Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
Author(s): W. J. Waluchow
Source: The University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Summer, 1998), pp. 387-449
Published by: University of Toronto Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/826047 .
Accessed: 23/12/2014 09:29
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
University of Toronto Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
University of Toronto Law Journal.
http://www.jstor.org
I LegalPositivism
and 'LegalPositivism'
*
Departmentof Philosophy,McMasterUniversity, Hamilton,Ontario
t A reviewarticleof: S. Guest,ed., PositivismToday(Aldershot:DartmouthPublishingCo.
Ltd., 1996) (xiv + 152) ISBN: 1 85521 689 2; TheAutonomy ofLaw: Essayson LegalPositiv-
ismed. RobertP. George (Oxford:ClarendonPress,1996) (viii + 339) ISBN: 0-19-
825786-4;TheLegal Theory ofEthicalPositivism
Tom D. Campbell (Aldershot:Dartmouth
PublishingCo. Ltd., 1996) (xii + 286) ISBN: 1 85521 171 8
1 R. Dworkin,TakingRightsSeriously, 2d ed. (Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press,
1978) at vii.
2 One recentcritichas gone so faras to claim thatpositivismitselfis among itsown worst
enemies.AccordingtoJ.D. Goldsworthy, legal positivismhas 'self-destructed'.
See 'The
Self-Destruction of Legal Positivism'(1990) 10 OxfordJ.Legal Stud. no. 4, 449.
OF TORONTOLAWJOURNAL387
(1998), 48 UNIVERSITY
I LegalPositivisms
A. A Conceptual Claim
The separationthesisis oftenunderstoodas a claimabout theveryconcept
of law. In the same wayas one mightprovidean analysisof the concept of
a promisebyaskingwhatit is necessarilyor typically
to engage in the social
practicewe call 'makinga promise,'one mightalso providean analysisof
17 AofL,290.
18 In the Postscriptto TheConcept ofLazt Hartfinally verifiedthathiscommitment to positiv-
ism had neverbeen to the exclusiveversion,somethingwhichI had earlierattemptedto
establishin InclusiveLegalPositivism.
Otherswho arguedin a similarfashionincludeJules
Coleman in 'Negativeand PositivePositivism'11 Journalof Legal Studies (1982), 139;
Philip Soper in 'Legal Theoryand the Obligationsof a Judge:The Hart/DworkinDis-
pute', 75 MichiganLaw Review(1977), 477; andJohnMackie,'The ThirdTheoryofLaw',
7 Philosophyand PublicAffairs, no. 1, (1977), 3. Raz's ExclusivePositivism is defendedin
a numberof places, includingTheAuthority ofLaw (Oxford:ClarendonPress,1979) and
'Authority,Law and Morality',68 TheMonist,no. 3, (1985), 295. For myresponseto Raz's
Exclusiveversionof positivism,see InclusiveLegalPositivism, especiallychs. 4 & 5.
19 See InclusiveLegalPositivism,passim.Many criticsof legal positivismidentifypositivism
withitsexclusiveversion.This is unfortunate because itskewsour understandingofwhat
Hartand the earlypositivistswereattempting to establish.
B. A DescriptiveClaim
H.L.A. Hart is famousfordescribingTheConcept ofLaw as 'an essayin de-
scriptivesociology.'21In so describinghismonumentalwork,Hartmeantto
distancehimselffromnormativetheoriesabout whatlaw (and laws) should
be like,as well as fromtheoriespurportingto offeror defendsemanticor
stipulativedefinitionsof theword'law.' His theorywas descriptivein so far
as it attemptedto providea descriptively accurateand theoretically illumi-
natingaccountof legal systems, and of theconceptswe actuallyuse in prac-
tisingand (in variousways)talkingabout law. In thissense, the theorywas
both conceptualand descriptive.The theorywas sociologicalin so faras it
was meantto be an accountof an actuallyexistingsocial phenomenonwith
whichhis readerwas familiar.
Owingto itsnature,Hart's theoryis, to some degree,susceptibleto em-
pirical confirmationor refutation.22 Hart's theoreticalclaim (that all sys-
temswe conceive of as legal include a foundationalrule of recognition)
stands,forexample,onlyifone can findsuch a rulewhereverone encoun-
terslaw.Severalauthorshavedenied thatsucha rulecan everbe discovered;
C. A NormativeClaim
The descriptiveclaim thatlegal validityis neverin factdependenton moral
considerations,and the opposingviewthatitis sometimes(even always)so
D. An Interpretive Claim
It is a fundamentaltenetof Dworkin'sjurisprudencethatthe NeutralDe-
scriptionThesis is false.Accountsof a legal systemare necessarilyinterpre-
tive,and interpretations necessarilyinclude both descriptionand evalua-
tion.In thecase oflaw,interpretation necessarilyincludesbothdescription
and moralevaluation.We mightthereforeaskthefollowingquestion:Could
the claimsof legal positivismbe sensiblyviewedas interpretivein Dworkin's
sense of thatterm?BythisI mean: Could theseparationthesis,read in one
ofthewaysoutlinedabove,be viewedas partofan interpretation or account
of the practiceof law whichattemptsto put thatpracticein itsbest moral
light?Such an account would, in effect,blend the descriptive,normative
and conceptualversionsof positivism.In principle,I see no reason whya
positivisttheorycould not be advanced in thisway.Withthe exceptionof
the Neutral Rationale Thesis, any of the versionsof positivismoutlined
above could be re-configured as elementsin an interpretation oflegal prac-
ticewhichattemptsto put thatpracticein itsbestmorallight.Whetherany
contemporary would agree to such a re-configuration
positivist is doubtful,
thoughas we shallsee, Campbell'sethicalpositivism comes close. But there
is no reasonwhyitcould not be done, and whyplausiblerivalsto Dworkin's
'law as integrity'
could not in thiswaybe fashioned.I hastento add, howev-
er, thatthese Dworkinianversionsof positivismwould likelybear littlere-
semblance to the versionsDworkinhimselfconstructsin Law's Empireand
elsewhere.
III PositivismToday
PositivismToday,edited byStephenGuest,containseightessaysbyteachers
ofJurisprudencewithinthe Facultyof Laws at University College London.
The essaysrangefromhistoricalstudiesof the originsof legal positivismin
the writingsofAustinand Bentham,throughto discussionsof the connec-
tionsbetweenlinguisticsand legal theory,objectivity
and truthin law,and
thefeasibility
oflegal positivism
in theworldofmodem globalization.Virtu-
allyall thewritersrepresentedare in some wayopposed to legal positivism.
The volume beginswitha shortpiece byRonald Dworkinwho,despite
Hart'srepeatedobjections,once again seeksto transform positivismintoan
interpretivetheory.30In Law'sEmpire Dworkin
suggestedthatlegalpositivism is bestunderstood as an affirmative
interpretively,
normativetheory claiming thatwe makemostsenseoflegalpractice, and see itin
thebestpossible[moral]light,bysupposing thatconventionplaystheroleinfixing
whatthelawofa societyis thatpositivismdescribes.3'
In thismore recentoffering, 'Indeterminacy and Law,' Dworkin'saim is to
considerthephilosophical
basisofanotherwayofregarding as following
positivism:
from... theideaofindeterminacybydefault.
On thisview,propositions oflawcan
onlybe determinatively
trueorfalsewhentheycanbe demonstrated as oneortheoth-
er [viasomethinglikeHart'sruleof recognition]
.... Positivism
thenclaimsthat
nothing thatcannotbe demonstratedtobe trueinsomesuch'positive' way... can
be true.32
33 PT 71.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 See PT p.74.
37 For an interesting(and amusing) account of the 'anarchical' tendenciesof naturallaw
theory,see Bentham'sdelightful'AnarchicalFallacies', in 2 TheCollectedWorksofJeremy
Bentham, (London, Bowringed., 1843).
38 PT 114.
39 See InclusiveLegalPositivism,
pp.86-98.
40 PT, 15.
41 Ibid.
42 PT 22.
43 Ibid.
44 PT, 45.
45 PT p.50.
46 PT 139.
47 PT 138, 139.
It is farfromclear thatpositivists
are necessarilybarredfromthisthird
level of commitment. Althoughit is truethatmanypositivists, the present
56 PT p.29.
57 Ibid.
According to Guest, it is natural to read Hart in such a way. But '[i]f we leap
to Chapter 9' of The ConceptofLawwe see Hart acknowledging that '[p]lain-
lywe cannot grapple adequately withthisissue ifwe see it as one concerning
the proprieties of linguistic usage.'59
Hart clearlyoffersmore thana descriptiveaccount of the law ....For whathe must
be offering are moralviewswhichjustifyhisaccordingmoralpriority overotherpos-
sible conceptionsoflaw and thesejustifications
mustbemoralones.I am in no doubtthat
thisis whathe does ... first,
byopenlyinvestinghiscentralset ofelementsconstitut-
ing lawin termswithcharacteristicsshowingthemoralsuperiority ofa societywhich
has adopted a set of ruleswhichallowforprogress... forefficient handlingof dis-
putes ... and rulesthatcreatethe possibility
of publiclyascertainable- certain
- cri-
teriaof whatis to countas the law."o
Guest's final step is to link Hart's methodology with Dworkin's.
To cut a long storyshort:ifHart is talkingmorals,we can join the argumentfrom
morals ... It also means, I think,thathe has conceded thattheoriesof law are, in
Dworkin'sextremely wide sense, interpretive.61
The inferences contained withinthis line of reasoning are astonishing. Ifwe
are to accept Guest's account we must accept that Hart did the following:
(a) Inferred from the proposition that linguistic analysis is insufficientfor
legal theory that more than a descriptive account of the law is re-
quired;
(b) Inferred from the factthat more than a descriptive account is required
that one must defend a legal theoryby showing that it is morally supe-
rior to its rivals;
58 PT p.30.
59 Ibid.,quoting TheConcept
ofLaw,p.209.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
IV TheAutonomy
ofLaw
69 AofL,1.
70 AofL,17.
71 AofL,24.
76 AofL,68.
77 Ibid.
In the presentcase, the audience need not be judges who are puzzled over
how theyshould respondto an immorallawor an act of civildisobedience,
or citizenswhowantto knowwhethertheyshouldaccept a moralobligation
to obey thelawsoftheirownparticularlegal system.The audience could be
otherphilosophersand theoristswhose puzzlementlies in the verynature
of law,legal systemsand legal reasoning.That a philosophicaltheoryabout
the natureof law does not entailanswersto specific,practicalmoral ques-
tionsneed in no waydetractfromitsphilosophicalsignificanceforsuch an
audience. A theorywhichattemptsto enrichour understandingof law by
revealingand systematizing our theoreticaland conceptualcommitments
concerning law and itsrelationshipto morality, forceand so on, can be of
greatphilosophical interest to such an audience. To suppose otherwisewould
be on a par withrejectingquantummechanicsbecause itfailsto tellour lo-
cal mechanic,Tony,how bestto fixour carburettor, or rejectingthe value
ofAristotle'smetaphysics because itfailsto informus about the differences
betweenapples and bananas. Philosophicalenlightenment is worthyin its
own right,as wellas fortheclarityit can provideforthosepuzzled bymoral
questions.That a theorywhichclarifiesquestionsfailsto answertheseques-
tionsis no reason to rejectthe theoryas trivial.
Manywho claimthatpositivism is lackingin theoreticaland practicalim-
portance share Greenawalt's belief thatthereis little,ifanything, whichdis-
tinguishes modern positivism from natural law theory. Those attractedby
thisline ofargumentwillfindsupportin RobertGeorge's 'NaturalLaw and
PositiveLaw' andJohnFinnis''The Truthin Legal Positivism.'Bothwriters
are concernedto stressthat'lawis a culturalobjectthatis createdfora mor-
al purpose.'78Bothagree withtheExclusivePositivist Raz that"'The identi-
ficationof the existenceand contentof law does not requireresortto any
moralargument."'79 Furthermore, bothagreewiththecentralclaimsofeth-
ical positivismthat:
constitution-makers havea moralresponsibilitytoestablishsourcesoflawwhichcan
be identified
without resorttomoralargument, andjudgesandothersubjectshave
a moralresponsibility to defer(withinlimits)to suchsources.Whenthesources
yieldno determinate solutionall concerned havetheresponsibility ofsupplement-
ingthesourcestofillthegapbya choiceguidedbystandards offairnessand other
morally trueprinciples and norms, wherepossiblebystandards whichalreadyhave
currency inthecommunity andlendmoralforcetothosepartsofpositive lawwhich
aremorally acceptable.80
78 AoJL,
330.
79 Finnis,AofL,204 quotingRaz 'The Purityof the Pure Theory',in RichardTur and Wil-
liam Twining(eds.), EssaysonKelsen(Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,1986), 81-2.
80 Finnis,AofL,204-5.
81 AofL,332.
82 Finnis,AofL,205.
83 AoJL,
182.
84 AoJL,
122& 134.
85 AofL, 146.
86 For an argumentthattheyin factdo not,see Inclusive 95-8.
LegalPositivism,
87 MacCormick,'A MoralisticCase forAmoralisticLaw?',supra n. 65, 10.
acidtothem,wasnottainted
bytheendorsement
thatscepticism
strains
toavoid.In
otherwords,ifone werea sceptic,thenone wouldwantto be a positivist.94
Schauer is fullyawareofthemoralnatureofthisargument.He fullyaccepts
'the propositionthatthe definitionof law is a matterof choice ratherthan
discovery, and thatmoralfactorsloom large in makingthatchoice.95'I am
actuallyattemptingto arguesubstantively and notjustlinguistically thatitis
morallyvaluable to recognizethe distinctionbetweenthe is and the ought
thatlies at the heartof thepositivist tradition.'96
Thusthemoralquestionisnotoneaboutthemorality ofa definition,perse,butrath-
er aboutthemoralconsequencesofa societyhavingthisratherthanthatunder-
standingof some social phenomenon, presupposing that,as is oftenthe case,
different of
understandingcomplex socialphenomenamayinfluence a widerange
ofquiteconsequential decisionsabouthowsomesocialinstitution willoperateand
develop.Justas itprobably makesa differencewhether wedefine (andtherefore un-
derstand) alcoholismas a oras a moralflaw,
disease orwhether wedefinesexuality
as a preference
oras an orientation,
so toomight itmakea genuinemoralandsocial
differencewhether we define(and therefore understand) theinstitution oflawin
onewayratherthananother.97
I fullyagreewithSchauerthattheadoptionofa theoryoflawcan havesignif-
icantpracticalconsequences.These are in additionto thepurelytheoretical
interestof the theoristin developinga philosophicallyenlighteningtheory.
For instance,ifajudge wereto acceptExclusivePositivism, thenhe mightbe
led, to interpreta document like the Canadian Charterof Rightsand
Freedoms,or thedue processclause of theAmericanConstitution, in a par-
ticularway.He mightbe led to some versionof originalismbecause of his
(mistaken)beliefsthatdeterminations oflawcan neverhingeon moralques-
tionsand thatdiscoveringthe intentionsof long-deadlegislatorsis a purely
factual,non-moralmatter.But,once again,theimportantconsequencesofa
theory'sadoption should not be confusedwithan argumentin itsfavour.
That thereare significant consequencesattachedto the answerwe giveis a
reason to getit right,not a reason to accept one answeroveranother.That
weviewalcoholismas a diseaseor moralflawcan,as Schauerpointsout,have
significantsocialconsequences.Thisshouldlead us tosearchcarefully forthe
natureand causesofalcoholism,because a good deal can depend on our un-
derstanding ofthematter.Butwhatgood woulditbe to 'define'or 'conceive'
ofalcoholismas a moralflawifin factitwasverylargelya matterofbiology?
94 AofL.,46.
95 AofL,34.
96 AofL,45.
97 34.
AoJfL,
98 AofL,163.
99 AofL,163.
100 AofL,170. For Hart'sdoctrineof the minimumcontentof naturallaw,see The
Concept
of
Law ch. 9.
101 AofL,164.
102 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 'Negativeand PositivePositivism',
See specifically, supra n. 18.
113 AofL,288.
114 AofL,290.
115 Ibid.
116 AofL,291.
122 AofL,293.
123 Ibid.
124 For a different
defenceof the claim thatpositivist's
are not committedto pure pedigree
criteriasee myInclusiveLegalPositivism,
especiallypp. 117-123,182-190.
125AofL,
305.
126 That the authorityof law is compatiblewithInclusivePositivismis among the central
claimsof InclusiveLegalPositivism.
See especiallypp.123-141.
ruleofrecognition, thattheruleofidentification
itis unlikely is theruleofrecog-
nition.127
Withoutan idea ofwhata real ruleofidentification mightlook like,itis dif-
ficult,of course, to determinewhetherthisis as an adequate response to
Raz's chargeof inconsistency.
Near the end of his paper, Coleman turnsto a slightlydifferent aspect
of theauthority oflaw.It is not enough,he contends,to saythattheauthor-
ityoflawdepends on itsefficacy in leadingus to act in accordancewithright
reason.It also depends on whetherthelaw,in so faras itis a public,reason-
givingpractice,sufficiently embodies the moral principlesof equalityand
autonomy which are presupposedin any'social or public practiceof giving
of
reasons, offering justificationswhichwithstandpublic scrutiny.'128 If this
is right,thenthe questionarises:Do we have here a fusionof moralitywith
lawwhichthreatensColeman's positivism? The answer,ofcourse,is thatwe
do not.First,naturallawtheoryclaimsthattheembodimentofcertainmor-
al ideals is essentialto the veryexistenceof law. This is not trueon Cole-
man's account. 'Autonomyand equalityare requirediflaw is to be author-
itative.Theyare notrequiredbytheconceptoflegalityitself.'Second, these
moralideals are not law owingto theirtruthas moralprinciplesbut rather
because theyare presupposedbythepublic practiceofgivingreasons.
... in naturallaw,itisthetruth ofa moralprinciplethatdetermines itsstatusas law.
In myview,themoralidealsofequality andautonomy arepartofthelawonlyifwe
takelawtobe a framework within whichindividuals can discusswhatis tocountas
good or rightreasonforthem.It is nottheirtruthas moralprinciples thatmakes
themlaw;rather, itisthefactthattheyarepresupposed bytherelevant publicprac-
tices.129
127 AofL,308.
128 AofL,
313.
129 AofL,314.
130 AofL,
88.
131 Ibid.
132AofL,
80.
133 AofL,
80.
134 AofL,94.
135 AofL,99.
136 Ibid.,quotingRaz, 'Facing Up', 62 SouthernCaliforniaLaw Review(1989), 1204.
137 AofL,88.
138 AoL, 102.
V TheLegalTheory
ofEthicalPositivism
149
150 LE,,1.
LER 2
151 LER85.
positivist's theory lie the resources for detailed moral arguments establish-
ing that,in practice, systemsof law ought to be modelled on Raz's Exclusive
Positivism.
It is not Campbell's aim to argue that LEPis 'the dominant form of Legal
Positivism,either historicallyor contemporaneously.' 59 Nor is it his inten-
tion to deny that positivismis 'standardly defended on conceptual and em-
pirical rather than evaluative grounds.'160 Nevertheless, Campbell con-
tends, 'the moral arguments for Legal Positivism are ... there in the
tradition and are often openly declared.'161 His aim is to expose
... the frequentlysubmergedmoralgroundsof Legal Positivism... Bringingwhatis
oftenthehidden moralagenda ofall Legal Positivisms can be moreinteresting than
taking them at theirconceptual or scientific
face value. This is particularly ifwe
so
examine the ideological or legitimating functionsof manyLegal Positivisms which
flourishon the perhaps disingenuousassumptionthatwhatought to be the case
about law actuallyis so as a matterof naturalmeaningor fact:a characteristic posi-
tivistexample ofarguingfromoughtto is,whichmaybe called thenormativefallacy.
In thisway,the hidden agendas of Legal Positivists are readilyviewedas malign,if
not dishonest,devicesthroughwhichthe role of lawyersand legal academics,to say
nothingof the absolutepowerof thestate,is beingfalselylegitimated.162
Having thus set the stage for his defence of LEP,Campbell goes on to de-
scribe in some detail what he calls 'the paradox of politics'. This is 'the ten-
sion between the societal need for centralised coercive authority and the
dangers involved in any human beings having such power over others.'163
The paradox is tragic, Campbell contends, because both the need for and
the dangers inherent in government stem from the very same features of
the human condition. These are 'the vulnerabilityof individuals and small
groups in situations where scarcity,or perhaps human nature itself,gener-
ates the drive to dominate and control others. 64This tragic situation is ex-
acerbated by 'contemporary uncertainties over the objectivityof values in
general and the perhaps related incapacity to agree as to the basic terms of
social existence in pluralistic societies ...'165 The paradox of politics, then,
is that we need Razian authorityto remove us from the state of nature, but
this same authority puts us at risk of domination and control by those in
whose hands we place this authority.According to LEP, the only means of
171 LEP,78.
172 LEP,247-8.
173 LER 75.
174 LER,73.
175 Ibid.
176 LEP,74.
177 LER 75.
178 LEP,118.
179 Ibid.
180 LEI, 119.
181 LEP,217.
182 LE, 134.
183 Ibid.
184 LE, 142.