A PROJECT REPORT ON - DOCTRINE OF SEVERABILITY

SCHOOL OF LAW
MANIPAL UNIVERSITY JAIPUR

UNDER SUPERVISION OF: SUBMITTED BY:

ABHAY JAIN KARTIK KATTA
SENIOR PROFESSOR 151301042
 CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that Mr. Kartik Katta student of B.A. LL.B (Hons.) second semester school of
Law Manipal University Jaipur has completed the project work entitled DOCTRINE OF
SEVERABILITY under my supervision and guidance.
It is further certify that the candidate has made sincere efforts for the completion of the project
work.

SUPERVISOR NAME
ABHAY JAIN
SENIOR PROFESSOR
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

I express deep sense of gratitude and indebtness to our teacher ABHAY JAIN Under whose
guidance valuable suggestions, constant encouragement and kind supervision the present project
was carried out. I am also grateful to college faculty of law for their feedback and for keeping us
on schedule.
I also wish to express my sincere thanks to my friends who held directly or indirectly by giving
their valuable suggestions.

KARTIK KATTA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................................5

DOCTRINE OF SEVERABILITY ............................................................................................................................5

CASES ..........................................................................................................................................................................6

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................................7

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................................................9

WEBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................................................10
INTRODUCTION
Article 13 of the constitution says that a law is void if it is inconsistent with the Fundamental
Rights. A void statute is devoid of any legal force and courts take no notice of such a statute. The
same article makes clear that in future, the State shall not make any law which takes away the
Fundamental Rights given by Part III. The law here does not only include the legislation but also
an ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification. This means that state cannot make any
law which takes away the fundamental rights of the individuals.
Importance of article 13 is that it has provided basis for judicial review of all legislations in India,
past as well as future. All laws whether made by a legislature or by a delegated authority and all
executive acts must respect and conform to the fundamental rights. The ordinances promulgated
by the president under art.123 or by the governor under art. 213 must also not be inconsistent with
the implement the fundamental rights. Article 13 impose an obligation on the state to respect and
implement the fundamental rights and at the same time confers a power on the courts to declare a
law/act void if it infringes a fundamental right. Art.13, thus, provides teeth to the fundamental
rights and makes them justifiable i.e. enforceable in the courts.
However, the article also says that a law is void only to the extent of the inconsistency or
contravention with the relevant Fundamental Right. This implies that an act may not be void as
a whole but only a part of it may be void and if that part is severable from the rest which is valid,
and then the rest may continue to stand and remain operative. This is called Doctrine of
Severability. The Act will then be read as if the invalid portion was not there. If, however, it is
not possible to separate the valid from the invalid portion, then the whole of the statute will have
to go.

DOCTRINE OF SEVERABILITY
It is not the whole Act which would be held invalid by being inconsistent with Part III of the
Constitution but only such provisions of it which are violative of the fundamental rights, provided
that the part which violates the fundamental rights is separable from that which does not isolate
them. But if the valid portion is so closely mixed up with invalid portion that it cannot be separated
without leaving an incomplete or more or less mingled remainder the court will declare the entire
Act void. This process is known as doctrine of severability or reparability.

CASES
The Supreme Court considered this doctrine in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras[xcv], and held
that the preventive detention minus section 14 was valid as the omission of the Section 14 from
the Act will not change the nature and object of the Act and therefore the rest of the Act will remain
valid and effective. The doctrine was applied in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India,[xcvi] where the
Act remained valid while the invalid portion of it was declared invalid because it was severable
from the rest of the Act. In State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara,[xcvii]it was held that the provisions
of the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 which were declared as void did not affect the validity of the
entire Act and therefore there was no necessity for declaring the entire statute as invalid.
The doctrine of severability has been elaborately considered by the Supreme Court and the
following rules regarding the question of severability has been laid down:[xcviii]
(1) The intention of the legislature is the determining factor in determining whether the valid parts
of a statute are severable from the invalid parts.
(2) If the valid and invalid provisions are so inextricably mixed up that they cannot be separated
from the other, then the invalidity of a portion must result in the invalidity of the Act in its entirety.
On the other hand, if they are so distinct and separate that after striking out what is invalid what
remains is itself a complete code independent of the rest, then it will be upheld notwithstanding
that the rest had become unenforceable.
(3) Even when the provisions which are valid, are distinct and separate from those which are
invalid if they form part of a single scheme which is intended to be operative as a whole, then also
the invalidity of a part will result in the failure of the whole.
(4) Likewise when the valid and invalid parts of a Statute are independent and do not form part of
a Scheme but what is left after omitting the invalid portion is so thin and truncated as to be in
substance different from what it was when it emerged out of legislature, then also it will be rejected
in its entirety.
(5) The severability of the valid and invalid provisions of a Statute does not depend on whether
provisions are enacted in same section or different section, it is not the form but the substance of
the matter that is material and that has to be ascertained on an examination of the Act as a whole
and of the setting of the relevant provisions therein.
(6) If after the invalid portion is expunged from the Statute what remains cannot be enforced
without making alterations and modifications therein, then the whole of it must be struck down as
void as otherwise it will amount to judicial legislation.
(7) In determining the legislative intent on the question of severability, it will be legitimate to take
into account the history of legislation, its object, the title and preamble of it.

CONCLUSION
The doctrine of severability is necessary to protect the validity of the act as a whole without
which an entire act would become void due to invalidity of one provision of the act. Now it is
upto the courts to decide the question related to the effects of invalid provisions on the
scheme of the act and accordingly adjudicate the question of declaring the validity of the act
as a whole and various provisions of the act.

When the office of Chief Justice of a High Court is vacant or when any such Chief Justice is, by reason of
absence or otherwise, unable to perform the duties of his office, the duties of the office shall be
performed by such one of the other Judges of the Court as the President may appoint for the purpose.
Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Chief Justice of a High Court for any State may at any
time, with the previous consent of the President, request any person who has held the office of a Judge
of that Court or of any other High Court to sit and act as a Judge of the High Court for that State, and
every such person so requested shall, while so sitting and acting, be entitled to such allowances as the
President may by order determine and have all the jurisdiction, powers and privileges of, but shall not
otherwise be deemed to be, a Judge of that High Court.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. V.N. Shukla, Constitution of India, 10th Edtition, Eastern Book Company.
2. J.N. Pandey, Constitutional Law of India, 6th Edition, Cental Law Agency.
WEBLIOGRAPHY
1. lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/finalreport/v1ch7.htm
2. indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/amend/amend15.htm
3. legalsutra.com/842/transfer-and-removal-of-judges/
4. https://polityinindia.wordpress.com/tag/appointment-and-transfer-of-judges/