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Beyond the Look East Policy: United

Malays National Organisation and
the Fall of the Liberal Democratic
Party in Japan

Muhamad Takiyuddin Ismail*

Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid

This article argues that the strong relationship between Malaysia and Japan is also stimu-
lated by symbiotic ties binding together both countries respective major political parties,
i.e., the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) and the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP). UMNO, especially under the leadership of Mahathir Mohamad (19812003),
derived political lessons from developments affecting LDP in Japan. First, emulation of
Japans success in economic development became the basis for the Look East Policy
launched in 1981. Second, which is the focus of this article, lessons were drawn from the
failure of LDP to retain power twice, in 1993 and in 2009. Although LDPs reversal of
fortunes served as a landmark for UMNO in situating changes to its trajectory since 1993,
the analogical reasoning and political lessons applied by UMNO leaders were, to a large
extent, flawed. Arguably, politicians frequently do misjudge in analogizing between dif-
ferent situations which at a glance seem to be comparable.

Key words: governance, Liberal Democratic Party, political lessons, politics of reform, United Malays
National Organisation

Santayanas aphorism must be reversed: too often it is those who can remember
the past who are condemned to repeat it. (Arthur Schlesinger Jr., quoted from May,
1973, p. 179)

Introduction

I n the aftermath of Malaysias 12th General Elections (GE) of 2008, which saw
the ruling National Front [Barisan Nasional (BN)] coalition dispossessed of its
dignified two-thirds parliamentary majority and conceding defeat in five states

*Muhamad Takiyuddin Ismail, PhD, is a Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the

Centre of History, Politics and Strategy, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM), Bangi,
Malaysia.

Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, PhD, is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the
School of Distance Education, Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), Penang, Malaysia.

Asian Politics & PolicyVolume 6, Number 1Pages 2544

2014 Policy Studies Organization. Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
26 Asian Politics & PolicyVolume 6, Issue 12014

to a hastily assembled Peoples Pact [Pakatan Rakyat (PR)] coalition, a quote

frequently employed by Prime Minister Najib Razak is Spanish-American
philosopher George Santayanas remark: Those who cannot remember the
past are condemned to repeat it (cf. Najib, 2009, 2011a, p. 17). Although BN
still won the 12th GE, instantaneous reaction from conservative United Malays
National Organisation (UMNO) quarters such as former Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamad, known to be obsessed with maintaining its traditional two-
thirds parliamentary majority, appeared to indicate the onset of a previously
unheard-of defeatist mentality within UMNO. The election results served to
emphasize the new political reality that BNs hegemony was vulnerable after
all, and UMNO as the dominant party in BN could no longer be so sure of its
apparent invincibility at the polls. Ironically, before the 12th GE, a group of
scholars studying dominant party systems had reminded parties like UMNO that
the primary challenge confronting them lies in their willingness at learning to
lose (Mauzy & Barter, 2008). From a positive angle, the 12th GE results opened
up space for political debate within UMNO concerning urgently needed reforms
and lessons to be learned in order to secure continuous support for the party.
Almost five months after Najib Razak took over the reins of government, UMNO
received a psychological blow when the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) toppled
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) from power in Japans GE of August 30, 2009.
LDPs defeat, taking place at a time when UMNO was struggling to rehabilitate
itself, greatly affected the present crop of UMNO leaders. This article seeks to
analyze how UMNO translates lessons from LDPs downfall in Japan into its own
process of party rehabilitation. We argue that the setback experienced by LDP
raised the need for UMNO to adopt a new political stance or what has been
characterized by Najib Razak as transformation. This development, however,
is counterpoised by the rise of reactionary forces urging UMNO to revive its
approach of overall control. The need for such a balancing act undermines the
extent to which lessons from LDPs defeat can be contextually transposed to
UMNOs situation accurately and comprehensively. The recent outcome of
Malaysias 13th GE of May 2013 underscores the assertion that learning from the
LDP fiasco has not really helped UMNO.
Our discussion is divided into three parts. The first part elaborates the concept
of political lesson or also known as analogical reasoning. The second part
deals with a historical overview juxtaposing the UMNO and LDP cases. We aim
to show how UMNO has in fact been using the path trodden by LDP as a model
for learning since the latters unprecedented defeat in Japans GE of 1993. In 2009,
when LDP lost the GE yet again on a larger scale, UMNO again sought to apply
lessons from LDPs fall via a pragmatic learning model. It is in this third part that
we look in particular at how UMNO leaders and members utilized analogical
reasoning in an effort to contextualize its process of party transformation.

Political Learning and Political Lessons

Every losing party will as a matter of convention adapt its norms or transform
in order to avoid future defeats (Friedman & Wong, 2008, pp. 12). Examples are
the Kuomintang (KMT) of Taiwan, the Congress Party of India, and the Institu-
tional Revolutionary Party [Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)] of Mexico.
 UMNO and the Fall of LDP in Japan 27

Nancy Bermeo (1992) defines political learning as the process through which
people modify their political beliefs and tactics as a result of severe crises,
frustrations, and dramatic changes in the environment (p. 274). According to
her, crises often force people to reevaluate the ideas that they have used as
guides to action in the past (Bermeo, 1992, p. 274). Literature on political learn-
ing, however, has not achieved popularity as an academic subject except in the
context of the discipline of international relations in the United States.
Pathbreaking works in this direction are the studies by Ernest May (1973) and by
Robert Jervis (1976). Both contributions demonstrate how international history
serves as the most vital resource for the powers that be especially during times of
crises. Thus, policymakers are often influenced by history and frequently resort
to analogical deduction from past events in projecting and devising present and
future programs. In fact, in confronting the September 11, 2001 (hereafter 9/11)
terrorist attacks and bracing for the Iraq War in March 2003, George W. Bushs
administration had to invoke past crises that could shed light on the United
States present predicament (see Hemmer, 2007). It is therefore understood that
perceived lessons of the past assume more significance in critical or novel
situations for which there is lack of precedence (Houghton, 1996, p. 525; Petraeus,
1986, p. 44). Frequently, however, such historical application and analogical rea-
soning have been badly used by policymakers. Among mistakes identified
during this process are the misuse of analogy beyond its actual context; indiffer-
ence toward details of events; overgeneralized lessons; tendency to confine analy-
ses to those derived from first impressions; overemphasis on individual
experiences and instances of pushing lessons too far. Such a myopic inclination
often drives decision makers to formulate faulty hypotheses, due to inadequate
information hampering interpretation of factual happenings in the real world. It
is for this reason that Schlesinger has attempted an inversion of Santayanas
aphorism; for Schlesinger, too often it is those who can remember the past who
are condemned to repeat it (Jervis, 1976, pp. 217218, 281282; Khong, 1992,
p. 12; May, 1973, p. xi; Petraeus, 1986, pp. 4445).
Having given a preliminary explanation of the concepts of political learning
and political lessons, it can be reasonably proposed that UMNO as a comparable
entity is seen as being in crisis mode after the 12th GE. In its self-introspection,
UMNO is compelled to refer to the vicissitudes of LDP, also arguably in crisis
mode, following its defeat in 2009. While it is axiomatic that the utility of political
lessons rise during crises and critically novel situations, the most important
question however is: Can the application of political lessons, hitherto over-
whelmingly applied by American scholars to fit American experiences, be judi-
ciously undertaken in different national and political party contexts, that is, that
of UMNO and LDP? As May (1973, p. x) argues, examples from other countries
could also be cited as a source of learning. Research by Zimmerman and
Axelrod (1981, p. 2), for example, analyzes how the Soviet Unions regime heeded
lessons of the Vietnam War in investigating its foreign policy. To them, ones
perception can be influenced by ones experience (Zimmerman & Axelrod, 1981,
p. 2). The best available evidence in the Asian context is the account of the
Chinese Communist Partys adaptation of lessons derived from the experiences
of dominant parties such as the Peoples Action Party (PAP) of Singapore,
Golkar of Indonesia, KMT of Taiwan, UMNO, and LDP (see Shambaugh, 2008,
28 Asian Politics & PolicyVolume 6, Issue 12014

pp. 9296). Realizing the dearth of research that utilizes the concept of political
learning in dominant parties in Asia, we hope that the present article contributes
to filling the discursive gap.

Historical Overview of UMNO and LDP

In the context of political lessons, analogy is a comparison between one thing
and another, where two things are held to exhibit structural similarities in some
or all of their properties (Houghton, 1996, p. 524). This definition is directly
relevant in depicting UMNO and LDP as a neglected model of comparison
in analyses of dominant parties. On why such a comparison has hitherto been
marginal, this might owe to the differential fact that LDP operates within a
democratic Japan, while UMNO exists within Malaysias semi-democratic para-
digm. Researchers have thus been more comfortable comparing Japan with other
uncommon democracies such as Sweden, Italy, Israel, and Germany (Pempel,
1990). UMNO, on the other hand, is leveled at par with parties of other semi-
democratic regimes, such as the PAP in Singapore (cf. Slater, 2012). We also
realize that as an ethnic-based party, UMNOs trajectory in its adaptive behavior
will necessarily be at variance with that of the LDP, whose structural composition
is more homogeneous. We nonetheless prefer the argument that the logic of
comparing political systems does not necessitate that subjects be of the same class
(De Felice, 1980, pp. 123124). Overemphasizing differences between both parties
limits our comparative imagination of them (Friedman & Wong, 2008, pp. 24),
whereas both parties are fit to be classified among the most established dominant
parties in Asia. We also take the cue from other scholarly opinions that have lately
called for comparative studies between outstanding party-states in Asia such as
those led by UMNO and LDP (Maznah, 2011, p. 361).
For analytical purposes, let us highlight a few similarities between both parties.
First, both parties were founded from the same generation. LDP was established in
1955 whereas UMNO entered the domestic electoral fray in 1955. Second, both
parties drove the nation-state along the developmental state orientation. Third,
both parties were at the commanding heights of nation-states well known for an
Asian-style democracy that emphasized stability, continuity, and consensus
elements that later formed bases for the Asian Values discourse popularized in
the mid-1980s by both parties leaders. Fourth, as stressed by Bhatia (2003), Both
Malaysia and Japan are in essence one-party states [in which] structures and
institutions of patron-client relations are entrenched, with all the accoutrements of
factionalism, machine politics, corruption, cronyism, nepotism, patrimonialism,
populism, fictive kinship and brokerage. This is among the most significant
parallels available to both UMNO and LDP through intricate interlocking mecha-
nisms between business and politics. Fifth, in administering the state, both UMNO
and LDP work hand in glove with a powerful bureaucracy friendly to the ruling
party. Such understanding is based on the presumption that it is advisable to
harmonize relations between government and big business in a nonantagonistic
way. The existence of Malaysia Inc. and Japan Inc., regardless of orientational
differences between their structures (Lee, 1988, pp. 3537), renders both political
systems susceptible to problems of inertia and malaise, hence throttling any
endeavor at systemic reform. Sixth, the support base for both UMNO and LDP is
situated in rural constituencies, thus giving rise to such neo-patrimonialistic
 UMNO and the Fall of LDP in Japan 29

practices as dispensation of patronage, clientelism, and pork barrel politics.

Seventh, in spite of their positions as dominant parties, UMNO and LDP allow
opposition challenges to filter through the political system not merely as fronts
to legitimize authoritarian politics (Case, 1996, p. 116). Despite the association of
UMNO and LDP party-states with an agenda full of menus of manipulation,
both are still distinguished by a cohesive organizational structure, an uncanny
ability to accommodate motley demands and an amazing perseverance in clinging
to power, admittedly assisted by disarray in the opposition forces.
In all the aforementioned comparisons, the underlying factor giving them
symbiotic dimensions is the penetration of party politics in the bilateral relation-
ship between Japan and Malaysia. Literature on Malaysias Look East Policy
(LEP) gives inadequate attention to how connections between UMNO and
LDP have had any impact on Malaysia-Japan bilateral relations (cf. Jomo, 1983;
Khadijah & Lee, 2003; Lim, 1984; Machado, 1987). Soon after Malaysia achieved
independence in 1957, the earliest foreign leader to visit the country to establish
diplomatic relations was the Japanese prime minister from LDP Nobusuke Kishi.
Half a century later, in 2007, Kishis grandson, LDP leader Shinzo Abe, in recall-
ing Kishis historic trip as the newly installed Japanese prime minister, reflected
on how important his grandfathers maiden visit had been in cementing relations
between both countries (Abe keeps, 2007). Mahathirs launching of the LEP
in 1982 was ipso facto an admission of his heeding lessons from Japan, which
was then rapidly advancing toward becoming a world economic giant under the
stewardship of the neoliberal LDP Premier Yasuhiro Nakasone. LEP, however,
had wider than just economic dimensions. Mahathir was also inspired by the
role of a strong and stable state as showcased in LDPs uninterrupted rule
(Barr, 2002, p. 42; Khadijah & Lee, 2003, p. 43). Consistent with his authoritarian
approach, Mahathir launched an Asian Values scheme as an additional develop-
mental program, which simultaneously functioned as an ideological device to
ultimately resist change. Among major advocates of Asian Values with whom
Mahathir collaborated, apart from former prime minister of Singapore Lee Kuan
Yew, was influential former LDP parliamentarian Shintaro Ishihara, who is also
former mayor of Tokyo. Through their jointly authored book, both leaders who
are well known for their ultraconservative views are insistent that the authoritar-
ian dimension in Asian Values can triumph over Western ideas. Such cooperative
aspects, we argue, further the tacit understanding already established between
both UMNO and LDP. Apart from the official visits by both Malaysian and
Japanese leaders, which were conventionally accompanied by party delega-
tions from BN component parties and LDP, the BN-UMNO-led government
sometimes could not hide its preferences pertaining to the ruling government in
Japan. In 2000, Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar frankly admitted,
in commenting on LDPs victory then:

We are very happy with the result of the election. I think they have chosen, once
again, in the true tradition of Japanese who opt for stability and continuity . . . Our
leaders are very familiar, very close with the Japanese leadership. (Most South-
east Asian, 2000)

From a different angle, Mahathirs emulation of Japan inadvertently dragged

UMNO into similar problems that were being faced by LDP. UMNOs
30 Asian Politics & PolicyVolume 6, Issue 12014

involvement in business from the mid-1980s made it an arena to build resources

for economic and political patronage. The scourge of money politics pervaded
party elections, as reflected in the rampantness of vote-buying at the divisional,
branch and central level contests (Gomez & Jomo, 1999, pp. 237240). In his study,
Lucian Pye (1997, pp. 215219) considers Japan under LDP as the teacher about
the workings of money politics, which contributed to its first-ever defeat in 1993.
In this regard Oxley (2003) views that Mahathir

emulated the Asian way touted by Japan in more ways than one. Malaysian
political analysts describe the operation of the leading Malay party which he
headed as based on the money-politics model of Japans Liberal Democratic
Party. Under him, corruption certainly increased in Malaysia and his successor,
Abdullah Badawi, has described it as one of Malaysias greatest challenges.

At the same time, the malaise of factionalism also permeated UMNO in the same
way that its prevalence in LDP had been exploited as a means toward controlling
state resources. UMNO factionalism during party elections in 1987, which even-
tuated in the High Court declaration of UMNO as an illegal party the following
year, for instance, has been compared with the factionalism within LDP that
brought about its exit from power in 1993 (cf. Gomez, 2002, p. 27; Khoo, 1999).
Following LDPs reversal of fortunes in 1993, UMNO began to tap from LDPs
experience as a model of learning. The UMNO notable we identify as having
pioneered using LDPs setback as a political lesson was then vice president
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. Interviewed four months after LDPs surprising
defeat, Abdullah asserted that LDPs fate could well befall UMNO if scandals,
money politics, and enmeshing of business and politics continue to afflict
UMNOs internal affairs (Abdullah, 1993). Although LDP reestablished itself as
the ruling party through the formation of a coalition government 10 months later,
LDPs first taste of defeat had a long-lasting effect. In November 1994, Mahathir
issued a painful reminder of how the practice of supporters encircling around a
particular factional leader, which was so characteristic of the LDP system, had
significantly featured as among causes of LDPs defeat (Mahathir, 1994).
The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 had a ripple effect on Malaysia. By then, the
enveloping crisis had started to expose larger structural defects of the Malaysian
economythe outgrowth of nepotistic and cronyistic practices that were mani-
fested in the intra-UMNO conflict between the Anwar Ibrahim and Mahathir
factions. Economist Jomo K. S. had then observed that interlocking relationships
between politics and business in both UMNO and LDP were the reason for there
being interesting parallels between the two countries and their structures,
which add to the difficulty of extricating them from the economic slump (quoted
from Can Anyone, 1998). In the subsequent 10th GE of 1999, partly as a
consequence of the controversial sacking of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar
Ibrahim from both government and party, BNs dominance at the polls was
severely challenged. The advent of new politics, seeing a real transformation of
voting attitudes from being primarily based on ethnic cleavages to being increas-
ingly influenced by universal issues, resulted in the election of a BN government
commanding a much eroded popular support, notwithstanding its clinging on to
a two-thirds parliamentary majority (Loh & Saravanamuttu, 2003). The setback
was treated nonchalantly by Mahathir, who not only refused to reform UMNO
 UMNO and the Fall of LDP in Japan 31

but also tightened democratic space and rules for competition within the party
(Case, 2001). Upon Mahathirs highly anticipated announcement to relinquish
power by October 2003 and his pinpointing Abdullah Badawi as his successor,
lofty hopes were placed on Abdullah to initiate substantive reforms on a nation-
wide scale. Five months prior to becoming prime minister, Abdullah had
reminded UMNO to heed lessons from the downfalls of such dominant parties
as the Congress Party of India, KMT, and LDP. In the case of LDP, to Abdullahs
(2003) mind:

Under the LDP, Japan emerged as the second most powerful economy in the
world, leading the way in innovation and technological advancement. Corruption
scandals that began in the 1970s and 1980s led to the LDPs first loss of a parlia-
mentary majority in 1993, after 38 years of dominance. Apart from corruption, the
LDP was seen as a party that was long controlled by kingmakers and power
brokers. To its good fortune although not as commanding as in the past, the LDP
has regained power due to the lack of opposition presented by other parties.

Hence, as soon as the power transfer from Mahathir to Abdullah was effected,
a de-Mahathirization process was in place. Abdullah recruited young, highly
educated, eloquent and media-friendly upstarts as trusted advisors in his quest
for reformation. A promising first few months, even if only declaratory and
aspirational in character, were sufficient to convince Malaysians to deliver BN an
overwhelming mandate of 64% of popular votes and 91% of parliamentary seats
in the 11th GE of March 2004. What Abdullah did arguably paralleled, if only
accidentally, Japanese reformist leader Junichiro Koizumis actions upon assum-
ing the reins of party and national leadership in 2001. Not only did Koizumi place
hopes on a group of well-educated, eloquent, and media-savvy LDP Young Turks
to carry through his reform mission, but he also boldly declared his intention to
change LDP and in turn change Japan. Nevertheless, as time passed, most of
Abdullahs reform program elicited stiff opposition from the UMNO conserva-
tives. These included the proposal for the establishment of an Independent Police
Complaints and Misconduct Commission, large-scale war against money politics
and relaxation of the political system. The overturning of Anwar Ibrahims con-
viction for sodomy in 2004 and his subsequent release from jail worried conser-
vatives who felt threatened by the loosening of party controls over government.
Abdullah, disappointingly, relented to such pressures. In April 2007, a commen-
tator using the pseudonym LKS, believed to be Democratic Action Party
supremo Lim Kit Siang, noted:

When ABB [sic] won the last election, I thought at the time that he had a lot of
similarity [sic] with Japan former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. Koizumi was
elected on massive public support for his political reform against the will of his
own ruling party, LDP, which like UMNO, has been the ruling party of Japan since
the World War 2. He promised to fight against money politic, construction indus-
try pump-priming that helps its owned [sic] supporters etc. During his time at
the office, he faced much resistance from its own party but he always managed to
go to the people and even threathen [sic] to campaign against his own party.
Japanese people were charmed and re-elected him again with another landslide.
(LKS, 2007)

LKSs comparison between Koizumi and Abdullah Badawi was more

attuned with reality. In order to ensure success of his reform program, not only
32 Asian Politics & PolicyVolume 6, Issue 12014

did Koizumi fill his cabinet with reform-minded politiciansan action that
Abdullah failed to dobut also dismissed opponents to reform such as in his
privatization of Japan Post. Koizumi exploited the new media to the fullest to
maintain popularity and warm voters hearts to win a third termno mean feat
in Japanese politics (cf. Kabashima & Steel, 2007). Abdullah and his administra-
tive colleagues unwarranted hostility against the new media, on the other hand,
practically cost them the 12th GEthe slender majority providing ammunition
to Abdullahs adversaries within UMNO. Abdullah consequently tried to prove
himself as a man of lessons. He awarded hefty ex gratia payments to judges
sacked by Mahathir during the judicial crisis of 1988, inducted the critical voices
of Zaid Ibrahim, Shahrir Samad, and Saifuddin Abdullah into the cabinet, and
pledged to accomplish his final institutional reforms, viz the Malaysian Anti-
Corruption Commission (MACC) and the Judicial Appointments Commission
(JAC). Yet the one year between BN and UMNOs disastrous performance in
March 2008 and Abdullah Badawis handover of power to Najib Razak in April
2009 was a period of lame duck premiership for Abdullah. Amid incessant calls
to hasten Abdullahs relinquishment of the UMNO presidency, party conserva-
tives maneuvered to water down both his reformist legacies vis--vis the MACC
and JAC. Backed by Mahathir, conservatives led by Muhyiddin Yassin pressured
Abdullah to fast-track his transfer of power to Najib.

LDPs Downfall in 2009 and UMNOs Employment of Lessons

LDPs defeat on August 30, 2009 had far-reaching implications for UMNO. It
transpired ominously at the very time when prospects of UMNOs own defeat
were hovering in the minds of many UMNO members, ensuing from the beating
it received at the 12th GE. The lower than usual morale prevailing across the
UMNO fraternity had increased the urgency for its members to learn. This is in
line with the scholarly perception that more recent events produce powerful
predispositions with greater impact (Jervis, 1976, p. 269). Secretary of UMNO in
Terengganu Rosol Wahid was the earliest UMNO leader to discuss lessons from
LDPs defeat on September 2, 2009 (Rosol, 2009). During the UMNO General
Assemblys session on October 13, 2009, UMNO Deputy President-cum-Deputy
Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin compared LDPs fall to similar fates of such
independence parties as Golkar in Indonesia and the Nacionalista Party in the
Philippines (Muhyiddin, 2009). As party President, Najib stopped short of invok-
ing direct parallels with LDP during the General Assembly, only to defer men-
tioning it to November 2009 in a meeting with a component BN party (Serve
without, 2009). On January 9, 2010, Najib again referred to the LDP on the
occasion of his conversation with the reigning Japanese prime minister from DPJ
Yukio Hatoyama on reasons for LDPs defeat (Juara Rakyat, 2010). Only a week
later, UMNO Information Chief Ahmad Maslan was in Japan meeting with
reformist LDP leader Kono Taroan old friend of UMNO Vice-President
Hishamuddin Husseinto solicit views on LDPs defeat (Taro, 2010). On April
30, 2010, UMNO invited a former LDP member who later joined DPJ, Tamura
Katoro, to share his experiences during a major UMNO retreat (Shahanaaz,
2010). During the following fortnight, until the commemorative celebration of
UMNOs 64th birth anniversary on May 12, 2010, twice did Najib allude to
 UMNO and the Fall of LDP in Japan 33

lessons delivered by Kataro on LDPs defeat (Avoid Cliques, 2010; Its not,
2010). We find that only after Najib publicly articulated lessons from LDP from
2010 onward could reference to LDPs checkered trajectory be heard in the public
domain.
For the present analysis, the methodology employed is that of closely examin-
ing statements from UMNO leaders whether at the leadership or grassroots
levels. Commentaries by UMNO sympathizers and supporters discussing
lessons from LDPs downfall, especially coming from columnists and journalists
of UMNO-linked newspapers such as Utusan Malaysia, are not given weight here
because they fall outside the purview of decision making. Using simple content
analysis, we focus on news, writings, and speeches that categorically deal with
lessons that UMNO has to learn and not simply generic statements. Our search
covers the period from the aftermath of Malaysias 12th GE of March 2008
until the reinstatement of an LDP government in Japan in December 2012, encom-
passing the major newspapers of both the mainstream media and the social
or alternative media. We have discerned 11 lessons that UMNO leaders have
employed, as presented in Table 1 below.
In general, most lessons invoked by UMNO leaders on LDPs defeat seem to
be of reasonable value. A closer inspection of their statements, however, reveal a
flurry of misconceptions, which result in the failure to translate the lessons
effectively in the context of UMNOs present transformation.

Fallacious Analyses
The tendency to resort to shallow analyses is observed in Lessons 1, 2, 5, and 9.
For advocates of Lesson 1, the Japanese were more inclined toward change as a
consequence of their societys homogeneous character. They argued that a com-
parable situation could not be symmetrically translated into the Malaysian
context, which had a distinctively multiethnic character. This lesson was quite
clearly used to implant the sentiment of fear especially among Malays. Inculca-
tion of the culture of fear had indeed been UMNOs popular campaign strategy
for a long time. In the case of LDPs downfall, this popular technique of repetition
was far from being totally new. Mahathir in 1997 had alluded to LDPs rule
to justify his protracted hold on power. To him, too frequent a change in the
Premiership as has happened under LDP may potentially hand over the driving
seat to unelected civil servants (Mahathir, 1997). In 1999, UMNO religious figure
Abdul Hamid Othman declared that the government was keeping close tabs
on a few individuals suspected of being CIA agents out to destroy Muslim unity
in Malaysia. He clarified that, being in fifth place in the list of the worlds
longest serving ruling party, UMNO had become the target of the United States
after the fall of LDP, Indias Congress Party, and a few main parties in Pakistan
and Bangladesh (US bid, 1999). Similarly in 2000, another senior UMNO
leader, Noh Omar, argued that the removal of Congress and LDP from the
apex of power did not entail the bereavement of native Indians and Japanese
from positions of authority, in contrast to what would happen if UMNO were
to be stripped of power (Rope in ACA, 2000). Hence, looking at Lesson 1 as
presented by Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah (a former UMNO vice president) and
Daim Zainuddin (a former UMNO treasurer), LDPs setback has frequently been
34 Asian Politics & PolicyVolume 6, Issue 12014

Table 1. Lessons Offered by UMNO Leaders and Members Related to

LDPs Downfall in 2009

No. Item Lessons Individualsa

1 Japan changes more easily due to
greater homogeneity of its society. If
translated into the Malaysian
context, Malays will encounter
problems
2 That an independence party may still
be rejected despite having done
many good deeds
3 The prerequisite of approaching the
people and avoiding the sense of
arrogance and elitism
4 The prerequisite of prioritizing party
interests rather than vested interests
5 The prerequisite of main leaders
listening to grassroots requests
6 The need to steer away from
factionalism and intra-political
rivalry
7 The prerequisite of eradicating
corruption and abuse of power
8 The prerequisite to reform and not be
bound by the old mode of thinking
9 The need to consolidate party strength
by opposing political liberalization
10 The prerequisite of reducing
developmental politics
11 Bureaucratic problems
Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah (2008),
Daim Zainuddin (quoted from
Daim Warns, 2012)
Rosol Wahid (2009), Muhyiddin Yassin
(2009), Mohamad Annuar Arifin
(2010), Najib (2011b)
Mahathir Mohamad (2009), Najib
(Juara Rakyat, 2010), Ahmad
Maslan (UMNO dan BN, 2010)
Najib (Its not, 2010)
Mohd Faizal Ramli (quoted from
DUN Bagan Pinang, 2009)
Najib (Avoid Cliques, 2010), Najib
(Its not, 2010), Mustafa Kamal
Yusoff (quoted from Jangan Jadi,
2010)
Mahathir Mohamad (2009), Ahmad
Maslan (UMNO dan BN, 2010)
Najib (Its not, 2010), Najib (2011b)
Mukhriz Mahathir (2009)
Najib (Serve Without, 2009)
Ahmad Maslan (UMNO dan BN,
2010)

Notes: aAt times, each individual may present more than one different lesson. Najib, for example,
voiced out three lessons from LDPs downfall in his speech of May 12, 2010.

used as a scare-mongering tactic on Malays with regard to the possibility of a

change in government. Strengthening this argument of an institutionalized fear
of non-Malays among Malays further, one may observe the outcome of the 13th
GE, where votes for UMNO increased amid a rising Malay apprehension of
imminent non-Malay dominance, as claimed by Mahathir (Dr M: Malays,
2013).
We also perceive that every time UMNO leaders employ the examples of LDPs
and other dominant parties downfall as a reference point, they will be invariably
lamenting the fact that an independence party may still be rejected despite having
done many good deeds, as depicted by the four statements of UMNO leaders
in Lesson 2. This argument seems to imply repayment of good deeds of a party
that grew out of the independence movement by voting it into power. Ever since
 UMNO and the Fall of LDP in Japan 35

securing the position of the most pivotal playmakers of Malaysian politics,

BN and UMNO have incessantly resorted to the narrow rhetoric of the moral
obligation of repaying their good deeds at the ballot box. Yet, even the appeal
of similar rhetoric had significantly waned among the LDP rank and file. For
example, amid much speculation of an impending LDP defeat in 2009, LDP
Secretary General Hiroyuki Hosoda was still heard appealing to the good
deeds rhetoric to persuade the Japanese to retain the status quo (Japans LDP
fears, 2009). Interestingly, Rosol Wahid (2009), one of the advocates of such
rhetoric in UMNO, relates:

I chatted with adolescents and youngsters . . . why they lack gratefulness to the
government which had done many good deeds to them . . . their answers are
similar and consistent . . . building roads, schools, bridges and improving infra-
structure . . . those are duties and obligations of the government anyway. In
Korea, they say, the government does what BN implements in Malaysia. Even on
a grander scale . . . and so does the Japanese government which has just lost power
. . . And similarly with the Chinese government . . . What we seek now are leaders
who have integrity, are trustworthy and can get along. . . .

Hence, it is least surprising that in the just concluded 13th GE, despite the
many economic incentives and goodies being bluntly distributed by Najib Razak
in a desperate effort to maintain BNs electoral base, the strategy failed to entice
support from the urban Malay middle class and young voters.
In Lesson 5, LDPs fall was used to send a reactionary message of change. In
September 2009, UMNO Youth chief of Teluk Kemang, Mohd Faizal Ramli ada-
mantly insisted that former UMNO Vice President Isa Samad be nominated as the
BN candidate in the forthcoming by-election. Mohd Faizal appealed to Isas
record of party loyalty, downplaying the fact that Isas suspension from party
activities for involvement in money politics had just been lifted. To Mohd Faizal,
there lurked the fear that UMNO would lose out in the same way as LDP did if
it ignored the voice of delegates. Mohd Faizals faulty logic was typical of the
mentality of hardline grassroots UMNO leaders that contributed to UMNOs loss
of seats due to internal sabotage during the 12th GE. In applying such reasoning,
he was unwittingly advocating the continual hegemony of grassroots leaders in
UMNOs decision making, regardless of the reality that it was just such a phe-
nomenon that was increasingly alienating UMNO from the masses. A similar
state of affairs was observable in Lesson 9, as presented by Mukhriz Mahathir
(currently the new chief minister of Kedah). He expressed the scary thought
that UMNO would follow the footsteps of defeated dominant parties such as
LDP, the Congress Party of India, the Tories in the UK, and the KMT in Taiwan in
the event that it resisted change. But at the same time Mukhriz criticized what he
characterized as western thinking practiced by UMNO. Referring to several
attributes of Abdullah Badawis leadership such as openness and transparency,
he regarded them as superfluous as compared with the need for economic and
political stability. In fearing UMNOs loss of power but retaining a measure of
discomfort against political reform, Mukhriz was almost dabbling in political
non sequitor. To UMNO conservatives, the idea that no alternative to internal
reform existed if UMNO were to have any reasonable chance of retaining power
in a democratic environment boosted by advances in information and commu-
nications technology was slow to sink in.
36 Asian Politics & PolicyVolume 6, Issue 12014

Deficit Between Lesson and Implementation

We have previously explained Abdullah Badawis failure to heed enough
lessons from Koizumis revolution even though Abdullah was very much on the
right track during the early stages of his prime ministerial tenure. As for Najibs
leadership, one of the favorite lessons he asserted in connection with LDPs defeat
was the urgency for reform without being tied to the old mode of thinking. Credit
is due to him for his candid call to reexamine aversion to reform, which became
widespread during the twilight years of Abdullah Badawis era. Najib has admit-
tedly accomplished a few reforms, such as the abolition of the Internal Security
Act and loosening of political controls. As the leader who can merely speak out
for reform, whether he can engineer the adaptation of a new political culture in
UMNO is speculative if not the product of wishful thinking.
One problem area that deserves UMNOs attention is freedom of the press. We
take for instance Kotaro Tamuras reminder to UMNO on the need to be receptive
to the media. In his speech as quoted by the UMNO-linked newspaper, Berita
Harian, Tamura stressed:

Frequent political changes in Japan owe to the medias role in too actively con-
ducting polls on the internet such that leaders have had to resign for failing to
perform. However, we steadfastly hold on to [media polls] as the size of reader-
ship and votes serve as early indicators of early elections. (Berwaspada ancaman,
2010)

In view of Tamuras statement, media freedom, although frowned upon in Japan,

remains reliable as a source of electoral analysis. In Malaysia, the state consistently
cold-shoulders such opinion polls, exhibiting the denial syndrome. The state is
willing to pay heed only to conformist polls, as presented by institutions, acade-
micians, and think tanks willing to toe the establishments line. Whenever results
of polls conducted by independent bodies are released, the state shows contradic-
tory reactions. If the outcome favors the government, the mainstream media will
give wide coverage of the polls. If negative results are otherwise publicized, the
polls legitimacy will be greatly questioned by the state on multiple excuses. More
surprisingly, during the Bersih 3.0 street gathering to demand electoral reform in
April 2012, media personnel from progressive news agencies were roughed up by
the police, triggering widespread protests. After the 13th GE, the government
toyed with the idea of imposing controls over social media, leading to speculation
that a clampdown on political dissent was in the offing.
In the same vein, the requisite of reducing dependence on developmental
politics ala-LDP as mentioned in Lesson 10 was also touched by Najib. Politics of
development takes place when equal competing parties retain significant support
in rural areas by offering and trading development projects in exchange for
votes. In the 1970s, LDP under Kakuei Tanaka enacted this method as an impor-
tant strategy that contributed in no small measure to the expansion of pork barrel
and patronage politics in Japan (Johnson, 1986). In UMNOs case, its enthusiastic
embrace of developmental politics has been much documented. As summarized
by Josh Hong (2010):

New buildings were mushrooming regardless of their eventual occupancy, while

contracts were constantly being churned out by UMNO to plaster the country with
roads, highways and bridges to nowhere. Perhaps I should also mention bus stops
 UMNO and the Fall of LDP in Japan 37

that no buses pass by. This was exactly how the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had
been ruling Japan until it was routed in the general election last September . . . For
years, Mahathir was fascinated by the LDPs firm hold on power, and secretly
hoped to replant the model in Malaysia. His party ended up exactly where the LDP
has been over the last few decades: plagued with cronyism and factionalism.

Hence, although Najib deserves credit for openly criticizing such Mahathir-
like prescriptions, one ought to be mindful that such reminders were not issued
by Najib in a grand occasion such as the UMNO General Assembly and were
thus not widely reported in the mainstream media. Such a situation is under-
standable in view of the embeddedness of such practices within the whole range
of UMNOs strategy and the need for not antagonizing Mahathir. More impor-
tantly, Najib forgot to acknowledge that the continual prevalence of patronage
politics in UMNO remains a bane to the party. A fortnight after LDPs downfall,
Malaysian financial analyst Choong Khuat Hock wrote on the imperative of
Malaysias learning from the failures of LDPs policies in Japan. Among issues
that Khuat Hock touched on was the utilization of fiscal stimulus to revive the
economy. As he saw it, such an approach was ineffective, being more of a means
to reward cronies. The LDP government had employed it to benefit its allies in
the construction and rural sectors. Detecting worrying parallels with the case
of Malaysia, leading to increasing deficits since 1998, Choong questioned the
wisdom behind the need for such new mega projects as the RM12 billion double
tracking railway from Ipoh to Thailand and the fast speed railway from Kuala
Lumpur to Singapore (Choong, 2009). It has been argued that patronage-based
strategies aimed at staying in power can turn over time into a boomerang by
undermining the cohesion, the principles, the autonomy, the flexibility, and
finally the ability of parties to win votes (Warner, 1997, pp. 533548). Najibs
reluctance to address this malaise has been accentuated by his continual reliance
on developmental politics on an even larger scale since assuming the party
and national leadership. Apart from two megaprojectsthe construction of the
skyscraper Warisan Merdeka and the building of the RM25 billion worth Tun
Razak Exchangea whopping RM57.7 billion was estimated to have been spent
on 13th GE campaign paraphernalia and economic incentives throughout the
hustings (Welsh, 2013).

Overgeneralized Lessons
The issue of factionalism, also relatively a popular lesson, was twice mentioned
by Najib Razak in his rationalization of LDPs exit from power, and similarly
referred to by the UMNO Youth chief of Seputeh, Kuala Lumpur, Mustafa Kamal
Yusuf. While advocates of Lesson 6 are crystal clear on factionalism as a scourge
that could potentially bring about UMNOs downfall, we argue that this lesson
seems to have been overgeneralized to the extent of factionalism becoming
UMNO members favored escapist explanation in lieu of addressing more fun-
damental problems affecting the party. Academically speaking, factionalism is
inevitable in most political parties of modern democracies (Harmel, Heo, Tan, &
Janda, 1995, p. 7). Whether in UMNO or LDP, factionalism is conducive to more
serious crises, as has been previously explained. Nonetheless, in LDPs case,
factionalism was far from extraordinary, being the outcome of Japans system of
38 Asian Politics & PolicyVolume 6, Issue 12014

single nontransferable vote, which encourages intraparty competition (before

changing to the mixed member system in 1994). More importantly, factionalism
within LDP also functioned as a check and balance on prime ministerial power
and thus bolstered political accountability (Crespo, 1995, pp. 205206; Okada,
2007, p. 11). In UMNOs case, however, factionalism was not as institutionalized
as in the LDP, being conditioned as well by the personality factor. Mahathir,
notwithstanding his own reminder in 1994 of the dangers of factionalism ala-LDP
to the party, himself fell victim to it when orchestrating his tirade against
Abdullah Badawi in 2006. Not only did he emerge as Abdullahs most vicious
critic, but Mahathir also played the role of factional king maker among UMNO
conservatives to demand his successors resignation. Following the 13th GE,
many observers have speculated on the precariousness of Najibs position, owing
to its perceived reliance on cues from Mahathir who has had expressed his
uneasiness at BNs declining performance. UMNO also neglected to give
adequate attention to the real cause behind the malaise of factionalism, that is,
the relationship between politics and business. Although Najib did touch on the
need for UMNO to prevent itself from being overwhelmed by vested interests
as in Lesson 4, he stopped short of unearthing more significant elements in the
relationship such as patronage politics, cronyism, corruption, money politics, and
the penetration of power brokers into UMNOs leadership. Small wonder that
UMNOs image and corruption have acquired embarassing synonymity between
them. This perception deficit skyrocketed prior to the 13th GE due to a number
of scandals, such as the RM250 million easy loan to the National Feedlot Centre
controlled by the family of UMNO Womens Chief Shahrizat Jalil, unaccounted
contributions to UMNO Sabah amounting to the value of RM40 million, and the
reluctance of Cabinet members to declare their assets. Notwithstanding Najibs
admittedly determined efforts to implement the anticorruption agenda, UMNOs
image as a party afflicted with the scourge of corruption appears to have ossified.
Within such a context, following the 13th GE, a panel of consultants proposed that
oversight of the MACC be placed under the jurisdiction of Parliament rather than
the UMNO-dominated executive.

The Santayanas Aphorism Must be Reversed Syndrome and

Contextual Mistakes
The only UMNO leader to have paid any serious attention to the lessons of the
intermingling between politics and business in UMNO is Abdullah Badawias
expressed by him in 1993 and as has been previously explained. Unfortunately,
Abdullahs situation fits into the Santayanas aphorism must be reversed syn-
drome. Taking over the stewardship of UMNO in 2003, Abdullahs attempt to
distance himself from nefarious elements creeping into UMNO was short lived.
Within a few years, his administration was marred by allegations implicating his
family members such as his son Kamaluddin, son-in-law-cum-UMNO Youth
chief (also Minister of Youth and Sports since May 2013) Khairy Jamaluddin, and
close confidante Kalimullah Hassan with numerous dubious business wheeling
and dealing. These contributed to the deficit perception of his leadership during
the 12th GE in 2008. In this regard, scholars have noted that frequent misappli-
cation of lessons takes place when politicians periodically get drawn into the
 UMNO and the Fall of LDP in Japan 39

pitfall of myopically applying lessons based on observable variables surrounding

their own circumstances and experiences. In Abdullahs example above, his
heeding the lesson of separating politics from business was influenced by his
own bid for UMNOs vice presidency in 1993. Upon losing to candidates repre-
senting the Vision Team led by aspirant for Deputy President Anwar Ibrahim,
Abdullah heaped blame on money politics for eroding his support. Anwar was
then infamous for having spread his political influence throughout UMNOs
network by implanting his proxies in the corporate sector, the media, and think
tanks (Gomez & Jomo, 1997, pp. 124128). Hence, although Abdullahs lesson was
genuine, he might well have been influenced by his own circumstances, relatively
isolated from the rough and tumble of realpolitik, corporate wire pulling, and
mainstream media reporting.
Long-standing UMNO numero uno Mahathir Mohamad was also seen as
having contextually misapplied political lessons. Five days after LDPs downfall
in 2009, Mahathir wrote an article on the lesson from Japan. He regarded the
beating experienced by LDP as proof that the populace are becoming increasingly
nonchalant about the sacrifices of independence or heritage parties. But rather
than castigating the whole of UMNOs degenerative political culture as the cause
of its decline, Mahathir focused instead on his successor Abdullah Badawis
shortcomings in allowing graft-ridden mores to take hold in UMNO. He pin-
pointed for instance Abdullahs alleged use of RM250 billion of the national oil
company PETRONASs income with hardly any tangible returns. Yet it is widely
accepted that UMNOs corruption-ridden culture had been ingrained during
Mahathirs era, and it was on the promise to eradicate corruption that Abdullah
achieved the biggest ever mandate by an incumbent prime minister in 2004.

Neglecting More Fundamental Lessons

UMNO has also been wont to neglect two other pressing issues: hereditary
politics and the readiness of learning to lose. Hereditary politics has been
virtually synonymous with LDP politics. This syndrome deprived LDP of new
ideas as kanban (name recognition) factored significantly for an aspiring politician
to climb the party hierarchy (Takahashi, 2011). While the hereditary politics
syndrome in UMNO is not as chronic as in LDP, its prevalence at important
decision-making levels does give UMNO a lackadaisical image. According to
Nik Nazmi, a young budding politician from PR, one of the most vital lessons
of DPJs triumph in Japan is the urgency of offering to the public youthful and
energetic figures whose constant emergence prevents a party from degenerating
into regressive dynasties (Nik Nazmi, 2009). Such a scenario is also captured
by the PAP in Singapore. In a speech in 2010, its prime minister Lee Hsien Loong,
presented for his party colleagues reference the cases of LDP and UMNO as
two dominant parties currently in crisis mode. LDP, he argued, has declined
due not only to economic stagnation, but also because of its failure to engineer
self-renewal and attract new talents in the midst of rampant dynastic politics
(Lee, 2010). In the light of LDPs downfall in Japan, hardly any senior UMNO
leader has dwelled upon the importance of enticing young upstarts as an early
measure to avoid UMNO deteriorating into a collection of dynastic families
ala-LDP. Abdullahs political guru, Musa Hitam, former deputy prime minister
40 Asian Politics & PolicyVolume 6, Issue 12014

(19811986) before his fallout with Mahathir, is another UMNO veteran who is
aware of the partys shortcomings in this sphere. A widely respected figure ever
since steadfastly sticking to his principles at the cost of antagonizing Mahathir in
the mid-1980s, Musa has often cautioned UMNO that continual hold on power
could only come about if it were willing and able to stoop, befriend, and welcome
promising youngsters with open arms (Musa: UMNO needs, 2008).
The resilience of UMNO as a dominant party is closely related to the willing-
ness of party members to learn to lose. Young UMNO leaders such as Muham-
mad Khairun Aseh has been open enough to see positive aspects from the
setback experienced by the Congress Party of India, which successfully rebuilt
its position of strength after losing as the incumbent regime (Pelajari sesuatu,
2010). For the vast majority of the UMNO rank and file, however, the 13th GE
verdict of the people, who gave 51% of their popular support to the opposition
PR, exposed their fears and insecurities. Such a prevailing mentality was dis-
cerned as early as January 2010 by the Japanese LDP leader Kono Taro upon
meeting with UMNO Information Chief Ahmad Maslan. Writing in his blog, Taro
recounts:

I told [Ahmad Maslan] that research in avoiding defeat is indeed important, but
the preparation for a smooth change of regime upon being defeated is even more
important. This is because a long term administration will have to end some day, as
with the Japanese LDP, PRI of Mexico and Eastern European communist parties.
It cannot be continually brought forward although the party can afford to defer it.
I counselled him that getting prepared for the end is of tremendous importance.
Even though beaten for only once, it is good in enabling a well-organized reha-
bilitation, and therefore of benefit to the country as a whole. I think he was not that
supportive of this idea.

Thus, upon his return to Malaysia, the only lessons quoted openly by Ahmad
Maslan as reported in the media were the urgency for UMNO to get closer to the
people, to avoid corruption, and to improve the public administration system.
Despite all three matters being undeniably important, the vital lesson pinpointed
by Taro was not given a public audience.

Concluding Remarks
This article has attempted to analyze the lessons applied by UMNO from the
Japanese LDPs election defeats in 1993 and especially in 2009. Even though other
dominant parties also serve as sources of reference for UMNOs learning of
political lessons, LDP receives greater attention due to the close relationship that
has been cemented between Malaysia and Japan through the LEP. It is an under-
statement to say that lessons that UMNO applied or rather misapplied with
respect to LDP were merely rituals. UMNOs proven desire to learn from LDP
underscores a dynamic character that appreciates a widening of its empirical
horizons. Our analysis, however, suggests that politicians are inclined to apply
political lessons in a most skewed manner, bearing a slew of misconceptions.
Although a large number of lessons employed by UMNO concerning the fall of
LDP bear some truth at first glance, many of its application fail to reflect the
fundamental problem of the party. Notwithstanding calls from within the
party to always learn from the past, a weak application of historical lessons would
 UMNO and the Fall of LDP in Japan 41

engender inaccurate trajectory of change needed of UMNO. Despite the number

of seats won by UMNO having increased in the 13th GE, we argue that the
learning process from LDP has barely contributed to the improved results. On the
contrary, we argue that UMNO remains beleaguered by reform fatigue. The way
UMNO adapts to the new environment, engages the public, and vilifies political
adversaries signifies an adamant attachment to the concept of government
knows best and to the politics of divide and rule along ethno-religious lines.
UMNO Vice President Muhyiddin Yassins recent call for UMNO to undergo
a more radical transformation process to ensure its post-13th GE continuity
(Muhyiddin: Umno needs, 2013), suggests that reformation within UMNO has
not reached a convincing stage.
LDPs recapturing the reins of government in 2012 has not helped UMNO in
effecting a change of perception among its members on the exigency of reform-
ing the party. Most UMNO spokesmen including Mahathir use instead LDPs
triumph as evidence that such a clamour for change is not only futile but also
puts the nation at a disadvantage, comparable to the Japanese electorates choice
of the DPJ in 2009 (Mahathir, 2012). While it is true that DPJs internal weaknesses
account heavily toward LDPs success in wresting back power in Japan, this
article underlines UMNOs reluctance to prepare for regime change and to learn
to lose as per Kono Taros advice.

Acknowledgments
We take this opportunity to express our appreciation to two anonymous reviewers for giving
valuable input for the purpose of improving this article. We also wish to thank sponsors of the
research that have led to the writing of this article, the Sumitomo Foundation and the Institute of
Developing Economies (IDE-Jetro), the Young Researcher Fellowship scheme of UKM 2012, Young
Researcher Grant of UKM 2013-040, and Research Development Fund of UKM 2013-189. We also owe
a debt of gratitude to a few individuals for their views and comments, among them Masashi
Nakamura, Khoo Boo Teik, Nobuhiro Aizawa, and Soda Naoki.

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