Civil Law Review 1 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
- In the
Part 1- The Civil Code
1. CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
ARTICLE 1
This act shall be known as the Civil Code of the Philippines
Spanish Civil Code of 1889- Forerunner of the New Civil Code, preceded the New
Civil Code
December 7, 1889- Date of effectivity (as published in the Gaceta De Manila) of the
Spanish Civil Code which is supported by a Supreme Court decision
November 17,1889-Completion of publication of the Spanish Civil Code 10 days
before December 7,1889
The New Civil Code of the Philippines
-Became a law by act of congress
June 18,1949, RA 386 -Date of Approval
August 30, 1950- New Civil Code took effect, Spanish Civil Code ceased to take
effect.
Family Code of the Philippines- Became a law by executive order
2. When do laws take effect?
Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall
take effect one year after such publication. (1a)
A. Revised Administrative Code
Section 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.
Section 19. Prospectivity. - Laws shall have prospective effect unless the contrary is
expressly provided.
Section 20. Interpretation of Laws and Administrative Issuances.
interpretation of a law or administrative issuance promulgated in all the official
languages, the English text shall control, unless otherwise specifically provided. In
case of ambiguity, omission or mistake, the other texts may be consulted.
Section 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law.- When a law which expressly
repeals a prior law itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived
unless expressly so provided.
Section 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed. - When a law which impliedly repeals
a prior law is itself repealed, the prior law shall thereby be revived, unless the
repealing law provides otherwise.
Section 23. Ignorance of the Law. - Ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith.
Section 24. Contents. - There shall be published in the Official Gazette all legislative
acts and resolutions of a public nature; all executive and administrative issuances of
general application; decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals, or other courts of similar rank, as may be deemed by said
courts of sufficient importance to be so published; such documents or classes of
documents as may be required so to be published by law; and such documents or
classes of documents as the President shall determine from time to time to have
general application or which he may authorize so to be published.
The publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official
Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority. lawphi1.net
Section 25. Editing and Publications. - The Official Gazette shall be edited in the
Office of the President and published weekly in Pilipino or in the English language. It
shall be sold and distributed by the National Printing Office which shall promptly
mail copies thereof to subscribers free of postage.
B. EO 200
Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the
Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
CASES:
1. PESIGAN V ANGELES

FACTS:
Petitioners Anselmo and Marcelino Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in a 10-
wheeler truck in April 1982, 26 carabaos and a calf, from Camarines Sur to Batangas.
Despite the health certificate, permit to transport, and certificate of inspection
issued to them by the provincial veterinarian, provincial commander and
constabulary command, respectively, while petitioners were negotiating the town of
Basud, Camarines Norte, the carabaos were confiscated by private respondents,
Police Station Commander Lt. Zanarosa, and provincial veterinarian Dr. Miranda.
The confiscation was based on Executive Order 626-A which prohibited the
transport of carabaos from one province to another. Pursuant to EO 626-A, Dr
Miranda distributed the carabaos to 25 farmers of Basud. Petitioners filed for
recovery of the carabaos and damages, against private respondent Judge Angeles
who heard the case in Daet and later transferred to Caloocan City, and dismissed the
case for lack of cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 626-A be enforced before its publication in the Official
Gazette.
HELD:
Said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982
because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months
later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen
days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and
regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public
of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
persons affected thereby.
2. PEOPLE V VERIDIANO
Facts: On 2nd week of May in 1979, private respondent Benito Go Bio Jr. issued a
check amounting to P200,000 to one Filipinas Tan. Said check was subsequently
dishonored and despite repreated demands, the respondent failed to make the
necessary payment hence the filing of charges against him for violation of BP 22 or
the Bouncing Check law.
Go Bio filed a Motion to Quash alleging that the information did not charge an
offense on ground that BP 22 has not yet taken effect when the offense was
committed on May 1979. Said law took into effect on June 29, 1979. The
prosecution opposed the motion and contended that the date of the dishonor of
the check -- September 26, 1979, is the date of the commission of the offense,
hence BP 22 is applicable.
The respondent judge granted Go Bio's motion and dismissed the criminal action.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that BP 22 was published in the Official
Gazette on April 4, 1979, and hence became effective 15 days thereafter or on April
24, 1979. PR contends however that said publication was only released on June 14,
1979 but since the questioned check was issued about the second week of May
1979, then he could not have violated BP 22 because it was not yet released for
circulation at the time.
Issue: W/N BP 22 was already in effect when the offense was committed
HELD: NO. It is proved that the penal statute in question was made public or
circulated only on June 14, 1979 and not on its printed date of April 9, 1979.
Publication of the law is necessary so that the public can be apprised of the
contents and or penalties of a penal statute before it can be bound by it. If a statute
had not been published before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no
such law to be violated. Hence, the accused could not have committed the alleged
crime. When the alleged offense was committed there was still no law penalizing it.
The term "publication" in BP 22 must be given the ordinary accepted meaning -- or
to make known to the people in general. Moreover, if BP 22 intended to make the
printed date of issue of the Gazette as the point of reference in the determination of
its the effectivity, it could have provided a special effectivity provision.
Facts: On 2nd week of May in 1979, private respondent Benito Go Bio Jr. issued a
check amounting to P200,000 to one Filipinas Tan. Said check was subsequently
dishonored and despite repreated demands, the respondent failed to make the
necessary payment hence the filing of charges against him for violation of BP 22 or
the Bouncing Check law. Go Bio filed a Motion to Quash alleging that the
information did not charge an offense on ground that BP 22 has not yet taken effect
when the offense was committed on May 1979. Said law took into effect on June 29,
1979. The prosecution opposed the motion and contended that the date of the
dishonor of the check -- September 26, 1979, is the date of the commission of the
offense, hence BP 22 is applicable. The respondent judge granted Go Bio's motion
and dismissed the criminal action. Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that BP
22 was published in the Official Gazette on April 4, 1979, and hence became
effective 15 days thereafter or on April 24, 1979. PR contends however that said
publication was only released on June 14, 1979 but since the questioned check was
issued about the second week of May 1979, then he could not have violated BP 22
because it was not yet released for circulation at the time. Issue: W/N BP 22 was
already in effect when the offense was committed HELD: NO. It is proved that the
penal statute in question was made public or circulated only on June 14, 1979 and
not on its printed date of April 9, 1979. Publication of the law is necessary so that
the public can be apprised of the contents and or penalties of a penal statute before
it can be bound by it. If a statute had not been published before its violation, then in
the eyes of the law there was no such law to be violated. Hence, the accused could
not have committed the alleged crime. When the alleged offense was committed
there was still no law penalizing it. The term "publication" in BP 22 must be given
the ordinary accepted meaning -- or to make known to the people in general.
Moreover, if BP 22 intended to make the printed date of issue of the Gazette as the
point of reference in the determination of its the effectivity, it could have provided a
special effectivity provision.
3.TANADA V TUVERA
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well
as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the
case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or
statute becomes valid and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear
object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various
laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice
and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia
legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever,
not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the
Official Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people
to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability
is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be
bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The
Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not
been published have no force and effect.
TAADA VS. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so
when it was otherwise as when the decrees themselves declared that they were
to become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and
laws which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not
to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This
clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that
do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be
invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the
legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it
might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and
not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published
as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless
a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform
the public of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the
Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The
Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in
the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and
rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents
are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give
proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot
faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
4. MRCA v CA
Facts: The Petitioner MRCA Inc., filed a complaint against private respondents
spouses (who were defendants in said civil case). Said case was dismissed by the
trial court due to the non-payment of proper filing fees when petitioner failed to
include include in the complain the amount of moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and litigation expenses sought to be recovered.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed said ruling, hence the petitioner comes to SC by
petition for review. Petitioner contends that the Manchester ruling does not apply
to the case since said court decision was not published in the Official Gazette. It
should be noted that petitioner filed said complaint ten months after the
promulgation of the Manchester ruling.
Issue: w/n court rulings need to be published in the Official Gazette order to be
effective
HELD: NO.
Publication in the Official Gazette is not a prerequisite for the effectivity of a court
ruling even if it lays down a new rule or procedure. It is a well-established doctrine
that the procedure of the court may be changed at any time and become effective
at once so long as it does not affect or change vested rights. (Aguillon v Dir. of
Lands)
As such, the court granted the petition and held that the Manchester ruling should
apply to the case of the petitioner though it was modified by the Sun Insurance case
where the court allowed the payment of docket fees within a reasonable period but
not beyond the reglamentary period. Petitioner was allowed to amend the
complaint and specify therein the amount of damages it seeks from defendant and
pay the proper filing fees
Facts: The Petitioner MRCA Inc., filed a complaint against private respondents
spouses (who were defendants in said civil case). Said case was dismissed by the
trial court due to the non-payment of proper filing fees when petitioner failed to
include include in the complain the amount of moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and litigation expenses sought to be recovered. The Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed said ruling, hence the petitioner comes to SC by petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the Manchester ruling does not apply to the case since said
court decision was not published in the Official Gazette. It should be noted that
petitioner filed said complaint ten months after the promulgation of the
Manchester ruling. Issue: w/n court rulings need to be published in the Official
Gazette order to be effective HELD: NO. Publication in the Official Gazette is not a
prerequisite for the effectivity of a court ruling even if it lays down a new rule or
procedure. It is a well-established doctrine that the procedure of the court may be
changed at any time and become effective at once so long as it does not affect or
change vested rights. (Aguillon v Dir. of Lands) As such, the court granted the
petition and held that the Manchester ruling should apply to the case of the
petitioner though it was modified by the Sun Insurance case where the court
allowed the payment of docket fees within a reasonable period but not beyond the
reglamentary period. Petitioner was allowed to amend the complaint and specify
therein the amount of damages it seeks from defendant and pay the proper filing
fees
5.YAOKASIN V COMMISSIONER
Facts: The Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 sacks of refined sugar owned by
petitioner Yaokasin, which were then being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and
turned them over to the custody of the Bureau of Customs. On June 7, 1988, the
District Collector of Customs ordered the release of the cargo to the petitioner but
this order was subsequently reversed on June 15, 1988. The reversal was by virtue
ofCustoms Memorandum Order (CMO) 20-87 in implementation of the Integrated
Reorganization Plan under P.D. 1, which provides that in protest and seizure cases
where the decision is adverse to the government, the Commissioner of Customs has
the power of automatic review.
Petitioner objected to the enforcement of Sec. 12 of the Plan and CMO 20-87
contending that these were not published in the Official Gazette. The Plan which
was part of P.D. 1 was however published in the Official Gazette.
Issue: W/n circular orders such as CMO 20-87 need to be published in the OG to
take effect
NO.
Article 2 of the Civil Code does not apply to circulars like CMO 20-87 which is an
administrative order of the Commissioner of Customs addressed to his
subordinates, the custom collectors. Said issuance requiring collectors of customs to
comply strictly with Section 12 of he Plan, is addressed only to particular persons or
a class of persons (the customs collectors), hence no general applicability. As held in
Tanada v. Tuvera, It need not be published, on the assumption that it has been
circularized to all concerned.
Moreover, Commonwealth Act. 638 provides an enumeration of what shall be
published in the Official Gazette. It provides that besides legislative acts, resolutions
of public nature of Congress, executive, administrative orders and proclamations
shall be published except when these have no general applicability.
Facts: The Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 sacks of refined sugar owned by
petitioner Yaokasin, which were then being unloaded from the M/V Tacloban, and
turned them over to the custody of the Bureau of Customs. On June 7, 1988, the
District Collector of Customs ordered the release of the cargo to the petitioner but
this order was subsequently reversed on June 15, 1988. The reversal was by virtue
ofCustoms Memorandum Order (CMO) 20-87 in implementation of the Integrated
Reorganization Plan under P.D. 1, which provides that in protest and seizure cases
where the decision is adverse to the government, the Commissioner of Customs has
the power of automatic review. Petitioner objected to the enforcement of Sec. 12 of
the Plan and CMO 20-87 contending that these were not published in the Official
Gazette. The Plan which was part of P.D. 1 was however published in the Official
Gazette. Issue: W/n circular orders such as CMO 20-87 need to be published in the
OG to take effect NO. Article 2 of the Civil Code does not apply to circulars like CMO
20-87 which is an administrative order of the Commissioner of Customs addressed
to his subordinates, the custom collectors. Said issuance requiring collectors of
customs to comply strictly with Section 12 of he Plan, is addressed only to particular
persons or a class of persons (the customs collectors), hence no general
applicability. As held in Tanada v. Tuvera, It need not be published, on the
assumption that it has been circularized to all concerned. Moreover,
Commonwealth Act. 638 provides an enumeration of what shall be published in the
Official Gazette. It provides that besides legislative acts, resolutions of public nature
of Congress, executive, administrative orders and proclamations shall be published
except when these have no general applicability.
6. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS V HYPERMIX
Customs Memorandum Order No. 27-2003 (CMO 23-2007) is invalid. The
Commissioner of Customs (1) violated the right to due process in the issuance of
CMO 27-2003 when he failed to observe the requirements under the Revised
Administrative Code, (2) violated the right to equal protection of laws when he
provided for an unreasonable classification in the application of the regulation, and
(3) went beyond his powers of delegated authority when the regulation limited the
powers of the customs officer to examine and assess imported articles. CMO 27-
2003 was issued without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code
on public participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the
University of the Philippines Law Center. For tariff purposes, CMO 27-2003 classified
wheat according to the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin;
and (3) port of discharge. This is a violation of the equal protection clause under the
Constitution. The Court does not see how the quality of wheat is affected by who
imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it came from. Thus, on the one
hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003 have imported food grade
wheat, the product would still be declared as feed grade wheat, a classification
subjecting them to 7% tariff. On the other hand, even if the importers listed under
CMO 27-2003 have imported feed grade wheat, they would only be made to pay 3%
tariff, thus depriving the state of the taxes due. The regulation, therefore, does not
become disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state. Section 1403 of
the Tariff and Customs Law, as amended mandates that the customs officer must
first assess and determine the classification of the imported article before tariff may
be imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified the article even
before the customs officer had the chance to examine it. Finally, Commissioner of
Customs diminished the powers granted by the Tariff and Customs Code with regard
to wheat importation when it no longer required the customs officers prior
examination and assessment of the proper classification of the wheat.
Commissioner of Customs vs. Hypermix Feeds Corporation, G.R. No. 179579,
February 1, 2012.
B. Ignorance of the Law
Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. (2)
1. KASILAG V RODRIGUEZ
Issue: W/N petitioner has a valid legal defense of ignorance of the law
HELD: YES
The petitioner is not a lawyer and therefore not conversant with the laws. When he
accepted the mortgage of the improvements, it isbased on his well-grounded belief
that he is was not violating the prohibition on the alienation of land. Thus is
possessing, and consenting the receipt of its fruits, he has no knowledge that this is
already in the nature of a contract of antichresis, which as a lien, was prohibited by
section 116. Therefore, petitioner's ignorance of the provisions of section 116 is
excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith.
C. Retroactivity
Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
Retroactive Law- intended to affect transactions which occurred or rights which
accrued before it became operative
Prospective Operation- Laws are to be construed as having only a prospective
operation.
Exceptions to the General Rule: Laws may be given retroactive effect if;
1. It provides for its retroactivity
2. Penal Laws favourable to the accused
3. If the law is procedural
4. When law is curative
5. When it creates substantial rights
Procedural Law/Remedial Law- Retroactive application does not violate any rights.
NCC ART 2252-2269
Article 2252. Changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by this Code
which may prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old
legislation shall have no retroactive effect.
For the determination of the applicable law in cases which are not specified
elsewhere in this Code, the following articles shall be observed: (Pars. 1 and 2,
Transitional Provisions).
Article 2253. The Civil Code of 1889 and other previous laws shall govern rights
originating, under said laws, from acts done or events which took place under their
regime, even though this Code may regulate them in a different manner, or may not
recognize them. But if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it
shall be effective at once, even though the act or event which gives rise thereto may
have been done or may have occurred under prior legislation, provided said new
right does not prejudice or impair any vested or acquired right, of the same origin.
(Rule 1)
Article 2254. No vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are
against the law or which infringe upon the rights of others. (n)
Article 2255. The former laws shall regulate acts and contracts with a condition or
period, which were executed or entered into before the effectivity of this Code,
even though the condition or period may still be pending at the time this body of
laws goes into effect. (n)
Article 2256. Acts and contracts under the regime of the old laws, if they are valid in
accordance therewith, shall continue to be fully operative as provided in the same,
with the limitations established in these rules. But the revocation or modification of
these acts and contracts after the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be
subject to the provisions of this new body of laws. (Rule 2a)
Article 2257. Provisions of this Code which attach a civil sanction or penalty or a
deprivation of rights to acts or omissions which were not penalized by the former
laws, are not applicable to those who, when said laws were in force, may have
executed the act or incurred in the omission forbidden or condemned by this Code.
If the fault is also punished by the previous legislation, the less severe sanction shall
be applied.
If a continuous or repeated act or omission was commenced before the beginning of
the effectivity of this Code, and the same subsists or is maintained or repeated after
this body of laws has become operative, the sanction or penalty prescribed in this
Code shall be applied, even though the previous laws may not have provided any
sanction or penalty therefor. (Rule 3a)
Article 2258. Actions and rights which came into being but were not exercised
before the effectivity of this Code, shall remain in full force in conformity with the
old legislation; but their exercise, duration and the procedure to enforce them shall
be regulated by this Code and by the Rules of Court. If the exercise of the right or of
the action was commenced under the old laws, but is pending on the date this Code
takes effect, and the procedure was different from that established in this new body
of laws, the parties concerned may choose which method or course to pursue. (Rule
4)
Article 2259. The capacity of a married woman to execute acts and contracts is
governed by this Code, even if her marriage was celebrated under the former laws.
(n)
Article 2260. The voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according
to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws. (n)
Article 2261. The exemption prescribed in article 302 shall also be applicable to any
support, pension or gratuity already existing or granted before this Code becomes
effective. (n)
Article 2262. Guardians of the property of minors, appointed by the courts before
this Code goes into effect, shall continue to act as such, notwithstanding the
provisions of article 320. (n)
Article 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person who died, with or without a will,
before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by
other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court. The inheritance of those who, with
or without a will, die after the beginning of the effectivity of this Code, shall be
adjudicated and distributed in accordance with this new body of laws and by the
Rules of Court; but the testamentary provisions shall be carried out insofar as they
may be permitted by this Code. Therefore, legitimes, betterments, legacies and
bequests shall be respected; however, their amount shall be reduced if in no other
manner can every compulsory heir be given his full share according to this Code.
(Rule 12a)
Article 2264. The status and rights of natural children by legal fiction referred to in
article 89 and illegitimate children mentioned in article 287, shall also be acquired
by children born before the effectivity of this Code. (n)
Article 2265. The right of retention of real or personal property arising after this
Code becomes effective, includes those things which came into the creditor's
possession before said date. (n)
Article 2266. The following shall have not only prospective but also retroactive
effect:
(1) Article 315, whereby a descendant cannot be compelled, in a
criminal case, to testify against his parents and ascendants;
(2) Articles 101 and 88, providing against collusion in cases of legal
separation and annulment of marriage;
(3) Articles 283, 284, and 289, concerning the proof of illegitimate
filiation;
(4) Article 838, authorizing the probate of a will on petition of the
testator himself;
(5) Articles 1359 to 1369, relative to the reformation of instruments;
(6) Articles 476 to 481, regulating actions to quiet title;
(7) Articles 2029 to 2031, which are designed to promote
compromises. (n)
Article 2267. The following provisions shall apply not only to future cases but also to
those pending on the date this Code becomes effective:
(1) Article 29, Relative to criminal prosecutions wherein the accused is acquitted on
the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt;
(2) Article 33, concerning cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries. (n)
Article 2268. Suits between members of the same family which are pending at the
time this Code goes into effect shall be suspended, under such terms as the court
may determine, in order that compromise may be earnestly sought, or, in case of
legal separation proceedings, for the purpose of effecting, if possible, a
reconciliation. (n)
Article 2269. The principles upon which the preceding transitional provisions are
based shall, by analogy, be applied to cases not specifically regulated by them. (Rule
13a)
B. REVISED PENAL CODE
Article 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal Laws shall have a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the
time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the
convict is serving the same
C. CASES
1. Puzon v Abellera
Facts:
The oppositor appellee Alejandra Abellera (substituted upon her death by
Domondon) was the owner of the subject 2-hectare parcel of land situated in
Baguio City, a land which was previously part of the public domain but was titled
pursuant to RA 931. In another case Republic v Pio Marcos, the Supreme Court
declared that all titles issued under RA 931 are null and void since the said Act was
applicable only to places covered by cadastral proceedings, and not to the City of
Baguio which was covered by a townsite reservation.
This same ruling was subsequently incorporated into a law, P.D. 1271 with the title
"An act nullifying decrees of registration and certificates of title covering lands
within the Baguio Townsite Reservation pursuant to RA 931 which took effect on
December 22, 1977. PD 1271 considered as valid certain titles of lands that are
alienable and disposable under certain conditions and for other purposes. Hence,
the lot in question was reverted to the public domain.
The subject lots were sold in an auction sale due to the non-payment of
taxes.\Petitioner took interest and subsequently won the bid. A year after, a
certificate of sale was issued. In this connection, the petitioner filed a case to
consolidate his ownership of the lots. Meanwhile, Domondon found out about the
auction sale and filed an opposition to the petition for consolidation filed by
petitioner. The trial court ruled that said auction sale is null and void and that the
assessments were illegally made. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence
this petition with petitioner contending that the tax assessments were valid and
that PD 1271 has a curative effect.
Issue: Whether or not PD 1271 can be applied retroactively
YES. Article 4 of the New Civil Code prohibits the retroactive application of laws
unless expressly provided therein, such rule allows some exceptions and PD 1271
falls under one of the exceptions. The intent of PD 1271 is necessarily to make such
titles valid from the time they were issued. This implies that the intent of the law is
to recognize the effects of certain acts of ownership done in good faith by persons
with Torrens titles issued in their favor before the cut-off date stated, honestly
believing that they had validly acquired the lands. And such would be possible only
by validating all the said titles issued before 31 July 1973, effective on their
respective dates of issue. However, the validity of these titles would not become
operative unless and after the conditions stated in PD 1271 are met.
Puzon v Abellera Digest G.R. No. 75082 July 31, 1989 Retroactivity Facts: The
oppositor appellee Alejandra Abellera (substituted upon her death by Domondon)
was the owner of the subject 2-hectare parcel of land situated in Baguio City, a land
which was previously part of the public domain but was titled pursuant to RA 931.
In another case Republic v Pio Marcos, the Supreme Court declared that all titles
issued under RA 931 are null and void since the said Act was applicable only to
places covered by cadastral proceedings, and not to the City of Baguio which was
covered by a townsite reservation. This same ruling was subsequently incorporated
into a law, P.D. 1271 with the title "An act nullifying decrees of registration and
certificates of title covering lands within the Baguio Townsite Reservation pursuant
to RA 931 which took effect on December 22, 1977. PD 1271 considered as valid
certain titles of lands that are alienable and disposable under certain conditions and
for other purposes. Hence, the lot in question was reverted to the public domain.
The subject lots were sold in an auction sale due to the non-payment of
taxes.\Petitioner took interest and subsequently won the bid. A year after, a
certificate of sale was issued. In this connection, the petitioner filed a case to
consolidate his ownership of the lots. Meanwhile, Domondon found out about the
auction sale and filed an opposition to the petition for consolidation filed by
petitioner. The trial court ruled that said auction sale is null and void and that the
assessments were illegally made. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence
this petition with petitioner contending that the tax assessments were valid and
that PD 1271 has a curative effect. Issue: Whether or not PD 1271 can be applied
retroactively YES. Article 4 of the New Civil Code prohibits the retroactive
application of laws unless expressly provided therein, such rule allows some
exceptions and PD 1271 falls under one of the exceptions. The intent of PD 1271 is
necessarily to make such titles valid from the time they were issued. This implies
that the intent of the law is to recognize the effects of certain acts of ownership
done in good faith by persons with Torrens titles issued in their favor before the cut-
off date stated, honestly believing that they had validly acquired the lands. And such
would be possible only by validating all the said titles issued before 31 July 1973,
effective on their respective dates of issue. However, the validity of these titles
would not become operative unless and after the conditions stated in PD 1271 are
met.
2. Acosta v Plan
Facts:
Petitioners filed an accion publiciana against private respondent Magday at the CFI
of Isabela. Believing that as pauper litigants they did not have to submit a record on
appeal, they waited for the trial court to elevate the entire records of the case to CA
(as provided in Section 16, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court).
On June 16, 1976, respondent Judge dismissed the appeal for failure to file a record
on appeal, hence this petition. Under the Rules of Court then in force, a record on
appeal was indeed required to be filed by a pauper appellant although it did not
have to be printed.
Issue: Whether or not a timely submission of a record on appeal is required for the
perfection of an appeal by a pauper litigant
NO.
Under B.P. Blg. 129, which has overtaken this case before it could be decided, a
record on appeal is no longer required for the perfection of an appeal. This law was
given retroactive effect.
As held in People v Sumilang, being procedural in nature, those provisions may be
applied retroactively for the benefit of petitioners, as appellants. 'Statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent.'
Facts: Petitioners filed an accion publiciana against private respondent Magday at
the CFI of Isabela. Believing that as pauper litigants they did not have to submit a
record on appeal, they waited for the trial court to elevate the entire records of the
case to CA (as provided in Section 16, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court). On June 16,
1976, respondent Judge dismissed the appeal for failure to file a record on appeal,
hence this petition. Under the Rules of Court then in force, a record on appeal was
indeed required to be filed by a pauper appellant although it did not have to be
printed. Issue: Whether or not a timely submission of a record on appeal is required
for the perfection of an appeal by a pauper litigant NO. Under B.P. Blg. 129, which
has overtaken this case before it could be decided, a record on appeal is no longer
required for the perfection of an appeal. This law was given retroactive effect. As
held in People v Sumilang, being procedural in nature, those provisions may be
applied retroactively for the benefit of petitioners, as appellants. 'Statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent.'
3. SPOUSES Dacudao v Gonzales
Facts: The petitioners filed a case of syndicated estafa against Celso Delos Angeles
and his associates after the petitioners were defrauded in a business venture.
Thereafter, the DOJ Secretary issued Department Order 182 which directs all
prosecutors in the country to forward all cases already filed against Celso Delos
Angeles, Jr. and his associates to the secretariat of DOJ in Manila for appropriate
action. However, in a separate order which is Memorandum dated March 2009, it
was said that cases already filed against Celso Delos Angeles et. al of the Legacy
Group of Companies in Cagayan De Oro City need not be sent anymore to the
Secretariat of DOJ in Manila. Because of such DOJ orders, the complaint of
petitioners was forwarded to the secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ in
Manila. Aggrieved, Spouses Dacudao filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus assailing to the respondent Secretary of justice grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the department Order and the Memorandum, which according to the
violated their right to due process, right to equal protection of the law and right to
speedy disposition of the cases. The petitioners opined that orders were
unconstitutional or exempting from coverage cases already filed and pending at the
Prosecutors Office of Cagayan De Oro City. They contended that the assailed
issuances should cover only future cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al, not those
already being investigated. They maintained that DO 182 was issued in violation of
the prohibition against passing laws with retroactive effect.
Relinquishment of a known right with both knowledge of its existence and
an intention to relinquish it.
E. REPEAL OF LAWS
ARTICLE 7
Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

Issue: Whether or not the assailed issuances can be given retroactive effect. The ways which laws may cease to take effect
1. Temporarily
Ruling: Yes. As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, 2. Permanently
exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature.
The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of Temporarily
procedure does not create new rights or take away vested rights but operates only Example: Moratorium Laws
in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation already existing rights. The o After the Second World War, many persons are left without jobs,
retroactive application is not violative of any right of a person who may feel obligations became due. A law was passed suspending obligations.
adversely affected, for, no vested right generally attaches to or arises from Permanently (2 kinds)
procedural law. Permanently due to intrinsic causes
o Due to intrinsic causes, expiration of laws, life-span of a law.
D. WAIVER OF RIGHTS o Cessation is permanent and is based on intrinsic causes
expiration.
Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, o Congress can re-enact the law when it expires.
public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law. (4a) Extrinsic due to extrinsic causes
o Repeal of a law- law may cease to take effect permanently
Article 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced; nor can it be 2 kinds of repeal
transmitted to a third person. Neither can it be compensated with what the Expressed repeal
recipient owes the obligor. Implied repeal
However, support in arrears may be compensated and renounced, and the right to Expressed Repeal
demand the same may be transmitted by onerous or gratuitous title. (151) Express provision of a law terminates a prior law, expressed means
provided by law
2 kinds of rights: Implied Repeal
1. Personal rights-right over a specific thing with definite positive subject against
Takes place when theres a clash of provisions of laws
whom you can enforce the right, it is enforceable against a specific person.
Example:
2. Rights- Without definite specific subject, enforceable generally
o Law 1 repealed by Law 2
o Law 2 repealed by Law 3
Difference between a Right and an Obligation
o Q: What is the effect of the repeal on Law 1?
Rights- connotes power, it can be waived. Those who dont exercise it
Depends on the repeal of law 1, repeal of law 2
waives his rights.
will not revive law by expressed repeal.
Obligations- Duty or submission, it cannot be waived
-Repeal of law 2 will revive law 1 unless will provide otherwise by implied repeal.
General laws
Wider coverage
Renunciation or waiver
Special Law
Particular or specific coverage
Conflict between a general and a specific law
Effect will depend on which law was enacted first. Special law which was
enacted after the general law will prevail, no repeal will take effect.
If a general law was enacted after the special law, special law will remain.
There will be no repeal except if there should exist a clear and
irreconcilable conflict between the 2 laws.
Special law-will be absorbed by the general law, or there may be a repeal.
1987 Constitution Art XVIII. Sec 3.
Section 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution
shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
ARTICLE 8
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines.
Judicial decisions
Refers only to the decisions of the Supreme Court.
Does not include decisions of lower courts.
Shall form part of the laws of the land
Roy vs CA
Supreme Court ruled judicial decisions are not laws
Supreme court decisions are not covered by article 2
Decisions can take effect without publication
It is the duty of all lawyers to keep abreast over the decisions of the
supreme court.
F. DUTY TO RENDER JUDGMENT
1. Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the
silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. (6)
Q: When a case is filed before a court, what is the duty of the court?
A: The duty of the court is to render judgement on the case
Q: How should a court decide on the case?
A: Courts should decide in accordance with existing applicable laws
Q: If applicable law is unjust, how do the court decide the case?
A: The court must decide on the basis of the said unjust law. The mere fact that the
applicable law to a given case appear to be unjust, it does not give the court an
option to not comply with the laws. As long as it is not repealed, it must still be
followed.
Dura lex sed lex- no matter how harsh the law may be, it is still the law.
Q: Can a court in deciding a case apply customs and traditions when it makes its
decision?
A: The answer to that question must be qualified if its civil or criminal in character
-In case of silence or insufficiency of a law, judgement can be rendered on the basis
of customs and traditions but only if the case is civil in nature.
Exceptions: Penal laws
An act can be criminal if there is a law that makes it criminal
Only judgement of ACQUITTAL or DISMISSAL can be rendered in criminal cases.
2. RPC Art. 5
Article 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but
which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a
court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is
not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the
Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the
court to believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without
suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the
provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty,
taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.
G. APPLICABILITY OF CUSTOMS
Article 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not
be countenanced. (n)
Article 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. (n)
Customs-rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts uniformly observed as a social
rule, legally binding and obligatory.
General Customs- practiced and observed throughout the country, no need to
present as a fact,
Local Customs-needs to present proof of existence and prevails only in absence of
general customs
Requisites in application of customs
 1. Plurality of acts, various resolutions of a juridical question raised
repeatedly in life.
2. Uniformity or identity of acts or various solutions to the juridical questions
3. General practice by a great mass of a social group.
4. Continued performance of these acts for a long period of time.
5. General conviction that the practice corresponds to a juridical necessity or
that is obligatory.
Practice must not be contrary to law, morals or public order.
1987 Constitution Art XVII. Sec 5
Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural
well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing
property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral
domain.
Rules of Court, Rule 129 Secs 2-3
Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of
matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable to unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
(1a)
Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the court, on
its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own
initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow
the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the
case. (n)
Revised Administrative Code Sec. 31
Section 31. Duties of Assistant Heads and Subordinates. -
(1) Assistant heads and other subordinates in every bureau or office
shall perform such duties as may be required by law or regulations, or as
may be specified by their superiors not otherwise inconsistent with law;
(2) The head of bureau or office may, in the interest of economy,
designate the assistant head to act as chief of any division or unit within
the organization, in addition to his duties, without additional
compensation; and
(3) In the absence of special restriction prescribed by law, nothing
shall prevent a subordinate officer or employee from being assigned
additional duties by proper authority, when not inconsistent with the
performance of the duties imposed by law.
Cases
1.Martinez v Van Buskirk
Facts:
1. On the 11th day of September, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding a
carromata in Ermita, Manila when a delivery wagon owned by the defendant (used
for the transportation of fodder and to which two horses are attached), came from
the opposite direction, while their carromata went close to the sidewalk in order to
let the delivery wagon pass by. However, instead of merely passing by, the horses
ran into the carromata occupied by the plaintiff with her child and overturned it,
causing a serious cut upon the plaintiffs head.
3. The defendant contends that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at
the time of the accident, was actually a good servant and was considered a safe and
reliable cochero. He also claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some forage
at Calle Herran, and for that purpose the defendants employee tied the driving lines
of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon for the purpose of unloading
the forage to be delivered. However, a vehicle passed by the driver and made noises
that frightened the horses causing them to run. The employee failed to stop the
horses since he was thrown upon the ground.
4. From the stated facts, the court ruled that the defendant was guilty of
negligence. The court specifically cited a paragraph of Article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Hence, this is appeal to reverse such decision.
Issue: Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle and tractable team
(of horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is liable for the negligence of such driver.
NO. The cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the
manner described by the evidence in this case. It is believed that acts or
performances which, in a long time, have not been destructive and which are
approved by the society are considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be
considered as unreasonable or imprudent.
The reason why they have been permitted by the society is that they are beneficial
rather that prejudicial. One could not easily hold someone negligent because of
some act that led to an injury or accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the
cochero negligent because of such circumstances.
The court further held that it is a universal practice of merchants during that time
to deliver products through horse-drawn vehicles; and it is also considered universal
practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left during the
accident. It has been practiced for a long time and generally has not been the cause
of accidents or injuries the judgment is therefore reversed.
Facts: 1. On the 11th day of September, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding
a carromata in Ermita, Manila when a delivery wagon owned by the defendant
(used for the transportation of fodder and to which two horses are attached), came
from the opposite direction, while their carromata went close to the sidewalk in
order to let the delivery wagon pass by. However, instead of merely passing by, the
horses ran into the carromata occupied by the plaintiff with her child and
overturned it, causing a serious cut upon the plaintiffs head. 3. The defendant
contends that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time of the
accident, was actually a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable
cochero. He also claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some forage at Calle
Herran, and for that purpose the defendants employee tied the driving lines of the
horses to the front end of the delivery wagon for the purpose of unloading the
forage to be delivered. However, a vehicle passed by the driver and made noises
that frightened the horses causing them to run. The employee failed to stop the
horses since he was thrown upon the ground. 4. From the stated facts, the court
ruled that the defendant was guilty of negligence. The court specifically cited a
paragraph of Article 1903 of the Civil Code. Hence, this is appeal to reverse such
decision. Issue: Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle and
tractable team (of horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is liable for the
negligence of such driver. NO. The cochero of the defendant was not negligent in
leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this case. It is
believed that acts or performances which, in a long time, have not been destructive
and which are approved by the society are considered as custom. Hence, they
cannot be considered as unreasonable or imprudent. The reason why they have
been permitted by the society is that they are beneficial rather that prejudicial. One
could not easily hold someone negligent because of some act that led to an injury or
accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the cochero negligent because of
such circumstances. The court further held that it is a universal practice of
merchants during that time to deliver products through horse-drawn vehicles; and it
is also considered universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they
were left during the accident. It has been practiced for a long time and generally has
not been the cause of accidents or injuries the judgment is therefore reversed.
H. LEGAL PERIODS
Article 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be
understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty
days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.
If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of
days which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included. (7a)
Computation of periods
Contains two paragraphs
1st paragraph general rule
2nd paragraph- exceptions to the general rule.
Exclude the first include the last *
365 days-year
30 days in a month regardless of the month
Night time- sunset to sunrise
Days-24 hours
Second Paragraph- when months are designated by name the 1st paragraph should
not apply. The complete number of days in a month must be counted.
Q: Can you apply article 13 in counting the age of a person?
A: Yes, The SC said yes, Art 13 can be applied in counting the age of a person
Q: Can you apply Art 13 in counting the period of pregnancy of a woman?
A: Never, Art 13 is not applicable, because nobody knows when the pregnancy of a
woman begins.
Cases:
1. Armigos v CA
Facts:
1. The private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed a complaint against the herein
petitioner with the Municipal Court of Digos Davao del Sur, for the collection of
damages and attorney's fees. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the
private respondent.
2. A copy of the decision was received by the petitioner on 8 June 1977, and the
following day, 9 June 1977, he filed a notice of appeal with the said municipal court,
and on 24 June 1977, he completed the other requirements for the perfection of an
appeal, including the filing of an appeal bond and the payment of the appellate
court docket fee. However, when the case was elevated to the CFI for the
consideration of the appeal, the presiding judge thereof ruled that the appeal was
filed beyond the reglementary period; consequently, he dismissed the appeal.
3. Petitioners contention: that from 8 June 1977, when he received a copy of the
decision of the municipal court, to 24 June 1977, when he perfected his appeal, only
fifteen (15) days had elapsed so that the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Davao del Sur, dismissing his appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary
period, is erroneous and contrary to law. The petitioner contended that the
computation of the period to appeal should commence on the hour he received
copy of the decision, so that the first of the 15-day period comprising 24 hours is
from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 9 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 10 June 1977 and the
last day, from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 23 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 24 June
1977.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner's contention is correct
NO.
1. The Court considered the day as synonymous with the date. Consequently, the
5th day shall be the 15 days after the appeal regardless of the time when it was
submitted.
2. The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that "In computing a
period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included" is similar, but not
identical to Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provided that "Unless
otherwise specially provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be
done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last; and if the
last be Sunday or a legal holiday it shall be excluded", as well as the old Rule 28 of
the Rules of Court which stated that prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court, by
order of a court, or by any other applicable statute, the day of the act, event or
default after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be
included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a
Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the time shall run until the end of the next
day which is neither a Sunday or a legal holiday."
3. Human memory is frail - Human memory on dates or days is frail and unless the
day is an extraordinary one for a person, there is no reasonable certainty of its
correctness. What more for the exact hour when a pleading, order or decision is
received by a party? The period laid down by the law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional.
Facts: 1. The private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed a complaint against the herein
petitioner with the Municipal Court of Digos Davao del Sur, for the collection of
damages and attorney's fees. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the
private respondent. 2. A copy of the decision was received by the petitioner on 8
June 1977, and the following day, 9 June 1977, he filed a notice of appeal with the
said municipal court, and on 24 June 1977, he completed the other requirements
for the perfection of an appeal, including the filing of an appeal bond and the
payment of the appellate court docket fee. However, when the case was elevated to
the CFI for the consideration of the appeal, the presiding judge thereof ruled that
the appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period; consequently, he dismissed
the appeal. 3. Petitioners contention: that from 8 June 1977, when he received a
copy of the decision of the municipal court, to 24 June 1977, when he perfected his
appeal, only fifteen (15) days had elapsed so that the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Davao del Sur, dismissing his appeal for having been filed beyond the
reglementary period, is erroneous and contrary to law. The petitioner contended
that the computation of the period to appeal should commence on the hour he
received copy of the decision, so that the first of the 15-day period comprising 24
hours is from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 9 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 10 June 1977
and the last day, from 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 23 June 1977 to 4:00 o'clock p.m. of 24
June 1977. Issue: Whether or not petitioner's contention is correct NO. 1. The
Court considered the day as synonymous with the date. Consequently, the 5th day
shall be the 15 days after the appeal regardless of the time when it was submitted.
2. The rule stated in Article 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that "In computing a
period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included" is similar, but not
identical to Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provided that "Unless
otherwise specially provided, the time within which an act is required by law to be
done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last; and if the
last be Sunday or a legal holiday it shall be excluded", as well as the old Rule 28 of
the Rules of Court which stated that prescribed or allowed by the Rules of Court, by
order of a court, or by any other applicable statute, the day of the act, event or
default after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be
included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a
Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the time shall run until the end of the next
day which is neither a Sunday or a legal holiday." 3. Human memory is frail -
Human memory on dates or days is frail and unless the day is an extraordinary one
for a person, there is no reasonable certainty of its correctness. What more for the
exact hour when a pleading, order or decision is received by a party? The period laid
down by the law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional.
2.Namarco v Tecson
F: On 10/14/55, the CFI-Mla. rendered judgment in a civil case, Price Stabilization
Corp. vs. Tecson, et al. Copy of this decision was, on 10/21/55 served upon
defendants in said case. On 12/21/65, NAMARCO, as successor to all the properties,
assets, rights, and choses in action of Price, as pltff in that case and judgment
creditor therein, filed w/ the same court, a complaint against defendants for the
revival of the judgment rendered therein. Def. Tecson moved to dismiss said
complaint, upon the ground of prescription of action, among others. The motion
was granted by the court. Hence, the appeal to the CA w/c was certified to the SC,
upon the ground that the only question raised therein is one of law, namely,
ISSUE: W/n the present action for the revival of a judgment is barred by the statute
of limitations.
Pursuant to Art. 1144 (3), NCC, an action for judgement must be brought w/in 10 yrs
from the time the judgment sought to be revived has become final. This in turn,
took place on 12/21/55 or 30 days from notice of the judgment-- w/c was received
by defs. on 10/21/55-- no appeal having been taken therefrom. The issue is thus
confined to the date on w/c the 10 yrs from 12/21/55 expired. Pltff alleges that it
was 12/21/65, but appellee maintains otherwise, bec. :when the law speaks of years
xxx it shall be understood that years are of 365 days each"-- and, in 1960 and 1964
being leap years, so that 10 yrs of 365 days each, or an aggregate of 3650 days, from
12/21/55, expired on 12/19/65.
Pltff.-appellant further insists that there is no question that when it is not a leap
year, 12/21 to 12/21 of the following year is one year. If the extra day in a leap year
is not a day of the year, bec. it is the 366th day, then to what year does it belong?
Certainly, it must belong to the year where it falls, and therefore, that the 366 days
constitute one yr.
HELD: The very conclusion thus reached by appellant shows that its theory
contravenes the explicit provision of Art. 13 limiting the connotation of each
"year"-- as the term is used in our laws-- to 365 days.
[The action to enforce a judgment which became final on December 21, 1955
prescribes in 10 years. Since the Civil Code computes "years" in terms of 365 days
each, the action has prescribed on December 19, 1955, since the two intervening
leap years added two more days to the computation. It is not the calendar year that
is considered.
I. BINDING EFFECT
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad. (9a)
Personal Statutes
Laws involving family rights and duties, conditions, status, and legal
capacity.
Nationality Theory
o Basis of civil laws and personal statutes
o National law governs a persons capacity
o Capacity-determined by a persons national law
Cases:
1. Baretto- Gonzales v Gonzales
Plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the Philippine Islands and at present residents
of the City of Manila. They were married in the City of Manila on January 19, 1919,
and lived together as man and wife in the Philippine Islands until the spring of 1926.
They voluntarily separated and since that time have not lived together as man and
wife. Of this union four children were born who are now 11, 10, 8 and 6 years of
age. Negotiations between the parties, both being represented by attorneys,
continued for several months, whereupon it was mutually agreed to allow the
plaintiff for her support and that of her children, five hundred pesos (P500)
monthly; this amount to be increased in case of illness or necessity, and the title of
certain properties to be put in her name. Shortly after this agreement the husband
left the Islands, betook himself to Reno, Nevada, and secured in that jurisdiction an
absolute divorce on the ground of desertion, which decree was dated November 28,
1927. Shortly thereafter the defendant moved to California and returned to these
Islands in August 1928, where he has since remained. On the same date that he
secured a divorce in Nevada he went through the forms of marriage with another
citizen of these Islands and now has three children as a result of that marriage.
Defendant, after his departure from these Islands, reduced the amount he had
agreed to pay monthly for the support of his wife and four minor children and has
not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony.
Shortly after his return his wife brought action in the Court of First Instance of
Manila requesting that the courts of the Philippine Islands confirm and ratify the
decree of divorce issued by the courts of the State of Nevada; that section 9 of Act
No. 2710, which reads as follows:
The decree of divorce shall dissolve the community of property as soon as such
decree becomes final, but shall not dissolve the bonds of matrimony until one year
thereafter.
The bonds of matrimony shall not be considered as dissolved with regard to the
spouse who, having legitimate children, has not delivered to each of them or to the
guardian appointed by the court, within said period of one year, the equivalent of
what would have been due to them as their legal portion if said spouse had died
intestate immediately after the dissolution of the community of property.
be enforced, and that she and the defendant deliver to the guardian ad litem the
equivalent of what would have been due to their children as their legal portion from
the respective estates had their parents did intestate on November 28, 1927. It is
also prayed that the community existing between plaintiff and defendant be
declared dissolved and the defendant be ordered to render an accounting and to
deliver to the plaintiff her share of the community property, that the defendant be
ordered to pay the plaintiff alimony at the rate of five hundred pesos (P500) per
month, that the defendant be ordered to pay the plaintiff, as counsel fees, the sum
of five thousand pesos (P5000), and that the defendant be ordered to pay plaintiff
the expenses incurred in educating the three minor sons.
A guardian ad litem was appointed for the minor children, and they appear as
intervenors and join their mother in these proceedings. The Court of First Instance,
after hearing, found against the defendant and granted judgment as prayed for by
the plaintiff and intervenors, with the exception of reducing attorneys fees to three
thousand, and also granted costs of the action against the defendant. From this
judgment defendant appeals and makes the following assignment of errors:
I. The lower court erred in not declaring that paragraph 2 of section 9 of the
Philippine Divorce Law, is unconstitutional, null and void.
II. The lower court erred in holding that section 9 of Act No. 2710 (Divorce Law)
applies to the Nevada decree of divorce issued in favor of appellant Augusto C.
Gonzalez, said decree being entitled to confirmation and recognition.
III. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint in intervention for lack of
cause of action against appellant and appellee.
IV. The lower court erred in not declaring the notice of lis pendens filed by
intervenors to be null and void.
V. The lower court erred in ordering the appellant to pay the sum of P500 per month
for the support not only of his children but also of his ex-wife, appellee herein,
Manuela Barretto.
VI. The lower court erred in not holding that plaintiff- appellee, Manuela Barretto, is
not entitled to support from her ex-husband, herein appellant, over and beyond the
alimony fixed by the divorce decree in Exhibit A.
VII. The lower court erred in condemning defendant appellant to pay to plaintiff-
appellee P3,000 attorney's fees.
VIII. The lower court erred in denying appellant's motion for new trial.
While the parties in this action are in dispute over financial matters they are in unity
in trying to secure the courts of this jurisdiction to recognize and approve of the
Reno divorce. On the record here presented this can not be done. The public policy
in this jurisdiction on the question of divorce is clearly set forth in Act No. 2710, and
the decisions of this court: Goitia vs. Campos Rueda (35 Phil., 252); Garcia Valdez vs.
Soteraa Tuason (40 Phil., 943-952); Ramirez vs. Gmur (42 Phil., 855); Chereau vs.
Fuentebella (43 Phil., 216); Fernandez vs. De Castro (48 Phil., 123); Gorayeb vs.
Hashim (50 Phil., 22); Francisco vs. Tayao (50 Phil., 42); Alkuino Lim Pang vs. Uy Pian
Ng Shun and Lim Tingco (52 Phil., 571); and the late case of Cousins Hix vs. Fluemer,
decided March 21, 1931, and reported in 55 Phil., 851.
The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case
was submitted to this court, in which they all prayed that the Reno divorce be
ratified and confirmed, clearly indicates a purpose to circumvent the laws of the
Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to secure for themselves a change of status
for reasons and under conditions not authorized by our law. At all times the
matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within the Philippine Islands and the
residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the husband of the purpose of
securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not confer jurisdiction
upon the Court of that State to dissolve the bonds if matrimony in which he had
entered in 1919. While the decisions of this court heretofore in refusing to recognize
the validity of foreign divorce has usually been expressed in the negative and have
been based upon lack of matrimonial domicile or fraud or collusion, we have not
overlooked the provisions of the Civil Code now in force in these Islands. Article 9
thereof reads as follows:
The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity or persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a
foreign country.
And article 11, the last part of which reads:
. . . the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and those
intended to promote public order and good morals, shall nor be rendered without
effect by any foreign laws or judgments or by anything done or any agreements
entered into a foreign country.
It is therefore a serious question whether any foreign divorce relating to citizens of
the Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause,
and under conditions for which the courts of Philippine Islands would grant a
divorce. The lower court in granting relief as prayed for frankly stated that the
securing of the divorce, the contracting of another marriage and the bringing into
the world of innocent children brings about such a condition that the court must
grant relief. The hardships of the existing divorce laws of the Philippine Islands are
well known to the members of the Legislature. It is of no moment in this litigation
what he personal views of the writer on the subject of divorce may be. It is the duty
of the courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature if they are
constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal.
Litigants by mutual agreement can not compel the courts to approve of their own
actions or permit the personal relations of the citizens of these Islands to be
affected by decrees of foreign courts in a manner which our Government believes is
contrary to public order and good morals. Holding the above views it becomes
unnecessary to discuss the serious constitutional question presented by appellant in
his first assignment of error.
The judgment of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila must therefore be
reversed and defendant absolved from the demands made against him in this
action. This, however, without prejudice to any right of maintenance that plaintiff
and the intervenors may have against defendant. No special pronouncement as to
costs. So ordered.
2. Tenchavez v Escano
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish
ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old
engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The
marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered
in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and
go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San
Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are
supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicentas
parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad , he disagreed for
a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor
went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was
approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against
Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the
State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to the
Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada
and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner
filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have
dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.
ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon
courts of the Philippines.
HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give
recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because
it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in
favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous
relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal
separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and
Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is
not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity
in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by
one spouse entitled the other for damages.
3. van dorn v ronillo
FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US
citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the
Philippines and had 2 children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and
petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner
was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioners business in Ermita Manila, the
Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be
ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the
administrator of the said property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private
respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino
citizen.
HELD:
Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped
by his own representation before the court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her
nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the
end of justice is to be served.
4. Pilapil v Ibay-Somera
FACTS:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and
Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was
born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony
eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against
petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The
petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of
failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the
petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City
Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with
William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in
1983.
ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of
adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was
already issued.
HELD:
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the
person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and
nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the
offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and
rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal
standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
ARTICLE 16
Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where
it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
Article 16- The law on property
1.general rule
Real and personal properties shall be governed by the law of the place which the
property is located.
Real properties
House- immovable property
o Personal Properties
Cars,stocks- movable property
Lex Rei Sitae
Real and personal properties shall be governed by the law of the place
which the property is located.
It will apply for as long as the owner of the properties is alive.
If the owner dies, the principle no longer applies
2.Exception to the general rule
 Should the owner dies, his property is not covered by Lex Rei
Sitate
In case of death of the owner, succession, the properties shall be
governed by the national law which governed the person who had
died.
Testamentary/ Estate Succession
Pursuant to a will secluded by the person who has died.
Intestate/Legal succession
Kind of succession where no will was prepared by the person who died
The provision does not apply in its intrinsic validity.
Miciano vs Breno
Breno a citizen of turkey who had properties in the Philippines
Executed a will provided that Philippine laws shall govern his properties
(legacies) to be given to his friends
Device-real property
Anyone who will disagree to his testimony will lose the gifts.
The testimony was void, in violation of the Art 16 of the civil code 2 nd
paragraph
Aznar vs Christensen
Edward Christensen a citizen of California came into the Philippines during
the American occupation.
Fell in love with Campo-Redondo a Filipino but did not married her and had
two children
Helen and Lucy Christensen
Helen was not recognized by her father but by judicial decree she was his
daughter
Edward gave Lucy the bulk of the estates on a will, while Helen was left
with a legacy of 300 pesos.
American National law (California law) governs the property of Christensen
California law in conflict with Philippine law in governing the estate, the
california law follows the domiciliary theory while Philippine laws follows
the nationality theory.
Supreme Court decided to stop the conflict and applied the RENVOI
DOCTRINE in case of conflict, the former law shall prevail. Philippine law
prevailed over the properties of Christensen.
Bellis vs Bellis
Amos Bellis- citizen of texas had a family in the Philippines
Executed 2 wills 1st-his texas properties should be disposed by texas law,
2nd-Philippine properties should be disposed by Philippine law
SC ruled that, Art 16 should apply, Texas law does not recognize illegitimate
children to be given properties upon succession. Renvoi doctrine was
invoked by his children but the SC ruled that art 16 should apply because
there was no conflict between Phil and texas laws.
ARTICLE 17
The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of
the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by
Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
1st paragraph
formal validity (extrinsic validity) of wills, contracts, and other properties
does not apply to Intrinsic validity.
Q: What will govern the extrinsic validity of the contracts, wills?
A: The law of the place where the contracts or wills are executed.
Q: Is the provision absolute?
A: 2nd and 3rd paragraphs are the exception.
2nd paragraph
The will, contract or other public instrument is executed before consular or
diplomatic officials of the republic of the Philippines in a foreign country,
then the forms and solemnities prescribed by Philippine law shall be
observed.
If the instrument in question is executed before a diplomatic or consular
department of the Philippines in a foreign country, what will govern is the
Philippine law.
Principle of Extraterritoriality- doctrine that governs art 17.
3rd paragraph
Prohibitive laws
Lex Voluntatis- law that has been voluntarily agreed upon by the parties to
govern the solemnities and contracts.
If no law is agreed upon- If parties is of same nationality, it will be their
national law. If theyre of different nationality, the nature of the agreement
will determine what law shall govern. The law of the domicile should be
applied.
Intrinsic validity
o Law agreed upon the parties of same nationality, if none, it will be
governed by their national law. If parties are not of the same
 nationality and no law was agreed upon, then the law of the place
where it was executed shall govern.
ARTICLE 18
In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their
deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code
J. Human Relations
Human Relations (n)
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage
to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any
other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
Article 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another's property was
not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for
indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited.
Article 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is
at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence,
mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his
protection.
Article 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a
period of acute public want or emergency may be stopped by order of the courts at
the instance of any government or private charitable institution.
Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though
they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for
damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of
another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs,
lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal
condition.
Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or
employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may
file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to
any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
Article 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or
in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other
unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the
person who thereby suffers damage.
Article 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require
the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be
found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the
court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground.
Article 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising
from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the
pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient
to prove the act complained of.
Article 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of
the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical
publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of
law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken
for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law;
 (13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the
Government for redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form;
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have
a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's
self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a
promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the
person confessing becomes a State witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual
punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a
statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the
defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved
party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action
for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and
may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to
render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such
peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall
be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be
independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall
suffice to support such action.
Article 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges
another with the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in this Code
or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to
believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or
fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complaint may bring a civil action for
damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a
preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the court may require
the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should
be found to be malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the
prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the
criminal proceedings.
Article 36. Pre-judicial questions, which must be decided before any criminal
prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court
which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with
the provisions of this Code.
Cases:
1. People v. Ritter 194 SCRA 690
FACTS: On or about October 10, 1986, Ritter brought Jessie Ramirez and Rosario
Baluyot in a hotel room in Olongapo. Ritter masturbated Jessie and fingered Rosario.
Afterwards, he inserted a foreign object to the vagina of Rosario. The next morning,
Ritter gave Jessie 200, and Rosario 300. Rosario told Jessie that Ritter inserted an
object inside her vagina. Sometime the following day, Rosario said that the object
has already been removed from her vagina. On May 14, 1987, Alcantara saw Rosario
with bloody skirt, foul smelling. Rosario was brought and confined to Olongapo City
general Hospital. An OB-Gyne tried to remove the object inside her vagina using
forceps but failed because it was deeply embedded and covered by tissues. She was
having peritonitis. She told the attending physician that a Negro inserted the object
to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was made liable for rape with homicide. RTC
found him guilty of rape with homicide.
ISSUE: W/N Ritter was liable for rape and homicide
HELD: No. The prosecution failed to prove that Rosario was only 12 years old when
the incident with Ritter happened. And that Rosario prostituted herself even at the
tender age. As evidence, she received 300 from Ritter the following morning. A
doctor/specialist also testified that the inserted object in the vagina of Rosario
Baluyot by Ritter was different from that which caused her death. Rosario herself
said to Jessie the following day that the object has been removed already. She also
told the doctor that a Negro inserted it to her vagina 3 months ago. Ritter was a
Caucasian.
However, it does not exempt him for the moral and exemplary damages he must
award to the victims heirs. It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also
free from civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Ritter
was deported.
2. Ardiente v Pastorfide
 FACTS:
Ma. Theresa Pastorfide entered a MOA with Joyce Ardiente where the latter sold,
conveyed, and transferred all their rights and interests in the Emily Homes Housing
unit to the former. It has been agreed by the parties that the water bill will remain in
the account of Ardiente. On March 12, 1999, Ma. Theresa's water supply was
disconnected without notice. She complained to the Cagayan De Oro Water District
(COWD) and she found out that the account has become delinquent. She paid the
three months due and wrote a letter through her counsel to the COWD to explain
why her water supply was cut without notice.

The general manager of the COWD, Gaspar Gonzalez, replied that it was Joyce
Ardiente who requested the disconnection of the water supply. A complaint for
damages was filed against Ardiente, COWD and Gonzalez by Ma. Theresa. The RTC
ruled in favor of Ma. Theresa on the ground that the defendants committed abuse
of their rights. The ruling was upheld by the CA on appeal with modification on the
award of the amount for damages.Hence this petition before the SC.

ISSUE:

Are the defendants liable for damages?

RULING:

Yes. The court ruled that the principle of abuse of rights under Section 19 of the Civil
Code was violated. It provides that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith."

A right, although it is legal for being recognized by law as such, may nevertheless
become the source of illegality (Globe Mackay and Radio Corporation v CA), when it
is exercised in a manner that does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article
19 and the same causes damage to another. The person exercising an abuse of right
is thus liable for damages caused to another. The herein petitioner is liable for
damages by ordering the cutting of the water supply of the respondent without
giving notice about such intention. The COWD and Gonzalez are likewise liable for
damages by disconnecting the water supply without prior notice and for their
subsequent neglect of reconnecting the water supply even when the respondent
already paid the delinquent account.