance (Province of Pangasinan v. Reparations Commission, November 29, 1977, 80 SCRA 376). In
the case at bar, however, in view of the above-cited subsequent decisions of this Court clearly defining the legal duty to grant
holiday pay to monthly salaried employees, mandamus is an appropriate equitable remedy (Dionisio v. Paterno, July 23, 1980,
98 SCRA 677; Gonzales v. Government Service Insurance System, September 10, 1981, 107 SCRA 492).
DECISION

FERIA, J.:
This is a petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed by petitioner against arbitrator Froilan M. Bacungan and Mantrade
Development Corporation arising from the decision of respondent arbitrator, the dispositive part of which reads as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"CONSIDERING ALL THE ABOVE, We rule that Mantrade Development Corporation is not under legal obligation to pay
holiday pay (as provided for in Article 94 of the Labor Code in the third official Department of Labor edition) to its monthly paid
employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less
than the statutory or established minimum wage, and this rule is applicable not only as of March 2, 1976 but as of November
1, 1974."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner questions the validity of the pertinent section of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code as
amended on which respondent arbitrator based his decision.
On the other hand, respondent corporation has raised procedural and substantive objections. It contends that petitioner is
barred from pursuing the present action in view of Article 263 of the Labor Code, which provides in part that "voluntary
arbitration awards or decisions shall be final, inappealable, and executory," as well as the rules implementing the same; the
pertinent provision of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between petitioner and respondent corporation; and Article 2044 of
the Civil Code which provides that "any stipulation that the arbitrators award or decision shall be final, is valid, without
prejudice to Articles 2038, 2039, and 2040." Respondent corporation further contends that the special civil action
of certiorari does not lie because respondent arbitrator is not an "officer exercising judicial functions" within the contemplation
of Rule 65, Section 1, of the Rules of Court; that the instant petition raises an error of judgment on the part of respondent
arbitrator and not an error of jurisdiction; that it prays for the annulment of certain rules and regulations issued by the
Department of Labor, not for the annulment of the voluntary arbitration proceedings; and that appeal by certiorari under
Section 29 of the Arbitration Law, Republic Act No. 876, is not applicable to the case at bar because arbitration in labor
disputes is expressly excluded by Section 3 of said law.chanrobles law library : red
These contentions have been ruled against in the decision of this Court in the case of Oceanic Bic Division (FFW) v. Romero,
promulgated on July 16, 1984, wherein it stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We agree with the petitioner that the decisions of voluntary arbitrators must be given the highest respect and as a general rule
must be accorded a certain measure of finality. This is especially true where the arbitrator chosen by the parties enjoys the first
rate credentials of Professor Flerida Ruth Pineda Romero, Director of the U.P. Law Center and an academician of
unquestioned expertise in the field of Labor Law. It is not correct, however, that this respect precludes the exercise of judicial
review over their decisions. Article 262 of the Labor Code making voluntary arbitration awards final, inappealable and
executory, except where the money claims exceed P100,000.00 or 40% of the paid-up capital of the employer or where there
is abuse of discretion or gross incompetence refers to appeals to the National Labor Relations Commission and not to judicial
review.
"In spite of statutory provisions making final the decisions of certain administrative agencies, we have taken cognizance of
petitions questioning these decisions where want of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, violation of due process, denial of
substantial justice, or erroneous interpretation of the Law were brought to our attention. . . .
x x x
"A voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. There is no reason why her decisions
involving interpretation of law should be beyond this Courts review. Administrative officials are presumed to act in accordance
with law and yet we do not hesitate to pass upon their work where a question of law is involved or where a showing of abuse
of discretion in their official acts is properly raised in petitions for certiorari." (130 SCRA 392, 399, 400-401)
In denying petitioners claim for holiday pay, respondent arbitrator stated that although monthly salaried employees are not
among those excluded from receiving such additional pay under Article 94 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, to
wit:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
ART. 94. Right to holiday pay. (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays, except in retail
and service establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers;

(b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such employee shall be paid compensation equivalent
to twice his regular rate; and
(c) As used in this Article, "holiday" includes: New Years Day, Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, the ninth of April, the first of
May, the twelfth of June, the fourth of July, the thirtieth of November, the twenty-fifth and the thirtieth of December, and the day
designated by law for holding a general election.
they appear to be excluded under Sec. 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Rules and Regulations implementing said provision which
reads thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 2. Status of employees paid by the month. Employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the
number of working days therein, with a salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to
be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not.
Respondent arbitrator further opined that respondent corporation does not have any legal obligation to grant its monthly
salaried employees holiday pay, unless it is argued that the pertinent section of the Rules and Regulations implementing
Section 94 of the Labor Code is not in conformity with the law, and thus, without force and effect.
This issue was subsequently decided on October 24, 1984 by a division of this Court in the case of Insular Bank of Asia and
America Employees Union (IBAAEU) v. Inciong, wherein it held as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WE agree with the petitioners contention that Section 2, Rule IV, Book III of the implementing rules and Policy Instruction No.
9, issued by the then Secretary of Labor are null and void since in the guise of clarifying the Labor Codes provisions on
holiday pay, they in effect amended them by enlarging the scope of their exclusion (p. 11, rec.)
"Article 94 of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 850, provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Art. 94. Right to holiday pay. (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays, except in retail
and service establishments regularly employing less than ten (10) workers . . .
"The coverage and scope of exclusion of the Labor Codes holiday pay provisions is spelled out under Article 82 thereof which
reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Art. 82. Coverage. The provision of this Title shall apply to employees in all establishments and undertakings, whether for
profit or not, but not to government employees, managerial employees, field personnel, members of the family of the employer
who are dependent on him for support, domestic helpers, persons, in the personal service of another, and workers who are
paid by results as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations.
x x x
"From the above-cited provisions, it is clear that monthly paid employees are not excluded from the benefits of holiday pay.
However, the implementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the then Secretary of Labor excludes monthly paid
employees from the said benefits by inserting under Rule IV, Book III of the implementing rules, Section 2, which provides that:
employees who are uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days therein, with a salary of not less
than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or
not." (132 SCRA 663, 672-673).
This ruling was reiterated by the Court en banc on August 28, 1985 in the case of Chartered Bank Employees Association v.
Ople, wherein it added that:chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
"The questioned Sec. 2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and the Secretarys Policy Instruction No. 9 add another
excluded group, namely employees who are uniformly paid by the month. While the additional exclusion is only in the form of
a presumption that all monthly paid employees have already been paid holiday pay, it constitutes a taking away or a
deprivation which must be in the law if it is to be valid. An administrative interpretation which diminishes the benefits of labor
more than what the statute delimits or withholds is obviously ultra vires." (138 SCRA 273, 282. See also CBTC Employees
Union v. , Clave, January 7, 1986, 141 SCRA 9.)
Lastly, respondent corporation contends that mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of an act which the law does
not clearly enjoin as a duty. True it is also that mandamus is not proper to enforce a contractual obligation, the remedy being
an action for specific performance (Province of Pangasinan v. Reparations Commission, November 29, 1977, 80 SCRA 376).

In the case at bar, however, in view of the above cited subsequent decisions of this Court clearly defining the legal duty to
grant holiday pay to monthly salaried employees, mandamus is an appropriate equitable remedy (Dionisio v. Paterno, July 23,
1980, 98 SCRA 677; Gonzales v. Government Service Insurance System, September 10, 1981, 107 SCRA 492).
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of respondent arbitrator is SET ASIDE and respondent corporation is ordered to
GRANT holiday pay to its monthly salaried employees. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-54718 December 4, 1985
CRISOLOGO VILLANUEVA Y PARDES, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF DOLORES, QUEZON, VIVENCIO G.
LIRIO respondents.
RESOLUTION
TEEHANKEE, J.:
Upon consideration of petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision of May 3, 1983 1 (which dismissed his petition to
set aside respondent Comelec's resolutions of February 21, 1980 and July 31, 1980 denying his petition for annulment of the
proclamation of respondent Vivencio Lirio as the elected vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon and for his proclamation instead as
such elected vice-mayor for having received the clear majority of the votes cast), the comments of public and private
respondents and petitioner's consolidated reply and manifestation and motion of June 25, 1985 (stating that respondent
abandoned his claim to the office and accepted and assumed on June 10, 1985, the position of municipal trial judge of Lucban
and Sampaloc, Quezon, as verified from the records of the Office of the Court Administrator), the Court Resolved to
RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE its aforesaid decision and to GRANT the petition at bar.
The undisputed facts show that one Narciso Mendoza, Jr. had filed on January 4, 1980, the last day for filing of certificates of
candidacy in the January 30, 1980 local elections, his sworn certificate of candidacy as independent for the office of vice-
mayor of the municipality of Dolores, Quezon. But later on the very same day, Mendoza filed an unsworn letter in his own
handwriting withdrawing his said certificate of candidacy "for personal reasons." Later on January 25, 1980, petitioner
Crisologo Villanueva, upon learning of his companion Mendoza's withdrawal, filed his own sworn "Certificate of Candidacy in
substitution" of Mendoza's for the said office of vice mayor as a one-man independent ticket. ... The results showed petitioner
to be the clear winner over respondent with a margin of 452 votes (3,112 votes as against his opponent respondent Lirio's
2,660 votes). But the Municipal Board of Canvassers disregarded all votes cast in favor of petitioner as stray votes on the

basis of the Provincial Election Officer's erroneous opinion that since petitioner's name does not appear in the Comelec's
certified list of candidates for that municipality, it could be presumed that his candidacy was not duly approved by the Comelec
so that his votes could not be "legally counted. " ... The canvassers accordingly proclaimed respondent Vivencio G. Lirio as the
only unopposed candidate and as the duly elected vice mayor of the municipality of Dolores.
Respondent Comelec issued its questioned resolution on February 21, 1980 denying the petition on two grounds after citing
the pertinent legal provisions, as follows:
The 1978 Election Code provides:
SEC. 27. ... No certificate of candidacy duly filed shall be considered withdraw ... unless the candidate files
with the office which received the certificate ... or with the Commission a sworn statement of withdrawal ...
SEC. 28. ... If, after last day for filing certificates of candidacy, a candidate with a certificate of candidacy
duly filed should ... withdraw ... any voter qualified for the office may file his certificate of candidacy for the
office for which ... the candidate who has withdrawn ... was a candidate on or before midday of election ...
Clearly, Petitioner Villanueva could not have substituted for Candidate Mendoza on the strength of Section
28 of the 1978 Election Code which he invokes, For one thing, Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate is not
under oath, as required under Section 27 of the Code; hence it produces no legal effect. For another, said
withdrawal was made not after the last day (January 4, 1980) for filing certificates of candidacy,
as contemplated under Sec. 28 of the Code, but on that very same day. (Emphasis copies)
Upon a restudy of the case, the Court finds merit in the reconsideration prayed for, which would respect the will of the
electorate instead of defeating the same through the invocation of formal or technical defects. (De Guzman vs. Board of
Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211 [1925], citing Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208 (1918) Badelles vs. Cabili 27 SCRA 121 [1969];
Yra vs. Abano 52 Phil. 380 [1928]; Canceran vs. Comelec, 107 Phil. 607 (1960) Corocoro vs. Bascara, 9 SCRA 522 [1963],
Pungutan vs. Abubakar, 43 SCRA 11 [19721; and Lacson, Jr. vs. Posadas 72 SCRA 170 [19761).
The Court holds that the Comelec's first ground for denying due course to petitioner's substitute certificate of candidacy, i.e.
that Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy was not "under oath," should be rejected. It is not seriously
contended by respondent nor by the Comelec that Mendoza's withdrawal was not an actual fact and a reality, so much so that
no votes were cast for him at all, In fact, Mendoza's name, even though his candidacy was filed on the last day within the
deadline, was not in the Comelec's certified list of candidates. His unsworn withdrawalfiled later on the same day had
been accepted by the election registrar without protest nor objection, On the other hand, since there was no time to include
petitioner's name in the Comelec list of registered candidates, because the election was only four days away, petitioner as
substitute candidate circularized formal notices of his candidacy to all chairmen and members of the citizens election
committees in compliance with the suggestion of the Comelec Law Manager, Atty. Zoilo Gomez.
The fact that Mendoza's withdrawal was not sworn is but a technicality which should not be used to frustrate the people's will
in favor of petitioner as the substitute candidate. In Guzman us, Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211, clearly applicable, mutatis
mutandis this Court held that "(T)he will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of candidacy
had not been properly sworn to, This legal provision is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election would be
fatal to the status of the candidate before the electorate, but after the people have expressed their will, the result of the
election cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate has not sworn to his certificate or candidacy." (See also Gundan vs.
Court of First Instance, 66 Phil. 125). As likewise ruled by this Court in Canceran vs. Comelec, 107 Phil. 607, the legal
requirement that a withdrawal be under oath will be held to be merely directory and Mendoza's failure to observe the
requirement should be "considered a harmless irregularity."
As to the second ground, Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy right on the very same day that he filed his
certificate of candidacy on January 4, 1980 which was the very last day for filing of certificates of candidacy shows that he was
not serious about his certificate of candidacy. But this could not be done to would be bonafide candidates, like petitioner who
had not filed his candidacy in deference to Mendoza's candidacy who was one of his " co-planners " with "some concerned
citizens ... (who) held causes to put up a slate that will run against the erstwhile unopposed KBL slate."
The Comelec's post-election act of denying petitioner's substitute candidacy certainly does not seem to be in consonance with
the substance and spirit of the law. Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code provides for such substitute candidates in case of
death. withdrawal or disqualification up to mid-day of the very day of the elections. Mendoza's withdrawal was filed on the last
hour of the last day for regular filing of candidacies on January 4, 1980, which he had filed earlier that same day. For all intents

and purposes, such withdrawal should therefore be considered as having been made substantially and in truth after the last
day, even going by the literal reading of the provision by the Comelec. Indeed, the statement of former Chief Justice Enrique
M. Fernando in his dissent that "the bona fides of petitioner Crisologo Villanueva y Paredes as a substitute candidate cannot,
(in his opinion), be successfully assailed. It follows that the votes cast in his favor must be counted. Such being the case, there
is more than sufficient justification for his proclamation as Vice Mayor...
ACCORDINGLY, the Court SETS ASIDE the questioned Resolutions of respondent Comelec and annuls the proclamation of
respondent Lirio as elected
vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon and instead declares petitioner as the duly elected vice-mayor of said municipality and entitled
forthwith to assume said office, take the oath of office and discharge its functions. This resolution is IMMEDIATELY
EXECUTORY. SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera and Relova, JJ., on leave.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, C.J., dissenting:
Vivencio G. Lirio of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan was the candidate for vice mayor of Dolores, Quezon Province in the
election held on January 30, 1980.
The other candidate for vice mayor was Narciso L. Mendoza, Jr., who filed as certificate of candidacy on January 4, 1980, the
last day for filing certificates of candidacy. But at 7:27 in the evening of that day, Mendoza withdrew his candidacy by means of
a handwritten letter of withdrawal which was not under oath. He handed that letter to the election registrar of Dolores.
Five days before the election or on January 25, 1980, Crisologo Villanueva filed his certificate of candidacy for vice mayor in
substitution for Mendoza. On January 26 the election registrar transmitted Villanueva's certificate of candidacy and Mendoza's
withdrawal letter to the provincial election registrar who, in turn, indorsed the same to the Commission on Elections. These
papers were received by the Comelec Law Department only on February 11, 1980 or after the election and after the
proclamation of Lirio as the duly elected vice mayor.
Villanueva's name was not included in the official list of candidates. However, on the eve of the election or on January 29, he
addressed a letter to all chairmen and members of the board of election inspectors of Dolores wherein he informed them of his
candidacy in substitution for Mendoza. He requested them to count the votes cast in his favor.
The municipal election registrar asked the provincial election registrar to clarify the status of Villanueva's candidacy. On
election day, the provincial election registrar replied that since Villanueva's name was not included in the official list of
candidates it could be legally presumed that the Comelec did not approve his certificate of candidacy.
On January 31, 1980 the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Lirio as the duly elected vice mayor. The votes cast for
Villanueva were not counted because he was not an official candidate. They were regarded as stray votes. It cannot be
assumed that he received 3,112 votes as against 2,600 votes for Lirio.
Villanueva filed a petition to annul Lirio's proclamation. The Comelec dismissed it on the grounds (1) that Mendoza's
withdrawal had no legal effect because it was not under oath as required in section 27 of the Election Code and (2) that even
assuming that it was effective, Villanueva's substitute candidacy was not valid under section 28 of the Election Code since
Mendoza did not withdraw after January 4 but on that very day.
Any votes cast for Villanueva were stray votes under section 155 (15) of the Election Code. It cannot be said that Villanueva
obtained more votes than Lirio, a reelectionist.
It is dangerous to rely on the so-called spirit of the law which we cannot see nor handle and which we do not know very much.
The Comelec resolution was affirmed by this Court. Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration. I vote to deny said motion.

Separate Opinions
AQUINO, C.J., dissenting:
Vivencio G. Lirio of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan was the candidate for vice mayor of Dolores, Quezon Province in the
election held on January 30, 1980.
The other candidate for vice mayor was Narciso L. Mendoza, Jr., who filed as certificate of candidacy on January 4, 1980, the
last day for filing certificates of candidacy. But at 7:27 in the evening of that day, Mendoza withdrew his candidacy by means of
a handwritten letter of withdrawal which was not under oath. He handed that letter to the election registrar of Dolores.
Five days before the election or on January 25, 1980, Crisologo Villanueva filed his certificate of candidacy for vice mayor in
substitution for Mendoza. On January 26 the election registrar transmitted Villanueva's certificate of candidacy and Mendoza's
withdrawal letter to the provincial election registrar who, in turn, indorsed the same to the Commission on Elections. These
papers were received by the Comelec Law Department only on February 11, 1980 or after the election and after the
proclamation of Lirio as the duly elected vice mayor.
Villanueva's name was not included in the official list of candidates. However, on the eve of the election or on January 29, he
addressed a letter to all chairmen and members of the board of election inspectors of Dolores wherein he informed them of his
candidacy in substitution for Mendoza. He requested them to count the votes cast in his favor.
The municipal election registrar asked the provincial election registrar to clarify the status of Villanueva's candidacy. On
election day, the provincial election registrar replied that since Villanueva's name was not included in the official list of
candidates it could be legally presumed that the Comelec did not approve his certificate of candidacy.
On January 31, 1980 the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Lirio as the duly elected vice mayor. The votes cast for
Villanueva were not counted because he was not an official candidate. They were regarded as stray votes. It cannot be
assumed that he received 3,112 votes as against 2,600 votes for Lirio.
Villanueva filed a petition to annul Lirio's proclamation. The Comelec dismissed it on the grounds (1) that Mendoza's
withdrawal had no legal effect because it was not under oath as required in section 27 of the Election Code and (2) that even
assuming that it was effective, Villanueva's substitute candidacy was not valid under section 28 of the Election Code since
Mendoza did not withdraw after January 4 but on that very day.
Any votes cast for Villanueva were stray votes under section 155 (15) of the Election Code. It cannot be said that Villanueva
obtained more votes than Lirio, a reelectionist.
It is dangerous to rely on the so-called spirit of the law which we cannot see nor handle and which we do not know very much.
The Comelec resolution was affirmed by this Court. Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration. I vote to deny said motion.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-66469 July 29, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO QUIJANO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. BERNARDO SALAS (In his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Cebu, Branch VIII), MARIO ABONG, ALFREDO
DE LEON, ERIWADWIN MONTEBON, ROMEO DE GUZMAN, & EDUARDO MABUHAY, respondents.
Basilio E. Duaban for accused.
CRUZ, J.:

Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Cebu but before he could be arraigned the
case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution.1 As a result of the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed,
with no bail recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. 2 Trial commenced, but while it was in progress, the prisoner, taking
advantage of the first information for homicide, succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and
ordering his release; and so he escaped.3 The respondent judge, learning later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond
and ordered Abong's re-arrest.4 But he was gone. Nonetheless, the prosecution moved that the hearing continue in
accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia under certain circumstances.5 The respondent judge
denied the motion, however, and suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused. 6 The order of the trial court is now
before us on certiorari and mandamus.7
The judge erred. He did not see the woods for the trees. He mistakenly allowed himself to be tethered by the literal reading of
the rule when he should have viewed it from the broader perspective of its intendment.
The rule is found in the last sentence of Article IV, Section 19, of the 1973 Constitution, reading in full as follows:
Section 19. In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to he informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified.
The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in the past be indefinitely deferred,
and many times completely abandoned, because of the defendant's escape. The old case ofPeople v. Avancea 8 required his
presence at certain stages of the trial which as a result, had to be discontinued as long as the defendant had not re-appeared
or remained at large. As his right to be present at these stages was then held not waivable even by his escape, such escape
thus operated to the fugitive's advantage, and in mockery of the authorities, insofar as the trial could not proceed as long as he
had not been recaptured.
The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by Section 19, which now allows trial in absentia, Now, the prisoner
cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possibly eventual conviction provided only that: a) he has
been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified.
The respondent judge was probably still thinking of the old doctrine when he ruled that trial in absentia of the escapee could
not be held because he could not be duly notified under Section 19. He forgets that the fugitive is now deemed to have waived
such notice precisely because he has escaped, and it is also this escape that makes his failure to appear at his trial unjustified.
Escape can never be a legal justification. In the past, his escape "rewarded" him by postponing all further proceedings against
him and in effect ultimately absolving him of the charge he was facing. Under the present rule, his escape will, legally
speaking, operate to Ms disadvantage by preventing him from attending his trial, which will continue even in his absence and
most likely result in his conviction.
The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present
witnesses who will Identify the accused. 9 Under Section 19, the defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right
and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. He will be
deemed to have received due notice. The same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear unjustified because he has,
by escaping, placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law.
Trial in absentia was not allowed in Borja v. Mendoza 10 because it was held notwithstanding that the accused had not been
previously arraigned. His subsequent conviction was properly set aside. But in the instant case, since all the requisites are
present, there is absolutely no reason why the respondent judge should refuse to try the accused, who had already been
arraigned at the time he was released on the illegal bail bond. Abong should be prepared to bear the consequences of his
escape, including forfeiture of the right to be notified of the subsequent proceedings and of the right to adduce evidence on his
behalf and refute the evidence of the prosecution, not to mention a possible or even probable conviction.
We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the
intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth," which is not
really that evanescent or elusive. As judges, we must look beyond and not be bound by the language of the law, seeking to
discover, by our own lights, the reason and the rhyme for its enactment. That we may properly apply it according to its ends,
we need and must use not only learning but also vision.

The trial judge is directed to investigate the lawyer who assisted Mario Abong in securing bail from the city court of Cebu on
the basis of the withdrawn information for homicide and to report to us the result of his investigation within sixty days.
WHEREFORE, the order of the trial court dated December 22, 1983, denying the motion for the trial in absentia of the accused
is set aside. The respondent judge is directed to continue hearing the case against the respondent Mario Abong in absentia as
long as he has not reappeared, until it is terminated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera and Paras, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19313 January 19, 1962

DOMINADOR R. AYTONA, petitioner,
vs.
ANDRES V. CASTILLO, ET AL., respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N.
BENGZON, C.J.:
Without prejudice to the subsequent promulgation of more extended opinion, the Court adopted today, the following
resolutions: .
On December 29, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia appointed Dominador R. Aytona as ad interim Governor of the
Central Bank. On the same day, the latter took the corresponding oath.
On December 30, 1961, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on December 31, 1961, he issued
Administrative Order No. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointment made by President Garcia after
December 13, 1961, (date when he, Macapagal, had been proclaimed elected by the Congress). On January 1, 1962,
President Macapagal appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank, and the latter qualified
immediately.
On January 2, 1962, both appointed exercised the powers of their office, although Castillo informed Aytona of his title thereto;
and some unpleasantness developed in the premises of the Central Bank. However, the next day and thereafter, Aytona was
definitely prevented from holding office in the Central Bank.
So, he instituted this proceeding which is practically, a quo warranto, challenging Castillo's right to exercise the powers of
Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona claims he was validly appointed, had qualified for the post, and therefore, the
subsequent appointment and qualification of Castillo was void, because the position was then occupied by him. Castillo replies
that the appointment of Aytona had been revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 of Macapagal; and so, the real issue is
whether the new President had power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by the past
President, even after the appointees had already qualified.1wph1.t
The record shows that President Garcia sent to the Commission on Appointments which was not then in session a
communication dated December 29, 1961, submitting "for confirmation" ad interim appointments of assistant director of lands,
councilors, mayors, members of the provincial boards, fiscals, justices of the peace, officers of the army, etc.; and the name of
Dominador R. Aytona as Governor of the Central Bank occupies number 45, between a justice of the peace and a colonel of
the Armed Forces.
Another communication of President Garcia bearing the same date, submitted a list of ad interim appointments of Foreign
Affairs officers, judges, fiscals, chiefs of police, justices of the peace, mayors, councilors, etc. number 63 of which was that of
Dominador R. Aytona for Governor of the Philippines in the Boards of International Monetary Fund, International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, etc.
A third communication likewise dated December 29, 1961, addressed to the Commission on Appointments submitted for
confirmation 124 names of persons appointed as judges of first instance, members of provincial boards, and boards of
government corporations, fiscals, justice of the peace, even one associate justice of this Court occupying position No. 8 and
two associate justices of the Court of Appeals (9 and 10) between an assistant of the Solicitor-General's Office, and the
chairman of the board of tax appeals of Pasay City, who in turn are followed by judges of first instance, and inserted between
the latter is the name of another associate justice of the Court of Appeals.
There were other appointments thus submitted by President Garcia on that date, December 29, 1961. All in all, about three
hundred fifty (350) "midnight" or "last minute" appointments.
In revoking the appointments, President Macapagal is said to have acted for these and other reasons: (1) the outgoing
President should have refrained from filling vacancies to give the new President opportunity to consider names in the light of
his new policies, which were approved by the electorate in the last elections; (2) these scandalously hurried appointments in
mass do not fall within the intent and spirit of the constitutional provision authorizing the issuance of ad interim appointments;
(3) the appointments were irregular, immoral and unjust, because they were issued only upon the condition that the appointee
would immediately qualify obviously to prevent a recall or revocation by the incoming President, with the result that those

deserving of promotion or appointment who preferred to be named by the new President declined and were by-passed; and
(4) the abnormal conditions surrounding the appointment and qualifications evinced a desire on the part of the outgoing
President merely subvert the policies of the incoming administration.
It is admitted that many of the persons mentioned in the communication to the Commission on Appointments dated December
29, 1961, did not qualify. There is evidence that in the night of December 29, there was a scramble in Malacaan of
candidates for positions trying to get their written appointments or having such appointments changed to more convenient
places, after some last minute bargaining. There was unusual hurry in the issuance of the appointments which were not
coursed through the Department Heads and in the confusion, a woman appointed judge was designated "Mr." and a man
was designated "Madam." One appointee who got his appointment and was required to qualify, resorted to the rush of asking
permission to swear before a relative official, and then never qualified.
We are informed, it is Malacaan's practice which we find to be logical to submit ad interim appointments only when the
Commission on Appointments is in session. One good reason for the practice is that only those who have accepted the
appointment and qualified are submitted for confirmation. Nevertheless, this time, Malacaan submitted its appointments on
the same day they were issued; and the Commission was not then in session; obviously because it foresaw the possibility that
the incoming President would refuse to submit later the appointees of his predecessor. As a result, as already adverted to,
some persons whose names were submitted for confirmation had not qualified nor accepted their appointments.
Because of the haste and irregularities, some judges of first instance qualified for districts wherein no vacancies existed,
because the incumbents had not qualified for other districts to which they had been supposedly transferred or promoted.
Referring specifically to judges who had not qualified, the course of conduct adopted by Former Chief Justice Moran is cited.
Being ambassador in Spain and desiring to return to this Court even as associate justice, Moran was tendered an ad
interim appointment thereto by President Quirino, after the latter had lost the election to President Magsaysay, and before
leaving the Presidency. Said Ambassador declined to qualify being of the opinion that the matter should be left to the incoming
newly-elected President.
Of course, nobody will assert that President Garcia ceased to be such earlier than at noon of December 30, 1961. But it is
common sense to believe that after the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, his was no more than a "care-
taker" administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he should
not do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. The time for debate had
passed; the electorate had spoken. It was not for him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare
that had ended or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies in important
positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one
night and planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some
reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan
effort to fill all vacant positions1 irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive the new administration of an
opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.
Normally, when the President makes appointments the consent of the Commission on Appointments, he has benefit of their
advice. When he makes ad interim appointments, he exercises a special prerogative and is bound to be prudent to insure
approval of his selection either previous consultation with the members of the Commission or by thereafter explaining to them
the reason such selection. Where, however, as in this case, the Commission on Appointments that will consider the appointees
is different from that existing at the time of the appointment 2 and where the names are to be submitted by successor, who may
not wholly approve of the selections, the President should be doubly careful in extending such appointments. Now, it is hard to
believe that in signing 350 appointments in one night, President Garcia exercised such "double care" which was required and
expected of him; and therefore, there seems to be force to the contention that these appointments fall beyond the intent and
spirit of the constitutional provision granting to the Executive authority to issue ad interim appointments.
Under the circumstances above described, what with the separation of powers, this Court resolves that it must decline to
disregard the Presidential Administrative Order No. 2, cancelling such "midnight" or "last-minute" appointments.
Of course, the Court is aware of many precedents to the effect that once an appointment has been issued, it cannot be
reconsidered, specially where the appointee has qualified. But none of them refer to mass ad interimappointments (three-
hundred and fifty), issued in the last hours of an outgoing Chief Executive, in a setting similar to that outlined herein. On the
other hand, the authorities admit of exceptional circumstances justifying revocation 3 and if any circumstances justify
revocation, those described herein should fit the exception.

Incidentally, it should be stated that the underlying reason for denying the power to revoke after the appointee has qualified is
the latter's equitable rights. Yet it is doubtful if such equity might be successfully set up in the present situation, considering the
rush conditional appointments, hurried maneuvers and other happenings detracting from that degree of good faith, morality
and propriety which form the basic foundation of claims to equitable relief. The appointees, it might be argued, wittingly or
unwittingly cooperated with the stratagem to beat the deadline, whatever the resultant consequences to the dignity and
efficiency of the public service. Needless to say, there are instances wherein not only strict legality, but also fairness, justice
and righteousness should be taken into account.
WHEREFORE, the Court exercising its judgment and discretion in the matter, hereby dismiss the action, without costs.
Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and De Leon, J.J., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring:
Once more this Court has to pass upon and determine a controversy that calls for an interpretation of the provisions of the
Constitution. The facts that gave rise to the petition need not be restated as they are set forth in opinion rendered for the
Court. The question is whether the appointment of a person to a public office by a President whose term of office was about to
expire or cease is lawful or does not contravene the Constitution; or, if lawful after the appointee has taken his oath, until when
would such appointment be valid and effective. The constitutional point involved seems to have been overlooked the framers
of the Constitution. It would seem that the framers, well-meaning persons that they were, never foresaw an eventuality such as
the one confronting the Republic. The framers never thought and anticipated that citizen elevated by the people to such an
exalted office the President of the Republic, would perform an act which though not expressly prohibited by the Constitution
and the law, ought not to be done, since a sense of propriety would be enough to stop him from performing it.
The petitioner invokes section 10, paragraph 4, article VII, of the Constitution which provides that
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments
shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.
Under these constitutional provisions there seems to be no doubt that the President may make the appointment, and if
approved by the Commission on Appointments, it would unquestionably be lawful, valid and effective, but if disapproved or not
acted upon by the Commission on Appointments then the appointment becomes ineffectual and the appointee ceases and can
no longer perform the duties of the office to which he had been appointed.
It is urged that the petitioner's appointment having been made by the President during the recess of the Congress and he
having taken his oath, the appointment is lawful, valid and effective until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of the Congress should the Commission on Appointments fail to act on it.
Ad interim appointments that the President may make during the recess of the Congress are those made during a period of
time from the adjournment of the Congress to the opening session, regular or special, of the same Congress. In other words, if
the President had convened in a special session the fourth Congress whose term was to expire on the 30th of December 1961
and during such session the ad interim appointments had been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments there would be
little doubt that the appointments would be lawful and valid.
The government established by the Constitution is one of checks and balances to preclude and prevent arrogation of powers
by officers elected or appointed under it.
Under the provisions of the Constitution "The term of office of Senators shall be six years and shall begin on the thirtieth day of
December next following their election."1 And "The term of office of the Members of the House of Representatives shall be four
years and shall begin on the thirtieth day of December next following their election." 2Under section 10, paragraph 4, article VII,
of the Constitution, above quoted, the President may make appointments during the recess of the Congress, "but such

appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress." .
The term "recess", in its broadest sense, means and refers to the intervening period between adjournment of a regular session
of one hundred days exclusive of Sundays, or of a Special session which cannot continue longer than thirty days, and the
convening thereof in regular session once every year on the fourth Monday of January or in special session to consider
general legislation or only such subjects as he (the President) may designate. 3 And such intervening period refers to the same
Congress that had adjourned and was to be convened. Such intervening period cannot refer to two different Congresses, one
that has adjourned and one newly chosen or elected to meet in regular session as provided for by the Constitution, or in
special session by the call of the President.
The term of the President ... shall end at noon the thirtieth day of December following the expiration four years after
(his) election and the term of (his) successor shall begin from such time.4
If the ad interim appointments made by the President during the recess of the Congress are effective only until disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress a limitation on the power of the President
there is a cogent and strong reason for holding to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution that such appointments
made by him ceased to be valid and effective after the term of the Congress existing at the time of the making of such
appointments had ended or expired. The end or expiration of the of the Congress existing at the time of the making of the ad
interim appointments by the President is a stronger cause or reason for the lapse or ineffectuality of such appointments than
"the next adjournment of the Congress." Since that Congress no longer exists and hence can no longer convene and then
"adjourn." The effectivity and validity of the appointment of the petitioner as Governor of the Central Bank ceased, lapsed and
expired on thirtieth of December 1961. He is no longer entitled hold the office to which he had been appointed. My vote,
therefore, is for the denial of the petition.
Dizon, J., concurs.
I concur with the foregoing concurring opinion of Justice Padilla, the same being based on an additional ground justifying
denial of the petition under consideration.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., concurring: .
In addition to the reasons stated in the resolution adopted by this Court on January 19, 1962, I wish to express the following
views: .
1. The "midnight appointments" made by President Garcia were extended by him under Section 10, Paragraph 4, Article VII of
the Constitution which provides: "The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress." It is clear that these appointments can only be made during the recess of Congress because
they are ad interim appointments.
The term "recess" has a definite legal meaning. It means the interval between a session of Congress that has adjourned and
another of the same Congress. It does not refer to the interval between the session of one Congress and that of another. In
that case the interval is not referred to as a "recess" but an adjournment sine die. Thus, in the case of Tipton v. Parker, 71 Ark.
194, the court said: "The 'recess' here referred to by Judge Cooley means the intermission between sittings of the same body
at its regular or adjourned session, and not to the interval between the final adjournment of one body and the convening of
another at the next regular session. When applied to a legislative body, it means a temporary dismissal, and not an
adjournment sine die." Since the appointments in question were made after the Fourth Congress has adjourned sine die and
ceased to function on December 30, 1961, they cannot partake of the nature of ad interim appointments within the meaning of
the Constitution.
2. The Commission on Appointments under our constitutional set-up is not continuing body but one that co-exists with the
Congress that has created it. This is so because said Commission is a creation of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives. While the Senate is a continuing body, the House ceases at the end of its fourth year. It cannot therefore be
continuing it being a creation of a body half of which is alive and the other half has ceased to exist. This theory can also be
gleaned from the proceedings of the constitutional convention.

Thus, the preliminary draft of the Philippine Constitution provides for a permanent Commission and for the holding of sessions
of the Commission even during the recess of Congress. After mature deliberation the proposal was defeated and a substitute
was adopted which is now embodied in Article VI, Section 12, of our Constitution. As a matter of fact, as finally adopted, the
Commission on Appointments has to be organized upon the convening of a new Congress after the election of the Speaker of
the House of Representatives or of the President of the Senate, as the case may be, as provided for in Section 13, Article VI of
the Constitution (Article VII, Preliminary Draft of the Constitution, Vol. 2, Aruego: The Framing of the Constitution, pp. 982,
987).
An ad interim appointment, to be complete, needs to be submitted to the Commission on Appointments one the same is
constituted. This is reflected in the Constitution when it provides that "such appointments shall be effective only until
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress" (Section 10, Paragraph 4,
Article VII). This mean that it must be submitted to the Commission on Appointments of the Congress that has created it. It
cannot be submitted to the Commission on Appointments of a different Congress. Since the appointments in question were
submitted to the Commission on Appointments which ceased to function on December 30, 1961, they lapsed upon the
cessation of said Commission. Consequently, they can be recalled by the new Chief Executive.
3. An ad interim appointment is not complete until the appointee takes the oath of office and actually takes possession of the
position or enters upon the discharge of its duties. The mere taking of the oath of office without actual assumption of office is
not sufficient to constitute the appointee the actual occupant thereof who may not be removed therefrom except for cause
(McChesney v. Sampson, 23 S.W. 2d. 584). The case of Summers v. Ozaeta, 81 Phil., 754, cannot be cited as a precedent as
to when an ad interim appointment becomes permanent and binding. That case involves a cadastral judge who was given
an ad interim appointment as judge at large. After assuming the office and discharging his duties, his appointment was not
confirmed. He claimed that he could still revert to his former position as cadastral judge. True, this Court made a statement
therein that an ad interimappointment becomes permanent after taking the oath of office, but such statement is merely
an obiter dictum because the case could have been decided on the doctrine that, having accepted an incompatible office,
petitioner was deemed to have abandoned the position of cadastral judge.
In relying on certain cases for the proposition that once an appointee has taken the oath of office his appointment becomes
irrevocable petitioner fails to consider that in said cases there had either been an actual discharge of duty and actual physical
possession or assumption of office following the oath-taking as to constitute the appointee the occupant of the position from
which he cannot be removed without cause. Even the case of Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, U.S. 137, 2 L. Ed., 61, 69,
cannot be invoked as a precedent, for there the appointees were merely nominated and their nominations confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments even if they have later taken their oath of office. Certainly, they can no longer be deprived of
their appointments for then the executive would be acting in disregard of the confirming body which is a coordinate and
independent body not subject to his control.
Since the appointments in question were made not in the light of the views herein expressed, I am of the opinion that they did
not ripen into valid and permanent appointments and as such were properly recalled by the new Chief Executive.
CONCEPCION, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: .
It is well settled that the granting of writs of prohibition and mandamus is ordinarily within the sound discretion of the courts, to
be exercised on equitable principles, and that said writs should be issued when the right to the relief is clear (55 C.J.S. 25, 29,
73 C.J.S. 18). Insofar as the majority resolution relied upon discretion and the equities of the case in denying said writs, I
concur, therefore, in the aforementioned resolution.
However, I cannot see my way clear to subscribing the observations therein made representing the motives allegedly
underlying petitioner's appointment and that of many others who are not parties in this case, and justifying the revocation of
such appointments. My reasons, among others, are: .
1. Save where the incumbent has a temporary appointment or is removable at the will of the appointing power, an appointment
once complete, by the performance of all acts required by law of the appointing power, is irrevocable.
An appointment to office may be revoked at any time before the appointment becomes final and complete, but
thereafter unless the appointee is removable at the will of appointing power. For the purpose of this rule, an
appointment to office is complete when the last act required of the person or body vested with the appointing power
has been performed. Where by constitutional, statutory, or other legal provision it is required that certain steps be
taken to make effective appointment, it has been held that the appointment becomes complete beyond the possibility
of recall when the last of the prescribed steps is taken, and that, where no method of appointment is provided, an

appointment does not become effective and beyond recall until the appointing officer by some act or word evinces a
final intent to vest the appointee with title to the office." (67 C.J.S., pp. 161-162) .
After the act of appointment is complete, the appointing authority may not revoke its former appointment and make
another. And appointment to office is complete when the last act required of the person or body vested with the
appointing power has been performed. (56 C., p. 954) .
In all jurisdictions where appointment to office is regarded as an executive function, as here, an appointment to office
once made is incapable of revocation or cancellation by the appointing executive in the absence of a statutory or
constitutional power of removal. Barrett v. Duff 114, Kan. 220; 217 P. 918; People v. Mizner, 7 Cal. 519, State v.
Williams, 222 Mo. 268, 121 S.W. 64, 17 Ann. Cas. 1006; Draper v. State, 175 Ala. 547, 57 So. 772, Ann. Cas. 1914D,
page 305, Annotation." (McChesney v. Sampson, 23 S.W. 2d., 584) .
May an appointment be revoked by reason of error or fraud? This question was taken up in Ex rel Coogan vs. Barbour (22 A
686) and Ex rel Scofield vs. Starr (63 A 512). The first involved a City Charter providing that its common council shall, in joint
convention, appoint a prosecuting attorney. In such convention, Coogan obtained a majority of the votes cast and of the
convention. Upon announcement of this result, a member of the convention offered a resolution declaring Coogan elected, but
the resolution was defeated. Then, two resolutions were offered and approved: one declaring that the ballots taken were null
and of no effect by reason of errors in the same and another declaring Barbour elected prosecuting attorney. The issue was
who had been appointed thereto. The court held that it was Coogan, he having obtained a clear majority and there having
been no error or fraud in the voting, although it did not deny the power of the convention to correct errors and to nullify the
effects of fraud in the voting by invalidating the same and calling another election, had the proceedings been tainted with such
error or fraud.
The second case referred to a similar provision in a city charter, to the effect that appointments by the common council shall
be by ballot and that the person receiving a plurality of ballots shall be elected. The first balloting taken for the election of the
city surveyor of Brigeport resulted in 25 ballots being cast. It was announced that there was one ballot more than members
voting, and that there were 13 ballots for Scofield, 11 for Starr and one blank ballot. Scofield maintained that this result
amounted to his appointment precluding the council from taking a new ballot but such pretense was rejected. Inasmuch as the
number of ballots cast exceeded the number of persons voting, the council was justified in believing that the proceeding was
not free from suspicion of fraud or mistake in the voting and, accordingly in taking another vote.
In both cases, the fraud or mistake alluded to referred to the manner of voting or of counting the ballots cast, not to the intent
of the voters in choosing a particular appointee.
2. An ad interim appointment, made during a recess of Congress, is complete and irrevocable upon the performance of the last
act required by law from the appointing power, even without previous notice to the appointee, or acceptance by him, or without
subsequent action of the legislative organ that may terminate its effectivity.
In the case of appointment made by a single executive such as a governor, mayor, etc., it is undisputed that the
appointment once made is irrevocable.
xxx xxx xxx
Where an appointment subject to confirmation by the senate is made by a governor during a recess of the senate, ...
the question arises as to whether such an appointment may be reconsidered and withdrawn by the governor before it
is acted upon by the Senate.
xxx xxx xxx
In Barrett v. Duff (1923) 114 Kan. 220, 217 Pac. 918, where appointments made by the governor during a recess of
the legislature, which appointments could not be confirmed by the senate as required by law until the next session of
that body, were revoked by the governor's successor, and other persons were appointed to the offices, such action by
him being taken after the senate had convened and had taken under advisement the confirmation of the persons first
appointed to the offices, but before the senate had taken any definite action with regard to such confirmation, and the
senate, confirmed the first appointee, but, despite this act of the senate, commissions were issued by the governor to
the second appointee, it was held, in reliance upon the terms of the statutes which provided that the governor should
'appoint' persons to such offices with the advice and consent of the senate, as distinguished from the provision of the

Constitution of the United States governing appointments by the President, which provides that the President shall
'nominate' and, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall 'appoint' persons to office, that the act of the
governor in making the first appointments was final and exhausted the power of the governor's office in that
regard unless and until the appointments were rejected by the senate, and that, therefore, the persons appointed by
the first governor were entitled to the office. In the words of the court, 'The power of the governor having been
exercised, he had no further power of the governor having been exercised, he had no further control over the
respective offices unless and until the appointees had been rejected by the senate.' In reaching this result, the court
emphasized the difference between a nomination and an appointment, holding that, where the statute relating to
appointments by the governor with the consent of the senate provides that the governor shall appoint persons to the
office with the consent of the senate, rather than merely nominate persons for consideration by the senate, the
appointment is final and conclusive without confirmation. ... .
Likewise in McChesney v. Sampson (1930) 232 Ky 395, 23 S.W. (2d.) 584, the act of governor in making a recess
appointment was held to be not merely a nomination subject to revocation by the governor at any time prior to action
thereon by the senate, but a final and irrevocable appointment subject only to rejection by the senate. In support of
this result, it was said: 'It is urged that appointment to the office consists of two separate acts, one by the governor
and one by the senate, and until both have acted there is no appointment such as to bring the incumbent within the
protection of the law. Even so, the two powers do not act concurrently, but consecutively, and action once taken and
completed by the executive is not subject to reconsideration or recall. ... The fact that the title to the office, and the
tenure of the officer, are subject to the action of the senate, does not render incomplete the act of the chief executive
in making the appointment. The appointment alone confers upon the appointee for the time being the right to take
and hold the office, and constitutes the last act respecting the matter to be performed by the executive power.' .
xxx xxx xxx
In People ex rel. Byder v. Mizner (1857) 7 Cal. 519, in holding that an appointment made by a governor to fill an office
which had expired during a recess of the legislature was not merely an appointment to fill a vacancy which would
expire at the end of the next session of the legislature, but was an appointment for a full term, and that the act of the
governor during a subsequent session of the legislature, in appointing another to the office and asking his
confirmation by the legislature, was unauthorized and void, it was said that, the power of the executive having been
once exercised, he had no further control over the office until the appointee has been rejected by the senate." (89
ALR, pp. 138, 139, 140.) .
3. The irrevocability of the ad interim appointment adverted to above becomes more apparent when we consider that the
House, Commission on Appointments or other agency of Congress charged with the function of terminating the effectivity of
such appointment, may act thereon, by approving or disapproving the same, even though the Executive had not submitted or
forwarded it to said House, Commission or agency of Congress, and even though either the outgoing or the incoming
Executive shall have submitted for confirmation the name of a subsequent appointee in lieu of the first one..
This was the situation met in People ex rel, Emerson vs. Shawver (30 Wyo 366, 222 Pac. 11). The facts therein were: On July
1, 1919, Governor Carey of Wyoming appointed Emerson as state engineer, to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of its
incumbent. Upon the expiration of the latter's term, Governor Carey reappointed Emerson for a full term of six (6) years, from
and after April 1, 1921. This last appointment was confirmed by the state legislature at its next session in 1923. Prior thereto,
however, Governor Carey's term had expired and his successor had appointed Shawver as state engineer. Thereupon
Shawver ousted Emerson from such office. It was held that Emerson had a better right thereto; that his appointment in 1921
was a completed appointment, requiring no action by the Senate to entitle him to hold said office; that a recess appointment
once made by "the executive is not subject to reconsideration or recall, "even though not as yet confirmed by the Senate,
inasmuch as," the appointment alone confers upon the appointee for the time being the right to take and hold the office, and
constitutes the last act respecting the matter to be performed by the executive power"; and that, although the term of Governor
Carey had expired and neither he nor his successor had forwarded Emerson's appointment to the Senate for confirmation or
requested the Senate to act upon said appointment, the same had been validly confirmed by said body, for .
The provision as to the office here in question found in the Constitution does not say that the appointment made by
the Governor shall be confirmed by the Senate when requested by the former, or upon a communication by him
submitting the matter to the Senate. And we perceive no substantial reason for adding by construction any such
restriction upon the Senate's right to act. (People v. Shawver, 222 P. 11; see, also, Commonwealth v. Waller, 145 Pa.
235, 23 Atl. 382; State v. Williams, 20 S.C. 13; Richardson v. Henderson, 4 Wyo. 535, 35 Pac. 517, and other cases
cited in the Shawver case.) .

4. The foregoing goes to show, also, that the question whether the Commission on Appointments is or is not a continuing body
can not affect the determination of the case. Besides, the constitutional provision making an ad interim appointment, if not
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments, effective only until the next adjournment of Congress, clearly indicates
that such Commission must have an opportunity to approve or disapprove the appointment and that its inaction, despite such
opportunity, at the session of Congress next following the making of the appointment during which it could have met, and,
probably, did meet must be understood as an expression of unwillingness to stamp its approval upon the act of the
executive. No such opportunity exists when the outgoing Congress has not held any session, regular or special after the
making of the appointment and before the expiration of the term of said Congress, and the new Congress has not, as yet,
organized itself or even met.
5. The American rule concerning irrevocability of appointments is bolstered up in the Philippines by Section 4 of Article XII of
the Constitution, which provides that "no officer of employee in the Civil Service shall be removed except for cause as
provided by law." (Article VII, Section 4.) .
In fact, in his concurring opinion in Eraa vs. Vergel de Dios (85 Phil., 17), our distinguished Chief Justice pointed out that the
revocation of an appointment, if feasible, "should be communicated to the appointee before the moment he qualified," and that
"any revocation thereafter, is tantamount to removal and must be judged according to the rules applicable to the removal"
(emphasis ours). In the present case, the revocation of petitioner's appointment was not communicated to him before he
qualified by taking his oath of office. It is not even claimed that any of the statutory causes for removal of petitioner herein
exists, or that the procedure prescribed for such removal has been complied with.
6. Once an appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable right, which is protected not only by statute, but,
also by the Constitution, for it cannot be taken away from him, either by revocation of the appointment or by removal, except
for cause, and with previous notice and hearing, consistently with said Section 4 of Article XII of our fundamental law, and with
the constitutional requirement of due process (Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil., 547; Sec. 67 C.J.S. 117, 42 Am. Jur. 887). (See also,
People ex rel Ryan v. Green, 58 N. v. 295; People vs. Gardner, 59 Barb 198; II Lewis Sutherland Statutory Construction, pp.
1161 and 1162; Mechem on Public Officers, Sec. 389; 22 R. C. L. 377- 378; 25 Am. Dec. 690-691, 703).
7. The case of Tipton vs. Parker (74 S. W., 298) has been cited in support of the theory that Congress of the Philippines was
not in "recess" on December 29, 1961, and that, accordingly, ad interim appointments could not validly be made in such date.
The question involved in said case was whether a committee of the Senate of Arkansas could be authorized by the same to
function after the adjournment sine die of the regular session of the state General Assembly. The State Supreme Court
considered as decisive authority the view expressed by Judge Cooley, to the effect that a legislative committee "has no
authority to sit during a recess of a House which appointed him, without its permission to that effect". The issue thus hinged on
the meaning of the term "recess" as used by Judge Cooley. Resolving this question, said court held that the recess referred to
by Judge Cooley was "only the intermission between the sittings of the same body at its regular or adjourned session and not
to the interval between the final adjournment of one body and the convening of another at the next regular session"..
In this connection, it should be noted that, as an agency of the Senate, the committee involved in said case could not operate
for its principal beyond the latter's term. Moreover, under the Constitution of Arkansas, the regular biennial session of the
General Assembly could not exceed 60 days, unless by a vote of 2/3 of the members of each of the two Houses of the
legislature. Inasmuch as the Senate could not, without the concurrence of the House, directly extend the period of its regular
session, neither could it, without such concurrence, indirectly extend said period, by granting its aforementioned committee the
authority to function beyond said period. As stated by the Court "the committee, being the mere agency of the body which
appointed it, dies when the body itself dies, unless it is continued by law", which the Senate may not enact, without the
concurrence of the House..
The decision in said case did not seek to define the meaning of the term "recess" as used in any constitution or statute. It did
not even refer to the authority to make appointments during "recess". It has absolutely no bearing, therefore, on the issue
before us.
Upon the other hand, Dr. Jose M. Aruego, a prominent member of the constitutional convention, says, in his work on "The
Framing of the Philippine Constitution" (Vol I, pp. 434-435), that the draft of the provision on ad interimappointments by the
President, as submitted by the corresponding committee, followed the principles of the Jones Law and that the
recommendation of the committee was readily approved on the floor of the convention, although the committee on style gave
said provision its present phraseology. Pursuant to the Jones Law, "appointments made while the Senate is not in session
shall be effective either until disapproval or until the next adjournment of the Senate". Hence, the term "recess" appearing in
Section 10(4) of Article VII of our Constitution should be construed to mean "while Congress is not in session" and this is
confirmed by the practice consistently observed in the Philippines for time immemorial, as well as the ad interim appointment
extended by President Macapagal to respondent Castillo.

8. The case of McChesney vs. Sampson (23 S. W. 2d. 584) has, also, been invoked in support of the proposition that "an ad
interim appointment is not complete until the appointee takes the oath of office and actually takes possession of the position or
enters upon the discharge of its duties" and that, before such actual taking of possession, though after the oath taking, the
appointee may be removed without cause.
We have not found in said case anything justifying such claim. The issue in said case was whether a state governor could
recall an unconfirmed appointment of McChesney to the state textbook commission when there had been no session of the
Senate subsequent to the appointment, and such issue was decided in the negative.
Although, in addition to accepting the appointment, McChesney had qualified and exercised the function of the office, the
decision of the Court clearly indicates that it was not necessary for him either to discharge the duties of the office or even to
take the oath of office, in order to render his appointment irrevocable. The Court explicitly declared that the appointment, once
"completed by the executive is not subject to reconsideration or recall;" that the appointment "is complete when the appointing
authority has performed the acts incumbent upon him to accomplish the purpose;" and that in the case of recess
appointments, like that of McChesney," the appointment alone confers upon the appointee for the time being the right to take
and hold the office and constitutes the last act respecting the matter to be performed by the executive power" completing the
appointment and rendering the same irrevocable.
In short, the McChesney case is authority for the petitioner herein.
9. Most, if not all appointments made by the President have two (2) aspects, namely, the legal and the political. The first refers
to his authority to make the appointment. The second deals with the wisdom in the exercise of such authority, as well as with
its propriety. Whether given vacancy or number of vacancies should be filled, or who among several qualified persons shall be
chosen, or whether a given appointment or number of appointment will favor the political party to whom the power of
appointment belongs and will injure the interest of a rival political party and to what extent, are, to my mind, essentially and
typically political matters. Hence, I believe that the question whether certain appointments should be sanctioned or turned
down by reason of the improper, immoral or malevolent motives with which said matters were allegedly handled is, likewise,
clearly political, and as such, its determination belongs, not to the courts of justice (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 205; 16
C.J.S 689-690; Willoughby on the Constitution, Vol. III 1326-1327), but to the political organ established precisely to check
possible abuses in the exercise of the appointing power the Commission on Appointments.
Indeed, I can hardly conceive of any question more patently and characteristically political than this one, or more appropriate
for determination of said body. Neither the possible or probable control thereof by members of the Nacionalista Party nor the
number of offices or appointments involved can affect the nature of the issue. Surely, its political character is the same
whichever political party may have the largest number of votes in the Commission on Appointments. The big number of said
appointments merely tend to make more manifest the political complexion thereof and its non-justifiable nature.
10. In Osmea vs. Pendatum (L-17144, October 28, 1960), we refused to disturb the action of the House of Representatives in
suspending a member thereof who had made derogatory imputations against the President of the Philippines upon the
ground that such imputations constituted a breach of the courtesy due to a coordinate branch of the Government. Yet, in the
present case, imputations similarly derogatory to the same branch of the Government are, in effect, made in the majority
resolution.
I cannot see how such imputations can be reconciled with the position taken by this Court in the Osmea case and in other
cases (Barcelona vs. Baker, 5 Phil., 87; Severino vs. Governor-General, 16 Phil., 366; Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil., 612;
Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 85; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1; Cabili vs. Francisco, L-4638, May 8, 1951) in which
it "fastidiously observed" the theory of separation of powers (Osmea vs. Pendatum, supra). Thus, in Santos vs. Yatco (55 Off.
Gaz. 8641), in which a department head was sought to be enjoined from electioneering, in view of the explicit provision of the
Civil Service Act of 1959 (Republic Act No. 2260, section 29), prohibiting all officers and employees in the civil service,
"whether in the competitive or classified, or non-competitive or unclassified service," from engaging directly or indirectly in
partisan political activities or taking part in any election except to vote, we held that the issue therein raised was one of
"impropriety as distinguished from illegality," and that, as such, it "is not justiciable by this Court." In Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito (78 Phil., 1), we refused to decide, upon the same ground, whether specified numbers of votes constituted three-fourths of
all members of each House of Congress. In Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192), we not only declared that "the judiciary is not the
repository of remedies for all political or social evils," but, also, quoted with approval the statement, made in Alejandrino vs.
Quezon (46 Phil., 81), to the effect that "the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair
action of the legislative department, or of either House thereof, taken in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that
department by the Constitution." (Emphasis ours.) .

11. In the present case, we have completely reversed our stand on the principle of separation of powers. We have inquired
into the motives of the Executive department in making the appointments in question, although it is well settled, under the
aforementioned principle, that: .
Generally courts cannot inquire into the motive, policy, wisdom, or expediency of legislation.
The justice, wisdom, policy, necessity, or expediency, of a law which is within its powers are for the legislature, and are not
open to inquiry by the courts, except as an aid to proper interpretation." (16 C.J.S. 471-478) .
If this is true as regards the legislative branch of the government, I can see no valid reason, and none has been pointed out,
why the same norm should not govern our relations, with the executive department. However, we have not merely disregarded
such norm. We are, also, in effect, restraining the Commission on Appointments an organ of a coordinate, co-equal branch
of the Government from acting on the questioned appointments. What is more, we are virtually assuming in advance that
said body which has not been organized as yet and whose membership is still undetermined will not act in harmony with
the spirit of our Constitution.
12. It is trite to say that certain moral and political aspects of the issue before us cannot but produce a strong aversion towards
the case of petitioner herein and the hundreds of others appointed under the same conditions as he was. Although members
of the bench must always endeavor to minimize the influence of emotional factors tending to affect the objectivity essential to a
fair and impartial appraisal of the issues submitted for their determination, it is only natural and, I venture to add, fortunate
(for, otherwise, how could they hope to do justice to their fellowmen?) that they should basically react as other members of
the human family. This is probably the reason why Justice Douglas of the Federal Supreme Court of the U.S., said, in Abel v.
U.S. (4 Lawyers Edition, 2d, 668, 688) :
"Cases of notorious criminals like cases of small, miserable ones are apt to make bad law. When guilt
permeates a record, even judges sometimes relax and let the police take shortcuts not sanctioned by constitutional
procedures. .... The harm in the given case may seem excusable. But the practices generated by the precedent have
far-reaching consequences that are harmful and injurious beyond measurement.".
Let us hope that no such consequences will flow from the precedent established in this case.
BARRERA, J., dissenting:
The instant case started with a simple petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction instituted by petitioner
Aytona who claims to have been duly appointed ad interim Governor of the Central Bank, against respondent Castillo who,
allegedly accompanied by his correspondent Colonel Gutierrez and a host of heavily armed Philippine Constabulary Rangers,
interfered with and prevented the petitioner in the discharge of his duties and prerogatives as such Governor of the Central
Bank. During the hearing, however, and immediately thereafter, a great amount of extraneous matter affecting persons not
parties to the proceedings has been introduced into the case and a veritable avalanche of memoranda after memoranda and
manifestations after manifestations swelled the records and helped involve the issues. One among the dozens who asked to
be admitted as amici curiae, even presented an answer in behalf of the people to support the side of the respondents.
Unfortunately, in the confusion, the case of the immediate parties became obscured by considerations of circumstances and
matters for and with which petitioner and respondents are not directly connected..
In my opinion, the fundamental questions which this Court is called upon to resolve in the present case a specifically: .
(1) Is the ad interim, appointment of petitioner Aytona valid when extended? .
(2) If so, did it automatically lapse with the ending the term of office of the twelve Congressmen composing one-half
of the membership of the Commission Appointments? .
(3) May this appointment be legally recalled or withdrawal after Aytona has qualified? .
Before entering into the discussion of the "propriety, morality and wisdom" of the appointment, it is necessary, I believe, that
the foregoing legal propositions must first be cleared out.
I. The Validity of Aytona's Appointment: .

Aytona's ad interim appointment is assailed on the theory that it was not made during a "recess" of Congress as provided in
paragraph 4, section 10 of Article VII of the Constitution. It is claimed for the respondents dents that the word "recess" means
"the intermission between sittings of the same body at its regular or adjourned session, and not to the interval between the
final adjournment of one body and the convening of another at the next regular session. When applied to a legislative body, it
means a temporary dismissal, and not adjournment sine die." In support of this view, counsel cites the case of Tipton v.
Parker, 71 Ark. 193, from which the foregoing quotation was taken.
An examination of this case, however, discloses that it did not refer to the power of the President to make ad
interim appointments. The pronouncement was made in connection with the interpretation of Section 17, Article 5 of the
Constitution of the State of Arkansas. The case involved the validity of the certificate of the auditor with reference to the legality
of the expenses of a committee of the State Senate authorized by the latter to make certain investigations beyond the duration
of the session of the General Assembly. The court, in declaring the certificate without sanction of law, stated: .
"The Senate has no power by resolution of its own to extend its session, and neither did it have power to such
separate resolution to continue its committee, a mere agency of the body, beyond the term of the body itself which
created it." .
in view of the provisions of the aforementioned Section 17, Article 5 of the state Constitution prescribing "that the regular
biennial session of the Legislature shall not exceed 60 days, unless by 2/3 vote of the members elected to each house, and
section 23 requiring a vote of the majority of each house to enact a law or pass a resolution having the force and effect of a
law". Apparently an opinion of Judge Cooley seemingly to the contrary was cited to refute this view of the court, and so the
decision went on to say:
Each house, says Judge Cooley, must also be allowed to proceed in its own way in the collection of such information
may seem important to a proper discharge of its functions; and whenever it is deemed desirable that witnesses
should be examined, the power and the authority to do so is very properly referred to a committee, with any such
powers short of final legislative or judicial action as may seem necessary or expedient in the particular case. Such a
committee has no authority to sit during a recess of the house which has appointed it, without its permission to that
effect. But the house is at liberty to confer such authority if it sees fit.
It is in this connection and evidently in a desire to explain the opinion of Judge Cooley that the court made the pronouncement
relied upon by respondents, thus: .
.... The recess here referred to by Judge Cooley we think should be construed to mean only the intermission between
sittings of the same body at its regular or adjourned session, and not to the interval between the final adjournment of
one body and the convening of another at the next regular session. When applied to a legislative body, it means a
temporary dismissal and not an adjournment sine die.
The conclusion reached by the court can not be otherwise. The case refers to the powers of one house of the state
Legislature, with the concurrence of the other, to confer authority upon its own committee to act beyond the duration of the
session of the General Assembly. Certainly, Judge Cooley's view that each house has power to confer authority to its
committee to act during a recess must be understood to exist only during the life of the house creating the committee. It can
not go beyond its own existence, that is, beyond its adjournment sine die.
But this ruling is no argument that the Executive's power to make appointments during such adjournment sine die does not
exist just because a house of the legislature lacks power to authorize its committee to act during the same adjournment. One
refers to the power of a defunct body to act beyond its life; the other refers to the power of another authority, the executive, to
perform its functions after the expiration of that other body. Non-existence of the first does not mean non-existence of the
other.
It is to be noted that the different counsel advocating the cause of the respondents are not even agreed in the application of
their interpretation of the word "recess". Some of them argue that the interregnum which they contend is not recess,
compromises the entire period between the adjournment of the 4th Congress in May, 1961 and the opening of the 1st session
of the first session of the 5th Congress on January 22, 1962, so that all ad interim appointments extended during this period
are null and void. Others claim that such interregnum is that period between December 13, 1961, date of adjournment of the
last session of the 4th Congress, and January 22, 1962. It seems that President Macapagal is of this same view because his
administrative Order No. 2 specifically refers to all appointments made after December 13, 1961. Still others, at least one,
advanced the theory during the oral argument that the banned period is that between the adjournment of the 4th Congress in
May, and December 30, 1961, excluding therefrom the period between this last date and January 22, 1962. Obviously, this

theory was advanced in an effort to lend validity to the appointments recently made by President Macapagal, for if the entire
period between May or December, 1961 to January 22, 1962 is held not a recess, but an adjournment sine die, then all
appointments heretofore made by the present Chief Executive would suffer the same defect as those extended by former
President Garcia. This last argument is unavailing because it, likewise, is untenable, tested upon the same authority cited by
counsel, i.e., that the term "recess" means "the intermission between sittings of the same body." Since the 5th Congress has
not as yet even convened, the period between December 30 and January 22 can not be a recess of the 5th Congress
because it, definitely, is not an intermission between sittings of the same body.
In the circumstances, it seems it is an over-statement to say that the term "recess has a definite legal meaning in the sense
attributed to it in the Tipton vs. Parker case. The confusion in the minds of the several counsels for the respondents as to the
application of the alleged meaning of the term, indicates a belabored effort on their part to impute a meaning to satisfy their
case. Upon the other hand, we find in "Hinds Precedents of the House of Representatives" (Vol. 5, pp. 852-853), a legislative
interpretation by the United States Senate made during the discussion of the term "recess of the Senate" in connection with
the President's1 power to make appointments, as follows: .
The word 'recess' is one of ordinary, not technical, signification, and it is evidently used in the constitutional provision
in its common and popular sense. It means in Article II, above referred to, precisely what it means in Article III, in
which it is again used. Conferring power upon the executive of a State to make temporary appointment of a Senator,
it says: .
And if vacancies happen, by resignation or otherwise, during the recess of the legislature of any State, the executive
thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the legislature, which shall then fill such
vacancies.' .
It means just what was meant by it in the Article of Confederation, in which it is found in the following provision": .
The United States in Congress assembled shall have authority to appoint a committee to sit in the recess of
Congress, it be denominated a committee of the States, and to consist of one delegate from each State.' .
It was evidently intended by the framers of the Constitution that it should mean something real, not something
imaginary; something actual, not something fictitious. They used the word as the mass of mankind then understood it
and now understand it. It means, in our judgment, in this connection the period of time when the Senate is not sitting
in regular or extraordinary session as a branch of the Congress, or in extraordinary session for the discharge of
executive functions; when its members owe no duty of attendance; when its Chamber is empty; when, because of its
absence, it cannot receive communications from the President or participate as body in making appointments." .
The Attorney General of the United States was also of this view when he stated: .
The recess of the Senate during which the President shall have power to fill a vacancy that may happen, means the
period after the final adjournment of Congress for the session and before the next session begins; while an
adjournment during a session of Congress means a merely temporary suspension of business from day to day, or for
such brief periods of time as are agreed upon by the joint action of the two houses. The President is not authorized to
appoint an officer during the current holiday adjournment of the Senate, which will have the effect of an appointment
made in the recess occurring between two sessions of the Senate." (President - Appointment Officers - Holiday
Recess, 1901, 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 599, (U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 2, Sec. 2[2]..
It is worthwhile to note that our Constitution in paragraph 4, Section 10 of Article VII speaks of "recess" without making any
distribution between the sessions one congress and the sessions of another. And it is trite to say that when the law makes no
distinction, no distinction should be made, especially if to do so would result in a strained interpretation thereof and defeat the
evident purpose of the framers of the Constitution - in this instance, to render it certain that at times there should be, whether
the Congress is in session or not, an officer for every office, entitled to discharge the duties thereof. (5 Hinds, op. cit., p. 853.) .
II. Lapsing of Aytona's Appointment: .
It is contended for the respondents that since 12 members of the Commission on Appointments ceased to be such upon the
expiration of their term of office at midnight of December 29, 1961, the Commission on Appointments likewise ceased to exist
on the theory that creation can not exist beyond the life of its creator at least with respect to one-half of its members. This
seems to stem from the wrong notion that the Commission on Appointments is a creature of the Congress. This confuses the

Commission on Appointments as a constitutional body with its members. The body continued to exist, but only its membership
changes periodically. When the Constitution provides in Section 13 of Article 6 thereof that "the Electoral Tribunals and the
Commission on Appointments shall be constituted within 30 days after the Senate and the House of Representatives shall
have been organized with the election of their President and Speaker, respectively", it did not mean that the Senate and the
House of Representatives thereby create said bodies, no more than the President can be said to create the Supreme Court by
appointing the Justices therein. It simply ordained that the Commission be constituted or organized by electing the members
thereof, whose positions have already been created in virtue of Section 12 of the same Constitution. To hold the Electoral
Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments are non-existing during the period from December 30, 1961 to January 22,
1962 (and during the corresponding period every four years thereafter) will result in an absurdity and a situation destructive of
the normal processes provided in the Constitution. One of such absurd results would be that no electoral protest against any
elected and proclaimed congressman or senator can be legally filed with the Electoral Tribunals within the period prescribe by
their rules, that is, within fifteen days following the proclamation of the results of the election, which period falls within the time
when the Electoral Tribunals (as is the case of Commission on Appointments) are allegedly non-existent.
The proceedings in the Constitutional Convention are cited to support the theory that the Commission on Appointments is not
a permanent commission. A review of the records, however, of that convention reveals that what was intended in the proposed
draft was to authorize the Commission on Appointments to hold sessions even when the Congress is not in session. The mere
fact that such a proposal was defeated and, consequently, the word "permanent" was not adopted in the final text, does not
import that the Constitution meant to give an off and on existence to the Commission on Appointments lapsing every four
years when the twelve of its members cease to be such. On the contrary, it seems more logical to hold that the legal existence
of the Commission as well as the Electoral Tribunals continue irrespective of the vacancies that may exist in the membership
thereof. It is for this reason that the personnel of these bodies do not cease periodically, but continue to perform their duties in
their respective offices for which they are legally paid their salaries by the government. It seems clear, therefore, that the
Commission on Appointments did not lapse on December 29, 1961. Neither did the appointment of Aytona lapse on that date
because the same could not be acted upon by the Commission on Appointments during the recess of the Congress.
III. May the appointment of Aytona be legally recalled or withdrawn after he has qualified for the position to which he was
appointed? .
Precedents are to the effect that when once an appointment has been extended by the Chief Executive who, as is provided in
our Constitution, has the sole power of appointment subject only to the consent of the Commission on Appointments, and the
appointee has accepted the appointment, the same becomes complete and the appointing power can not withdraw it except in
cases where the tenure of the appointee is at the Chief Executive's pleasure or upon grounds justifying removal and after due
process. This is not because the appointment constitutes a contract (for truly a public office can not be subject of any
contract), but because of the provisions of the Constitution itself to the effect that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service
shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." If, therefore, the recall or the withdrawal of the
appointment of Aytona was not authorized by law, then his assumption of the functions of his office on January 2, 1962 was
clearly within his legal right and the interference of Castillo, aggravated by the assistance or at least the presence of members
of the Armed Forces, was clearly unlawful.
The foregoing disposes, in my opinion, the legal issue and the rights of the parties in the present case. But against these, to
me, clear mandates of the Constitution and the legal and judicial precedents, respondents have appealed to this Court for it to
exercise "judicial statesmanship" invoking the spirit of the Constitution. It is claimed that there was a manifest abuse of power
by the outgoing President in extending, on the eve of the expiration of his term, some three hundred and fifty ad
interim appointments to fill an equal number of vacancies in the different branches of the government; that no proper
consideration was given of the merits of the appointees, it appearing that in the case of at least some of the appointees to the
judiciary, their assurance of an immediate assumption of office or the taking of oath was made a condition precedent to the
appointments, and that there was a wild scramble in Malacaan among the appointees on the night of December 29. We are
scandalized by this and expect the Court to apply the remedy. What of the proceedings in Congress during the last day of
session when bills after bills are passed in a manner not too dissimilar to the described scene in Malacaan? Can the
Supreme Court be expected to correct this too by declaring all such laws as invalid just as we are asked to invalidate these
appointments? .
Be this as it may, whatever may be our personal views on this matter, I agree with Mr. Justice Concepcion that not all wrongs
or even abuse of power can be corrected by the exercise of the high prerogatives of the Supreme Court vested in it by the
Constitution. As I take it, the higher and more delicate is the prerogative, the greater should be the degree of self-restraint in
the exercise thereof, lest the fine and tested scale of checks and balances set up by the Constitution be jarred. In the same
manner that we expect circumspection and care, even double care, on the part of the other two co-equal coordinate
departments of the government, so must we be most cautious and slow in judging the morality, propriety and good faith
involved in the actuations of the other departments in matters coming within their competence. The remedy, I believe, under

the circumstances is with the Commission on Appointments to which the appointments have been submitted. The more fact
that it is expected that the Commission on Appointments would be controlled by the party of the outgoing President is
immaterial, because legal processes can not be made to depend upon the fortunes of political parties, for there is still the
ultimate remedy by the people in all authority. At any rate, as has already been aptly said: the judiciary is not the repository of
remedies for all political or social evils, and that the judicial department has no power to revise even arbitrary or unfair action of
the other departments taken in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to those departments by the Constitution..
May I add: all the scandalous circumstances brought to the attention of this Court did not link the petitioner herein, save for the
fact that this appointment was extended on the same day as those issued under the unusual and irregular circumstances
attending the other appointments. If at all, there is evidence in favor of Aytona to the effect that insofar as he is concerned, his
appointment to the position of Governor of the Central Bank has been under consideration for a long time and that he is
qualified for the position. It can not, therefore be said that with respect to him there was no mature deliberation and due
consideration of his qualifications and of the need of the service. he charge was made that the position of Governor of the
Central Bank has been vacant for several months and that the President should have filled it earlier. Yet, when the President
actually filled it as he did, he is criticized claiming that there was no immediate need for such action in view of the fact that
there was an Acting Governor. That it was really necessary to fill the position is evidenced by the act of President Macapagal
himself in making his own appointment hardly twenty-four hours after he recalled the appointment of Aytona.
Summarizing, I would say that all the circumstances cited by the respondents that have surrounded the issuance of the
appointments in question, have to do with the mode or manner of the exercise of the authority to make the appointment, quite
apart from the existence of the authority itself. The observance of good faith, morality and propriety by the other two co-equal
coordinate departments in the performance of their functions must be secured by their sense of duty and official oath hand not
by any supervisory power of the courts..
The role of courts in our scheme of government is to interpret the law and render justice under it. This simply means that
whatever may be our own personal feelings as to the propriety, morality, or wisdom of any official act or actuation of a public
officer or any agency of the government within their respective competence brought to the attention of the Court for
adjudication, they should not be permitted to prevail over clear legal considerations, for ours is a regime under the Rule of
Law..
In view of the foregoing, I am constrained to register my dissent.

Intro To Law 1st Half Cases

Caricato da

Informazioni sul documento

Titolo originale

Copyright

Formati disponibili

Condividi questo documento

Condividi o incorpora il documento

Opzioni di condivisione

Hai trovato utile questo documento?

Questo contenuto è inappropriato?

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Intro To Law 1st Half Cases

Caricato da

Copyright:

Formati disponibili

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 70443 September 15, 1986

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The resolution reads as follows:

INTRO TO LAW Page 1

We decide the petition.

xxx xxx xxx

INTRO TO LAW Page 2

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

INTRO TO LAW Page 3

Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur,

INTRO TO LAW Page 4

G.R. No. 172409 February 4, 2008

ROOS INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION, INC. and OSCAR TOCMO, petitioners,

The following are the antecedents.

INTRO TO LAW Page 5

INTRO TO LAW Page 6

The Court denies the petition.

INTRO TO LAW Page 7

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.

Quisumbing,Chairperson Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-44717 August 28, 1985

THE CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

INTRO TO LAW Page 8

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

INTRO TO LAW Page 9

TO: All Regional Directors

SUBJECT: PAID LEGAL HOLIDAYS

These new interpretations must be uniformly and consistently upheld.

This issuance shall take effect immediately.

INTRO TO LAW Page 10

xxx xxx xxx

INTRO TO LAW Page 11

Teehankee, J., in the result.

INTRO TO LAW Page 12

[G.R. No. L-48437. September 30, 1986.]

INTRO TO LAW Page 13

INTRO TO LAW Page 14

INTRO TO LAW Page 15

Fernan, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

CRISOLOGO VILLANUEVA Y PARDES, petitioner,

INTRO TO LAW Page 16

The 1978 Election Code provides:

INTRO TO LAW Page 17

Melencio-Herrera and Relova, JJ., on leave.

AQUINO, C.J., dissenting:

INTRO TO LAW Page 18

AQUINO, C.J., dissenting:

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-66469 July 29, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO QUIJANO, petitioners,

Basilio E. Duaban for accused.

INTRO TO LAW Page 19

INTRO TO LAW Page 20

Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera and Paras, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-19313 January 19, 1962

INTRO TO LAW Page 21