10. Isabelo Montano vs. The Insular Gov.
2) Whether the land used as fishery is
(1909)
FACTS:
Petitioner Montano filed in the Court of Land
Registration for the registration of his land
in Libis, Caloocan which was used as a
fishery. Such registration was applied under
Sec. 54 (6) of Act 926 which covers the
confirmation of "agricultural public lands"
subject to private appropriation by occupation
and possession of 10 years.
The petition was opposed by two entities. The
first was by Obras Pias de la Sagrada Mitra
who contended that he was the absolute owner
of all dry land on the eastern boundary of the
fishery. The second was by the Solicitor-
General (SG) on behalf of the Director of
Lands. The SG contended that the land in
question belonged to the US Government, who at
that period has authority over lands under the
Insular Government of the Philippines.
The registration court ruled in favor of
Montano and dismissed the two oppositions,
citing Mapa vs. Insular where lands used for
fisheries could be registered as private
property on the strength of ten years'
occupation, under paragraph 6 of section 54 of
Act No. 926. It was ruled as agricultural
since it was neither forest nor mineral lands.
The SG appealed the decision, contending
whether the definition of "agricultural lands"
as used in Act No. 926 includes all government
property not forest or mineral in character.
(The SC chose to define public lands since
agricultural land remains to be defined as
such not forest nor mineral lands)
There is confusion because Sec. 55 of Act 926
used the term Government lands in stating
that all those not listed in Sec. 54 cannot
claim title to such lands.
He explained that such definition would put
into question the validity of Act No. 1654, a
foreshore law regulating the control and
disposal of foreshore lands filled-up by soil
within Government lands.
This is because under US laws pertaining to
public domain, lands under the ebb and flow
of the tide of navigable waters are not the
subject of private ownership.
Therefore, in the absence of specific US
Congressional legislation, it is impossible
for individuals to acquire title under the ten
years provision of Act No. 926 or unless in
conformity with the pre-existing local law of
the Archipelago.
Issues:
1) Whether the term "public land" in Act, 926
includes all government property not forest or
mineral in character
included in the term "agricultural public
lands"
Held:
1) Act No. 1654 would not be affected since it
is still part of public land
The Supreme Court defined the difference
between Public Lands and Government Lands, as
cited in Mapa vs. Insular Government.
Public lands and Public domain are equivalent
terms which includes all lands of the
government which are subject to private
appropriation.
On the other hand, Government lands include
all lands part of the Public Lands, and all
other lands reserved for public use.
"Public lands" is held to be equivalent to
"public domain," and dos not by any means
include all lands of Government ownership, but
only so much of said lands as are thrown open
to private appropriation and settlement by
homestead and other like general laws.
Accordingly, "government land" and "public
domain" are not synonymous items; the first
includes not only the second, but also other
lands of the Government already reserved or
devoted to public use or subject to private
right. In other words, the Government owns
real estate which is part of the "public
lands" and other real estate which is not part
thereof."
2) The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the registration court, citing the Spanish Law
of Waters which allowed private ownership to
swamps and marshes and other ponds not
directly connected to the sea. This was valid
due to the laws retained by the US government
after the Treaty of Paris in order to avoid
conflict with vested interests, in conformity
with the pre-existing local law during the
Spanish occupation.
11. SUSANA MENGUITO, EMELITA MENGUITO-
MANALILI, HELEN MARTA MENGUITO-LUNA, RENATO
MENGUITO, BERSAMIN MENGUITO, FROILAN MENGUITO
and GENEROSO MENGUITO vs. Republic (2000)
FACTS:
On November 1987, the heirs of spouses Cirilo
and Juana Menguito, successors-in-interests
and herein petitioners, filed for the
registration of 11 parcels of land in Ususan,
Taguig.
The Republic filed its objection saying that
the registration should be denied and be
declared as part of the public domain,
contending that the evidence the petitioners
used to prove ownership and possession was
insufficient.
The Republic contended that the extrajudicial
settlement executed by Cirilo donating the
lands to his heirs "Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob",
was self-serving and were in fact mere
photocopies which was dated on 1989.
It added that the surveyor-geodetic engineers
notation was insufficient to prove the land
was classified as alienable and disposable.
Also, the tax declarations they presented did
not date back to June 12, 1945 but only up to
1968 when they received the property from
their parents.
The RTC granted the registration of the
petitioners so the Republic appealed to the
CA. The CA ruled in favor of Republic, saying
that the petitioners failed to give convincing
proof that the land in question had been
classified as alienable or disposable and that
petitioners or their predecessors-in-interest
had been in possession of it since June 12,
1945.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners showed
incontrovertible evidence that the land was A
and D
Held:
The petitioners failed to prove their claim.
The land is presumed inalienable unless such
incontrovertible evidence is shown by the
applicant.
The petitioners failed to prove the legal
requirements of CA 141, as clarified by PD
107310 that (1) the land applied for was
alienable and disposable; and (2) the
applicants and their predecessors-in-interest
had occupied and possessed the land openly,
continuously, exclusively, and adversely
since June 12, 1945.
"Petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic
engineers notation indicating that the survey
was inside alienable and disposable land. A
mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify
lands of the public domain. By relying solely
on the said surveyors assertion, petitioners
have not sufficiently proven that the land in
question has been declared alienable."
"Petitioners presented evidence that they had
been paying real estate taxes since 1974.
Their predecessors-in-interest, they claimed,
have also been paying taxes on the land for
several years before them, and Cirilo Menguito
had declared the land for tax purposes in
1943.
However, they did not present any documents or
any other satisfactory proof to substantiate
this claim. General statements, which are mere
conclusions of law and not proofs of
possession, are unavailing and cannot
suffice".
12. Ignacio Mesina vs. Eulalia De Sonza (1960)
FACTS:
Petitioner Mesina contends that he is the
owner in fee simple of a land with
improvements situated in San Antonio, Nueva
Ecija in actual possession since 1914.
In 1953, Respondent Sonza was awarded a
homestead patent over the same land by the
Director of Lands and a certificate of title
afterwards.
In 1958, Mesina filed before the Nueva Ecija
CFI praying for the cancellation of the
registration of land awarded to Sonza. He also
prayed that his own registration be given due
course since it was still pending in the same
court.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the case
on the ground that it was already barred by
the statute of limitations and the title
already became indefeasible and
incontrovertible. The CFI granted to dismiss
the action hence this case.
Mesina contends that the Director of Lands did
not exercise due care in the registration
knowing that Sonza did not comply with the
requirements of CA 141 and that he had no
jurisdiction to award the land since it was
already a private property.
He also asserts that the title of respondent
was procured through fraud, deception and
misrepresentation since Sonza allegedly knew
that the land belongs to Mesina.
ISSUE:
Whether the dismissal due to the statute of
limitations was correct
HELD:
The dismissal was not correct. The Supreme
Court said that the 1-year period for
impugning decrees of registration cannot be
applied since the property involved is
allegedly private in nature and has ceased to
be part of the public domain by operation of
law, citing Susi vs. Razon.
The decision was set aside and remanded to the
CFI for further proceedings.
If by legal fiction, as stated in the Susi
case, plaintiff is deemed to have acquired the
lot by a grant of the State, it follows that
the same had ceased to be part of the public
domain and had become private property and,
therefore, is beyond the control of the
Director of Lands. Consequently, the homestead
patent and the original certificate of title
covering said lot issued by the Director of
Lands in favor of the defendants can be said
to be null and void, for having been issued
through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation.
13. Valentin Suzi vs. Angela Razon; Director
of Lands (1925)

FACTS:
In 1899, petitioner Suzi bought a parcel of
land for P12 evidenced by a deed of sale. He
used the land to plant and sell bacawan
which was used for firewood. He claimed that
he and the previous owners had been in open,
continuous, adverse and public, without any
interruption, except during the revolution.

In 1913, respondent Razon filed to recover

possession of the land in CFI Pampanga against
Suzi but was denied. She then filed for the
purchase with the Director of Lands, which was
granted despite the opposition of Suzi hence
this case.

ISSUE:
Whether the sale of the Director of Lands to
Razon was valid

Held:
The sale was not valid since the land was
already under private ownership by operation
of law in compliance to Sec. 45(b) of Act No.
926 and therefore, no longer part of the
public domain.

So that when Angela Razon applied for the

grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already
acquired, by operation of law, not only a
right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that
certificate of title should be issued in order
that said grant may be sanctioned by the
courts, an application therefore is
sufficient, under the provisions of section 47
of Act No. 2874.

Consequently, in selling the land in question

to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands
disposed of a land over which he had no longer
any title or control, and the sale thus made
was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon
did not thereby acquire any right.