Panganiban September 9, 1933 was at the time a practicing and notary public in the Province of Occidental Negros.
was at the time a practicing and notary public in the Province of Occidental Negros. The respondent, after hearing
JOSE R. PAGANIBAN, complainant,
vs.
ELIAS BORROMEO, respondent.
The Respondent in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
These proceedings looking to the disbarment of the respondent attorney are before us on the representations of the
Solicitor-General that the respondent appear and show cause, if any he has, why he should not be proceeded against for
professional malpractice. The respondent admits that, in his capacity as notary public he legalized the document which is
the basis of the complaint against him, and that the document contains provisions contrary to law, morals and good
customs, but by way of defense disclaims any previous knowledge of the illegal character of the document.
On November 25, 1931, Alejandro Pabro and Juana Mappala husband and wife, subscribed a contract before the notary
public Elias Borromeo, who was at that time a regularly admitted member of the Philippine Bar. The contract in question
had been prepared by the municipal secretary of Naguilian, Isabela. Attorney Borromeo cooperated in the execution of the
document and had, at lease, some knowledge of its contents, although he may not have been fully informed because of a
difference in dialect. The contract in substance purported to formulate an agreement between the husband and the wife
which permitted the husband to take unto himself a concubine and the wife to live in adulterous relationship with another
man, without opposition from either one of them.
Two questions are suggested by the record. The first concerns the points of whether or not the contract sanctioned an
illicit and immoral purpose. The second concerns the point, on the supposition that the contract did sanction an illicit and
immoral purpose, of whether a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct as a notary public.
The contract of the spouses, it will be recalled, was executed at a time when the Spanish Penal Code, as modified by Act
No. 1773 was in force. Conceding, however, that the more liberal provisions of the Revised Penal Code should be given
application, it is herein provided that the consent or pardon given by the offended party constitutes a bar to prosecution
for adultery or concubinage. In this instance, if the spouses should retain their present frame of mind, no prosecution of
either one by the other could be expected. Nevertheless, we think it far from the purpose of the Legislature to legalize
adultery and concubinage. They still remain crimes, with the qualification that prosecution cannot be instituted if the
offended party consent to the act or pardon the offender. This is a matter of future contingency and is not matter for
legalization in wanton disregard of good morals. We hold the contract to contain provisions contrary to law, morals and
public order, and as a consequence not judicially recognizable.
Passing to the second question, we think there can be no question as to the right of the court to discipline an attorney
who, in his capacity as notary public, has been guilty of misconduct. To the office of notary public there is not attached
such importance under present conditions as under the Spanish administration. Even so, the notary public exercise duties
calling for carefulness and faithfulness. It is for the notary to inform himself of the facts to which he intends to certify, and
to take part in no illegal enterprise. The notary public is usually a person who has been admitted to the practice of law, and
such, in the commingling of his duties as notary and lawyer, must be held responsible for both. We are led to hold that a
member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public of a disgraceful or immoral character may be held to account by
the court even to the extent of disbarment. (See 2 Thornton on Attorneys At Law, pp. 1258, 1259; In re Chappell [1909],
115 N.Y.S., 868; In re Bernard [1912], 136 N.Y.S., 185; In re Arctander [1879], 1 N.W., 43; In re Terrell [1903], 2 Phil., 266; In
re Adriatico [1906], 7 Phil., 173; U.S. vs. Kilayko [1916], 34 Phil., 796; De la Cruz vs. Capinpin and Albea [1918], 38 Phil.,
492.)
It now becomes necessary to pronounce sentence. As mitigating circumstances, there may be taken into consideration (1)
that the attorney may not have realized the full purport of the document to which he took acknowledgment, (2) that no
falsification of facts was attempted, and (3) that the commission of the respondent as a notary public has been revoked.
Accordingly, we are disposed in this case to exercise clemency and to confine our discipline of the respondent to severe
censure. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Street, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 932 June 21, 1940
In re ATTY. ROQUE SANTIAGO, respondent,
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta as petitioner-complainant.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an administrative case initiated upon complaint of the Solicitor-General against the respondent Roque Santiago,
charging the latter with malpractice and praying that disciplinary action be taken against him.
It appears that one Ernesto Baniquit, who was living then separately from his wife Soledad Colares for some nine
consecutive years and who was bent on contracting a second marriage, sought the legal advice of the respondent, who
Baniquit's side of the case, assured the latter that he could secure a separation from his wife and marry again, and asked
him to bring his wife on the afternoon of the same day, May 29, 1939. This was done and the respondent right then and
there prepared the document Exhibit A in which it was stipulated, among other things, that the contracting parties, who
are husband and wife authorized each other to marry again, at the same time renouncing or waiving whatever right of
action one might have against the party so marrying. After the execution and acknowledgment of Exhibit A by the parties,
the respondent asked the spouses to shake hands and assured them that they were single and as such could contract
another and subsequent marriage. Baniquit then remarked, "Would there be no trouble?" Upon hearing it the respondent
stood up and, pointing to his diploma hanging on the wall, said: "I would tear that off if this document turns out not to be
valid." Relying on the validity of Exhibit A, Ernesto Baniquit, on June 11, 1939, contracted a second marriage with Trinidad
Aurelio. There is also evidence to show that the respondent tried to collect for this service the sum of P50, but as the
evidence on this point is not clear and the same is not material in the resolution of the present case, we do not find it
necessary to make any express finding as to whether the full amount or any portion thereof was paid or, as contended by
the respondent, the service were rendered free of charge.
The respondent did not deny the preparation of Exhibit A, put up the defense that he had the idea that seven years
separation of husband and wife would entitle either of them to contract a second marriage and for that reason prepared
Exhibit A, but immediately after the execution of said document he realized that he had made a mistake and for that
reason immediately sent for the contracting parties who, on June 30, 1939, came to his office and signed the deed of
cancellation Exhibit A.
There is no doubt that the contract Exhibit A executed by and between the spouses Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares
upon the advice of the respondent and prepared by the latter as a lawyer and acknowledged by him as a notary public is
contrary to law, moral, and tends to subvert the vital foundation of the family. The advice given by the respondent, the
preparation and acknowledgment by him of the contract constitute malpractice which justifies disbarment from the
practice of law. The admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is upon the implied condition that his continued
enjoyment of the privilege conferred is dependent upon his remaining a fit and safe person to society. When it appears
that he, by recklessness or sheer ignorance of the law, is unfit or unsafe to be entrusted with the responsibilities and
obligations of a lawyer, his right to continue in the enjoyment of this professional privilege should be declared terminated.
In the present case, respondent was either ignorant of the applicable provision of the law or carelessly negligent in giving
the complainant legal advice. Drastic action should lead to his disbarment and this is the opinion of some members of the
court. The majority, however, have inclined to follow the recommendation of the investigator, the Honorable Sotero
Rodas, in view of the circumstances stated in the report of said investigator and the fact that immediately after discovering
his mistakes, respondent endeavored to correct it by making the parties sign another document cancelling the previous
one.
The respondent Roque Santiago is found guilty of malpractice and is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one year. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.
A.M. No. 804-CJ May 19, 1975
SATURNINO SELANOVA, complainant,
vs.
ALEJANDRO E. MENDOZA, City Judge of Mandaue City, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AQUINO, J.:+.wph!1
Saturnino Selanova charged Judge Alejandro E. Mendoza of Mandaue City with gross ignorance of the law for having
prepared and ratified a document dated November 21, 1972, extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of the
complainant and his wife, Avelina Ceniza. One condition of the liquidation was that either spouse (as the case may be)
would withdraw the complaint for adultery or concubinage which each had filed against the other and that they waived
their "right to prosecute each other for whatever acts of infidelity" either one would commit against the other.
Judge Mendoza in his comment on the charge purposed to convey the impression that he was aware of the invalidity of
the agreement but he nevertheless ratified it and gave it his nihil obstat on the assurance of the spouses that they would
ask the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental (where they were residing) to approve the agreement. That pretension is
disbelieved by the Judicial Consultant.
Respondent Judge alleged that he relied on the provision that "the husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval" (Par. 4, Art. 191, Civil Code).
He argues that to give the prohibition against an extrajudicial liquidation of the conjugal partnership during the marriage
"an unqualified and literal legal construction" would lender nugatory the aforequoted provisions of article 191. He cites
Lacson vs. San Jose-Lacson, L-23482, L-23767 and L-24259, August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 837 as authority for the propriety of
an extrajudicial agreement for the dissolution during the marriage of the conjugal partnership as long as the agreement is
subsequently approved by the court.
However, the respondent overlooks the unmistakable ruling of this Court in the Lacson case that judicial sanction for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage should be "secured beforehand."
Respondent Judge surmised that Selanova's complaint was instigated by a lawyer whose case was adversely decided by the
Judge. That speculation was denied by Selanova who also belied Judge Mendoza's version that the complainant and his
wife, Avelina Ceniza, "together with their parents", came to the office of Judge Mendoza and solicited his help in the
amicable settlement of their marital imbroglio.
According to Selanova, in 1972 his father was already dead and his mother was ninety-one years old. They could not
possibly have come to Judge Mendoza's office. Selanova said that only he and his brother-in-law, Arcadio Ceniza, an
alleged classmate of Judge Mendoza, were the persons who went to the Judge's office. But that version may be inaccurate
and oversimplified, considering that the agreement was signed before Judge Mendoza not only by Selanova but also by his
wife and two witnesses, Lamberts M. Ceniza and Florencio C. Pono.
Judge Mendoza retired on February 27, 1975 when he reached the age of seventy. In his letter of April 8, 1975 he asked for
a compassionate view of his case considering his forty-three years' service in the government (he started his public career
in 1932 as a policeman and became a justice of the peace in 1954). He also cited the financial predicament of his big family
occasioned by the delay in the payment of his retirement and terminal leave pay.
The case was not referred to a Judge of the Court of First Instance for investigation because actually no factual issues
necessitate a hearing and presentation of evidence. Respondent Judge admitted that he was responsible for the execution
of the questioned document, an extrajudicial "Liquidation of Conjugal Properties", which he caused complainant Saturnino
Selanova and his wife, Avelina Ceniza, to sign.
In that instrument Judge Mendoza divided the two pieces of conjugal assets of the spouses by allocating to the husband a
thirteen-hectare riceland and to the wife the residential house and lot. The last paragraph of the instrument, which
licensed either spouse to commit any act of infidelity, was in effect a ratification of their personal separation. The
agreement in question is void because it contravenes the following provisions of the Civil Code:t.hqw MEDIALDEA, J.:
ART. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;
(2) Every extrajudicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and wife;
xxx xxx xxx
Even before the enactment of the new Civil Code, this Court held that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal
partnership without judicial approval was void (Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil. 285; De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15, De La
Rosa vs. Barruga, L-2368, June 30, 1950, 4 ROP Digest 171, sec. 29).
On the other hand, disciplinary action had been taken against notaries who authenticated agreements for the personal
separation of spouses wherein either spouse was permitted to commit acts of infidelity.
Thus, in Panganiban vs. Borromeo, 58 Phil. 367, a lawyer was severely censured for having notarized a document
containing "an agreement between the husband and the wife which permitted the husband to take unto himself a
concubine and the wife to live in adulterous relationship with another man, without opposition from either one of them".
The document was prepared by another person.
In that case this Court noted that while adultery and concubinage are private crimes, "they still remain crimes" and a
contract legalizing their commission is "contrary to law, morals and public order, and as a consequence not judicially
recognizable". Since the notary's commission was already revoked, this Court did not disbar him. The fact that he "may not
have realized the full purport of the document to which he took acknowledgment' was considered mitigating.
Severe censure was also administered to a notary of Cebu City who ratified a document entitled "Legal Separation",
executed by husband and wife, wherein they agreed that they separated mutually and voluntarily, that they renounced
their rights and obligations, and that they authorized each other to remarry, renouncing any action to which they might be
entitled and each promising not to be a witness against the other. Those covenants are contrary to law, morals and good
customs and tend to subvert the vital foundation of the legitimate family (Biton vs. Momongon, 62 Phil. 7).
In the Santiago case respondent lawyer prepared for a married couple (who had been separated for nine years) a
document wherein it was stipulated, inter alia, that they authorized each other to marry again, at the same time
renouncing whatever right of action one might have against the other. When the husband inquired if there would be no
trouble, respondent lawyer pointed to his diploma which was hanging on the wall and said: "I would tear that off if this
document turns out not to be valid." The husband remarried. The respondent was suspended from the practice of law for
one year for having been ignorant of the law or being careless in giving legal advice (In re Santiago, 70 Phil. 66).
In Balinon vs. De Leon, 94 Phil. 277, Attorney Celestino M. de Leon prepared an affidavit wherein he declared that he was
married to Vertudes Marquez, from whom he had been separated, their conjugal partnership having been dissolved, and
that he was consorting with Regina S. Balinon his "new found life-partner," to whom he would "remain loyal and faithful"
"as a lawful and devoted loving husband for the rest of" his life "at all costs". Attorney Justo T. Velayo notarized that
affidavit. This Court reprimanded Velayo and suspended De Leon from the practice of law for three years.
In the instant case, respondent Judge, due to his unawareness of the legal prohibition against contracts for the personal
separation of husband and wife and for the extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal partnership, prepared the said void
agreement which was acknowledged before him as "City Judge and Notary Public Ex-Officio". (Because he was admitted to
the bar in 1948 and, consequently, he did not study the new Civil Code in the law school, he might not have been cognizant
of its aforecited article 221).
Taking into account that circumstance and his apparent good faith and honest desire to terminate the marital conflict
between the complainant and his wife, we are of the opinion that a drastic penalty should not be imposed on him. But he
deserves a severe censure for his mistake in preparing and notarizing the aforementioned immoral and illegal agreement.
Such severe reprimand should not be an obstacle to his enjoyment of retirement privileges, assuming that there are no
causes for depriving him of such benefits.
WHEREFORE, the respondent is severely censured.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 80965 June 6, 1990
SYLVIA LICHAUCO DE LEON, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MACARIA DE LEON AND JOSE VICENTE DE LEON, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioner.
De Jesus & Associates for Macaria de Leon.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for Jose Vicente de Leon.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 06649 dated June 30,
1987 the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig in SP Proc. No. 8492 dated December 29, 1983; and its resolution
dated November 24, 1987 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On October 18, 1969, private respondent Jose Vicente De Leon and petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De Leon were united in
wedlock before the Municipal Mayor of Binangonan, Rizal. On August 28, 1971, a child named Susana L. De Leon was born
from this union.
Sometime in October, 1972, a de facto separation between the spouses occured due to irreconcilable marital differences,
with Sylvia leaving the conjugal home. Sometime in March, 1973, Sylvia went to the United States where she obtained
American citizenship.
On November 23, 1973, Sylvia filed with the Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco, a petition for dissolution
of marriage against Jose Vicente. In the said divorce proceedings, Sylvia also filed claims for support and distribution of
properties. It appears, however, that since Jose Vicente was then a Philippine resident and did not have any assets in the
United States, Sylvia chose to hold in abeyance the divorce proceedings, and in the meantime, concentrated her efforts to
obtain some sort of property settlements with Jose Vicente in the Philippines.
Thus, on March 16, 1977, Sylvia succeeded in entering into a Letter-Agreement with her mother-in-law, private respondent
Macaria De Leon, which We quote in full, as follows (pp. 40-42, Rollo):
March 16, 1977
Mrs. Macaria Madrigal de Leon
12 Jacaranda, North Forbes Park
Makati, Metro Manila
Dear Dora Macaria:
This letter represents a contractual undertaking among (A) the undersigned (B) your son, Mr. Jose
Vicente de Leon, represented by you, and (C) yourself in your personal capacity.
You hereby bind yourself jointly and severally to answer for the undertakings of Joe Vincent under
this contract.
 In consideration for a peaceful and amicable termination of relations between the undersigned and
her lawfully wedded husband, Jose Vicente de Leon, your son, the following are agreed upon:
Obligations of Jose Vicente de Leon and/ or yourself in a joint and several capacity:
1. To deliver with clear title free from all liens and encumbrances and subject to no claims in any
form whatsoever the following properties to Sylvia Lichauco-de Leon hereinafter referred to as the
wife:
A. Suite 11-C, Avalon Condominium, Ortigas Ave., corner Xavier St., Mandaluyong, Rizal, Philippines.
B. Apartment 702, Wack Wack Condominium, Mandaluyong, Rizal, Philippines.
C. The rights to assignment of 2 Ayala lots in Alabang, Rizal (Corner lots, 801 s q. meters each). (Fully
paid).
D. 2470 Wexford Ave., South San Francisco, California, U.S.A. (Lot 18 Block 22 Westborough Unit No.
2). (Fully paid).
E. 1) The sum of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000)
2) $30,000
3) $5,000
2. To give monthly support payable six (6) months in advance every year to any designated assignee
of the wife for the care and upbringing of Susana Lichauco de Leon which is hereby pegged at the
exchange rate of 7.50 to the dollar subject to adjustments in the event of monetary exchange
fluctuations. Subsequent increase on actual need upon negotiation.
3. To respect the custody of said minor daughter as pertaining exclusively to the wife except as
herein provided.
Obligations of the wife:
1. To agree to a judicial separation of property in accordance with Philippine law and in this
connection to do all that may be necessary to secure said separation of property including her
approval in writing of a joint petition or consent decree.
2. To amend her complaint in the United States before the Federal Court of California, U.S.A. entitled
"Sylvia Lichauco de Leon vs. Jose V. de Leon" in a manner compatible with the objectives of this
herein agreement. It is the stated objective of this agreement that said divorce proceedings will
continue.
3. All the properties herein described for assignment to the wife must be assigned to Sylvia Lichauco
de Leon upon the decree of the Court of First Instance in the Joint Petition for Separation of
Property; except for the P100,000, $30,000 and $5,000 which will be paid immediately.
4. This contract is intended to be applicable both in the Republic of the Philippines and in the United
States of America. It is agreed that this will constitute an actionable document in both jurisdictions
and the parties herein waive their right to object to the use of this document in the event a legal
issue should arise relating to the validity of this document. In the event of a dispute, this letter is
subject to interpretation under the laws of California, U.S.A.
5. To allow her daughter to spend two to three months each year with the father upon mutual
convenience.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) Sylvia de Leon t/ SYLVIA L. DE LEON
CONFORME:
s/t/MACARIA M. DE LEON
with my marital consent:
s/t/JUAN L. DE LEON
On the same date, Macaria made cash payments to Sylvia in the amount of P100,000 and US$35,000.00 or P280,000.00, in
compliance with her obligations as stipulated in the aforestated Letter-Agreement.
On March 30, 1977, Sylvia and Jose Vicente filed before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal a joint petition for judicial
approval of dissolution of their conjugal partnership, the main part of which reads as follows (pp. 37-38, Rollo):
5. For the best interest of each of them and of their minor child, petitioners have agreed to dissolve
their conjugal partnership and to partition the assets thereof, under the following terms and
conditions-this document, a pleading being intended by them to embody and evidence their
agreement:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The following properties shall be adjudicated to petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De Leon. These
properties will be free of any and all liens and encumbrances, with clear title and subject to no
claims by third parties. Petitioner Jose Vicente De Leon fully assumes all responsibility and liability in
the event these properties shall not be as described in the previous sentence:
Sedan (1972 model)
Suite 11-C, Avalon Condominium,
Ortigas Ave., comer Xavier St.,
Mandaluyong, Rizal, Philippines
Apt. 702, Wack-Wack Condominium,
Mandaluyong, Rizal, Philippines
The rights to assignment of 2 Ayala lots in Alabang Rizal (corner lots, 801 sq. meters each) (Fully
paid)
2470 Wexford Ave., South San Francisco, California, U.S.A. (Lot 18, Block 22 Westborough Unit 2)
(Fully paid)
The sum of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
$30,000.00 at current exchange rate
$5,000.00 at current exchange rate
After ex-parte hearings, the trial court issued an Order dated February 19, 1980 approving the petition, the dispositive
portion of which reads (p. 143, Rollo):
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that the conjugal partnership of the Spouses is DISSOLVED
henceforth, without prejudice to the terms of their agreement that each spouse shall own, dispose
of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her separate estate, without the consent of the other, and
all earnings from any profession, business or industries shall likewise belong to each spouse.
On March 17, 1980, Sylvia moved for the execution of the above-mentioned order. However, Jose Vicente moved for a
reconsideration of the order alleging that Sylvia made a verbal reformation of the petition as there was no such agreement
for the payment of P4,500.00 monthly support to commence from the alleged date of separation in April, 1973 and that
there was no notice given to him that Sylvia would attempt verbal reformation of the agreement contained in the joint
petition
While the said motion for reconsideration was pending resolution, on April 20, 1980, Macaria filed with the trial court a
motion for leave to intervene alleging that she is the owner of the properties involved in the case. The motion was
granted. On October 29, 1980, Macaria, assisted by her husband Juan De Leon, filed her complaint in intervention. She
assailed the validity and legality of the Letter-Agreement which had for its purpose, according to her, the termination of
marital relationship between Sylvia and Jose Vicente. However, before any hearing could be had, the judicial
reorganization took place and the case was transferred to the-Regional Trial Court of Pasig. On December 29, 1983, the
trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 35-36, Rollo):
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered on the complaint in intervention in favor of the
intervenor, declaring null and void the letter agreement dated March 16, 1977 (Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2'),
and ordering petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De Leon to restore to intervenor the amount of P380,000.00
plus legal interest from date of complaint, and to pay intervenor the amount of P100,000.00 as and
for attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit.
Judgment is likewise rendered affirming the order of the Court dated February 19, 1980 declaring
the conjugal partnership of the spouses Jose Vicente De Leon and Sylvia Lichauco De Leon
DISSOLVED; and adjudicating to each of them his or her share of the properties and assets of said
conjugal partnership in accordance with the agreement embodied in paragraph 5 of the petition,
except insofar as the adjudication to petitioner Sylvia L. De Leon of the properties belonging to and
owned by Intervenor Macaria De Leon is concerned.
Henceforth, (a) each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her separate
estate, present and future without the consent of the other; (b) an earnings from any profession,
business or industry shall likewise belong to each of them separately; (c) the minor child Susana De
Leon shall stay with petitioner Sylvia Lichauco De Leon for two to three months every year-the
transportation both ways of the child for the trip to the Philippines to be at the expense of the
petitioner Jose Vicente De Leon; and (d) petitioner Jose Vicente De Leon shall give petitioner Sylvia
Lichauco De Leon the sum of P4,500.00 as monthly support for the minor child Susana to commence
from February 19, 1980.
Sylvia appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals raising the following errors:
1) The trial court erred in finding that the cause or consideration of the Letter- Agreement is the termination of marital
relations;
2) The trial court failed to appreciate testimonial and documentary evidence proving that Macaria de Leon's claims of
threat, intimidation and mistake are baseless; and
3) The trial court erred in finding that Sylvia Lichauco de Leon committed breach of the Letter-Agreement; and further,
failed to appreciate evidence proving Macaria de Leon's material breach thereof.
The respondent court affirmed the decision in toto. The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present
petition.
The only basis by which Sylvia may lay claim to the properties which are the subject matter of the Letter-Agreement, is the
Letter-Agreement itself. The main issue, therefore, is whether or not the Letter-Agreement is valid. The third paragraph of
the Letter-Agreement, supra, reads:
In consideration for a peaceful and amicable termination of relations between the undersigned and
her lawfully wedded husband, Jose Vicente De Leon, your son, the following are agreed upon:
(emphasis supplied)
It is readily apparent that the use of the word "relations" is ambiguous, perforce, it is subject to interpretation. There being
a doubt as to the meaning of this word taken by itself, a consideration of the general scope and purpose of the instrument
in which it occurs (see Germann and Co. v. Donaldson, Sim and Co., 1 Phil. 63) and Article 1374 of the Civil Code which
provides that the various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that
sense which may result from all of them taken jointly, is necessary.
Sylvia insists that the consideration for her execution of the Letter-Agreement was the termination of property relations
with her husband. Indeed, Sylvia and Jose Vicente subsequently filed a joint petition for judicial approval of the dissolution
of their conjugal partnership, sanctioned by Article 191 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, Macaria and Jose Vicente
assert that the consideration was the termination of marital relationship.
We sustain the observations and conclusion made by the trial court, to wit (pp. 44- 46, Rollo):
On page two of the letter agreement (Exhibit' E'), the parties contemplated not only to agree to a
judicial separation of property of the spouses but likewise to continue with divorce proceedings
(paragraphs 1 and 2, Obligations of the Wife, Exhibit 'E-1'). If taken with the apparently ambiguous
provisions in Exhibit E' regarding termination of 'relations', the parties clearly contemplated not only
the termination of property relationship but likewise of marital relationship in its entirety.
Furthermore, it would be safe to assume that the parties in Exhibit 'E' not having specified the
particular relationship which they wanted to peacefully and amicably terminate had intended to
terminate all kinds of relations, both marital and property. While there could be inherent benefits to
a termination of conjugal property relationship between the spouses, the court could not clearly
perceive the underlying benefit for the intervenor insofar as termination of property relationship
between petitioners is concerned, unless the underlying consideration for intervenor is the
termination of marital relationship by divorce proceedings between her son Jose Vicente and his wife
petitioner Sylvia. The last sentence of paragraph 2 under "Obligations of the Wife" unequivocally
states: "It is the stated objective of this agreement that said divorce proceedings (in the United
States) will continue. "There is merit in concluding that the consideration by which Intervenor
executed Exhibit 'E' to 'E-2' was to secure freedom for her son petitioner Jose Vicente De Leon,
especially if Exhibit 'R'-Intervenor, which is (sic) agreement signed by petitioner Sylvia to consent to
and pardon Jose Vicente De Leon for adultery and concubinage (among others) would be
considered. In the light, therefore, of the foregoing circumstances, this Court finds credible the
testimony of intervenor as follows:
Q Will you please go over the Exhibit 'E' to 'E-2'- intervenor consisting of three
pages and inform us whether or not this is the letter of March 16, 1977 which
you just referred to?
A Yes, this is the letter.
Why did you affix your signature to this Exh. 'E'-intervenor (sic)?
A Because at that time when I signed it I want to buy peace for myself and for
the whole family.
Q From whom did you want to buy peace and/or what kind of peace?
A I wanted to buy peace from Sylvia Lichauco whom I knew was kind of
'matapang;' so I want peace for me and primarily for the peaceful and
amicable termination of marital relationship between my son, Joe Vincent and
Sylvia. (Deposition dated September 6, 1983-Macaria de Leon, p. 6-7)
This Court, therefore, finds and holds that the cause or consideration for the intervenor Macaria De
Leon in having executed Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2' was the termination of the marital relationship between
her son Jose Vicente De Leon and Sylvia Lichauco de Leon.
Article 1306 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions as
they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy.
If the stipulation is contrary to law, morals or public policy, the contract is void and inexistent from
the beginning.
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:
Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy;
xxx xxx xxx
(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.
These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the defense of illegality be waived.
But marriage is not a mere contract but a sacred social institution. Thus, Art. 52 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 52. Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social institution. Its nature, consequences
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulations...
From the foregoing provisions of the New Civil Code, this court is of the considered opinion and so
holds that intervenor's undertaking under Exhibit 'E' premised on the termination of marital
relationship is not only contrary to law but contrary to Filipino morals and public Policy. As such, any
agreement or obligations based on such unlawful consideration and which is contrary to public
policy should be deemed null and void. (emphasis supplied)
Additionally, Article 191 of the Civil Case contemplates properties belonging to the spouses and not those belonging to a
third party, who, in the case at bar., is Macaria. In the petition for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, it was made
to appear that the said properties are conjugal in nature. However, Macaria was able to prove that the questioned
properties are owned by her. Neither Sylvia nor Jose Vicente adduced any contrary evidence.
Granting, in gratia argumenti, that the consideration of the Letter-Agreement was the termination of property relations,
We agree with the respondent court that (pp. 46-47, Rollo):
... the agreement nevertheless is void because it contravenes the following provisions of the Civil
Code:
Art. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;
(2) Every extra-judicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains or of the absolute community of property between husband and wife;
Besides, the Letter-Agreement shows on its face that it was prepared by Sylvia, and in this regard, the ambiguity in a
contract is to be taken contra proferentem, i.e., construed against the party who caused the ambiguity and could have also
avoided it by the exercise of a little more care. Thus, Article 1377 of the Civil Code provides: "The interpretation of obscure
words of stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity" (see Equitable Banking Corp. vs. IAC,
G.R. No. 74451, May 25, 1988, 161 SCRA 518).
Sylvia alleges further that since the nullity of the Letter-Agreement proceeds from the unlawful consideration solely of
Macaria, applying the pari delicto rule, it is clear that she cannot recover what she has given by reason of the Letter-
Agreement nor ask for the fulfillment of what has been promised her. On her part, Macaria raises the defenses of
intimidation and mistake which led her to execute the Letter-Agreement. In resolving this issue, the trial court said (pp.
148-151, Rollo):
In her second cause of action, intervenor claims that her signing of Exhibits 'E' to 'E- 2' was due to a
fear of an unpeaceful and troublesome separation other son with petitioner Sylvia Lichauco de Leon.
In support of her claim, intervenor testified as follows:
Q Will you please inform us how did Sylvia Lichauco disturb or threaten your
son or yourself?
A Despite the fact that Sylvia Lichauco voluntarily left my son Joe Vincent and
abandoned him, she unashamedly nagged Joe and me to get money and when
her demands were not met she resorted to threats like, she threatened to
bring Joe to court for support. Sylvia threatened to scandalize our family by
 these baseless suits; in fact she caused the service of summons to Joe when he
went to the United States. (Intervenor's deposition dated Sept. 6, 1983, p. 8).
On the other hand, petitioner Sylvia claims that it was intervenor and petitioner Jose Vicente who
initiated the move to convince her to agree to a dissolution of their conjugal partnership due to the
alleged extra-marital activities of petitioner Jose Vicente de Leon. She testified as follows:
Q Now in her testimony, Macaria Madrigal de Leon also said that you
threatened her by demanding money and nagged her until she agreed to the
letter agreement of March 1977, what can you say about that?
A I think with all the people sitting around with Atty. Quisumbing, Atty.
Chuidian, my father-in-law, my sister-in-law and I, you know, it can be shown
that this was a friendly amicable settlement that they were much really
interested in settling down as I was. I think there were certain reasons that
they wanted to get done or planned, being at that time Jose was already
remarried and had a child. That since she then found out that since she was
worried about what might be, you know, involved in any future matters. She
just wanted to do what she could. She just want me out of the picture. So in
no way, it cannot be said that I nagged and threatened her. (TSN dated
December 8, 1983, p. 137-138)
In resolving this issue, this Court leans heavily on Exhibit 'R'-intervenor, which was not controverted
by petitioner Sylvia. A reading of Exhibit 'R' would show that petitioner Sylvia would consent to and
pardon petitioner Jose Vicente, son of intervenor, for possible crimes of adultery and/or
concubinage, with a sizing attached; that is, the transfer of the properties subject herein to her.
There appears some truth to the apprehensions of intervenor for in petitioner Sylvia's testimony she
confirms the worry of intervenor as follows:'... being at that time Jose (De Leon) was already
remarried and had a child. That since she (intervenor) found out that, she was worried about what
might be, you know, involved in any future matters. She just want me out of the picture." The
aforesaid fear of intervenor was further corroborated by her witness Concepcion Tagudin who
testified as follows:
Q Now, you mentioned that you were present when Mrs. Macaria De Leon
signed this Exhibit 'E-2, ' will you inform us whether there was anything
unusual which you noticed when Mrs. Macaria M. De Leon signed this Exhibit
'E-2'?
A Mrs. Macaria M. De Leon was in a state of tension and anger. She was so
mad that she remarked: 'Punetang Sylvia ito bakit ba niya ako ginugulo.
Ipakukulong daw niya si Joe Vincent kung hindi ko pipirmahan ito. Sana
matapos na itong problemang ito pagkapirmang ito,' sabi niya.' (Deposition-
Concepcion Tagudin, Oct. 21, 1983, pp. 10-11)
In her third cause of action, intervenor claims mistake or error in having signed Exhibits '1' to 'E-2'
alleging in her testimony as follows:
Q Before you were told such by your lawyers what if any were your basis to
believe that Sylvia would no longer have inheritance rights from your son, Joe
Vincent?
A Well, that was what Sylvia told me. That she will eliminate any inheritance
rights from me or my son Joe Vincent's properties if I sign the document
amicably. ... (Intervenor's deposition-Sept. 6, 1983, pp. 9-10).
On the other hand, petitioner Sylvia claims that intervenor could not have been mistaken in her
having signed the document as she was under advice of counsel during the time that Exhibits 'E' to
'E-2' was negotiated. To support such claims by Sylvia Lichauco De Leon, the deposition testimony of
Atty. Vicente Chuidian was presented before this Court:
Atty. Herbosa: Now you mentioned Atty. Norberto Quisumbing, would you be
able to tell us in what capacity he was present in that negotiation?
Atty. Chuidian: He was counsel for Dona Macaria and for Joe Vincent, the
spouse of Sylvia. (Deposition of V. Chuidian, December 16, 1983, p. 8)
The New Civil Code provides:
Art. 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud is voidable.
Art. 1331. In order that mistake may invalidate consent, it should refer to the substance of the thing
which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally moved one or both
parties to enter into a contract. ...
The preponderance of evidence leans in favor of intervenor who even utilized the statement of the
divorce lawyer of petitioner Sylvia (Mr. Penrod) in support of the fact that intervenor was mistaken
in having signed Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2' because when she signed said Exhibits she believed that fact that
petitioner Sylvia would eliminate her inheritance rights and there is no showing that said intervenor
was properly advised by any American lawyer on the fact whether petitioner Sylvia, being an
American citizen, could rightfully do the same. Transcending, however, the issue of whether there
was mistake of fact on the part of intervenor or not, this Court could not. see a valid cause or
consideration in favor of intervenor Macaria De Leon having signed Exhibits 'E' to 'E-2.' For even if
petitioner Sylvia had confirmed Mr. Penrod's statement during the divorce proceedings in the United
States that she would undertake to eliminate her hereditary rights in the event of the property
settlement, under Philippine laws, such contract would likewise be voidable, for under Art. 1347 of
the New Civil Code 'no contract may be entered into upon future inheritance.
We do not subscribe to the aforestated view of the trial court. Article 1335 of the Civil Code provides:
xxx xxx xxx
There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-
grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or
property of his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his consent.
To determine the degree of the intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne
in mind.
A threat to enforce one's claim through competent authority, if the claim is just or legal, does not
vitiate consent.
In order that intimidation may vitiate consent and render the contract invalid, the following requisites must concur: (1)
that the intimidation must be the determining cause of the contract, or must have caused the consent to be given; (2) that
the threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real and serious, there being an evident disproportion
between the evil and the resistance which all men can offer, leading to the choice of the contract as the lesser evil; and (4)
that it produces a reasonable and well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from whom it comes has the necessary
means or ability to inflict the threatened injury. Applying the foregoing to the present case, the claim of Macaria that Sylvia
threatened her to bring Jose Vicente to court for support, to scandalize their family by baseless suits and that Sylvia would
pardon Jose Vicente for possible crimes of adultery and/or concubinage subject to the transfer of certain properties to her,
is obviously not the intimidation referred to by law. With respect to mistake as a vice of consent, neither is Macaria's
alleged mistake in having signed the Letter-Agreement because of her belief that Sylvia will thereby eliminate inheritance
rights from her and Jose Vicente, the mistake referred to in Article 1331 of the Civil Code, supra. It does not appear that
the condition that Sylvia "will eliminate her inheritance rights" principally moved Macaria to enter into the contract.
Rather, such condition was but an incident of the consideration thereof which, as discussed earlier, is the termination of
marital relations.
In the ultimate analysis, therefore, both parties acted in violation of the laws. However, the pari delicto rule, expressed in
the maxims "Ex dolo malo non oritur actio" and "In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis," which refuses remedy to
either party to an illegal agreement and leaves them where they are, does not apply in this case. Contrary to the ruling of
the respondent Court that (pp. 47-48, Rollo):
... [C]onsequently, intervenor appellees' obligation under the said agreement having been annulled,
the contracting parties shall restore to each other that things which have been subject matter of the
contract, their fruits and the price or its interest, except as provided by law (Art. 1398, Civil Code).
Article 1414 of the Civil Code, which is an exception to the pari delicto rule, is the proper law to be applied. It provides:
When money is paid or property delivered for an illegal purpose, the contract may be repudiated by
one of the parties before the purpose has been accomplished, or before any damage has been
caused to a third person. In such case, the courts may, if the public interest wig thus be subserved,
allow the party repudiating the contract to recover the money or property.
Since the Letter-Agreement was repudiated before the purpose has been accomplished and to adhere to the pari
delicto rule in this case is to put a premium to the circumvention of the laws, positive relief should be granted to Macaria.
Justice would be served by allowing her to be placed in the position in which she was before the transaction was entered
into.
With the conclusions thus reached, We find it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated June 30, 1987 and its
resolution dated November 24, 1987 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 89651 November 10, 1989
DATU FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, DATU BLO UMPAR ADIONG, DATU MACALIMPOWAC DELANGALEN, CELSO PALMA, ALI
MONTANA BABAO, JULMUNIR JANNARAL, RASHID SABER, and DATU JAMAL ASHLEY ABBAS, representing the other
taxpayers of Mindanao, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and HONORABLE GUILLERMO C. CARAGUE, DEPARTMENT SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, respondents.
G.R. No. 89965 November 10, 1989
ATTY. ABDULLAH D. MAMA-O, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Budget, and the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondents.
Abbas, Abbas, Amora, Alejandro-Abbas & Associates for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 89651 and 89965.
Abdullah D. Mama-o for and in his own behalf in 89965.
CORTES, J.:
The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and
Palawan, 1 scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for
an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."
These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the
plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and Management from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2)
declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional .
After a consolidated comment was filed by Solicitor General for the respondents, which the Court considered as the
answer, the case was deemed submitted for decision, the issues having been joined. Subsequently, petitioner Mama-o
filed a "Manifestation with Motion for Leave to File Reply on Respondents' Comment and to Open Oral Arguments," which
the Court noted.
The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized into either of the following:
(a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and
(b) that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.
The Tripoli Agreement, more specifically, the Agreement Between the government of the Republic of the Philippines of the
Philippines and Moro National Liberation Front with the Participation of the Quadripartie Ministerial Commission
Members of the Islamic Conference and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference" took effect on
December 23, 1976. It provided for "[t]he establishment of Autonomy in the southern Philippines within the realm of the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines" and enumerated the thirteen (13) provinces
comprising the "areas of autonomy." 2
In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified, which the for the first time provided for regional autonomy, Article X, section 15
of the charter provides that "[t]here shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and
the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines."
To effectuate this mandate, the Constitution further provides:
Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that the
laws are faithfully executed.
Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to the
autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and
participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the
President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic
structure of government for the region consisting of the executive and representative of the
constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with personal,
family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this Constitution and national
laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes
cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only the provinces,
cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region.
Sec. 19 The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months from the
time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the
general welfare of the people of the region.
Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the
local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance
with applicable laws. The defense and security of the region shall be the responsibility of the
National Government.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted and signed into law on August 1, 1989.
1. The Court shall dispose first of the second category of arguments raised by petitioners, i.e. that certain provisions of R.A.
No. 6734 conflict with the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement.
Petitioners premise their arguments on the assumption that the Tripoli Agreement is part of the law of the land, being a
binding international agreement . The Solicitor General asserts that the Tripoli Agreement is neither a binding treaty, not
having been entered into by the Republic of the Philippines with a sovereign state and ratified according to the provisions
of the 1973 or 1987 Constitutions, nor a binding international agreement.
We find it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the nature of the Tripoli Agreement and its binding
effect on the Philippine Government whether under public international or internal Philippine law. In the first place, it is
now the Constitution itself that provides for the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. The standard for
any inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734 would therefore be what is so provided in the Constitution. Thus, any conflict
between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining
the implementation of the Organic Act. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty or
international agreement, it would then constitute part of the law of the land. But as internal law it would not be superior
to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of the Congress of the Philippines, rather it would be in the same class as the latter
[SALONGA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (4th ed., 1974), citing Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) and Foster v.
Nelson, 2 Pet. 253 (1829)]. Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would be amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement, being a subsequent
law. Only a determination by this Court that R.A. No. 6734 contravened the Constitution would result in the granting of the
reliefs sought. 3
2. The Court shall therefore only pass upon the constitutional questions which have been raised by petitioners.
Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in Mindanao, contrary to the
aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region which make the creation of such region dependent
upon the outcome of the plebiscite.
In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which declares that "[t]here is hereby
created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in the
plebiscite called for the purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution." Petitioner contends that the
tenor of the above provision makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces
vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created composed of the two provinces where the
favorable votes were obtained.
The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its composition needs to be clarified.
Firs, the questioned provision itself in R.A. No. 6734 refers to Section 18, Article X of the Constitution which sets forth the
conditions necessary for the creation of the autonomous region. The reference to the constitutional provision cannot be
glossed over for it clearly indicates that the creation of the autonomous region shall take place only in accord with the
constitutional requirements. Second, there is a specific provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic
Act, which incorporates substantially the same requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details, thus:
SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take effect when
approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1
of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later
than one hundred twenty (120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces
and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the
Autonomous Region shall remain the existing administrative determination, merge the existing
regions.
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only when
approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where
a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein
such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous
region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No.
6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be
determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities,
among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it. [See III RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION
482-492 (1986)].
As provided in the Constitution, the creation of the Autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao is made effective upon the
approval "by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose" [Art. X, sec. 18]. The
question has been raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite
in all the constituent units, or a majority in each of the constituent units, or both?
We need not go beyond the Constitution to resolve this question.
If the framers of the Constitution intended to require approval by a majority of all the votes cast in the plebiscite they
would have so indicated. Thus, in Article XVIII, section 27, it is provided that "[t]his Constitution shall take effect
immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose ... Comparing this with
the provision on the creation of the autonomous region, which reads:
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes
cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces,
cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2].
it will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the
plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this. for if the
intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply
adopted the same phraseology as that used for the ratification of the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the autonomous
region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose."
It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the organic Act in individual
constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual
constituent units.
More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in which the vote requirement in the plebiscite
provided under Article X, section 18 must have been understood by the people when they ratified the Constitution.
Invoking the earlier cited constitutional provisions, petitioner Mama-o, on the other hand, maintains that only those areas
which, to his view, share common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics should be properly included within the coverage of the autonomous region. He insists that
R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because only the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte
and Maguindanao and the cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities
included in the Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics.
By including areas which do not strictly share the same characteristics. By including areas which do not strictly share the
same characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has expanded the scope of the autonomous region which
the constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.
Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall determine which
areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of
the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any review of this
ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law. This the Court cannot do without doing violence to the
separation of governmental powers. [Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 (1936); Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-
20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424].
After assailing the inclusion of non-Muslim areas in the Organic Act for lack of basis, petitioner Mama-o would then adopt
the extreme view that other non-Muslim areas in Mindanao should likewise be covered. He argues that since the Organic
Act covers several non-Muslim areas, its scope should be further broadened to include the rest of the non-Muslim areas in
Mindanao in order for the other non-Muslim areas denies said areas equal protection of the law, and therefore is violative
of the Constitution.
Petitioner's contention runs counter to the very same constitutional provision he had earlier invoked. Any determination
by Congress of what areas in Mindanao should compromise the autonomous region, taking into account shared historical
and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics, would necessarily carry with it the
exclusion of other areas. As earlier stated, such determination by Congress of which areas should be covered by the
organic act for the autonomous region constitutes a recognized legislative prerogative, whose wisdom may not be inquired
into by this Court.
Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable classification [People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1963); Laurel v. Misa, 76 Phil.
372 (1946); J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Land tenure Administration, G.R. No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413].
In Dumlao v. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 52245, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 392], the Court ruled that once class may
be treated differently from another where the groupings are based on reasonable and real distinctions. The guarantee of
equal protection is thus not infringed in this case, the classification having been made by Congress on the basis of
substantial distinctions as set forth by the Constitution itself.
Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantee on free
exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which mandates that should
there be any conflict between the Muslim Code [P.D. No. 1083] and the Tribal Code (still be enacted) on the one had, and
the national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should apply national law. Petitioners
maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be
subjected to any "man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible instances of
conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein an application of national law might be
offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions.
As enshrined in the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable. [Art. VIII, Sec. 11. As a condition precedent for the power to be exercised, an actual
controversy between litigants must first exist [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra; Tan v. Macapagal, G.R. No. L-34161,
February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 677]. In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no
conflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. This being
so, the Court in this case may not be called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict between the
provisions the Muslim Code and national law.
Petitioners also impugn the constitutionality of Article XIX, section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 which, among others, states:
. . . Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not
vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative
regions: Provided, however, that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the
existing regions.
According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge regions, a power which is not conferred
by the Constitution upon the President. That the President may choose to merge existing regions pursuant to the Organic
Act is challenged as being in conflict with Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution which provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of administrative regions, i.e. Regions I to XII
and the National Capital Region, which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes [Integrated
Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by Pres. dec. No. 1, Pres. Dec. No. 742].
Administrative regions are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays [see
Art. X, sec. 1 of the Constitution]. While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the
Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of
general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, sec. 4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflict between the power
of the President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of
local government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities,
municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.
Petitioners likewise question the validity of provisions in the Organic Act which create an Oversight Committee to
supervise the transfer to the autonomous region of the powers, appropriations, and properties vested upon the regional
government by the organic Act [Art. XIX, Secs. 3 and 4]. Said provisions mandate that the transfer of certain national
government offices and their properties to the regional government shall be made pursuant to a schedule prescribed by
the Oversight Committee, and that such transfer should be accomplished within six (6) years from the organization of the
regional government.
It is asserted by petitioners that such provisions are unconstitutional because while the Constitution states that the
creation of the autonomous region shall take effect upon approval in a plebiscite, the requirement of organizing an
Oversight committee tasked with supervising the transfer of powers and properties to the regional government would in
effect delay the creation of the autonomous region.
Under the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. if the Organic
Act is approved by majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the
autonomous region immediately takes effect delay the creation of the autonomous region.
Under the constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. if the Organic Act
is approved by majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous
region immediately takes effect. The questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an oversight Committee to supervise
the transfer do not provide for a different date of effectivity. Much less would the organization of the Oversight
Committee cause an impediment to the operation of the Organic Act, for such is evidently aimed at effecting a smooth
transition period for the regional government. The constitutional objection on this point thus cannot be sustained as there
is no bases therefor.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality [Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387 (1925); Salas v.
Jarencio, G.R. No. L-29788, August 30, 1979, 46 SCRA 734; Morfe v. Mutuc, supra; Peralta v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-47771,
March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30]. Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must
clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by
petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the
presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is, therefore, inevitable.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
G.R. No. L-16925 March 31, 1962
FABIAN PUGEDA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAPAEL TRIAS, MIGUEL TRIAS, SOLEDAD TRIAS, assisted by her husband Angel Sanchez,
CLARA TRIAS, assisted by her husband Victoriano Salvanera,
GABRIEL TRIAS, minors ROMULO VINIEGRA, GLORIA VINIEGRA
and FERNANDO VINIEGRA, JR., assisted by guardian-ad-litem, Rafael Trias,
TEOFILO PUGEDA, and VIRGINIA PUGEDA, assisted by her husband Ramon Portugal, defendants-appellants.
Placido Ramos for plaintiff-appellee.
Cajulis, Trias and Viniegra for defendants-appellants Trias, et al.
Ramon C. Aquino for defendants-appellants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda.
LABRADOR, J.:
The subject of this action, which was appealed from the Court of First Instance of Cavite, is certain lands acquired from the
Friar Lands Estate Administration known as lots Nos. 225, 226, 269, 311, 1803, 1814, 1816, 1832, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2282,
2284, 2378, 2412, 2282, 2683, 2685, 2686, 2688, 2722, 3177 and 3178 of the San Francisco de Malabon estate located in
General Trias, Cavite, a house of strong materials, a barn (camarin) also of strong materials, and a store also of strong
materials in General Trias, Cavite and sets of household furniture. The plaintiff claims participation in the said properties
on the ground that the same were acquired by him and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, with whom plaintiff contracted
marriage in January, 1916 and who died on February 11, 1934.
The defendants Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias are the children of the deceased
Maria C. Ferrer with her first husband Mariano Trias, while the defendants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda are children
of the plaintiff with said deceased Maria C. Ferrer.
The plaintiff alleges that during the lifetime of the marriage between himself and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, they
acquired with conjugal partnership funds lots Nos. 273, 2650, 2680, 2718 and 2764 of the San Francisco de Malabon estate
with the following interest therein; 71% in lot No. 273, 82% in lot No. 2650, 77% in lot No. 2652, 77% in lot No. 2080, 64%
in lot No. 2718 and 76% in lot No. 2764; that plaintiff is the owner of one-half of the said interest in the lots above-
mentioned; that upon the death of Maria C. Ferrer in 1934 plaintiff and defendants became co-owners of said properties
and defendants managed the properties in trust as co-owners thereof. Plaintiff prays that the properties above described,
acquired as conjugal properties by the plaintiff and deceased Maria C. Ferrer, be partitioned -and one-half thereof be given
as share therein of plaintiff.
The defendants surnamed Trias and Viniegra denied the claims of the plaintiff to the properties described in the complaint,
or that said properties had been administered by the defendants in trust as co-owners with the plaintiff, and by way of
special and affirmative defense they alleged that the properties subject of the complaint had been inherited by the
defendants from their deceased father Mariano Trias and deceased mother Maria C. Ferrer and had been in possession
and full enjoyment thereof for more than 10 years, peacefully, uninterruptedly, quietly and adversely under a claim of
ownership to the exclusion of all others, and that plaintiff is estopped from claiming or asserting any rights or participation
in the said properties. Defendants Trias also denied for lack of knowledge and belief the claim of plaintiff in his complaint
that he was married to Maria C. Ferrer and that the marriage continued up to the death of the latter in 1934. They further
presented a counterclaim against the plaintiff for the sum of P40,000, this amount being what was contributed by them in
support of the candidacies of plaintiff when running for the office of provincial governor of Cavite. They also filed a
counterclaim for 30 pieces of Spanish gold coins and P5,000 in cash amounting in value to the total sum of P50,000 and a
counterclaim for P100,000 which is the value of four big parcels of land belonging to the defendants which the plaintiff had
appropriated for his own use.
The defendants Pugeda joined the plaintiff in the latter's claim that the properties mentioned in plaintiff's complaint were
joint properties of the plaintiff and the defendants. They also allege that the properties had gone to the management and
control of the defendants Trias who should be required to answer for the fruits and profits thereof during the
administration by them of said properties. As cross-claim against their co-defendants, they allege that they are each
entitled to one-eighth of the properties left by their mother as listed in the first ten paragraphs of the complaint, as well as
a share of one-eighth each in lots Nos. 98, 2015 of the San Francisco de Malabon estate and in a parcel of land in Lingad,
Litiit in Silang, Cavite and in 60 heads of cattle.
Plaintiff denied the counterclaim of the defendants Trias and the defendants Trias, answering the cross-claim of their co-
defendants Pugeda, denied all the allegations contained in the answer of the defendants Pugeda, and further alleged that
the cross-claim is improper as the same should be the subject of probate proceedings, and the defendants Pugeda are
estopped and barred by prescription from claiming any further right to the properties left by their deceased mother.
There are two questions or issues raised in the present case. The first is the alleged existence of a marriage of Fabian
Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer. The second is the claim of the plaintiff to various lands acquired from the Friar Lands Estate
under certificates of sale issued first in the name of Mariano Trias and later assigned to Maria C. Ferrer, but paid for in part
during the marriage of plaintiff and Maria C. Ferrer. A third but minor issue is the claim for furniture alleged by plaintiff to
have been bought by him and Maria C. Ferrer during the marriage, which plaintiff claims is in the possession of the
defendants.
On the first issue, the existence of marriage, plaintiff and his witness Ricardo Ricafrente testified that in the afternoon of
January 5, 1916, on the eve of Epiphany or Three Kings, plaintiff and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer went to the office of the
Justice of the Peace, who was then witness Ricardo Ricafrente, to ask the latter to marry them; that accordingly Ricafrente
celebrated the desired marriage in the presence of two witnesses one of whom was Santiago Salazar and another Amado
Prudente, deceased; that after the usual ceremony Ricafrente asked the parties to sign two copies of a marriage contract,
and after the witnesses had signed the same, he delivered one copy to the contracting parties and another to the
President of the Sanitary Division, which officer was at that time the keeper of the records of the civil register. Plaintiff and
his witnesses explained that no celebration of the marriage was held inspite of the prominence of the contracting parties
because plaintiff was then busy campaigning for the office of Member of the Provincial Board and Maria C. Ferrer was
already on the family way.
The defendants denied the existence of the marriage and introduced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages in the
municipality of Rosario, Cavite, in the month of January, 1916, which showed that no record of the alleged marriage
existed therein; but this absence was explained by the Justice of the Peace that perhaps the person who kept the register
forgot tomake an entry of the marriage in the registry.
Other witnesses were introduced to the effect that after the marriage plaintiff lived in the house of Maria C. Ferrer, which
was the house of spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer. Evidence was also submitted to the effect that the first issue
was baptized on August 26, 1917 and the one who acted as sponsor was a sister-in-law of Maria C. Ferrer. The baptismal
certificate submitted states that the baptized child was the issue of the spouses Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer. The
registry of said birth was also submitted and it states that the father is Fabian Pugeda and the mother is Maria C. Ferrer.
It is also not denied that after the marriage, plaintiff cohabited with the deceased wife, as husband and wife, until the
death of the latter, publicly and openly as husband and wife. Lastly, a document entitled "Project of Partition" (Exhibit 5-
Trias) was signed by the parties defendants themselves. The document contains the following significant statement or
admission: .
WHEREAS the parties hereto are the only children and forced heirs of the said deceased: Rafael, Miguel,
Soledad, Clara, Constancia, and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias y Ferrer, are the children of her first marriage with
Mariano Trias, now deceased; and Teofilo and Virginia, both surnamed Pugeda y Ferrer,are the children of her
second marriage with Fabian Pugeda..
.... That it is hereby agreed by and between the parties hereto that lots Nos. 3177 and 3178 known as the
Buenavista property will be administered by one of the parties to be agreed upon and for said purpose they
appoint MIGUEL F. TRIAS, and all earnings, rentals and income or profits shall be expended for the
improvement and welfare of the said property and for the payment of all claims and accounts of our deceased
mother Maria C. Ferrer, and for the maintenance and education of Teofilo and Virginia Pugeda y Ferrer.
The judge who heard the evidence, after a review of he testimonial and documental evidence, arrived at the conclusion
that plaintiff Fabian Pugeda was in fact married to Maria C. Ferrer on January 5, 1916, this conclusion being borne out not
only by the chain of circumstances but also by the testimonies of the witnesses to the celebration of the marriage, who
appeared to be truthful, as well as by the fact that plaintiff and deceased Maria C. Ferrer lived together as husband and
wife for eighteen years (1916-1934) and there is a strong presumption that they were actually married.
On the competency of the evidence submitted by plaintiff to prove the marriage we cite the following authority: .
Art. 53. As to marriages contracted subsequently, no proof other than a certificate of the record in the civil
register shall be admitted, unless such books have never been kept, or have disappeared, or the question arises
in litigation, in which cases the marriage may be proved by evidence of any kind. (p. 27, Civil Code) .
The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and mother, while the latter
wasin articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does not
invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity
were not present, and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not being one of said requisites.
(Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil., 1) .
Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, has been held to
be admissible to prove the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent
to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage. (55 C.J.S., p. 900).
In our judgment the evidence submitted shows conclusively that plaintiff Fabian Pugeda was in fact married to Maria C.
Ferrer, said marriage subsisting from 1916 until 1934, upon the death of the latter, and we affirm the finding of the trial
court to that effect.
On the second issue the evidence introduced at the trial shows that the lands subject of the action were formerly Friar
Lands included in the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, province of Cavite, which were acquired under certificates of sale
in the name of Mariano Trias in the year 1910 and later assigned to his widow Maria C. Ferrer in the year 1916. The
different lots, the dates of their acquisition and assignment to said Maria C. Ferrer, widow are set forth in a table
appended to this decision as Annex "A".
On the basis of the facts about their acquisition and assignment Judge Lucero declared that the lots in question were
conjugal properties of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and consequently decreed that 1/2 thereof, should be
adjudicated to Mariano Trias, as the latter's share in the conjugal properties, to be divided among his 6 children at the rate
of 1/6 each, and the other half to Maria C. Ferrer, as her share in the conjugal properties, to be assigned to her children by
both marriages at the rate of 1/9 each and the balance of 1/9 to widower Fabian Pugeda in usufruct. From this judgment
the case was appealed to the Court of Appeals.
When the case was before the Court of Appeals, the attorneys for the defendants presented a motion for new trial on the
ground that they discovered copies of four documents namely Annexes "A", "B" "C," "D" and "E" Record on Appeal, pp.
108-117, (The last document is a copy of a court order issued by Judge Manuel V. Moran approving the project of partition
in Case No. 860, Intestate estate of Mariano Trias) which if admitted might alter the decision. The Court of Appeals granted
the motion and remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Cavite for the consideration of said evidence.
Upon the return of the case to the Court of First Instance, Judge Primitivo Gonzales who then presided the court, rendered
a new decision. Judge Gonzales found that the total amount paid by Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer on the lots in
question amounts to only P8,911.84, while the installments paid during the marriage of the spouses Fabian Pugeda and
Maria C. Ferrer totaled P35,146.46. He also found that lots 3177 and 3178 were paid for during the marriage of Pugeda
and Ferrer in the total sum of P16,557.32. Judge Gonzales therefore ruled that the two marriages should participate in the
ownership of the lands, according to the actual contributions made by each marriage in the installments in payment of the
lands. The dispositive part of the decision, now subject of the appeal, is as follows: .
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, the Court hereby renders judgment: .
1. That lots 2378, 225, 226, 269, 311, 1808, 1804, 1816; 1832, 2264, 2265, 2282, 2284, 2412, 2682, 273, 2650,
2652, 2680, 2718, 2764 (21 lots) are conjugal assets of Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer in the proportion of
percentage and indicated in each individual lot;
2. That lots 3177 and 3178, since all the installments for the same were fully paid during the marriage of Pugeda
and Maria C. Ferrer are hereby declared conjugal of the couple Pugeda and Ferrer; and even some of the
installments for these two lots were paid after the death of Maria C. Ferrer, they do not loss the character of
conjugal property for payments were made from the crops thereof;
3. That since Mariano Trias during his marriage to Maria C. Ferrer contributed in the payment for the
installments of these 21 lots amounting to P8,911.84, half of which must be reimbursed in favor of the children
or heirs of Mariano Trias to be paid from the mass of the hereditary estate of Maria C. Ferrer; the other half of
P4,455.92 to be distributed among all the children or heirs of Maria C. Ferrer in her first and second marriage to
be deducted from the mass of her estate;
4. That lots 2266, 2683, 2685, 2686, 2688 and 2722 since all the installments for these six (6) lots were fully paid
during marriage of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, they are hereby declared to be conjugal between them
one half of which must go to the children or heirs of Mariano Trias, the other half must equally go to the
children or heirs of Maria C. Ferrer in her first and second marriage;
5. That Miguel Trias as administrator of all the properties which commenced after the death of his mother who
died on February 11, 1934, must render an accounting of his administration within three (3) months time from
the date this judgment has become final.
6. That defendants Trias to pay the costs of this action. (Record on Appeal, pp. 154-156) .
Against this ruling the appeal has come to this Court. Defendants-appellants claim that Judge Gonzales had no power or
authority to change the decision of Judge Lucero, as it was not he but Judge Lucero himself, who had heard the evidence.
They have also assigned before Us a set of errors which may be boiled down to the three main issues set forth above. As
the issue of marriage has already been considered we will now pass to the second and more important question as to
whether the land subject of the action may be considered conjugal properties of the first marriage or of the second or of
both.
A consideration of the legal nature and character of the acquisition of the various lots is necessary that the issues in the
action may be justly determined.
A study of the provisions of the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120) discloses that the friar lands were purchased by the
government for sale to actual occupants (actual settler and occupants at the time said land are acquired by the
Government). (Paragraph 3 of Declaration of Purposes, Act 1120). The said act expressly declares that the land are not
public land in the sense in which this word is used in the Public Land Act, and their acquisition is not governed by the
provisions of the Public Land Act (Par. IV, Declaration of Purposes, Id.) .
The pertinent provisions of said Act No. 1120 are as follows: .
Sec. 12. .... When the costs thereof shall have been thus ascertained, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands
shall give the said settler and occupant a certificate which shall set forth in detail that the Government has
agreed to sell to such settler and occupant the amount of land so held by him, at the price so fixed, payable as
provided in this Act at the office of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, in gold coin of the United States or
its equivalent in Philippine currency, and that upon the payment of the final installment together with all
accrued interest the Government will convey to such settler and occupant the said land so held by him by
proper instrument of conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective in the manner provided in
section one hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act. ...
Sec. 13. The acceptance by the settler and occupant of such certificate shall be considered as an agreement
by him to pay the purchase price so fixed and in the installments and at the interest specified in the certificate,
and he shall by such acceptance become a debtor to the Government in that amount together with all accrued
interest. .... Provided however, That every settler and occupant who desires to purchase his holding must enter
into the agreement to purchase such holding by accepting the said certificate and executing the said receipt
whenever called on so to do by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, and a failure on the part of the settler
and occupant to comply with this requirement shall be considered as a refusal to purchase, and he shall be
ousted as above provided and thereafter his holding may be leased or sold as in case of unoccupied lands: ....
Sec. 15. The Government hereby reserves the title to each and every parcel of land sold under the provisions
of this Act until the full payment of all installments of purchase money and interest by the purchaser has been
made, and any sale or incumbrance made by him shall be invalid as against the Government of the Philippine
Islands and shall be in all respects subordinate to its prior claim.
Sec. 16. In the event of the death of a holder of a certificate the issuance of which is provided for in section
twelve hereof, prior to the execution of a deed by the Government to any purchaser, his widow shall be entitled
 to receive a deed of the land stated in the certificate upon showing that she has complied with the
requirements of law for the purchase of the same. In case a holder of a certificate dies before the giving of the
deed and does not leave a widow, then the interest of the holder of the certificate shall descend and deed shall
issue to the persons who under the laws of the Philippine Islands would have taken had the title been perfected
before the death of the holder of the certificate, upon proof of the holders thus entitled of compliance with all
the requirements of the certificate. In case the holder of the certificate shall have sold his interest in the land
before having complied with all the conditions thereof, the purchaser from the holder of the certificate shall be
entitled to all the rights of the holder of the certificate upon presenting his assignment to the Chief of the
Bureau of Public Lands for registration. (Vol. III, Public Laws, pp. 315-316).
A study of the above quoted provisions clearly indicates that the conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or
the so-called certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the ownership of the property, subject only to the resolutory condition
that the sale may be cancelled if the price agreed upon is not paid for in full. In the case at bar the sale certificates were
made in favor of Mariano Trias, and upon his death they were assigned in accordance with Sec. 16, to his widow. But the
law provides that when the buyer does not leave a widow, the rights and interests of the holder of the certificate of sale
are left to the buyer's heirs in accordance with the laws of succession. In the case of the Director of Lands, et al. vs. Ricardo
Rizal, et al., G.R. No. 2925 prom. December 29, 1950, this court thru Mr. Justice Montemayor held: .
... All this clearly and inevitably leads to the conclusion that the purchaser, even before the payment of the full
price and before the execution of the final deed of conveyance, is considered by the law as the actual owner of
the lot purchased, under obligation to pay in full the purchase price, the role or position of the Government
being that of a mere lien holder or mortgagee.
... In conclusion, we find and hold that in the sale of a Friar Lands lot or parcel under Act 1120, pending payment
in full of the purchase price, altho the Government reserves title thereto, merely for its protection, the
beneficial and equitable title is in the purchaser, and that any accretion received by the lot even before
payment of the last installment belongs to the purchaser thereof.
We also invite attention to the fact that a sale of friar lands is entirely different from a sale of public lands under the
provisions of the Public Land Act. In the case of public lands, a person who desires to acquire must first apply for the parcel
of land desired. Thereafter, the land is opened for bidding. If the land is awarded to an applicant or to a qualified bidder
the successful bidder is given a right of entry to occupy the land and cultivate and improve it (Secs. 22-28, Commonwealth
Act 141). It is only after satisfying the requirements of cultivation and improvement of 1/5 of the land that the applicant is
given a sales patent (Sec. 30).
In the case of friar lands the purchaser becomes the owner upon issuance of the certificate of sale in his favor, subject only
to cancellation thereof in case the price agreed upon is not paid. In case of sale of public lands if the applicant dies and his
widow remarries both she and the second husband are entitled to the land; the new husband has the same right as his
wife. Such is not the case with friar lands. As indicated in Section 16 of Act 1120, if a holder of a certificate dies before the
payment of the price in full, the sale certificate is assigned to the widow, but if the buyer does not leave a widow, the right
to the friar lands is transmitted to his heirs at law.
It is true that the evidence shows that of the various parcels of land now subject of the action none was paid for in full
during the marriage of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and that payments in installments continued to be made even
after the marriage of Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer on January 5, 1916. But it is also true that even after said marriage the
certificates of sale were assigned to Maria C. Ferrer and installments for the lots after said marriage continued in the name
of Maria C. Ferrer; also all the amounts paid as installments for the lots were taken from the fruits of the properties
themselves, according to the admission of plaintiff Fabian Pugeda himself, thus: .
Mr. Viniegra:
Q De los productos de pesos terrenos, durante la administracion por los demandados, recibia Vd. su
participation?
A No, seor.
Q Nunca? .
A Because I know there are obligations to be paid to the Bureau of Lands, and I have been informed that the
obligations have been paid annually from the products of the land.
Q Therefore, from the products of these lands - the proceeds - the obligations to the Bureau of Lands are
being discounted from the said proceeds and after the remainder, as in palay, are equally divided, is that what
you mean to say ? .
A Perhaps they were following the practice that, from the products of the lands the obligations to the Bureau
of Lands would be paid.
Court: .
Q Pero Vd. no ha recibido ninguna cantidad, o sea les darian alguna participation?
A No seor, porque estaba en Manila, but they informed me that the obligations to the Bureau of Lands were
being paid from the products of the lands.
Mr. Viniegra: .
Q You do not claim any participation in the remainder of the products after paying the Bureau of Lands? .
A How would I ask for I knew they were still paying the obligations to the Bureau of Lands - that was until the
Japanese time, and I knew some obligations were not paid, as a result of which the sales certificates of some big
lots were cancelled.
Court:
Q Como se mantenia Vd.? .
A Mi madre tenia la casa en Manila y ella recibia alguna renta. My mother helped me. (Session of November
20, 1951, before Judge A. G. Lucero, pp. 259-261, Matro.) (Brief for Defendants-Appellants, pp. 49-51).
There is another reason why the above conclusion must be upheld in the case at bar, and that is the fact that in the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Mariano Trias, which was instituted in August 1915, the
inventory of the estate left by said deceased included the lots purchased from the Friar Lands Estates (Exh. 2, Trias) and
the project of partition in said special proceedings submitted to the court as Exh. 3-Trias adjudicated 1/2 of said lands as
the share of Mariano Trias in the conjugal properties, the other 1/2 being awarded to Maria C. Ferrer.
The above considerations, factual and legal, lead us to the inevitable conclusion that the friar lands purchased as above
described and paid for, had the character of conjugal properties of the spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer. But
another compelling legal reason for this conclusion as against plaintiff, is the judicial pronouncement on said nature of the
lands in question. In the year 1915, even before the marriage of plaintiff and Maria C. Ferrer took place, the latter was
appointed administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband Mariano Trias in Civil Case No. 860 of the Court of First
Instance of Cavite (Exh. "1" Trias). An inventory of the estate left by the deceased Mariano Trias, dated January 15, 1929,
was submitted by her and on April 10, 1929, the project of partition of the properties was submitted. The project includes
the friar lands subject of the action, and in accordance with it one-half of the properties listed in the inventory was
adjudicated to the deceased Mariano Trias as his share and the other half adjudicated to Maria C. Ferrer also as her share.
The share of Mariano Trias was decreed in favor of his children and heirs. This project of partition was approved by Judge
Manuel V. Moran in an order dated February 11, 1929, submitted to the Court of Appeals as Annex "E", pp. 114-115 of the
record on appeal.
The pendency of the above intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Mariano Trias must have been known
to plaintiff Fabian Pugeda, who is a lawyer. It does not appear, and neither does he claim or allege, that he ever appeared
in said proceedings to claim participation in the properties subject of the proceedings. His failure to intervene in the
proceedings to claim that the friar lands or some of them belonged to himself and his wife Maria C. Ferrer, shows a
conviction on his part that the said friar lands actually belonged to the spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and that
he had no interest therein. The project of partition was approved as late as 1929, by which time plaintiff and defendant
had already been married for a period of 13 years. Plaintiff's failure to assert any claim to the properties in the said
intestate proceedings during its pendency now bars him absolutely from asserting the claim that he now pretends to have
to said properties.
We will now proceed to consider plaintiff's claim that the lands in question had, through the joint effort of himself and his
wife, increased in productivity from 900 cavans to 2,400 cavans of rice because of the introduction therein of
improvements such as a system of irrigation for the lands. If, as admitted by plaintiff himself, the installments remaining
unpaid were taken from the produce or the yield of the said lands and if it be taken into account that one-half of said lands
already belonged to the children of the first marriage, to whom the lands were adjudicated in the settlement of the estate
of their father, the deceased Mariano C. Trias, the only portion of the products or produce of the lands in which plaintiff
could claim any participation is the one-half share therein produced from the paraphernal properties of Maria C. Ferrer.
How much of said produce belonging to Maria C. Ferrer was actually used in the improvement of the lands is not shown,
but the fact that plaintiff was engaged in continuous political campaigns, ever since his marriage in 1916 (he had devoted
most of his time while married to Maria C. Ferrer to politics), portions of the products of the paraphernal properties of
Maria C. Ferrer must have been used in these political campaigns as well as in meeting the expenses of the conjugal
partnership. The value of the useful improvements introduced on the lands, joint properties of Maria C. Ferrer and her
children, was not proved in court by plaintiff. Hence the provisions of Article 1404 of the old Civil Code, to the effect that
useful expenditures for the benefit of the separate properties of one of the spouses are partnership properties, cannot be
applied. But even if such useful improvements had been proved, the statute of limitations bars plaintiff' action to recover
his share therein because Maria C. Ferrer died in 1934, whereas the present action was instituted by plaintiff only in the
year 1948. After the death of Maria C. Ferrer, plaintiff came to Manila, took a second wife, and was not heard from for 14
years, that is, until he instituted this action in 1948. His claim for the improvements, if any, is therefore also
barred. 1wph1.t
The above ruling, that the action to demand his share in the value of the improvements in the paraphernal properties of
Maria C. Ferrer is barred, is also applicable to the claim of the plaintiff herein for the construction alleged to have been
made and the furniture supposedly bought by him and his spouse Maria C. Ferrer, and which had the character of conjugal
partnership property of said spouses. In the year 1935, defendants herein presented a project of partition to plaintiff for
his signature (the project of partition is dated March, 1935 and is mark Exhibit "5"-Trias). In this project of partition of the
properties of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, mention is made of the participation of the plaintiff's children with the
deceased Maria C. Ferrer, but no mention is made therein of any participation that plaintiff had or could have as usufruct
or otherwise, or in any building or improvement. This deed of partition was shown to plaintif but the latter did not sign it.
The express omission of the name of plaintiff here in the above deed of partition as one of the heirs of the deceased Maria
C. Ferrer was enough notice to plaintiff that defendants had intended to deprive him of any share or participation in the
properties left by the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, even of the usufruct that the law assigns to him. But in spite of his
knowledge of this fact no action was taken by him until February, 1948 when plaintiff demanded his share in the
properties and later brought this action.
The period of around 13 years therefore elapsed before plaintiff instituted this action. Consequently, whatever rights he
may have had to any portion of the estate left by the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, as a usufructuary or otherwise, must be
deemed to have prescribed. As a consequence, we find that the order of Judge Lucero granting to the plaintiff herein one-
ninth share in the estate of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer in usufruct should be set aside and the objection to the grant of
such share to plaintiff on the ground of prescription is sustained.
Having disposed of the claims of plaintiff Fabian Pugeda, we will now proceed to consider the cross-claim of his children,
namely, Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda. Judge Lucero decreed that the properties left by the deceased Maria C.
Pugeda, be divided among her children, including the two cross-claimants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda, and decreed
one-ninth of the properties of the said deceased Maria C. Ferrer to each of these two children of hers with the plaintiff and
assigning also to the plaintiff one-ninth share in the said estate left by her in usufruct.
In view of our finding that the claim of the plaintiff to any share in the estate of his wife Maria C. Ferrer is already barred
by the statute of limitations, the decree entered by Judge Lucero declaring that her properties be divided into nine parts,
one part belonging to each heir and one to plaintiff in usufruct, is hereby modified, by eliminating the share in usufruct of
the plaintiff therein and increasing the share of each of her heirs to one-eighth.
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed, and the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Cavite, Hon. Antonio C. Lucero, presiding, decreeing the division of the properties of the deceased Maria
C. Ferrer among her eight children and plaintiff, is hereby modified in the sense that all of her properties be divided among
her eight children at the rate of one-eight per child. As thus modified, the judgment of Judge Lucero is hereby affirmed.
Without costs.
[G.R. No. 4868. February 24, 1909. ]
JUAN SISON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FAUSTINO RAMOS, Defendant-Appellee.
Vicente Franco, for Appellant.
Mariano Locsin Rama, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. REALTY; ACTION TO RECOVER POSSESSION; BURDEN OF PROOF. In order that an action for recovery may be
maintained, it is indispensable, according to the well-settled doctrine of the courts of justice, that the person bringing the
action shall fully prove not only his dominion over the thing claimed, but also the identity of the same.
2. ID.; RIGHTS OF OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION. When the dominion of the defendant over the land claimed appears to
have been expressly and tacitly recognized by the plaintiff, as shown by the evidence adduced by the said defendant, the
latter can not be deprived of the ownership and possession he enjoys of the said land, which possession has been also
recognized by the said plaintiff, inasmuch as it has not been properly proven that the latter has a better right.
3. ID.; FORMS OF CONTRACT. A contract executed by both parties with all the requisites prescribed by article 1261 of
the Civil Code is a perfect, effective and binding contract, although the same has been executed as a private document
only. (Art. 1278.)
4. ID.; CONTRACTS AFFECTING REAL ESTATE; PRIVATE AGREEMENTS. The legalization of a contract by a public
instrument and its registration are not essential requisites, but mere conditions of form or solemnities imposed by the law
in order that the said contract may be effective as against third parties, and the agreement executed in the form of a deed
and inscribed in the registry may be respected, according to the doctrine laid down by the supreme court of Spain relating
to the application of certain articles of the Civil Code, which is also in force in these Islands.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. It is not within the scope of article 1280 of the said code to require that a
contract shall appear in a public document, in order to prove the dominion, inasmuch as, under article 1278 of the same
code, all contracts which contain the conditions required for their validity by article 1261 produce full effect as between
the contracting parties without prejudice to their right to demand and obtain that they be set out in a public instrument, as
provided by article 1279; the absence of said requisite can not be availed by either of such parties and much less by a third
person, to deny the existence and reality of the contract, when it is supported by elements of proof admissible in law.
6. ID.; PRESCRIPTION OF OWNERSHIP; THIRD PARTIES. Article 1949 of the Civil Code and article 35 of the Mortgage Law
do not consider as a third party the true owner of real estate that is the object of the prescription, nor those who derive
their rights from him, as held by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of January 11, 1888, because the precept of the
code is only efficacious with respect to third parties so denominated by the Mortgage Law, and therefore, according to the
common law, the period of prescription should be counted to the prejudice of the said owner and his successors, as
provided by paragraph 4 of the said article 35, which is an exception to the rule contained in article 27 of the above-cited
law that is to say, from the commencement of the possession under title of ownership in favor of the claimant
although the title by virtue of which it prescribes, or may prescribe, has not been recorded.
DECISION
TORRES, J. :
On the 24th of August, 1906, counsel for the plaintiff, Juan Sison, presented a written complaint against Faustino Ramos,
alleging that plaintiff owned in the sitio of Tabao, barrio of Magallanes, town of Sagay, Occidental Negros, a tract of land,
94 hectares, 39 ares, and 25 centares in extent, the boundaries of which are described in the complaint; the said land
formerly belonged to Pedro Catalbas, as shown by a title issued by the Government and recorded in the registry of
property although later by a judicial decision it became the property of Mariano Devesa, from whom it was ultimately
bought by the plaintiff; that the defendant Faustino Ramos, a resident of Sagay and brother-in-law of Pedro Catalbas,
occupied, and by mere tolerance was allowed to live on a parcel of the said tract of land of about 5 hectares, more or less,
which forms an integral portion of the property described in the complaint, wherein are described the boundaries of the 5
hectares usurped; that in May, 1905, on the defendant being requested by the plaintiff to vacate the parcel occupied by
him, he refused to do so, alleging right of ownership over the same, and ever since he has continued to unlawfully occupy
it and to receive the benefits and fruits therefrom, inasmuch as the said parcel is planted with coconut palms and bamboo,
which at the present time yield P200 profits in coconuts, P90 in tuba, and P60 in bamboo that is to say, a total of P350
and through the illegal retention of the said parcel, the plaintiff has been subjected to loss and damages to the extent of
P500; therefore, he prayed that judgment be entered against the defendant, ordering the restoration of the said parcel of
land to the plaintiff, and sentencing him to pay the sum of P850 for loss and damages, and also the costs of the
proceedings.
Counsel for Faustino Ramos, the defendant, answered the complaint on October 1, 1908, and denied each and every one
of the allegations thereof, and in defense alleged that the parcel in question did not measure 5 hectares, but that it had
approximately an area of 3 cavanes, and that the said land as well as the coconut palms, bamboo, and other useful trees
planted thereon are of the exclusive and absolute ownership of the defendant who has been in the possession thereof
since the year 1884, the date of the purchase thereof from the original owners, and that up to the present day he has been
in the quiet, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession thereof; the defendant therefore prayed that he be absolved of the
complaint and that costs be adjudged in his favor, without prejudice to any further remedy that might be just and
equitable.
By a writing dated February 25, 1907, the plaintiff Sison prayed the court below to issue an injunction to restrain the
defendant from cutting down any useful plants or trees on the land in question, and that the letter be finally sentenced as
prayed for in the complaint.

At the trial, evidence was adduced by both parties to the suit, and the documents exhibited by them were made of record;
on February 29, 1908, the trial judge rendered judgment, holding that the parcel of land claimed in paragraph 3 of the
complaint was the property of the defendant, Faustino Ramos. The writ of prohibition issued against him was thereupon
annulled and he was absolved of the complaint with the costs in his favor.
On being notified of the above decision, the plaintiff, by a petition dated March 3, 1908, moved for a new trial on the
ground that the judgment was not in consonance with the facts and the principles of law indicated, and that, therefore,
said decision was unlawful; his motion was overruled to which the plaintiff excepted three days later, and in due course
presented the corresponding bill of exceptions.
In order that an action for recovery, which is that which the plaintiff, Juan Sison, has brought, may prosper, it is
indispensable, according to the constant jurisprudence of the courts, that whoever brings it must fully prove, not only his
dominion over the thing claimed, but also the identity of the same.
The plaintiff endeavors to procure from the defendant, Faustino Ramos, the delivery or restoration of a parcel of land 5
hectares in extent, or, according to the latter, of 3 cavanes, which, the plaintiff says, forms an integral portion of his
Hacienda Antipolo, which consists of more than 94 hectares of land. He has not, however, satisfactorily substantiated his
claim, as it appears from the evidence submitted that the parcel of land described in the complaint is owned by the
defendant Ramos, who has possessed it as owner since 1884, in which year he acquired one portion of the land from
Constantina Gereos and the other portion from Raymundo Lobaton, as appears from the documents A and B, the
authenticity of which has been proven by the testimony of proper witnesses, who also testified to the possession of the
defendant as owner of the property in question.
Hence, it is an unquestionable fact, admitted by the plaintiff and his witnesses, that the defendant possessed the above-
mentioned parcel of land, although it was alleged that the latter, as brother-in-law of the original owner, Pedro Catalbas,
was occupying it by mere sufferance of the latter; he was requested by the administrator of said hacienda, Pedro Arellano,
to vacate the parcel of land, but Ramos, refused to do so, alleging that it belonged to him.
Against the assertion, which has not, however, been proven, that the possession of the parcel of land in question on the
part of the defendant was a precarious one, the case furnishes conclusive evidence that the said defendant Ramos had
acquired the said parcel of land in two portions by means of proper conveyances from the original owners thereof since
1884, and that ever since that time he has exercised over the property real acts of ownership, and that as such owner he
has been in peaceful and public possession, without any interruption whatever, for more than twenty-one years. (Art. 348,
Civil Code.)
The fact that the said parcel of land was included in the title which Pedro Catalbas obtained by composicion from the
Government for the large tract of land which afterwards formed the Hacienda Antipolo, does not prejudice or interfere
with the rights of the defendant Ramos, because, apart from the fact that such inclusion is rationally explained by the
relationship existing between Catalbas and Ramos, who are brother-in-law, and of the natural desire of the latter to avoid
heavy expense in securing title deeds for such a small parcel of land, the son of the former, Quintin Catalbas, as attorney-
in-fact for his father, and in his own name, acknowledged to Ramos, as he had promised to do, that the parcel in question,
which was included in the title of his father, Pedro Catalbas, was the exclusive property of his uncle, Faustino Ramos, as
proven by the document marked Exhibit C, drawn up by the said attorney-in-fact, and which is literally as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The undersigned, as attorney-in-fact of Sr. Pedro Catalbas, declares that Sr. Faustino Ramos, residing in the town of Sagay,
owns one parcel of land included in the royal title of the said Sr. Catalbas, measuring three hectares more or less, planted
with bamboo; the said parcel is bounded on the north by the beach; on the south by lands of Sr. Catalbas and the road
leading to Tabao; on the west by lands of Sra. Leoncia Catalbas and Sr. Mariano de la Paz; and on the east by lands of the
said Sr. Catalbas.
"In witness whereof, as such attorney-in-fact I issue the present in Sagay on the 10th of August 1902. pp. Pedro
Catalbas." An unintelligible signature follows. (The words one year, corrected.)
Quintin Catalbas having before him the document lettered C, said that the signatures which appeared at the foot of the
same appeared to be his own, and although he said that he did not recollect having signed such a document, he added that
he remembered signing many documents in favor of the defendant, and that he was actually attorney-in-fact for his father
by virtue of a power of attorney executed by the latter in 1898, a date long prior to that of the said document.
The case does not present any rational or legal reason opposed to the action of the lower court in adjudging that the
signatures of Quintin Catalbas, as affixed to the said document marked C are genuine and authentic, in view of those
written by him in the presence of the court, with which they were compared; and on his part, the defendant affirmed
under oath that he had received the said document from Quintin Catalbas signed by him. The witnesses Mariano Paz and
Joaquin Galicia recognized the signatures as those of Quintin Catalbas, and the witness first named furthermore avers that
he was present when Quintin signed the aforesaid document.
Therefore, the dominion of the defendant over the land in question has also been duly recognized by Pedro Catalbas
through his attorney-in-fact, and for this reason, when the ownership of the Hacienda Antipolo was transferred to Mariano
Devesa, and subsequently to Juan Sison, the parcel of land of said defendant was not included; indeed, according to the
affidavit filed by the original owner, Pedro Catalbas, and certain proceedings for the attachment of said property, certified
copies of which were produced at the trial, this land is cited as one of the adjoining properties to the said hacienda.
Moreover, the ownership alleged by the defendant appears corroborated, without any sort of contradiction, by the
contents of the certified copies of the proceedings that were offered in evidence at the trial as Exhibit F, from which it
appears, that, as the said parcel of land was attached as the property of Juan Sison, bondsman of Enrique Catalbas, and
principal insolvent debtor, the defendant Faustino Ramos, as owner of the land, and third party whose prejudice was at
issue, objected to the levy and on the 20th February, 1906, moved for the release of the attachment; the sheriff was
obliged to accede to the claim and admit the right of the intervening party; in view thereof the municipal president, on the
motion of the sheriff, ordered by means of a commissioner the return and delivery of the property to Ramos, the
intervener.
In view of the allegations of the defendant in defense of his rights, that as such owner he has been in the quiet, peaceful
and uninterrupted possession of the said parcel of land from 1884, in which year he purchased it from the original owners,
up to the present day, the court below rightly considered, that even supposing that Catalbas and his successors were the
owners of the land claimed (and it has been seen that the contrary is the case), Ramos has acquired the ownership by
prescription through possession for more than twenty years with good faith and by virtue of a just title; which is the nature
of the legal means for the acquisition of real estate as contained in the documents marked A and B. The fact that the latter
are merely private documents is not a bar to the consideration of the contracts contained in them as a just title.
In the decision rendered in case No. 4274, Alano v. Babasa (10 Phil. Rep., 511), the following rule was laid
dow:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Essential elements of a contract. A contract in which the three requisites imposed by article 1261 of the Civil Code are
present is valid, perfect, and efficient, and, notwithstanding the fact that it was drawn up in the form of a private
document, it is, however, binding as provided by article 1278 of said code.
"Contract: public or private document; registration. The legalization by a public writing and the recording of the same in
the registry are not essential requisites of a contract entered into, as between the parties, but mere conditions of form or
solemnities which the law imposes in order that such contract may be valid as against third persons, and to insure that a
publicly executed and recorded agreement shall be respected by the latter."cralaw virtua1aw library
In its decision of July 12, 1904, the supreme court of Spain, in applying certain articles of the Civil Code in force in these
Islands which relate to this case laid down the following rule:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That, as it has been repeatedly held by the supreme court, it is not within the scope of article 1280 to require, in order to
prove the dominion, that a contact shall appear in a public instrument, inasmuch as according to article 1278, all contracts
which contain the conditions of validity to which article 1261 refers, produce full effect as between the contracting parties,
without prejudice to their right to demand and obtain that they be set out in a public instrument as provided by article
1279; the absence of said requisite can not be availed by either of such parties, and much less by a third person, to deny
the existence and reality of the contract when it is supported by elements of proof admissible in law."cralaw virtua1aw
library

Even supposing that the plaintiff Sison, who succeeded Devesa and Catalbas in the dominion of the Hacienda Antipolo, was
the lawful owner of the parcel of land sued for an unfounded supposition, as has already been demonstrated the
provisions of article 1949 of the Civil Code and article 35 of the Mortgage Law do not include or affect the lawful owner of
the realty or right that is the object of the prescription, nor those who derive their rights from him; by the said article of
the special law the lawful owner of the property is not considered as a third person, as held by the supreme court in its
decision of January 11, 1888, because the precept of the code is only efficacious with respect to third persons so qualified
in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law; and it does not nor can it in any manner govern with respect to the
owner of the property that is the subject of prescription, or his successors, by universal or separate title; by the common
law the time for prescription to the prejudice of the same shall be counted as provided for by the fourth and last paragraph
of article 35 of said law, which is an exception to the rule contained in article 27, that is to say, from the commencement of
the possession under title of ownership, although the title by virtue of which it prescribed may not have been registered.
It should also be noticed that the title by composicion of Pedro Catalbas is the only one which appears to have been
temporarily recorded in the registry, while those of the later acquisition by Mariano Devesa and Juan Sison do not seem to
have been so recorded; for this reason the latter, as plaintiff, can not be considered as a third person, as described in the
Mortgage Law, in view of the fact that his title was not recorded; but even if it had been recorded, the plaintiff, as he
pretended owner of the land in question is not comprehended in the said articles of the code and Mortgage Law, as such
third person, and prescription to his prejudice is in accordance with the law even by virtue of titles not recorded in the
registry of property, and those contained in the said documents A and B of the defendant.
With the foregoing, it has been demonstrated, in our opinion, how unfounded are the errors attributed to the judgment
appealed from, and it should be noted that though the ownership of the property unduly claimed by the plaintiff was
satisfactorily proven, nevertheless, this decision has dwelt on the questions set up by said plaintiff relative to the
prescription and to matter of third persons whose rights might be affected by such prescription, for the reason that it is so
required by the nature and the conditions of a decision rendered on appeal to the second instance, as in this case.
In view of the foregoing considerations and of those contained in the judgment of the court below, it is our opinion that
the same should be and hereby is affirmed with costs.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Willard, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-8014 March 14, 1955
PEDRO V. VILAR, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
GAUDENCIO V. PARAISO, respondent-appellant.
Claro M. Recto and Jose Nava for petitioner-appellant.
Josefina R. Phodaca and Naomi P. Salvador for respondent-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
In the general elections held on November 13, 1951, Pedro V. Vilar and Gaudencio V. Paraiso were among the candidates
registered and voted for the office of mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. after the canvass was made, Vilar obtained 1,467 votes
while Paraiso garnered 1,509, and as a result the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed the latter as the mayor duly
elected with a plurality of 41 votes. However, contending that Paraiso was ineligible to hold office as mayor because he
was then a minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines and such was disqualified to be a candidate under
section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, Vilar instituted the present quo warranto proceedings praying that
Paraiso be declared ineligible to assume office and that his proclamation as mayor-elect be declared null and void. He also
prayed that he be declared duly elected mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, in lieu of respondent Paraiso.
Respondent in his answer denied his ineligibility and claimed that he resigned as minister of the United Church of Christ in
the Philippines on August 21, 1951, that his resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church at a special meeting held
in Polo, Bulacan on August 27, 1951, and that even if respondent was not eligible to the office, petitioner could not be
declared elected to take his place.
After due trial, the court found respondent to be ineligible for the office of mayor, being an ecclesiastic, and, consequently,
it declared his proclamation as mayor null and void, but refrained from declaring petitioner as mayor-elect for lack of
sufficient legal grounds to do so. from this election both parties have appealed, respondent from that portion finding him
ineligible, and petitioner from that portion holding he cannot be declared elected as mayor for lack of sufficient legal
grounds to do so.
The case was originally taken to the Court of Appeals. However, as the latter court found that while petitioner raises in his
brief only questions of law respondent raises both questions of law and fact, and both appeals are indivisible in that they
pertain to only one case, that court resolved to certify it to this Court pursuant to the provisions of sections 17 and 31 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948, upon the theory that one of the appeals is exclusively cognizable by the Supreme Court.
The only issue before us is whether respondent, being an ecclesiastic, is ineligible to hold office under section 2175 of the
Revised Administrative Code, or whether he actually resigned as minister before the date of the elections, and his
resignation duly accepted, as claimed, thereby removing his disability. As may be noted, this is a question of fact the
determination of which much depends upon the credibility and weight of the evidence of both parties.
The evidence for petitioner tends to show that respondent was ordained as minister of the Evangelical Church of the
Philippines in 1944 and as such was given license to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries; that since 1944
up to 1950 he acted as minister in the town of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, continuously and without interruption and has been
renewing his license to solemnize marriages as prescribed by the regulations of the Bureau of Public Libraries; that on April
19, 1950, respondent transferred to the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, having been assigned to work in the
same place and chapel during the years 1944-1950; that on April 7, 1951, respondent applied for, and was issued, a license
to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries as minister of the new church up to the end of April, 1952; that
said license has never been cancelled, as neither the head of the united church nor respondent has requested for its
cancellation; and that respondent has been publicly known as minister of the United Church of Christ, but he has not
attached to his certificate of candidacy a copy of his alleged resignation as minister.
The evidence for the respondent, on the other hand, tends to show that while he was formerly a minister of the United of
Christ in the Philippines, he, however, filed his resignation as such minister on August 21, 1951, because of his desire to
engage in politics; that said resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church at a special meeting held in Polo, Bulacan
on August 27, 1951; that respondent turned over his chapel and his office to the elder members of his religious order on
August 21, 1951, and since then he considered himself separated from his order and in fact he has refrained ever since
from conducting any religious services pertaining to that order.
Which of these versions is correct?
After careful examining the evidence of record, and after weighing its credibility and probative value, we have not found
any reason for deviating from the finding of the trial court that respondent never ceased as minister of the order to which
he belonged and that the resignation he claims to have filed months before the date of the elections is but a mere scheme
to circumvent the prohibition of the law regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run for a municipal office. Indeed, if
respondent really and sincerely intended to resign as minister of the religious organization to which he belonged for the
purpose of launching his candidacy why did he not resign in due form and have the acceptance of his resignation
registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries.1 The importance of resignation cannot be underestimated. The purpose of
registration is two-fold: to inform the public not only of the authority of the minister to discharge religious functions, but
equally to keep it informed of any change in his religious status. This information is necessary for the protection of the
public. This is specially so with regard to the authority to solemnized marriages, the registration of which is made by the
law mandatory (Articles 92-96, new Civil Code). It is no argument to say that the duty to secure the cancellation of the
requisite resignation devolves, not upon respondent, but upon the head of his organization or upon the official in charge of
such registration, upon proper showing of the reason for such cancellation, because the law likewise imposes upon the
interested party the duty of effecting such cancellation, who in the instant case is the respondent himself. This he failed to
do. And what is more, he failed to attach to his certificate of candidacy, a copy of his alleged resignation as minister
knowing full well that a minister is disqualified by law to run for a municipal office.
It is true that respondent attempted to substantiate his claim by submitting as evidence certain documents purporting to
show the alleged resignation and its acceptance by the cabinet of his church at a meeting held on August 27, 1951, but,
considering said documents in the light of the shortcomings we have pointed out above, one cannot help but brand them
as self-serving or as documents merely prepared to serve the political designs of respondent in an attempt to obviate his
disqualification under the law. And this feeling appears strengthened if we examine the so-called minute book wherein,
according to witness Jose Agpalo, are entered the minutes of all the meeting of the church, because upon an examination
thereof one would at once get the impression that it was prepared haphazardly and not with such seriousness and
solemnity that should characterize the religious activities of a well established religious order. As the trial court aptly
remarked "All these lead the court to believe with the petitioner, that the supposed resignation and acceptance were
made at a later date to cure the ineligibility of the respondent." We are therefore constrained to hold that respondent is
disqualified to hold the office of mayor as found by the trial court.
As to the question whether, respondent being ineligible, petitioner can be declared elected, having obtained second place
in the elections, our answer is simple: this Court has already declared that this cannot be done in the absence of an express
provision authorizing such declaration. Our law not only does not contain any such provision but apparently seems to
prohibit it. This is what we said in at least two cases where we laid down a ruling which is decisive of the present case.
 . . . . In the first case when the person elected is ineligible, the court cannot declare that the candidate
occupying the second place has been elected, even if he were eligible, since the law only authorizes a
declaration of election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and has presented his
certificate of candidacy. (Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil., 645.)
Section 173 of Republic Act No. 180 known as the Revised Election Code, does not provide that if the contestee
is declared ineligible the contestant will be proclaimed. Indeed it may be gathered that the law contemplates no
such result, because it permits the filing of the contest by any registered candidate irrespective of whether the
latter occupied the next highest place or the lowest in the election returns. (Llamoso vs. Ferrer, et al., 84 Phil.,
489, 47 Off. Gaz., [No. 2] p. 727.)
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-
Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late groom Dominador B.
Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction.
They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed away. However,
since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized. She was
likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.
On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court Administrator Zenaida
N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator required respondent judge to
comment.
In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15
February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that all the documents
to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand
the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested
if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which request he acceded.
Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents submitted
to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused to
solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the
influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the marriage out of human
compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered
from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the marriage license and admonished the parties that
their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give
the license to him in the afternoon of that same day. When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with
Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the
Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the
absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own
fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Court
Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her marriage due to the want of a duly
issued marriage license and that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the same.
She confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the Comment filed by respondent
judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.
Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License
on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000. However,
neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.
It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no record of such marriage
that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur issued
another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage Contract of the parties since it has
no record of their marriage.
On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could communicate with the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. Respondent judge wrote the
Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office, Grace T. Escobal, informed
respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of Orobia to submit the Death
Certificate of his previous spouse.
The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November 2000, found the
respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his
territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.
We agree.
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges
of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,[1] respondent judge held office and had
jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized a wedding
at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to do so only within the
area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the
entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied
with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and
not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability.[2] (Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of solemnizing a marriage
outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further held that:
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply,
more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited
ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.[3]
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines
Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and
subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the
marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In People
vs. Lara,[4] we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent
issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law,
it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not
possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross
ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has
consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of
exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the
discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.[5] Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or
personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another,
condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves the Courts
constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a
public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.[6]
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-4904 February 5, 1909
ROSALIA MARTINEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ANGEL TAN, defendant-appellee.
Domingo Franco, for appellant.
Doroteo Karagdag, for appellee.
WILLARD, J.:
The only question in this case is whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married on the 25th day of
September, 1907, before the justice of the peace, Jose Ballori, in the town of Palompon in the Province of Leyte.
There was received in evidence at the trial what is called an expediente de matrimonio civil. It is written in Spanish and
consists, first, of a petition directed to the justice of the peace, dated on the 25th of September, 1907, signed by the
plaintiff and the defendant, in which they state that they have mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage before
the justice of the peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the marriage. Following this is a document dated on the same
day, signed by the justice of the peace, by the plaintiff, by the defendant, and by Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori. It
states the presentation of the petition above mentioned; that the persons who signed it where actually present in the
office of the justice on the same day named; that they ratified under oath the contents of the petition, and that they
insisted in what they had there asked for. It also stated that being required to produce witnesses of the marriage, the
presented Zacarias Esmero as a witness for the husband and Pacita Ballori as a witness for the wife. Following this is a
certificate of marriage signed by the justice of the peace and the witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, dated the
25th day of September, 1907, in which it is stated that the plaintiff and the defendant were legally married by the justice of
the peace in the presence of the witnesses on that day.
The court below decided the case in favor of the defendant, holding that the parties were legally married on the day
named. The evidence in support of that decision is: First. The document itself, which the plaintiff admits that she signed.
Second. The evidence of the defendant, who testifies that he and said plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at
the time named, together with the witness Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, and that they all signed the document
above mentioned. Third. The evidence of Zacarias Esmero, one of the above-named witnesses, who testifies that the
plaintiff, the defendant, and Pacita Ballori appeared before the justice at the time named and did sign the document
referred to. Fourth. The evidence of Pacita Ballori, who testified to the same effect. Fifth. The evidence of Jose Santiago,
the bailiff of the court of the justice of the peace, who testified that the plaintiff, the defendant, the two witnesses above-
named, and the justice of the peace were all present in the office of the justice of the peace at the time mentioned.
The only direct evidence in favor of the plaintiff is her own testimony that she never appeared before the justice of the
peace and never was married to the defendant. She admits that she signed the document in question, but says that she
signed it in her own home, without reading it, and at the request of the defendant, who told her that it was a paper
authorizing him to ask the consent of her parents to the marriage.
There is some indirect evidence which the plaintiff claims supports her case, but which we think, when properly
considered, is not entitled to much weight. The plaintiff at the time was visiting, in the town of Palompon, her married
brother and was there for about two weeks. The wife of her brother, Rosario Bayot, testified that the plaintiff never left
the house except in her company. But she admitted on cross-examination that she herself went to school every morning
and that on one occasion the plaintiff had gone to church unaccompanied. The testimony of this witness loses its force
when the testimony of Pacita Ballori is considered. She says that at the request of the defendant on the day named, about
5 o'clock in the afternoon, she went to the store of a Chinese named Veles; that there she met the plaintiff and her
mother; that she asked the mother of the plaintiff to allow the plaintiff to accompany her, the witness, to her own house
for the purpose of examining some dress patterns; that the mother gave her consent and the two rights left the store, but
instead of going to the house of the witness they went directly to the office of the justice of the peace where the
ceremony took place; that after the ceremony had taken place, one came advising them that the mother was approaching,
and that they thereupon hurriedly left the office of the justice and went to the house of Pacita Ballori, where the mother
later found them.
The other testimony of the plaintiff relating to certain statements made by the justice of the peace, who died after the
ceremony was performed and before the trial, and certain statements made by Pacita Ballori, is not sufficient to overcome
the positive testimony of the witnesses for the defendant.
The other testimony of Pacita Ballori is severely criticized by counsel for the appellant in his brief. It appears that during
her first examination she was seized with an hysterical attack and practically collapsed at the trial. Her examination was
adjourned to a future day and was completed in her house where she was sick in bed. It is claimed by counsel that her
collapse was due to the fact that she recognized that she testified falsely in stating the office of the justice of the peace
was at the time in the municipal building, when, in fact, it was in a private house. We do not think that the record justifies
the claim of the appellant. The statement as to the location of the office of the justice of the peace was afterwards
corrected by the witness and we are satisfied that she told the facts substantially as they occurred.
There is, moreover, in the case written evidence which satisfies us that the plaintiff was not telling the truth when she said
she did not appear before the justice of the peace. This evidence consists of eight letters, which the defendant claims were
all written by the plaintiff. The plaintiff admits that she wrote letters numbered 2 and 9. The authenticity of the others was
proven. No. 9 is as follows:
ANGEL: Up to this time I did not see my father; but I know that he is very angry and if he be informed that we
have been married civilly, I am sure that he will turn me out of the house.
Do what you may deem convenient, as I don't know what to do.
Should I be able to go to-morrow to Merida, I shall do so, because I can not remain here.
Yours, ROSAL.
Letter No. 6, which bears no date, but which undoubtedly was written on the morning of the 25th of September, is as
follows:
Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.
ANGEL: It is impossible for me to go to the house of Veles this morning because my sister in law will not let me
go there; if it suits you, I believe that this afternoon, about 5 or 6 o'clock, is the best hour.
Arrange everything, as I shall go there only for the purpose of signing, and have Pacita wait for me at the
Chinese store, because I don't like to go without Pacita.
The house must be one belonging to prudent people, and no one should know anything about it.
Yours, ROSAL.
It will be noticed that this corroborates completely the testimony of Pacita Ballori as to her meeting the plaintiff in the
afternoon at the store of the Chinese, Veles. Letter No. 7 is also undated, but was evidently written after the marriage
before the justice of the peace. It is as follows:
Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.
ANGEL: If you want to speak to my mother, who is also yours, come here by and by, at about 9 or 10, when you
see that the tide is high because my brother will have to go to the boat for the purpose of loading lumber.
Don't tell her that we have been civilly married, but tell her at first that you are willing to celebrate the marriage
at this time, because I don't like her to know to-day that we have been at the court-house, inasmuch as she told
me this morning that she heard that we would go to the court, and that we must not cause her to be ashamed,
and that if I insist on being married I must do it right.
Tell her also that you have asked me to carry you.
I send you herewith the letter of your brother, in order that you may do what he wishes.
Yours, ROSAL.
Letter No. 8 was also evidently written after the marriage and is in part as follows:
Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.
ANGEL: I believe it is better for you to go to Ormoc on Sunday of the steamer Rosa, for the purpose of asking
my father's permission for our marriage, and in case he fails to give it, then we shall do what we deem proper,
and, if he does not wish us to marry without his permission, you must request his consent.
Tell me who said that my sister in law knows that we are civilly married; my brother ill treatment is a matter of
no importance, as every thing may be carried out, with patience.
It was proven at the trial that the defendant did go to Ormoc on the steamer Rosa as indicated in this letter, and that the
plaintiff was on the same boat. The plaintiff testified, however, that she had no communication with the defendant during
the voyage. The plaintiff and the defendant never lived together as husband and wife, and upon her arrival in Ormoc, after
consulting with her family, she went to Cebu and commenced this action, which was brought for the purpose of procuring
the cancellation of the certificate of marriage and for damages. The evidence strongly preponderates in favor of the
decision of the court below to the effect that the plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at the time named.
It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the peace, even admitting all that the witnesses for
the defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal marriage. General orders, No. 68, section 6, is as follows:
No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare in the presence of
the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife.
Zacarias Esmero, one of the witnesses, testified that upon the occasion in question the justice of the peace said nothing
until after the document was signed and then addressing himself to the plaintiff and the defendant said, "You are
married." The petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that they had mutually agreed to
be married and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage. The document signed by the plaintiff, the
defendant, and the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the justice, the contents of the
petition and that witnesses of the marriage were produced. A mortgage took place as shown by the certificate of the
justice of the peace, signed by both contracting parties, which certificates gives rise to the presumption that the officer
authorized the marriage in due form, the parties before the justice of the peace declaring that they took each other as
husband and wife, unless the contrary is proved, such presumption being corroborated in this case by the admission of the
woman to the effect that she had contracted the marriage certified to in the document signed by her, which admission can
only mean the parties mutually agreed to unite in marriage when they appeared and signed the said document which so
states before the justice of the peace who authorized the same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant
were able to read and write the Spanish language, and that they knew the contents of the document which they signed;
and under the circumstances in this particular case were satisfied, and so hold, that what took place before the justice of
the peace on this occasion amounted to a legal marriage.
The defendant's original answer was a general denial of the allegations contained in the complaint. Among these
allegations was a statement that the parties had obtain previously the consent of the plaintiff's parents. The defendant
was afterwards allowed to amend his answer so that it was a denial of the allegations of the complaint except that relating
to the condition in regard to the consent of the parents. The plaintiff objected to the allowance of this amendment. After
the trial had commenced the defendant was again allowed to amend his answer so that it should be an admission of
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the complaint, except that part which related to the consent of the parents. It will be seen that this
second amendment destroyed completely the first amendment and the defendants lawyer stated that what he intended
to allege in his first amendment, but by reason of the haste with which the first amendment was drawn he had
unintentionally made it exactly the opposite of what he had intended to state. After argument the court allowed the
second amendment. We are satisfied that in this allowance there was no abuse of discretion and we do not see how the
plaintiff was in any way prejudiced. She proceeded with the trial of the case without asking for a continuance.
The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint is affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the appellant.
G.R. No. L-32473 October 6, 1930
MELECIO MADRIDEJO, assisted by his guardian ad litem, Pedro Madridejo, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GONZALO DE LEON, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
L. D. Abaya and S. C. Pamatmat for appellants.
Aurelio Palileo for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This is a rehearsing of the appeal taken by the defendants, Gonzalo de Leon et al. from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna holding as follows:
Wherefore, the court finds that Melecio Madridejo is Domingo de Leon's next of kin, and hereby orders the
defendants in case No. 5258 to restore and deliver the ownership and possession of the property described in
the complaints filed in the aforesaid case, to Melecio Madridejo, without cost. So ordered.
In support of their appeal the defendants assign the following alleged errors as committed by the trial court, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the marriage between Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez is valid.
2. The lower court also erred in declaring that solely because of the subsequent marriage of his parents, the
appellee Melecio Madridejo, a natural child, was legitimated.
3. The lower court lastly erred in not rendering judgment in favor of the defendants and appellants.
The relevant facts necessary for the decision of all the questions of fact and of law raised herein are as follows:
Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had but one child, Domingo de Leon. The wife and son survived Eulogio
de Leon, who died in the year 1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana Perez lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. The
registry of births of the municipality of Siniloan, Laguna, shows that on June 1, 1917, a child was born to Pedro Madridejo
and Flaviana Perez, which was named Melecio Madridejo, the necessary data being furnished by Pedro Madridejo (Exhibit
B). On June 17, 1917, a 24-day old child of Siniloan, Laguna, as a son of Flaviana Perez, no mention being made of the
father (Exhibit 2). On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez, being at death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor, 30
years of age, by the parish priest of Siniloan (Exhibit A). She died on the following day, July 9, 1920, leaving Domingo de
Leon, her son by Eulogio de Leon, and the plaintiff-appellee Melecio Madridejo, as well as her alleged second husband,
Pedro Madridejo. Domingo de Leon died on the 2nd of May, 1928.
With regard to the first assignment of error, the mere fact that the parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna, who married Pedro
Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary does not
invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the essential requisites required by law for its validity were
lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.
Touching the second assignment of error, there has been no attempt to deny that Melecio Madridejo, the plaintiff-
appellee, is the natural son of the Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, The only question to be decided is whether the
subsequent marriage of his parents legitimated him.
Article 121 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 121. Children shall be considered as legitimated by a subsequent marriage only when they have been
acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration thereof.
According to this legal provision, in order that a subsequent marriage may be effective as a legitimation, the natural
children born out of wedlock must have been acknowledged by the parents either before or after its celebration. The Civil
Code has established two kinds of acknowledgment: voluntary and compulsary. Article 131 provides for the voluntary
acknowledgment by the father or mother as follows:
Art. 131. The acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the record of birth, in a will, or in some other
public document.
Article 135 provides for the compulsary acknowledgment by the father, thus:
Art. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:
1. When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his paternity, is in existence.
2. When the child has been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the defendant
father, justified by the conduct of the father himself of that of his family.
3. In cases of rape, seduction, or abduction, the provisions of the Penal Code with regard to the
acknowledgment of the issue, shall be observed.
Article 136 providing for the compulsory acknowledgment by the mother, reads:
Art. 136. The mother may be compelled to acknowlegde her natural child:
1. When the child is, with respect to the mother, included in any of the cases mentioned in the next preceding
article.
2. When the fact of the birth and the identity of the child are fully proven.
Let us see whether the plaintiff-appellee, Melecio Madridejo, has been acknowledged by his parents Pedro Madridejo and
Flaviana Perez, under any of the provisions above quoted.
To begin with the father, no document has been adduced to show that he has voluntarily acknowledged Melecio
Madridejo as his son, except the registry certificate of birth, Exhibit B. This, of course, is not the record of birth mentioned
in the law, for it lacks the requisites of article 48 of the Law of Civil Registry. It, no doubt, is a public instrument, but it has
neither been executed nor signed by Pedro Madridejo, and contains no statement by which he acknowledges Melecio
Madridejo to be his son. Although as Pedro Madridejo testified, he furnished the municipal secretary of Siniloan with
necessary data for recording the birth of Melecio Madridejo, and although said official inscribed the data thus given in the
civil registry of births, this is not sufficient to bring it under the legal provision regarding acknowledgment by a public
document.
As to the mother, it does not appear that Flaviana Perez supplied the data set forth in the civil registry of births, Exhibit B,
or in the baptismal register, where of Exhibit 2 is a certificate, and which constitutes final proof only of the baptism, and
not of the kinship or parentage of the person baptized (Adriano vs. De Jesus, 23 Phil., 350). Furthermore, church registers
of baptism are no longer considered public documents (United States vs. Evangelista, 29 Phil., 215).
Melecio Madridejo, then, was not voluntarily acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo or Flaviana Perez, either before or after
their marriage. 1awph!l.net
Did Pedro Madridejo acknowledge Melecio Madridejo as his son, by compulsion?
The compulsory acknowledgment by the father established in article 135 of the Civil Code, and by the mother according to
article 136, requires that the natural child take judicial action against the father or mother, or against the persons setting
themselves up as the heirs of both, for the purpose of compelling them to acknowledge him as a natural son through a
judgment of the court.
In the instant action brought by Melecio Madridejo not only has he not demanded to be acknowledged as a natural child,
which is the condition precedent to establishing his legitimation by the subsequent marriage and his right to the estate of
his uterine brother, Domingo de Leon, but he has not even impleaded either his father Pedro Madridejo, or the heirs of his
mother, Flaviana Perez, in order that the court might have authority to make a valid and effective pronouncement of his
being a natural child, and to compel them to acknowledge him as such.
The plaintiff-appellee alleges that the second paragraph of the defendants' answer amounts to an admission that he is
indeed Flaviana Perez's son, and relieves him of the burden of proving that his mother acknowledged him as a son before
her marriage. Such an admission would have been affective if the present action had been brought for the purpose of
compelling Flaviana Perez or her heirs to acknowledge the appellee as her son.
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that Melecio Madridejo has not been acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana
Perez, either voluntarily or by compulsion, before or after their marriage, and therefore said marriage did not legitimate
him.
Wherefore, the judgment is reversed, the complaint dismissed, and the defendants absolved with costs against the
appellee without prejudice to any right he may have to establish or compel his acknowledgment as the natural son of
Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 173540 January 22, 2014
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,
vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of Court, assailing the 31 August 2005 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444, which reversed the 25 March 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 8 of Davao City, in a complaint for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage docketed as Civil Case No. 26,
908-98.
The Facts
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the same man, now
deceased.
Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the
deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on
30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the fact of
their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon,
Bohol. However, due to World War II, records were destroyed. Thus, only a Certification3 was issued by the LCR.
During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquios union, they begot four (4) children, namely: Climaco H. Avenido, born on 30
March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born on 23 August 1948; Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H.
Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December 1952. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his family and his whereabouts was not known.
In 1958, Tecla and her children were informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another woman by the name of
Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977 without any issue.
In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which
marriage she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous an action she sought to protect the rights of her
children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.
On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with counterclaim,4 essentially averring that she is the legal
surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City, their marriage having been celebrated on 30
March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City. She also contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the
properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio.
Trial ensued.
Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:
1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and Tecla herself to substantiate
her alleged prior existing and valid marriage with (sic) Eustaquio;
2) Documentary evidence such as the following:
a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944 issued by the Office of
the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon, Bohol;5
b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office of the Civil Registrar
General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd., Sta Mesa, Manila;6
c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages that were actually filed in
the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO Manila, started only in 1932;7
d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO,
from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila;8
e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9
f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;10
g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11
h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish Priest of Talibon,
Bohol on 30 September 1942;12
i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by Second World War issued
by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that they cannot furnish as requested a
true transcription from the Register of Birth of Climaco Avenido;13
j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March 1943 to spouses
Eustaquio and Tecla;14
k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina.15
On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to Eustaquio that took place in Davao City on 3
March 1979; her life as a wife and how she took care of Eustaquio when he already had poor health, as well as her
knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but was once a common law wife of Eustaquio.16 Peregrina likewise set forth
documentary evidence to substantiate her allegations and to prove her claim for damages, to wit:
1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the date of marriage on 3 March 1979;
2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single when he contracted marriage
with the petitioner although he had a common law relation with one Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4)
children namely: Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed Avenido;18
3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil Registrar of the Municipality of
Alegria, Surigao del Norte;19 and
4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as the Civil Registrar of Alegria,
Surigao del Norte.20
In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was initiated in bad faith so as to deprive her of
the properties she owns in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio; hence, her entitlement to damages and attorneys
fees.
On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision21 denying Teclas petition, as well as Peregrinas counter-claim. The
dispositive portion thereof reads:
For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE" filed by petitioner TECLA HOYBIA
AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA MACUA is hereby DENIED.
The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO is hereby
DISMISSED.22
Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial courts alleged disregard of the evidence on the existence
of her marriage to Eustaquio.
In its 31 August 2005 Decision,23 the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio, while
pronouncing on the other hand, the marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and void.
The CA ruled:
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO
who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30
September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother
[Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the
outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition
sine qua non, for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court
has disregarded.24
Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the CA to appreciate the validity of
her marriage to Eustaquio. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Memorandum25dated 5 June 2008,
raises the following legal issues:
1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage" to overturn the validity of a
subsequent marriage;
2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken cognizance of, without proof of the
execution or existence and the cause of the unavailability of the best evidence, the original document;
and
3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative value to prove the existence of
a valid marriage without the priest who issued the same being presented to the witness stand.26
Our Ruling
Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented during the trial proves the existence of the
marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.
The trial court, in ruling against Teclas claim of her prior valid marriage to Eustaquio relied on Teclas failure to present her
certificate of marriage to Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial court considered as useless the certification of the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that it has no more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The
same thing was said as regards the Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila. The trial court observed:
Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise, issued a Certification (Exhibit "B")
stating that:
records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the liberation of Manila on February 4, 1945.
What are presently filed in this office are records from the latter part of 1945 to date, except for the city of Manila which
starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way of verifying and could not issue as requested, certified true copy of the
records of marriage between [Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942, in Talibon,
Bohol.27
In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to the testimony of Tecla and her witnesses
as it considered the same as mere self-serving assertions. Superior significance was given to the fact that Tecla could not
even produce her own copy of the said proof of marriage. Relying on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, the trial court declared that Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first marriage.
The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio as
they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four (4) children. Such presumption, supported by documentary
evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by the trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially
that of Adelina Avenido-Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. Contrary to the trial
courts ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.
We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite recently, in Aonuevo v. Intestate Estate of
Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we said, citing precedents, that:
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and
exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other
than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a persons birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the
marriage between his parents.
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other proof of the fact can be accepted, has
been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of Appeals.29 Thus:
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua
non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded.
They have thus confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In
Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court clarified this misconception thus:
x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the instrument was barred.
The court confounded the execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be proven
by secondary evidence when the
instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the
document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as
foundation for the inroduction of secondary evidence of the contents.
xxxx
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It generally consists of
parol testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its authencity is not necessarily, if at all,
determined from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document,
when available, to establish its execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the admissibility of such
evidence.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.
But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who
saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the
execution thereof. The Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or
by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has
been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument
[has] indeed [been] lost."
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the
marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and
the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due
execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence
testimonial and documentarymay be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.30
As correctly stated by the appellate court:
In the case at bench, the celebration of marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was established by the testimonial
evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during the marriage ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living
witness to the event. The loss was shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are
relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly
shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence testimonial and documentary may be admitted to prove the
fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the
Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. The testimony by one of the
parties to the marriage or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of
marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of
marriage."
xxxx
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO
who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla] on 30
September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother
[Tecla] was married to his father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence mentioned at the
outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition
sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court
has disregarded.31
The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.
As early as the case of Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this Court has elucidated on the rationale behind the presumption:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.1wphi1 Marriage in this jurisdiction is not
only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established
by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always presume marriage.
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and
Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of
Talibon, Bohol.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is
AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby
declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183896 : January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner, v. GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No. 03-
0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated
July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to
RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive
Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to
Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on
January 8, 1993, was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were
married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January
9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F. Muoz St., Malate,
Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some
ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During
the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until
Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he
had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on
their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number
could be found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the
effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967,
was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification
reads as follows:cralawlibrary
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:cralawlibrary
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in
favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993. ???r?bl? ??r??l l?? l?br?r around them at the time were Chinese.31?r?l1
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8,
1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.7?r?l1
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had
gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage license
on advice of his counsel.8?r?l1
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic
appeared under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents
pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20,
1993.9?r?l1
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued
chronologically.10 He testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion,
Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the same
serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person.11?r?l1
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo
and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is
authorized to solemnize marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar
Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo
Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that
he is familiar with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the day
before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the
marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and
copy of the marriage license with that office.17?r?l1
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of
the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and
that this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further testified that he did not
know where the marriage license was obtained.20He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the
marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer
and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21?r?l1
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present at
the wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at
the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male person
went to their house with the application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person went back to their
house, showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing
officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that
the marriage license was obtained from Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against
Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before
Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.26?r?l1
As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the
wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could identify
all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures as
proof.27 She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of
the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several
days returned with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with
the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria
testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28?r?l1
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.29?r?l1
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura
during the existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the
RTC of Manila.30?r?l1
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said
marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license
had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona,
Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family Code.33 As the
marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an
absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as
follows:cralawlibrary
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby
annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the respondent even if no property was
acquired during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel
from their respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-
Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila. ???r?bl? ??r??l l?? l?br?r
SO ORDERED.34?r?l1
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal
the questioned decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:cralawlibrary
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND
VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE
SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE
THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE
IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN
ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35?r?l1 ???r?bl? ??r??l l?? l?br?r
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and
thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial
and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the
requisites laid down by law.37?r?l1
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the
parties had comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a
case against him for bigamy.38?r?l1
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27
January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas
and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39?r?l1
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution
dated July 24, 2008.41?r?l1
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN
THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND
LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE.42?r?l1
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the
Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and
35(3), which read as follows:cralawlibrary
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:cralawlibrary
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer
and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age. ???r?bl? ??r??l l?? l?br?r office.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:cralawlibrary
xxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the
authority of the solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt
from the requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case,
thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage
license had been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as
well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued,
Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was
there that he requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such
certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:cralawlibrary
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his
deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license, the Court held:cralawlibrary
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document
does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of
public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where
they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the
marriage license was issued and such other relevant data.44?r?l1
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to
maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued,
issued a certification to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number
of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of
Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and
Syed do not appear in the document.
132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification, and since the
certification used stated that no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and
thus the certification could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.45 It is worth noting that in that particular
case, the Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification
issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the
same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved
conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly
performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was
shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No.
996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those
of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the
marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to
apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the
other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having admitted to not
reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in
securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license was
delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this
Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license were
submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured from
that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there
was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
In the case of Cario v. Cario,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the certification of the Local Civil
Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The
case of Cario further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it
became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required
marriage license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be
reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage
license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage
license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite and Glorias failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To
quote the CA:cralawlibrary
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and appellee have been
validly married and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to
marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein
gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several
pictures were presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other members
of appellants family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the
marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.
 xxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was
born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to
have been instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him
for contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to
reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit
from his own deceit and perfidy.50?r?l1
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed
does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the
beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without
a marriage license, is void ab initio.
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than pure, that
he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove
that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage
license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the
marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and
Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling
the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001]
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing marriage
is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta,
Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in
a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May
1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.[1] Four children were born out of that marriage.[2] On
22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent
Judge.[3] When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous,
as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano
and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as
husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.[4] According
to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise,
he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being
designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent
Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition
of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting
aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits[5] of the late Manzano and
of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively;
and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had
never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those
affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under
oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are
without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the
parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.[6]
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits
executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly
stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would
make the subsequent marriage null and void.[7] In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano
was married he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny
knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits
which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is
immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately
from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve
the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de
facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that
they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with
another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a
long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for
exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent
marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous
marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special application to judges,[8] who, under Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative
that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles.[9] And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary,
the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[10]
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that
the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO
NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners.
Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December
11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and
Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after finding
that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of
the nullity of marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time
of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with defendant is null and void
ab initio;
(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it
was dissolved due to their fathers death.[1]
Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their fathers marriage to
respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the
persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage.[2] Hence, this petition for review with this Court grounded
on a pure question of law. Scnc m
This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and
because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioners averment that the allegations in the petition are true and
correct." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997
Rules.[3]However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for
review.[4]
The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the applicable
law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.[5] A valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,[6] the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initiopursuant to Article 80(3)[7] in relation to Article 58.[8] The requirement and issuance of marriage
license is the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested.[9] This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity
of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic "autonomous social institution."[10] Specifically, the
Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be
protected by the State.[11] This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent
union"[12] and case law considers it "not just an adventure but a lifetime commitment."[13]
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of
which is that provided in Article 76,[14] referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication
of every applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons
from legitimizing their status.[15] To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure
and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their
privacy and exempt them from that requirement. Sdaa miso
There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each
other."[16] The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article
76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a
marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire
five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime
during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the
benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where
the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had
it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any
time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed
without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then
the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on
the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected
as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any
excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape
ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that
two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to
the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.[17] The Civil Code provides:
Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar
shall forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. x x x"Sdaad
This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any
impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."
Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought
to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the
application for a marriage license. x x x."
This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by
the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first
spouse shall be illegal and void,[18] subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more marriages
and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery.[19] The law
sanctions monogamy.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to
the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by
law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of
the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses
cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife". Scs daad
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their fathers marriage void
after his death?
Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code[20] cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which
allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article 47
pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages
are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is
void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken place[21] and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be
generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable
marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally.
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.[22] That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible,
unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning
the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,[23] and its
effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article
51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal
partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Sup rema
Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him and
respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was
dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never existed at all
and the death of either extinguished nothing.
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage.[24] "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the
marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and
declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place.
And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of
marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or
after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void,
it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be
collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either,
the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.[26] But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that
there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage[27] and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.[28] For the same reason,
the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.[29] Corollarily,
if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible. Juris
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity
is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the September 29, 2011
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios)
as void from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer. She
alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never
really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She
described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case
for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an
investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and
reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being
duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee
Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using
the surname of respondent as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she remains the
wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence to the testimony of
Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in
consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went their
separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn, she
did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and
should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained
that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no
intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite
of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting
married and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the parties never intended to enter
into the marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that their
purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration
of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR
THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT
OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid
$2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that
marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be
distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here
intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire
American citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage was similar to a
marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.
On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring
American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
The Court resolves in the negative.
Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes of
immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration
The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of marriage fraud for the
sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only to achieve a
particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common limited
purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present
case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple at the time of
their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,15 established the principal test for determining
the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not
intend to establish a life together at the time they were married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead demonstrate that the
marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus,
shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration
laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not
purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of
immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States made no
definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties had
agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge Learned
Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay in the country was not a marriage,
there being no consent, to wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every contract; and no
matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do not in
fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at
all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses agree to a
marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the understanding that they will put an
end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married at all. They must
assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or
cover, to deceive others.18
(Italics supplied)
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as valid a marriage entered
into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be avoided "merely
because the marriage was entered into for a limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further
recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as problematic. The problem
being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At present, United States courts
have generally denied annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple married only to achieve a
particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondents marriage not void
In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a purpose other than
the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception. In its
resolution denying the OSGs motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared void
because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and
used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the
essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence
of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that
the parties only entered into the marriage for the acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never
intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.
The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family
Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of any essential
requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing
officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under
Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.24Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication,
drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was
not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they
understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their
ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage.
There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between
them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by way of jest.
A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering into
the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not
followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage not intended to be
real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in
jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is
no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1wphi1 Albios and Fringer had an undeniable
intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid marriage
can properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual
marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and family life.
The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however,
insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides that the nature,
consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be
declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered
into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable
under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that
a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would
raise serious constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in
almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and
so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship,
money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites,31are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law,
may validly support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondents attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot
declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondents marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the
purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the
circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous
conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a
sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other
misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage
for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore,
under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is
no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be declared
void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event the
parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it.
These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios
already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it
to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting
parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the
parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414
is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-28248 March 12, 1975
LEONORA PERIDO, joined by husband MANUEL PIROTE, INOCENCIA PERIDO, ALBENIO PERIDO, PAULINO PERIDO, LETIA
PERIDO, joined by husband BIENVENIDO BALYAO, LETICIA PERIDO, joined by husband FELIX VILLARUZ, EUFEMIA
PERIDO, CONSOLACION PERIDO, ALFREDO PERIDO, GEORGE PERIDO, AMPARO PERIDO, WILFREDO PERIDO, MARGARITA
PERIDO, ROLANDO SALDE and EDUARDO SALDE, petitioners,
vs.
MARIA PERIDO, SOFRONIO PERIDO, JUAN A. PERIDO, GONZALO PERIDO, PACITA PERIDO, MAGDALENA PERIDO, ALICIA
PERIDO, JOSEFINA PERIDO, FE PERIDO, TERESA PERIDO and LUZ PERIDO, respondents.
Januario L. Jison, Jr. for petitioners.
Antonio T. de Jesus for respondents.
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:+.wph!1
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in its CA-G.R. No. 37034-R, affirming the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 6529.
Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong, with
whom he begot three (3) children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with
whom he had five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo. Lucio himself died in 1942, while his second
wife died in 1943.
Of the three (3) children belonging to the first marriage only Margarita Perido is still living. Her deceased brother, Felix
Perido, is survived by his children Inocencia, Leonora, Albinio, Paulino, Letia, Leticia, and Eufemia, all surnamed Perido.
Nicanora Perido, another daughter of Felix, is also deceased, but is survived by two (2) sons, Rolando and Eduardo Salde.
Margarita's other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is survived by his children, namely: Consolacion, Alfredo, Wilfredo, and
Amparo. Susano Perido, another son of Ismael, is dead, but survived by his own son George Perido.
Of Lucio Perido's five (5) children by his second wife, two are already dead, namely: Eusebio and Juan. Eusebio is survived
by his children Magdalena Perido, Pacita Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido,
while Juan is survived by his only child, Juan A. Perido.
On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first and second marriages of Lucio Perido executed a document
denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition," whereby they partitioned among themselves Lots
Nos. 458, 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-B, 807, and 808, all of the Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Occidental Negros.
Evidently the children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido had second thoughts about the partition. On March 8,
1962 they filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, which complaint was later amended on
February 22, 1963, against the children of the second marriage, praying for the annulment of the so-called "Declaration of
Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition" and for another partition of the lots mentioned therein among the plaintiffs alone.
They alleged, among other things, that they had been induced by the defendants to execute the document in question
through misrepresentation, false promises and fraudulent means; that the lots which were partitioned in said document
belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, and that the five children of Lucio
Perido with Marcelina Baliguat were all illegitimate and therefore had no successional rights to the estate of Lucio Perido,
who died in 1942. The defendants denied the foregoing allegations.
After trial the lower court rendered its decision dated July 31, 1965, annulling the "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-
Judicial Partition." However, it did not order the partition of the lots involved among the plaintiffs exclusively in view of its
findings that the five children of Lucio Perido with his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were legitimate; that all the lots,
except Lot No. 458, were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido; and that 11/12 of Lot No. 458 belonged to the conjugal
partnership of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:t.hqw Lucio Perido married his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925, as allegedly established through the testimony of
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment as follows: declaring the following as
the legitimate children and grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong: Felix Perido,
deceased; grandchildren: Inocencia Perido, Leonora Perido, Albinio Perido, Paulino Perido, Letia
Perido, Leticia Perido, Eufemia Perido; Nicanora Perido, deceased; great grandchildren: Rolando
Salde and Eduardo Salde; Ismael Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Consolacion Perido, Alfredo
Perido, Susano Perido, deceased; great grandson: George Perido; Amparo Perido and Wilfredo
Perido; and, Margarita Perido; (2) declaring the following as the legitimate children and
grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat: Eusebio Perido, deceased;
grandchildren: Pacita Perido, Magdalena Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa
Perido, and Luz Perido; Juan B. Perido, deceased; grandson, Juan A. Perido; Maria Perido; Sofronia
Perido; and Gonzalo Perido; (3) declaring all lots (471, 506, 511, 509, 513-part, 807, and 808) except
Lot No. 458 as exclusive properties of Lucio Perido so that each of them should be divided into eight
(8) equal parts: 1/8 belongs to Felix Perido, but because of his death leaving eight (8) children, the
same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/64 to Inocencia Perido of age, widow; 1/64 to
Leonora Perido, of age, married to Manuel Pirote; 1/64 to Albinio Perido, of age, married to
Honorata Villasana; 1/64 to Paulino Perido, of age, married to Norma Villalba 1/64 to Letia Perido, of
age, married to Bienvenido Balyac; 1/64 to Leticia Perido, of age, married to Felix Villaruz; 1/64 to
Eufemia Perido, of age, single; 1/64 to Nicanora Perido, but because she is now dead the same
should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/128 to Rolando Salde, of age, single; and 1/128 to
Eduardo Salde, of age, single; 1/8 belongs to Ismael Perido, but because he is already dead leaving
five children, the same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/40 to Consolacion Perido, of age,
widow; 1/40 to Alfredo Perido, of age married to Trinidad Tamargo; 1/40 to Susano Perido, but he is
already dead with one son, the same goes to George Perido, of age, single; 1/40 to Wilfredo Perido,
of age, single; 1/8 belongs to Margarita Perido, of age, widow; 1/8 belongs to Eusebio Perido, but
because he is already dead with seven children, the same should be divided and alloted as follows:
1/56 goes to Pacita Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Magdalena Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes
to Alicia Perido, of age, married to Isaias Ruiz; 1/56 goes to Josefina Perido, of age, married to
Leopoldo Doloroso; 1/56 goes to Fe Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Teresa Perido, of are single;
1/56 goes to Luz Perido, of age, married to Fidel de la Cruz; 1/8 belongs to Juan B. Perido, but
because he is already dead with one child, the same 1/8 goes to Juan A. Perido, of age, married to
Salud Salgado 1/8 goes to Maria Perido. of age, married to Julio Pirote; 1/8 goes to Sofronia Perido,
of age, widow; and, 1/8 goes to Gonzalo Perido, of age, married to Lacomemoracion Estiller; (4)
declaring the 11/12 shares in Lot No. 458 as conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and
Marcelina Baliguat, which should be divided and alloted as follows: 11/24 goes to Lucio Perido to be
divided into eight (8) equal shares and 11/24 goes to Marcelina Baliguat to be divided into five (5)
equal shares or 11/120 for each of the children and again to be divided by the children of each child
now deceased; (6) declaring Fidel Perido owner of 1/12 share in Lot 458 to be divided among his
heirs to be determined accordingly later; and (6) declaring null and void Exhibit "J" of the plaintiffs
which is Exhibit "10" for the defendants, without costs and without adjudication with respect to the
counterclaim and damages, they being members of the same family, for equity and justice.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred: (1) in declaring that Eusebio Perido, Juan
Perido, Maria Perido, Sofronia Perido and Gonzalo Perido, were the legitimate children of Lucio Perido and his second wife,
Marcelina Baliguat; (2) in declaring that Lucio Perido was the exclusive owner of Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-Part,
807, and 808 of Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, and in not declaring that said lots were the conjugal
partnership property of Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong; and (3) in holding that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the
conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat.
Finding no reversible error in the decision of the lower court, the Court of Appeals affirmed it in toto. The appellants
moved to reconsider but were turned down. Thereupon they instituted he instant petition for review reiterating in effect
the assignments of error and the arguments in the brief they submitted to the appellate court.
The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat. The petitioners insist
that said children were illegitimate on the theory that the first three were born out of wedlock even before the death of
Lucio Perido's first wife, while the last two were also born out of wedlock and were not recognized by their parents before
or after their marriage. In support of their contention they allege that Benita Talorong died in 1905, after the first three
children were born, as testified to by petitioner Margarita Perido and corroborated by petitioner Leonora Perido; that as
late as 1923 Lucio Perido was still a widower, as shown on the face of the certificates of title issued to him in said year; and
petitioner Leonora Perido.
The petition cannot be sustained. The Court of Appeals found that there was evidence to show that Lucio Perido's wife,
Benita Talorong, died during the Spanish regime. This finding conclusive upon us and beyond our power of review. Under
the circumstance, Lucio Perido had no legal impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their first child in
1900.
With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates of title issued to him in 1923, the Court of
Appeals correctly held that the statement was not conclusive to show that he was not actually married to Marcelina
Baliguat. Furthermore, it is weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons living together husband and wife
are married to each other. This presumption, especially where legitimacy of the issue is involved, as in this case, may be
overcome only by cogent proof on the part of those who allege the illegitimacy. In the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng
Gee1 this Court explained the rationale behind this presumption, thus: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized
world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in
the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society,
and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would he living in the constant violation of
decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio Always presume marriage."
While the alleged marriage ceremony in 1925, if true, might tend to rebut the presumption of marriage arising from
previous cohabitation, it is to be noted that both the trial court and the appellate court did not even pass upon the
uncorroborated testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido on the matter. The reason is obvious. Said witness, when asked
why she knew that Marcelina Baliguat was married to Lucio Perido only in 1925, merely replied that she knew it because
"during the celebration of the marriage by the Aglipayan priest (they) got flowers from (their) garden and placed in the
altar." Evidently she was not even an eyewitness to the ceremony.
In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the five children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat were born during their marriage and, therefore, legitimate.
The second assignment of error refers to the determination of whether or not Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509-513-Part, 807
and 808 were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido. In disposing of the contention of the petitioners that said lots
belong to the conjugal partnership of spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, the Court of Appeals said:t.hqw the death of Jovita de Asis. The Solicitor General, however, argues that, even assuming that appellant's second marriage to
... We cannot agree again with them on this point. It is to be noted that the lands covered by the
certificates of title (Exhs. B to G) were all declared in the name of Lucio Perido. Then there is
evidence showing that the lands were inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother (t.s.n., p. 21,
Feb. 20, 1964). In other words, they were the exclusive properties of the late Lucio Perido which he
brought into the first and second marriages. By fiat of law said Properties should be divided
accordingly among his legal heirs.
The petitioners take exception to the finding of the appellate court that the aforementioned lots were inherited by Lucio
Perido from his grandmother and contend that they were able to establish through the testimonies of their witnesses that
the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong acquired them during their lifetime. Again, the petitioners cannot be
sustained. The question involves appreciation of the evidence, which is within the domain of the Court of Appeals, the
factual findings of which are not reviewable by this Court.
The third assignment of error is with regard to the ruling of the Court of Appeals sustaining the finding of the trial court
that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. Said
the appellate court:t.hqw
With respect to Lot No. 458 which is now covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 21769 issued in
1925 the same should be considered conjugally owned by Lucio Perido and his second wife,
Marcelina Baliguat. The finding of the lower court on this point need not be disturbed. It is expressly
stated in the certificate of title (Exh. L) that Lucio Perido, the registered owner, was married to
Marcelina Baliguat unlike in the previous land titles. If the law presumes a property registered in the
name of only one of the spouses to be conjugal (Guinguing vs. Abutin, 48 Phil. 144; Flores vs. Flores,
48 Phil. 288, Escutin vs. Escutin, 60 Phil. 922), the presumption becomes stronger when the
document recites that the spouse in whose name the land is registered is married to somebody else,
like in the case at bar. It appearing that the legal presumption that the No. 458 belonged to the
conjugal partnership had not been overcome by clear proofs to the contrary, we are constrained to
rule, that the same is the conjugal property of the deceased spouses Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat.
In impugning the foregoing ruling, the petitioners maintain that they were able to prove that 6/12 of said Lot 458 was the
conjugal property of spouses Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong, and that the purchase price of the additional
5/12 of said lot came from the proceeds of sale of a lot allegedly belonging to Lucio Perido and his three children of the
first marriage. As in the second assignment of error, the issue raised here also involves appreciation of the evidence and,
consequently, the finding of the appellate court on the matter is binding on this Court. Indeed, a review of that finding
would require an examination of all the evidence introduced before the trial court, a consideration of the credibility of
witnesses and of the circumstances surrounding the case, their relevancy or relation to one another and to the whole, as
well as an appraisal of the probabilities of the entire situation. It would thus abolish the distinction between an ordinary
appeal on the one hand and review on certiorari on the other, and thus defeat the purpose for which the latter procedure
has been established.2
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.
G.R. No. L-5877 September 28, 1954
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ARTURO MENDOZA, defendant-appellant.
Nestor A. Andrada for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Felicisimo R. Rosete for appellee.
PARAS, C.J.:
The defendant, Arturo Mendoza, has appealed from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, finding him guilty
of the crime of bigamy and sentencing him to imprisonment for an indeterminate term of from 6 months and 1 day to 6
years, with costs.
The following facts are undisputed: On August 5, 1936, the appellant and Jovita de Asis were married in Marikina, Rizal. On
May 14, 1941, during the subsistence of the first marriage, the appellant was married to Olga Lema in the City of Manila.
On February 2, 1943, Jovita de Asis died. On August 19, 1949, the appellant contracted another marriage with Carmencita
Panlilio in Calamba, Laguna. This last marriage gave rise to his prosecution for and conviction of the crime of bigamy.
The appellant contends that his marriage with Olga Lema on May 14, 1941 is null and void and, therefore, non-existent,
having been contracted while his first marriage with Jovita de Asis August 5, 1936 was still in effect, and that his third
marriage to Carmencita Panlilio on August 19, 1949 cannot be the basis of a charge for bigamy because it took place after
Olga Lema is void, he is not exempt from criminal liability, in the absence of a previous judicial annulment of said bigamous
marriage; and the case of People vs. Cotas, 40 Off. Gaz., 3134, is cited.
The decision invoked by the Solicitor General, rendered by the Court of Appeals, is not controlling. Said case is essentially
different, because the defendant therein, Jose Cotas, impeached the validity of his first marriage for lack of necessary
formalities, and the Court of Appeals found his factual contention to be without merit.
In the case at bar, it is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was contracted during the existence of
his first marriage with Jovita de Asis. Section 29 of the marriage law (act 3613), in force at the time the appellant
contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides as follows:1wphl.nt
Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse
of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or the absentee being generally
considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in either case until declared null and
void by a competent court.
This statutory provision plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first
spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished
from mere annulable marriages. There is here no pretence that appellant's second marriage with Olga Lema was
contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, has been absent for seven consecutive years or generally
considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared null and void by a competent court.1wphl.nt
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de officio so ordered.
Pablo, Bengzon, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-10016 February 28, 1957
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle,
vs.
PROCESO S. ARAGON, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Adolfo Brillantes for appellee.
Prospero V. Manuel, Fernando Moncada and Antonio Abad Tornis for defendant and appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding appellant guilty of bigamy. The facts are not disputed
and, as found by the trial court, are as follows:
On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima, contracted marriage with a certain
Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu (Exhibits "1" and "1-A"). While his marriage with
Maria Gorrea was subsisting, the accused under the name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage
with Maria Faicol on August 27, 1934, in the Santa Teresita Church in Iloilo City.
The sponsors of the accused and Maria Faicol were Eulogio Giroy, who was then an employee of the Office of
the Municipal Treasurer of Iloilo, and a certain Emilio Tomesa, a clerk in the said office (Exhibit "A" and
testimonies of Eulogio Giroy and complainant Maria Faicol). After the said marriage, the accused and Maria
Faicol established residence in Iloilo. As the accused was then a traveling salesman, he commuted between
Iloilo where he maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu where he maintained his first wife, Maria Gorrea died in
Cebu City on August 5, 1939 (Exhibit "2"). After Maria Gorrea's death, and seeing that the coast was dear in
Cebu, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City in 1940, where she worked as a teacher-nurse.
It would seem that the accused and Maria Faicol did not live a happy marital life in Cebu, for it appears that in
1949 and 1950, Maria Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment in the hands of the
accused. On January 22, 1953, the accused sent Maria Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing
treatment of her eyesight. During her absence, the accused contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C.
Maglasang on October 3, 1953, in Sibonga, Cebu. (See Exhibits "C", "D", "E" and "F")
The accused admitted having contracted marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasangin Sibonga, Cebu, on October 3,
1953, Although the accused made an attempt to deny his previous marriage with Maria Faicol, the Court,
however, believes that the attempt is futile for the fact of the said second marriage was fully established not
only by the certificate of the said marriage, but also by the testimony of Maria Faicol and of Eulogio Giroy, one
of the sponsors of the wedding, and the identification of the accused made by Maria Faicol. (See Exhibits "A"
and "B"; t.s.n. pp. 32-33, 40, 41, hearing of April 27, 1954).
The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision in Act No. 3613 authorizing the
filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio, defendant could not legally contract
marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter
or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the instance of the latter. Authorities given for this ruling
are 5 Viada, 5th edition, 651; 35 American Jurisprudence, Marriage, Sec. 46, p. 212; Bickford vs. Bickford, 74 N. H. 466, 69
A. 579.
Appellant in this Court relies on the case of People vs. Mendoza, (95 Phil., 845; 50 Off. Gaz., [10] 4767). In this case the
majority of this Court declared:
The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a subsequent
marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its
performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from
mere annullable marriages. There is here no pretense that appellant's second marriage with Olga
Lema was contracted in the belief that the first spouse, Jovita de Asis, had been absent for seven
consecutive years or generally considered as dead, so as to render said marriage valid until declared
null and void by a subsequent court.
We are of the very weighty reasons by Justice Alex Reyes in the dissent in the case above-quoted But this weighty reasons
notwithstanding, the very fundamental principle of strict construction of penal laws in favor of the accused, which
principle we may not ignore, seems to justify our stand in the above-cited case of People vs. Mendoza. Our Revised Penal
Code is of recent enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial declaration of nullity
of ab initio void marriages been within the contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that effect would or
should have been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of strict interpretation already adverted to.
It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with the appellant was
not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was
a valid one and appellant's prosecution for contracting this marriage can not prosper.
For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted,
with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted the second bigamous marriage. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-43905 May 30, 1983
SERAFIA G. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS, MARIA CLEMENTE and THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PAOMBONG, BULACAN, respondents.
Amelita G. Tolentino for petitioner.
Hermin E. Arceo for Maria Clemente.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The reversal of respondent Court's Order, dismissing petitioner's suit for her "declaration ... as the lawful surviving spouse
of deceased Amado Tolentino and the correction of the death certificate of the same", is sought in this Petition for Review
on Certiorari.
The records disclose that Amado Tolentino had contracted a second marriage with private respondent herein, Maria
Clemente, at Paombong, Bulacan, on November 1, 1948 (Annex "C", Petition), while his marriage with petitioner, Serafia G.
Tolentino, celebrated on July 31, 1943, was still subsisting (Annex "A", Petition).
Petitioner charged Amado with Bigamy in Criminal Case No. 2768 of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch II, which
Court, upon Amado's plea of guilty, sentenced him to suffer the corresponding penalty. After Amado had served the prison
sentence imposed on him, he continued to live with private respondent until his death on July 25, 1974. His death
certificate carried the entry "Name of Surviving Spouse Maria Clemente."
In Special Proceedings No. 1587-M for Correction of Entry, petitioner sought to correct the name of the surviving spouse in
the death certificate from "Maria Clemente" to "Serafia G. Tolentino", her name. The lower Court dismissed the petition
"for lack of the proper requisites under the law" and indicated the need for a more detailed proceeding,
Conformably thereto, petitioner filed the case below against private respondent and the Local Civil Registrar of Paombong,
Bulacan, for her declaration as the lawful surviving spouse, and the correction of the death certificate of Amado. In an
Order, dated October 21, 1976, respondent Court, upon private respondent's instance, dismissed the case, stating:
The Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendants in this case, thru counsel Atty. Hernan E. Arceo, for
the reasons therein mentioned, is hereby GRANTED. Further: (1) the correction of the entry in the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar is not the proper remedy because the issue involved is marital
relationship; (2) the Court has not acquired proper jurisdiction because as prescribed under Art. 108,
read together with Art. 412 of the Civil Code publication is needed in a case like this, and up to
now, there has been no such publication; and (3) in a sense, the subject matter of this case has been
aptly discussed in Special Proceeding No. 1587-M, which this Court has already dismissed, for lack of
the proper requisites under the law.
In view of the above dismissal, all other motions in this case are hereby considered MOOT and
ACADEMIC.
SO ORDERED. 1
Thus, petitioner's present recourse mainly challenging the grounds relied upon by respondent Court in ordering dismissal.
We rule for petitioner.
First, for the remedy. Although petitioner's ultimate objective is the correction of entry contemplated in Article 412 of the
Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, she initially seeks a judicial declaration that she is the lawful surviving spouse
of the deceased, Amado, in order to lay the basis for the correction of the entry in the death certificate of said deceased.
The suit below is a proper remedy. It is of an adversary character as contrasted to a mere summary proceeding. A claim of
right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it. Private respondent, as the individual most affected; is a
party defendant, and has appeared to contest the petition and defend her interests. The Local Civil Registrar is also a party
defendant. The publication required by the Court below pursuant to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is not absolutely
necessary for no other parties are involved. After all, publication is required to bar indifferently all who might be minded to
make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. 2 Besides, even assuming that this is a proceeding
under Rule 108, it was the Court that was caned upon to order the publication, 3 but it did not. in the ultimate analysis,
Courts are not concerned so much with the form of actions as with their substance. 4
Second, for the merits. Considering that Amado, upon his own plea, was convicted for Bigamy, that sentence furnishes the
necessary proof of the marital status of petitioner and the deceased. There is no better proof of marriage than the
admission by the accused of the existence of such marriage. 5 The second marriage that he contracted with private
respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. 6 No
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage. 7 It can be safely concluded, then, without need of
further proof nor remand to the Court below, that private respondent is not the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado,
but petitioner. Rectification of the erroneous entry in the records of the Local Civil Registrar may, therefore, be validly
made.
Having arrived at the foregoing conclusion, the other issues raised need no longer be discussed.
In fine, since there is no question regarding the invalidity of Amado's second marriage with private respondent and that
the entry made in the corresponding local register is thereby rendered false, it may be corrected. 8 While document such
as death and birth certificates, are public and entries therein are presumed to be correct, such presumption is merely
disputable and will have to yield to more positive evidence establishing their inaccuracy. 9
WHEREFORE, the Order, dated October 21, 1975, of respondent Court is hereby set aside and petitioner, Serafia G.
Tolentino, hereby declared the surviving spouse of the deceased Amado Tolentino. Let the corresponding correction be
made in the latter's death certificate in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Paombong, Bulacan.
No costs.
SOORDERED.
G.R. No. L-53703 August 19, 1986
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan
City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for petitioner.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July,
1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva
Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A.
Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while
admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she and the first
husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue
agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted against both
parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable? Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked
the respondent court for an opportunity to present evidence-
(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the first husband; and
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married to someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence of force exerted on both parties of the
first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the present petition for certiorari assailing the following Orders of
therespondent Judge-
(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit the case for resolution based on
"agreed facts;" and
(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's motion to allow her to present evidence in her favor.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties
because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid
until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly
married to her first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of such
fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded
VOID under the law.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the Orders complained of are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE
FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN, respondents.
Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioner.
Emiterio C. Manibog for private respondent.
City Fiscal of Manila for public respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question for the resolution of the Court is
whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Itance of Manila should be suspended in view
of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the
latter constitutes a prejudicial question. The respondent judge ruled in the negative. We sustain him.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru Assistant
City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor filed an information for bigamy against herein petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with the Court of
First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 43554 and assigned to Branch XXXII of said court. The information
was filed based on the complaint of private respondent Paz B. Abayan.
On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed with the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September
26, 1978, which action was docketed as Civil Case No. E-02627. Said civil case was based on the ground that private
respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was petitioner Donato's second one, since she had no previous
knowledge that petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner Donato's
answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized
without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private
respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the subsequent or second
marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together and deported themselves as husband and wife without the
benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as evidenced by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26,
1978, for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code
pertaining to marriages of exceptional character.
Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings of said case contending that Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking the annulment of his second marriage filed by
private respondent raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined or decided before the criminal case can
proceed.
In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
43554 for bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for denial is the ruling laid down in the case of Landicho vs. Relova. 1 The order
further directed that the proceedings in the criminal case can proceed as scheduled.
A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel citing as one of his grounds for suspension of
proceedings the ruling laid down by this Court in the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito 2 which was a much later case than that
cited by respondent judge in his order of denial.
The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an order dated April 14, 1980, for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.3 It is one based on
a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of
the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. 4 A prejudicial question
usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue
raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a
criminal case.5
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's
guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent Paz
B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained
through deceit.
Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared null and void on the ground of
force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by private respondent only sometime later when he was
required to answer the civil action for anulment of the second marriage. The doctrine elucidated upon by the case
of Landicho vs. Relova 6 may be applied to the present case. Said case states that:
The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy
case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant
the suspension of the case. In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a
prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must be shown that the petitioner's
consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means of duress, force and
 intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis
of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly different. At
the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage
ceremonies had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the
petitioner who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was
only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint
against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on the
ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the
ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the case. Parties to
the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that
the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court
therefore, has not abused much less gravely abused, its discretion in failing to suspend the hearing
as sought by petitioner.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage has been obtained by
the use of threats, force and intimidation.
Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito is a later case and as such it
should be the one applied to the case at bar. We cannot agree. The situation in the case at bar is markedly different. In the
aforecited case it was accused Milagros dela Cruz who was charged with bigamy for having contracted a second marriage
while a previous one existed. Likewise, Milagros dela Cruz was also the one who filed an action for annulment on the
ground of duress, as contra-distinguished from the present case wherein it was private respondent Paz B. Abayan,
petitioner's second wife, who filed a complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was
obtained through deceit since she was not aware that petitioner's marriage was still subsisting. Moreover, in De la Cruz, a
judgment was already rendered in the civil case that the second marriage of De la Cruz was null and void, thus
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In the present case, there is as yet no such
judgment in the civil case.
Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions
since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused
only if it is proved that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and
intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same
cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.
Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case. The
records reveal that prior to petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been living with private
respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage. Thus, petitioner's
averments that his consent was obtained by private respondent through force, violence, intimidation and undue influence
in entering a subsequent marriage is belled by the fact that both petitioner and private respondent executed an affidavit
which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for five years, one month and
one day until their marital union was formally ratified by the second marriage and that it was private respondent who
eventually filed the civil action for nullity.
Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact hat it was only when Civil Case No. E-02627 was
filed on September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse of one year from the solemnization of the second marriage that
petitioner came up with the story that his consent to the marriage was secured through the use of force, violence,
intimidation and undue influence. Petitioner also continued to live with private respondent until November 1978, when
the latter left their abode upon learning that Leonilo Donato was already previously married.
In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen that the respondent Judge did not err in his earlier order.
There is no pivotal issue that must be pre-emptively resolved in Civil Case No. E-02627 before proceedings in the criminal
action for bigamy can be undertaken.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the respondent judge dated
April 14, 1980 should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992
DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan
Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct," consisting of contracting a second marriage and
living with another woman other than complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting.
The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint. 1 Respondent successfully evaded five (5) attempts to
serve a copy of the Court's Resolution and of the complaint by moving from one place to another, such that he could not
be found nor reached in his alleged place of employment or residence. 2 On 24 April 1985, that is after three (3) years and
a half, with still no answer from the respondent, the Court noted respondent's success in evading service of the complaint
and the Court's Resolution and thereupon resolved to "suspend respondent Atty. Jordan Terre from the practice of law
until after he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint against him" in the instant
case. 3
On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension Order. In his
Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977 upon her
representation that she was single; that he subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito A.
Bercenilla sometime in 1968; that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their
conjugal residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her private meetings with Merlito A. Bercenilla and that the
child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that believing in good faith that his marriage to
complainant was null and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with Helina Malicdem at Dasol, Pangasinan. 4
In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and insisted that Jason
was the child of respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate and physical resemblance to
respondent. Dorothy further explained that while she had given birth to Jason Terre at the PAFGH registered as a
dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had done so out of extreme necessity and to avoid risk of death or injury to the fetus
which happened to be in a difficult breech position. According to Dorothy, she had then already been abandoned by
respondent Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay for the medical and hospital bills arising by
reason of her pregnancy.
The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension Order and instead referred; by a Resolution
dated 6 January 1986, the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 5
Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the Office of the Solicitor General. He set the case for hearing
on 7 July 1986 with notice to both parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant Dorothy appeared and presented her evidence ex
parte, since respondent did not so appear. 6 The Investigating Solicitor scheduled and held another hearing on 19 August
1986, where he put clarificatory questions to the complainant; respondent once again did not appear despite notice to do
so. Complainant finally offered her evidence and rested her case. The Solicitor set still another hearing for 2 October 1986,
notifying respondent to present his evidence with a warning that should he fail once more to appear, the case would be
deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent did not appear on 2 October 1986. The Investigating Solicitor accordingly
considered respondent to have waived his right to present evidence and declared the case submitted for resolution. The
parties were given time to submit their respective memoranda. Complainant Dorothy did so on 8 December 1986.
Respondent Terre did not file his memorandum.
On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and Recommendation" to this Court. The
Report summarized the testimony of the complainant in the following manner:
Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified substantially as follows: she and
respondent met for the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates in Cadiz City High
School (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was then married to Merlito Bercenilla, while respondent was
single (id.); respondent was aware of her marital status (ibid, p. 14); it was then that respondent
started courting her but nothing happened of the courtship (ibid, p. 10); they [complainant and
respondent] moved to Manila were they respectively pursued their education, respondent as a law
student at the Lyceum University (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent continued courting her,
this time with more persistence (ibid, p. 11); she decided nothing would come of it since she was
married but he [respondent] explained to her that their marriage was void ab initio since she and her
first husband were first cousins (ibid, p. 12); convinced by his explanation and having secured
favorable advice from her mother and
ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their marriage license, despite
her [complainant's] objection, he [respondent] wrote "single" as her status explaining that since her
 marriage was void ab initio, there was no need to go to court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they
were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City Court of Manila on June 14, 1977 (Exhibit A;
tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 16-17); Jason Terre was born of their union on June 25, 1981 (Exhibit B, tsn, July
7, 1986, p. 18); all through their married state up to the time he [respondent] disappeared in 1981,
complainant supported respondent, in addition to the allowance the latter was getting from his
parents (ibid, pp. 19-20); she was unaware of the reason for his disappearance until she found out
later that respondent married a certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C, tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22);
she then filed a case for abandonment of minor with the City Fiscal of Pasay City (ibid, p. 23) which
was subsequently filed before Branch II of the City Court of Pasay City as Criminal Case No. 816159
(Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she likewise filed a case for bigamy against respondent and Helina
Malicdem with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, where a prima facie case was found
to exist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26); additionally, complainant filed an administrative case
against respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was employed, which case however was
considered closed for being moot and academic when respondent was considered automatically
separated from the service for having gone on absence without official leave (Exhibit F; tsn, July 7,
1986, pp. 28-29). 7
There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan Terre contracted marriage on 14
July 1977 before Judge Priscilla Mijares. There is further no dispute over the fact that on 3 May 1981, respondent Jordan
Terre married Helina Malicdem in Dasol, Pangasinan. When the second marriage was entered into, respondent's prior
marriage with complainant was subsisting, no judicial action having been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to
the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant.
Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that his prior marriage
with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity was
necessary.
The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place, respondent
has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which underscores the bad faith of respondent Terre. In the
second place, that pretended defense is the same argument by which he had inveigled complainant into believing that her
prior marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla being incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins
to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage with the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer,
knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for
purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. 8 Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that
mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first
marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helina
Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.
That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown by other circumstances. As noted, he
convinced the complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that she was still legally single
and free to marry him. When complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went through law
school while being supported by complainant, with some assistance from respondent's parents. After respondent had
finished his law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent abandoned the complainant without support and
without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a hospital.
Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan Terre, by his actions, "eloquently displayed, not only his
unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to uphold the purpose and responsibility of his
gender" because marriage is a basic social institution. 9
In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a petition to be allowed to take the oath as a member of the Bar and to
sign the Roll of Attorneys, said through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera:
It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession. Whether the marriage was a joke as respondent claims, or a trick played on her as
claimed by complainant, it does not speak well of respondent's moral values. Respondent had made
a mockery of marriage, a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects (Article
216, Civil Code). 11
In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent there guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" because he made a dupe
of complainant, living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities while
dangling before her the mirage of a marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his
marriage a secret while continuing to demand money from complainant. . . . ." The Court held such acts "indicative of a
character not worthy of a member of the Bar." 13
We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to contract a
second marriage with him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him and supported him
through law school, leaving her without means for the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a second marriage with
Helina Malicdem while his first marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral
conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than sufficient basis for disbarment of
respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first place. The Court will correct this error
forthwith.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name from the Roll of
Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on the personal record of respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar Confidant's
Office. A copy of this resolution shall also be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and shall be circularized to
all the courts of the land.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187512 June 13, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Rule 45 Petition seeking the reversal of the Resolutions dated 23 January 20091 and 3 April 20092 issued by the
Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the grant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent.
In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada (Cyrus) at Sumida Electric Philippines, an
electronics company in Paranaque where both were then working. The two eventually got married at the Manila City Hall
on 3 March 1993. Their marriage resulted in the birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment.
Yolanda claimed that from that time, she had not received any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts
to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latters whereabouts, to no avail.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead. The Petition was raffled
to Presiding Judge Avelino Demetria of RTC Branch 85, Lipa City, and was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2002-0530.
On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate
Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead. However, in an Order dated 29 June 2007,
the RTC denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA, presumably under Rule 41, Section 2(a) of the Rules of
Court. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding,
in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.
In its 23 January 2009 Resolution, the appellate court granted Yolandas Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,3 the CA ruled that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under
Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is immediately final and executory upon
notice to the parties.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 3 April 2009.4
Hence, the present Rule 45 Petition.
Issues
1. Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision of the RTC in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice
to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal
2. Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive
Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that respondent presented
Our Ruling
1. On whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the Decision of the RTC in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and,
hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal
In the assailed Resolution dated 23 January 2009, the CA dismissed the Petition assailing the RTCs grant of the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-
Lorino,5 the appellate court noted that a petition for declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage is a
summary judicial proceeding under the Family Code. Hence, the RTC Decision therein is immediately final and executory
upon notice to the parties, by express provision of Article 247 of the same Code. The decision is therefore not subject to
ordinary appeal, and the attempt to question it through a Notice of Appeal is unavailing.
We affirm the CA ruling.
Article 41 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there
is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only
two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute
a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Underscoring supplied.)
Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent
marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding "as provided for" under the Family Code.
Further, Title XI of the Family Code is entitled "Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law." Subsumed thereunder are
Articles 238 and 247, which provide:
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this
Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to
technical rules.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
Further, Article 253 of the Family Code reads:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles
41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable.
Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of
presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.
In Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,6 the Republic likewise appealed the CAs affirmation of the RTCs grant of respondents
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her absent spouse. The Court therein held that it was an error for the
Republic to file a Notice of Appeal when the latter elevated the matter to the CA, to wit:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an
appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are
"immediately final and executory."
xxx xxx xxx
But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar, let it be stated that the RTCs
decision dated November 7, 2001, was immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous for
the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction
over the case, and should have dismissed the appeal outright on that ground.
Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban, who concurred in the result reached by the Court in Republic v.
Bermudez-Lorino, additionally opined that what the OSG should have filed was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a
petition for review under Rule 45.
In the present case, the Republic argues that Bermudez-Lorino has been superseded by the subsequent Decision of the
Court in Republic v. Jomoc,7 issued a few months later.
In Jomoc, the RTC granted respondents Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of her absent husband for the
purpose of remarriage. Petitioner Republic appealed the RTC Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal. The trial court
disapproved the Notice of Appeal on the ground that, under the Rules of Court,8 a record on appeal is required to be filed
when appealing special proceedings cases. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. In reversing the CA, this Court clarified that
while an action for declaration of death or absence under Rule 72, Section 1(m), expressly falls under the category of
special proceedings, a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary
proceeding, as provided for by Article 238 of the same Code. Since its purpose was to enable her to contract a subsequent
valid marriage, petitioners action was a summary proceeding based on Article 41 of the Family Code, rather than a special
proceeding under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Considering that this action was not a special proceeding, petitioner was
not required to file a record on appeal when it appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.
We do not agree with the Republics argument that Republic v. Jomoc superseded our ruling in Republic v. Bermudez-
Lorino. As observed by the CA, the Supreme Court in Jomoc did not expound on the characteristics of a summary
proceeding under the Family Code. In contrast, the Court in Bermudez-Lorino expressly stated that its ruling on the
impropriety of an ordinary appeal as a vehicle for questioning the trial courts Decision in a summary proceeding for
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code was intended "to set the records straight and for the
future guidance of the bench and the bar."
At any rate, four years after Jomoc, this Court settled the rule regarding appeal of judgments rendered in summary
proceedings under the Family Code when it ruled in Republic v. Tango:9
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under
the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules
that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this
Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to
technical rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and three of the same title.
It states:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles
41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory.
As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying,
however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To
be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of
Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the
decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of
jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party
may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republics Notice of Appeal on the ground that the RTC
judgment on the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of respondents spouse was immediately final and
executory and, hence, not subject to ordinary appeal.
2. On whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death
under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that respondent had presented
Petitioner also assails the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of
respondent on the ground that she had not adduced the evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that her
absent spouse was already dead, as expressly required by Article 41 of the Family Code. Petitioner cites Republic v.
Nolasco,10 United States v. Biasbas11 and Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro12 as authorities on the subject.
In Nolasco, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CAs affirmation of the RTCs grant of respondents Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death of his absent spouse, a British subject who left their home in the Philippines soon after
giving birth to their son while respondent was on board a vessel working as a seafarer. Petitioner Republic sought the
reversal of the ruling on the ground that respondent was not able to establish his "well-founded belief that the absentee is
already dead," as required by Article 41 of the Family Code. In ruling thereon, this Court recognized that this provision
imposes more stringent requirements than does Article 83 of the Civil Code.13 The Civil Code provision merely requires
either that there be no news that the absentee is still alive; or that the absentee is generally considered to be dead and is
believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. In comparison,
the Family Code provision prescribes a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted. As noted by the Court in that case, the four requisites for the declaration
of presumptive death under the Family Code are as follows:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil
Code;
 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee.
In evaluating whether the present spouse has been able to prove the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the absent
spouse is already dead, the Court in Nolasco cited United States v. Biasbas,14 which it found to be instructive as to the
diligence required in searching for a missing spouse.
In Biasbas, the Court held that defendant Biasbas failed to exercise due diligence in ascertaining the whereabouts of his
first wife, considering his admission that that he only had a suspicion that she was dead, and that the only basis of that
suspicion was the fact of her absence.
Similarly, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CA ruling affirming the
RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse on the ground that the respondent
therein had not been able to prove a "well-founded belief" that his spouse was already dead. The Court reversed the CA,
granted the Petition, and provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a "well-founded belief" under
Article 41 of the Family Code:
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute
a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define
what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that "es menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en
motivos racionales."
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act.1wphi1 It may be proved by direct evidence
or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination
probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity
and objects of life which usually control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to
explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence [sic] evidence on the ultimate
question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the
whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the
spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from
a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent
of the inquiries made by present spouse. (Footnotes omitted, underscoring supplied.)
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a
diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the
whereabouts of Cyrus from the latters relatives, these relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdados testimony.
In short, respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would
have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or
the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these
omissions.
The Republics arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent spouse was
already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be
modified or reversed. Indeed, "[n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it
becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law."15
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 23 January 2009 and 3 April
2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90165 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-43701 March 6, 1937
In re Instate of the deceased Marciana Escao.
ANGELITA JONES., petitioner-appellant-appellee,
vs.
FELIX HORTIGUELA, as administrator, widower and heir, oppositor-appellant-appellee.
Salvador E. Imperial for petitioner-appellant-appellee.
Vicente L. Faelnar , Hipolito Alo and Ciriaco S. Salazar for oppositor-appellant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal taken from the order issued by the Court of First Instance of Cebu on March 14, 1935 , in the intestate
proceedings of the deceased Marciana Escao, denying thereby: (1) the motion to appoint a new administrator and (2) to
set aside the order of May 9, 1932, declaring the heirs of said deceased; (3) holding it unwarranted to declare that the
properties of the intestate estate are paraphernal properties of said deceased, but reserving to the parties the right to
discuss which of said properties are paraphernal and which are conjugal; (4)setting aside the order of January 10, 1933.
granting to the administrator fees in the sum of P10,000, and that of June 26, 1933, approving the project of portion and
the final account; and (5) ordering the presentation of another project of partition and final account.
As Marciana Escao had died intestate, her widower Felix Hortiguela was appointed judicial administrator of her entire
estate, and in an order issued on May 9, 1932, Angelita Jones, her daughter by her first marriage, and Felix Hortiguela, her
widower by her second marriage, were declared her only heirs. In a motion filed with the conformity of the guardian of the
heiress Angelita Jones, Felix Hortiguela, as administrator, prayed that his fees, as such, be fixed at P10,000 which was
granted by the court in its order of January 10, 1933. The administrator later presented an inventory of the properties left
by said deceased Marciana Escao, a final account of his administration, and a project of partition of the intestate estate
wherein he adjudicated to himself a part of the estate in payment of his share of the conjugal properties and his
usufructuary right, and the remaining part to Angelita Jones. The latter, who was a minor, was represented in the
proceedings by her guardian Paz Escao de Corominas. The project of partition and final account were approved in an
order of June 26, 1933, and the properties were turned over to the respective grantees by virtue thereof.
On May 3, 1934, the heiress Angelita Jones, then married to Ernesto Lardizabal, filed a motion alleging that she was the
only heir of her mother, the deceased Marciana Escao; that there never was a valid marriage between her mother and
Felix Hortiguela or that had such marriage been celebrated, it was null and void; and even granting that it were valid, Felix
Hortiguela was not entitled to a share in usufruct of one-third of the inheritance; that the petitioner was a minor and that
during the hearing of the intestate proceedings she had not been assisted by counsel but was represent by the same
attorney of Felix Hortiguela; that during said proceedings there had been committed many errors and inaccuracies which
impaired her rights and that the fees of P10,000 charged by the administrator were highly unreasonable and
unconscionable. She prayed: (a) for the reopening of the proceedings; (b) that her husband appointed special
administrator without bond; (c) that her mother's alleged marriage to Felix Hortiguela be declared null and void; (d) that
the partition of the properties made by administrator or Hortiguela be declared null and void that petitioner be declared
the only universal heir of her deceased mother; and (e) that in case there was a valid marriage between Felix Hortiguela
and Marciana Escao, Hortiguela be declared not entitled to the widower's usufruct; the errors in the administrator's
account be corrected; the latter be granted a remuneration of only P4 a day, and new partition of the properties be made.
After Hortiguela's answer had been filed and the evidence for both parties received, the court issued the order of March
14, 1935, the provisions of which are stated in the first paragraph of this decision. Both parties appealed therefrom.
The principal question upon the resolution of which depends that of the others, is whether or not Felix Hortiguela's alleged
marriage to Marciana Escao was celebrated.
It is a fact that in December, 1914, Marciana Escao married Arthur W. Jones in the suburban catholic church of San
Nicolas, Province of Cebu. On January 10, 1918, Jones secured a passport to go abroad and thereafter nothing was ever
heard of him. In October, 1919, proceedings were institute in the Court of First Instance of Maasin, Leyte, at the instance
of Marciana Escao, to have her husband judicially declared an absentee. On the 25th of said month, the court issued an
order declaring Arthur W. Jones an absentee from the Philippine Islands pursuant to the provisions of article 186 of the
Civil Code, with the proviso that said judicial declaration of absence would not take effect until six months after its
publication in the official newspapers. Said order directed the publication thereof in the Official Gazette and in the
newspaper "El Ideal". Pursuant thereto, said order was published in the Official Gazette during the month of December,
1919, and January, February, March, April, May and June, 1920. On April 23, 1921, the court issued another order for the
taking effect of the declaration of absence, publication thereof having been made in the Official Gazette and in "El Ideal."
On May 6, 1927, Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escao were married before the justice of the peace of Malitbog, Leyte,
and they signed the certificate of marriage.
Now, Angelita Jones contends that the declaration of absence must be understood to have been made not in the order of
October 25, 1919, but in that of April 23, 1921, and that from the latter date to May 6, 1927, the date of the celebration of
the marriage, only 6 years and 14 days elapsed; and in accordance with section III, paragraph 2, of General Orders, No. 68,
the marriage so contracted by Felix Hortiguela and Marciana Escao is null and void. This court does not believe so. For the
purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The
declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the
taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil
marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time
of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former
spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believe at the time of the celebration of the marriage
(section III, paragraph 2, General orders, No. 68).
In accordance with the foregoing legal provision, the absence of Marciana Escao's former husband should be counted
from January 10, 1918, the date on which the last news concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from said date to
May 6, 1927, more than nine years elapsed. Said marriage is, therefore, valid and lawful.
For some unknown reason not attributable, of course, to the fault or negligence of Felix Hortiguela or Marciana Escao,
the marriage contracted does not appear recorded in the marriage register of the municipality of Malitbog. Angelita Jones
assigns as one of the errors of the court its having declared that failure to record said marriage does not affect the efficacy
and validity thereof.
On this point, the court a quo very correctly stated as follows:
Section VIII of General Orders, No. 68, as amended, provides that the person solemnizing the marriage must
transmit the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, and failure to transmit such certificate shall be
fined not less than twenty-five and not more than fifty dollars; but does not provide that failure to transmit
such certificate to the municipal secretary annuls the marriage. Interpreting this legal provision, the Supreme
Court, in its decision of September 5, 1931 (Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil., 1 ) said:
"The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and mother, while the
latter was in articulo mortis failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal
secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear that in the celebration thereof
all requisites for its validity were not present, the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not
being one said requisites."
In another case (U. S. vs. De Vera, 28 Phil., 105), the court said:
"Certificate issued pursuant the provisions of section 20 of the Municipal Code by municipal secretaries,
marriages recorded in their respective registers, are not the only ones that can attest and prove such facts to
such an extent that other proofs established by law may not be presented or admitted at trial, when through
the omission or fault either of the municipal secretary himself or of the person who solemnized the marriage, it
was not duly entered or recorded in the municipal register."
Furthermore, Marciana Escao believed Arthur W. Jones to be dead when she contracted her second marriage. Her
daughter Angelita Jones herself was of the same belief, since she lived with her mother after the latter had married
Hortiguela, treated Hortiguela as her true stepfather, and lived and traveled with him together with her mother. She
certainly would not have behaved so if she had not believed her father to be dead. Still furthermore, according to section
334, No. 24, of the Code of Civil Procedure, a person not heard from in seven years is presumed to be dead.
Inasmuch as Felix Hortiguela was lawfully married to Marciana Escao and was divorced from her at the time of her death
there is no doubt that he is entitled to inherit in usufruct, not only in testate but also in intestate succession, as in the
present case (6 and 7 Manresa, pages 497-499 and 134-141, respectively).
Therefor, there is no reason to annul the order of May 9, 1932, declaring that the heirs of the deceased were her widower
and her daughter Angelita Jones. Neither is there any reason to annul the order of June 26, 1933, approving the partition
of the properties of the intestate estate.
The inaccuracies and error attributed to the administrator Felix Hortiguela in Angelita Jones' motion and alleged therein as
one of the grounds for asking for the reopening of any assignment of error. It should, therefore, be considered that the
petitioner has desisted from her intention relative to this alleged ground for the nullity of the proceedings.
As to the administrator's fees, the evidence shows that of the P10,000 granted by the court to Hortiguela as his own sum
of P8,000 for the latter's professional services in this as well as in other cases affecting the estate of his deceased wife.
Taking into consideration the nature of and the amount involved in this and in the other cases wherein Attorney Faelnar
has rendered his services this court is of the opinion that the sum of P8,000 paid by the administrator is a reasonable and
moderate compensation. Angelita Jones' objection to the effect that she had no reason to contribute to the payment of
Faelnar's fees is untenable, considering the fact that said attorney's professional services were rendered for the benefit of
the administration of the estate of the deceased Escao prior to the controversy provoked by said heiress. As to the
remainder of P2,000, said administrator is entitled to collect the sum of P4 for every day employed by him as such, and
considering the importance of the inheritance in question and the time elapsed since the inception of the administration
proceedings this court is of the opinion that the sum of P2,000 is an adequate compensation for said administrator's
services.
Lastly, had the court jurisdiction to set aside, as it did, the order of January 10, 1933, approving the administrator's fees
and the order of June 26, 1933, approving the partition and the final account? Had the court jurisdiction to order the
presentation of another project of partition and final account? These are the questions raised by Felix Hortiguela and this
court is of the opinion that said orders having therefrom, the court has lost jurisdiction that no appeal was ever taken
therefrom, the court has lost jurisdiction over the case and it could not resume it under section 113 of the Code of Civil
Procedure or under section 598 thereof because the above-cited section refer to grounds other than those upon which
Angelita Jones' motion of May 3, 1934, is based.
For all the foregoing consideration this court reverses the appealed order of March 14, 1935, in so far as it set aside the
order of January 10, 1933, relative to the administrator's fees and the order of June 26, 1933, approving the final account
and the project of portion, and in so far as said order of March 14, 1935, required the presentation of a new project of
partition; denied the appointment of Angelita Jones husband as administrator; affirms the order of May 9, 1932, relative to
declaration of heirs; and holds it unwarranted to make a finding as to whether or not the properties of this intestate estate
are paraphernal properties of the deceased Marciana Escao reserving to the parties the right to discuss which are
paraphernal and which are conjugal properties. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Diaz and Laurel, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code)
to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the
meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find
difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive
of his frustration Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to
resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article
36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab
initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were
married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of
marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to
spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid
and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between
them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the
sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their
relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents
in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that
Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a
highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be
to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be
an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband
and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of
insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital
duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine,
Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria
Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio
General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not
present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by
the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of
the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application
thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce
procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the
marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown
opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the
application of our civil laws on personal and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental
and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital
union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the
long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and
considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very
objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding
the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions
thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and
duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities
and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7Justice Vitug wrote that "the
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor
physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other. There
had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert
testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr.
Sison testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your
findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically
unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity
existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-
nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent"
on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely
shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and
jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts
interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar
Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and
Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these
friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which
they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by
the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The
evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less
ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family
Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of
such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be
decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function
of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more
cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano
to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 143376. November 26, 2002]
LENI O. CHOA, petitioner, vs. ALFONSO C. CHOA, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Though interlocutory in character, an order denying a demurrer to evidence may be the subject of a certiorari
proceeding, provided the petitioner can show that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion; and that appeal in due course
is not plain, adequate or speedy under the circumstances. Indeed, when the plaintiffs evidence is utterly and patently
insufficient to prove the complaint, it would be capricious for a trial judge to deny the demurrer and to require the defendant
to present evidence to controvert a nonexisting case. Verily, the denial constitutes an unwelcome imposition on the courts
docket and an assault on the defendants resources and peace of mind. In short, such denial needlessly delays and, thus,
effectively denies justice.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 16, 2000
Decision[1] and the May 22, 2000 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 53100. The decretal portion of
the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.[3]
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.[4]
The Facts
Petitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this union, two children were born, Cheryl Lynne
and Albryan. On October 27, 1993, respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Branch 51,
a Complaint[5] for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-
8098.Afterwards he filed an Amended Complaint[6] dated November 8, 1993 for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
petitioner based on her alleged psychological incapacity.
The case went to trial with respondent presenting his evidence in chief. After his last witness testified, he submitted
his Formal Offer of Exhibits[7] dated February 20, 1998. Instead of offering any objection to it, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss (Demurrer to Evidence)[8] dated May 11, 1998. The lower court then allowed a number of pleadings to be filed thereafter.
Finally, the RTC issued its December 2, 1998 Order[9] denying petitioners Demurrer to Evidence. It held that
[respondent] established a quantum of evidence that the [petitioner] must controvert. [10] After her Motion for
Reconsideration[11] was denied in the March 22, 1999 Order,[12] petitioner elevated the case to the CA by way of a Petition
for Certiorari,[13] docketed as CA-GR No. 53100.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA held that the denial of the demurrer was merely interlocutory; hence, certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court was not available. The proper remedy was for the defense to present evidence; and if an unfavorable decision was
handed down later, to take an appeal therefrom.[14] In any event, no grave abuse of discretion was committed by respondent
judge in issuing the assailed Orders.[15]
The CA also ruled that the propriety of granting or denying a demurrer to evidence rests on the sound exercise of the
[trial] courts discretion.[16] Further, the [p]etitioner failed to show that the issues in the court below [had] been resolved
arbitrarily or without basis.[17]
Hence, this Petition.[18]
The Issues
In her Memorandum,[19] petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
1) Upon the denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is she under
obligation, as a matter of inflexible rule, as what the Court of Appeals required of her, to present her evidence, and when
an unfavorable [verdict] is handed down, appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law, despite the palpably and
patently weak and grossly insufficient or so inadequate evidence of the private respondent as plaintiff in the annulment of
marriage case, grounded on psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of The Family Code? Or under such circumstances, can
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari be directly and immediately resorted to by the petitioner; and
2) In upholding the lower courts denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence, did the Court of Appeals wantonly violate,
ignore or disregard in a whimsical manner the doctrinal pronouncements of this Court in Molina (G.R. No. 108763,
February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198) and Santos (G.R. No. 112019, January 14, 1995, 58 SCRA 17)?[20]
Simply stated, the issues are: (1) is certiorari available to correct an order denying a demurrer to evidence? and (2) in
its denial, did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion by violating or ignoring the applicable law and jurisprudence?
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Resort to Certiorari
Petitioner argues that the RTC denied her Demurrer to Evidence despite the patent weakness and gross insufficiency
of respondents evidence. Thus, she was entitled to the immediate recourse of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari. Echoing the CA, respondent counters that appeal in due course, not certiorari, is the proper remedy.
We clarify. In general, interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to certiorari proceedings.
However, this rule is not absolute. In Tadeo v. People,[21] this Court declared that appeal -- not certiorari -- in due time
was indeed the proper remedy, provided there was no grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction or oppressive
exercise of judicial authority.
In fact, Rules 41 and 65 of the Rules of Court expressly recognize this exception and allow certiorari when the lower
court acts with grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of an interlocutory order. Rule 41 provides:
No appeal may be taken from:
xxxxxxxxx
(c) An interlocutory order;
xxxxxxxxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65. [22]
In turn, Section 1 of Rule 65 reads as follows:
SEC. 1. Petition for certiorari -- When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require.[23]
Thus, a denial of a demurrer that is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
may be assailed through a petition for certiorari.[24] In Cruz v. People, this exception was stressed by the Court in this wise:
Admittedly, the general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to challenge interlocutory orders of
the trial court may be subject to exceptions. When the assailed interlocutory orders are patently erroneous or issued with
grave abuse of discretion, the remedy of certiorari lies.[25]
Second Issue:
Denial of Demurrer to Evidence
Having established that a writ of certiorari may be issued in exceptional circumstances, this Court is now tasked to
determine whether the present case falls under the exception; that is, whether the RTC indeed committed a patent error or
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners Demurrer to Evidence.
 A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection or exception by one of the parties in an action at law, to the effect
that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his case or
sustain the issue.[26] The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiffs evidence to sustain a verdict.[27] In passing upon
the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent
or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.[28]
We have thoroughly reviewed the records of the present case, and we are convinced that the evidence against
respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity that would warrant a
declaration of nullity of the parties marriage.
First. Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges against him are proof of the latters
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. These charges included Complaints for
perjury,[29] false testimony,[30] concubinage[31] and deportation.[32] According to him, the filing and the prosecution of these
cases clearly showed that his wife (herein petitioner) wanted not only to put him behind bars, but also to banish him from
the country. He contends that this is very abnormal for a wife who, instead of protecting the name and integrity of her
husband as the father of her children, had acted to the contrary.[33]
We do not agree. The documents presented by respondent during the trial do not in any way show the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically incapacitated
to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she filed cases against him. The evidence presented, even if taken as true,
merely establishes the prosecution of the cases against him. To rule that the filings are sufficient to establish her
psychological incapacity is not only totally erroneous, but also grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity.
Second. Neither is the testimony of respondent, taken by itself or in conjunction with his documentary offerings,
sufficient to prove petitioners alleged psychological incapacity. He testified in these words:
Q Will you please tell us or explain to the Court what do you mean by psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage. What do you mean by that?
A Because before our marriage she was already on the family way, so at that time she even want it aborted by
taking pills. She was even immature, carefree, and she lacked the intention of procreative sexuality.[34]
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. CHUA:
And you consider her that she was carefree, she is psychologically incapacitated? Will you please
elaborate on this what you mean by carefree approximating psychologically incapacitated?
ATTY. MIRANO:
I think we better ask the witness what he means by carefree.
ATTY. CHUA:
Okay.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
WITNESS:
She does not help in the household chores, she does not take care of the child, she wants me to hire an
attendant in order to take care of the child. Even when the children were sick she does not bother to let
the children see a doctor.[35]
xxxxxxxxx
STENOGRAPHER (reads back the question of Atty. Chua):
ATTY. CHUA:
Now. From the time of courtship up to the time of your marriage to the defendant, did you notice any
characteristic or traits which you consider as psychological incapacity?
WITNESS:
Sometimes when I cannot visit at her house she gets mad at me, and she wont talk to me when I call her
up by telephone. So, all she wanted for me to visit her everytime and even at the time when I am busy
with some other things. So, I think that is all.[36]
Even if taken as true, the testimony of respondent basically complains about three aspects of petitioners personality;
namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention to their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an intention of procreative
sexuality. None of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity. Far from it.
In Santos v. CA,[37] this Court clearly explained that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence and (c) incurability.[38] Said the Court:
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the
Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Code has
not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's Void and
Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law, quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases). Article
36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.[39]
Furthermore, in Republic v. Molina,[40] we ruled that the psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty,
a refusal or a neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. We stressed that a mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he and his wife could not get along with
each other. There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting
their marital union.
Sorely lacking in respondents evidence is proof that the psychological incapacity was grave enough to bring about the
disability of a party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In Molina, we affirmed that mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes of psychological
incapacity.The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there should be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.[41]
Respondents pious peroration that petitioner lacked the intention of procreative sexuality is easily belied by the fact
that two children were born during their union. Moreover, there is absolutely no showing that the alleged defect was already
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Third. Most telling is the insufficiency, if not incompetency, of the supposed expert testimony presented by
respondent. His witness, Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon, utterly failed to identify and prove the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity. Specifically, his testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true, was medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Neither did he testify that it was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. The pertinent portions of his testimony are quoted thus:
ATTY. CHUA:
And then finally and ultimately you reached the conclusion that both parties, meaning the husband and
the wife in the present case have a personality which is normal. That is your conclusion?
WITNESS:
They are normal, but they cannot mix together.
Q. So as a general proposition, both of them are of normal personality, only that they are not compatible with
each other?
A. Yes.
Q. And by normal personality, you mean that neither of them suffer from any personality disorder, bordering
on abnormality?
A. Yes.
Q. But Doctor, is not a fact or a fact of life, that no couple could be or are perfectly match?
A. Precisely, if there is a problem, marital problem, there should be somebody who knows how to handle
marriage, that should try to intervene.
Q. You mean expert advise or services should be needed by the couple?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, if the couple are mature enough and each of them practises what we call maximum tolerance and give
and take, will that serve the purpose?
A. That would served the purpose of getting well.
Q. Yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Meaning to say that the incompatibility could be harmonized?
 A. Yes, because they are supposedly normal, but both of them are personally disordered. It cannot be Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as these had merely been relayed to
harmonized. So this case, if only they have tried professional help to take care of their marital problem, him by respondent. The former was working on pure suppositions and secondhand information fed to him by one
it could have been solved. side. Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and unreliable.
Q. Or the situation could have been remedied? Dr. Gauzon tried to save his credibility by asserting that he was able to assess petitioners character, not only through
A. Yes. But I would like to say that it must be somebody who is an expert. Not just any from Tom, Dick and Harry the descriptions given by respondent, but also through the formers at least fifteen hours[50] of study of the voluminous
could handle this. That means from the very beginning they have personalities which they were transcript of records of this case. Even if it took the good doctor a whole day or a whole week to examine the records of this
incompatible. So if anybody would handle that, they will not mix, they will be always quarreling with case, we still find his assessment of petitioners psychological state sorely insufficient and methodologically flawed.
each other. They should not have got married.[42] As to respondents argument -- that because Dr. Gauzons testimony had never been objected to, the objection raised
xxxxxxxxx thereafter was deemed waived -- the Supreme Court has already ruled on the matter. It held that although the question of
Q. Yes. So in this present case, your expert opinion was sought by the plaintiff, and you found out that both are admissibility of evidence could not be raised for the first time on appeal, hearsay or unreliable evidence should be
normal? disregarded whether objected to or not, because it has no probative value.[51]
A. With different personalities. So that they were incompatible. We are, of course, mindful of the ruling that a medical examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of
Q. Normal, simply incompatible. psychological incapacity, so long as the totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity
A. Yes, with personalities different from each other, which I mentioned there in my last page. That they are like adequately.[52] Here, however, the totality of evidence presented by respondent was completely insufficient to sustain a
oil and water, immiscible. Like oil and water, they will not mix. finding of psychological incapacity -- more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.
Q. You also mentioned that the plaintiff. Meaning to say the husband told you about the frequent quarrels had The trial court should have carefully studied and assessed the evidence presented by respondent and taken into
with the wife. Did he ever tell you that was a serious or major quarrel? account the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. It could then have easily concluded, as we conclude now, that it was
A. Actually there was no major quarrel. It was all petty quarrels.[43] useless to proceed further with the tedious process of hearing contravening proof. His evidence was obviously, grossly and
xxxxxxxxx clearly insufficient to support a declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Withal, it was grave
Q. So the problem of this couple is fundamentally a conflicting personalities? abuse of discretion for the RTC to deny the Demurrer and to violate or ignore this Courts rulings in point. Indeed, continuing
A. Yes.[44] the process of litigation would have been a total waste of time and money for the parties and an unwelcome imposition on
xxxxxxxxx the trial courts docket.
Q. Now, you mentioned that you maybe able to make them reconcile? We have already ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes
A. Yes. the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.[53] Any decision, order or resolution of a lower court tantamount to
Q. You mean that given the time and opportunity, things could be worked out? overruling a judicial pronouncement of the highest Court is unmistakably a very grave abuse of discretion.[54]
A. Yes. There is no reason to believe that an appeal would prove to be a plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the case at bar.
Q. You mean reconciliation at this stage with expert services, and the advise of those who possess the necessary An appeal would not promptly relieve petitioner from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken Orders maintaining the
[expertise] could be worked out? baseless action of respondent. It would only compel her to go needlessly through a protracted trial, which would further
A. Yes, as I said it can be done by therapy. Family therapy.[45] clog the court dockets with another futile case.[55]
xxxxxxxxx WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed CA Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents
Q. Doctor, you draw your conclusion that there is psychological inc[a]pacity existing in this case? Demurrer to Evidence is GRANTED, and the case for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the alleged psychological
A. Yes. incapacity of petitioner is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Q. Because of the SO ORDERED.
A. The incompatibility. [G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003]
Q. Incompatibility. DIANA M. BARCELONA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TADEO R. BENGZON, respondents.
A. Yes.[46] DECISION
His testimony established merely that the spouses had an incompatibility, a defect that could possibly be treated or CARPIO, J.:
alleviated through psychotherapy. We need not expound further on the patent insufficiency of the expert testimony to The Case
establish the psychological incapacity of petitioner. The Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May 1997 Decision[1] as well as the 7 August 1997 Resolution of the
Furthermore, the assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based merely on descriptions communicated to him by Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order[2] dated 21 January 1997 of the Regional
respondent. The doctor never conducted any psychological examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to have done so. In Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, in Civil Case No. Q-95-24471. The Regional Trial Court refused to dismiss private
fact, his Professional Opinion[47] began with the statement [I]f what Alfonso Choa said about his wife Leni is true, x x x.[48]The respondents Petition for Annulment of Marriage for failure to state a cause of action and for violation of Supreme Court
expert witness testified thus: Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The assailed Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
ATTY. CHUA The Facts
Q Doctor, in this professional opinion of yours, you gathered most of your material data from the plaintiff who On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (respondent Tadeo) filed a Petition for Annulment of
is the husband? Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona (petitioner Diana). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23445 (first
WITNESS petition) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87.[3] On 9 May 1995, respondent Tadeo filed a Motion to
A Yes. By the way, I requested the husband Alfonso, if it was possible for me to interview Leni, and he said, he Withdraw Petition which the trial court granted in its Order dated 7 June 1995.
doesnt know. On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana. This
ATTY. CHUA time, the case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-24471 (second petition) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Q He doesnt know. Now, Doctor if we were to request you to conduct the same personal interview and written Branch 106 (trial court).
psychological examination on the part of the wife, [w]ould you be willing to do that? Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second petition on two grounds. First, the second petition fails to state
WITNESS a cause of action. Second, it violates Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 (Circular No. 04-94) on forum
A Sure for a fee. I maybe able to make them reconcile.[49] shopping. Respondent Tadeo opposed the Motion to which petitioner Diana filed Additional Arguments in Support of the
Motion.
 The trial court, through Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, issued on 18 September 1996 an Order (first order) deferring
resolution of the Motion until the parties ventilate their arguments in a hearing. Petitioner Diana filed a motion for
reconsideration. However, the trial court, through Pairing Judge Rosalina L. Luna Pison, issued on 21 January 1997 an Order
(second order) denying the motion. In denying the motion for reconsideration, Judge Pison explained that when the ground
for dismissal is the complaints failure to state a cause of action, the trial court determines such fact solely from the petition
itself. Judge Pison held that contrary to petitioner Dianas claim, a perusal of the allegations in the petition shows that
petitioner Diana has violated respondent Tadeos right, thus giving rise to a cause of action. Judge Pison also rejected
petitioner Dianas claim that respondent Tadeo is guilty of forum shopping in filing the second petition. Judge Pison explained
that when respondent Tadeo filed the second petition, the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-23445) was no longer pending
as it had been earlier dismissed without prejudice.
Petitioner Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals assailing the
trial courts first order deferring action on the Motion and the second order denying the motion for reconsideration on 14
February 1997. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner Diana that the trial court in its first order erred in deferring action on the
Motion until after a hearing on whether the complaint states a cause of action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals pointed
out that the trial courts second order corrected the situation since in denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial court
in effect denied the Motion. The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the allegations in the second petition state
a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven to be true.
The Court of Appeals also held that there was no violation of Circular No. 04-94. To determine the existence of forum
shopping, the elements of litis pendentia must exist or a final judgment in one case must amount to res judicata in the
other. In this case, there is no litis pendentia because respondent Tadeo had caused the dismissal without prejudice of the
first petition before filing the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because there is no final decision on the merits.
Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner Diana raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE SECOND PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE SUFFICIENTLY
STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION;
II. WHETHER RESPONDENT TADEO VIOLATED SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 IN
FAILING TO STATE THE FILING OF A PREVIOUS PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE, ITS
TERMINATION AND STATUS.[4]
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Sufficiency of Cause of Action
Petitioner Dianas contention that the second petition fails to state a cause of action is untenable. A cause of action is
an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right of the plaintiff.[5] A complaint states a cause of action when
it contains three essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises;
(2) an obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the
plaintiff.[6]
We find the second petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of the
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code.[7] The petition alleged that respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were
legally married at the Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship as shown by the marriage contract attached to the
petition. The couple established their residence in Quezon City. The union begot five children, Ana Maria, born on 8
November 1964; Isabel, born on 28 October 1968; Ernesto Tadeo, born on 31 March 1970; Regina Rachelle born on 7 March
1974; and Cristina Maria born in February 1978. The petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was psychologically
incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply with the essential obligations of marriage and such
incapacity subsists up to the present time. The petition alleged the non-complied marital obligations in this manner:
xxx
5. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich family,
was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She would go to her sisters house or would play
tennis the whole day.
6. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the sickness of a child, respondent
withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband.
7. On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the pretext of re-
evaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. She further
insisted that she wanted to feel a little freedom from petitioners marital authority and influences. The petitioner argued
that he could occupy another room in their conjugal dwelling to accommodate respondents desire, but no amount of plea
and explanation could dissuade her from demanding that the petitioner leave their conjugal dwelling.
8. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondents pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to
leave their conjugal dwelling and reside in a condominium located in Greenhills.
9. This separation resulted in complete estrangement between the petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner waived
his right to the conjugal dwelling in respondents favor through an extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal partnership of
gains. The separation in fact between the petitioner and the respondent still subsists to the present time.
10. The parties likewise agreed on the custody and support of the children. The extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal
partnership of gains is hereto attached as Annex C and taken as an integral part hereof.
11. The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligation of marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and until the present time. Such incapacity was
conclusively found in the psychological examination conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and the
respondent.
12. Under Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is void ab initio and
needs to be annulled. This petition is in accordance with Article 39 thereof.
xxx.[8]
The second petition states the ultimate facts on which respondent bases his claim in accordance with Section 1, Rule
8 of the old Rules of Court.[9] Ultimate facts refer to the principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of
which the cause of action rests. The term does not refer to details of probative matter or particulars of evidence which
establish the material elements.[10]
Petitioner Diana relies mainly[11] on the rulings in Santos v. Court of Appeals[12] as well as in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina.[13] Santos gave life to the phrase psychological incapacity, a novel provision in the Family Code, by
defining the term in this wise:
xxx psychological incapacity should refer to no less than mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist
at the time the marriage is celebrated. xxx.
Molina additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in cases for annulment of marriages
grounded on psychological incapacity.[14]
Petitioner Diana argues that the second petition falls short of the guidelines set forth
in Santos and Molina. Specifically, she contends that the second petition is defective because it fails to allege the root cause
of the alleged psychological incapacity. The second petition also fails to state that the alleged psychological incapacity existed
from the celebration of the marriage and that it is permanent or incurable. Further, the second petition is devoid of any
reference of the grave nature of the illness to bring about the disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Lastly, the second petition did not even state the marital obligations which petitioner Diana allegedly failed to
comply due to psychological incapacity.
Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (new Rules).[15]Specifically, Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules
provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
x x x.
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either
or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the
time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the
time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. (Emphasis supplied)
Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.[16] The obvious effect of the
new Rules providing that expert opinion need not be alleged in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root
cause of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to
determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion
on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the
psychological incapacity.
 Science continues to explore, examine and explain how our brains work, respond to and control the human body.
Scientists still do not understand everything there is to know about the root causes of psychological disorders. The root
causes of many psychological disorders are still unknown to science even as their outward, physical manifestations are
evident. Hence, what the new Rules require the petition to allege are the physical manifestations indicative of psychological
incapacity. Respondent Tadeos second petition complies with this requirement.
The second petition states a cause of action since it states the legal right of respondent Tadeo, the correlative
obligation of petitioner Diana, and the act or omission of petitioner Diana in violation of the legal right. In Dulay v. Court of
Appeals,[17] the Court held:
In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind
that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset;
this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in
a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed
regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Devt Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing
Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack
of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been
defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). xxx. (Emphasis
supplied)
A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action hypothetically admits all the
factual averments in the complaint.[18] Given the hypothetically admitted facts in the second petition, the trial court could
render judgment over the case.
Forum Shopping
Similarly untenable is petitioner Dianas contention that the second petitions certificate of non-forum shopping which
does not mention the filing of the first petition and its dismissal without prejudice violates Circular No. 04-94.[19] Petitioner
Diana refers to this portion of Circular No. 04-94-
1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint, petition, application or other
initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme court, the Court of Appeals, or any
other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such action or proceeding which is either pending or
may have been terminated, he must state the status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or
proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency,
he undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and
sworn certification contemplated herein have been filed.[20]
Petitioner Diana points out that respondent Tadeo did not disclose in his certificate of non-forum shopping that he
had previously commenced a similar action based on the same grounds with the same prayer for relief. The certificate of
non-forum shopping should have stated the fact of termination of the first petition or its status.
The Court has consistently held that a certificate of non-forum shopping not attached to the petition or one belatedly
filed or one signed by counsel and not the party himself constitutes a violation of the requirement. Such violation can result
in the dismissal of the complaint or petition. However, the Court has also previously held that the rule of substantial
compliance applies to the contents of the certification.[21]
In Roxas v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court squarely addressed the issue of whether the omission of a statement on
the prior filing and dismissal of a case involving the same parties and issues merits dismissal of the petition. In Roxas, the
Court ruled:
xxx an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would not constitute res judicata and litis
pendentia as in the case at bar, is not fatal as to merit the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings considering
that the evils sought to be prevented by the said certificate are not present. It is in this light that we ruled in Maricalum
Mining Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission that a liberal interpretation of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 on
non-forum shopping would be more in keeping with the objectives of procedural rules which is to secure a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
The dismissal of the first petition precluded the eventuality of litis pendentia. The first petitions dismissal did not also
amount to res judicata. Thus, there is no need to state in the certificate of non-forum shopping in the second petition (Civil
Case No. Q-95-24471) about the prior filing and dismissal of the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-23445).
The first petition was dismissed without prejudice at the instance of respondent Tadeo to keep the peace between
him and his grown up children. The dismissal happened before service of answer or any responsive pleading. Clearly, there
is no litis pendentia since respondent Tadeo had already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the first petition when he
subsequently filed the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because the dismissal order was not a decision on the
merits but a dismissal without prejudice.
Circular No. 04-94,[23] now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, must be interpreted and applied to
achieve its purpose. The Supreme Court promulgated the Circular to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of
justice. The Circular should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate
objective or the goal of all rules of procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.[24]
A final word. We are ever mindful of the principle that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation
of the family that the state cherishes and protects.[25] In rendering this Decision, this Court is not prejudging the main issue
of whether the marriage is void based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court must resolve this issue after trial on
the merits where each party can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses. We are merely holding
that, based on the allegations in the second petition, the petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action and does not violate
the rule on forum shopping. Thus, the second petition is not subject to attack by a motion to dismiss on these grounds.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision dated 30 May 1997 as well as the Resolution dated 7 August
1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of Appeals2 affirming the
decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void the marriage
contracted between herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her
husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in
the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16,
1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor,
Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which
incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and
promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two
months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991,
respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing at his given address. Consequently,
on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The trial court
granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published
in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive
pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case
to the prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted the motion on November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no collusion existed between the parties.
He prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was
not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondents motion to present her evidence ex parte. She
then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her
testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio
Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are ordered to make proper entries into
the records of the afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment of the Court.
SO ORDERED.4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshios psychological incapacity, the trial court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the
petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and
welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and
 lack of respect for his wife and child which characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior could
be traced to respondents mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life.5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the Court of
Appeals but the same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and
evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered denying the instant appeal. The decision of the court a quo
is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month after the celebration of the marriage,
and returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except
for two months, he never sent any support to nor communicated with them despite the letters respondent sent. He even
visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact
Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to
his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of
the Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion and creation of a
family as a social inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage where the other
spouse is not around and worse, left them without even helping them cope up with family life and assist in the
upbringing of their daughter as required under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code?7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina8and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.9 In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed
marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:
I (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio
Hamano to perform his marital obligations, despite respondents failure to comply with the guidelines laid
down in the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did not automatically
constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling
short of reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder on the part of
Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the courts a quo and sought the denial
of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.11 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity
of the marriage.12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 for the guidance of
the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the
family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in
the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the
illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone
of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation
of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and
their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095.13 (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability."14 The foregoing guidelines do not
require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
"medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys
psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.15
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshios psychological incapacity to fulfill his
marital responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family. He abandoned them a
month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but he never replied. He made a trip to the
Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to
assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor
proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no
other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there
was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondents case had she presented
evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This
respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation.16 There was no showing that the case at bar
was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from
the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it
is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he
must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.17 There was no proof of a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.18
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present case
involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we
find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules
merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and
clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general.
Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution that the State cherishes and
protects. While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage to her husband may not necessarily be the
fitting denouement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 170022, January 09, 2013]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1rl1 filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines challenging the
October 7, 2005 amended decision2rl1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) that reconsidered its March 22, 2004
decision3rl1 (original decision) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. In its original decision, the CA set aside the June 5, 2002
decision4rl1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 95-74257, which
The Factual Antecedents
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita5rl1 and the union bore two children, Maricar and Manny.6rl1 To support
his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in Saudi Arabia, learned
that Lolita had been having an illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991,7rl1 Lolita allegedly left the conjugal
home with her children and lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed
with the RTC a petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita's psychological
incapacity.8rl1
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she contended that Alvin used to be an associate in her promotions
business. She insisted that she is not psychologically incapacitated and that she left their home because of irreconcilable
differences with her mother-in-law.9rl1
At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita's infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the family home.10rl1 He
testified that he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their children even after he learned of her illicit affair
with Alvin.11rl1
Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report12rl1 on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the National
Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found that Lolita was "not suffering from any form of major psychiatric
illness[,]13rl1 but had been "unable to provide the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital
relationship;14rl1 her "transferring from one job to the other depicts some interpersonal problems with co-workers
as well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions;15rl1and "her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies
her reluctance to work out a good marital and family relationship.16rl1
The RTC Ruling
In its June 5, 2002 decision,17rl1 the RTC declared Cesar's marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to declare
Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.cralawlibrary
The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the CA.cralawlibrary
The CA Ruling
The CA originally18rl1 set aside the RTC's verdict, finding that Lolita's abandonment of the conjugal dwelling and
infidelity were not serious cases of personality disorder/psychological illness. Lolita merely refused to comply with her
marital obligations which she was capable of doing. The CA significantly observed that infidelity is only a ground for legal
separation, not for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage.cralawlibrary
Cesar sought reconsideration19rl1 of the CA's decision and, in due course, attained his objective. The CA set aside its
original decision and entered another, which affirmed the RTC's decision. In its amended decision,20 the CA found two
circumstances indicative of Lolita's serious psychological incapacity that resulted in her gross infidelity: (1) Lolita's
unwarranted refusal to perform her marital obligations to Cesar; and (2) Lolita's willful and deliberate act of abandoning
the conjugal dwelling.cralawlibrary
The OSG then filed the present petition.cralawlibrary
The Petition
The OSG argues that Dr. Flores' psychological evaluation report did not disclose that Lolita had been suffering from a
psychological illness nor did it establish its juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability; infidelity and abandonment do
not constitute psychological incapacity, but are merely grounds for legal separation.cralawlibrary
The Case for the Respondent
Cesar submits that Lolita's infidelity and refusal to perform her marital obligations established her grave and incurable
psychological incapacity.cralawlibrary
The Issue
The case presents to us the legal issue of whether there exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar's marriage to Lolita on the
ground of psychological incapacity.cralawlibrary
The Court's Ruling
We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to annul Cesar's marriage to Lolita on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence
on Psychological Incapacity
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage. It provides
that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization."
In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates "downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations;21rl1 not merely the
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.22rl1 The plaintiff bears the burden of
proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of
the condition of the errant spouse.23rl1
Cesar failed to prove Lolita's
psychological incapacity
In this case, Cesar's testimony failed to prove Lolita's alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the dates when he
learned of Lolita's alleged affair and her subsequent abandonment of their home,24rl1as well as his continued financial
support to her and their children even after he learned of the affair,25rl1but he merely mentioned in passing Lolita's
alleged affair with Alvin and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.cralawlibrary
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily constitute
psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation.26rl1 To constitute psychological incapacity, it
must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality that completely
prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential marital obligations.27rl1 No evidence on record exists to
support Cesar's allegation that Lolita's infidelity and abandonment were manifestations of any psychological
illness.cralawlibrary
Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores' psychological evaluation report on Lolita to prove her alleged psychological
incapacity. The psychological evaluation, in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer from any major psychiatric
illness.28rl1 Dr. Flores' observation on Lolita's interpersonal problems with co-workers,29rl1 to our mind, does not pending appointment of a regular administrator became an urgent necessity.
suffice as a consideration for the conclusion that she was at the time of her marriage psychologically incapacitated to
enter into a marital union with Cesar. Aside from the time element involved, a wife's psychological fitness as a spouse
cannot simply be equated with her professional/work relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities are poles
apart from their marital counterparts. While both spring from human relationship, their relatedness and relevance to one
another should be fully established for them to be compared or to serve as measures of comparison with one another. To
be sure, the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores' further belief that
Lolita's refusal to go with Cesar abroad signified a reluctance to work out a good marital relationship30rl1 is a mere
generalization unsupported by facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court cannot support.cralawlibrary
In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence of Lolita's psychological incapacity; thus, the CA committed a
reversible error when it reconsidered its original decision.cralawlibrary
Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable social institution31rl1 protected by the State. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of its existence its existence and continuation and against its dissolution and nullity.32rl1 It cannot be
dissolved at the whim of the parties nor by transgressions made by one party to the other during the
marriage.cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the October 7, 2005 amended decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Cesar Encelan's petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage
to Lolita Castillo-Encelan.cralawlibrary
Costs against the respondent.cralawlibrary
G.R. No. L-26462 June 9, 1969
TERESITA C. YAPTINCHAY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO E. TORRES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch; VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY, in her
own behalf and in her capacity as Special Administratrix in the Intestate Estate of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and
JESUS MONZON, MARY YAPTINCHAY ELIGIR, ERNESTO YAPTINCHAY, ANTONIO YAPTINCHAY, ASUNCION YAPTINCHAY,
JOSEFINA Y. YAPTINCHAY, ROSA Y. MONZON, ISABEL Y. VALERIANO, REMEDIOS Y. YAPTINCHAY, FELICIDAD Y.
ARGUELLES, MARY DOE and JOHN DOE,respondents.
V. E. del Rosario and Associates for petitioner.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo and Feliciano for respondents.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The problem posed in this, an original petition for certiorari, is whether or not this Court in the exercise of its supervisory
powers should stake down as having been issued in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the respondent
judge's order of June 15, 1966 in Civil Case 8873 (Court of First Instance of Rizal) directing petitioner to deliver to Special
Administratrix Virginia Y. Yaptinchay of the estate of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay the North Forbes Park property
hereinafter described, and to refrain from disturbing or interfering in any manner whatsoever with the latter's possession
thereof, such order having been amended by said respondent judge's subsequent order of June, 28, 1966 in turn enjoining
defendants in said case (private respondents herein) and/or their duly authorized agents or representatives from selling,
disposing, or otherwise encumbering said property in any manner whatsoever pending the termination of said case. We
granted the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction prayed for and directed respondents to return the possession of the
North Forbes Park property to petitioner upon a P50,000-bond.
The controlling facts are the following:
On July 13, 1965, herein petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay sought in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch,
her appointment first as Special Administratrix and then as regular administratrix of the estate of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay who
died in Hongkong on July 7, 1965. This is known in the record as Special Proceedings 1944-P. Petitioner there alleged that
the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay had lived with her continuously, openly and publicly as husband and wife for nineteen
(19) years: from 1946 to 1964 at 1951 Taft-Avenue, Pasay City, and from 1964 to July 1965 at 60 Russel Avenue, Pasay City;
that the deceased who died without a will left an estate consisting of personal and real properties situated in the
Philippines, Hongkong and other places with an estimated value of about P500,000; that to petitioner's knowledge and
information, the deceased left three daughters, Virginia Yaptinchay, Mary Yaptinchay Eligir and Asuncion Yaptinchay, all of
age; that on July 7, 8 and 11, 1965, certain parties carted away from the residences aforesaid personal properties
belonging to the deceased together with others exclusively owned by petitioner. It was averred that in these
circumstances the appointment of a special administrator to take custody and care of the interests of the deceased
Upon the foregoing allegations, the court issued on July 17, 1965 an order appointing herein petitioner Teresita C.
Yaptinchay special administratrix of the state of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay upon a P25,000-bond.
To the petition of Teresita C. Yaptinchay, an opposition was registered by Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate
wife, and Ernesto Y. Yaptinchay and other children, of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay, upon the ground that said
Teresita C. Yaptinchay, not being an heir of the decedent, had no right to institute the proceeding for the settlement of the
latter's estate, much less to procure appointment as administratrix thereof; and that having admittedly cohabited with the
deceased for a number of years said petitioner was not qualified to serve as administratrix for want of integrity. At the
same time, oppositors counter-petitioned for the appointment of Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, daughter of the deceased, as
special administratrix and of Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, the alleged surviving spouse, as regular administratrix.
To give oppositors an opportunity to be heard, the probate court, on July 19, 1965, set aside its order of July 17, 1965
appointing petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay special administratrix.
On July 30, 1965, after the parties were heard, the probate court granted counter-petitioners' prayer and named Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay special administratrix upon a P50,000-bond.1awphil.nt
On August 18, 1965, the special administratrix submitted a preliminary inventory of the assets of the estate of the
deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay. Included amongst these was "[a] bungalow residential house with swimming pool, situated
at Park corner Talisay Road, North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal" adverted to at the start of this opinion.
It was after respondent Virginia Y. Yaptinchay had been appointed special administratrix that herein petitioner Teresita C.
Yaptinchay made her second move. That was on August 14, 1965. This time, petitioner filed in another branch (Pasig
Branch) of the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for replevin and for liquidation of the partnership supposedly
formed during the period of her cohabitation with Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and for damages. This case was docketed as Civil
Case 8873. 1 Pending hearing on the question of the issuance of the writs of replevin and preliminary injunction prayed
for, respondent judge Guillermo E. Torres issued an order of August 17, 1965 temporarily restraining defendants therein
(private respondents here) and their agents from disposing any of the properties listed in the complaint and from
interfering with plaintiff's (herein petitioner's) rights to, and possession over, amongst others, "the house now standing at
North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal."
On August 25, 1965, defendants (private respondents herein) resisted the action, opposed the issuance of the writs of
replevin and preliminary injunction, mainly upon these propositions: (1) that exclusive jurisdiction over the settlement of
the estate of the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay was already vested in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch
in the special proceedings heretofore mentioned (Special Proceedings No. 1944-P); (2) that the present liquidation case
was filed to oust said probate court of jurisdiction over the properties enumerated in this, the second case (Civil Case
8873); and (3) that plaintiff was not entitled to the remedy of injunction prayed for, her alleged right sought to be
protected thereby being doubtful and still in dispute.
Said defendants (private respondents before this Court) in turn prayed the court for a writ of preliminary injunction to
direct plaintiff (petitioner here) and all others in her behalf to cease and desist from disturbing in any manner whatsoever
defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay's possession amongst others of the North Forbes Park house and to order the removal
from the premises of said North Forbes Park house of the guards, agents and employees installed therein by plaintiff; to
enjoin plaintiff and her agents from entering the aforesaid house and any other real property registered in the name of
Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and from interfering with or from disturbing the exercise by Virginia Y. Yaptinchay of her rights and
powers of administration over the assets registered in the name of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay and/or in the latter's possession at
the time of his death.
Came the herein disputed order of June 15, 1966 issued in said Civil Case 8873, the pertinent portion of which
reads: "From the pleadings as well as the evidence already submitted and representations made to the court
during the arguments, it appears that one of the properties in dispute is the property located at the corner of
Park Road and Talisay Street, North Forbes Park, Makati, Rizal which at the time of the death of the deceased
Isidro Y. Yaptinchay was still under construction and it also appears that after his death said property was
among the properties of the deceased placed under the administration of the special administratrix, the
defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay. Information has been given that in the evening of August 14, 1965, the
plaintiff was able to dispossess the special administratrix from the premises in question and that since then she
had been in custody of said house.
While the Court is still considering the merits of the application and counter-application for provisional relief,
the Court believes that for the protection of the properties and considering the Forbes Park property is really
under the responsibility of defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, by virtue of her being appointed Special
Administratrix of the estate of the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay, the Court denies the petition for the issuance of
 a writ of preliminary injunction of the plaintiff with respect to the Forbes Park property and the restraining
order issued by this Court is lifted. The Court also orders the plaintiff to cease and desist from disturbing in any
manner whatsoever the defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay in the possession of said property.
WHEREFORE, upon defendant's filing a bond in the amount of P10,000.00, let a writ of preliminary injunction is
requiring the plaintiff, her representatives and agents or other persons acting in her behalf to deliver the
possession of the property located at the corner of Park Road and Talisay Street, North Forbes Park, Makati,
Rizal to the Special Administratrix Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, and to refrain from disturbing interfering in any
manner whatsoever defendant's possession thereof.
Which, as aforestated, was amended by the court order of June 28, 1966, which in part recites:
Considering that the present case treats principally with the liquidation of an alleged partnership between the
plaintiff and the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay and considering further that said house in North Forbes Park is
included among the properties in dispute, the Court hereby clarifies its Order of June 15, 1966 by enjoining the
defendants and/or their duly authorized agents or representatives from selling, disposing or otherwise
encumbering said property in any manner whatsoever pending the termination of this case.
Petitioner's motion to reconsider the June 15, 1966 order was overturned by respondent judge's order of August 8, 1966,
which recites that:
Considering that defendants, principally Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, took actual or physical possession of the said
properties which were formerly held by the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay and the plaintiff, by virtue of her
appointment and under her authority, as Special Administratrix of the estate of the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay,
the plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied.2
The orders of June 15 and August 8, 1966 triggered the present proceedings in this Court.
1. Petitioner's stance before us is this: As she was occupying the Forbes Park property at the time of the death of Isidro
Yaptinchay, grave abuse of discretion attended respondent judge's order issuing an injunctive writ transferring possession
of said property to respondent Virginia Y. Yaptinchay.
A rule of long standing echoed and reechoed in jurisprudence is that injunction is not to be granted for the purpose of
taking property out of possession and/or control of a party and placing it in that of another whose title thereto has not
been clearly established. 3 With this as guidepost, petitioner would have been correct if she were lawfully in possession of
the house in controversy when Civil Case 8873 (where the injunctive writ was issued) was commenced in the Pasig
court, and if respondent special administratrix, to whom the possession thereof was transferred, were without right
thereto. But the situation here is not as petitioner pictures it to be. It is beyond debate that with the institution on July 13,
1965 of Special Proceedings 1944-P, properties belonging not only to the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay but also to the
conjugal partnership of said deceased and his legitimate wife, Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, 4 were brought under the jurisdiction
of the probate court, properly to be placed under administration.5 One such property is the lot at North Forbes Park. 6
With respect to the Forbes Park house, petitioner offers varying versions. In the verified petition before this Court,
petitioner avers "that the construction of said North Forbes Park property was undertaken jointly by petitioner and the
deceased, petitioner even contributing her own exclusive funds therefor." 7 This is a reproduction of an allegation in
petitioner's June 27, 1966 alternative motion for reconsideration or for clarification/amendment of the herein
controverted order of June 15, 1966 in Civil Case 8873. 8 And again, in the affidavit of Teresita C. Yaptinchay dated August
3, 1965, she spoke of the acquisition of properties, real and personal, in her own words, "through our joint efforts and
capital, among which properties are those situated" in "North Forbes Park." 9 All of which contradict her averment in the
amended complaint dated October 25, 1965 also verified in said Case 8873 to the effect that she "acquired through
her own personal funds and efforts real properties such as ... the house now standing at North Forbes Park, Makati,
Rizal." 10
But herein private respondents vehemently dispute petitioner's claim of complete or even partial ownership of the house.
They maintain that the construction of that house was undertaken by the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay without her
(petitioner's) intervention and the deceased paid with his own personal funds all expenses incurred in connection with the
construction thereof. 11
It was only after hearing and considering the evidence adduced and the fact that after the death of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay the
Forbes Park house "was among the properties of the deceased placed under the administration of" respondent Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay, that respondent judge issued the injunction order of June 15, 1966 herein complained of. Worth repeating at
this point is that respondent judge, in his order of August 8, 1966, declared that defendants (private respondents herein),
"principally Virginia Y. Yaptinchay, took actual or physical possession", amongst others, of the North Forbes Park house
"by virtue of her appointment and under her authority, as Special Administratrix."
On this score, petitioner herein is not entitled to the injunction she prayed for below.
2. As well established is the rule that the grant or denial of an injunction rests upon the sound discretion of the court, in
the exercise of which appellate courts will not interfere except in a clear case of abuse. 12
A considerate and circumspect view of the facts and circumstances in this case obtaining will not permit us to tag the
disputed order of June 15, 1966 with the vice of grave abuse of discretion. It is quite true that, in support of the allegation
that the house in North Forbes Park was her exclusive property, petitioner presented proof in the form of loans that she
had contracted during the period when said house was under construction. But evidence is wanting which would correlate
such loans to the construction work. On the contrary, there is much to the documentary proof presented by petitioner
which would tend to indicate that the loans she obtained from the Republic Bank were for purposes other than the
construction of the North Forbes Park home. And this, we gather from pages 17 to 18 of petitioner's memorandum before
this Court; and the affidavit of Teresita C. Yaptinchay, Annex A thereof, which states in its paragraph 4 that she obtained
various loans from the Republic Bank "for her own exclusive account" and that the proceeds thereof "were also used by
affiant both for her business and for the construction, completion and furnishing of the said house at North Forbes Park",
and which cites her seven promissory notes in favor of Republic Bank, Appendices 1 to 7 of said affidavit. Not one of the
promissory notes mentioned reveals use of the proceeds for the construction of the North Forbes Park house. On the
contrary, there is Appendix 2, the promissory note for P54,000 which says that the purpose of the loan for "Fishpond
development"; Appendix 3 for P100,000 for the same purpose; Appendix 5 for P50,000, "To augment working capital in
buying & selling of appliances & gift items"; and Appendix 7 for P1,090,000, "For Agricultural Development". In plain terms,
the fact alone of petitioner's indebtedness to the Republic Bank does not establish that said house was built with her own
funds.
It is in the context just recited that the unsupported assertion that the North Forbes Park house is petitioner's exclusive
property may not be permitted to override the prima facie presumption that house, having been constructed on the lot of
Isidro Y. Yaptinchay (or of the conjugal partnership) at his instance, and during the existence of his marriage with
respondent Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, is part of the estate that should be under the control of the special administratrix.
3. Nor can petitioner's claim of ownership presumably based on the provisions of Article 144 of the Civil Code be decisive.
Said Article 144 says that: "When man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership." .
But stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the civil relationship envisaged in Article 144 is circumscribed by
conditions, the existence of which must first be shown before rights provided thereunder may be deemed to accrue. 13 One
such condition is that there must be a clear showing that the petitioner had, during cohabitation, really contributed to the
acquisition of the property involved. Until such right to co-ownership is duly established, petitioner's interests in the
property in controversy cannot be considered the "present right" or title that would make available the protection or aid
afforded by a writ of injunction. 14 For, the existence of a clear positive right especially calling for judicial protection is
wanting. Injunction indeed, is not to protect contingent or future rights; 15 nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right. 16
At any rate, it would seem to us that the interests of the parties would be better safeguarded if the controverted North
Forbes Park property be in the hands of the bonded administratrix in the estate proceedings. For then, her acts would be
subject to the control of the probate court.
Finding no error in the disputed orders of respondent judge, the herein petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed, and the
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction 17 issued by this Court is hereby dissolved and set aside.
Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31
January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife
to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay
and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain
a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of
bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that
the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family
Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese
Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to
the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing
the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the
respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent,
where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial
court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the
preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that
only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void,
and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for
declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of
foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil
action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words,
the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife
and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with
Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine
courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujikis view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family
Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in
bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of
course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband
in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous
marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable.
Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil
Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a
copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of
annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or
correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the
certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujikis motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it
dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with
the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki
cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendants
prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20Moreover, petitioner
alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioners motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial
court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband
in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On
the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec.
4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court
x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan
City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x
x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry]
x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial
court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against
forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this
also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review.30 The public
respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO,
participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation
and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTCs "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to
comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue
to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v.
Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this
Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period
that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent
marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the
marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a
subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the
financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the
prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce decree,
in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay,
who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other
words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a
persons legal capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a
Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108,
citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Nial v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be
collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to comment on the
petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara
also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason
to oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause
misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the
reason behind the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To
be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family
Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of
the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court
and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition,51 the service of
summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial
court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments,
which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the
case on the merits. In Mijares v. Raada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were
reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the
previously concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties.
However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex
nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition
by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the
status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court
of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the
foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can
only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a
"presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover,
Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise
limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign
judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review
embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other
states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino
and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a
marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however,
recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino
citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese
Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the
beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section
3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a persons life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or
marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this
Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of
persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
(Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he
contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest
derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate
human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of
the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a spouses right in a marriage extends
further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family
Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the
integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the
personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a
subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75it refers to the husband or the wife
of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus,
the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the
prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution
for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal
action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue
on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of
prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore
interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the
bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of
all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once
established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC
relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards
of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and
children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to
prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369),
as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the
corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of
a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of
Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action
for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried
and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No.
8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the
legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse" 89 under the
laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt
the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot
try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage
between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists
in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her
country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already
effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this
Courts decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in
her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a
foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare
the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies
because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of
his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated
the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation
where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding
Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference
between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a
ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family
Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her.
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a
criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was
decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal
capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question
of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino
party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding
public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is
neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the
foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign
judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in
the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that
establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the
Philippines.1wphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover,
under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the
offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and the
contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional
Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, primarily assailing the 28
November 2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1the decretal
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2005, and the
Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Pias City are AFFIRMED in toto.2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein
respondents who are Eliseos common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia
Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and
Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed
a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City.3 In her Petition docketed as
SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when
her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise
impugned the validity of Eliseos marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during
the subsistence of the latters marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise,
among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her
father. In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth 2,040,000.00 and personal properties
worth 2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her
appointment as administratrix of her late fathers estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer,
opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted
that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City, at the time of his
death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement of decedents estate
should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Pias City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the
petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseos estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the
necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Pias City, thereby
discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseos last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The
dispositive of the RTC decision reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any disqualification or incompetence to serve as
administrator, let letters of administration over the estate of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to
petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by this Court of a bond in the amount of 100,000.00 to be
posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to
prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992. For purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseos estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that
the decedent was a resident of Las Pias City. The petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS
PIAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC
OF LAS PIAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY
MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN
THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.12
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should
be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in
the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had
estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term
"resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13Even where the
statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.14 Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the
terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."15In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil
actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning.18 As thus defined, "residence," in the context of
venue provisions, means nothing more than a persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency.19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that
the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Pias City. It is evident from the records that
during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For this reason, the
venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseos Death Certificate that he
is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates can be
considered proofs of a decedents residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not binding on the
courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as
husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo
filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground
that their marriage is void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia
before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with
Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners submission that the lower courts findings arose
from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelias marriage to Eliseo
as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the
lifetime of the parties to the marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo
and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Nial v.
Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Nial, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein
petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent after the death of
their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike
voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage.24
It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of rights, such
that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her fathers
marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may
be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a
compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and
Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseos marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to determine whether or not
the decedents marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was
sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the
officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a competent
evidence of marriage and the certification from the National Archive that no information relative to the said marriage
exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the first
marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be found in
the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any showing
that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseos marriage was solemnized, the inescapable
conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition
for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters
of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or
to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death
of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it
may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the
court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an
interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the
decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has
a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose
relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseos estate, is deemed
to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the
petitioners pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedents estate, is just a desperate attempt to
sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of
the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to
her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseos estate as one
of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28
November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004]
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision[1] dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment[2] dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol,
Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution[3] of the appellate court, dated
September 25, 2000, denying Morigos motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of
Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and after an
exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained
constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get
married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which was
granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago[4] at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish,
Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court
of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds
marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information[5] filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran
[City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.[6]
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of
his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied
upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months
of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[7]
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null and
void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[8] the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a
defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if
such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to
marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,[9] which held that the court of a
country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of
obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said
court is not entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in contracting the second marriage,
the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,[10] everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does
not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial
court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no
marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration of
nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be
punished by Article 349[12] of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage
had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in
a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not
be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15[13] of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to
public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17[14] of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered
ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v.
People,[15] allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for
good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit.[16] However, the denial was by a split
vote. The ponente of the appellate courts original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in
the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly declared
 void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first
marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable
doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE
SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE
FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.[17]
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his
defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario
court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy
would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in
the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and
hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference
between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his
intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant case is a convenient
but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[18] which held that bigamy can be
successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40[19] of the Family Code, a judicial
declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of
no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioners contention that he was in good
faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking
a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first determine whether
all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[20] we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not
been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC
of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered into by
petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar
of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.[21]
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a
solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence
of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3[22] and
4[23] of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, This simply means that there
was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words,
for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of
the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married.[24] The records show that
no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final
and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case,
legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the
principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the beginning. The
contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes,
petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity
of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense
cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant
charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.[25] In the latter case, the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held
therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One
who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle
applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as void.[26]
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first
before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites.
Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage
contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without
more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy
unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and
weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances
of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the
issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein
petitioners motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from
the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or
subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individuals criminal liability for bigamy. We hold
that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact
to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual
who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy,
notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990.
The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived
together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had
been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a
marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal
dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge
German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she
verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,3 Villareyes confirmed
that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.4 The Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said
marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage
with LETICIA ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential requisites for validity
were it not for the subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children.
However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage ceremony took
place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment
from his office in connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from
the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of
said marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUOCONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE
CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF
THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND
VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.12
Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to
Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to
the date on which the second marriage was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the
crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.14
Petitioners defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first
marriage between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage
contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at
the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes
and Tenebro were legally married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a certification issued by the National Statistics
Office dated October 7, 1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3,
1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between
Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself
would already have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public
documents are applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court reads as
follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the original of a document is in the custody
of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public
officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was
admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated
between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to
public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995
and that issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither document attests
as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November
10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of such a marriage.
Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a
marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence
of any record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage
contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact
that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are
present.19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself. Balanced against
this testimony are Villareyes letter, Ancajas testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first
marriage, and petitioners own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for
validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by
requesting his brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued by the
National Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively.
Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accuseds marriage to his second wife, private respondent in this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the first and second
requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent judicial declaration20 of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage to
Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of
bigamy was not committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are
concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological
capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently,
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before
the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the
provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first
marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing
between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a
subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for
bigamy is concerned. The States penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct
character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an individuals deliberate disregard of the permanent
character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an
indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a
marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely
given in the presence of the solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and
marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the
presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years
or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas.
Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license
before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date
of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that
said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself
that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy completely
nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus
escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of
futurity and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his
marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the
accuseds guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of
marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of
which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the States basic
social institution, the States criminal laws on bigamy step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has
a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall
be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which has a
duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of
the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183805, July 03, 2013
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Decision1 dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution2 dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444.
The factual antecedents are as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an
Information which reads:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused being
previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said marriage having been legally dissolved or
annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter.
Contrary to law.3
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of
nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the
marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case
for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view of the filing of the Motion to
Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of the second
marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the
husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the criminal
case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second marriage between him and private respondent had
already been declared void by the RTC.
In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioners Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss, to
wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be dismissed as a decision dated December 1, 2004 had
already been rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled: Karla
Medina-Capili versus James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo, a case for declaration of nullity of marriage) nullifying
the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and said decision is already final.
In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was stated, among others, that the issues raised in the
civil case are not similar or intimately related to the issue in this above-captioned case and that the resolution of the issues
in said civil case would not determine whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the parties, this Court is of the humble opinion
that there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the accused as it appears that the second marriage between James
Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo had already been nullified by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72 of Antipolo City
which has declared the voidness, non-existent or incipient invalidity of the said second marriage. As such, this Court
submits that there is no more bigamy to speak of.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.
Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTCs decision.
The falloreads:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 152 in
Crim. Case No. 128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.6nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution7 dated
July 24, 2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
1. THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE
PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT AND TO REVERSE THE ORDER DATED JULY 7,
2006 OF THE TRIAL COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 128370 GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE OF BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER,
INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID ORDER IS BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF
THE CASE IN THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72, IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE CONCLUDING AND DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN THE SAID DECISION WHICH
STATES THAT, AFTER PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES
X X X, THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT
SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL AND VOID.
 2. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN
PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043, IS ON THE GROUND THAT IT
IS BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS
BASED IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 14 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS NOT A GROUND FOR
DISMISSAL OF THE BIGAMY CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE OF THE SAID DECISION AND WHICH IS CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE
LAWS AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
3. THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN EXCEPTION TO EXISTING
JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO
THE SET OF FACTS IN THE SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE IS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR ABANDONING
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE INSTANT CASE THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE USE BY RESPONDENT SHIRLEY
G. TISMO OF THE SURNAME CAPILI IS ILLEGAL INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 DECLARING NULL AND VOID
THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD LONG BECOME
FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE OF THE SAID DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND
DULY RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF ENTRIES IN THE CORRESPONDING BOOK IN THE OFFICE OF THE
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE.8
In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.
We rule in the negative.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has not
been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according
to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage
has all the essential requisites for validity.9
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the Information was filed
on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999
during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3,
1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and
private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does
not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is
a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the
second marriage was celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accuseds conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime of bigamy is
consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null
and void, viz.:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration
of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution
of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke
the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the
charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a
judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab
initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled.11nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled that what makes a person
criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first
marriage. It further held that the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can
it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he
who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for bigamy.12
Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and
from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law.13 It is clear then that the crime of bigamy
was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality
of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioners second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for
bigamy against him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution dated July
24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191566 July 17, 2013
PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner People of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, against respondent Edgardo V. Odtuhan assailing the Court of Appeals
Decision1 dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution2 dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616. The assailed decision
granted the petition for certiorari filed by respondent, and ordered the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 27, to
give due course to and receive evidence on respondent's motion to quash and resolve the case with dispatch, while the
assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case follow:
On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina).3 On October 28, 1993, respondent married Eleanor A.
Alagon (Alagon).4 Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Modina.5 On February
23, 1999, the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondents petition and declared his marriage with Modina void ab
initio for lack of a valid marriage license.6 On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, in June 2003, private
complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned of respondents previous marriage with Modina.7She thus filed a Complaint-
Affidavit8 charging respondent with Bigamy.
On April 15, 2005, respondent was indicted in an Information9 for Bigamy committed as follows:
That on or about October 28, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused being then legally married to
JASMIN MODINA and without such marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with ELEANOR A. ALAGON, which second/subsequent marriage has
all the essential requisites for validity.
Contrary to law.10
On February 5, 2008, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion11 praying that he be allowed to present evidence to support his
motion; that his motion to quash be granted; and that the case be dismissed. Respondent moved for the quashal of the
information on two grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the criminal action
or liability has been extinguished.12
On September 4, 2008, the RTC13 issued an Order14 denying respondents Omnibus Motion. The RTC held that the facts
alleged in the information that there was a valid marriage between respondent and Modina and without such marriage
having been dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage with Alagon constitute the crime of bigamy. The trial
court further held that neither can the information be quashed on the ground that criminal liability has been extinguished,
because the declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not one of the modes of extinguishing criminal liability.
Respondents motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order15 dated February 20, 2009.
Aggrieved, respondent instituted a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court16 before the CA,
assailing the denial of his motion to quash the information despite the fact that his first marriage with Modina was
declared null and void ab initio prior to the filing of the bigamy case.17
On December 17, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The RTC, Branch 27, Manila is
hereby ordered to give due course to and receive evidence on the petitioners motion to quash and resolve the case with
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.18
The CA applied the conclusion made by the Court in Morigo v. People,19 and held that there is cogent basis in looking into
the motion to quash filed by respondent, for if the evidence would establish that his first marriage was indeed void ab
initio, one essential element of the crime of bigamy would be lacking.20 The appellate court further held that respondent is
even better off than Morigo which thus calls for the application of such doctrine, considering that respondent contracted
the second marriage after filing the petition for the declaration of nullity of his first marriage and he obtained the
favorable declaration before the complaint for bigamy was filed against him.21 The CA thus concluded that the RTC gravely
abused its discretion in denying respondents motion to quash the information, considering that the facts alleged in the
information do not charge an offense.22
With the denial of the motion for reconsideration before the CA, petitioner filed a petition before the Court in this petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court based on the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RENDERED ITS DECISION DATED DECEMBER 17, 2009
GRANTING RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND THE RESOLUTION DATED MARCH 4, 2010 DENYING
PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE INFORMATION CHARGING RESPONDENT OF BIGAMY SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGES ALL THE ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING SAID
OFFENSE.
II.
THE SUBSEQUENT COURT JUDGMENT DECLARING RESPONDENTS FIRST MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO DID NOT EXTINGUISH
RESPONDENTS CRIMINAL LIABILITY WHICH ALREADY ATTACHED PRIOR TO SAID JUDGMENT.23
The petition is meritorious.
The issues are not novel and have been squarely ruled upon by this Court in Montaez v. Cipriano,24 Teves v. People,25 and
Antone v. Beronilla.26
In Montaez, respondent Cipriano married Socrates in April 1976, but during the subsistence of their marriage on January
24, 1983, respondent married Silverio. In 2001, respondent filed a petition for the annulment of her marriage with
Socrates on the ground of psychological incapacity which was granted on July 18, 2003. On May 14, 2004, petitioner filed a
complaint for bigamy against respondent. The latter, however, moved for the quashal of the information and dismissal of
the criminal complaint alleging that her first marriage had already been declared void ab initio prior to the filing of the
bigamy case.
In Teves, petitioner married Thelma on November 26, 1992. During the subsistence of their marriage on December 10,
2001, he again married Edita. On May 4, 2006, petitioner obtained a declaration of her marriage with Thelma null and void
on the ground that the latter is physically incapacitated to comply with her marital obligations. On June 8, 2006, an
Information for Bigamy was filed against petitioner. The court eventually convicted petitioner of the crime charged.
In Antone, petitioner married respondent in 1978, but during the subsistence of their marriage, respondent contracted a
second marriage in 1991. On April 26, 2007, respondent obtained a declaration of nullity of her first marriage which
decision became final and executory on May 15, 2007. On June 21, 2007, the prosecution filed an information for bigamy
against respondent which the latter sought to be quashed on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense.
The present case stemmed from similar procedural and factual antecedents as in the above cases. As in Antone and
Montaez, respondent moved to quash the information on the grounds that the facts do not charge the offense of bigamy
and that his criminal liability has been extinguished both because of the declaration of nullity of the first marriage. The RTC
refused to quash the information. On petition for certiorari, the CA, however, reached a different conclusion.
As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal
complaint or information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in
the face of the information." It is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. The fundamental test in
determining the sufficiency of the material averments in an Information is whether or not the facts alleged therein, which
are hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or
matters extrinsic of the information are not to be considered.27 To be sure, a motion to quash should be based on a defect
in the information which is evident on its fact.28 Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it is based on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the court the opportunity to correct
the defect by amendment.29 If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or
information be filed30 except when the information is quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal liability or double
jeopardy.31
An examination of the information filed against respondent, however, shows the sufficiency of the allegations therein to
constitute the crime of bigamy as it contained all the elements of the crime as provided for in Article 34932 of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit:
(1) That the offender has been legally married;
(2) That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.33
Here, the information contained the following allegations: (1) that respondent is legally married to Modina; (2) that
without such marriage having been legally dissolved; (3) that respondent willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a
second marriage with Alagon; and (4) that the second marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. Respondents
evidence showing the courts declaration that his marriage to Modina is null and void from the beginning because of the
absence of a marriage license is only an evidence that seeks to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the information
that a first valid marriage was subsisting at the time he contracted the second marriage. This should not be considered at
all, because matters of defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash.34It is notproper, therefore, to resolve the charges at
the very outset without the benefit of a full blown trial. The issues require a fuller examination and it would be unfair to
shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to quash the information on the basis of the document
presented by respondent.35 With the presentation of the court decree, no facts have been brought out which destroyed
the prima facie truth accorded to the allegations of the information on the hypothetical admission thereof.
Respondents motion to quash was founded on the trial courts declaration that his marriage with Modina is null and void
ab initio. He claims that with such declaration, one of the elements of the crime is wanting. Thus, the allegations in the
information do not charge the offense of bigamy, or at the very least, such court decree extinguished his criminal liability.
Both respondent and the CA heavily relied on the Courts pronouncement in Morigo v. People36where the accused therein
was acquitted because the elements of the crime of bigamy were incomplete. In said case, the first marriage was declared
null and void, because the parties only signed the marriage contract without the presence of a solemnizing officer.
Considering, therefore, that the declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage, the Court held that there
was no marriage to speak of when the accused contracted the second marriage. Logically, the accused was acquitted.
The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.1wphi1 A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.37 It has been
held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be
contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.38
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage.39 Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for
the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore,
he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.40 If we allow respondents line of defense and the CAs ratiocination, a person who commits
bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage
and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him.41
Respondent, likewise, claims that there are more reasons to quash the information against him, because he obtained the
declaration of nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy against him. Again, we cannot sustain such
contention. In addition to the discussion above, settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon
the commission of the offense and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law and
that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material only for determining prescription.42
Thus, as held in Antone:
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the latter
contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the
information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense. Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be
interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the
allegations in the information are matters of defense which may be raised only during the presentation of evidence.43
In view of the foregoing, the CA erred in granting the petition for certiorari filed by respondent. The RTC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash and to allow him to present evidence to support his omnibus
motion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution
dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616 are SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 05-235814 is REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and the 14 March 2012 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in
Caloocan City. They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto parts
and supplies business owned by Benjamins family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of America. In
February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sallys father was against the relationship. On 7
March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a
purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamins marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not
be registered.
Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of their cohabitation,
they acquired the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as
spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin, married to Sally;
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in the name of Sally,
married to Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a single individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her.
She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated
marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it
lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he
acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the
properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total
of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties
enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court denied. Sally filed a motion
for reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and
asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally
then refused to present any evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of Appeals.
The trial court gave Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September
2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite repeated warnings from the
trial court, Sally still refused to present her evidence, prompting the trial court to consider the case submitted for decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave weight to the
certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during trial, that only Marriage
License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982 and the purported Marriage License
No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local
civil registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamins subsisting marriage
with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second
marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a
marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy
status of Bernice and Bentley because they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sallys claim for spousal
support because she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied support for Bernice and Bentley who
were both of legal age and did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as part
of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin. Further, the
37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamins parents who gave the properties to their children,
including Benjamin, as advance inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase
"married to Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamins civil status in the title. As regards the two lots under TCT Nos.
61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were bought by Benjamin using his own money and that Sally failed to
prove any actual contribution of money, property or industry in their purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a
registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two condominium units
under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium
units were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the properties under TCT Nos. 61722,
61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without
prejudice to Benjamins right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena.
Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sallys share in the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-
193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamins share reverted to his conjugal ownership with
Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro
Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared NONEXISTENT.
Respondents claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724,
17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620, 194621, 194622,
194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629, 194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636,
194637, 194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan
are the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are directed
to delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these thirty-seven (37) titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties acquired from petitioners
money without contribution from respondent, hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife.
Consequently, petitioner is appointed the administrator of these five (5) properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an
accounting of her collections of income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof. Except for
lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to turn over and
surrender control and possession of these properties including the documents of title to the petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under co-ownership of the parties shared
by them equally. However, the share of respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley Go
Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation,
partition and distribution of these two (2) properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-
10 of March 15, 2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.
Respondents claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no
declaration of the status of the parties children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and the Registry of
Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August
2009,7 the trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial courts decision before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial
court did not err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted that there were six resettings of the case,
all made at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present her evidence on
the next hearing or the case would be deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally still failed to
present her evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and was not subpoenaed despite the
presence of her other witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sallys allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamins action was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there was no
evidence that the marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with Sally. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamins marriage to Sally null and void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contribution. The Court
of Appeals ruled that the 37 properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties under TCT
Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was able to establish that
they were acquired by him solely. The Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were
exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamins actual contribution in their purchase. The Court of
Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by
them in common, to be shared equally. However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his
existing marriage with Azucena while Sallys share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and convincing proof of bad
faith.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that would show bias and
prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Order dated March
26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 04-109401
are hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-
appellee while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely
owned by the respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned by them and common and to be
shared equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his first marriage
while the share of respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.8
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial courts ruling that Sally had
waived her right to present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial courts decision declaring
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and non-existent; and
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with modification the trial courts
decision regarding the property relations of Benjamin and Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts ruling that she waived her right to present her
evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she and Benjamin were married, the trial court
abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to the
discretion of the trial court.9 In this case, Sallys presentation of evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter,
there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November
2008. They were all made at Sallys instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned
Sally that in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for decision. On the date of the
scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not
even subpoenaed on that day. Sallys counsel insisted that the trial court could not dictate on the priority of witnesses to
be presented, disregarding the trial courts prior warning due to the numerous resettings of the case. Sally could not
complain that she had been deprived of her right to present her evidence because all the postponements were at her
instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would submit the case for decision should she still fail to present her
evidence on 28 November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed to have waived her
right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sallys continued failure to present her evidence despite the
opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally
was delaying the case because she was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition questioning the trial
courts denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did not issue any temporary
restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect marriage as an inviolable
institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to
proceed by one of the parties.10
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin because a marriage
could not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were allowed to
present her evidence, she would have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked
this Court to consider that in acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was "married to"
her; that Benjamin was the informant in their childrens birth certificates where he stated that he was their father; and
that Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was no real property
registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin was not the informant in the birth
certificates of his children with Azucena.
First, Benjamins marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial court, evidenced by a
certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7
March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed
that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-
07568 did not match the series issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City did
not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to
prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative
value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was void from the beginning
for lack of a marriage license.12
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded
with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta B. Javier,
Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the
Archives Division of the Records Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the Arts;14 and
Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics Office.15 The documentary and
testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally,
intended to cover her up from expected social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially from
her parents seen as Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the informant in Bernices birth certificate which stated
that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 198218 while Sally was the informant in Bentleys birth certificate which
also stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married on 7
March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same time,
non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by
Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that
Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City
for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 3520 which made their marriage void ab
initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent
contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and
void from the beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial courts ruling that the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects the trial courts
decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands."22 While the Court of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous marriages,
it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court
of Appeals adopted the trial courts discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous.1wphi1 The
trial court stated:
On whether or not the parties marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the
marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the
petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no
trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not
because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not
committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was contracting marriage
against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of
the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no marriage license. The daring and repeated stand of respondent
that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has
the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by a prior existing
valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena.23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the
existence of a prior marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a
purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived
together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the
Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of
credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married
to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being
claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamins father to his children as advance inheritance. Sallys Answer to the
petition before the trial court even admitted that "Benjamins late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his
children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x."25
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with the
evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as
spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin27 with the descriptive title
"married to Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally28 with the
descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the
name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.29 Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual
contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.30
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing the case. She cited
the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She further alleged that Judge Gironella
practically labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of
the judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt
purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself.32 In this case, we have
sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision because of Sallys continued
refusal to present her evidence.
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used uncomplimentary words in writing
the decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding the
case that would justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 94226.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-23433 February 10, 1968
GLORIA G. JOCSON, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RICARDO R. ROBLES, defendant-appellant.
REYES J.B.L., J.:
On February 4, 1963, Gloria G. Jocson commenced in the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court an action for the
annulment of her marriage to Ricardo R. Robles (Civ. Case No. E-00013), on the ground that it was bigamous. It was alleged
in the amended complaint that previous to his marriage to plaintiff on May 27, 1958, defendant Robles had contracted a
first marriage with Josefina Fausto, who had instituted a criminal action for Bigamy against the same defendant in the
Court of First Instance of Manila (Crim. Case No. 64124). Plaintiff also demanded from the defendant moral and exemplary
damages, attorneys' fees, and costs, claiming that during their cohabitation, she was subjected to physical maltreatment
by her husband, resulting in the premature birth of their first child, who died three days later.
In his answer, defendant also assailed the validity of the marriage. But he charged plaintiffs' parents with having
compelled him by force, threat and intimidation, to contract that marriage with her, notwithstanding their knowledge that
he is a married man; and that said threat and intimidation allegedly persisted until January, 1963 when he was finally able
to get away and live apart from the plaintiff.
Thereafter, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, on the ground that no genuine issue of fact is involved
in the case. It was claimed that defendant's contention, that his consent to the marriage was secured by force and
intimidation employed upon his person by the relatives of plaintiff, was allegedly supported by the joint affidavit of
plaintiff's father and brother, dated October 28, 1963, attached to the motion (pp. 22-32, Record on Appeal). Plaintiff, on
the other hand, submitted the case for judgment on the pleadings.
On December 23, 1963, defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied, the court ruling that before it can
pass upon plaintiff's prayer for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to defendant, there is necessity for proof that
when he contracted marriage with plaintiff, defendant Robles had a previous and subsisting valid marriage. The
evidentiary requirement to establish these facts, according to the court, was not met in the motion for summary judgment.
Defendant's plea to have his marriage declared as having been brought about by force and intimidation, was also denied,
the court finding indications of collusion between the parties in their attempt to secure the nullification of said marriage.
Reconsideration of this order, sought by defendant, was denied on January 18, 1964. And, when both parties failed to
appear at the scheduled hearing on March 9, 1964, the court directed the dismissal of the action.
On April 17, 1964, defendant notified the court below of his intention to appeal to this Court from the
abovementioned orders of December 23, 1963, January 18, 1964, and March 9, 1964. The appeal bond and amended
record on appeal, dated April 15, 1964, were thereafter approved.
 It is noted that, as specified in the notice of appeal, defendant is taking exception from the lower court's orders of
December 23, 1963, January 18, 1964, and March 9, 1964; however, there is no indication or certification or proof that the
filing of the appeal notice, bond and record on appeal on April 17, 1964 were made within the reglementary period, as
required by the provisions of Section 6, Revised Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Thereunder, the record on appeal must
contain, not only the full names of all the parties to the proceeding, as well as the pleadings, petitions, motions and orders
related to the order or judgment subject of the appeal and which are necessary for the proper understanding of the issue
involved therein, but also "such data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time." This requirement, incorporated
in the new Rules of Court to enable the appellate courts to determine without protracted inquiry whether an appeal was
timely made or not, was held to be jurisdictional, failure to comply with which shall cause the dismissal of the
appeal. 1 There is here no showing that the present appeal was perfected within the reglementary period, which datum
should have appeared in the record on appeal.
On the merits, we are satisfied that the Court of Domestic Relations correctly denied the motion for summary
judgment in view of the first paragraph of Articles 88 and 1011 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that expressly prohibit
the rendition of a decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. The affidavits
annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically amount to these methods not countenanced by the Civil Code.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, this proceeding is hereby dismissed, conformable to Section (a) of Revised Rule 50 of
the Rules of Court, and the judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs against the appellant.
G.R. No. L-23264 March 15, 1974
ROMULO TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
HELEN VILLANUEVA and HONORABLE CORAZON JULIANO AGRAVA, Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court, respondents.
Magno T. Bueser for petitioner.
MAKASIAR, J.:p
Petitioner prays for the nullification of the order dated July 29, 1963 of the respondent Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila.
On April 26, 1962, petitioner Romulo Tolentino filed a suit for annulment of his marriage to private respondent Helen
Villanueva, alleging that his consent was obtained through fraud because immediately after the marriage celebration, he
discovered that private respondent was pregnant despite the fact that he had no sexual relations with her prior to the
marriage ceremony; and that they did not live as husband and wife as immediately after the marriage celebration, Helen
Villanueva left his house and her whereabouts remained unknown to him until January, 1962 when he discovered that she
is residing in San Francisco, Cebu. Said marriage was solemnized by Quezon City Judge Mariano R. Virtucio on September
28, 1959. Said case was docketed as Civil Case No, 43347 of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila.
Despite the fact that she was served with summons and copy of the complaint, Helen failed to file a responsive pleading,
for which reason petitioner filed on June 13, 1962 a motion to declare her in default and to set the date for the
presentation of his evidence.
In an order dated June 28, 1962, respondent Judge declared private respondent in default, but, pursuant to the provision
of Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila for investigation to
determine whether collusion exists between the parties, directing the City Fiscal to submit his report within sixty (60) days
from receipt thereof, and, in the event of a negative finding, to represent the State at the trial of the case to prevent
fabrication of evidence; and likewise directed herein petitioner to furnish the City Fiscal with copies of the complaint and
such other documents necessary for the City Fiscal's information and guidance.
On July 3, 1962, thru counsel, petitioner submitted to the City Fiscal only a copy of his complaint.
Assistant City Fiscal Rafael A. Jose, assigned to the case, issued a subpoena to petitioner's counsel requiring him to bring
petitioner with him as well as copies of other documents in connection with the annulment case on August 27, 1962 at
10:00 A.M.
Plaintiff's counsel, in a letter dated August 24, 1962, informed Assistant City Fiscal Jose that he could not comply with the
subpoena for it will unnecessarily expose his evidence.
In a motion dated and filed on October 29, 1962, petitioner, thru counsel, prayed the respondent Judge to set the date for
the reception of his evidence on the ground that the City Fiscal had not submitted a report of his findings despite the lapse
of sixty (60) days from July 10, 1962 when he submitted to the City Fiscal a copy of the complaint.
On November 6, 1962, respondent Judge denied the aforesaid motion of petitioner unless he submits himself for
interrogation by the City Fiscal to enable the latter to report whether or not there is collusion between the parties.
In an order dated July 29, 1963, respondent Judge dismissed the complaint in view of the fact that petitioner is not willing
to submit himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 101 of
the New Civil Code.
His motions for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied on July 29, 1963 and on April 11, 1964,
petitioner now files his petition to annul said order of July 29, 1963 and to compel the respondent Judge to receive his
evidence.
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision in suits for annulment
of marriage and legal separation based on a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and direct that in case of non-
appearance of defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between the
parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence for the
plaintiff. Thus, Articles 88 and 101 state:
ART. 88. No judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the provisions of article 101, paragraph 2, shall be
observed.
ART. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by
confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting
attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not
fabricated.
Even the 1940 Rules of Court, which preceded the 1950 Civil Code of the Philippines, direct that actions for the annulment
of marriage or divorce shall not be decided unless the material facts alleged in the complaint are proved (Sec. 10, Rule 35,
1940 Rules of Court). The same rule is reiterated in Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1964 Revised Rules, with "legal separation"
being substituted for "divorce", obviously because the present Civil Code does not authorize absolute divorce.
The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the fact that the institutions of marriage and of
the family are sacred and therefore are as much the concern of the State as of the spouses; because the State and the
public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration by collusion
between the parties or by fabricated evidence. The prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment or by non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact that marriage is more than a
mere contract between the parties; and for this reason, when the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins the court to
direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for the State in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds
(De Ocampo vs. Florenciano, 107 Phil. 35, 38-40; Brown vs. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168, 172; Bigornia de Cardenas vs. Cardenas,
et al., 98 Phil. 73, 78-79; Roque vs. Encarnacion, et al., 95 Phil. 643, 646).
Hence, the inevitable conclusion is that the petition is without merit.
WHEREFORE, THE ORDER DATED JULY 29, 1963 IS HEREBY AFFIRMED AND THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED. WITH
COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.
Buccat v Buccat (1941)
Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat
April 25, 1941
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio.
Facts:
Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in March 1938, became engaged in September, and got married in
Nov 26.
On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who was 9 months pregnant, gave birth to a son. After knowing this,
Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life with her.
On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to married Luida, she
assured him that she was a virgin.
The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.
Issue:
Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccats marriage be granted on the grounds that Luida concealed her pregnancy
before the marriage?
Held:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a marriage, a sacred institution in which the State is interested
and where society rests.
In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for
annulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year law student, did not suspect anything about Luidas condition
considering that she was in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed physical manifestation,
ie. enlarged stomach) when they got married.
Decision:
SC affirmed the lower courts decision. Costs to plaintiff-appellant
G.R. No. L-15853 July 27, 1960
FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
CONCHITA DELIZO, respondent.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal which dismissed petitioner's complaint for annulment of his marriage with respondent Conchita Delizo.
The dismissed complaint, which was filed on September 6, 1955, was based on the ground of fraud, it being alleged,
among other things, that defendant Conchita Delizo, herein respondent, at the date of her marriage to plaintiff, herein
petitioner Fernando Aquino, on December 27, 1954, concealed from the latter that fact that she was pregnant by another
man, and sometime in April, 1955, or about four months after their marriage, gave birth to a child. In her answer,
defendant claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the plaintiff.
At the trial, the attorney's for both parties appeared and the court a quo ordered Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco to
represent the State in the proceedings to prevent collusion. Only the plaintiff however, testified and the only documentary
evidence presented was the marriage contract between the parties. Defendant neither appeared nor presented any
evidence despite the reservation made by her counsel that he would present evidence on a later date.
On June 16, 1956, the trial court noting that no birth certificate was presented to show that the child was born within
180 days after the marriage between the parties, and holding that concealment of pregnancy as alleged by the plaintiff
does not constitute such fraud sa would annul a marriage dismissed the complaint. Through a verified "petition to
reopen for reception of additional evidence", plaintiff tried to present the certificates of birth and delivery of the child
born of the defendant on April 26, 1955, which documents, according to him, he had failed to secure earlier and produce
before the trial court thru excusable negligence. The petition, however, was denied.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, that court held that there has been excusable neglect in plaintiff's inability to present
the proof of the child's birth, through her birth certificate, and for that reason the court a quo erred in denying the motion
for reception of additional evidence. On the theory, however, that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have
had sexual intercourse during their engagement so that the child could be their own, and finding unbelievable plaintiff's
claim that he did not notice or even suspect that defendant was pregnant when he married her, the appellate court,
nevertheless, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
On March 17, 1959, plaintiff filed a motion praying that the decision be reconsidered, or, if such reconsideration be denied,
that the case be remanded to the lower court for new trial. In support of the motion, plaintiff attached as annexes thereof
the following documents:
1. Affidavit of Cesar Aquino (Annex A) (defendant's brother-in-law and plaintiff's brother, with whom defendant
was living at the time plaintiff met, courted and married her, and with whom defendant has begotten two more
children, aside from her first born, in common-law relationship) admitting that he is the father of defendant's
first born, Catherine Bess Aquino, and that he and defendant hid her pregnancy from plaintiff at the time of
plaintiff's marriage to defendant;
2. Affidavit of defendant, Conchita Delizo (Annex "B") admitting her pregnancy by Cesar Aquino, her brother-in-
law and plaintiff's own brother, at the time of her marriage to plaintiff and her having hidden this fact from
plaintiff before and up to the time of their marriage;
3. Affidavit of Albert Powell (Annex "C") stating that he knew Cesar Aquino and defendant lived together as
husband and wife before December 27, 1954, the date of plaintiff's marriage to defendant;
4. Birth Certificate of defendant's first born, Catherine Bess Aquino showing her date of birth to be April 26,
1955;
5. Birth Certificate (Annex "D") of Carolle Ann Aquino, the second child of defendant with Cesar Aquino, her
brother-in-law;
6. Birth Certificate (Annex "E") of Chris Charibel Aquino, the third child of Cesar Aquino and defendant; and
7. Pictures of defendant showing her natural plumpness as early as 1952 to as late as November, 1954, the
November, 1954 photo itself does not show defendant's pregnancy which must have been almost four months
old at the time the picture was taken.
Acting upon the motion, the Court of Appeals ordered the defendant Conchita Delizo and Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal, who was representing the Government, to answer the motion for reconsideration, and deferred action on the prayer
for new trial until after the case is disposed of. As both the defendant and the fiscal failed to file an answer, and stating
that it "does not believe the veracity of the contents of the motion and its annexes", the Court of Appeals, on August 6,
1959, denied the motion. From that order, the plaintiff brought the case to this Court thru the present petition
for certiorari.
After going over the record of the case, we find that the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint cannot be sustained.
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage. (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86,
par. (3). In the case of Buccat vs. Buccat (72 Phil., 19) cited in the decision sought to be reviewed, which was also an action
for the annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud, plaintiff's claim that he did not even suspect the pregnancy of the
defendant was held to be unbelievable, it having been proven that the latter was already in an advanced stage of
pregnancy (7th month) at the time of their marriage. That pronouncement, however, cannot apply to the case at bar. Here
the defendant wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that
stage, we are not prepared to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally plump" or
fat as alleged by plaintiff. According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month of pregnancy, the enlargement of a
woman's abdomen is still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement is limited to the lower part of the abdomen
so that it is hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen. It
is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a height above the
umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. (See Lull, Clinical Obstetrics, p. 122) If, as
claimed by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally plump", he could hardly be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or
not she was pregnant at the time of their marriage more so because she must have attempted to conceal the true state of
affairs. Even physicians and surgeons, with the aid of the woman herself who shows and gives her subjective and objective
symptoms, can only claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy in 33% at five months. and 50% at six months. (XI Cyclopedia of
Medicine, Surgery, etc. Pregnancy, p. 10).
The appellate court also said that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse before
they got married and therefore the child could be their own. This statement, however, is purely conjectural and finds no
support or justification in the record.
Upon the other hand, the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial, taken together with what has already been
adduced would, in our opinion, be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by plaintiff. The Court of Appeals should,
therefore, not have denied the motion praying for new trial simply because defendant failed to file her answer thereto.
Such failure of the defendant cannot be taken as evidence of collusion, especially since a provincial fiscal has been ordered
of represent the Government precisely to prevent such collusion. As to the veracity of the contents of the motion and its
annexes, the same can best be determined only after hearing evidence. In the circumstance, we think that justice would be
better served if a new trial were ordered.
Wherefore, the decision complained of is set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for new trial. Without costs.
G.R. No. L-27930 November 26, 1970
AURORA A. ANAYA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FERNANDO O. PALAROAN, defendant-appellee.
Isabelo V. Castro for plaintiff-appellant.
Arturo A. Romero for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from an order of dismissal, issued motu proprio by the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court, Manila, of a complaint
for annulment of marriage, docketed therein as Civil Case No. E-00431, entitled "Aurora A. Anaya, plaintiff vs. Fernando O.
Palaroan, defendant."
The complaint in said Civil Case No. E-00431 alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff Aurora and defendant Fernando were married
on 4 December 1953; that defendant Fernando filed an action for annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on the
ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation, which action was docketed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila as Civil Case No. 21589; that judgment was rendered therein on 23 September 1959 dismissing the
complaint of Fernando, upholding the validity of the marriage and granting Aurora's counterclaim; that (per paragraph IV)
while the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated "to settle the judgment," Fernando had divulged to Aurora
that several months prior to their marriage he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his; and that "the non-
divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-marital secret on the part of defendant that definitely wrecked their
marriage, which apparently doomed to fail even before it had hardly commenced ... frank disclosure of which, certitude
precisely precluded her, the Plaintiff herein from going thru the marriage that was solemnized between them constituted
'FRAUD', in obtaining her consent, within the contemplation of No. 4 of Article 85 of the Civil Code" (sic) (Record on
Appeal, page 3). She prayed for the annulment of the marriage and for moral damages.
Defendant Fernando, in his answer, denied the allegation in paragraph IV of the complaint and denied having had pre-
marital relationship with a close relative; he averred that under no circumstance would he live with Aurora, as he had
escaped from her and from her relatives the day following their marriage on 4 December 1953; that he denied having
committed any fraud against her. He set up the defenses of lack of cause of action and estoppel, for her having prayed in
Civil Case No. 21589 for the validity of the marriage and her having enjoyed the support that had been granted her. He
counterclaimed for damages for the malicious filing of the suit. Defendant Fernando did not pray for the dismissal of the
complaint but for its dismissal "with respect to the alleged moral damages."
Plaintiff Aurora filed a reply with answer to the counterclaim, wherein she alleged:
(1) that prior to their marriage on 4 December 1953, he paid court to her, and pretended to shower
her with love and affection not because he really felt so but because she merely happened to be the
first girl available to marry so he could evade marrying the close relative of his whose immediate
members of her family were threatening him to force him to marry her (the close relative);
(2) that since he contracted the marriage for the reason intimated by him, and not because he loved
her, he secretly intended from the very beginning not to perform the marital duties and obligations
appurtenant thereto, and furthermore, he covertly made up his mind not to live with her;
(3) that the foregoing clandestine intentions intimated by him were prematurely concretized for him,
when in order to placate and appease the immediate members of the family of the first girl (referent
being the close relative) and to convince them of his intention not to live with plaintiff, carried on a
courtship with a third girl with whom, after gaining the latter's love cohabited and had several
children during the whole range of nine years that Civil Case No. 21589, had been litigated between
them (parties); (Record on Appeal, pages 10-11)
Failing in its attempt to have the parties reconciled, the court set the case for trial on 26 August 1966 but it was
postponed. Thereafter, while reviewing the expendiente, the court realized that Aurora's allegation of the fraud was legally
insufficient to invalidate her marriage, and, on the authority of Brown vs. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168, holding:
It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts can
take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of
marriage, involve public interest, and it is the policy of our law that no such decree be issued if any
legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.
the court a quo required plaintiff to show cause why her complaint should not be dismissed. Plaintiff
Aurora submitted a memorandum in compliance therewith, but the court found it inadequate and
thereby issued an order, dated 7 October 1966, for the dismissal of the complaint; it also denied
reconsideration.
The main issue is whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another
woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.
We must agree with the lower court that it is not. For fraud as a vice of consent in marriage, which may be a cause for its
annulment, comes under Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as her husband or his
wife, as the case may be;
This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by law to those kinds or species of fraud
enumerated in Article 86, as follows:
ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the
preceding article:
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;
(2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime
involving moral turpitude, and the penalty imposed was imprisonment for two
years or more;
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she
was pregnant by a man other than her husband.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such
fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.
The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances that can constitute fraud as ground for annulment of marriage to
the foregoing three cases may be deduced from the fact that, of all the causes of nullity enumerated in Article 85, fraud is
the only one given special treatment in a subsequent article within the chapter on void and voidable marriages. If its
intention were otherwise, Congress would have stopped at Article 85, for, anyway, fraud in general is already mentioned
therein as a cause for annulment. But Article 86 was also enacted, expressly and specifically dealing with "fraud referred to
in number 4 of the preceding article," and proceeds by enumerating the specific frauds (misrepresentation as to identity,
non-disclosure of a previous conviction, and concealment of pregnancy), making it clear that Congress intended to exclude
all other frauds or deceits. To stress further such intention, the enumeration of the specific frauds was followed by the
interdiction: "No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as
will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage."
Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated circumstances
that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that
"no other misrepresentation or deceit as to ... chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman
may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the
marriage, nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she
entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the
Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.
But plaintiff-appellant Anaya emphasizes that not only has she alleged "non-divulgement" (the word chosen by her) of the
pre-marital relationship of her husband with another woman as her cause of action, but that she has, likewise, alleged in
her reply that defendant Fernando paid court to her without any intention of complying with his marital duties and
obligations and covertly made up his mind not to live with her. Plaintiff-appellant contends that the lower court erred in
ignoring these allegations in her reply.
This second set of averments which were made in the reply (pretended love and absence of intention to perform duties of
consortium) is an entirely new and additional "cause of action." According to the plaintiff herself, the second set of
allegations is "apart, distinct and separate from that earlier averred in the Complaint ..." (Record on Appeal, page 76). Said
allegations were, therefore, improperly alleged in the reply, because if in a reply a party-plaintiff is not permitted to amend
or change the cause of action as set forth in his complaint (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445), there is more reason not to allow
such party to allege a new and additional cause of action in the reply. Otherwise, the series of pleadings of the parties
could become interminable.
On the merits of this second fraud charge, it is enough to point out that any secret intention on the husband's part not to
perform his marital duties must have been discovered by the wife soon after the marriage: hence her action for annulment
based on that fraud should have been brought within four years after the marriage. Since appellant's wedding was
celebrated in December of 1953, and this ground was only pleaded in 1966, it must be declared already barred.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed order is hereby affirmed. No costs.
G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960
JOEL JIMENEZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REMEDIOS CAIZARES, defendant.
Republic of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant.
Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for appellant.
Climaco, Ascarraga and Silang for appellee.
PADILLA, J.:
In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga the plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree
annulling his marriage to the defendant Remedios Caizares contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge of the municipal
court of Zamboanga City, upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina was to small to allow the penetration of
a male organ or penis for copulation; that the condition of her genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage
and continues to exist; and that for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and one day after they had been
married. On 14 June 1955 the wife was summoned and served a copy of the complaint. She did not file an answer. On 29
September 1956, pursuant to the provisions of article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed the city attorney of
Zamboanga to inquire whether there was a collusion, to intervene for the State to see that the evidence for the plaintiff is
not a frame-up, concocted or fabricated. On 17 December 1956 the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to
submit to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her physical capacity for copulation and to
submit, within ten days from receipt of the order, a medical certificate on the result thereof. On 14 March 1957 the
defendant was granted additional five days from notice to comply with the order of 17 December 1956 with warning that
her failure to undergo medical examination and submit the required doctor's certificate would be deemed lack of interest
on her part in the case and that judgment upon the evidence presented by her husband would be rendered.
After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, on 11 April 1957 the Court entered a decree annulling the marriage
between the plaintiff and the defendant. On 26 April 1957 the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decree thus entered, upon the ground, among others, that the defendant's impotency has not been satisfactorily
established as required by law; that she had not been physically examined because she had refused to be examined; that
instead of annulling the marriage the Court should have punished her for contempt of court and compelled her to undergo
a physical examination and submit a medical certificate; and that the decree sought to be reconsidered would open the
door to married couples, who want to end their marriage to collude or connive with each other by just alleging impotency
of one of them. He prayed that the complaint be dismissed or that the wife be subjected to a physical examination.
Pending resolution of his motion, the city attorney timely appealed from the decree. On 13 May 1957 the motion for
reconsideration was denied.
The question to determine is whether the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone testimony
of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is impotent. The latter did not answer the complaint, was
absent during the hearing, and refused to submit to a medical examination.
Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The state has surrounded it with
safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely dependent
upon it. It is the interest of each and every member of the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that
would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction. The incidents of the status are governed by law, not by
will of the parties. The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence,
to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of
the husband who was expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his marriage he sought
and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed to have been satisfactorily established, becase from the
commencement of the proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein. Although her
refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption
arising out of the suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature coy,
bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless compelled to by competent authority. This the
Court may do without doing violence to and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any
offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself.1 "Impotency being an abnormal condition should not
be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency."2 The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically
incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.
The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance
with this decision, without pronouncement as to costs.
[G.R. No. L-8492. February 29, 1956.]
In the Matter of the Declaration of the Civil Status of: LOURDES G. LUKBAN, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellee.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for a declaration that Petitioner is a widow of her husband
Francisco Chuidian who is presumed to be dead and has no legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that the same is not authorized by law. After Petitioner had
presented her evidence, the court sustained the opposition and dismissed the petition. Hence this appeal.
Lourdes G. Lukban, Petitioner herein, contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on December 10, 1933 at the Paco
Catholic Church, Manila. On December 27, of the same year, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel and since then he
has not been heard from despite diligent search made by her. She also inquired about him from his parents and friends but
no one was able to indicate his whereabouts. She has no knowledge if he is still alive, his last known address being Calle
Merced, Paco, Manila. She believes that he is already dead because he had been absent for more than twenty years, and
because she intends to marry again, she desires that her civil status be defined in order that she may be relieved of any
liability under the law.
We believe that the petition at bar comes within the purview of our decision in the case of Nicolai Szartraw, 46 Off. Gaz., 1st
Sup., 243, wherein it was held that a petition for judicial declaration that Petitioners husband is presumed to be dead cannot
be entertained because it is not authorized by law, and if such declaration cannot be made in a special proceeding similar to
the present, much less can the court determine the status of Petitioner as a widow since this matter must of necessity
depend upon the fact of death of the husband. This the court can declare upon proper evidence, but not to decree that he
is merely presumed to be dead. (Nicolai Szartraw, 46 Off. Gaz., 1st sup. 243).
The philosophy behind the ruling that such judicial pronouncement cannot be made in a proceeding of this nature is well
expressed in the case above-cited. Thus, we there said that A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and
executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject
of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent
court has to pass cralaw. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he
had been unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the
stage of finality or become final.
Appellant claims that the remedy she is seeking for can be granted in the present proceedings because in the case of Hagans
vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil., 880, it was declared that a special proceeding is an application or proceeding to establish the status
or right of a party, or a particular fact; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut, as already said, that remedy can be invoked if the
purpose is to seek the declaration of death of the husband, and not, as in the present case, to establish a presumption of
death. If it can be satisfactorily proven that the husband is dead, the court would not certainly deny a declaration to that
effect as has been intimated in the case of Nicolas Szartraw, supra.
Appellant also claims that the present petition can be entertained because article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in defining
bigamy, provides that a person commits that crime if he contracts a second marriage before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings and, it is claimed, the present
petition comes within the purview of this legal provision. The argument is untenable for the words proper proceedings
used in said article can only refer to those authorized by law such as those which refer to the administration or settlement
of the estate of a deceased person (Articles 390 and 391, new Civil Code). That such is the correct interpretation of the
provision in question finds support in the case of Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil., 179, wherein this Court made the following
comment:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee.
The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the
taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage,
however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that each former spouse is generally
reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage (section III, paragraph
2, General Orders, No. 68).
The decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-14058 March 24, 1960
In the matter of the petition for the declaration of William Gue, presumptively dead. ANGELINA L. GUE,petitioner-
appellant,
vs.
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellee.
Virgilio V. David for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor E. M. Salva for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by Judge Bonifacio Ysip, dismissing the
petition of Angelina Gue. Involving as it does only question of law, the appeal was taken directly to us.
On November 20, 1957, Angelina L. Gue filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila, Civil Case No. 34303,
alleging that she was married to William Gue; that they had a child named Anthony L. Gue; that January 5, 1946, her
husband left Manila where they were residing and went to Shanghai, China, but since then, he had not been heard of,
neither had he written to her, nor in anyway communicated with her as to his whereabouts; that despite her efforts and
diligence, she failed to locate him; and that they had not acquired any property during the marriage. She asked the court
for a declaration of the presumption of death of William Gue, pursuant to the provisions of Article 390 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. After due publication and hearing, the trial court issued the order of dismissal, which we reproduce below:
This is a petition filed by Angelina L. Gue to declare her husband. William Gue, presumptively dead. During the
hearing of this petition, it was established by the testimony of the petitioner that she and her husband were
married on October 11, 1944 in the City of Manila before the parish priest of Tondo, Manila, as shows in Exhibit
B, the marriage contract. Her husband, who is a Chinese citizen, left the Philippines for Shanghai on January,
1946. The petitioner joined him in Shanghai in August of the same year. In January, 1949, the petitioner came
back to the Philippines alone with her children, on which occasion her husband promised to follow her.
However, up to the present time, said William Gue has not returned to the Philippines. From January, 1949, the
petitioner had sent letters to her husband in Shanghai, but she never received any reply thereto. She made
 inquiries from the Bureau of Immigration in 1955 and 1958 as to whether her husband had already returned to
the Philippines and she received Exhibit D and Exhibit E from said Office, which gave no information as to the
whereabouts of her husband. It was also established by petitioner's testimony that no properties have been
acquired by said spouses during their union, and during which they begot two children, named Eugeni and
Anthony, surnamed Gue.
With this evidence on record and considering the allegations in the petition, it is clear that no right had been
established by the petitioner upon which a judicial decree may be predicated, and this action is not for the
settlement of the estate of the absentee, as it is clear that he did not leave any.
In the case of "Petition for the Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw", 81 Phil., 461, a case similar to the
present, the Supreme Court held:
The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Szatraw, because it does not appear that he
possessed property brought to the marriage and because he had acquired no property during his married life
with the petitioner. The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which permits the court to
presume that a person is dead after the fact that such person had been unheard from in seven years had been
established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case, whether in an action or in a special
proceeding, which is tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a special proceeding. In this case, there is
no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner for the final determination of his right
or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact (Hagans vs. Wislizenus, 42 Phil., 880), for the petition does
not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be
presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years. If there is any pretense at securing a
declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead, such a pretension cannot be granted because it is
unauthorized. The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is presumptively dead. But this
declaration, even if judicially made, would not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a presumption is
established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima
facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial
pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a
competent court has to pass. The latter must decide finally the controversy the right or status of a party or
established finally a particular fact, out of which certain rights and obligations arise or may arise; and once such
controversy is decided by a final judgment or such right or status is determined, then the judgment on the
subject of the controversy, or the decree upon the right or status of a party or upon the existence of a particular
fact, becomes res judicata, subject to no collateral attack, except in a few rare instances especially provided by
law. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been
unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof cannot reach the
state of finality or become final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because he had been
unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally
determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead, because he had not been heard from in
seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which
an appeal may be taken, for such a presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a
petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The
Court should not waste its valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless act.
"Little effort is necessary to perceive that a declaration such as the one prayed for by the petitioner, if granted,
may make or lead her to believe that the marital bonds which binds her to her husband are torn asunder, and
that for that reason she is or may feel free to enter into a new marriage contract. The framers of the rules of
court, by the presumption provided for in the rule of evidence in question, did not intend and mean that a
judicial declaration based solely upon that presumption may be made. A petition for a declaration such as the
one filed in this case may be made in collusion with the other spouse. If that were the case, then a decree of
divorce that cannot be obtained or granted under the provisions of the Divorce Law (Act No. 2710) could easily
be secured by means of a judicial decree declaring a person unheard from in seven years to be presumptively
dead. This is another strong reason why a petition such as the one presented in this case should not be
countenanced and allowed. What cannot be obtained directly under the provisions of the Divorce Law could
indirectly be secured under the provisions of Rule 123, section 69 (x). Obviously, the latter must not be made to
prevail over the former."
In view of the foregoing and the doctrine of the Supreme Court laid down in the case above-cited, the Court
hereby orders that this case be, as it is hereby dismissed, without pronouncement as the costs.
In her appeal, Angelina invoked the provisions of the Article 390 of the New Civil Code, which for purpose of reference, we
reproduce below.
ART. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be
presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening this succession till after an absence of ten
years. If he disappeared after the of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that
his succession may be opened.
She contends that under Article 191 of the Old Civil Code, which reads:
After thirty years have elapsed since disappearance of the absentee, or since he was last heard from, or ninety
years from his birth, the judgment upon the petition of any party lawfully interested, shall make an order
declaring that such absentee is presumed to be dead.
a person could be declared presumptively dead, but that said legal provision was repealed by the Code of Civil Procedure
and continued to be repealed by the Rules of Court. Consequently, only a mere disputable presumption of death was
available to any party, and that the case of Nicolai Szatraw, cited by the trial court, was decided on the law then existing,
namely, the Code of Civil Procedure, and later the new Rules of Court. However, according to appellant, with the
promulgation of the New Civil Code in 1950, particularly, Article 390 thereof, the Courts are now authorized to declare
persons presumptively dead.
In answer to her contention, the Solicitor General, as appellee herein, correctly cites our decision in the recent case of
Lourdes G. Lukban vs. Republic of the Philippines, 98 Phil., 574; 52 Off. Gaz., No. 3, 1441, decided long after the New Civil
Code went into effect, wherein we reiterated the doctrine laid own in Nicolai Szatraw, supra. We quote the pertinent
portions of our decision in that case:
This is a petition filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal for a declaration that petitioner is a widow of her
husband Francisco Chuidian who is presumed to be dead and has no legal impediment to contract a subsequent
marriage.
The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that the same is not authorized by law. After
petitioner had presented her evidence, the court sustained the opposition and dismissed the petition. Hence
this appeal.
Lourdes G. Lukban, petitioner herein, contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on December 10, 1933 at
the Paco Catholic Church, Manila. On December 27, of the same year, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent
quarrel and since then he has not been heard from despite diligent search made by her. She also inquired about
him from his parents and friends but no one was able to indicate his whereabouts. She has no knowledge if he
is still alive, his last known address being Calle Merced, Paco, Manila. She believes that he is already dead
because he had been absent for more than twenty years, and because she intends to marry again, she desires
that her civil status be defined in order that she may be relieved of any liability under the law.
We believe that the petition at bar comes within the purview of our decision in the case of Nicolai Szatraw, 46
Off. Gaz. 1st Sup. 243, wherein it was held that a petition for judicial declaration that petitioner's husband is
presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is not authorized by law, and if such declaration cannot
be made in a special proceedings similar to the present, much less can the court determine the status of
petitioner as a widow since this matter must of necessity depend upon the fact of death of the husband. This
the court can declare upon proper evidence, but not to decree that he is merely presumed to be dead. (Nicolai
Szatraw, 48 Off. Gaz., 1st Sup. 243).
The philosophy behind the ruling that such judicial pronouncement cannot be made in a proceeding of this
nature is well expressed in the case above-cited. Thus, we there said that "A judicial pronouncement to that
effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for
that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or
matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass .. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial
declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final."
We deem it unnecessary to further discuss the merits of the case. The appealed order dismissing the petition is hereby
affirmed, with costs.
G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case No.
R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million pesos in
damages against his wife and parents-in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed
"Escao," respectively.2
The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:
Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then
enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escao, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially
prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her
parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was
the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register.
Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in love. Together with
a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out their marital future whereby Pacita would
be the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage,
their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love
for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to get married and then
elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall,
which was their usual trysting place.
Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however, materialize because when
Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already
waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto
and Mena Escao were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the
great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the Escao
spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid
marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the
officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto
Escao was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos
college students and disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the
letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of
Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her
letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous
letters when their love was aflame.
Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her being
called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escao"), but her
letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-
Escao"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu
society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did
not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing
(Exh. "B-4").
On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she was
single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two years.
The application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for
divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of
Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final
and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to
Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).
On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in California,
and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escao, whom he charged with
having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman
Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage
to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's
acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire
property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted
directly to this Court.
The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:
1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escao liable for damages and in
dismissing the complaint;.
2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doa Mena Escao liable for
damages;.
3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant parents on their
counterclaims; and.
4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.
That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escao, were
validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the record before us. Both
parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was
performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that
said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.
The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as required by Canon
law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the
Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time) expressly provided that
SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and
consent. (Emphasis supplied)
The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential to give
the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which provided the following:
SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid because of the
absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the spouses or one
of them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to do so,
and that the marriage was perfectly legal.
The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be presumed until the
contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note
here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when
Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning
her original action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her marriage to plaintiff
was valid and binding.
Defendant Vicenta Escao argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue influence of Pacita
Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake, the
truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not
render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent
civil court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was
dismissed for non-prosecution.
It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao remained
subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and
obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of
"extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escao, like her
husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact
does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding
legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710).
Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in
that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).
For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen
Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in view of the third
paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:
 Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an
irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity
whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.
From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada divorce court.
Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and
additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally
had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).
From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta
Escao's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez
must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her
denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the
husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor
an anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse.
Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her
husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation
under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).
The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord with the previous
doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that were rendered under our laws prior to the
approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did
not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of the
Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing before Act
2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of
these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:
As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona
Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the circumstance that they
afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal significance. The
claims of the very children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to
inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous
relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be
interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied)
Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after the
invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that such union is
adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal separation on the part of the innocent consort of
the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.
True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether divorced or not) would
depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the Philippines, and the answer to
them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:
The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the
Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if they are
constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)
The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.
However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escao and his wife, the late Doa Mena
Escao, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not supported by
credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escao's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely
conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2-Escao"
and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them"
and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic].
Plaintiff was admitted to the Escao house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would
not have been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded.
Even after learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta
proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice
that the previous one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due to
defendants Mamerto Escao and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escao did not
seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision, or that they abided by
her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her
money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that they should not wish their daughter to live in penury even
if they did not concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).
There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for
annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to
judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged
with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being
always presumed until the contrary is proved.
SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. The law distinguishes between the right of a parent to
interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger to intermeddle in such
affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that of strangers is only in regard to what
will justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct,
as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts
maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his
child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the interest of his child as he sees it, the
marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for,
his child's welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of the
spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or misinformation, or
where his advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is
liable for consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into his home and afford
him or her protection and support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does not
maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been
applied in the case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice given
to a son.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with having exerted
efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them
to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in
the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices
or spleen.
In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicente Escao, it is
proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage
was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b)
that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment
of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While
appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that
appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are
of the opinion that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.
With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao, by the court
below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded said defendants'
feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise
prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been
correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in
the whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only.
Summing up, the Court rules:
(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep.
Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another
party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;
(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle the
latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;
(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover damages;
(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of
malice or unworthy motives on their part.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;
(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F.
Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages
and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of his wife, the deceased
Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.
Neither party to recover costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region
Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated
September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to
Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the
United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in
the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties
were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore
Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal
property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private
respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground
that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein
respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below
denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines
so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari and
Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when
a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it
devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed
which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless and a waste
of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have
given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the
representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property;
that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior
judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws
of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the
same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between petitioner and
private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation
of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person
before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as
No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to
the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor
community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD
LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf
and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the
following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is
binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either.
A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law
provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as
the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing
to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case
No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI;
HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only to be followed by a
criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what
hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard
Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the
Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in
Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto
between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a
divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that
there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of
divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records
show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the
dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two
complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had
an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983".
Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated
January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were
accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was
assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda
Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of
the same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid resolution of
respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-
accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to
both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already
been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both
cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings
thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other
hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before
such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in
said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before the Secretary of
Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was
denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of
both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner
refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and
her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private
respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is
anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a
private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as
an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal
complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from implementing the
aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on
March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding
petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the
complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot
be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established,
with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law,
the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the
prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the
complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents,
grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first
four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens
patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a
deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in
default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and
concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This
is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil
cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the same requirement
and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found necessary since criminal actions are generally
and fundamentally commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the
complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio,
and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the
right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence
rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal
action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the
supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal
case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the action be
definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he
initiates the action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his
status beforeor subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased
before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have
the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue as to when precisely the
status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one
who in law can be categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the
inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds
between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the
former against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule
that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the
offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for
adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legal
effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.'
Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have been
committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his
status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the
offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this
provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such when
the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our
statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant
vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the
adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time
of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent
is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a United States court between
Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her
business concern was conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be
granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of
such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal
standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce
proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of
the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be
one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal
relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each
other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In applying Article
433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery
"although the marriage be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare
adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is
entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial
declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the
declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never
existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity
would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the
decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed beforethe termination of the marriage
by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination
of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of
inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a
complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the
complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the
controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order
issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-3047 May 16, 1951
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GUADALUPE ZAPATA and DALMACIO BONDOC, defendants-appellees.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Jaime de los Angeles for appellant.
Francisco M. Ramos and Moises Sevilla Ocampo for appellee Dalmacio Bondoc.
Hernandez and Laquian for appellee Guadalupe Zapata.
PADILLA, J.:
In the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against Guadalupe Zapata,
his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse during the period
from the year 1946 14 March 1947, the date of the filing of the complaint, Dalmacio Bondoc knowing his codefendant to
be a married woman (criminal case No. 426). The defendant wife entered the plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer
four months of arresto mayor which penalty she served. In the same court, on 17 September 1948, the offended husband
filed another complaint for adulterous acts committed by his wife and her paramour from 15 March 1947 to 17 September
1948, the date of the filing of the second complaint (criminal case No. 735). On 21 February 1949, each of the defendants
filed a motion to quash the complaint of the ground that they would be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. The trial court upheld the contention of the defendants and quashed the second complaint. From the other
sustaining the motions to quash the prosecution has appealed.
The trial court held that the adulterous acts charged in the first and second complains must be deemed one continuous
offense, the defendants in both complaints being the same and identical persons and the two sets of unlawful acts having
taken place continuously during the years 1946, 1947 and part of 1948, and that the acts or two sets of acts that gave rise
to the crimes of adultery complained of in both cases constitute one and the same offense, within the scope and meaning
of the constitutional provision that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.".
Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency, as the Supreme Court of Spain has held (S. 10 December 1945); it is a
instantaneous crime which is consummated and exhausted or completed at the moment of the carnal union. Each sexual
intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 569). True, two or more adulterous acts
committed by the same defendants are against the same person the offended husband, the same status the union of
the husband and wife by their marriage, and the same community represented by the State for its interest in maintaining
and preserving such status. But this identity of the offended party, status society does not argue against the commission of
the crime of adultery as many times as there were carnal consummated, for as long as the status remain unchanged, the
nexus undissolved and unbroken, an encroachment or trespass upon that status constitutes a crime. There is no
constitutional or legal provision which bars the filing of as many complaints for adultery as there were adulterous acts
committed, each constituting one crime.
The notion or concept of a continuous crime has its origin in the juridical fiction favorable to the law transgressors and in
many a case against the interest of society (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 521). For it to exist there would be
plurality of acts performed seperately during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated; and
unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provision are united in one
and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim (Ibid. p. 520).In the instant case the
last unity does not exist, because as already stated the culprits perpetrate the crime in every sexual intercourse and they
need not to another or other adulterous acts to consummate it. After the last acts of adultery had been committed as
charged in the first complaint, the defendants again committed adulterous acts not included in the first complaint and for
which the second complaint was filed. It was held by the Supreme Court of Spain that another crime of adultery was
committed, if the defendants, after their provincional release during the pendency of the case in which they were sent to
prison to serve the penalty imposed upon them(S. 28 February 1906; 76 Jur. Crim. pp. 208-210).
Another reason why a second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts not included in the first complaint
does not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the constitution is that, if the second places complaint the
defendants twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, the adultery committed by the male defendant charged
in the second complaint, should he be absolved from, or acquitted of, the first charge upon the evidence that he did not
know that his codefendant was a married woman, would remain or go unpunished. The defense set up by him against the
first charge upon which he was acquitted would no longer be available, because at the time of the commission of the crime
charged in the second complaint, he already knew that this defendant was a married woman and he continued to have
carnal knowledge of her. Even if the husband should pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would not exempt the wife
and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the pardon was granted because the pardon
refers to previous and not to subsequent adulterous acts(Viada [5th ed.] Vol. 5, p. 208; Groizard [2nd ed.] Vol. 5, pp. 57-
58).
The order appealed from, which quashed the second complaint for adultery, is hereby reversed and set aside, and trial
court directed to proceed with the trial of the defendants in accordance with law, with costs against the appellees.
G.R. No. 79284 November 27, 1987
FROILAN C. GANDIONCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SENEN C. PEARANDA, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, Cagayan de
Oro City, and TERESITA S. GANDIONCO, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
A special civil action for certiorari, with application for injunction, to annul (1) the Order of the respondent Judge, dated 10
December 1986, ordering petitioner to pay support pendente lite to private respondent (his wife) and their child, and (2)
the Order of the same respondent Judge, dated 5 August 1987, denying petitioner's motion to suspend hearings in the
action for legal separation filed against him by private respondent as well as his motion to inhibit respondent Judge from
further hearing and trying the case.
On 29 May 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental, 10th Judicial District, Branch 18, in Cagayan de Oro City, presided over by respondent Judge, a complaint against
petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages. This
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 10636. On 13 October 1986, private respondent also filed with the Municipal Trial
Court, General Santos City, a complaint against petitioner for concubinage, which was docketed on 23 October 1986 as
Criminal Case No. 15437111. On 14 November 1986, application for the provisional remedy of support pendente
lite, pending a decision in the action for legal separation, was filed by private respondent in the civil case for legal
separation. The respondent judge, as already stated, on 10 December 1986, ordered The payment of support pendente
lite.
In this recourse, petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto, such
as, application for support pendente lite, should be suspended in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against
him the private respondent. In support of his contention, petitioner cites Art. III. Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which states:
SEC. 3. Other Civil action arising from offenses. Whenever the offended party shall have instituted
the civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense. as contemplated in the first
Section 1 hereof, the following rules shall be observed:
(a) After a criminal action has been commenced the pending civil action arising from the same
offense shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered. . . .
The civil action for legal separation, grounded as it is on concubinage, it is petitioner's position that such civil action arises
from, or is inextricably tied to the criminal action for concubinage, so that all proceedings related to legal separation will
have to be suspended to await conviction or acquittal for concubinage in the criminal case. Authority for this position is
this Court's decision in the case of Jerusalem vs. Hon. Roberto Zurbano. 1
Petitioner's contention is not correct.
In Jerusalem, the Court's statement to the effect that suspension of an action for legal separation would be proper if an
allegation of concubinage is made therein, relied solely on Sec. 1 of Rule 107 of the then provisions of the Rules of Court on
criminal procedure, to wit:
Sec. 1. Rules governing civil actions arising from offenses.-Except as otherwise provided by law, the
following rules shall he observed:
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly
waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately;
(b) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after
the criminal action has been commenced the civil action can not be instituted until final judgment
has been rendered in the criminal action;
(c) After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be
prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found until final judgment
in the criminal proceeding has been rendered ... (Emphasis supplied)
The provisions last quoted did not clearly state, as the 1985 Rules do, that the civil action to be suspended, with or upon
the filing of a criminal action, is one which is "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense". In other words, in view
of the amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage,
may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to
enforce the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the
same offense. Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof,
such as, the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support, and disqualification from
inheriting from the innocent spouse, among others. As correctly pointed out by the respondent Judge in his Order dated 5
August 1987:
The unreported case of JERUSALEM vs. Hon. Roberto Zurbano, Judge of CFI of Antique, et al., L-
11935, April 24, 1959 (105 Phil. 1277) is not controlling. It applied paragraph C of Sec. 1, of then Rule
107 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
After a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended, in whatever
stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been
rendered. (Emphasis supplied)
The governing rule is now Sec. 3, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which refers to "civil actions to enforce the
civil liability arising from the offense" as contemplated in the first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 111-which is a civil action
"for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged." Sec. 1, Rule 111, (1985) is specific that it refers to civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged. Whereas, the old Sec. 1 (c), Rule 107 simply
referred to "Civil action arising from the offense."
As earlier noted this action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability, in the main, but is aimed at the conjugal
rights of the spouses and their relations to each other, within the contemplation of Articles 7 to 108, of the Civil Code."2
Petitioner also argues that his conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured before the action for legal
separation can prosper or succeed, as the basis of the action for legal separation is his alleged offense of concubinage.
Petitioner's assumption is erroneous.
A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in
the action for legal separation. 3 No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary. To this end, the doctrine in Francisco vs.
Tayao 4 has been modified, as that case was decided under Act. No. 2710, when absolute divorce was then allowed and
had for its grounds the same grounds for legal separation under the New Civil Code, with the requirement, under such
former law, that the guilt of defendant spouses had to be established by final judgment in a criminal action. That
requirement has not been reproduced or adopted by the framers of the present Civil Code, and the omission has been
uniformly accepted as a modification of the stringent rule in Francisco v. Tayao.5
Petitioner's attempt to resist payment of support pendente lite to his wife must also fail, as we find no proof of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge in ordering the same. Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be
availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge. 6 If petitioner finds the amount of
support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same. 7
Petitioner lastly seeks to have the respondent Judge disqualified from hearing the case, as the grant of supportpendente
lite and the denial of the motion to suspend hearings in the case, are taken by the petitioner as a disregard of applicable
laws and existing doctrines, thereby showing the respondent Judge's alleged manifest partiality to private respondent.
Petitioner's contention is without merit. Divergence of opinions between a judge hearing a case and a party's counsel, as
to applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the judge from hearing the case, on the ground
of bias and manifest partiality. This is more so, in this case, where we find the judge's disposition of petitioner's motions to
be sound and well-taken.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-29138 May 29, 1970
ELENA CONTRERAS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CESAR J. MACARAIG, defendant-appellee.
Jose T. Nery for plaintiff-appellee.
The City fiscal for defendant-appellant.
Cesar J. Macaraig in his own behalf.
DIZON, J.:
Appeal taken by Elena Contreras from a decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila in Civil Case No.
00138 dismissing her complaint upon the ground that the same was filed more than one year from and after the date on
which she had become cognizant of the cause for legal separation.
The following, facts found by the trial court are not in dispute:
Plaintiff and defendant were married on March 16, 1952 in the Catholic Church of Quiapo, Manila.
Out of their Marriage, three children were born: Eusebio C. Macaraig, on January 11, 1953; Victoria
C. Macaraig, on March 26, 1956; and Alexander C. Macaraig, on August 4, 1958. All the children are
in the care of plaintiff wife.
Sometime in 1958, the couple acquired rights, as lessee and purchaser under a conditional sale
agreement, to own a house and lot, known as Lot 4, Block 8 of the Philamlife Homes in Quezon City
which they transferred in favor of their three children on October 29, 1958 (Exh. F). Installment
payments are being made by plaintiff's father. The spouses own no other conjugal property.
Immediately before the election of 1961, defendant was employed as manager of the printing
establishment owned by plaintiff's father known as the MICO Offset. In that capacity, defendant met
and came to know Lily Ann Alcala, who place orders with MICO Offset for propaganda materials for
Mr. Sergio Osmea, who was then a Vice-Presidential candidate. After the elections of 1961,
defendant resigned from MICO Offset to be a special agent at Malacaang. He began to be away so
 often and to come home very late. Upon plaintiff's inquiry, defendant explained that he was out on a
series of confidential missions.
In September, 1962, Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car, told plaintiff that defendant was living in
Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala. When defendant, the following October, returned to the conjugal
home, plaintiff refrained from verifying Lubos' report from defendant in her desire not to anger nor
drive defendant away. Although plaintiff, in April 1963, also received rumors that defendant was
seen with a woman who was on the family way on Dasmarias St., she was so happy that defendant
again return to the family home in May, 1963 that she once more desisted from discussing the
matter with him because she did not wish to precipitate a quarrel and drive him away. All this while,
defendant, if and whenever he returned to the family fold, would only stay for two or three days but
would be gone for a period of about a month.
After plaintiff received reports that Lily Ann Alcala had given birth to a baby, she sent Mrs. Felicisima
Antioquia, her father's employee, to verify the reports. The latter was driven by Lubos to the house
in Singalong and between 5:00 and 6:00 o'clock that afternoon, she saw defendant was carrying a
baby in his arms. Mrs. Antioquia then went to the parish priest of Singalong where she inquired
about the child of Cesar Macaraig and Lily Ann Alcala and she was given a copy of the baptismal
certificate of Maria Vivien Mageline Macaraig (Exh. G) which she gave to plaintiff sometime in
October, 1963.
Plaintiff then entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with defendant and to
convince him to return to his family. Mr. Macaraig, after talking to his son and seeking him with the
latter's child told plaintiff that he could not do anything.
In November, 1963, plaintiff requested the cooperation of defendant's older sister, Mrs. Enriqueta
Majul, and the latter obliged and arranged a meeting at her home in Buendia between plaintiff and
Lily Ann Alcala. Lily Ann said she was willing to give up defendant as she had no desire to be accused
criminally but it was defendant who refused to break relationship with her.
In the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by her two children, Victoria and
Alexander, and by Mrs. Leticia Lagronio went to talk to defendant at his place of work on Espaa
Extension in front of Quezon Institute. They repaired to Victoria Peak, a nearby restaurant, where
plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to the conjugal home,
assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff that he could no
longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.
On December 14, 1963, plaintiff instituted the present action for legal separation. When defendant
did not interpose any answer after he was served summons, the case was referred to the Office of
the City Fiscal of Manila pursuant to the provisions of Article 101 of the Civil Code. After a report was
received from Asst. Fiscal Primitivo M. Pearanda that he believed that there was no collusion
present, plaintiff was allowed to present her evidence. Defendant has never appeared in this case.
The reasons relied upon by the trial court in dismissing the complaint are set forth in the appealed decision as follows:
Under the facts established by plaintiff's evidence, although the infidelity of the husband is
apparent, yet the case will have to be dismissed. Article 102 provides that, an action for legal
separation cannot be instituted except within one year after plaintiff "became cognizant of the
cause." In the absence of a clear-cut decision of the Supreme Court as to the exact import of the
term "cognizant," the practical application of said Article can be attended with difficulty. For one
thing; that rules might be different in case of adultery, which is an act, and for concubinage, which
may be a situation or a relationship.
In respect of concubinage, the word 'cognizant' may not connote the date when proof thereof
sufficient to establish the cause before a court of law is possessed. Otherwise, the one year period
would be meaningless for practical purposes because all a wife would have to do would be to claim
that the necessary proof was secured only within one year before the filing of the complaint. On the
other hand, it should be hard to concede that what the law envisages (and, in a way, encourages) is
the filing of a complaint within one year after the innocent spouses has received information of the
other's infidelity, howsoever baseless the report might be.
The Court believes that the correct rule lies between the two extremes. At the time a wife acquired
information, which can be reasonably relied upon as true, that her husband is living in concubinage
with another woman, the one-year period should be deemed to have started even if the wife shall
not then be in possession of proof sufficient to establish the concubinage before a court of law. The
one-year period may be viewed, inter alia, as an alloted time within which proof should be secured.
It is in the light of this rule that the Court will determine whether or not plaintiff's action for legal
separation has prescribed.
After her husband resigned from MICO Offset to be a special agent in Malacaan, subsequent to the
elections of 1961, he would seldom come home. He allayed plaintiff's suspicions with the
explanation that he had been away on 'confidential missions.' However, in September, 1962, Avelino
Lubos, plaintiff's driver, reported to plaintiff that defendant was living in Singalong with Lily Ann
Alcala. As a matter of fact, it was also Lubos who brought Mrs. F. Antioquia (when plaintiff had asked
to verify the reports) to the house in Singalong where she saw defendant, Lily Ann and the baby.
The requirement of the law that a complaint for legal separation be filed within one year after the
date plaintiff become cognizant of the cause is not of prescriptive nature, but is of the essence of the
cause of action. It is consonant with the philosophy that marriage is an inviolable social institution so
that the law provides strict requirements before it will allow a disruption of its status.
In the instant action, the Court has to find that plaintiff became cognizant of defendant's infidelity in
September, 1962. Plaintiff made successive attempts to induce the husband to amend his erring
ways but failed. Her desire to bring defendant back to the connubial fold and to preserve family
solidarity deterred her from taking timely legal action.
The only question to be resolved is whether the period of one year provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code should be
counted, as far as the instant case is concerned from September 1962 or from December 1963. Computing the period of
one year from the former date, it is clear that plaintiff's complaint filed on December 14, 1963 came a little too late, while
the reverse would be true if said period is deemed to have commenced only in the month of December 1963.
The period of "five years from after the date when such cause occurred" is not here involved.
Upon the undisputed facts it seems clear that, in the month of September 1962, whatever knowledge appellant had
acquired regarding the infidelity of her husband, that is, of the fact that he was then living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala,
was only through the information given to her by Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car. Much as such hearsay information
had pained and anguished her, she apparently thought it best and no reasonable person may justifiably blame her for it
not to go deeper into the matter herself because in all probability even up to that time, notwithstanding her husband's
obvious neglect of his entire family, appellant still cherished the hope however forlorn of his coming back home to
them. Indeed, when her husband returned to the conjugal home the following October, she purposely refrained from
bringing up the matter of his marital infidelity "in her desire not to anger nor drive defendant away" quoting the very
words of the trial court. True, appellant likewise heard in April 1963 rumors that her husband was seen with a woman on
the family way on Dasmarias Street, but failed again to either bring up the matter with her husband or make attempts to
verify the truth of said rumors, but this was due, as the lower court itself believed, because "she was so happy that
defendant again returned to the family home in May 1963 that she once more desisted from discussing the matter with
him because she did not wish to precipitate a quarrel and drive him away." As a matter of fact, notwithstanding all these
painful informations which would not have been legally sufficient to make a case for legal separation appellant still
made brave if desperate attempts to persuade her husband to come back home. In the words of the lower court, she
"entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to intercede with defendant and to convince him to return to his family" and
also "requested the cooperation of defendant's older sister, Mrs. Enriqueta Majul" for the same purpose, but all that was
of no avail. Her husband remained obdurate.
After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded that, in the eyes of the law, the only time when appellant really
became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the early part of December 1963 when, quoting from the
appealed decision, the following happened
In the early part of December, 1963, plaintiff, accompanied by her two children, Victoria and
Alexander, and by Mrs. Leticia Lagronio went to talk to defendant at his place of work on Espaa
Extension in front of Quezon Institute. They repaired to Victoria Peak, a nearby restaurant, where
plaintiff pleaded with defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala and to return to the conjugal home,
assuring him that she was willing to forgive him. Defendant informed plaintiff that he could no
longer leave Lily Ann and refused to return to his legitimate family.
From all the foregoing We conclude that it was only on the occasion mentioned in the preceding
paragraph when her husband admitted to her that he was living with and would no longer leave Lily
Ann to return to his legitimate family that appellant must be deemed to be under obligation to
decide whether to sue or not to sue for legal separation, and it was only then that the legal period of
one year must be deemed to have commenced.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is set aside and another is hereby rendered holding that appellant is entitled to
legal separation as prayed for in her complaint; and the case is hereby remanded to the lower court for appropriate
proceedings in accordance with law.
G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO LAPUZ, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellant.
D. G. Eufemio for respondent-appellee.
REYES J.B.L., J.:p
Petition, filed after the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, for review by certiorari of an order, dated 29 July 1969, of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 20387, dismissing said case for legal separation on the
ground that the death of the therein plaintiff, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred during the pendency of the case,
abated the cause of action as well as the action itself. The dismissal order was issued over the objection of Macario Lapuz,
the heir of the deceased plaintiff (and petitioner herein) who sought to substitute the deceased and to have the case
prosecuted to final judgment.
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the
main, that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934; that they had lived
together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that they
acquired properties during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named
Go Hiok at 1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation,
which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal
partnership profits.
In his second amended answer to the petition, herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special
defenses, and, along with several other claims involving money and other properties, counter-claimed for the declaration
of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated
according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.
Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. But before the trial could be
completed (the respondent was already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence on 9 and 18 June 1969), petitioner
Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her
death.
On 9 June 1969, respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation"1 on two (2) grounds, namely:
that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and
that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.
On 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.
On 29 July 1969, the court issued the order under review, dismissing the case.2 In the body of the order, the court stated
that the motion to dismiss and the motion for substitution had to be resolved on the question of whether or not the
plaintiff's cause of action has survived, which the court resolved in the negative. Petitioner's moved to reconsider but the
motion was denied on 15 September 1969.
After first securing an extension of time to file a petition for review of the order of dismissal issued by the juvenile and
domestic relations court, the petitioner filed the present petition on 14 October 1969. The same was given due course and
answer thereto was filed by respondent, who prayed for the affirmance of the said order.3
Although the defendant below, the herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio, filed counterclaims, he did not pursue them
after the court below dismissed the case. He acquiesced in the dismissal of said counterclaims by praying for the
affirmance of the order that dismissed not only the petition for legal separation but also his counterclaim to declare the
Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to be null and void ab initio.
But petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy (through her self-assumed substitute for the lower court did not act on the motion
for substitution) stated the principal issue to be as follows:
When an action for legal separation is converted by the counterclaim into one for a declaration of
nullity of a marriage, does the death of a party abate the proceedings?
The issue as framed by petitioner injects into it a supposed conversion of a legal separation suit to one for declaration of
nullity of a marriage, which is without basis, for even petitioner asserted that "the respondent has acquiesced to the
dismissal of his counterclaim" (Petitioner's Brief, page 22). Not only this. The petition for legal separation and the
counterclaim to declare the nullity of the self same marriage can stand independent and separate adjudication. They are
not inseparable nor was the action for legal separation converted into one for a declaration of nullity by the counterclaim,
for legal separation pre-supposes a valid marriage, while the petition for nullity has a voidable marriage as a pre-condition.
The first real issue in this case is: Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate
the action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights? .
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there being
no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100,
by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that
the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation
already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the
action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona.
... When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage is dissolved.
The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse takes place during the course of
the suit (Article 244, Section 3). The action is absolutely dead (Cass., July 27, 1871, D. 71. 1. 81; Cass.
req., May 8, 1933, D. H. 1933, 332.")4 .
Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law, and an action for divorce
is a proceeding brought for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of that relation. The action is one
of a personal nature. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, the death of one of the parties to
such action abates the action, for the reason that death has settled the question of separation
beyond all controversy and deprived the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties to
the action and of the subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the courts are almost
unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a divorce proceeding, before final decree,
abates the action. 1 Corpus Juris, 208; Wren v. Moss, 2 Gilman, 72; Danforth v. Danforth, 111 Ill. 236;
Matter of Grandall, 196 N.Y. 127, 89 N.E. 578; 134 Am St. Rep. 830; 17 Ann. Cas. 874; Wilcon v.
Wilson, 73 Mich, 620, 41 N.W. 817; Strickland v. Strickland, 80 Ark. 452, 97 S. W. 659; McCurley v.
McCurley, 60 Md. 185, 45 Am. Rep. 717; Begbie v. Begbie, 128 Cal. 155, 60 Pac. 667, 49 L.R.A. 141. 5
The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for separation and maintenance (Johnson vs. Bates, Ark. 101 SW 412; 1
Corpus Juris 208).
A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the decree
of legal separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. On the point,
Article 106 of the Civil Code provides: .
Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not
be severed; .
(2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal community of property shall be
dissolved and liquidated, but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the profits
earned by the partnership or community, without prejudice to the provisions of article 176;
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, unless otherwise
directed by the court in the interest of said minors, for whom said court may appoint a guardian;
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate
succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent
one shall be revoked by operation of law.
From this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains (or of the absolute
community of property), the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or
community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of
testamentary provisions in favor of the offending spouse made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by
the very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature and intent,
such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not a
claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant
continuation of the action through a substitute of the deceased party.
Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall
order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted
for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted...
The same result flows from a consideration of the enumeration of the actions that survive for or against administrators in
Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. No
action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced
against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest
 therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury
to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
Neither actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage can be deemed fairly included in the enumeration..
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are
involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the
decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a
more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is
apparent that such action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there could be no further interest
in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired
by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper
action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the
Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for seven
consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as
soon as one of the three persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the
action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the
liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse", as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and
not in the annulment proceeding.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations is hereby affirmed. No
special pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-11766 October 25, 1960
SOCORRO MATUBIS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ZOILO PRAXEDES, defendant-appellee.
Luis N. de Leon for appellant.
Lucio La. Margallo for appellee.
PAREDES, J.:
Alleging abandonment and concubinage, plaintiff Socorro Matubis, filed with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur,
on April 24, 1956, a complaint for legal Separation and changed of surname against her husband defendant Zoilo Praxedes.
The allegations of the complaint were denied by defendant spouse, who interposed the defense that it was plaintiff who
left the conjugal home.
During the trial, wherein the plaintiff alone introduced oral as well as documentary evidence, the following facts were
established:.
Plaintiff and defendant were legally married on January 10, 1943 at Iriga, Camarines Sur. For failure to agree on how they
should live as husband and wife, the couple, on May 30, 1944, agreed to live separately from each other, which status
remained unchanged until the present. On April 3, 1948, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement (Exhibit B), the
significant portions of which are hereunder reproduced..
. . . (a) That both of us relinquish our right over the other as legal husband and wife.
(b) That both without any interference by any of us, nor either of us can prosecute the other for adultery or
concubinage or any other crime or suit arising from our separation.
(c) That I, the, wife, is no longer entitled for any support from my husband or any benefits he may received
thereafter, nor I the husband is not entitled for anything from my wife.
(d) That neither of us can claim anything from the other from the time we verbally separated, that is from May
30, 1944 to the present when we made our verbal separation into writing.
In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting with one Asuncion Rebulado and on September 1, 1955, said Asuncion gave
birth to a child who was recorded as the child of said defendant (Exh. C.).It was shown also that defendant and Asuncion
deported themselves as husband and wife and were generally reputed as such in the community.
After the trial, without the defendant adducing any evidence, the court a quo rendered judgment holding that the acts of
defendant constituted concubinage, a ground for legal separation. It however, dismissed the complaint by stating:
While this legal ground exist, the suit must be dismissed for two reasons, viz:
Under Art. 102 of the new Civil Code, an action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from
and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the
date when the cause occurred. The plaintiff became aware of the illegal cohabitation of her husband with
Asuncion Rebulado in January, 1955. The complaint was filed on April 24, 1956. The present action was,
therefore, filed out of time and for that reason action is barred.
Article 100 of the new Civil Code provides that the legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent
spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. As shown in
Exhibit B, the plaintiff has consented to the commission of concubinage by her husband. Her consent is clear
from the following stipulations:
(b) That both of us is free to get any mate and live with as husband and wife without any
interference by any of us, nor either of us can prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or
any other crime or suit arising from our separation. (Exh. B).
This stipulation is an unbridled license she gave her husband to commit concubinage. Having consented to the
concubinage, the plaintiff cannot claim legal separation.
The above decision is now before us for review, plaintiff- appellant claiming that it was error for the lower court to have
considered that the period to bring the action has already elapsed and that there was consent on the part of the plaintiff
to the concubinage. The proposition, therefore, calls for the interpretation of the provisions of the law upon which the
lower court based its judgment of dismissal.
Article 102 of the new Civil Code provides:
An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which the
plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from after the date when cause occurred.
The complaint was filed outside the periods provided for by the above Article. By the very admission of plaintiff, she came
to know the ground (concubinage) for the legal separation in January, 1955. She instituted the complaint only on April 24,
1956. It is to be noted that appellant did not even press this matter in her brief.
The very wording of the agreement Exhibit B. gives no room for interpretation other than that given by the trial judge.
Counsel in his brief submits that the agreement is divided in two parts. The first part having to do with the act of living
separately which he claims to be legal, and the second part that which becomes a license to commit the ground for legal
separation which is admittedly illegal. We do not share appellant's view. Condonation and consent on the part of plaintiff
are necessarily the import of paragraph 6(b) of the agreement. The condonation and consent here are not only implied but
expressed. The law (Art. 100 Civil Code), specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent
spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned and/or
consented in writing, the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy (People vs. Scheneckenburger, 73 Phil., 413).
Plaintiff's counsel even agrees that the complaint should be dismissed. He claims however, that the grounds for the
dismissal should not be those stated in the decision of the lower court, "but on the ground that plaintiff and defendant
have already been legally separated from each other, but without the marital bond having been affected, long before the
effectivity of the new Civil Code" (appellants brief, pp. 7-8). Again, we cannot subscribed to counsel's contention, because
it is contrary to the evidence.
Conformably with the foregoing, we find that the decision appealed from is in accordance with the evidence and the law
on the matter. The same is hereby affirmed, with costs.
G.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956
BENJAMIN BUGAYONG, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
LEONILA GINEZ, defendant-appellee.
Florencio Dumapias for appellant.
Numeriano Tanopo, Jr. for appellee.
FELIX, J.:
This is a case for legal separation filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan wherein on motion of the defendant, the
case was dismissed. The order of dismissal was appealed to the Court of Appeals, but said Tribunal certified the case to the
Court on the ground that there is absolutely no question of fact involved, the motion being predicated on the assumption
as true of the very facts testified to by plaintiff-husband.
The facts of the case abridgedly stated are as follows: Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was
married to defendant Leonila Ginez on August 27, 1949, at Asingan, Pangasinan, while on furlough leave. Immediately
after their marriage, the couple lived with their sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, or about
July, 1951, Leonila Ginez left the dwelling of her sister-in-law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to
reside with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan, from which place she later moved to Dagupan City to study in a local
college there.
As early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco (plaintiff's sister-in-law) and
some from anonymous writers(which were not produced at the hearing) informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his
wife which he did not even care to mention. On cross-examination, plaintiff admitted that his wife also informed him by
letter, which she claims to have destroyed, that a certain "Eliong" kissed her. All these communications prompted him in
October, 1951 to seek the advice of the Navy Chaplain as to the propriety of a legal separation between him and his wife
on account of the latter's alleged acts of infidelity, and he was directed to consult instead the navy legal department.
In August, 1952, plaintiff went to Asingan, Pangasinan, and sought for his wife whom he met in the house of one Mrs.
Malalang, defendant's godmother. She came along with him and both proceeded to the house of Pedro Bugayong, a
cousin of the plaintiff-husband, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. Then they
repaired to the plaintiff's house and again passed the night therein as husband and wife. On the second day, Benjamin
Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that she had committed adultery but
Leonila, instead of answering his query, merely packed up and left, which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity
imputed on her. After that and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted efforts to locate her and failing to find her, he went to
Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, "to soothe his wounded feelings".
On November 18, 1952, Benjamin Bugayong filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint for legal
separation against his wife, Leonila Ginez, who timely filed an answer vehemently denying the averments of the complaint
and setting up affirmative defenses. After the issues were joined and convinced that a reconciliation was not possible, the
court set the case for hearing on June 9, 1953. Plaintiff's counsel announced that he was to present 6 witnesses but after
plaintiff-husband finished testifying in his favor, counsel for the defendant orally moved for the dismissal of the complaint,
but the Court ordered him to file a written motion to that effect and gave plaintiff 10 days to answer the same.
The motion to dismiss was predicted on the following grounds: (1) Assuming arguendo the truth of the allegations of the
commission of "acts of rank infidelity amounting to adultery", the cause of action, if any, is barred by the statute of
limitations; (2) That under the same assumption, the act charged have been condoned by the plaintiff-husband; and (3)
That the complaint failed to state a cause of action sufficient for this court to render a valid judgment.
The motion to dismiss was answered by plaintiff and the Court, considering only the second ground of the motion to
dismiss i. e., condonation, ordered the dismissal of the action. After the motion for reconsideration filed by plaintiff was
denied, the case was taken up for review to the Court of Appeals, appellant's counsel maintaining that the lower court
erred:
(a) In so prematurely dismissing the case;
(b) In finding that there were condonation on the part of plaintiff-appellant; and
(c) In entertaining condonation as a ground for dismissal inasmuch as same was not raised in the answer or in a
motion to dismiss.
As the questions raised in the brief were merely questions of law, the Court of Appeals certified the case to Superiority.
The Civil Code provides:
ART. 97. A petition for legal separation may be filed:
(1) For adultery on the part of the wife and for concubinage for the part of the husband as defined on the Penal
Code; or
(2) An attempt by one spouse against the life of the other.
ART. 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation
cannot by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of
the petition.
ART. 102. An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on
which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such
cause occurred.
As the only reason of the lower Court for dismissing the action was the alleged condonation of the charges of adultery that
the plaintiff-husband had preferred in the complaint against his wife, We will disregard the other 2 grounds of the motion
to dismiss, as anyway they have not been raised in appellant's assignment of errors.
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation or, as stated in I Bouver's Law
Dictionary, p. 585, condonation is the "conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of a matrimonial
offense which the latter has committed". It is to be noted, however, that in defendant's answer she vehemently and
vigorously denies having committed any act of infidelity against her husband, and even if We were to give full weight to
the testimony of the plaintiff, who was the only one that had the chance of testifying in Court and link such evidence with
the averments of the complaint, We would have to conclude that the facts appearing on the record are far from sufficient
to establish the charge of adultery, or, as the complaint states, of "acts of rank infidelity amounting to adultery" preferred
against the defendant. Certainly, the letter that plaintiff claims to have received from his sister-in-law Valeriana Polangco,
which must have been too vague and indefinite as to defendant's infidelity to deserve its production in evidence; nor the
anonymous letters which plaintiff also failed to present; nor the alleged letter that, according to plaintiff, his wife
addressed to him admitting that she had been kissed by one Eliong, whose identity was not established and
which admission defendant had no opportunity to deny because the motion to dismiss was filed soon after plaintiff
finished his testimony in Court, do not amount to anything that can be relied upon.
But this is not a question at issue. In this appeal, We have to consider plaintiff's line of conduct under the assumption that
he really believed his wife guilty of adultery. What did he do in such state of mind. In August, 1952, he went to Pangasinan
and looked for his wife and after finding her they lived together as husband and wife for 2 nights and 1 day, after which he
says that he tried to verify from her the truth of the news he had about her infidelity, but failed to attain his purpose
because his wife, instead of answering his query on the matter, preferred to desert him, probably enraged for being
subjected to such humiliation. And yet he tried to locate her, though in vain. Now, do the husband's attitude of sleeping
with his wife for 2 nights despite his alleged belief that she was unfaithful to him, amount to a condonation of her previous
and supposed adulterous acts? In the order appealed from, the Court a quo had the following to say on this point:
In the hearing of the case, the plaintiff further testified as follows:
Q. Now Mr. Bugayong, you have filed this action for legal separation from your wife. Please tell this Hon. Court
why you want to separate from your wife? A. I came to know that my wife is committing adultery, I
consulted the chaplain and he told me to consult the legal adviser. (p. 11, t.s.n.)
Q. Did you finally locate her?--A. Four days later or on the fifth day since my arrival she went to the house of our
god-mother, and as a husband I went to her to come along with me in our house but she refused. (p. 12,
t.s.n.)lawphil.net
Q. What happened next? A. I persuaded her to come along with me. She consented but I did not bring her
home but brought her to the house of my cousin Pedro Bugayong. (p. 12, t.s.n.)
Q. How long did you remain in the house of your cousin Pedro Bugayong? A. One day and one night. (p. 12.
t.s.n.)
Q. That night when you stayed in the house of your cousin Pedro Bugayong as husband and wife, did you slept
together? A. Yes, sir. (p. 19, t.s.n.)
Q. On the next night, when you slept in your own house, did you sleep together also as husband and wife? A.
Yes, sir. (p. 19. t.s.n.)
Q. When was that? A. That was in August, 1952. (p. 19 t.s.n.)
Q. How many nights did you sleep together as husband and wife? A. Only two nights. (p. 19, t.s.n.)
The New Civil Code of the Philippines, in its Art. 97, says:
A petition for legal separation may be filed:
(1) For adultery on the part of the wife and concubinage on the part of the husband as defined on the Penal
Code.
and in its Art. 100 it says:lawphil.net
The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of
or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, legal separation cannot be
claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of
the petition.
A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband, especially those portions quoted above,
clearly shows that there was a condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts of rank infidelity
amounting to adultery" committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the infidelities
amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant, a reconciliation was effected between her and the
plaintiff. The act of the latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him
and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there as
husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further fact that in the second night they again slept
together in their house likewise as husband and wife all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of
this court than that a reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife
by the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity
amounting to adultery.
In Shackleton vs. Shackleton, 48 N. J. Eq. 364; 21 Atl. 935, it has been held that "condonation is implied from
sexual intercourse after knowledge of the other infidelity. such acts necessary implied forgiveness. It is entirely
consonant with reason and justice that if the wife freely consents to sexual intercourse after she has full
knowledge of the husband's guilt, her consent should operate as a pardon of his wrong."
 In Tiffany's Domestic and Family Relations, section 107 says:
Condonation. Is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for divorce and bars the
right to a divorce. But it is on the condition, implied by the law when not express, that the
wrongdoer shall not again commit the offense; and also that he shall thereafter treat the other
spouse with conjugal kindness. A breach of the condition will revive the original offense as a ground
for divorce. Condonation may be express or implied.
It has been held in a long line of decisions of the various supreme courts of the different states of the U. S. that
'a single voluntary act of sexual intercourse by the innocent spouse after discovery of the offense is ordinarily
sufficient to constitute condonation, especially as against the husband'. (27 Corpus Juris Secundum, section 61
and cases cited therein).
In the lights of the facts testified to by the plaintiff-husband, of the legal provisions above quoted, and of the
various decisions above-cited, the inevitable conclusion is that the present action is untenable.
Although no acts of infidelity might have been committed by the wife, We agree with the trial judge that the conduct of
the plaintiff-husband above narrated despite his belief that his wife was unfaithful, deprives him, as alleged the offended
spouse, of any action for legal separation against the offending wife, because his said conduct comes within the restriction
of Article 100 of the Civil Code.
The only general rule in American jurisprudence is that any cohabitation with the guilty party, after the commission of the
offense, and with the knowledge or belief on the part of the injured party of its commission, will amount to conclusive
evidence of condonation; but this presumption may be rebutted by evidence (60 L. J. Prob. 73).
If there had been cohabitation, to what extent must it be to constitute condonation?
Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation,
and where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation
(27 C. J. S., section 6-d).
A divorce suit will not be granted for adultery where the parties continue to live together after it was known
(Land vs. Martin, 15 South 657; Day vs. Day, 80 Pac. 974) or there is sexual intercourse after knowledge of
adultery (Rogers vs. Rogers, 67 N. J. Eq. 534) or sleeping together for a single night (Toulson vs. Toulson, 50 Atl.
401, citing Phinizy vs. Phinizy, 114 S. E. 185, 154 Ga. 199; Collins vs. Collins, 193 So. 702), and many others. The
resumption of marital cohabitation as a basis of condonation will generally be inferred, nothing appearing to
the contrary, from the fact of the living together as husband and wife, especially as against the husband
(Marsh vs. Marsh, 14 N. J. Eq. 315).
There is no ruling on this matter in our jurisprudence but we have no reason to depart from the doctrines laid down in the
decisions of the various supreme courts of the United States above quoted.
There is no merit in the contention of appellant that the lower court erred in entertaining condonation as a ground for
dismissal inasmuch as same was not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss, because in the second ground of the
motion to dismiss. It is true that it was filed after the answer and after the hearing had been commenced, yet that motion
serves to supplement the averments of defendant's answer and to adjust the issues to the testimony of plaintiff himself
(section 4, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court).
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant.
It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-996 October 13, 1902
LUIS R. YANGCO,Petitioner, vs. WILLIAM J. ROHDE, judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,Respondent.
Francisco Ortigas, for petitioner.
Fred. G. Waite, for respondent.
ARELLANO, C.J.: chanrobles virtual law library
The petitioner, Luis R. Yangco, filed in this court a petition for a writ of prohibition, alleging that before Judge William J.
Rohde, of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, a complaint had been filed by Victorina Obin against the
petitioner praying that she be declared the lawful wife of the said Yangco, and that she be granted a divorce, an allowance
for alimony, and attorney's fees during the pendency of the suit; that the demurrer filed by the petitioner was overruled by
the said judge, said ruling being in part as follows: "I am of the opinion that the marriage alleged in the complaint is valid
under the laws in force, although the question is not clear nor without doubt. The facts alleged in the complaint compel
me to resolve the doubt in favor of the plaintiff;" and that the petitioner, in answer to the complaint, denied the principal
allegation of fact therein, to wit, the mutual agreement to be husband and wife alleged by the plaintiff to have been
entered into before witnesses; that while the case was in this condition the plaintiff filed a motion for a monthly allowance
as alimony, costs, and attorney's fees; that on the 22nd of July last the said judge ordered the petitioner to pay the
plaintiff, in advance, a monthly allowance of 250 Mexican pesos from and after the 11th of March last past, and to pay on
the 1st day of August following all accrued allowances, in addition to the allowance for the said month, amounting to the
sum of 1,500 pesos; that the plaintiff in the said action owns no property, and the judge not having required from her any
security, it is certain that the petitioner, defendant in the said action below, should judgment be rendered in his favor,
would be unable to recover such sums as the judge might compel him to disburse; that against the ruling of the court he
had no right of appeal or any plain, speedy, or adequate remedy; therefore he prays the court to render judgment
declaring the Hon. William J. Rohde, judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, has acted in excess of his jurisdiction in
attempting to oblige petitioner to pay to the said Victorina Obin the said allowance, and to direct that a writ of prohibition
issue to the said William J. Rohde prohibiting him from attempting to compel petitioner to pay the said amount.chanrobles
virtual law library
Against this petition the attorney for the respondent, William J. Rohde, filed a demurrer and motion to dismiss upon the
following grounds: (1) That this court is without jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action; (2) that the petition does
not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. It is to be observed that in the oral argument and brief filed no
denial was made, but on the contrary the fact alleged by the petitioner was affirmed in that the ruling on the demurrer in
the Court of First Instance the respondent had expressed his opinion that "the question (as to the alleged marriage) is not
clear nor free from doubt."chanrobles virtual law library
Nevertheless, he says, "this being so, the said Victorina Obin acquired a right to all conjugal rights, and in particular to the
allowance of alimony pendente lite." And upon this supposition he cited articles of the Civil Code as to rights enjoyed by a
married woman by virtue of the marriage, and those which she may further exercise by reason of divorce pending
litigation and those granted to her finally in case of a favorable judgment.chanrobles virtual law library
The entire theory developed by the demurrer now before us may be expressed in the following terms: The respondents
judge had jurisdiction to try the divorce case and its incidents, among others that of alimony; in an interlocutory ruling he
held that the alleged matrimony existed, although it appeared to him to be a matter not clear or free from doubt; in
another interlocutory order, notwithstanding the fact that the existence of the marriage is not clear or free from doubt, he
directed the allowance of alimony pendente lite in favor of the plaintiff; against this interlocutory order no appeal lies on
behalf of the alleged husband who is to pay this allowance; this alleged husband must pay it without any guaranty of
recovery in the event that the proof should established a contrary condition of affairs to that assumed to be correct,
notwithstanding the fact that the question is not clear or free from doubt; and as the judge is not devoid of jurisdiction,
and as no appeal lies against an interlocutory order, that such an opinion, such an interlocutory order so rendered,
although erroneous and causing irreparable damage, can not be reviewed by any other court during the course of the
trial.chanrobles virtual law library
Such a theory was not possible in these Islands under its former Law of Civil Procedure, nor is it possible now under the
present Code of Civil Procedure. Under article 1591 of the old Code any person believing himself entitled to that
provisional alimony or support was required to file with the complaint documents proving conclusively the title by virtue of
which the same was sued for. If the title was based upon a right created by law, it was necessary to present the documents
establishing the bond of relationship between the plaintiff and defendant or the circumstances which gave a right to the
alimony, such evidence to be completed by the testimony of witnesses if necessary. The judge, under article 1592, could
not admit the complaint unless the documents referred to in the preceding article were submitted. It is evident from this
that under the provisions of the law then in force a suit for alimony could not prosper upon the mere opinion of the judge
expressed, not in a final judgment causing status, but in an interlocutory order which has no other purpose than to
facilitate the continuance of the trial. This, apart from the fact that under the former procedural law ever interlocutory
order not merely of practice was appealable, and consequently the case of one finding himself prejudiced by an order
capable of causing him irreparable damage, such as that of paying an allowance without security or possibility of recovery,
could never arise under that system of legislation.chanrobles virtual law library
The necessity of founding the action for support or alimony on a title, and a title supported by documentary evidence, is a
consequence of the precepts of article 143 of the Civil Code cited by the respondent judge himself. In this article the right
to support is granted (1) to spouses inter se; (2) to legitimate descendants and ascendants inter se; (3) to parents and
certain legitimated and acknowledged natural children; (4) to other illegitimate children, and (5) to brothers and sisters. In
all these cases in is a civil status or a juridical relation which is the basis of the action for support - the civil status of
marriage or that of relationship.chanrobles virtual law library
In the present case the action for the support or alimony is brought by a woman who alleges that she is a wife; therefore it
is necessary for her to prove possession of the civil status of a spouse - that is, a marriage, without which one has no right
to the title to husband or wife. Marriages celebrated before the adoption of the Civil Code must be proven by the means
established by the former laws (art. 53). "Marriages celebrated before the operation of the Code," says Q. Mucius
Scaevola, "must be proven by the canonical certificate." (Vol. 2, p. 137.) "Before the Council of Trent," says Manresa, "no
absolute provision of law required the parish priests to make entries in their books with regard to the birth, marriage, or
death of their parishioners ... . The council required the parish priests to open books in which to record baptisms,
marriages, and deaths ... The State, the attention of which was called for the first time to the importance of the records
established by the provisions of the council, gave evidence of its interest by issuing the royal order of March 21, 1794,
according to which the prelates of the Kingdom were directed to require the evidence referred to be kept exclusively in the
churches." (Commentaries, vol. 1, p. 262.)chanrobles virtual law library
This evidence being lacking, and the civil status of marriage being in litigation, it is evident that nothing can be taken for
granted upon the point in issue. There is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of alimony to a person who claims
to be a spouse in the same manner as to a person who conclusively establishes by legal proof that he or she is such spouse,
and sues for divorce or separation. In this case the legal evidence raises a presumption of law; in the former there is no
presumption, there is nothing but a mere allegation - a fact in issue - and a simple fact in issue must not be confounded
with an established right recognized by a final judgment or based upon a legal presumption. The civil status of marriage
being denied, and this civil status, from which the right to support is derived, being issue, it is difficult to see how any
effect can be given to such a claim until an authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause. It is
evident that there is of necessity a substantial difference between the capacity of a person after the rendition of a final
judgment in which that person is declared to be in possession of the status of marriage and his capacity prior to such time
when nothing exists other than his suit or claim to be declared in possession of such status of marriage. Any other view
would render useless all the legal effects which flow from the authority of res adjudicata.chanrobles virtual law library
Nor can such a theory be sustained under the Code of Civil Procedure now in force. It is true that an interlocutory order
such as that rendered by the respondent judge in the present case is not appealable during the course of the trial, but only
after a final judgment has been rendered therein; but it is none the less true that it can not be the intention of the law,
when prohibiting an appeal against interlocutory orders, to give executory force to all kinds of interlocutory orders which
the judge may see fit to make in the course of a trial, and still less when the effect would be to cause irreparable damage,
such as that alleged by the petitioner in the present case, by reason of the insolvency of the person in whose favor the
granting of alimony has been ordered, and which allegation has not been objected to or denied by the respondent. It is
indeed a wise rule of procedure which refuses to permit the interruption of a trial by means of incidental appeals; but, if
the judge incidentally in the course of a trial proceeds without or in excess of his jurisdiction, this rule which prohibits an
appeal does not leave the party aggrieved without remedy. The same Code of Civil Procedure establishes several means by
which such excess may be prevented.chanrobles virtual law library
In this case the remedy of prohibition is invoked. (Art. 516 in relation with 226.) This remedy must be based upon a lack of
jurisdiction or an excess in the exercise of jurisdiction in order that the judge may be prohibited from continuing the
proceedings. This remedy having been established by the Code of Civil Procedure now in force, it is not allowable to apply
the theories and principles concerning the lack of jurisdiction or an excess in its exercise which prevailed in the law of
these Islands prior to the promulgation of that Code. We must of necessity apply the theories and principles which prevail
in the law which has established the remedy, or the authorities which, in the American law, establish the doctrine upon the
subject, and more especially the views prevailing in the State of California, whose Code of Procedure is strictly in accord
with the Code in these Islands as to the remedy in question, with respect to which it may be said that the California Code is
its true legal precedent.chanrobles virtual law library
To this end and as an illustration of the case as to the propriety of the remedy by prohibition, we may cite a decision of the
supreme court of California of July 9, 1890 (Havemeyer & Co., petitioners, vs. the Superior Court, Judge Wallace,
respondent.)chanrobles virtual law library
This was a case of quo warranto brought by the attorney-general of the State against a California corporation, the
American Sugar Refinery Company, for the cancellation of its charter, and in which case judgment was rendered on the 8th
of January, 1890; an incident having arisen as to the appointment of a receiver to take charge of the property of the
company pending the taking of an appeal or to proceed to distribute the same according to law in case an appeal should
not be taken, inasmuch as the corporation had been dissolved and its corporate rights forfeited, the judge made an order
appointing a receiver. The receiver attempted to take possession of the sugar refinery, which he found in the possession of
Messrs. Havemeyer & Co, who claimed to have purchased it in the month of March, 1889, and asserted that since that
time they had been in full and complete possession as absolute owners in their own exclusive right. After several other
incidental proceedings the judge made an order directing the sheriff to put the receiver in possession of the locus in quo.
Havemeyer & Co. then applied to the supreme court for a writ of prohibition, which was issued. "The question now
remains," says the court in its decision, "whether the superior court had jurisdiction to make an order appointing the
receiver and ordering him to take from the possession of the petitioners certain property, the petitioners not having been
a party to the quo warranto proceedings and alleging a right of their own to the said property."chanrobles virtual law
library
In disposing of this question the court holds that the judge was without jurisdiction to make this order, and continues: "We
now come to the question as to the remedy. Prohibition arrests the proceedings of an inferior judicial tribunal or officer
when such proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal or officer, and the writ issues in all cases
where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. We have shown that the
superior court in appointing a receiver exceeded its jurisdiction, and there is no question that the petitioners are seriously
injured by the enforcement of the order. If then they have no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, they are clearly entitled to the benefit of the writ of prohibition to arrest the proceedings under the void order." The
court, to fortify its decision, takes up and discusses various objections, such as the following: (1) That the petitioners might
have bowed to the authority of the receiver, giving him possession, and then obtained leave from the court to sue him in
ejectment; (2) that the order appointing the receiver was appealable, and that, therefore, the remedy for prohibition
would not lie; (3) that before availing themselves of this remedy petitioners should show that an objection to the order in
question had been overruled. With respect to the first point the court says: "It is true petitioners might have done this, but
the remedy would have been neither speedy nor adequate. They had the right not merely to get their property back after
along and expensive litigation - they had a right to keep it. The wrong with which they were threatened when they applied
for the writ and when the writ issued was the deprivation of the possession and the use of their property. To give the
property up in the hope of being allowed by the superior court to sue for it and to recover it after years of litigation was
neither an adequate nor speedy remedy. It would be as reasonable to say that an injunction should never issue to restrain
a threatened injury because the injured party may always have his action for damages." As to the second point the court
states: "There must not only be a right of appeal but the appeal must furnish an adequate remedy in order to prevent the
issuance of the writ. A number of cases have been decided in this court in which writs of prohibition have been refused
because there was a right of appeal, but in all of those cases the appeal afforded a complete and adequate remedy for the
threatened excess of jurisdiction."chanrobles virtual law library
With respect to the third point the court says that "the following propositions applicable to the case are fully supported by
the decision in the case of the Mayor of London vs. Cox, L.R., H.L., 278-280: (1) If a want of jurisdiction is apparent on the
face of the proceedings in the lower court, no plea or preliminary objection is necessary before suing out the writ of
prohibition. (2) If the proceeding in the lower court is not on its face without the jurisdiction of such court, but is so in fact
by reason of the existence of some matter not disclosed, such matter ought to be averred in some proper form in order to
make the want of jurisdiction appear. (3) But this is not essential to the jurisdiction of the superior court to grant
prohibition. It is only laches which may or may not be excused, according to circumstances.
Accordingly, we find that frequently a failure to plead in the lower court was excused for the reason that it appeared that
the plea would have been rejected if made.
By judgment of the 12th of December, 1891, the same supreme court in a similar proceeding against the superior court of
San Francisco, Judge Wallace used the following language:
Prohibition lies in all cases where there have been proceedings "without or in excess" of jurisdiction, and there "is not a
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Jurisdiction is usually defined as "the power to hear
and determine;" but, of course, it is difficult to express in abstract terms a statement of the distinction between error in
exercising jurisdiction and jurisdiction itself that can be readily applied to all cases as they may arise. The law endeavors to
fix definitely everything that can in its nature be so fixed, so as to leave as little as possible to the judgment or caprice of
those who administer it. But as many future events can not, in the nature of things, be foreseen and provided for, it
follows necessarily that much must be left to the discretion of courts and other tribunals.
This doctrine was applied to the procedure of the judge who had taken action upon a void information presented by a
grand jury which by reason of its defective organization was not regarded as a legally existing body, and the court decided
"that the jury not being a legal body and the so-called indictment being void, the court below was without jurisdiction to
try the accused upon such an indictment, hence the attempted action of the court was without and in excess of its
jurisdiction." As to whether the petitioner had any other prompt, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the court said:
If there be such remedy, it must be by appeal. But it would be a difficult proposition to maintain that a defendant in a
criminal case, forced through all the stages of a trial for felony without any indictment against him, or, which is the same
thing in effect, upon a void indictment, would have a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, because, after conviction and
judgment, and perhaps after suffering the ignominy of imprisonment in the state prison, he could have the illegal
proceeding reversed on appeal. ... We are of opinion, therefore, that there is no jurisdiction in the respondent to proceed
with the trial of petitioner; that the latter has no "plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law," and
that prohibition is the proper remedy.
Mr. Justice Garmette added:
The case of Quimbo Appo vs. People, 20 N.Y., 542, received an exhaustive consideration from the court of that State, and,
after referring to many authorities upon the question as to when the writ of prohibition should issue, it said: "These cases
prove that the writ lies to prevent the exercise of any unauthorized power in a cause or proceeding of which the
subordinate tribunal has jurisdiction, no less than when the entire cause is without the jurisdiction." And again: "This
shows that the writ was never governed by any narrow, technical rules, but was resorted to as a convenient mode of
exercising a wholesome control over inferior tribunals. The scope of this remedy ought not, I think, to be abridged, as it is
far better to prevent the exercise of unauthorized power that to be driven to the necessity of correcting the error after it is
committed."
In its decision of December 8, 1890, the same supreme court in a proceeding similar to that now before us, instituted, by
J.M. McDowell against Aaron Bell, judge of the superior court of Shasta County, upon the ground that this judge in an
incidental proceeding similar to that which now occupies our attention directed that certain property claimed by a third
person be subjected to the satisfaction of a judgment rendered against the grantee, held as follows:
In this the respondent exceeded his jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of his court. His only power in the premises was to
make an order authorizing the judgment creditor to institute an action in the proper court against the parties claiming the
property for the recovery of the property and the subjection of the same to the satisfaction of the debt, and forbidding a
transfer of the property until such action could be commenced and prosecuted to judgment.
This indicates what is meant by an act without or in excess of jurisdiction in accordance with the principles upon which
article 226 of the present Code of Civil Procedure is based.chanrobles virtual law library
The court below had jurisdiction to try the divorce suit, but he was without jurisdiction to grant alimony when the right to
claim alimony had not accrued in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. This Code only grants the rights to
alimony to a wife. This status not appearing by a final judgment, the court is without jurisdiction to make any order in the
matter. Therefore mandamus is the proper remedy upon the facts related.chanrobles virtual law library
It is not necessary to decide at this time if an exception could be made with respect to a case in which the fact of the
marriage is admitted of record by the defendant. In the case before us this fact was denied. The motion and demurrer are
overruled and the defendant is authorized to answer the complaint within twenty days from this date.chanrobles virtual
law library
Torres, Willard, and Ladd, JJ., concur.
Smith and Mapa, JJ., did not sit in this case.
Separate Opinions
chanrobles virtual law library
COOPER, J., dissenting:chanrobles virtual law library
The petition for the writ of prohibition presents a case in which the Court of First Instance of Manila in an action for
divorce has, by an interlocutory order upon application of the alleged wife after a hearing had thereon, granted the alleged
wife, the plaintiff in the suit, alimony pendente lite. The defendant bases his application for a writ of prohibition, staying
and annulling the order granting the alimony, on the grounds that the Court of First Instance in granting alimonypendente
lite has acted in excess of its jurisdiction; that the alleged wife, the plaintiff in the divorce suit, has no resources whatever,
and that the judge not having required of her security for the return of the money to be received as alimony, in the event
of the rendition of judgment against her upon the final trial the money will be lost to him, and that the remedy by appeal is
not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. A demurrer was presented to the application which has been overruling are
summarized as follows: (1) The Court of First Instance had jurisdiction in the matter of divorce; (2) in this suit the power to
grant alimony depends exclusively upon the provisions of the Civil Code, and that this favor of a wife; and (3) that such
status not having been established by a final judgment the court lacks jurisdiction to pass any judgment upon the matter of
alimony.chanrobles virtual law library
I regard this decision as establishing an inequitable rule in cases of alimony, and also a practice in the granting of writs of
prohibition not authorized by law.chanrobles virtual law library
The learned Chief Justice in his opinion seems to have in view the practice prevailing in the ecclesiastical tribunals formerly
existing here, but which have passed out with the Spanish domination.chanrobles virtual law library
These courts having ceased to exist, the practice peculiar to them has been abolished.chanrobles virtual law library
The jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts depended upon a canonical marriage, proof of which was jurisdictional and was
the prerequisite to an action. Only one kind of proof was admissible - this was the evidence contained in the registers of
the church. If this character of proof was not forthcoming and the marriage was disputed the party was sent to the civil
tribunal to establish the marriage; the action would not be admitted otherwise. Again, alimony could not be granted in the
ecclesiastical court, the court which had cognizance of the main suit, because the ecclesiastical decree produced no civil
effects whatever; therefore, in order that it might be granted, the matter was remitted to the civil tribunals which had
power to deal with the property of the parties, and this was usually done under the provisions of articles 1591-1599 of the
Code of Civil Procedure formerly in force in these Islands. These provisions are for temporary maintenance and apply
generally to all cases where the applicant is entitled to support under the law.chanrobles virtual law library
Actions for divorce were invariably brought in the ecclesiastical courts, but this was on account of the universal custom of
the celebration of canonical marriages. The ecclesiastical courts, as stated, exercise jurisdiction only in cases of a canonical
marriage. They had no jurisdiction in cases of civil marriage or any other form of marriage such as marriages under foreign
laws. The civil tribunals had jurisdiction of divorce suits and suits for nullity of marriage in these cases, and not only had
jurisdiction of the main suit but they were also given jurisdiction of the proceedings for alimony pendente lite. Article 103
and 107 of the Civil Code, with vest this jurisdiction, read as follows:
(103) The civil tribunal shall take cognizance of the suits for nullity of marriages celebrated in conformity with the
provisions of this chapter (regulating civil marriages) and shall adopt the measures indicated in article 68 (the article
providing for alimony pendente lite), and shall give sentence definitely.
Article 107 is as follows:
The provisions of article 103 shall be applicable to suits for divorce and their incidents.
From this it will be seen that the ecclesiastical courts and the civil tribunals admitted suits in their respective jurisdictions
on different principles - the former only where the marriage was not contested or where the status of marriage had been
established in a civil tribunal. The latter did not require proof of marriage was only one of the issues involved in the suit.
The decrees of the ecclesiastical courts produced no civil effects whatever, and it was necessary to call to their aid the civil
tribunals in order to deal with the property of a party. On the other hand, the civil tribunal might settle the whole dispute
in one proceeding, they having the power both to adjudge and to enforce their decrees upon the property of the parties. A
party in this tribunal would never have been remitted to any other proceeding to establish the civil status of the wife, nor
to any other proceeding to enforce its decrees against the property. Consequently the civil tribunals having the full power
to adjudge every matter in dispute between the parties after taking cognizance of the cause would retain it until its final
termination and the fruits of the judgment had been secured. In the clear language of the statute, it has jurisdiction of
divorce suits and its incidents and the granting of the alimony; the law in express terms gives it this jurisdiction.chanrobles
virtual law library
While section 68 of the Civil Code gives alimony to the wife, the jurisdiction of the court can not be made to depend upon
this article, nor can the word "wife" in any manner be regarded as a word of limitation on the power to adjudicate
alimony.chanrobles virtual law library
Nor do we apprehend that the Court of First Instance as now organized, with general jurisdiction and with its admitted
power to hear divorce suits, can be circumscribed in its power by any such reasons as that the civil status of the wife is a
prerequisite to its power to adjudicate the case.chanrobles virtual law library
If it is intended to be asserted in the decision that in order to obtain alimony it is necessary that the parties should resort
to the special proceedings as provided in article 1591, a serious objection to such position is that it is probable these
provisions of law are no longer in force. Our present Code of Civil Procedure contains a sweeping clause in the repeal of all
other procedure. It reads as follows:
SEC. 795. All codes, statutes, acts, decrees, and orders or parts thereof heretofore promulgated, enacted, or in force in the
Philippine Islands prescribed in the Procedure in Civil Actions or Special Proceedings in any court or tribunal are hereby
repealed, and the procedure in all civil actions and special proceedings and all courts and tribunals shall hereafter be in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.
However this may be, the courts organized under our present laws of procedure pursue their course in the exercise of
jurisdiction in accordance with American laws. The Spanish system of procedure is scarcely recognized among its
enactments.chanrobles virtual law library
In divorce suits, according to American practice, alimony is regarded as an incident to the suit and the granting of alimony
as an auxiliary proceeding. (Encl. PI. and Prac., 408, alimony; 2 Am. and Eng. Encl. Law, 93.) Such a practice as dividing up
the suit and trying the issues in the divorce suit in a separate and distinct action in an American court.
(Bennet vs. Southard, 35 Cal., 691.) Nor would it be practicable to separate the two proceedings. Alimony being a provision
for the wife pendente lite, if the granting of it was separated from the main suit its adjudication might not reach a final
conclusion until long after the principal suit, in aid of which it is supposed to be granted, has been disposed of; besides, it
would require a multiplicity of suits without any compensating benefit whatever.chanrobles virtual law library
The proper parties being duly before the court and the court having the power to hear and determine the matter as issue
between them constitutes its jurisdiction. The Court of First Instance in this case clearly had the power to hear and
determine all the issues involved in the main suit and in the application for alimony, and having the power to hear and
determine these questions, in both of which marriage is an issue, it did not exceed its jurisdiction, and prohibition will not
lie to correct any errors that may have been committed in the hearing.chanrobles virtual law library
If it be admitted that the court was not acting without or in excess of its jurisdiction the language of our statute authorizing
prohibition seems too plain for controversy. Section 226 reads as follows:
When the complainant in an action pending in any Court of First Instance alleges that the proceedings of any inferior
tribunal, corporation, board, or person where exercising functions judicial or ministerial were without or in excess of the
jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person, and the court on trial shall find that the allegations of the
complainant are true and that the plaintiff has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
it shall render a judgment in favor of the complainant including an order commanding the defendant absolutely to desist
or refrain from further proceeding in the action or matter specified therein.
In order for a party to avail himself of this remedy the inferior tribunal must be acting without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, and in addition to this there must be no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.chanrobles virtual law library
As we have attempted to show, the Court of First Instance had the jurisdiction to hear and determine the issues upon
which the right to alimony depended, and whether the remedy by an appeal from an erroneous exercise of this jurisdiction
is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy that had been provided, and if cases occur in which it does not afford adequate
relief it is the default of the legislative power and it rests with it to provide additional remedies. The case of
Havemeyer vs. Superior Court, 84 Cal., 327, is in no way in conflict with these views, but rather supports them. The same
may be said of the other cases cited.chanrobles virtual law library
Let us now examine the nature of alimony pendente lite and the principles upon which it is granted. Article 68 of the Civil
Code provides that after a petition for a nullity of marriage or for a divorce has been interposed and admitted certain
provisions shall be adopted during the pendency of the suit, among which is a provision for the support of the wife and
such children as do not remain under the power of the husband. This provision of law contemplates a separation of the
consorts in every case. This character of suit is generally marked by obstinacy and bitterness. For here is found property
and the offspring as the stake at issue. Passions engendered by resentment, pride, cupidity, and affection find scope in the
action.chanrobles virtual law library
The husband and wife thus involved in litigation and their position as to the right and wrong of the matter being as yet
unascertained, we find with reference to their resources the law has placed them in the following condition: The wife's
estate consists of her dowry, paraphernalia, and one-half of the conjugal community property. Her dowry is composed of
the property and rights brought as such by her to the marriage at the time of contracting it and those which she acquires
during the marriage by donation, inheritance, or legacy as total property. The dowry may have been obligatory, i. e., such
as the law has required the parents to give to their legitimate daughter on marriage. Now, dowry, if it be anestimated
dowry - that is, if the property of which it consists was appraised at the time of its constitution - is transferred in ownership
to the husband, who only upon the dissolution of the marriage is pledged to return its value. Of this he has absolute
control and power of disposition.chanrobles virtual law library
The ownership of the dowry not estimated is retained by the wife, but she can alienate, encumber or mortgage it only with
the license of the husband, who, in case of such litigation, is not likely to consent. Of this part of the dowry the husband is
the administrator and usufructuary.chanrobles virtual law library
The paraphernalia is the property which the wife brings to the marriage, not included in the dowry and what she acquires
after the constitution of the same, and which is not added to the dowry; of this the wife still retains the dominion as well
as its management, unless she has delivered the same to the husband with the intent that he may administer it. This
property she can not alienate, encumber, or mortgage without the like permission of her husband, and when it consists of
available property, such as money or public stocks, or valuable personal property, the husband has the right to require that
it be deposited or invested in such a way that the alienation of the same should be impossible without his
consent.chanrobles virtual law library
With reference to the conjugal community property, which is the earnings or profits indiscriminately obtained by either of
the consorts during the marriage and which belongs to the husband and wife share and share alike, when the marriage is
dissolved she finds herself in no better position, for the husband is the administrator of his property and has the exclusive
disposition of it.chanrobles virtual law library
So we find that the husband at the beginning of this litigation, in which a separation is contemplated, has all of his
individual separate property brought to the marriage or acquired during the marriage by him with the absolute power of
control and disposition; he is the administrator of the conjugal community property and has the power of its control and
disposition; he is the owner, and has the control and disposition over the wife's estimated dowry, and is the administrator
and usufructuary of the dowry not estimated; he has a veto power upon the right of the wife to alienate, encumber, or
mortgage the dowry not estimated and the paraphernalia. The wife has been shorn of power over all of that which she
possesses in her separate right as well as that held in her conjugal community right.chanrobles virtual law library
In this situation she turns in despair to the law and finds that it has done her scant justice by making provisions for her
alimony.chanrobles virtual law library
But this court so construes the law as to substantially deprive her of this benefit. She asks for support while she carries on
the litigation; she is told that she must institute an independent action to establish her status as a wife, and that this action
must be prosecuted to final judgment. Upon her is thus imposed the additional burden of another suit, in which no
provision has been made for alimony; and further, this second suit being commenced subsequent to the divorce suit and
the judgment being alike appealable, according to the natural course of events, will probably not reach a final
determination until the main suit has been settled; as a result alimony pendente lite is made impossible.chanrobles virtual
law library
She is also met by another objection, which is that she is totally without resources and will unable to return the amount of
the alimony received form the husband in the event that she fails in the litigation unless she gives security for it. We have
seen that the law absolutely prohibits her from encumbering, without license of her husband, that part of her separate
property which it has not taken from her and given to the husband.chanrobles virtual law library
The law thus mocks her in helplessness in which it has placed her. She asks for bread, a stone is given her.chanrobles
virtual law library
Conclusions leading to such inequitable results ought not to be readily adopted by a court of justice.chanrobles virtual law
library
For the reasons stated I dissent from the opinion of the court.
[G.R. No. 138322. October 2, 2001]
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according
to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who
obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any
other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on
evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January 7, 1999
Decision[1] and the March 24, 1999 Order[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No.
3026AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12,
1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or
both parties.[3]
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1,
1987.[4] They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, [5] a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving
the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued
by the Australian government.[6] Petitioner -- a Filipina -- and respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of
Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.[7] In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as single
and Filipino.[8]
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their
Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.[9]
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage[10] in the court a quo, on the
ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She
claimed that she learned of respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and its
subsequent dissolution.[11] He contended that his first marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a
divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989;[12] thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
On July 7, 1998 -- or about five years after the couples wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity was
pending -- respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage
ha[d] irretrievably broken down.[13]
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complaint be dismissed on the ground that it stated no cause of
action.[14] The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent.[15] The court marked and admitted the documentary
evidence of both parties.[16] After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution.[17]
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and
recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of
the marriage; that is, respondents alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry.Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree
obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more marital union to nullify or
annul.
Hence, this Petition.[18]
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
1 ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso
facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the
petitioner.
2 of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to marry
constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the petitioners marriage to the respondent
3 itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.[31] The decree purports to be a written act or record of
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.
4 Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the
applicable provisions in this case.
5 issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso
facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree
before our courts.[19]
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) whether
the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally
capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial courts recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson. Citing Adong v.
Cheong Seng Gee,[20] petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in
this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce
decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are
governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the
presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place
where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law does
not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.[21] A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved
even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15[22] and 17[23] of the Civil Code.[24] In mixed marriages involving a
Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26[25] of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.[26] A divorce obtained abroad by a
couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national
laws.[27]
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v.
Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law.[28] Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. [29] Presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the registration
requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles read as follows:
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for
such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:
xxxxxxxxx
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
xxxxxxxxx
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish,
instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased
spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or
her previous marriage. x x x.
of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry
and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons.
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document -- a written official act
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.[30] A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.[32]
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested[33] by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. [34]
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian
family court.[35] However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for
petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Cabanatuan City.[36] The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioners qualification.[37] Hence, it was admitted
in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree
admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.[38]
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer
bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. [39] Naturalization is the legal act of
adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.[40] Naturalized citizens, freed from
the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent
severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party
challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce
decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long
time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of
foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary
in the prosecution or defense of an action.[41] In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of
the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in
their answer when they introduce new matters.[42] Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.[43] Like any other facts,
they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by
reason of their judicial function.[44] The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt
upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue: Respondents Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally incapacitated to marry
her in 1994. Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence, adequately established
his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondents contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for
a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it
and leaves the bond in full force.[45] There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
 Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree -- a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It
is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the
prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.[46]
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict
remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which
was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after
proof of good behavior.[47]
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has
died) commits the offence of bigamy.[48]
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been restricted. It did not
absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the
trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondents capacity to remarry
despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or presumptive
evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39[49] of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has
been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code was not submitted
together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal
capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party
concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal
capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie
evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.[50]
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner. A review
of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for
petitioner: (a) Exhibit A Complaint;[51] (b) Exhibit B Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino-Australian)
and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija;[52] (c) Exhibit C Certificate of Marriage
Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila; [53] (d)
Exhibit D Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A.
Recio and Editha D. Samson was in its records;[54] and (e) Exhibit E Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.
Recio;[55] (2) for respondent: (a) Exhibit 1 -- Amended Answer;[56] (b) Exhibit 2 Family Law Act 1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution
of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;[57] (c) Exhibit 3 Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recio;[58] (d)
Exhibit 4 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate; [59] and Exhibit 5 -- Statutory
Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recio and Grace J. Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.[60]
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with petitioners contention that the court a quo erred
in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to
adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal
capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result
of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive
evidence, if any, which show petitioners legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare
a nullity of the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates,
which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in
Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for
the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that,
of declaring the parties marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-13982 July 31, 1920
DIEGO DE LA VIA, petitioner,
vs.
ANTONIO VILLAREAL, as Auxiliary Judge of First Instance, and NARCISA GEOPANO, respondents.
Del Rosario and Del Rosario and W. F. Mueller for petitioner.
J. Lopez Vito for respondents.
JOHNSON, J.:
This is an original petition presented in the Supreme Court. Its purpose is to obtain an order declaring: (a) That the
respondent, the Honorable Antonio Villareal, as Auxiliary Judge sitting in the Court of First Instance of the province of
Iloilo, has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of a certain action for divorce instituted in said court by the respondent
Narcisa Geopano against her husband, Diego de la Via, the petitioner herein; (b) that the said respondent judge has
exceeded his power and authority in issuing, in said action, a preliminary injunction against the said petitioner prohibiting
him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action; and (c) that all
the proceedings theretofore had in said court were null and void.
It appears from the record that on September 17, 1917, Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Iloilo against Diego de la Via, alleging: (1) That she was a resident of the municipality of Iloilo, Province of
Iloilo, and that the defendant was a resident of the municipality of Vallehermoso, Province of Oriental Negros; (2) that she
was the legitimate wife of the defendant, having been married to him in the municipality of Guijulgan, Province of Negros
Oriental, in the year 1888; (3) that since their said marriage plaintiff and defendant had lived as husband and wife and had
nine children, three of whom were living and were already of age; (4) that during their marriage plaintiff and defendant
had acquired property, real and personal, the value of which was about P300,000 and all of which was under the
administration of the defendant; (5) that since the year 1913 and up to the date of the complaint, the defendant had been
committing acts of adultery with one Ana Calog, sustaining illicit relations with her and having her as his concubine, with
public scandal and in disgrace of the plaintiff; (6) that because of said illicit relations, the defendant ejected the plaintiff
from the conjugal home, for which reason she was obliged to live in the city of Iloilo, where she had since established her
habitual residence; and (7) that the plaintiff, scorned by her husband, the defendant, had no means of support and was
living only at the expense of one of her daughters. Upon said allegations she prayed for (a) a decree of divorce, (b) the
partition of the conjugal property, and (c) alimony pendente lite in the sum of P400 per month.
Subsequent to the filing of the said complaint, Narcisa Geopano, the plaintiff therein, presented a motion, which was later
amended, alleging, among other things, that since the filing of her complaint she had personal knowledge that the
defendant was trying to alienate or encumber the property which belonged to the conjugal partnership between the
plaintiff and the defendant, to the prejudice of the plaintiff, and prayed that a preliminary injunction be issued against the
defendant restraining and prohibiting him in the premises.
The defendant Diego de la Via, petitioner herein, opposed the said motion for a preliminary injunction, and,
subsequently, demurred to the complaint upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
cause, "nor over the person of the defendant."
After hearing the respective parties the respondent judge, in to separate orders, dated November 1 and November 2,
1917, respectively, overruled the defendant's demurrer, and granted the preliminary injunction prayed for by the plaintiff.
Thereafter and on April 27, 1918, the defendant, Diego de la Via filed the present petition for certiorari in this court, upon
the ground that the respondent judge had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action in question, and had exceeded
his power and authority in issuing said preliminary injunction.
The questions arising out of the foregoing facts are as follows:
1. May a married woman ever acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the existence of
the marriage?
2. In an action for divorce, brought by the wife against her husband, in which the partition of the conjugal property is also
prayed for, may the wife obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband restraining and prohibiting him from
alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action?
I.
The petitioner contends that the Court of First Instance of Iloilo had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the said action for
divorce because the defendant therein was a resident of the Province of Negros Oriental and the plaintiff, as the wife of
the defendant, must also be considered a resident of the same province inasmuch as, under the law, the domicile of the
husband is also the domicile of the wife; that the plaintiff could not acquire a residence in Iloilo before the arriage between
her and the defendant was legally dissolved.
This contention of the petitioner is not tenable. It is true, as a general of law, that the domicile of the wife follows that of
her husband. This rule is founded upon the theoretic identity of person and of interest between the husband and the wife,
and the presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of the one is that of the other. It is intended to
promote, strenghten, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail.
But the authorities are unanimous in holding that this is not an absolute rule. "Under modern laws it is clear that many
exceptions to the rule that the domicile from of the wife is determined by that of her husband must obtain. Accordingly,
the wife may acquire another and seperate domicile from that of her husband where the theorical unity of husband and
wife is is dissolved, as it is by the institution of divorce proceedings; or where the husband has given cause for divorce; or
where there is a separation of the parties by agreement, or a permanent separation due to desertion of the wife by the
husband or attributable to cruel treatment on the part of the husband; or where there has been a forfeiture by the wife of
the benefit of the husband's domicile." (9 R. C. L., 545.)
The case of Narcisa Geopano comes under one of the many exceptions above-mentioned, to wit: "Where the husband has
given cause for divorce, the wife may acquire another and seperate domicile from that of her husband." In support of this
proposition there is a formidable array of authorities. We shall content ourselves with illustrative quotations from a few of
them, as follows:
Although the law fixes the domicile of the wife as being that of her husband, universal jurisprudence recognizes
an exception to the rule in the case where the husband's conduct has been such as to furnish lawful ground for
a divorce, which justifies her in leaving him, and, therefore, necessarily authorities her to live elsewhere and to
acquire a separate domicile. Cheever vs. Wilson, 9 Wall. (U. S.), 108; Barber vs. Barber, 21 How. (U. S.), 582; 2
Bishop, Mar. and Div., 475; Schouler, Hus. and Wife, sec. 574; 5 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, p. 756." (Smith vs.
Smith, 43 La. Ann., 1140, 1146.)
The matrimonial domicile of the wife is usually that of the husband, but if she is justified in leaving him because
his conduct has been such as to entitle her to a divorce, and she thereupon does leave him and go into another
state for the purpose of there permanently residing, she acquires a domicile in the latter state. (Atherton vs.
Atherton, 155 N. Y., 129; 63 Am. St. Rep., 650.)
The law will recognize a wife as having a separate existence, and separate interests, and separate rights, in
those cases where the express object of all proceedings is to show that the relation itself ougth to be dissolved,
or so modified as to establish separate interests, and especially a separate domicile and home, bed and board
being put, apart for the whole, as expressive of the idea of home. Otherwise the parties, in this respect, would
stand upon very unequal ground, it being in the power of the husband to change his domicile at will, but not in
that of the wife. (Harteau vs. Harteau, 14 Pick. [Mass.], 181; 25 Am. Dec., 372, 375-376.)
Under the pauper laws, and upon general principles, the wife is regarded as having the domicile of her husband;
hut this results from his marital rights, and the duties of the wife. If the husband has forfeited those rights be
misbehavior, and has left and deserted the wife, they may have different domiciles, in the view of the law
regulating divorces. (Harding vs. Alden, 9 Greenl. [Me.], 140; 23 Am. Dec., 549, 552.)
Though as a general principle of law the domicile of the husband is regarded as the domicile of the wife,
according to the prevailing view a wife may acquire a residence or domicile separate from her husband so as to
confer jurisdiction upon the courts of the state, in which her domicile or residence is established, to decree a
divorce in her favor. (9 R. C. L. 400-401, citing various cases.)
The law making the domicile of the husband that of the wife is applicable only to their relations with third
parties, and has no application in cases of actual separation and controversy between themselves as to the
temporary or permanent severance of the marriage ties by judicial proceedings. Vence vs. Vence, 15 How. Pr.,
497; Schonwald vs. Schonwald, 55 N. C., 367; Cheever vs. Wilson, 76 U. S. (9 Wall.), 109; 19 L. ed., 605. (Notes,
p. 498, 16 L. R. A.)
In the case of Schonwald vs. Schonwald (55 N. C., 343), the plaintiff tried to do what the petitioner in this case insists the
respondent Narcisa Geopano should have done. In that case the wife filed a bill of divorce in a court in North Carolina,
where her husband resided. She herself had not resided in that state for three years previous to the filing of the suit, as
required by the statute; but she claimed that the domicile of her husband was also her domicile and, inasmuch as her
husband, the defendant, had been a resident of North Carolina for more than three years, she had also been a resident of
that state during that time. The court dismissed the bill, holding that the legal maxim that "her domicile is that of her
husband" would not avail in the stead of an actual residence. The court said:
It is true that for many purpose the domicile of the husband is the domicile of the wife, but it is not so for every
purpose. The maxim that the domicile of the wife follows that of the husband cannot be applied to oust the
court of its jurisdiction; neither, from party of reasons can it give jurisdiction. (P. 344.)
Turning to the Spanish authorities, we find that they agree with the American authorities in holding that the maxim or rule
that the domicile of the wife follows that of the husband, is not an absolute one. Scaevola, commenting on article 40 of the
Civil Code (which is the only legal provision or authority relied upon by the petitioner in this case), says:
Although article 64 of the Law of Civil Procedure provides that the domicile of a married woman, not legally
separated from her husband, is that of the latter, yet, when the tacit consent of the husband and other
circumstances justify it, for the purpose of determining jurisdiction, the habitual residence of the woman should
be considered as her domicile where her right may be exercised in accordance with article 63. (Scaevola, Civil
Code, p. 354.)
Manresa, commenting upon the same article (art. 40) says:
The domicile of married women not legally separated from their husband shall be that of the latter. This
principle, maintained by the Supreme Court in numerous decisions, was modified in a particular case by the
decision of June 17, 1887, and in conformity with this last decision, three others were afterwards rendered on
October 13, 23, and 28, 1899, in all of which it is declared that when married women as well as children subject
to parental authority live, with the acquiescence of their husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the
latter live, they have their own independent domicile, which should be considered in determining jurisdiction in
cases of provisional support guardianship of persons, etc. (1 Manresa, 233.)
If the wife can acquire a separate residence when her husband consents or acquiesces, we see no reason why the law will
not allow her to do so when, as alleged in the present case, the husband unlawfully ejects her from the conjugal home in
order that he may freely indulge in his illicit relations with another woman. Under no other circumstance could a wife be
more justified in establishing a separate residence from that of her husband. For her to continue living with him, even if he
had permitted it, would have been a condonation of his flagrant breach of fidelity and marital duty. Furthermore, in this
case no longer was there an "identity of persons and of interest between the husband and the wife." Therefore the law
allowed her to acquire a separate residence. For, "it would do violence to the plainest principle of common sense and
common justice of to call this residence of the guilty husband, where the wife is forbidden to come, . . . the domicile of the
wife." (Champon vs. Champon, 40 La. Ann., 28.)
It is clear, therefore, that a married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband, during
the existence of the marriage, where the husband has given cause for divorce.
II.
We come now to the second question whether or not the respondent judge exceeded his power in issuing the
preliminary injunction complained of by the petitioner.
Section 164 of Act No. 190 provides:
A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established, in the manner hereinafter provided, to the
satisfaction of the judge granting it:
1. That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in restraining
the commission or continuance of the acts complained of either for a limited period or perpetually;
2. That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the plaintiff;
3. That the defendant is doing, or threatens, on is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act
probably in violation of the plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the
judgment ineffectual.
The petitioner quotes the foregoing section and argues that the respondent Narcisa Geopano was not entitled to have a
preliminary injunction issued against her husband because contrary to the requirement of the first paragraph of said
section, she was not entitled to the relief demanded, which consisted in restraining the power and authority which the law
confers upon the husband; that under articles 1412 and 1413 of the Civil Code, the husband is the manager of the conjugal
partnership and, as such, is empowered to alienate and encumber and conjugal property without the consent of the wife;
that neither could the wife obtain a preliminary injunction under paragraph 3 of said section, upon the ground that the
defendant was committing some acts in violation of the plaintiff's rights, because the plaintiff, as the wife of the
defendant, had nor right to intervene in the administration of the conjugal property, and therefore no right of hers was
violated.
We cannot subscribe to that argument of counsel. The law making the husband the sole administrator of the property of
the conjugal partnership is founded upon necessity and convenience as well as upon the presumption that, from the very
nature of the relating between husband and wife, the former will promote and not injure the interests of the latter. So
long as this harmonious relation, as contemplated by law, continues, the wife cannot and should not interfere with the
husband in his judicious administration of the conjugal property. But when that relation ceases and, in a proper action, the
wife seeks to dissolve the marriage and to partition the conjugal property, it is just and proper, in order to protect the
interests of the wife, that the husband's power of administration be curtailed, during the pendency of the action, insofar as
alienating or encumbering the conjugal property is concerned.
In her motion for a preliminary injunction, Narcisa Geopano alleged that the defendant was about to alienate or encumber
the property belonging to the conjugal partnerships, with the object of injuring her interests; and this allegation does not
appear to have been controverted by the defendant either in this court or in the court below. In view of this fact, we are of
the opinion that under both paragraphs 2 and 3 of section 164 of Act No. 190, above quoted, the respondent judge was
empowered and justified in granting the preliminary injunction prayed for by her. It cannot be doubted that, if the
defendant should dispose of all or any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action for divorce, and
squander or fraudulently conceal the proceeds, that act "would probably work injustice to the plaintiff," or that it would
probably be "in violation of the plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual." In this case the plaintiff's rights sought to be protected by said paragraph 3 is not the right to administer the
conjugal property, as counsel for the petitioner believes, but the right to share in the conjugal property upon the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership.
The case under consideration, then, is covered or contemplated by the statute (sec. 164, Act No. 190), so that there can be
no question, in our opinion, as to the power of the respondent judge to issue the preliminary injunction complained of by
the petitioner. Indeed, even in a case not covered by the statute this court had upheld the power of Court of First Instance
to grant preliminary injunctions. In the case of Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company vs. Del Rosario and Jose (22
Phil., 433), Doroteo Jose asked for, and the Court of First Instance granted ex parte, a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction directing the Manila Electric Railroad and Light Company to continue furnishing electricity to Jose. Thereupon
the Light Company filed in this court a petition for the writ of certiorari against Judge S. del Rosario upon the ground that
Courts of First Instance in these Islands are wholly without jurisdiction to issue preliminary mandatory injunctions under
any circumstances whatever. This court denied that petition, determining the power of the Courts of First Instance to issue
preliminary injunction, as follows:
The power to grant preliminary injunctions, both preventative and mandatory, is a logical and necessary
incident of the general powers conferred upon Courts of First Instance in these Islands, as courts of record of
general and unlimited original jurisdiction, both legal and equitable.
Insofar as the statute limits or prescribes the exercise of this power it must be followed: but beyond this, and in
cases not covered by or contemplated by the statute, these courts must exercise their jurisdiction in the
issuance of preliminary injunctions upon sound principles applicable to the circumstances of each particular
case, having in mind the nature of the remedy, and the doctrine and practice established in the courts upon
which our judicial is modeled.
The only limitation upon the power of Courts of First Instance to issue preliminary injunctions, either
mandatory of preventative, is that they are to be issued in the "manner" or according to the "method" provided
therefor in the Code of Civil Procedure.
We conclude, therefore, that in an action for divorce brought by the wife against the husband, in which the partition of the
conjugal property is also prayed for, the wife may obtain a preliminary injunction against the husband, prohibiting the
latter from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during the pendency of the action.
It follows from all of the foregoing that the respondent, the Honorable Antonio Villareal, as Auxiliary Judge sitting in the
Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo, had jurisdiction to hear and determine the action for divorce instituted in
said court by the respondent Narcisa Geopano, and that he did not exceed his power and authority in issuing a preliminary
injunction against the defendant, prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property during
the pendency of the action.
Therefore, the petition should be and is hereby denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
[G.R. No. L-9667. July 31, 1956.]
LUIS MA. ARANETA, Petitioner, vs. HONORABLE HERMOGENES CONCEPCION, as judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch VI and EMMA BENITEZ ARANETA, Respondents.
DECISION
LABRADOR, J.:
The main action was brought by Petitioner against his wife, one of the Respondent herein, for legal separation on the ground
of adultery. After the issues were joined Defendant therein filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their three minor
children, a monthly support of P5,000 for herself and said children, and the return of her passport, to enjoin Plaintiff from
ordering his hirelings from harassing and molesting her, and to have Plaintiff therein pay for the fees of her attorney in the
action. The petition is supported by her affidavit. Plaintiff opposed the petition, denying the misconduct imputed to him and
alleging that Defendant had abandoned the children; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryalleging that conjugal properties were
worth only P80,000, not one million pesos as alleged by Defendant; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarydenying the taking of her
passport or the supposed vexation, and contesting her right to attorneys fees. Plaintiff prayed that as the petition for
custody and support cannot be determined without evidence, the parties be required to submit their respective evidence.
He also contended that Defendant is not entitled to the custody of the children as she had abandoned them and had
committed adultery, that by her conduct she had become unfit to educate her children, being unstable in her emotions and
unable to give the children the love, respect and care of a true mother and without means to educate them. As to the claim
for support, Plaintiff claims that there are no conjugal assets and she is not entitled to support because of her infidelity and
that she was able to support herself. Affidavits and documents were submitted both in support and against the omnibus
petition.
The Respondent judge resolved the omnibus petition, granting the custody of the children to Defendant and a monthly
allowance of P2,300 for support for her and the children, P300 for a house and P2,000 as attorneys fees. Upon refusal of
the judge to reconsider the order, Petitionerfiled the present petition for certiorari against said order and for mandamus to
compel the Respondent judge to require the parties to submit evidence before deciding the omnibus petition. We granted a
writ of preliminary injunction against the order.
The main reason given by the judge, for refusing Plaintiffs request that evidence be allowed to be introduced on the issues,
is the prohibition contained in Article 103 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
ART. 103. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the
petition.
Interpreting the spirit and policy of the provision the trial judge says:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This provision of the code is mandatory. This case cannot be tried within the period of six months from the filing of the
complaint. The court understands that the introduction of any evidence, be it on the merits of the case or on any incident,
is prohibited. The law, up to the last minute, exerts efforts at preserving the family and the home from utter ruin. Interpreting
the intent of said article, the court understands that every step it should take within the period of six months above stated
should be taken toward reconciling the parties. Admitting evidence now will make reconciliation difficult if not impossible.
In this case the court should act as if nothing yet had happened. The children must be given for custody to him or her who
by family custom and tradition is the custodian of the children. The court should ignore that Defendant had committed any
act of adultery or the Plaintiff, any act of cruelty to his wife. The status quo of the family must be restored as much as
possible. In this country, unlike perhaps in any other country of the globe, a family or a home is a petite corporation. The
father is the administrator who earns the family funds, dictates rules in the home for all to follow, and protects all members
of his family. The mother keeps home, keeps children in her company and custody, and keeps the treasure of that family. In
a typical Filipino family, the wife prepares home budget and makes little investment without the knowledge of her husband.
A husband who holds the purse is un-Filipino. He is shunned in Filipino community. The court therefore, in taking action on
petition No. 1 should be guided by the above considerations. (pp. 116-117, Record on Appeal.)
It may be noted that since more than six months have elapsed since the filing of the petition the question offered may not
be allowed. It is, however, believed that the reasons for granting the preliminary injunction should be given that the scope
of the article cited may be explained.
It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein Article 103 (Civil Code) is evidently intended as a cooling off period
to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their grievances against each other in court may only
fan their already inflamed passions against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them opportunity
for dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy, does not have the effect
of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente
lite according to the circumstances. (Article 105, Civil Code.) The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by
the court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank in justice
may be caused.
Take the case at bar, for instance. Why should the court ignore the claim of adultery by Defendantin the face of express
allegations under oath to that effect, supported by circumstantial evidence consisting of letter the authenticity of which
cannot be denied. And why assume that the children are in the custody of the wife, and that the latter is living at the conjugal
dwelling, when it is precisely alleged in the petition and in the affidavits, that she has abandoned the conjugal abode?
Evidence of all these disputed allegations should be allowed that the discretion of the court as to the custody and alimony
pendente lite may be lawfully exercised.
The rule is that all the provisions of the law even if apparently contradictory, should be allowed to stand and given effect by
reconciling them if necessary.
The practical inquiry in litigation is usually to determine what a particular provision, clause or word means. To answer it
one must proceed as he would with any other composition construe it with reference to the leading idea or purpose of
the whole instrument. A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose
and intend. Consequently, each part of section should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to
produce a harmonious whole. Thus it is not proper to confine interpretation to the one section to be construed.
(Southerland, Statutory Construction section 4703, pp. 336-337.)
Thus the determination of the custody and alimony should be given effect and force provided it does not go to the extent of
violating the policy of the cooling off period. That is, evidence not affecting the cause of the separation, like the actual
custody of the children, the means conducive to their welfare and convenience during the pendency of the case, these should
be allowed that the court may determine which is best for their custody.
The writ prayed for is hereby issued and the Respondent judge or whosoever takes his place is ordered to proceed on the
question of custody and support pendente lite in accordance with this opinion. The courts order fixing the alimony and
requiring payment is reversed. Without costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ.,
concur.

G.R. No. L-33352 December 20, 1974
TEODORO E. LERMA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCEPCION DIAZ, respondents.
Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Parlade & Associates for petitioner.
Villareal, Matic & Associates for private respondent.
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p
Before Us for resolution are: (1) the petition for review by certiorari filed by Teodoro E. Lerma on March 21, 1971 to set
aside the resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 44906-R dismissing his petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction filed therein; and (2) the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of our resolution
dated February 8, 1974 denying his urgent motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining
order to enjoin the enforcement of certain orders of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City (hereinafter
referred to as the lower court) ordering the petitioner to pay support pendente lite to Concepcion Diaz, the private
respondent herein.
Petitioner Lerma and respondent Diaz are husband and wife. They married on May 19, 1951. On August 22, 1969 the
petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against the respondent and a certain Teodoro Ramirez (Crim. Case No. 0519 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal). On November 18, 1969 the respondent filed with the lower court, presided by Judge
Leonor Ines Luciano, a complaint1 against the petitioner for legal separation and/or separation of properties, custody of
their children2 and support, with an urgent petition for support pendente lite for her and their youngest son, Gregory, who
was then and until now is in her custody. The respondent's complaint for legal separation is based on two grounds:
concubinage and attempt against her life.
The petitioner filed his opposition to the respondent's application for support pendente lite, setting up as defense the
adultery charge he had filed against the respondent.
Judge Luciano granted the respondent's application for support pendente lite in an order dated December 24, 1969, which
she amended in an order dated February 15, 1970 to the following effect: (1) the respondent was declared entitled to
support pendente lite from the date of the filing of the complaint; and (2) the amount of such monthly support was
reduced from P2,250.00 to P1,820.00.
On March 12, 1970 the petitioner filed with respondent Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction to annul the aforementioned orders on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of
discretion. The next day the respondent court gave due course to the petition and issued a writ of preliminary injunction to
stop Judge Luciano from enforcing said orders.
The respondent court, in its decision of October 8, 1970, set aside the assailed orders and granted the petitioner an
opportunity to present evidence before the lower court in support of his defense against the application for
support pendente lite.
The respondent moved to reconsider the decision on the ground that the petitioner had not asked that he be allowed to
present evidence in the lower court. The respondent court, in its resolution of January 20, 1971, set aside the decision of
October 8 and rendered another, dismissing the petition. This is now the subject of the instant proceeding for review.
On January 23, 1974 the petitioner filed an urgent motion for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or restraining order,
alleging (1) that during the pendency of this appeal and until December 5, 1973 the respondent had never sought the
enforcement of the assailed orders of the lower court granting support pendente lite; (2) that on December 5, 1973 the
respondent filed with the lower court an urgent motion praying that the petitioner be ordered to pay the awarded
support pendente lite, both current and in arrears, on the ground that in the absence of an injunction from this Court the
assailed orders should be executed; (3) that the petitioner filed his opposition to the motion, pointing out that for the
previous three years the respondent did not ask for the enforcement of the orders and her belated move came only "after
petitioner had filed new adultery charges against her and her second paramour" and after the petitioner had sought
custody of their son Gregory; (4) that in connection with the first adultery charge, the respondent and her co-accused,
Teddy Ramirez, had been convicted by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in its decision rendered on September 26, 1972
and said judgment of conviction was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals; (5) that Judge Luciano issued an order dated
January 19, 1974, ordering the petitioner to pay the respondent the awarded support pendente lite within 15 days; and (6)
that unless the lower court was enjoined from enforcing its assailed orders, the present petition would be rendered moot
and academic, to the prejudice of the petitioner.
On January 28, 1974 this Court, acting on the petitioner's motion, resolved "to issue a temporary restraining order
effective immediately and until further orders from this Court." The order was addressed to Judge Luciano, her agents and
representatives.
Required to comment on the petitioner's urgent motion for preliminary injunction, the respondent filed an opposition,
with a prayer for the immediate lifting of the temporary restraining order issued ex-parte. The opposition reiterated the
grounds of her motion dated December 5, 1973 filed in the lower court, to wit: (1) that an order granting support pendente
lite, although interlocutory, is immediately executory even if appealed, unless enjoined; (2) that the dismissal of the
petition by the respondent Court of Appeals rendered functus oficio the writ of preliminary injunction it had previously
issued; and (3) that under Article 292 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "during the proceedings for legal
separation, or for annulment of marriage, the spouses and children shall be supported from the conjugal partnership
property ...," such support is mandatory even if there be a showing that the wife is guilty of adultery.
In a minute resolution dated February 8, 1974 We denied the petitioner's urgent motion for a writ of preliminary
injunction. On February 28, 1974 the petitioner filed this instant motion for reconsideration. On March 6, 1974 We issued
another resolution setting aside the resolution of February 8, 1974 and reinstated the temporary restraining order
previously issued until further orders. On the same day the respondent filed her opposition to the motion for
reconsideration and later asked that it be set for oral argument. The petitioner's pending motion was set for hearing on
April 22, 1974 and then reset for May 20, 1974. On the latter date counsel for both parties appeared. In lieu, however, of
oral argument the Court allowed them to file memoranda.
The petition assails the resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals on two main grounds:
I. IT IS ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO HOLD THAT THE LOWER COURT, IN GRANTING
SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE TO RESPONDENT CONCEPCION DIAZ, DID NOT COMMIT A GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 292 OF THE CIVIL
CODE MAKE IT MANDATORY DURING THE PENDENCY OF LEGAL SEPARATION PROCEEDINGS TO
GRANT SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE TO HEREIN RESPONDENT.
The foregoing alleged errors refer to the two aspects, procedural and substantive, of the disputed orders granting
support pendente lite.
As correctly stated by the respondent court in its decision (which was later reconsidered in its resolution under review),
the procedural law on support pendente lite is Rule 61 of the Revised Rules of Court, specifically Section 5 thereof, which
partly provides:
The court shall determine provisionally the pertinent facts, and shall render such order as equity and
justice may require, having due regard to the necessities of the applicant, the means of the adverse
party, the probable outcome of the case, and such other circumstances as may aid in the proper
elucidation of the questions involved. ...
The petitioner maintains that the above-quoted provision was disregarded by the lower court when it issued the disputed
orders without provisionally determining the pertinent facts of the case, particularly insofar as they might have a bearing
on its probable outcome, merely relying on the bare allegations of the complaint. The petitioner also claims he was
deprived of the opportunity to present evidence in support of his defense of adultery against the respondent's application
for support pendente lite.
The question of whether or not the petitioner should be allowed to present evidence in the lower court in support of that
his wife had committed adultery has become academic. The petitioner, in his motion filed February 28, 1974 for
reconsideration of the denial by this Court of his petition for preliminary injunction, manifested that on September 26,
1972 the court of First Instance of Rizal decided the adultery case of the respondent and found her and her co-accused,
Teodoro Ramirez, guilty of the charge, sentencing them to a term of imprisonment. This has not been denied by the
respondent. Neither is it denied that on March 30, 1970, as a result of the adulterous relations with Teodoro Ramirez for
which she was later on convicted, the said respondent gave birth prematurely to a baby boy, who however died the same
day. When the respondent entered the hospital for delivery, she registered under the assumed name of "Gloria Santos,"
and when the child died had it falsely identified in the death certificate as the child of one Rosario R. Salita, a close friend
of hers. For the falsification thus committed Rosario E. Salita was criminally charged and convicted, although the
respondent herself was acquitted on reasonable doubt. The petitioner's motion of February 28 also states, without denial
on the part of the respondent, that after Teodoro Ramirez another man, this time a Manila policeman by the name of Jose
Gochangco, became her paramour, as a consequence of which criminal charges of adultery have been filed against them
before the Fiscal of Manila. Photographs of the two, showing them in intimate pose, were submitted to this Court. Their
veracity has not been disputed.
The legal issue posed by the foregoing facts is whether adultery is a good defense against the respondent's claim for
support pendente lite. In Quintana v. Lerma, 24 Phil. 285, which was an action by the wife against the husband for support,
based upon a written contract, this Court held that adultery is a good defense. This ruling was reiterated in the subsequent
cases of Sanchez v. Zulueta, 68 Phil. 110, and Mangoma v. Macadaeg, et al., 90 Phil. 508. See also Olayvar v. Olayvar, 98
Phil. 52.
The respondent Court of Appeals, in upholding the questioned orders of the lower court, relied on Article 292 of the Civil
Code, which reads:
ART. 292. During the proceedings for legal separation, or for annulment of marriage, the spouses
and children shall be supported from the conjugal partnership property. After the final judgment of
legal separation, or of annulment of marriage, the obligation of mutual support between the
spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall
give support to the innocent one, the judgment specifying the terms of such order.
It is suggested that while adultery may be a defense in an action for personal support, that is, support of the wife by the
husband from his own funds, it is not a defense when the support is to be taken from the conjugal partnership property.
We do not see that the distinction is material in this case. In the first place Article 292 is not in itself the source of the legal
right to receive support. It merely states that the support, not only of the spouses but also of the children, shall be taken
from the conjugal property during the pendency of the legal separation proceeding. It does not preclude the loss of such
right in certain cases. In the second place, the said article contemplates the pendency of a court action and, inferentially at
least, a prima facie showing that the action will prosper. For if the action is shown to be groundless the mere filing thereof
will not necessarily set Article 292 in operation. This is also the sense of Section 5 of Rule 61, supra, which requires, among
other things, when support pendente lite is applied for, that the court determine provisionally "the probable outcome of
the case."
Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that "the legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided
there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage ... (and) where both spouses are offenders, a
legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them ..."
In a provisional sense at least, within the meaning of Rule 61 (Section 5), the probable failure of the respondent's suit for
legal separation can be foreseen since she is not an innocent spouse, having been convicted of adultery by the Court of
First Instance. It is true that the judgment of conviction is on appeal in the Court of Appeals, but the same undoubtedly
satisfies the standard of provisional showing set by the aforesaid Rule. If legal separation cannot be claimed by the guilty
spouse in the first place, the fact that an action for that purpose is filed anyway should not be permitted to be used as a
means to obtain support pendente lite, which, without such action, would be denied on the strength of the decisions of
this Court recognizing adultery as a good defense. Otherwise, as pointed out by the petitioner, all that an erring spouse has
to do to circumvent such defense would be to file a suit for legal separation no matter how groundless.
The right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership property, presupposes the existence of
a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming such right to live separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil Code, which
states that after the filing of the petition for legal separation the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each
other. A petition in bad faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act which constitutes a ground
for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered as within the intendment of the law granting
separate support. In fact under Article 303 of the same Code the obligation to give support shall cease "when the recipient,
be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance;" and under Article 921 one of the
causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when the spouse has given cause for legal separation." The loss of the substantive
right to support in such a situation is incompatible with any claim for support pendente lite.
What has been said above, of course, is not meant to be a prejudgment of either the legal separation proceeding pending
in the lower court or the criminal case for adultery pending in the Court of Appeals. It is to be understood only in the light
of Rule 61, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, which specifically governs the subject of support pendente lite.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals of January 20, 1971 and the orders of respondent Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court herein complained of, dated December 24, 1969 and February 15, 1970, all are set aside and
their enforcement enjoined, without prejudice to such judgment as may be rendered in the pending action for legal
separation between the parties. No pronouncement as to costs.
Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-37720 March 27, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
URSULA SENSANO and MARCELO RAMOS, defendants-appellants.
Emilio L. Medina for appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
BUTTE, J.:
The appellants were sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte for the crime of adultery to three years, six
months and twenty-one days of prision correccional and appealed to this court, assigning the following error: "The court
below erred in not holding that the offended husband contested to the adultery committed by his wife Ursula Sensano in
that he refused to live with her after she extinguished her previous sentence for the same offense, and by telling her then
that she could go where she wanted to and do what she pleased, and by his silence for seven years notwithstanding that
he was informed of said adultery."
The facts briefly stated as follows:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. They had one child. Shortly after the birth of his
child, the husband left his wife to go to the Province of Cagayan where he remained for three years without writing to his
wife or sending her anything for the support of herself and their son. Poor and illiterate, without relatives upon whom she
could call, she struggled for an existence for herself and her son until a fatal day when she met the accused Marcelo Ramos
who took her and the child to live with him. On the return of the husband (in 1924), he filed a charge against his wife and
Marcelo Ramos for adultery and both were sentenced to four months and one day of arresto mayor. The court, in its
decision, stated the following: "In the opinion of the court, the husband of the accused has been somewhat cruel in his
treatment of his wife having abandoned her as he did." After completing her sentence, the accused left her paramour. She
thereupon appealed to this municipal president and the justice of the peace to send for her husband so that she might ask
his pardon and beg him to take her back. At the house of the president she begged his pardon and promised to be a
faithful wife it he would take care her back. He refused to pardon her to live with her and said she could go where she
wished, that he would have nothing more to do with her, and she could do as she pleased. Abandoned for the second
time, she and her child went back to her coaccused Marcelo Ramos (this was in the year 1924) and they have lived with
him ever since. The husband, knowing that she resumed living with her codefendant in 1924, did nothing to interfere with
their relations or to assert his rights as husband. Shortly thereafter he left for the Territory of Hawaii where she remained
for seven years completely abandoning his said wife and child. On his return to these Islands, he presented the second
charge of adultery here involved with the sole purpose, as he declared, of being able to obtain a divorce under the
provisions of Act No. 2710.
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraphs 1 and 2, are as follows:
Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. The
crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended
spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are
both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.
Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was assuming a mere pose when he signed the complaint as the
"offended" spouse, we have come to the conclusion that the evidence in this case and his conduct warrant the inference
that he consented to the adulterous relations existing between the accused and therefore he is not authorized by law to
institute this criminal proceeding.
We cannot accept the argument of the Attorney-General that the seven years of acquiescence on his part in the adultery
of his wife is explained by his absence from the Philippine Islands during which period it was impossible for him to take any
action against the accused. There is no merit in the argument that it was impossible for the husband to take any action
against the accused during the said seven years.
The judgment below is reversed with costs de oficio.
G.R. No. L-10699 October 18, 1957
WILLIAM H. BROWN, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JUANITA YAMBAO, defendant-appellee.
Jimenez B. Buendia for appellant.
Assistant City Fiscal Rafel A. Jose for appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to obtain legal separation from his
lawful wife Juanita Yambao. He alleged under oath that while interned by the Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the
University of Sto. Tomas internment camp, his wife engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she
begot a baby girl that Brown learned of his wifes misconduct only in 1945, upon his release from internment; that
thereafter the spouse lived separately and later executed a document (Annex A ) liquidating their conjugal partnership and
assigning certain properties to the erring wife as her share. The complaint prayed for confirmation of the liquidation
agreement; for custody of the children issued of the marriage; that the defendant be declared disqualified to succeed the
plaintiff; and for their remedy as might be just and equitable.
Upon petition of the plaintiff, the court subsequently declared the wife in default, for failure to answer in due time, despite Hence, there being at least two well established statutory grounds for denying the remedy sought (commission of similar
service of summons; and directed the City Fiscal or his representatives to offense by petitioner and prescription of the action), it becomes unnecesary to delve further into the case and ascertain if
investigate, in accordance with Article 101 of the Civil Code, whether or not a collusion exists between the Brown's inaction for ten years also evidences condonation or connivance on his part. Even if it did not, his situation would
parties and to report to this Court the result of his investigation within fifteen (15) days from receipt of copy of not be improved. It is thus needless to discuss the second assignment of error.
this order. The City Fiscal or his representative is also directed to intervene in the case in behalf of the State. The third assignment of error being a mere consequence of the others must necessarily fail with them.
(Rec. App. p. 9). The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.
As ordered, Assistant City Fiscal Rafael Jose appeared at the trial, and cross-examined plaintiff Brown. His questions
(strenuously objected to by Brown's counsel) elicited the fact that after liberation, Brown had lived maritally with another
woman and had begotten children by her. Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying the legal separation asked, on
the ground that, while the wife's adultery was established, Brown had incurred in a misconduct of similar nature that
barred his right of action under Article 100 of the new Civil Code, providing:
ART. 100. The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation or of consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal
separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall
cause the dismissal of the petition.
that there had been consent and connivance, and because Brown's action had prescribed under Article 102 of the same
Code:
ART. 102 An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from and after the date on which
the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after date when such cause
occurred.
since the evidence showed that the learned of his wife's infidelity in 1945 but only filed action in 1945.
Brown appeared to this Court, assigning the following errors:
The court erred in permitting the Assistant Fiscal Rafel Jose of Manila to act as counsel for the defendant, who
defaulted.
The court erred in declaring that there was condonation of or consent to the adultery.
The court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
Appellant Brown argues that in cross-examining him with regard to his marital relation with Lilia Deito, who was not his
wife, the Assistant Fiscal acted as consel for the defaulting wife, "when the power of the prosecuting officer is limited to
finding out whether or not there is collusion, and if there is no collusion, which is the fact in the case at bar, to intervene
for the state which is not the fact in the instant case, the truth of the matter being that he intervened for Juanita Yambao,
the defendant-appellee, who is private citizen and who is far from being the state.".
The argument is untenable. Collusion in matrimonial cases being "the act of married persons in procuring a divorce by
mutual consent, whether by preconcerted commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or by failure, in pursuance of
agreement to defend divorce proceedings" (Cyclopedia Law Dictionary; Nelson, Divorce and Separation, Section 500), it
was legitimate for the Fiscal to bring to light any circumstances that could give rise to the inference that the wife's default
was calculated, or agreed upon, to enable appellant to obtain the decree of legal separation that he sought without regard
to the legal merits of his case. One such circumstance is obviously the fact of Brown's cohabitation with a woman other
than his wife, since it bars him from claiming legal separation by express provision of Article 100 of the new Civil Code.
Wherefore, such evidence of such misconduct, were proper subject of inquiry as they may justifiably be considered
circumstantial evidence of collusion between the spouses.
The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested
proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88), is to emphasize that marriage is more
than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or
interruption cannot be made depend upon the parties themselves (Civil Code, Article 52; Adong vs, Cheong Gee, 43 Phil,
43; Ramirez vs. Gmur 42 Phil. 855; Goitia vs. Campos, 35 Phil. 252). It is consonant with this policy that the injury by the
Fiscal should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate whether the proceedings for separation or
annulment are fully justified or not.
The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's action was already barred, because Brown did not
petition for legal separation proceedings until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery, which was upon his release
from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal separation can not be filed except within
one (1) year from and after the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when
such cause occurred. Appellant's brief does not even contest the correctness of such findings and conclusion.
It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless, the courts can take cognizance thereof,
because actions seeking a decree of legal separation, or annulment of marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy
of our law that no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the record.