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#3 G.R. No.

95318 June 11, 1991 After trial, the Municipal Court [found private
respondents to be mere squatters and] rendered
LOURDES PEA QUA, assisted by her husband, JAMES judgment2 ordering . . . [them] to vacate and remove
QUA, petitioner, their houses and [the] auto repair shop from the lot in
vs. question and to pay the petitioner attorney's fees and a
CARILLO, REBECCA CARILLO, MARIA CEPRES, CECILIO On appeal to respondent [Regional Trial] Court, the
CEPRES and SALVADOR CARILLO, JR., respondents. judgment was modified by ordering the case dismissed
[insofar as] Carmen Carillo [was concerned being
Brotamonte Law Office for petitioner. qualified as an agricultural tenant and] declaring that
Isabel E. Florin for private respondents the home lot and her house standing thereon should be

GANCAYCO, J.: Believing that even private respondent Carmen Carillo

does not qualify as an agricultural tenant, petitioner
This case deals with the issue of whether or not private pursues her cause before this forum citing only one
respondents possess the status of agricultural tenants ground for the entertainment of her petition, to wit:
entitled to, among others, the use and possession of a
home lot. THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT [Court of Appeal]
Respondent Court of Appeals,1 in denying due course to CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FACTS AND APPLICABLE
the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner, stated the JURISPRUDENCE, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
antecedents of this case in the lower courts as follows: JURISDICTION, FOR DENYING DUE COURSE TO THE
. . . [O]n July 17, 1986, petitioner Lourdes Pea Qua filed THE PETITION.4
a complaint for ejectment with damages against private
respondents claiming that she is the owner of a parcel The Court agrees and finds that respondent Court of
of residential land, Lot No. 2099 of the Malinao Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in
Cadastre, situated at Poblacion, Tinapi, Malinao, Albay, dismissing the petition for review of the decision of the
with an area of 346 square meters, which is registered Regional Trial Court, the same being replete with
in her name under TCT T-70368; that inside the land in inconsistencies and unfounded conclusions. Because of
question is an auto repair shop and three houses, all this jurisdictional issue raised by petitioner, the Court
owned by private respondents; and that said hereby treats this petition as a special civil action for
respondents' stay in the land was by mere tolerance certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.5
and they are in fact nothing but squatters who settled
on the land without any agreement between her (sic), The Regional Trial Court6 made the following
paying no rents to her nor realty taxes to the observations:
The land in question is a measly three hundred forty six
In their answer, private respondent Carmen Carillo, (346) square meters and adjoining another two (2) lots
surviving spouse of the late Salvador Carillo (and which are separately titled having two thousand four
[respectively the] mother and mother-in-law of the hundred thirteen (2,413) square meters and eight
other [private] respondents), alleged that the lot in thousand two hundred ninety eight (8,298) square
question is a farm lot [home lot] because she and her meters the three (3) lots having a total area of
late husband were tenants of the same including the eleven thousand fifty seven (11,057) square meters,
two other lots adjoining the lot in question, Lots No. more or less, or over a hectare of land owned by the
2060 and 2446, which also belong to petitioner; that as plaintiff or by her predecessors-in-interest.
tenants, they could not just be ejected without cause;
that it was not petitioner who instituted them as In the 346 square meters lot stand (sic) four (4)
tenants in the land in question but the former owner, structures, [to wit]: an auto repair shop, a house of
Leovigildo Pea who permitted the construction of the [private respondent] Carmen Carillo and two (2) other
auto repair shop, the house of Carmen Carillo and the houses owned or occupied by the rest of the [private
other two houses. respondents] . . .; in other words, the [private
respondents] almost converted the entire area as their
home lot for their personal aggrandizement, believing from the premises in question, and restoring the area to
that they are all tenants of the [petitioner]. the lawful owner, the herein plaintiff;

Claimed, the defendants planted five hundred (500) 2. Ordering said six defendants to pay the plaintiff
coconut trees and only fifty (50) coconut trees survived jointly and severally the amount of Four Thousand
in the land in question and/or in the entire area of the (P4,000.00) Pesos as attorney's fees and litigation
three lots. Such an evidence (sic) is very untruthful, expenses;
unless it is a seed bed for coconut trees as the area is so
limited. But found standing in the area in question or in 3. Ordering said six defendants to pay plaintiff the
the entire three (3) lots are only seven (7) coconut sum of One Hundred Seventy One Pesos and Thirty Six
trees, the harvest of which is [allegedly] 2/3 share for Centavos (P171.36) monthly, for the use of the area in
the [petitioner] and the 1/3 share for the [private question, commencing July 17, 1986 the date the
respondents]. The share, if ever there was/were, could plaintiff filed this action in Court, up to the time the
not even suffice [to pay] the amount of taxes of the defendants vacate the area in question and restore the
land (sic) paid religiously by the [petitioner] yearly.7 same to the plaintiff peacefully.
(Emphasis supplied.)
4. And ordering said six (6) defendants to pay the
It is clear from the foregoing that the source of costs proportionately.
livelihood of private respondents is not derived from
the lots they are allegedly tenanting. This conclusion is The case against defendant, Carmen Carillon is hereby
further supported by private respondent Carmen ordered DISMISSED. The home lot and where her house
Carillo's assertion that the auto repair shop was stands is respected. And without pronouncement as to
constructed with the consent of petitioner's its costs (sic).
predecessor-in-interest for whom her husband served
as a driver-mechanic.8 IT IS SO ORDERED.9 (Emphasis supplied.)

From private respondents' manner of caring for the lots, Without explaining why, the Regional Trial Court chose
it is also apparent that making the same agriculturally not to believe the findings of the Municipal Circuit Trial
viable was not the main purpose of their occupancy, or Court and instead, adopted the recommendation of the
else they should have immediately replanted coconut Regional Director for Region V, acting for the Secretary
trees in place of those that did not survive. Indeed, the of the Department of Agrarian Reform, without making
location of their auto repair shop being near the separate findings and arriving at an independent
poblacion and along the highway, private respondents conclusion as to the nature of the relationship between
chose to neglect the cultivation and propagation of the parties in this case. This is evident in the following
coconuts, having earned, through the automobile repair excerpt of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court:
shop, more than enough not only for their livelihood
but also for the construction of two other dwelling The dispositive part of the Resolution of this Civil Case
houses thereon. It is also intimated by the Regional Trial No. T-1317 for Ejectment with Damages, Referral Case
Court that there is no direct evidence to confirm that No. 880054 states and is quoted verbatim:
the parties herein observed the sharing scheme
allegedly set-up between private respondents and WHEREFORE, premises considered, we are constrained
petitioner's predecessor-in-interest. to issue the following resolutions:

Notwithstanding the foregoing indicia of a non- 1) Certifying this case as NOT PROPER FOR TRIAL
agricultural tenancy relationship, however, the Regional in as far as the home lot and house built thereon by the
Trial Court decided in favor of private respondent spouses Carmen Carillo (sic);
Carmen Carillo and ruled, thus:
2) Advising the plaintiff to institute proper cause
In View of the Foregoing, and Premises considered, the of action in as far as the auto repair shop and the two
Court renders judgment: (2) houses erected on her landholdings by the children
of tenant-farmer Salvador Carillo since they appear as
1. Ordering defendants, namely: Eduardo Carillo, not the lawful tenants thereat.
Josephine P. Carillo, Rebecca Carillo, Maria Cepres,
Cecilio Cepres and Salvador Carillo, Jr., to vacate and SO RESOLVED.
remove their two (2) houses and the auto repair shop
xxx xxx xxx
The Court reiterates the ruling in Tiongson v. Court of
From the foregoing dispositive part of the resolution Appeals,15 that
penned down by the Regional Director, it defines and
explains the status of each of the defendants.10 All these requisites are necessary in order to create
tenancy relationship between the parties and the
Time and again, the Court has ruled that, as regards absence of one or more requisites do (sic) not make the
relations between litigants in land cases, the findings alleged tenant a de facto tenant as contradistinguished
and conclusions of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, from a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person
being preliminary in nature, are not in any way binding has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not
on the trial courts11 which must endeavor to arrive at entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the
their own independent conclusions. Land Reform Program of the Government under existing
tenancy laws.
Had the Regional Trial Court hearkened to this doctrine,
proceeded to so conduct its own investigation and Under the foregoing, private respondent Carmen Carillo
examined the facts of this case, a contrary conclusion is not entitled to be considered an agricultural tenant.
would have been reached, and the findings of the Therefore, she may be not allowed the use of a home
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, sustained, particularly lot, a privilege granted by Section 35 of Republic Act No.
when the circumstances obtaining in this case are 3844, as amended, in relation to Section 22 (3) of
examined in the light of the essential requisites set by Republic Act No. 1199, as amended,16 only to persons
law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, thus: (1) satisfying the qualifications of agricultural tenants of
the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the coconut lands.
subject is agricultural land; (3) the purpose is
agricultural production; and (4) there is WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of
consideration.12 It is also understood that (5) there is respondent Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and a
consent to the tenant to work on the land, that (6) new one is issued REINSTATING the decision of the
there is personal cultivation by him and that the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Malinao-Tiwi, Albay,
consideration consists of sharing the harvest.13 Fifth Judicial Region dated 19 August 1987. No
pronouncement as to costs.
It is contended by petitioner that the parcel of land
occupied by private respondents, Lot No. 2099, with an SO ORDERED.
area of only 346 square meters is residential in nature,
being situated near the poblacion of Malinao, Albay,
and as evidenced by the tax declaration obtained by
petitioner to this effect.1wphi1 Indeed, the municipal
trial court judge ordered the ejectment of the private
respondents on this basis. On the other hand, private
respondents aver that the lot is agricultural being
bounded by two other agricultural lands planted to
coconuts titled in the name of petitioner and all three
parcels being cultivated by them.

The Court is not prepared to affirm the residential

status of the land merely on the basis of the tax
declaration, in the absence of further showing that all
the requirements for conversion of the use of land from
agricultural to residential prevailing at the start of the
controversy in this case have been fully satisfied.14

Be that as it may and recognizing the consent to the

presence of private respondents on the property as
given by petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, the
situation obtaining in this case still lacks, as discussed
earlier, three of the afore-enumerated requisites,
namely: agricultural production, personal cultivation
and sharing of harvests.
(pilapiles) existing thereon; and that despite their
#4 protest to refrain from said acts, Tropical Homes, Inc.
G.R. No. L-30821 December 14, 1988 and its henchmen continued the bulldozing of the
landholding of the private respondents. The plaintiffs in
VIDAL BERNARDO and JESUS SILVERIO, petitioners, the abovementioned case prayed in their verified
vs. complaint for the issuance ex parte of a writ of
COURT OF APPEALS (4th Division) and TROPICAL preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants
HOMES, INC., respondents. therein from continuing with the bulldozing of their
Advincula Law Office for petitioners.
Pursuant to the verified complaint and motion for a writ
Serrano, Diokno and Serrano for private respondent. of preliminary injunction, the respondent Judge,
pending the hearing of said motion, issued on January
31, 1969, an order temporarily restraining and enjoining
Mercedes Tomas and the Tropical Homes, Inc., their
PARAS, J.: agents, representatives and/or their hired contractors
to cease and desist from bulldozing or causing the
This is a petition for review by certiorari which has been performance of any kind of work over the landholding
pending for seventeen years now. As per its resolution that would have the effect of dispossessing the
dated 1 September 1986 (p.144, Rollo), this Court plaintiffs therein.
ordered the parties to manifest "whether or not they
are still interested in prosecuting this case, or The defendants abovementioned were given five (5)
supervening events have transpired which render the days from receipt of notice of said order within which to
case moot and academic or otherwise substantially file their reply or objection to the motion for issuance of
affect the same." Counsel for petitioners has expressed the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction and said
that he has never seen nor has communicated with his motion was set for hearing on February 6, 1969, at 9:30
clients "for ten (10) years or more" and is therefore A.M. The defendants in said case were summoned on
without knowledge of their interest in pursuing this January 30, 1969, and were notified of the temporary
case (Manifestation with Explanation, p. 152, Rollo). On restraining order of January 31, 1969, on the latter date.
the other hand, both respondent Tropical Homes, Inc.
(TROPICAL, for short) and its counsel could not be found On February 3, 1969, petitioner Tropical Homes, Inc.
at their addresses of record. Nevertheless, under the filed an ex parte motion to lift the temporary restraining
circumstances We cannot as yet consider this case as order, including its opposition to the issuance of the
moot and academic. We therefore will resolve the writ of preliminary injunction.
On February 6, 1969, Tropical Homes, Inc. filed an ex
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as parte motion to stay the proceedings and asked that
follows: the hearing of the motion for preliminary injunction set
for February 4, 1969, be held in abeyance pending
On January 29, 1969, the respondents tenants, Vidal action by this Court on this petition for certiorari with
Bernardo and Jesus Silverio, filed a verified complaint preliminary injunction, filed by the petitioner on
with the Court of Agrarian Relations, Sixth Regional February 5, 1969, to nullify the restraining order of
District, Branch III, Pasig, Rizal, CAR Case No. 442-Rizal January 31, 1969.
'69, against Mercedes Tomas and the petitioner,
Tropical Homes, Inc., alleging that they are the The respondent Judge by order of February 7, 1969,
agricultural lessees of Mercedes Tomas of a 2-hectare held in abeyance the hearing of the motion for
rice landholding; that on January 16 and 17, 1969, preliminary injunction until this Court shall have
petitioner herein, in conspiracy with its co-defendant decided the instant petition, and on February 8, he
Mercedes Tomas, who had apparently sold the issued an order denying the motion to lift the
landholding aforementioned to the petitioner to be temporary restraining order of January 31, 1969.
converted for residential purposes, without any written
notice to the plaintiffs in said case, now private A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court
respondents herein, nor any verbal report to them and on February 17, 1969, enjoining and restraining the
without their permission and against their will and respondents from enforcing the order of January 31,
consent, forcibly bulldozed a small portion, of their 1969, upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P1,000.00.
landholding and destroyed the earth embankments (pp. 67-70, Rollo)
the same period whether or not the preliminary
Ruling in favor of TROPICAL, respondent Court of injunction shall be granted and shall accordingly issue
Appeals (CA for brevity) construed the restraining order the corresponding order. In the event that the
issued by the Agrarian Court dated 31 January 1969 as application for preliminary injunction is denied, the
"practically a writ of preliminary injunction" (p. 76, restraining order is deemed automatically vacated.
Rollo) and therefore irregularly issued as no prior
hearing was conducted and that no bond was posted as Nothing herein contained shall be construed to impair,
required under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 58 of the New affect or modify in any way any rights-ranted, by, or
Rules of Court. The CA also applied Section 14 of the rules pertaining to injunctions contained in, existing
Code of Agrarian Reform (R.A. 3844) as invoked by agrarian, labor or social legislation. (Emphasis supplied)
TROPICAL and interpreted Section 36(l) of the same
Code, the basis of petitioners' claim of right, thus, Applying now the above law to the case at bar, it is clear
that the Court, in this case the CAR, can issue a
... ejectment proceedings should take precedence only restraining order which is to last for only twenty (20)
in cases where the owner himself or a member of his days and which is clearly distinct from the writ of
immediate family undertakes the conversion in good injunction applied for. This restraining order may be
faith of the agricultural landholding into a residential issued by the judge despite the absence of a prior
subdivision. In such case the provisions of Section 36(l) hearing as long as it could be shown by affidavits or in
requiring final court order for ejectment of the lessee the verified complaint that great or irreparable injury
would be applicable. (p. 75, Rollo) would be suffered by the applicant. There being no
substantial rights affected, We rule that the temporary
prompting the petitioners to file this petition for review. injunction of 31 January 1969 is not equivalent to the
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by petitioners
Culling from the respective briefs of the parties, this in their verified complaint, thus, no bond nor prior
Court is now tasked to determine the validity of the hearing is necessary since its purpose is merely to
restraining order in question and the proper application maintain the status quo (B.F. Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-
of Sections 14 and 36(l) of R.A. 3844. 30690, November 19, 1982).

It is to be noted that the first matter in issue is It is clear from the law that the issuance of the
procedural in nature. And in the disposition of this restraining order is left to the sound discretion of the
issue, the basic legal truth in Remedial Law that laws of judge whenever he deems that grave or irreparable
procedure may be retroactively applied provided no injury on the part of the applicant commands it. We do
substantial rights are impaired is of principal hot doubt the CAR Judge's discretion. He was correct in
importance. The pertinent legal provision under his observation (Motion for Reconsideration, p. 80,
consideration is section 5 of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Rollo) that "security of tenure is a legal concession to
Court. It is worthy to note that in 1982, several years agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and
after the questioned temporary injunction was issued deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to
by the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR, for short) Judge deprivation of their and their families (sic) only means
Pastor Reyes, the defunct Batasang Pambansa enacted of livelihood." Such dispossession, therefore, in the
B.P. Blg. 224 which substantially amended said Section context of this case, is indeed a grave injury which social
5 of Rule 58 to read as follows: justice seeks to vindicate. Unfortunately, however,
considering that this case had been pending for a long
Sec. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without time now, We leave it to the proper Court presently
notice; issuance of restraining order.No preliminary having jurisdiction over this case, subject to the parties'
injunction shall be granted without notice to the intention to pursue or not this litigation, to determine
defendant. If it shall appear from the facts shown by the possibility of enforcing the lower court's restraining
affidavits or by the verified complaint that great or order in the light of the physical changes which might
irrepairable injury would result to the applicant before have ensued.
the matter can be heard on notice, the judge to whom
the application for preliminary injunction was made, Coming now to the matter involving sections 14 and 36
may issue a restraining order to be effective only for a (1) of R.A. 3844, We disagree with the respondent
period of twenty days from date of its issuance. Within Court's ruling that:
the said twenty-day period, the judge must cause an
order to be served on the defendant, requiring him to We hold that ejectment proceedings should take
show cause, at a specified time and place, why the precedence only in cases where the owner himself or a
injunction should not be granted, and determine within member of his immediate family undertakes the
conversion in good faith of the agricultural landholding redeem the same if its sale had already been
into a residential subdivision. In such case the consummated. However, a reading of the petitioner's
provisions of Section 36 (1) requiring final court order complaint filed with the CAR (pp. 20-24, Rollo) does not
for ejectment of the lessee would be applicable. (p. 75, reveal any desire on their part to exercise this right;
Rollo) what they express, however, is their eagerness to work
on their landholdings as tenants-lessees. They invoke,
As correctly pointed out by Judge Reyes of the CAR, therefore, their right to security of tenure. And
pursuant to section 36 of R.A. 3844, the agricultural
The purchaser of the landholding is subrogated to the lessee cannot be dispossessed of his landholding except
rights and substituted to the obligations of the by a Court order that is final and executory. Hence, in
agricultural lessor (Sec. 10, Rep. Act No. 3844), hence, conjunction with section 10 of R.A. 3844, the
the agricultural leasehold relationship continues mandatory requirement of Section 36 may never be
between the agricultural lessee and the purchaser overlooked by respondents. Nor may they invoke the
automatically by operation of law and the latter, as provisions of the repealed section 14, even if it were
agricultural lessor, is bound to respect the agricultural still applicable today.
lessee's possession and cultivation of the land. (Motion
for Reconsideration, p. 79, Rollo). WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is
granted and the appealed decision of the Fourth
This being the case, TROPICAL is bound to respect the Division of the respondent Court of Appeals dated 15
possession of the petitioners as leasehold tenants over July 1969 is hereby reversed, without pronouncement
the land in question pursuant to the latters' right to as to costs. It is further instructed that the records of
security of tenure as enshrined in Sections 9, 10 and 36 CAR Case No. 442-Rizal '69, filed with the then Court of
of R.A-3844. To hold otherwise would render nugatory Agrarian Relations, Sixth Regional District, Branch III, be
one of the primary reasons for the enactment of said remanded to the proper court now having jurisdiction
law. for trial on the merits, conditioned on the interest of
the parties to pursue this case.
Respondent TROPICAL, in an attempt to justify its
dispossessory acts against petitioners, invoke the SO ORDERED.
provisions of Section 14 * of R.A. 3844 (p. 28, Rollo).
However, this Court does not find the pertinence of
such provision in the case at bar. The repealed section
14 stated:

Sec. 14. Right of Pre-emption and Redemption not

Applicable to Land to be Converted into Residential,
Industrial and Similar Purposes.The right of
preemption and redemption granted under Sections
eleven and twelve of this Chapter cannot be exercised
over landholding suitably located which the owner
bought or holds for conversion into residential,
commercial, industrial or other similar non-agricultural
purposes Provided, however, That the conversion be in
good faith and is substantially carried out within one
year from the date of sale. Should the owner fail to
comply with the above condition, the agricultural lessee
shall have the right to repurchase under reasonable
terms and conditions said landholding from said owner
within one year after the aforementioned period for
conversion has expired: Provided, however, That the
tenure of one year shall cease to run from the time the
agricultural lessee petitions the [Land Authority] to
acquire the land under the provisions of paragraph 11
of Section fifty one.

Clearly, this defunct section establishes the right of the

tenant-lessee to pre-empt the sale of his landholding or
nor by sale, alienation or transfer of the legal
#6 possession of the landholding does not extinguished
Nisnisan, et al vs. Court of Appeals leasehold. In these cases, the transferee is subrogated
294 SCRA 173 (1998) to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the
Facts: lessor.
Spouses Gavino and Florencia Nisnisan are the owners
of a 4.9774 hectare land in Davao del Sur. Policarpio, Dispossession of Tenants
the son of Gavino, has been cultivating one (1) ha of Under Sec. 36 of RA 3844, dispossession of tenants
said land since 1961. In 1976, Gavino and Policarpio may be authorized by the Court in a judgment that is
executed a leasehold contract which stipulates a sharing final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
arrangement of 1/3:2/3 of the harvest. In 1978, Gavino a) The lessee failed to substantially comply with the
sold two (2) ha of the land, including the land tenanted terms and conditions of the contract or with pertinent
by Policarpio, to spouses Mancera. As a result of the laws unless the failure is caused by a fortuitous event or
sale, Policarpio and family were ousted. They then filed force majeure;
an action for reinstatement of tenancy against the b) The lessee planted crops or used the land for a
Manceras. The Manceras, on the other hand, countered purpose other than what has been previously agreed
that spouses Nisnisan have no cause of action because upon;
they voluntarily surrendered their landholding. (Note: Under DAR AO 5 [1993], the lessee is now
Issue: allowed to intercrop or plant secondary crops after the
Is the tenant deemed to have voluntarily surrendered rental has been fixed, provided the lessee shoulders the
subject landholding? expenses.)
Held: c) The lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices
Other than their bare allegations, private respondents necessary to conserve the land, improve its fertility, and
failed to present any evidence to show that petitioners- increase its productivity taking into consideration the
spouses surrendered their landholding voluntarily after lessee's financial capacity and the credit facilities
the private respondents purchased the subject available to him;
property. Moreover, the filing of the complaint for d) There has been substantial damage, destruction
reinstatement of leasehold tenancy by petitioners- or unreasonable deterioration of the land or any
spouses against private respondents before the CAR permanent improvement thereon due to the fault or
militates against the private respondents' claim that negligence of the lessee;
petitioners-spouses voluntarily surrendered their e) The lessee failed to pay lease rental on time
landholding to them. Under Sec. 8 of RA 3844, voluntary except when such non-payment is due to crop failure to
surrender, as a mode of extinguishing agricultural the extent of 75% as a result of a fortuitous event;
leasehold tenancy relations, must be convincingly and f) The lessee employed a sub-lessee; or
sufficiently proved by competent evidence. The tenant's g) The landholding is declared by the DAR to be
intention to surrender the landholding cannot be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some
presumed, much less determined by mere implication. other urban purposes subject to payment of
Effect of death or permanent incapacity of tenant- disturbance compensation to the lessee.
lessee on leasehold relation (Note: Under Sec. 36 [1] of RA 3844, as amended
Under Sec. 9 of RA 3844, in case of death or by RA 6389, disturbance compensation is equivalent to
permanent incapacity, the leasehold relation continues five [5] times the average of the gross harvest on his
between the lessor and the person who can cultivate landholding during the last five [5] preceding calendar
the land personally, chosen by the lessor within one years.)
month from such death or incapacity, from among the In the case of Garchitorena vs. Panganiban, 6 SCRA
following: 338 (1962), it was held that when non-payment of lease
a) The surviving spouse; rentals occurs for several years, said omission has the
b) The eldest direct descendant by consanguinity; effect of depriving the landowner of the enjoyment of
c) The next eldest descendant or descendants in the possession and use of the land.
the order of age. Under Sec. 36 (1) of RA 3844, as amended, a lessor
The age requirement is applied under the who ejects his tenant without the court's authorization
presumption that all heirs/successors are qualified. shall be liable for:
The leasehold relation is not terminated by death or a) fine or imprisonment;
permanent incapacity of the landholder-lessor. It binds b) damages suffered by the agricultural lessee in
his legal heirs (Rep. Act No. 3844 [1963], sec. 9). addition to the fine or imprisonment for unauthorized
Also, Sec. 10 of RA 3844 provides that the mere dispossession;
expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract
c) payment of attorney's fees incurred by the harvest during these three (3) preceding agricultural
lessee; and years.
d) the reinstatement of the lessee.
Determination of Lease Rentals
The lease rental shall not be more than the
equivalent of 25% of the average normal harvest during
the three (3) agricultural years preceding the following
10 September 1971, the date of effectivity of RA
6389for tenanted rice and corn lands;
15 June 1988 or date the tenant opted to enter
into leasehold agreement, whichever is sooner, for
tenanted sugar lands; or
15 June 1988 or date of leasehold agreement by
the parties concerned, whichever is sooner, for all other
agricultural lands after deducting the amount used for
seeds and the cost of harvesting, threshing, loading,
hauling and processing whichever is applicable (DAR
Adm. O. No. 5 [1993]).
DAR AO 5 (1993) defines "normal harvest" as the
usual or regular produce obtained from the land when it
is not affected by any fortuitous event like drought,
earthquake, volcanic eruption, and the like. If there had
been no normal harvest, the estimated normal harvest
during the three (3) preceding agricultural years shall be
considered as the normal harvest.
"Agricultural year" refers to the period of time
required for raising a particular product, including the
preparation of the land, sowing, planting and harvesting
of crops and, whenever applicable, threshing of said
crops: Provided, however, That in case of crops yielding
more than one harvest from one planting, "agricultural
year" shall be the period from the preparation of the
land to the first harvest and thereafter from harvest to
harvest. In both cases, the period may be shorter or
longer than a calendar year.
The law states that only the amount used for seeds
and the cost of harvesting, threshing, loading, hauling,
and processing, whichever is applicable, are considered
allowable deductions from the normal harvest in order
to determine the lease rental.
The lease rental shall cover the whole farmholding
attended to by the lessee. Computation of lease rental
shall include both primary and secondary crops existing
as of 15 June 1988. Secondary crops which are planted
to an aggregate area of half a hectare or less shall not
be included in the computation of the lease rental (DAR
Adm. O. No. 5 [1993]).
If the land has been cultivated for a period of less
than three agricultural years prior to 15 June 1988, the
initial rental shall be based on the average normal
harvest during the preceding agricultural years when
the land was actually cultivated.

After the lapse of the first three (3) normal harvests,

the final rental shall be based on the average normal


As a mode of extinguishing tenancy relationship?

Ruling: YES.
As a mode of extinguishing tenancy relationship it
connotes a decision in the part of the tenant to return
the possession of the landholding and relinquished his
right as tenant thereon uninfluenced by any compelling
factor, coming particularly from the landholder. For
surrender to be valid, there must be (a) an intention to
abandon, and (b) an external act or an omission to act,
by which such intention is carried out into effect. When
a tenant voluntarily yields the land, he terminates the
tenancy relationship by his unilateral act. (Anacleto
Inson vs. Planas de Asis,, CA GR No. Sp-01769,
October 11, 1974.)