RUJJERIC Z.PALAGANAS vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 165483. 12 September 2006, First Division (Chico-Nazario, J.)

Topic: Frustrated Felony vs. Attempted Felony

FACTS

CRIMINAL CASE No. U-9608 (Art. 248, in relation to Art. 6 and Art. 50 of the RPC)
Accused shot SERVILLANO FERRER JR., however, due to timely medical assistance rendered to the victim, the
latter survived the injuries caused by the gunshot.

CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9609 (Art. 248, in relation to Art. 6 and Art. 50 of the RPC)
Accused shot MICHAEL (BOYING) FERRER, however, due to timely medical assistance rendered to the victim,
the latter survived the injuries caused by the gunshot.

CRIMINAL CASE No. U-9610 (Art. 248, in relation to Art. 6 and Art. 50 of the RPC)
Accused shot MELTON (TONY) FERRER in the head causing his instantaneous death.

While the Ferrer brothers were singing My Way, a fight ensued between the Ferrer brothers and the
Palaganases at a videoke bar which resulted in to the latter shooting the former; causing the Ferrer brothers to
suffer injuries.

TRIAL COURT

The trial court finds the Rujjeric Palaganas guilty of the crime of Homicide and two (2) counts of Frustrated
Homicide (instead of Murder and Frustrated Murder) Ferdinand, on the other hand, was not found guilty, for
failure to prove conspiracy.

There was NO CONSPIRACY between Rujjeric Palaganas and Ferdinand in killing Meliton Ferrer,
and wounding the others.

Rujjeric was not part of the rumble inside the videoke bar; and the act of Ferdinand in
pointing the Ferrers and saying that they are the ones, shoot does not in itself
connotes a common design or unity of purpose to kill. The shooting was instantaneous
and without any prior plan or agreement with Ferdinand to execute the same.

There is NO TREACHERY that will qualify the crime to murder. Ferrer brothers were given the
chance to defend themselves during the shooting incident by stoning Rujjerick and Ferdinand.

There is also no evident PREMEDITATION, as there was no sufficient period of time that lapsed
from the time Ferdinand called Rujjerick up to the shooting.

However, the use by the petitioner of a gun was NOT a reasonable means to prevent the attack of the
Ferrer brothers who were only equipped with stones.

On APPEAL, the court affirmed the assailed decision of the trial court.

ISSUE

WON the petitioner is liable for Frustrated Homicide for the serious injuries sustained by Michael Ferrer,
instead of Attempted Homicide.
RULING

Yes.

The jurisprudence provides that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a
deadly weapon in his assault, and his victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely
medical assistance, the crime committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide depending on whether or
not any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code are present. However, if
the wound/s sustained by the victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed is only
attempted murder or attempted homicide. Lastly, if there was no intent to kill on the part of the accused and
the wound/s sustained by the victim were not fatal, the crime committed may be serious, less serious or slight
physical injury.

Comparison of frustrated and attempted felony shows that, in the former, the offender has performed all the
acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in the latter, the offender merely
commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution. In
frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause independent of the will of
the perpetrator; on the other hand, in attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime is a
cause or accident other than the offender's own spontaneous desistance.

Here, the gunshot wound sustained by Michael was not fatal or mortal since the treatment period for his wound
was short and he was discharged from the hospital on the same day he was admitted therein. Hence petitioner
is liable only for the crime of attempted homicide as regards Michael in Criminal Case No. U-9609.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROQUE DAGOOCI DAYADAY
G.R. No. 213224. 16 January 2017. (Caguioa, J.)

Topic: Treachery, as a qualifying circumstance of Murder

FACTS

Accused, armed with a handgun and knife, assault, shot and stab several times the victim, Basilio
Gallenero; inflicting upon the latter several mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death. Post
mortem report showed that the victim suffered four (4) gunshot wounds and one (1) stab wound and
died due to cardiopulmonary arrest, which, probably secondary to multiple injuries.

The trial court convicted the accused of the crime of murder. Aggrieved by the said decision, Roque
appealed, however, the Appellate Court affirmed the assailed decision of the trial court. The latter Court
argued that despite failure of the prosecution to prove the aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation, treachery was very patent. Records showed that the victim was shot several times in the
back while he was walking, which means that he was defenseless at the time of the attack; and the fact
that the stab wound was located on the victim's abdomen would not preclude treachery because the
victim was already vulnerable due to the gunshot wounds.

ISSUE

WON Roque is liable for murder.

RULING

Yes.

The law provides, under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, that murder s committed when: (1) a person was
killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances
enumerated in Article 248; and (4) the killing neither constitutes parricide nor infanticide.

All elements of the crime of murder have been established beyond reasonable doubt. Through the testimony of
Alex, the eyewitness to the crime, it was established that Basilio was killed and it was Roque who had killed
him. As to the presence of qualifying circumstances, the Court sustains the Appellate Court's finding that
treachery attended the killing of Basilio.

Here, the evidence unequivocally shows that the attack against Basilio, which came from behind, was sudden,
deliberate and unexpected. The victim was completely unaware of any threat to his life as he was merely
walking home with his son. The use of a firearm showed deliberate intent to kill Basilio and the location and
number of gunshot wounds rendered him defenseless and incapable of retaliation. Hence, treachery was
evident in the case at bar, sufficient to qualify the crime to Murder.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BUENAVENTURA BULING
G.R. No. L-13315. 27 April 1960. En Banc (Labrador, J.)

Topic: Physical Injuries;

Double Jeopardy vis--vis New Supervening Fact/s

FACTS

Accused was charged with the crime of less serious physical injuries for inflicting wounds on Isidro
Balaba; which wounds, allegedly required medical attendance for a period of 10 to 15 days, and will
incapacitate Isidro from the performance of his customary labor for the same period. Accused pleaded
guilty; and has fully served his sentence.

However, Isidros injury did not heal within the period estimated, and so the Provincial Fiscal filed an
information against accused for serious physical injuries; stating therein that the wounds of Isidro
requires medical attendance, and incapacitated him for a period of 1 months. To 2 months. Accused
was found guilty thereof.

ISSUE

WON the prosecution and conviction of Accused for less serious physical injuries is a bar to the second
prosecution for serious physical injuries.

RULING

Yes.

The jurisprudence provides that where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the
defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and together with the facts existing
at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy,
if indicted for the new offense.

Here, no new facts supervened. No X-ray examination of the wounded hand was made by the physician
during the first examination; hence, the latter could not have seen the fracture at the distal end of the
right arm, which, could only be apparent or visible by X-ray photography. Clearly, the wound causing the
delay in healing was already in existence at the time of the first examination, but said delay was caused
by the very superficial examination made by the first physician.

Hence, the Court finds that no new supervening fact has existed or occurred, which has transformed the
offense from less serious physical injuries to serious physical injuries.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODRIGO YORAC
G.R. No. L-29270. 23 November 1971. En Banc (Fernando, J.)

Topic: Slight Physical Injuries to Frustrated Murder

Double Jeopardy vis--vis New Supervening Fact/s

FACTS

Accused was charged with slight physical injuries by victim Lam Hock who, according to the medical
certificate, was confined for head injury. Accused plea guilty. While serving his sentence, the Provincial
Fiscal filed an information against the accused for the crime of frustrated murder arising from the same
act; anchored upon another medical certificate issued by the same physician. The said medical certificate
revealed that the head injury was a result of contusion with lacerated wound and cerebral concussion;
and the healing period would be from 18 to 20 days.

Pursuant thereto, a Motion to Quash was filed by Accused on ground that he would be placed in double
jeopardy. The trial court, relying on the ruling in the case of People vs. Buling, grant the said motion, and
held that nothing in the later medical certificate indicated that a new supervening fact had developed
since the time of the filing of the original action against the accused. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE

WON Accused may be prosecuted anew for frustrated murder for the same act committed, as in the first
case, against the same person.

RULING

No.

The jurisprudence provides that if after the first prosecution "a new fact supervenes on which defendant
may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct
offense, "the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. There is
then the indispensable requirement of the existence of "a new fact [which] supervenes for which the
defendant is responsible" changing the character of the crime imputed to him and together with the facts
existing previously constituting a new and distinct offense.

Here, the case of People vs. Buling was squarely applicable as "nothing in the later medical certificate
[indicated] that a new or supervening fact had developed or arisen since the time of the filing of the
original action" against the accused. Hence, the accused cannot be properly charged of frustrated
murder, and the Appeallate Court is correct in sustain the motion to quash and dismiss the aforesaid
information against Yorac.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ASST. PROVINCIAL FISCAL F. VISITACION, JR. vs HON.
MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, nad MARGARITO FAMA, JR.
G.R. No. L-41863. 22 April 1977. Second Division (Barredo, J.)

Topic: Slight Physical Injuries to Serious Physical Injuries;

Double Jeopardy vis--vis New Supervening Fact/s
Rule of Identity

FACTS

Accused was charged with the crime of slight physical injuries. It was alleged that the accused assault/attack
Miguel Viajar by hurling the latter with a stone on his right cheek; thereby inflicting physical injuries which
required medical attendance for a period of 5 to 9 days, as shown by the medical certificate of the physician.
On arraignment, accused entered a plea of not guilty.

On the following day, victim and Provincial Fiscal filed an information charging the accused with serious
physical injuries arising from the same incident; anchored on the fact that permanent scar and deformation
on the right side of the victims face had become apparent few days after the filing of the case for slight physical
injuries.

Pursuant thereto, Accused filed an urgent motion to defer the proceedings, claiming that he would be in double
jeopardy.

PROCEDURAL/DUE PROCESS: The Fiscal sought the dismissal of the case for slight physical injuries, but the
trial court did not act on the said motion, instead, it was set for hearing. In view of the several postponements
asked by the Fiscal, in order to await the resolution of the issue of double jeopardy, the trial court dismissed
the aforesaid case. Ratiocinating that, To grant another postponement as sought by the Fiscal against the
vehement, strong and vigorous objection of the accused is to the mind of the Court, no longer an exercise of
sound discretion consistent with justice and fairness but a clear and palpable abuse of discretion amounting to
a serious denial to, and a grave violation of, the right of the accused to a speedy trial to which he is rightfully
entitled to under Section 16 of Article IV, (Bill of Rights) of the Philippine Constitution.

ISSUE

WON the additional allegation of deformity in the subsequent information constitutes a supervening element
which should take this case out of the Rule of Identity/ Ruling in the case of People vs. Silva, as cited by the
respondent court.

RULING

Yes.

The jurisprudence provides that if after the first. prosecution a new fact supervenes on which defendant may
be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, the
accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.

Here, no finding was made in the first examination, as shown in the first medical certificate, that the injuries
had caused deformity and the loss of use of the right hand. It can be presumed that such fact was not apparent
or could have not been discernible at the time of the first examination. The course of the healing of an injury
may not be determined beforehand, it can only be known after the period of healing has ended. Hence, the
Court, considered that the additional allegation of deformity of the right side of the face of the victim constitutes
a supervening fact occurring since the filing of the original information.
GODOFREDO ENRILE and DR. FREDERICK ENRILE vs. HON. DANILO MANALASTAS, HON. ERANIO
G. CEDILLO, SR. and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 166414. 22 October 2014. First Division (Bersamin, J.)

Topic: Presentation of Medical Certificate to prove the number of days of medication required is essential only
during trial, and not during the filing of the complaint and/or preliminary investigation.

FACTS

A mauling incident ensued between neighbors, which includes the Moranos, who claims to be the victims
therein. Rommel and Perla Morano charged the Enriles with less serious physical injuries, and Josefine
Morano charged the latter with frustrated homicide.

MTC found probable cause against petitioners for less physical injuries; and set their arraignment. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration, arguing that complainants had not presented proof of having been given medical
attention lasting 10 days or longer; however, MTC denied their Motion to Quash.

ISSUE

WON the presentation of medical certificates, showing the number of days rendered for medication, is essential
during the filing of complaint, considering that the complaints were filed two (2) months after the alleged
incident.

RULING

No.

The jurisprudence provides that the presentation of the medical certificates to prove the duration of the
victims need for medical attendance or of their incapacity should take place only at the trial, not before or
during the preliminary investigation. Further stated, preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, in that it
is the occasion for the submission of the parties respective affidavits, counter-affidavits and evidence to
buttress their separate allegations; its sole purpose is to determine whether a crime has been committed and
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.

Here, what is required only is that the evidence be sufficient to establish a probable cause that the accused
committed the crime charged, not that all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused be removed. Hence, the
presentation of the medical certificates during the filing of the complaint and preliminary investigation is not
essential.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNAND MAPALO
G.R. No. 172608. 6 February 2007. Third Division (Chico-Nazario, J.)

Topic: Maltreatment

FACTS

Appellant together with 3 John Does were charged with the crime of Murder. It was alleged that the latter
clubbed Manuel Piamonte with lead pipes and stabbed him several with their bladed weapons; thereby
inflicting fatal injuries to the victim which caused his direct and immediate death.

The RTC finds the 3 accused guilty of the crime charged. The court ruled that the conspiracy was established
by the prosecution. In addition, the witness positively identified Appellant as the one who struck the victim on
the head with a lead pipe, which alone is sufficient manifestation of a concerted, common and united design
with the other accused to commit an unlawful and felonious act; and the fact that the medical certificate shows
that the COD was the stab wounds, was deemed immaterial, in view of the presence of the conspiracy. On the
contrary, the Appellate Court, modified the assailed decision of the trial court, and convicted the Appellant of
frustrated murder only. It was not convinced that the evidence on record established conspiracy among the
Appellant and his co-accused.

The COD of the victim was the stab wounds; however, the prosecutions evidence only established that the
Appellant clubbed the victim with a lead pipe; hence, it cannot be inferred from the account of the witness that
the appellant ad his co-accused came to an agreement to commit a felony, or that they decided to commit the,
by concerted acts. Also, the killing was a result of a fight that erupted suddenly, which fact discourages the
conclusion that the killing was planned. It could not now be said that conspiracy was proven attendant beyond
reasonable doubt. Hence, in the absence of conspiracy, the Appellant could only be liable for the consequences
of his own criminal act.

ISSUE

WON Appellant shall be held liable for FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE.

RULING

No, instead he shall be charged with the crime of maltreatment.

The jurisprudence provides that intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or
number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the
victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries
are inflicted by him on the victim.

Here, no motive on the part of appellant to kill Piamonte was shown either prior or subsequent to the incident.
Nor can such intent to kill be inferred from his acts. It bears reiterating that no injury on the body of the
deceased was attributed to the appellants act of hitting the victim with a lead pipe.

Hence, When the offender shall ill-treat another by deed without causing any injury, and without causing
dishonor, the offense is Maltreatment under Article 266,98 par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code. It was beyond
reasonable doubt that by hitting Piamonte, appellant ill-treated the latter, without causing any injury. No proof
of injury was offered. Maltreatment is necessarily included in Murder, which is the offense charged in the
Information.
JUN MUPAS and GIL MUPAS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 172834. 6 February 2008. Second Division (Tinga, J.)

Topic: Intent to kill as an essential element of the crime of Homicide or Murder

FACTS

Accused mauled with fist and stones, and stabbed with a knife Rogelio Murao, hitting and inflicting to the latter
injuries on his face and head; but because of timely medical assistance, death of the victim was prevented.

Accused Jun and Gil, alias Banjo, were found guilty as charged by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals, arguing that Jun had performed already performed all the acts of execution necessary to bring about
the death of Rogelio, which would have transpired had it not been for the timely medical assistance.

ISSUE

WON Accused Jun is liable for the crime of physical injuries only, instead of frustrated homicide.

RULING

Yes.

The jurisprudence provides that when intent to kill is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not
frustrated homicide but physical injuries. Intent to kill is the principal element of homicide or murder, in
whatever stage of commission; such intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every
possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor.

Here, such intent is lacking. Although it can be fairly assumed that the injuries suffered by Rogelio were
sustained during the fistfight, it is not conclusive that the same were inflicted purposely to kill him. If Jun in fact
had been carrying a bolo with intent of killing Rogelio, and if indeed Banjo had conspired with Jun, it is no small
wonder why the wounds inflicted were more superficial than mortal, more mild than grave; and that Rogelio
was able to go home shortly after the tricycle incident without being pursued by his aggressor also shows that
Jun and Banjo were not intent on beating him to death or even leaving him for dead.

Hence, it is wrong to infer that the intent to kill was present in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove
this fact beyond reasonable doubt. The Accused shall be convicted of the crime of less physical injuries,
considering that in the opinion of the attending physician, the wounds sustained by the victim would take two
(2) weeks to heal. Also,
ENGR. CARLITO PENTECOSTES, JR. vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 167766. 7 April 2010. Third Division (Peralta, J.)

Topic: Less serious physical injuries under Art. 265 of the Revised Penal Code;
Attempted Murder

FACTS

Accused shot the Rudy Baclig, hitting the latter just below his armpit, thereafter, accused rode his car and sped
away. The victim, on the other hand, was brought to the Municipal Hall and identified the accused as the person
who shot him; he was then immediately brought to the hospital and was discharged therefrom on the following
day. The victim sustained gunshot wound on the arm which required only 10 days of medical assistance.

The Provincial Prosecutor filed an information against herein petitioner for the crime of frustrated murder.
The trial court finds petitioner guilty but only for attempted murder. The fact that there was sufficient lighting
at the place of incident, the positive identification of the victim and that the latter knew petitioner ever since
he attained the age of reason, were considered by the trial court in arriving in the said decision.

On appeal, CA affirmed the assailed decision of the trial court, however, modified the crime charged from
attempted murder to less serious physical injuries. CA opined that the intent to kill Rudy was not
established. Petitioners act of shooting the victim once was not followed by any other assault or any act which
would ensure the latters death; or that he could have chased or run him over, since petitioner was driving a
car. Further stated, Petitioners desistance displayed his nonchalance to cause the death of Rudy.

ISSUE

WON Petitioner is liable for less serious physical injuries only, instead of attempted murder.

RULING

Yes.

The law provides "Any person who inflicts upon another physical injuries not described as serious physical
injuries but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten (10) days or more, or shall require
medical attendance for the same period, shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor." Further, the principal and essential element of attempted or frustrated murder is
the intent on the part of the assailant to take the life of the person attacked. Such intent must be proved in a
clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the aggressor. The
inference that intent to kill existed should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this
fact beyond reasonable doubt. When such intent is lacking but wounds are inflicted upon the victim, the crime
is not attempted murder but physical injuries only.

Here, intent to kill the victim could not be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. Petitioner only shot
the victim once and did not hit any vital part of the latters body. If he intended to kill him, petitioner could have
shot the victim multiple times or even ran him over with the car. Also, it should be noted, that, as per Medico-
Legal Certificate, the wound sustained by the victim would only require ten (10) days of medical assistance.
Hence, petitioner shall be held liable for the crime of less serious physical injuries.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINNES vs. HON. EMETERIO OCAYA, and ESTERLINA MARAPAO, LETICIA
MARAPAO and DIOSDADO MARAPAO.
G.R. No. L-47448. 17 May 1978. First Division (Teehankee, J.)

Topic: Acquisition of Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter/Crime Charged

FACTS

Private respondents wrestled, threw and hit Mrs. Llolita Ares with a fist-size stone at the face, thereby
inflicting upon the victim lacerated wound, with contusion and swelling at the inflicted, which caused
deformity of her face. The victim, who was then on the 12 th day from child delivery, suffered relapse, which
incapacitated her from performing her customary labor for a period of more than 30 days.

The records shows that neither arraignment nor trial on the merits ensued, and no warrant of arrest was
issued; instead herein respondent judge, motu proprio ordered that the case be dismissed, as the crime of
slight or less serious physical injury is not within the jurisdiction of his court. Further stated, in the filing of a
physical injury case is the certificate issued by the physician regarding the duration of treatment and not what
the victim declares because the same is self-serving. The motion for reconsideration proved futile after
evaluating the case without the parties or their witnesses being heard nor having received their evidence.

ISSUE

WON the Court has jurisdiction over the case/subject matter.

RULING

Yes.

The rule provides that the mere fact that evidence presented at the trial would indicate that a lesser offense
outside the trial court's jurisdiction was committed, does not deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction, which
had vested in it under the allegations of the information as filed, since the jurisdiction attaches to the person
and subject matter of the litigation; the subsequent happening of events, although they are of such a character
as would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, will not operate to oust jurisdiction
already attached.

Here, Respondent judge disregards the established rule that the information for serious physical injuries
properly vested his court with jurisdiction to try and hear the case, and that if from the evidence submitted a
lesser offense was established, that he equally had jurisdiction to impose the sentence for such lesser offense.
Besides, the doctor who issued the medical certificate had yet to be presented at the trial and conceivably could
corroborate the victim's testimony that her injuries had taken longer to heal than had at first been estimated
by him as well as clarify the location of the victim's facial scar. Hence, the case below should therefore be
transferred to another court presided by another judge.
GEORGE BONGALON vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 169533. 20 March 2013. First Division (Bersamin, J.)

Topic: Slight Physical Injuries

RA No. 7610, Child Abuse vis--vis element of intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being.

FACTS

Petitioner hit and slapped the 12-year old victim Jayson Dela Cruz at his back and left cheek, respectively, while
uttering derogatory remarks against the victims family. The incident happened during the evening procession
in Legazpi City. Petitioner went to the house of the victims father and challenged him into a fight, but latter
refused. The victim underwent medical treatment; and the medical certificates issued pursuant thereto states
that the child suffered contusions in the left scapular area and contusions in the left zygomatic area.

Petitioner was charged with child abuse, a violation under Sec. 10 (a) of RA No. 7610; and was found guilty of
the crime charged. On appeal, CA affirmed the conviction.

ISSUE

WON the acts of Petitioner constituted child abuse within the purview of RA 7610.

RULING

No.

The law (RA No. 7610) provides that child abuse refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the
child, which includes psychological and physical abuse, cruelty, emotional maltreatment, or any act by deeds
or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being (Sec.
3). In relation thereto, the same law in Sec. 10 (a) provides that any person who shall commit acts of child abuse
or cruelty, not covered by the RPC, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

Here, the records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that petitioners laying of hands on the victim had
been intended to debase the intrinsic worth and dignity of the latter as a human being, or that he had thereby
intended to humiliate or embarrass him. The laying of hands on the victim have been done at the spur of the
moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety
of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of the victim and his brother, Roldan.

Hence, with the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse. Instead, he shall
be held liable for slight physical injuries; considering that the victims physical injury required 5 to 7 days of
medical attention.
DR. FILOTEO A. ALANO vs. ZENAIDA MAGUD-LOGMAO
G.R. No. 175540. 7 April 2014. Third Division (Peralta, J.)

Topic: Republic Act No. 349, as amended byPD No. 856

Donation/Transplant of Internal Organs of Deceased

FACTS

Appellee, Zenaida, is the mother of deceased Arnelito Logmao; while petitioner is the Executive Director of
National Kidney Institute.

Arnelito Logmao was brought to the hospital by two sidewalk vendors, who allegedly saw the patient fall from
an overpass. The patients data sheet identified him as Angelito Lugmoso; however, the clinical abstract
prepared by the surgical resident on-duty, stated that the patient is Angelito Logmao. Due to the latters
unstable condition, he was transferred to National Kidney Institute, there he was recorded as Angelito Lugmoso
and was immediately attended to and given necessary medical treatment; however, was later on pronounced
as brain dead. The authorities of the said hospital enlisted police and media assistance to locate the family of
the deceased, but it proved futile. Dr. Ona requested a tissue typing and tissue cross-matching examination on
the deceased for organ transplant purposes. Upon expiration of the patient, Dr. Ona sought the permission from
Dr. Filoteo Alano authorizing the removal of specific organs from the body of the deceased; Dr. Alano, in turn
issued a Memorandum, authorizing the same, provided that said Department of the hospital had exerted all
reasonable efforts to locate the relatives/next of kin of the deceased. Thereafter, a medical team proceeded
with the said operation and transfer of organs to prospective donees. Pursuant thereto, NKI issued a press
release. Aida, cousin of the deceased overheard the news aired on television that the donor was an 18 year old
boy whose remains were in a Funeral Home in Quezon City, and the name of the donor sounded like Arnelito
Logmao, the Zenaida was informed by Aida. They went to the said funeral home and saw Arnelito inside a cheap
casket.

Plaintiff filed a complaint for damages against several person including Dr. Alano, in his capacity as
representative of NKI for allegedly conspiring to remove the organs of the deceased while the latter was still
alive, and for concealing his true identity. The trial court found Dr. Alano liable for damages. On appeal, CA
affirmed the assailed decision.

ISSUE

WON the removal of the internal organs of the Arnelito Logmao were valid.

RULING

Yes.

Here, petitioner instructed his subordinates to "make certain" that "all reasonable efforts" are exerted to locate
the patient's next of kin, even enumerating ways in which to ensure that notices of the death of the patient
would reach said relatives. It also clearly stated that permission or authorization to retrieve and remove the
internal organs of the deceased was being given ONLY IF the provisions of the applicable law had been complied
with. Such instructions reveal that petitioner acted prudently by directing his subordinates to exhaust all
reasonable means of locating the relatives of the deceased. He could not have made his directives any clearer.
He even specifically mentioned that permission is only being granted IF the Department of Surgery has
complied with all the requirements of the law. Verily, petitioner could not have been faulted for having full
confidence in the ability of the doctors in the Department of Surgery to comprehend the instructions, obeying
all his directives, and acting only in accordance with the requirements of the law.
DECS and DIRECTOR OF CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT vs. ROBERTO REY SAN DIEGO and
JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG
G.R. No. 89572. 21 December 1989. En Banc (Cruz, J.)

Topic: NMAT and Three-Flunk-Rule vis--vis Constitutional Right to academic Freedom

FACTS

Private respondent took the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT, for brevity) thrice and flunked it. When
applied to take it again, herein petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the rule that a student shall be
allowed only 3 chances to take the NMAT. Roberto went to the RTC to compel his admission to the test. He
invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education; and was allowed to the take the
said test conditioned upon the outcome of his petition. However, he amended his petition and challenged the
constitutionality of the MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972; the trial court judge declared that the same was
invalid, and held that Roberto was deprived of his right to pursue a medical education through arbitrary
exercise of police power.

ISSUE

WON the NMAT three-flunk-rule order is valid and constitutional.

RULING

Yes.

The jurisprudence provides that the implementation of NMAT is constitutional; it is a measure intended to limit
the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for
a medical education.

It should be noted that .the medical profession directly affects the very lives of the people, unlike other careers
which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. In relation thereto, the power to regulate and
control the same includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice
medicine.

Lastly, the right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute; the Constitution also
provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable
and equitable admission and academic requirements.

Here, the subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right
and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by
incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. Hence, NMAT and the tree-flunk-
rule are constitutional.
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, ET AL. vs. ARLENE DE GUZMAN, ET AL.
G.R. No. 144681. 21 June 2004. Second Division (Tinga, J.)

Topic: Republic Act No. 2382

FACTS

Respondents passed the Physician Licensure Examination, and pursuant thereto, Petitioner PRC released their
names as successful examinees; however, the Board of Medicine observed that the grades of the 79 successful
examinees in BioChem and OB-Gyne were unusually and exceptionally high; that many of those who passed
from Fatima College got marks of 95% in the said subjects and no one got a mark lower than 90%; and that
such unusual ratings were true only for the examinees of the said school. The Board resolved to withhold the
registration of the said examinees; and PRC asked the NBI to investigate on any anomaly or irregularity in the
said Examination. NBI concluded that Fatima examinees gained early access to the test question.

The Board resolved to charge the respondents with immorality, dishonesty conduct, fraud and deceit in
connection with the said subjects; and recommended that the test results of Fatima examinees be nullified.
However, the trial court ordered to allow the some of the petitioners and intervenors herein to take the
physicians oath and to be registered as physicians. On appeal, CA sustained the assailed decision, ratiocinating
that the respondents complied with all the statutory requirements for admission into the licensure
examination; as such, they should be allowed to take their oaths and be registered in the Rolls of the PRC.

ISSUE

WON the act pursuant to RA No. 2382 is a valid exercise of police power.

RULING

Yes.

The jurisprudence provides that the Court has upheld the constitutional right35 of every citizen to select a
profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.36 But
like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power
of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people.37 Thus,
persons who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required
to take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers.

It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation
cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body that
regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in accordance
with certain conditions. Such conditions may not, however, require giving up ones constitutional rights as a condition
to acquiring the license.40 Under the view that the legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or
refuse a license on a public agency or officer, courts will generally strike down license legislation that vests in public
officials discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily lawful business, profession, or activity
without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of said officials in the exercise of their power.

The aforementioned guidelines are provided for in Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended, which prescribes, among others,
the grounds for denying the issuance of a physicians license, or revoking a license that has been issued. Verily, to be
granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications. Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements
imposed by the law and the licensing authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less than
satisfactory, then the privilege will not issue. For said privilege is distinguishable from a matter of right, which may
be demanded if denied. Thus, without a definite showing that the aforesaid requirements and conditions have been
satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without thwarting the
legislative will. Further, section 830 of Rep. Act No. 2382 prescribes, among others, that a person who aspires to
practice medicine in the Philippines, must have "satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board Examination." Section
22, in turn, provides that the oath may only be administered "to physicians who qualified in the examinations." The
operative word here is "satisfactorily," defined as "sufficient to meet a condition or obligation" or "capable of
dispelling doubt or ignorance."

Here, it can be gleaned from Board Resolution No. 26, the licensing authority apparently did not find that the
respondents "satisfactorily passed" the licensure examinations. The Board instead sought to nullify the examination
results obtained by the respondents. Hence, the decision ordering the petitioners to administer the physicians oath to
herein respondents are reversed and set aside by SC.
BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCCATION and HON. LOURDES QUISIMBING vs. HON. DANIEL ALFONSO and the
PHILIPPINE MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN COLLEGE OF MEDICINE FOUNDATION, INC.
G.R No. 88259. 10 August 1989. En Banc (Narvasa, J.)

Topic: Courts of Justice should not generally interfere with purely administrative and discretionary functions.

FACTS

Due to the unstable peace and order situation in Mindanao, herein College was established in Antipolo, Rizal,
instead in Zamboanga City, where the said school was first proposed to be located. Pursuant thereto, it has
since adopted Antipolo as its permanent site and changed its name to Rizal College of Medicine.

Commission on Medical Education conducted a study of all the medical schools in the Philippines, and reports
showed that the said College fell very much short of the minimum standards set for medical schools. A
recommendation for its closure was anchored on grounds of : (a) inappropriate location and absence in its
curriculum subjects relating to Muslim culture and welfare; (b) lack of university affiliation; (c) lack of a
philosophy base hospital for training its students; and (d) more than 60% of the college faculty did not teach
therein full-time. The school, failed several evaluations conducted to test its fitness to continue as a medical
school/determine its eligibility for government recognition. Pursuant thereto Sec. of DECS, Quisimbing,
informed the Colleges Board of Trustees of its final and unappealable decision to close the said school. The
College, however, appealed to the Office of the President, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the Secretary;
but the same proved futile. The College filed an action against Sec. Qusimbing, wherein Judge Alfonso ruled in
their favor; the school thereupon advertised in newspapers dailies for enrollees.

ISSUE

WON Judge Alfonso acted with grave abuse of discretion.

RULING

Yes.

The rule provides that resort to the Courts to obtain a reversal of the determination by the Secretary of Education,
Culture and Sports that the College is unfit to continue its operations is in this case clearly unavailing. There is, to
begin with, no law authorizing an appeal from decisions or orders of the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports
to this Court or any other Court. It is not the function of this Court or any other Court to review the decisions and
orders of the Secretary on the issue of whether or not an educational institution meets the norms and standards required
for permission to operate and to continue operating as such. On this question, no Court has the power or prerogative
to substitute its opinion for that of the Secretary. Indeed, it is obviously not expected that any Court would have the
competence to do so. The, only authority reposed in the Courts in the matter is the determination of whether or not the
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports has acted within the scope of powers granted him by law and the
Constitution. As long as it appears that he has done so, any decision rendered by him should not and will not be subject
to review and reversal by any court.

Here, Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in substituting his judgment for theirs. It is well-settled doctrine
that courts of justice should not generally interfere with purely administrative and discretionary functions; that courts
have no supervisory power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government;
involving the exercise of judgment and findings of facts, because by reason of their special knowledge and expertise
over matters falling under their jurisdiction, the latter are in a better position to pass judgment on such matters and
their findings of facts in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts. There are, to be sure,
exceptions to this general rule but none of them obtains in this case.
PHILIPPINE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION vs. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS and JOSE MA.
TORRES
G.R. No. L-25135. 21 September 1968. En Banc (Conception, C.J.)

Topic: Treaties and Republic Act No. 2882 vis--vis Practice of Medicine by Foreigners in the Philippines

FACTS

Private respondent is a Spanish subject and a member of a Missionary. He graduated from Spain with the degree of
Licentiate in Medicine and Surgery; and is therefore entitled, under the laws of Spain, to practice medicine and surgery
throughout the territory thereof. Respondent was granted a special authority to practice medicine in Basilan City,
where he resides, pursuant to Sec. 771 (e) of the Revised Administrative Code. However, the same was revoked by
the Sec. of Health on ground that the conditions under which it was granted no longer exists, there being enough
practicing physicians in the locality. His motion for reconsideration was approved by the Board of Medical Examiners,
and later on approved by the President; thereby granting him a Certificate to practice medicine in the Philippines,
without the examination required in RA No.2882 (Medical Act of 1959). The said resolution was anchored on the The
Treaty on the Validity of Academic Degrees and The Exercise of the Professions between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Spanish State, signed at Manila on March 4, 1949, and ratified on May 19, 1949.

Philippine Medical Association, request that the said authority granted to Torres be revoked on ground that
pursuant to RA No. 2882, respondent has to take a d pass the examination therein prescribed before he can be
allowed to practice medicine in the Philippines; but the same proved futile.

ISSUE

WON Private respondent should be allowed to practice medicine under the abovementioned treaties, without
taking and passing the requisite examination as provided in the Medical Act of 1959.

RULING

No.

The jurisprudence provides, by analogy, that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are
made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting State in whose territory it is desired to exercise
the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection with Sections 2, 9, and 16 thereof, which have the force
of law, require that before anyone can practice the legal profession in the Philippines he must first successfully pass
the required bar examinations...

Here, the Court found no plausible reason to depart from the said view. That the said Treaty merely extended to
diplomas issued or degrees conferred by educational institutions of Spain the same recognition and treatment that we
accord to similar diplomas or degrees from local institutions of learning. Hence, the holders of said Spanish diplomas
or degrees must take the examination prescribed by our laws for holders of similar diplomas or degrees from
educational institutions in the Philippines.