#3 G.R. No.
95318 June 11, 1991 After trial, the Municipal Court [found private
LOURDES PEA QUA, assisted by her husband, JAMES
QUA, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (SECOND DIVISION),
CARMEN CARILLO, EDUARDO CARILLO, JOSEPHINE
CARILLO, REBECCA CARILLO, MARIA CEPRES, CECILIO
CEPRES and SALVADOR CARILLO, JR., respondents.
Brotamonte Law Office for petitioner.
Isabel E. Florin for private respondents
GANCAYCO, J.:
This case deals with the issue of whether or not private
respondents possess the status of agricultural tenants
entitled to, among others, the use and possession of a
home lot.
Respondent Court of Appeals,1 in denying due course to
the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner, stated the
antecedents of this case in the lower courts as follows:
. . . [O]n July 17, 1986, petitioner Lourdes Pea Qua filed
a complaint for ejectment with damages against private
respondents claiming that she is the owner of a parcel
of residential land, Lot No. 2099 of the Malinao
Cadastre, situated at Poblacion, Tinapi, Malinao, Albay,
with an area of 346 square meters, which is registered
in her name under TCT T-70368; that inside the land in
question is an auto repair shop and three houses, all
owned by private respondents; and that said
respondents' stay in the land was by mere tolerance
and they are in fact nothing but squatters who settled
on the land without any agreement between her (sic),
paying no rents to her nor realty taxes to the
government.
In their answer, private respondent Carmen Carillo,
surviving spouse of the late Salvador Carillo (and
[respectively the] mother and mother-in-law of the
other [private] respondents), alleged that the lot in
question is a farm lot [home lot] because she and her
late husband were tenants of the same including the
two other lots adjoining the lot in question, Lots No.
2060 and 2446, which also belong to petitioner; that as
tenants, they could not just be ejected without cause;
that it was not petitioner who instituted them as
tenants in the land in question but the former owner,
Leovigildo Pea who permitted the construction of the
auto repair shop, the house of Carmen Carillo and the
other two houses.
respondents to be mere squatters and] rendered
judgment2 ordering . . . [them] to vacate and remove
their houses and [the] auto repair shop from the lot in
question and to pay the petitioner attorney's fees and a
monthly rental of P200.00.
On appeal to respondent [Regional Trial] Court, the
judgment was modified by ordering the case dismissed
[insofar as] Carmen Carillo [was concerned being
qualified as an agricultural tenant and] declaring that
the home lot and her house standing thereon should be
respected.3
Believing that even private respondent Carmen Carillo
does not qualify as an agricultural tenant, petitioner
pursues her cause before this forum citing only one
ground for the entertainment of her petition, to wit:
THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT [Court of Appeal]
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND ACTED
CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FACTS AND APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION, FOR DENYING DUE COURSE TO THE
PETITIONER'S CRY FOR JUSTICE AND FOR DISMISSING
THE PETITION.4
The Court agrees and finds that respondent Court of
Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the petition for review of the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, the same being replete with
inconsistencies and unfounded conclusions. Because of
this jurisdictional issue raised by petitioner, the Court
hereby treats this petition as a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.5
The Regional Trial Court6 made the following
observations:
The land in question is a measly three hundred forty six
(346) square meters and adjoining another two (2) lots
which are separately titled having two thousand four
hundred thirteen (2,413) square meters and eight
thousand two hundred ninety eight (8,298) square
meters the three (3) lots having a total area of
eleven thousand fifty seven (11,057) square meters,
more or less, or over a hectare of land owned by the
plaintiff or by her predecessors-in-interest.
In the 346 square meters lot stand (sic) four (4)
structures, [to wit]: an auto repair shop, a house of
[private respondent] Carmen Carillo and two (2) other
houses owned or occupied by the rest of the [private
respondents] . . .; in other words, the [private
respondents] almost converted the entire area as their
home lot for their personal aggrandizement, believing
that they are all tenants of the [petitioner].
Claimed, the defendants planted five hundred (500)
coconut trees and only fifty (50) coconut trees survived
in the land in question and/or in the entire area of the
three lots. Such an evidence (sic) is very untruthful,
unless it is a seed bed for coconut trees as the area is so
limited. But found standing in the area in question or in
the entire three (3) lots are only seven (7) coconut
trees, the harvest of which is [allegedly] 2/3 share for
the [petitioner] and the 1/3 share for the [private
respondents]. The share, if ever there was/were, could
not even suffice [to pay] the amount of taxes of the
land (sic) paid religiously by the [petitioner] yearly.7
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing that the source of
livelihood of private respondents is not derived from
the lots they are allegedly tenanting. This conclusion is
further supported by private respondent Carmen
Carillo's assertion that the auto repair shop was
constructed with the consent of petitioner's
predecessor-in-interest for whom her husband served
as a driver-mechanic.8
From private respondents' manner of caring for the lots,
it is also apparent that making the same agriculturally
viable was not the main purpose of their occupancy, or
else they should have immediately replanted coconut
trees in place of those that did not survive. Indeed, the
location of their auto repair shop being near the
poblacion and along the highway, private respondents
chose to neglect the cultivation and propagation of
coconuts, having earned, through the automobile repair
shop, more than enough not only for their livelihood
but also for the construction of two other dwelling
houses thereon. It is also intimated by the Regional Trial
Court that there is no direct evidence to confirm that
the parties herein observed the sharing scheme
allegedly set-up between private respondents and
petitioner's predecessor-in-interest.
Notwithstanding the foregoing indicia of a non-
agricultural tenancy relationship, however, the Regional
Trial Court decided in favor of private respondent
Carmen Carillo and ruled, thus:
In View of the Foregoing, and Premises considered, the
Court renders judgment:
1. Ordering defendants, namely: Eduardo Carillo,
Josephine P. Carillo, Rebecca Carillo, Maria Cepres,
Cecilio Cepres and Salvador Carillo, Jr., to vacate and
remove their two (2) houses and the auto repair shop
from the premises in question, and restoring the area to
the lawful owner, the herein plaintiff;
2. Ordering said six defendants to pay the plaintiff
jointly and severally the amount of Four Thousand
(P4,000.00) Pesos as attorney's fees and litigation
expenses;
3. Ordering said six defendants to pay plaintiff the
sum of One Hundred Seventy One Pesos and Thirty Six
Centavos (P171.36) monthly, for the use of the area in
question, commencing July 17, 1986 the date the
plaintiff filed this action in Court, up to the time the
defendants vacate the area in question and restore the
same to the plaintiff peacefully.
4. And ordering said six (6) defendants to pay the
costs proportionately.
The case against defendant, Carmen Carillon is hereby
ordered DISMISSED. The home lot and where her house
stands is respected. And without pronouncement as to
its costs (sic).
IT IS SO ORDERED.9 (Emphasis supplied.)
Without explaining why, the Regional Trial Court chose
not to believe the findings of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court and instead, adopted the recommendation of the
Regional Director for Region V, acting for the Secretary
of the Department of Agrarian Reform, without making
separate findings and arriving at an independent
conclusion as to the nature of the relationship between
the parties in this case. This is evident in the following
excerpt of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court:
The dispositive part of the Resolution of this Civil Case
No. T-1317 for Ejectment with Damages, Referral Case
No. 880054 states and is quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we are constrained
to issue the following resolutions:
1) Certifying this case as NOT PROPER FOR TRIAL
in as far as the home lot and house built thereon by the
spouses Carmen Carillo (sic);
2) Advising the plaintiff to institute proper cause
of action in as far as the auto repair shop and the two
(2) houses erected on her landholdings by the children
of tenant-farmer Salvador Carillo since they appear as
not the lawful tenants thereat.
SO RESOLVED.
xxx xxx xxx

From the foregoing dispositive part of the resolution
penned down by the Regional Director, it defines and
explains the status of each of the defendants.10
Time and again, the Court has ruled that, as regards
relations between litigants in land cases, the findings
and conclusions of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
being preliminary in nature, are not in any way binding
on the trial courts11 which must endeavor to arrive at
their own independent conclusions.
Had the Regional Trial Court hearkened to this doctrine,
proceeded to so conduct its own investigation and
examined the facts of this case, a contrary conclusion
would have been reached, and the findings of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, sustained, particularly
when the circumstances obtaining in this case are
examined in the light of the essential requisites set by
law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, thus: (1)
the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the
subject is agricultural land; (3) the purpose is
agricultural production; and (4) there is
consideration.12 It is also understood that (5) there is
consent to the tenant to work on the land, that (6)
there is personal cultivation by him and that the
consideration consists of sharing the harvest.13
It is contended by petitioner that the parcel of land
occupied by private respondents, Lot No. 2099, with an
area of only 346 square meters is residential in nature,
being situated near the poblacion of Malinao, Albay,
and as evidenced by the tax declaration obtained by
petitioner to this effect.1wphi1 Indeed, the municipal
trial court judge ordered the ejectment of the private
respondents on this basis. On the other hand, private
respondents aver that the lot is agricultural being
bounded by two other agricultural lands planted to
coconuts titled in the name of petitioner and all three
parcels being cultivated by them.
The Court reiterates the ruling in Tiongson v. Court of
Appeals,15 that
All these requisites are necessary in order to create
tenancy relationship between the parties and the
absence of one or more requisites do (sic) not make the
alleged tenant a de facto tenant as contradistinguished
from a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person
has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not
entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the
Land Reform Program of the Government under existing
tenancy laws.
Under the foregoing, private respondent Carmen Carillo
is not entitled to be considered an agricultural tenant.
Therefore, she may be not allowed the use of a home
lot, a privilege granted by Section 35 of Republic Act No.
3844, as amended, in relation to Section 22 (3) of
Republic Act No. 1199, as amended,16 only to persons
satisfying the qualifications of agricultural tenants of
coconut lands.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and a
new one is issued REINSTATING the decision of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Malinao-Tiwi, Albay,
Fifth Judicial Region dated 19 August 1987. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

The Court is not prepared to affirm the residential

status of the land merely on the basis of the tax
declaration, in the absence of further showing that all
the requirements for conversion of the use of land from
agricultural to residential prevailing at the start of the
controversy in this case have been fully satisfied.14

Be that as it may and recognizing the consent to the

presence of private respondents on the property as
given by petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, the
situation obtaining in this case still lacks, as discussed
earlier, three of the afore-enumerated requisites,
namely: agricultural production, personal cultivation
and sharing of harvests.

#4
G.R. No. L-30821 December 14, 1988
VIDAL BERNARDO and JESUS SILVERIO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (4th Division) and TROPICAL
HOMES, INC., respondents.
Advincula Law Office for petitioners.
Serrano, Diokno and Serrano for private respondent.
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review by certiorari which has been
pending for seventeen years now. As per its resolution
dated 1 September 1986 (p.144, Rollo), this Court
ordered the parties to manifest "whether or not they
are still interested in prosecuting this case, or
supervening events have transpired which render the
case moot and academic or otherwise substantially
affect the same." Counsel for petitioners has expressed
that he has never seen nor has communicated with his
clients "for ten (10) years or more" and is therefore
without knowledge of their interest in pursuing this
case (Manifestation with Explanation, p. 152, Rollo). On
the other hand, both respondent Tropical Homes, Inc.
(TROPICAL, for short) and its counsel could not be found
at their addresses of record. Nevertheless, under the
circumstances We cannot as yet consider this case as
moot and academic. We therefore will resolve the
same.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:
On January 29, 1969, the respondents tenants, Vidal
Bernardo and Jesus Silverio, filed a verified complaint
with the Court of Agrarian Relations, Sixth Regional
District, Branch III, Pasig, Rizal, CAR Case No. 442-Rizal
'69, against Mercedes Tomas and the petitioner,
Tropical Homes, Inc., alleging that they are the
agricultural lessees of Mercedes Tomas of a 2-hectare
rice landholding; that on January 16 and 17, 1969,
petitioner herein, in conspiracy with its co-defendant
Mercedes Tomas, who had apparently sold the
landholding aforementioned to the petitioner to be
converted for residential purposes, without any written
notice to the plaintiffs in said case, now private
respondents herein, nor any verbal report to them and
without their permission and against their will and
consent, forcibly bulldozed a small portion, of their
landholding and destroyed the earth embankments
(pilapiles) existing thereon; and that despite their
protest to refrain from said acts, Tropical Homes, Inc.
and its henchmen continued the bulldozing of the
landholding of the private respondents. The plaintiffs in
the abovementioned case prayed in their verified
complaint for the issuance ex parte of a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants
therein from continuing with the bulldozing of their
landholding.
Pursuant to the verified complaint and motion for a writ
of preliminary injunction, the respondent Judge,
pending the hearing of said motion, issued on January
31, 1969, an order temporarily restraining and enjoining
Mercedes Tomas and the Tropical Homes, Inc., their
agents, representatives and/or their hired contractors
to cease and desist from bulldozing or causing the
performance of any kind of work over the landholding
that would have the effect of dispossessing the
plaintiffs therein.
The defendants abovementioned were given five (5)
days from receipt of notice of said order within which to
file their reply or objection to the motion for issuance of
the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction and said
motion was set for hearing on February 6, 1969, at 9:30
A.M. The defendants in said case were summoned on
January 30, 1969, and were notified of the temporary
restraining order of January 31, 1969, on the latter date.
On February 3, 1969, petitioner Tropical Homes, Inc.
filed an ex parte motion to lift the temporary restraining
order, including its opposition to the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction.
On February 6, 1969, Tropical Homes, Inc. filed an ex
parte motion to stay the proceedings and asked that
the hearing of the motion for preliminary injunction set
for February 4, 1969, be held in abeyance pending
action by this Court on this petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction, filed by the petitioner on
February 5, 1969, to nullify the restraining order of
January 31, 1969.
The respondent Judge by order of February 7, 1969,
held in abeyance the hearing of the motion for
preliminary injunction until this Court shall have
decided the instant petition, and on February 8, he
issued an order denying the motion to lift the
temporary restraining order of January 31, 1969.
A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court
on February 17, 1969, enjoining and restraining the
respondents from enforcing the order of January 31,
1969, upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P1,000.00.
(pp. 67-70, Rollo)

Ruling in favor of TROPICAL, respondent Court of
Appeals (CA for brevity) construed the restraining order
issued by the Agrarian Court dated 31 January 1969 as
"practically a writ of preliminary injunction" (p. 76,
Rollo) and therefore irregularly issued as no prior
hearing was conducted and that no bond was posted as
required under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 58 of the New
Rules of Court. The CA also applied Section 14 of the
Code of Agrarian Reform (R.A. 3844) as invoked by
TROPICAL and interpreted Section 36(l) of the same
Code, the basis of petitioners' claim of right, thus,
... ejectment proceedings should take precedence only
in cases where the owner himself or a member of his
immediate family undertakes the conversion in good
faith of the agricultural landholding into a residential
subdivision. In such case the provisions of Section 36(l)
requiring final court order for ejectment of the lessee
would be applicable. (p. 75, Rollo)
prompting the petitioners to file this petition for review.
Culling from the respective briefs of the parties, this
Court is now tasked to determine the validity of the
restraining order in question and the proper application
of Sections 14 and 36(l) of R.A. 3844.
It is to be noted that the first matter in issue is
procedural in nature. And in the disposition of this
issue, the basic legal truth in Remedial Law that laws of
procedure may be retroactively applied provided no
substantial rights are impaired is of principal
importance. The pertinent legal provision under
consideration is section 5 of Rule 58 of the New Rules of
Court. It is worthy to note that in 1982, several years
after the questioned temporary injunction was issued
by the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR, for short) Judge
Pastor Reyes, the defunct Batasang Pambansa enacted
B.P. Blg. 224 which substantially amended said Section
5 of Rule 58 to read as follows:
Sec. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without
notice; issuance of restraining order.No preliminary
injunction shall be granted without notice to the
defendant. If it shall appear from the facts shown by
affidavits or by the verified complaint that great or
irrepairable injury would result to the applicant before
the matter can be heard on notice, the judge to whom
the application for preliminary injunction was made,
may issue a restraining order to be effective only for a
period of twenty days from date of its issuance. Within
the said twenty-day period, the judge must cause an
order to be served on the defendant, requiring him to
show cause, at a specified time and place, why the
injunction should not be granted, and determine within
the same period whether or not the preliminary
injunction shall be granted and shall accordingly issue
the corresponding order. In the event that the
application for preliminary injunction is denied, the
restraining order is deemed automatically vacated.
Nothing herein contained shall be construed to impair,
affect or modify in any way any rights-ranted, by, or
rules pertaining to injunctions contained in, existing
agrarian, labor or social legislation. (Emphasis supplied)
Applying now the above law to the case at bar, it is clear
that the Court, in this case the CAR, can issue a
restraining order which is to last for only twenty (20)
days and which is clearly distinct from the writ of
injunction applied for. This restraining order may be
issued by the judge despite the absence of a prior
hearing as long as it could be shown by affidavits or in
the verified complaint that great or irreparable injury
would be suffered by the applicant. There being no
substantial rights affected, We rule that the temporary
injunction of 31 January 1969 is not equivalent to the
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by petitioners
in their verified complaint, thus, no bond nor prior
hearing is necessary since its purpose is merely to
maintain the status quo (B.F. Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-
30690, November 19, 1982).
It is clear from the law that the issuance of the
restraining order is left to the sound discretion of the
judge whenever he deems that grave or irreparable
injury on the part of the applicant commands it. We do
hot doubt the CAR Judge's discretion. He was correct in
his observation (Motion for Reconsideration, p. 80,
Rollo) that "security of tenure is a legal concession to
agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and
deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to
deprivation of their and their families (sic) only means
of livelihood." Such dispossession, therefore, in the
context of this case, is indeed a grave injury which social
justice seeks to vindicate. Unfortunately, however,
considering that this case had been pending for a long
time now, We leave it to the proper Court presently
having jurisdiction over this case, subject to the parties'
intention to pursue or not this litigation, to determine
the possibility of enforcing the lower court's restraining
order in the light of the physical changes which might
have ensued.
Coming now to the matter involving sections 14 and 36
(1) of R.A. 3844, We disagree with the respondent
Court's ruling that:
We hold that ejectment proceedings should take
precedence only in cases where the owner himself or a
member of his immediate family undertakes the
conversion in good faith of the agricultural landholding
into a residential subdivision. In such case the
provisions of Section 36 (1) requiring final court order
for ejectment of the lessee would be applicable. (p. 75,
Rollo)
As correctly pointed out by Judge Reyes of the CAR,
The purchaser of the landholding is subrogated to the
rights and substituted to the obligations of the
agricultural lessor (Sec. 10, Rep. Act No. 3844), hence,
the agricultural leasehold relationship continues
between the agricultural lessee and the purchaser
automatically by operation of law and the latter, as
agricultural lessor, is bound to respect the agricultural
lessee's possession and cultivation of the land. (Motion
for Reconsideration, p. 79, Rollo).
This being the case, TROPICAL is bound to respect the
possession of the petitioners as leasehold tenants over
the land in question pursuant to the latters' right to
security of tenure as enshrined in Sections 9, 10 and 36
of R.A-3844. To hold otherwise would render nugatory
one of the primary reasons for the enactment of said
law.
Respondent TROPICAL, in an attempt to justify its
dispossessory acts against petitioners, invoke the
provisions of Section 14 * of R.A. 3844 (p. 28, Rollo).
However, this Court does not find the pertinence of
such provision in the case at bar. The repealed section
14 stated:
redeem the same if its sale had already been
consummated. However, a reading of the petitioner's
complaint filed with the CAR (pp. 20-24, Rollo) does not
reveal any desire on their part to exercise this right;
what they express, however, is their eagerness to work
on their landholdings as tenants-lessees. They invoke,
therefore, their right to security of tenure. And
pursuant to section 36 of R.A. 3844, the agricultural
lessee cannot be dispossessed of his landholding except
by a Court order that is final and executory. Hence, in
conjunction with section 10 of R.A. 3844, the
mandatory requirement of Section 36 may never be
overlooked by respondents. Nor may they invoke the
provisions of the repealed section 14, even if it were
still applicable today.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is
granted and the appealed decision of the Fourth
Division of the respondent Court of Appeals dated 15
July 1969 is hereby reversed, without pronouncement
as to costs. It is further instructed that the records of
CAR Case No. 442-Rizal '69, filed with the then Court of
Agrarian Relations, Sixth Regional District, Branch III, be
remanded to the proper court now having jurisdiction
for trial on the merits, conditioned on the interest of
the parties to pursue this case.
SO ORDERED.

Sec. 14. Right of Pre-emption and Redemption not

Applicable to Land to be Converted into Residential,
Industrial and Similar Purposes.The right of
preemption and redemption granted under Sections
eleven and twelve of this Chapter cannot be exercised
over landholding suitably located which the owner
bought or holds for conversion into residential,
commercial, industrial or other similar non-agricultural
purposes Provided, however, That the conversion be in
good faith and is substantially carried out within one
year from the date of sale. Should the owner fail to
comply with the above condition, the agricultural lessee
shall have the right to repurchase under reasonable
terms and conditions said landholding from said owner
within one year after the aforementioned period for
conversion has expired: Provided, however, That the
tenure of one year shall cease to run from the time the
agricultural lessee petitions the [Land Authority] to
acquire the land under the provisions of paragraph 11
of Section fifty one.

Clearly, this defunct section establishes the right of the

tenant-lessee to pre-empt the sale of his landholding or

#6
Nisnisan, et al vs. Court of Appeals
294 SCRA 173 (1998)
Facts:
Spouses Gavino and Florencia Nisnisan are the owners
of a 4.9774 hectare land in Davao del Sur. Policarpio,
the son of Gavino, has been cultivating one (1) ha of
said land since 1961. In 1976, Gavino and Policarpio
executed a leasehold contract which stipulates a sharing
arrangement of 1/3:2/3 of the harvest. In 1978, Gavino
sold two (2) ha of the land, including the land tenanted
by Policarpio, to spouses Mancera. As a result of the
sale, Policarpio and family were ousted. They then filed
an action for reinstatement of tenancy against the
Manceras. The Manceras, on the other hand, countered
that spouses Nisnisan have no cause of action because
they voluntarily surrendered their landholding.
Issue:
Is the tenant deemed to have voluntarily surrendered
subject landholding?
Held:
Other than their bare allegations, private respondents
failed to present any evidence to show that petitioners-
spouses surrendered their landholding voluntarily after
the private respondents purchased the subject
property. Moreover, the filing of the complaint for
reinstatement of leasehold tenancy by petitioners-
spouses against private respondents before the CAR
militates against the private respondents' claim that
petitioners-spouses voluntarily surrendered their
landholding to them. Under Sec. 8 of RA 3844, voluntary
surrender, as a mode of extinguishing agricultural
leasehold tenancy relations, must be convincingly and
sufficiently proved by competent evidence. The tenant's
intention to surrender the landholding cannot be
presumed, much less determined by mere implication.
Effect of death or permanent incapacity of tenant-
lessee on leasehold relation
Under Sec. 9 of RA 3844, in case of death or
permanent incapacity, the leasehold relation continues
between the lessor and the person who can cultivate
the land personally, chosen by the lessor within one
month from such death or incapacity, from among the
following:
a) The surviving spouse;
b) The eldest direct descendant by consanguinity;
c) The next eldest descendant or descendants in
the order of age.
The age requirement is applied under the
presumption that all heirs/successors are qualified.
The leasehold relation is not terminated by death or
permanent incapacity of the landholder-lessor. It binds
his legal heirs (Rep. Act No. 3844 [1963], sec. 9).
Also, Sec. 10 of RA 3844 provides that the mere
expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract
nor by sale, alienation or transfer of the legal
possession of the landholding does not extinguished
leasehold. In these cases, the transferee is subrogated
to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the
lessor.
Dispossession of Tenants
Under Sec. 36 of RA 3844, dispossession of tenants
may be authorized by the Court in a judgment that is
final and executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
a) The lessee failed to substantially comply with the
terms and conditions of the contract or with pertinent
laws unless the failure is caused by a fortuitous event or
force majeure;
b) The lessee planted crops or used the land for a
purpose other than what has been previously agreed
upon;
(Note: Under DAR AO 5 [1993], the lessee is now
allowed to intercrop or plant secondary crops after the
rental has been fixed, provided the lessee shoulders the
expenses.)
c) The lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices
necessary to conserve the land, improve its fertility, and
increase its productivity taking into consideration the
lessee's financial capacity and the credit facilities
available to him;
d) There has been substantial damage, destruction
or unreasonable deterioration of the land or any
permanent improvement thereon due to the fault or
negligence of the lessee;
e) The lessee failed to pay lease rental on time
except when such non-payment is due to crop failure to
the extent of 75% as a result of a fortuitous event;
f) The lessee employed a sub-lessee; or
g) The landholding is declared by the DAR to be
suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some
other urban purposes subject to payment of
disturbance compensation to the lessee.
(Note: Under Sec. 36 [1] of RA 3844, as amended
by RA 6389, disturbance compensation is equivalent to
five [5] times the average of the gross harvest on his
landholding during the last five [5] preceding calendar
years.)
In the case of Garchitorena vs. Panganiban, 6 SCRA
338 (1962), it was held that when non-payment of lease
rentals occurs for several years, said omission has the
effect of depriving the landowner of the enjoyment of
the possession and use of the land.
Under Sec. 36 (1) of RA 3844, as amended, a lessor
who ejects his tenant without the court's authorization
shall be liable for:
a) fine or imprisonment;
b) damages suffered by the agricultural lessee in
addition to the fine or imprisonment for unauthorized
dispossession;
c) payment of attorney's fees incurred by the harvest during these three (3) preceding agricultural
lessee; and years.
d) the reinstatement of the lessee.
Determination of Lease Rentals
The lease rental shall not be more than the
equivalent of 25% of the average normal harvest during
the three (3) agricultural years preceding the following
dates:
10 September 1971, the date of effectivity of RA
6389for tenanted rice and corn lands;
15 June 1988 or date the tenant opted to enter
into leasehold agreement, whichever is sooner, for
tenanted sugar lands; or
15 June 1988 or date of leasehold agreement by
the parties concerned, whichever is sooner, for all other
agricultural lands after deducting the amount used for
seeds and the cost of harvesting, threshing, loading,
hauling and processing whichever is applicable (DAR
Adm. O. No. 5 [1993]).
DAR AO 5 (1993) defines "normal harvest" as the
usual or regular produce obtained from the land when it
is not affected by any fortuitous event like drought,
earthquake, volcanic eruption, and the like. If there had
been no normal harvest, the estimated normal harvest
during the three (3) preceding agricultural years shall be
considered as the normal harvest.
"Agricultural year" refers to the period of time
required for raising a particular product, including the
preparation of the land, sowing, planting and harvesting
of crops and, whenever applicable, threshing of said
crops: Provided, however, That in case of crops yielding
more than one harvest from one planting, "agricultural
year" shall be the period from the preparation of the
land to the first harvest and thereafter from harvest to
harvest. In both cases, the period may be shorter or
longer than a calendar year.
The law states that only the amount used for seeds
and the cost of harvesting, threshing, loading, hauling,
and processing, whichever is applicable, are considered
allowable deductions from the normal harvest in order
to determine the lease rental.
The lease rental shall cover the whole farmholding
attended to by the lessee. Computation of lease rental
shall include both primary and secondary crops existing
as of 15 June 1988. Secondary crops which are planted
to an aggregate area of half a hectare or less shall not
be included in the computation of the lease rental (DAR
Adm. O. No. 5 [1993]).
If the land has been cultivated for a period of less
than three agricultural years prior to 15 June 1988, the
initial rental shall be based on the average normal
harvest during the preceding agricultural years when
the land was actually cultivated.

After the lapse of the first three (3) normal harvests,

the final rental shall be based on the average normal
#7 INSON VS. PLANAS

Issue: WON there is VOLUNTARY SURRENDER

As a mode of extinguishing tenancy relationship?

Ruling: YES.
As a mode of extinguishing tenancy relationship it
connotes a decision in the part of the tenant to return
the possession of the landholding and relinquished his
right as tenant thereon uninfluenced by any compelling
factor, coming particularly from the landholder. For
surrender to be valid, there must be (a) an intention to
abandon, and (b) an external act or an omission to act,
by which such intention is carried out into effect. When
a tenant voluntarily yields the land, he terminates the
tenancy relationship by his unilateral act. (Anacleto
Inson vs. Planas de Asis, et.al., CA GR No. Sp-01769,
October 11, 1974.)