Monotheism, Polytheism, the Trinitys dogma and Semantic Modality

Author: Paulo Jnio de Oliveira

Goinia, Brasil
Maro/2017
Abstract
..

Introduction
In this article1 I perform a semantic-modal analysis of some denitory
characteristics of monotheist conceptual core, particularly the notion/concept of
Christian "trinity." Some of the definitory characteristics of monotheism are as
follows: (i) the uniqueness of divinity in a sense in which it is only permissible to
say that there is only one individual who belongs to the divine genus in an absolute
sense; (ii) the admission of the impossibility of any other individual belonging to
the divine genus in an absolute sense. Therefore, from (i) and (ii) follows from
monotheism, (iii) besides there being only one individual belonging to the divine
genus in an absolute sense, it would be impossible to have any other. That is, it is
not contingent that there is only one individual who belongs to the divine genus in
an absolute sense.

In carrying out a semantic-modal analysis of these definitory

characteristics I try to show that there is a certain polysemy in the sense of the
term "God", "Deity" and/or "Divine." This polysemy reveals itself quite peculiarly
in the doctrine of the Christian trinity. In this example I shall to show how some
formulations of Christian trinitarian doctrine in order to avoid paradoxes end up
causing semantic oddities and, apparently, precisely to avoid any kind of
polytheism.

1 I dedicate this article to my Phds supervisor who taught me to philosophize in the spirit
of his own Wittgenstein. What I have learned from logical-philosophical analysis with him has
great influence on this work.
 At the end of the article, the reader will be able to evaluate for himself
which alternatives the orthodox Trinitarian Christian will have: embrace a kind of
polytheism or maintain the doctrine of the trinity in the realm of absolute
ineffability, since any expression of thought and language of such a concept will
entail some kind of semantic oddities or paradoxes. In this sense, even the dogma
should not be formulate.

1. Polytheism, Monotheism and Logical Quantifiers

It is possible that there are several kinds of polytheist positions. Some are
devotees of a single Deity, but believe in the existence of other Deities. Others
could be devotees of a single Deity, but only accept the possibility of the existence
of other Gods. Another group could hold that the number of Deities could be
infinite. Regardless of the variety of positions, all polytheists agree that the number
of absolute individuals is not necessarily and only 1. The atheist could say that
the number of Deities is 02. If the Monotheist or Polytheist accepted that Gods can
be counted3 in some sense, then the monotheist would say that the number is 1.
The polytheist would say that is or 1+n or it is possible that he may say that it is
infinite.

Do there exist several monotheistic positions4? It is possible. But it would

be strange because the monotheistic position does not affirm merely that There is

2 About this kind of matter, see: Steinhart, E. Int J Philos Relig (2012) 72: 75.
doi:10.1007/s11153-011-9325-

3 If it is asserted that there is a continuity in God or Gods or in Divine Reality, so that it

makes no sense to speak about a number of Gods, then I would like to draw attention to the fact
that the concept of continuum per se does not guarantee it for itself. I mean it is necessary extra
argumentation for that proposition, because it is possible to assert that there is a continuum in
Divine Reality and yet it would make some sense to speak of a possible numeric multiplicity in the
Divine Reality even if a specific number is not given.
If it is asserted that it could not make sense to speak of a number of Gods, for they are
measures, not measured then it is possible to answer that they are the measure does not mean
that it does not make some sense to speak of some possible numeric multiplicity in this context. For
example, it would make sense to speak of numeric multiplicity in the natural numbers, and they are
also treated as a measurement standard and not as a measured object.
4 I am referring specifically to Judaism, Muslim, and Christianity. I am aware of the
differences of these religions, but I am referring to the monotheistic "core" shared between them. I
am also aware that Christianity is a peculiar case, because of the notion of "trinity." This notion will
be treated on in this article as a problem for the Christian.
one Deity., since the polytheist could claim that too. In symbolic logic we could
formalize the proposition there is one Deity in this way:

(1) x(Dx)

We can note that in this logical formulation being a Deity (Dx) is treated as first-
order predicate, that is, here it is a predicate and it is not an object/individual or
subject of predication. Then, we can better understand that with the scheme
bellow:

Level 1 First-order level For example, being a

(predicates) Deity, being Blue,
being Solid, being
Gentle

Level 0 (Objects/individuals) For example, Persons,

Pcs, Sofas.

And, in this formalization we have the existential quantifier x expressing There

is x, and this x has a certain property in this particular case the property of
being a Deity (Dx)5. However, nothing in this assertion prevents the polytheist
from also agreeing that it could be true. In short, the polytheist could say In fact,
there is 1 Deity.

For the monotheist to be able to allege what he would like to cognitively

express he would need more semantic expedients. Which ones? He would need
unicity clause presupposed in the existential x. In fact, after all, both the
polytheist and the monotheist agree with the statement

(2) "There is x, such that x is a Deity".

For monotheism to be logically expressed, so that a "polytheist"

interpretation of the statement xDx could not be possible, it would be necessary
to make the "uniqueness" property explicit -, but it seems to me that even that it
will not be sufficient, since the polytheist could claim something like there is a

5 I am aware that is controversial that this type of formalization presupposes the

distinction between being a Deity and existence. However, I am sympathetic the idea of
existence as a second-order predicate. But, it does not mean that I am not aware of a general
theological debate about existence and Goddess. But, someone could say that if someone treated
being Divine as existence, then someone can be treated as pantheist as well.
Deity x, and x is unique and x is Apollo and at the same time there is a Deity x,
and x is unique and x is Athena, for example. That uniqueness property would be a
reasonable necessary characteristic note6 of monotheisms concept. It in symbolic
logic could be:

(3) !x(Dx)

The exclamation point "!" placed after the existential quantifier serves precisely to
show that the "x" that has the "D" property is an absolutely "unique" object in the
universe of that genus but, like I claimed in last paragraph the polytheist could
have a different semantic interpretation to that affirmation too, that is, the
polytheist could agree with that affirmation too without any kind of logical
problem. For example, the polytheist could formalize there is x and x is
absolutely unique, x is a Deity and x is Apollo:

(4) !x(Dx ^ Ax)

Here, we can note that in this logical formulation being a Deity (Dx) and being
Absolute (Ax) are treated both as first-order predicate, that is, here it is a
predicate and it is not an object/individual or a subject of predication. That logical-
metaphysical hierarchy is very important. Then, again we can better understand
with the scheme bellow:

Level 1 First-order level For example, being a

(predicates) Deity, being Blue,
being Solid, being
Gentle

Level 0 (Objects/individuals) For example, Persons,

Pcs, Sofas.

And could formalize there is x and x is unique, x is a Deity and x is Athena:

(5) !x(Dx ^ Ax)

There is another semantic expedient that is presupposed in the

monotheistic claim:

6 It is clear that each Deity per se is unique, but uniqueness does not mean that there is
just 1 of the divine type. For example, to clarify: each human individual is unique in your own way,
but that does not mean that there is just 1 human individual.
(6) "There is a unique x that has the property of being a Deity"

In addition to asserting that "There is only one x" expressed by !, it must also be
the case that:

(7)"There can be no other" or It is logically impossible any other.

The polytheist could not sustain that clause of impossibility of the

existence of others Gods, nonetheless the polytheist not necessarily has problem
with the idea of uniqueness of a God - because the polytheism can always
understand that each God is unique individually in an absolute way. It is not
sufficient to assert the monotheist position expressing the property of
uniqueness, because the polytheist could always say that that each God is unique
in an absolute way, for example, Thoth is a Unique God in an absolute way.

For what reason does the monotheist believe he is right in asserting "It is
impossible any other God"? It is possible to believe in existence of one God, but
when someone asserts that there is only one and it is impossible any other God
the modal logical commitment requires a very modal proof. It seems very
reasonable to say that does not make sense to say it is impossible any other God
without a very modal proof.

2. The question of Christian trinity

The Christian religion is a monotheist one, besides the monotheist position

the nature of God is understood in a peculiar and strange mode. In the case of
Christianity, there is that strange case: the question of the "trinity," concerning
which it is ostensibly not possible to be clear about what one wants to express
cognitively.

There are discrepancies among Christian theologians about the doctrine of

the trinity. There is no reason to deny that. I do not doubt that there are ever more
sophisticated formulations of the notion of the trinity. Regardless of these
sophisticated formulations, the Christian will still claim the impossibility of a
manifold of Deities outside of his own religion7. But such a claim would only have
its supposed "justification" in the dogma discovered in the revelatory datum and
not in a rational and/or intellectual justification.

Unlike the Jew and the Muslim who say that "There is only one Deity," that
is, there is only one individual who belongs to the divine genus, the Christian
seems to want to express something quite different:

(8) "There are only three individuals who participate in the divine nature and no
other".

For example, Boethius asserts the following:

The belief of this religion concerning the Unity of the Trinity is as follows:
the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God. Therefore Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit are one God, not three Gods (Boethius, THE TRINITY
IS ONE GOD NOT THREE GODS, p. 7).

Lets try to understand what Boethius is saying. First, I believe the sentence The
Father is God, the Son is God, the Spirit is God that Boethius is asserting means the
following:

(9) p,f,e!(Dp ^ Df ^ De)

In this case, it seems very clear that Boethius is saying: the Father is God, the Son is
God, the Spirit is God. Well, Boethius maybe does not believe that God can be
treated as a property. However, if God is not treated as a predicate, then it
must be treated as subject; that is, the Father is God like two names to the
same subject in a fregean sense. Nonetheless, I do not believe the Christian could
accepted this as an orthodox alternative. I cannot see another logical alternative
besides the idea of 3 names to the same reality or the idea of 3 Gods. This ideas
seems to be very intuitive. But, Boethius says also:

For the essence of plurality is otherness; apart from otherness plurality

is unintelligible. In fact, the difference between three or more things lies
in genus or species or number (Boethius, THE TRINITY IS ONE GOD NOT
THREE GODS, p. 7).

7 The traditional Christian response to the challenge of the existence of the Gods of other
religions would be: such Gods either would be demons/idols or they would not exist. See, for
example: Psalm 95,5.
It seems what Boethius is trying to express something very strange. Lets continue
to try understand. The difference between 2 things lies in distinct properties. For
example, the human Paul is different of the human Manuel, but it is not just
because they are 2, but because they have different properties. Of course, numeric
difference is important, but it is not the only thing that matters on the question of
difference. Boethius says important things about that too:

Similarly difference is expressed by genus, species, and number. Now

numerical difference is caused by variety of accidents ; three men differ
neither by genus nor species but by their accidents, for if we mentally
remove from them all other accidents, still each one occupies a different
place which cannot possibly be regarded as the same for each, since two
bodies cannot occupy the same place, and place is an accident. Wherefore
it is because men are plural by their accidents that they are plural in
number. (Boethius, THE TRINITY IS ONE GOD NOT THREE GODS, p. 7).

Boethius speaks about difference caused by accidents, for example, the property
of living in Goiania.

In the trinitys case there is at least 1 property that Jesus do has but the
Father does not, and it seems to me that it could be an accidental property. For
example, the Son has the property of incarnation, the Son has also the property of
being human. The Son was a human, the son incarnated, and just in that
properties it is possible to deduce several others. It seems to be that the orthodox
Christian could not disagree with that. But, in this case, the orthodox Christian
must to agree with the idea of different properties that exists between the Gods
persons.

3. The Traditional Tomist alternative: the focus on the idea of relation

How could be the tomist alternative to understand p,f,e(Dp ^ Df ^ De)

and yet there is only 1 God and not 3 Gods? The idea of Aquinas is the focus on the
concept of relation. It seems that Aquinas defends the idea of just make sense to
speak of trinity if someone understand the persons of trinity as relations in God.
Aquinas claim the following about the Dogma of Trinity:

() the Catholic faith is this, that we venerate one God in the Trinity, and
the Trinity in oneness; neither confounding the persons, nor dividing the
substance for there is one person of the Father, another of the Son, (and)
another of the Holy Spirit; but the divine nature of the Father and of the
Son and of the Holy Spirit is one ()Of such a nature as the Father is, so
 is the Son, so (also) is the Holy Spirit; the Father is uncreated, the Son is
uncreated, (and) the Holy Spirit is uncreated; the Father is immense, the
Son is immense, (and) the Holy Spirit is immense; the Father is eternal,
the Son is eternal, (and) the Holy Spirit is eternal; and nevertheless there
are not three eternals, but one eternal; just as there are not three
uncreated beings, nor three infinite beings, but one uncreated, and one
infinite; similarly the Father is omnipotent, the Son is omnipotent, (and)
the Holy Spirit is omnipotent; and yet there are not three omnipotents,
but one omnipotent; thus the Father is God, the Son is God, (and) the
Holy Spirit is God; nevertheless there are not three gods, but there is one
God.8

In the previous quotation it is possible to see the Christian emphasis on

the characteristic of absolute oneness of a single God and on the trinitarian
character of this God divided into three distinct persons. One of the main questions
is how to interpret the assertion that

(10) "There is one God, though three persons".

Pay a little more attention to the following statements: The Father is eternal, the
Son is eternal, (and) the Holy Spirit is eternal; and nevertheless there are not three
eternals, but one eternal; The Father is omnipotent, the Son is omnipotent, (and)
the Holy Spirit is omnipotent; and yet there are not three omnipotents, but one
omnipotent; and The Father is God, the Son is God, (and) the Holy Spirit is God;
nevertheless there are not three gods, but there is one God. What does the
Christian really mean with such allegations? In order to try to make sense of this
dogma, there is something called Scutum Fide. This is a specie of traditional
diagram to teach something from an orthodox point of view, see bellow:

8 THE CREED "QUICUMQUE", cf: Catholic Encyclopedia (1913)/Athanasian Creed,

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Talk:Catholic_Encyclopedia_(1913)/Athanasian_Creed
I will try to do my best to understand what such allegations could mean. After that,
I intend to use some modal notions to analyses the allegations of that quotation. In
order to understand that, I will speak a little about relations as polyadic
properties.

Today we can call relations polyadic properties. For example, love

can be treated is a polyadic property. In logic we formalize so:

(11) L(x,y)

That is, love is a polyadic predicate applied to two things, x and y. Love is an
interesting predicate, because it could be the case that x loves y, but y does not love
x:

(12) (L(x,y) ^ ~L(y,x))

But, in what sense Aquinas believe that persona est relatio9? For
example, how could we see Jesus as a relation? Maybe we can treated Jesus as a
relation, for example, the relation between the Father and the Son. But, Jesus is not
the relation, he has a relation, a polyadic property. Right? Even though persona
est relatio, it must be the case of being a relation between two things. These things
can be identical to each other or not. If x and y is not identical to each other, then
obviously the relation is not of one thing with itself.

The est of persona est relatio is an est of identity or an est of

property? It seems that a person could have some polyadic property, it seems that
someone could say that one person is an effect from some kind of a relation. In fact,
there could be several answers to what the Aquinas means for persona est
relation in trinitys context.

There are some propositions that could be raised here. Jesus could be a
relation, but if so, that means: the Son, Jesus, is a divine person due to something
else; the Father, Yahweh, is a divine person due to something else and the Spirit
too.

9 Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologiea 1,40,2.

 Let us try recap. The christian claims that "There is one God" - as the Jew
and Muslim; though they differ in the interpretation of the term "God". Still, in such
allegation it does not seem to be clear if "God" is treated as a "subject" or
"predicate". In this context, if "God" is treated as a predicate, then there is not a
unique God. But if it is treated as a "name" then it would be the name of at least
three people. There seems to be no other way out. Is it possible to say that people
are "forms" or "manners" of the same deity? Apparently yes. But it does not seem
that the orthodox Christian wants to express it in this way. Apparently, he means
that they are different people. If they are distinct, they are distinguished in
monadic or polyadic properties of some type. According to Aquinas, the trinitys
person are relations, that is, polyadic properties; in this case, it seems obvious that
the divine persons has different polyadic properties and it will be a problem to
defend the idea of identity between the trinitys divine persons, since the divine
persons are pretty much defined by relations.

4. Divine type and semantic shift

It is perfectly possible to claim that "God is used in some context as the

"type" of some kind or/and also as the "attribute" of a singular individual. It seems
quite reasonable and intuitive to claim that a "God x", for example, God Thoth
belongs to the "Divine type. This is possible without compromising in any way
with the question of the number of Gods. In logic we could claim:

(13) x [in Dt] (Tx)

That is: there is x, in domain/type Divine, and x is Thoth. The question of how
many individuals belong to such a type/domain is independent of the question of
whether it makes sense to identify an instance of a type with its own type.

It is also possible to ask: what is the type of the "Jesuss person? The
answer would have to be something like "It belongs to the divine type". It is also
possible to use the "individualized" form of the expression "divine," since it is
possible to say that "Jesus is a deity."
 The question seems to be a sort of "grammatical confusion" a la
Wittgenstein. The term "God" can be treated as a "polysemic" term like most terms
in any natural language. We can already notice that now. Such a term can be
treated as a "predicate," but sometimes it can be treated as a "subject". For
example, it is possible to say "Jesus is a God". But when the Christian wants to
"express" uniqueness he can say "Jesus is the God". However, considering the
question of the trinity, in the context of "God" as a first-order predicate, it must
make sense to say that:

(14) "Jesus is the God as well as the Father and the Spirit are".

In this case, the question is already getting scrambled and strange to express a
concept that seems to lack perspicuity.

For what reason should the Christian bother to sort out all this "linguistic"
confusion? It is natural for some religions to consider the information provided by
the revelatory datum as the highest authority, even if it doesn't make either
intellectual or rational sense.

Now I would like to draw attention to some semantic/grammatical

questions. The questions I would like to do here has some personal influence from
Wittgensteins works, because I am uniquely preoccupied with the sense, that is,
with the semantic after determined assertions. It is not my interest if someone
treated some concept as normative, but in reality it is not. So, lets go back to our
discussion.

Let's see how the Jew, Muslim, and Christian would answer the question
"What is the number of Absolute Individuals?" If the Christian understand the term
Absolute Individual as Person Divine, then he could answer:

Jew 1
Muslim 1
Trinitarian Christian 3
But, if he understand the term Absolute Individual as God, then he could
answer:

Jew 1
 Muslim 1
Trinitarian Christian 1
They all mean that there is only one Deity, the Muslim could name him
"Allah". The Jew has several names for him, "Yahweh" is one of them. But, how the
Christian could name God? He could, in fact, name like a Jewish Theologian, for
example, Yahweh; but, the Christian distinguish divine persons in God, so it
seems possible that the way of deal with divine names will require a different
treatment.

It seems that all I want to say is that the christian seems to do some kind of
semantic shift depending on the terminological interpretation. The answer to the
question depends on the terminological interpretation and the answer is altered
depending on the terminological interpretation. It seems that if by absolute
individual the christian means God, then he will say there is just 1 that belongs
to divine type. But, if by absolute individual the christian means divine person,
then he will say there is just 3 that belongs to divine type. I call that some kind of
semantic shift. This question of semantic is central to me here.

It makes pretty much sense to assert that some individuals can belong to
the divine type. But, what does "divine type" means here? It is worth emphasizing
that divine type means [at least] that a certain "individual" has a property of
"absolute being". "Absolute" here could mean that determined individual is non-
temporal10. It is even possible to formalize the term absolute individual in
symbolic logic, so we can see very well what we are treating as subject and what
we are treating as predicate and it should be very important if someone is
preoccupied with semantic clarity. In first-order logic we say that an individual is
absolute in this way:

(15) ()

The "predicate" represented by the "greater letter." The "subject" by the

"minor letter." However, even stressing the subject/predicate distinction in

10 I am aware of the fact that there is several philosophical discussion about the meaning of
Absolute. The necessary point of this paper does not need to be related with this particular
question.
language, it is still possible to use "absolute" as a name, for example, "Jesus the
Absolute" or "Apollo the Absolute"11. But the possibility of using a term as a name
or the same term as a predicate does not constitute proof of the idea that there
is just 1 absolute individual and can not be any other in any sense.

Returning to the question of the divine type and semantic distinctions. Let
us formulate the term "absolute individual" (i.e., "()") with the existential
quantifier for semantic distinction purposes:

(16) x(A)

Or, we could claim too:

(17) x (Ax Dx)

The Christian would agree with this statement: that is, for all x, if x is
absolute, then x is Divine. The Jew and Muslim as well. Of course, each of them
could make philosophical improvements in the meaning of what would mean
"individual" in this statement, there is no problem with that. But, the central point
is clear: there is an absolute individual.

Returning to the theme "trinity" in the topic "divine type" and "semantic
distinctions". Would the Christian even agree with the claim "there is only one
absolute individual", such as Muslim and Jew? The answer is: it depends on the
interpretation of the meaning of the terminology "absolute individual." If the
"absolute individual" is interpreted as "God", then yes: there is only one absolute
individual. If the "absolute individual" is interpreted as "person," then no, there is
not only one absolute individual for according to the "Christian trinity," there are
several divine persons; and, the Christian knows exactly how many people exist
through a revelatory datum. That is, for the Christian, "There are exactly three
people, although there is only one God or there are exactly 1 God, although he
just can be conceived as 3 divine persons. Again, "God" is here treated as "name"
or "predicate"?

11 It is very important to avoid confusion between logical "absolute" and "infinity" with
concepts such as "absolute space" or "infinite space". A God is absolute, but it is not in the spatial
sense. A God is infinite, but it is not in the spatial sense. Spatial analogies are possible, but they
cannot escape the domain of analogy.
 In polytheism it is possible that "God" is treated as both "name" and
"predicate" - depending on the context of terminological use. The Christian seems
to make room for the use of the term "God" both as a name and as a predicate.
Apparently, when he wants the trinity to make sense he would have to treat "God"
as a name of the divine type. But when it comes to affirming that polytheism could
not be true, then he seems to treat "God" as a name of 1 subject.

It is possible to use "God" as both "name" and "predicate", although it is

more commonly used as a "predicate"; for example, "Jesus is God" or "Thoth is
God"; something analogous to "being human", although it is strange to call
someone "human", but it is possible.

Consider that the Christian could claim that there is the "divine type" - to
which the divine people of the trinity belong and that such type is expressed in
the use of the term "God" as a predicate of trinitys people. If this is the case, then it
would make sense to say that "there are three divine individuals, for they belong to
the divine type." However, apparently the Christian, in general, would not accept
this formulation as well.

The Christian linguistic confusion can be expressed as followed: Jesus is

God? Is the Father God? Is the Spirit God? The answer to the three questions,
according to the orthodox Christian, would be yes. However, he would still argue
that "Although Jesus is God, the Father is God and the Spirit is God, yet there is only
one God"; I might add, "Revealed in the three persons of the Trinity." In brief, the
formulations seem to culminate in a strange kind of "paradox."

What deep down Christian seems to want to express is this: when the
questions are answered "Is Jesus God? Is the Father God? The Spirit is God? ", then,
the Christian treats the term"God" as "predicate"; since if he treats the term "is" as
an "is" of identity, then, logically and necessarily there would be three "Gods." So
he would have to treat is as an is of predication. But when the Christian has to
answer the question "How many Gods are there?" Then he understands "God" as a
proper name.

The whole point, to save guard the dogmatic notion of "Trinity" and stave
off the polytheism results in some kind of a semantic oddity. Even if the Christian
manages to resolve the semantic confusion, there is still no rational reason and
motive against the polytheist, other than the supposed Christian revelatory datum,
since the polytheist does not disagree with the property of uniqueness in an
absolute way. What does that mean? Suppose the Christian accepts to express the
trinity thus: "There is the divine type and three persons belonging to such type."
Now, in what sense would the polytheist disagree with this? The polytheist could
understand the polysemic character of the term "God" and their absolute singular
instances. For the polytheist, in fact, there is the divine type and a multiple of
individuals belong to such type. According to polytheism, the number of such
individuals in their totality is at least (1+n OR aleph0).

To conclude this section, what then does the polytheist12 and the
trinitarian christian disagree with? We know that the polytheist and the
monotheistic Jew and Muslim disagree on the following: for the Jew and Muslim
there is only one individual who is either called "God" or "Allah" or "Yahweh" or
who has the predicate of "being God"; even for the polytheist, it may even be the
case that such "individuals" exist, but there would be others that is, an infinite
multiplicity of such individuals would be possible. In fact, when one give any fixed
number of elements in divine continuum, then this number is arbitrary in some
sense. Turning to the initial question of this paragraph: then, what would the
polytheist disagree with the Christian about the doctrine of the trinity? If it were
possible to make a semantically reasonable formulation of the doctrine of the
trinity such as the idea that "there is the divine type and the individuals
belonging to such a divine type" - then the polytheist would disagree that there are
only three, or that there could be only these three people. - But a position which
accepts that there are only three divine persons, therefore, accepts the distinction
between divine type and instances of the type, then this would no longer be a
monotheistic position but polytheistic position.

12 I know that there is disagreement and it is problematic among polytheists as to the

understanding of "God" as a predicative semantic expedient in the context of intellectual treatment
of the concept of "divine type." I share this concern; However, my objective in this article was very
restricted: it is restricted to the treatment of the concept of "trinity" in the context of the
"possibility of the existence of other Gods" being a problem for the Christian. In short, this problem
of the relationship between the concept of "divine gender" and "God" - as a predicative semantic
expedient - is independent of the question I want to address here.
 In short, the Christian would necessarily have two ways out: either he
accepts an intelligible formulation of the doctrine of the trinity and therefore be a
polytheist, or, keep silence in the rational debate on the question of the number of
Gods.

5. On the nature of the meaning of "divine person" and distinctions between "divine
individuals

Being an individual person must mean something. If Christ is not the

Father, there must be something that does not make him so. There are two options,
one negative and one positive: 1) Christ is not the Father because he does not have
the properties that make the Father, Father. In other words, there is a distinction
that is related to a denial of attributes that belong only to the Father. 2) Christ
would be Christ, his individuality would be found in itself. He would be Christ not
because he was not the Father, but because he was the Christ. Accepting 1) implies
that the nature of Christ "relative," if the nature of Christs person is relative, he is
not a God. To accept 2) implies some kind of polytheism. The same applies to all
trinitys persons.

Someone can say consistently and coherently: there is the human type and
the individual humans, they differ in contingent properties. In the case of the
divine reality it would be: there is the divine type, and there are the divine
individual, however, they differ in an absolute mode. In a way analogous to
mathematics: numbers share the same "essence" and differ in essential properties
as well, so there is the mathematical type and the singular numbers. But, to
polytheist, type is interpreted here in a nominalist sense, that is, there is no sense
in speaking of a type superior and transcendent to the divine individuals. The
divine type is just a way of speaking (de dicto) of all divine individuals.
However, even though the Christian accepts a way monocentric and not-
nominalist to interpreted divine type, yet it will means a polytheist position of
trinity.
 The polytheistic position could be polycentric position13. This means that
when a polytheist speaks of a divine individual he is not speaking of an x that
participates in a higher and transcendent nature to him. It is not a divine person
who participates in the divine type that encompasses only two divine persons,
totalizing three like the doctrine of Christian trinity. In fact, all the divine
individuals encompasses and forms this divine nature, being transcendent to
things. When a polytheist speaks of divine type he is probably thinking of a "de
dicto" and not of a "de re". There would be no such thing as a divine type
encompassing all divine persons; in fact, all divine persons each being absolute in
itself, in fact, only this can mean "absoluteness" - would form what is "de dicto", i.e.,
divine type.

To conclude this paper, it seems that the key idea to understand the
polytheism is: each God is absolute in itself and not in a relationship with anything
else, neither with type nor with another divine person this, of course, to exclude
the tomist idea of persona est relatio.

13 In order to properly understand what polycentric polytheism is, one needs at least a
familiarity with Edward Butler's work: Butler, P.E. Polycentric Polytheism. Cf.
https://henadology.files.wordpress.com/2016/11/wp32-butler-pp3538-version-2.pdf