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The future of strategic studies:

Beyond even grand strategy
a
John Chipman
a
Director of Studies at the IISS,

Version of record first published: 03 Mar 2008

To cite this article: John Chipman (1992): The future of strategic studies: Beyond even grand
strategy, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 34:1, 109-131

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 The future of strategic
studies: beyond even grand
strategy
JOHN CHIPMAN
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The profession of strategic studies was dominated by a perversion for

decades. Because the main new factor for international stability after
World War II was the existence of nuclear weapons, the main analytical
activity of those engaged in strategic studies was the development of
nuclear deterrence and arms control theories. Despite its often highly
abstract quality, this work had considerable policy relevance: in an era
when the East-West struggle had potentially cataclysmic consequences,
preserving military stability was of utmost importance. Concepts of
balance of power and deterrence were the vital stuff of official
communiqus and policy documents. The perversion of this entirely
necessary work lay in the impression that nuclear accountancy, conven-
tional armaments ratios, arms procurement issues and targeting calcu-
lations were synonymous with 'strategic studies'.1
Despite the revival of the term 'geopolitics' by US Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger in the 1970s, strategic analysts have often been criti-
cized for being reluctant to incorporate a broad range of factors into
their studies of international power politics. Apparently stagnant
realities - the 'East-West confrontation' and 'Third World
marginalization' - were the prime political givens that inspired the gen-
eral requirement to 'manage strategic stability'. The elemental threat
was clear, and nuclear deterrence theory greatly simplified the range of
so-called strategic choices. In the eyes of many, it also tended to sub-
merge wider questions - such as why force might be used and to what
end - under a deluge of escalation scenarios and throw-weight compari-
sons. The need to shore up an unjust but safe status quo perhaps
justified a penchant for analysing military details more than political
forces. An aversion to close examination of the contents of the Cold
War freezers in the East was strengthened by the firmness with which
they were shut. Yet, it was for good reason that Lawrence Freedman

John Chipman is Director of Studies at the IISS.

 110 John Chipman

ended his famous study of nuclear strategy with the evocative phrase:
'C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la stratgie'.2
Area specialists generally took into account a wider range of political,
economic, ethnic, social, religious and environmental issues. But they
were prisoners of another parochialism, as much intellectual as geo-
graphical, which often deterred them from properly balancing the
weight of regional and global forces in their analyses of given areas.
This was an affliction that also touched political leaders. While in 1990
President Hafiz ai-Asad of Syria understood the global shifts of power
(particularly the decline of the Soviet Union) and positioned himself
accordingly in the politics of the Middle East, Iraq's President Saddam
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Hussein, absorbed in the tactics of local political manoeuvring, grossly

misunderstood the world's likely reaction to his Kuwaiti adventure,
thus richly deserving US General H. Norman Schwarzkopfs assess-
ment that he was 'no strategist'.
True strategic thinking requires an appreciation of the forces at play,
both locally and generally, which may result in peoples, nations or
states (not necessarily the same thing) using military force to achieve
their ambitions or to reverse a perceived wrong. Equally, it requires an
understanding of the way the eventual use of force, or a decision to
desist in its application, affects the stability of the area in which it was
exercised and the interests of outside actors politically, or otherwise,
engaged. All this makes necessary an analysis of the quality of social
organization, economic prowess, political unity and military prepared-
ness that makes the use of force by any group a realistic option, or its
renunciation an imperative. The deployment and engagement of mili-
tary force may be the anchor of the strategist's concerns, but it will be
political, economic and social factors that permit or constrain, that
inspire or foreclose the decision to use military force that must be at the
centre of any investigation. This wide field of inquiry is the proper
camp of the strategic analyst. To those who argue that definitions of
strategic studies need to be widened, it is right to answer that, having
been artificially shrunk in the past 40 years, they are now returning to
their natural and necessary proportions.
Those proportions are now particularly great. Between October 1989
and August 1991, the world lost an international system that served as
an ordering principle of international relations, but it did not gain an
international society with a universal culture that would eliminate the
threat or use of military force in world affairs. The end of the Cold War
made more evident the pluralist tendencies in global politics, even if
many of the values the West had championed during the East-West
conflict now have wider acceptance. Public opinion is also particularly
sensitive to strategic questions, not least because more people had been
 The future of strategic studies 111

involuntarily conscripted into the Cold War than any other conflict in
history. In the West, this had few adverse side effects, although the
McCarthy era and the Vietnam War left their scars, as did high levels of
defence expenditure. In the East, however, millions were controlled
and lied to, and genuine economic growth was sacrificed to false icons.
In the rest of the developing world, leaders who cynically played East
against West nevertheless often used the Cold War (or the vestiges of
imperialism) as an explanation for their suffering. The speed with
which the Cold War thawed has brought out the good interred by com-
munism and the totalitarian state. It has also revealed a fair amount of
rot and raised expectations. The involuntary conscripts of the Cold
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War would have demanded, even without the panegyric of a 'new world
order' that the 1991 Gulf War evoked, that their political leaders pro-
vide them with a better future. The list of remaining challenges is long.
The new enfranchizement of peoples in ex-communist Europe (as
well as in some other areas of the world) has truly popularized sover-
eignty, but the vengeance of nations has created disorder and military
conflict. The collapse of the organized military threat in Europe has
produced a multiplicity of risks for which existing security structures
are inadequate or inappropriate palliatives. There are regions outside
Europe - the Middle East, South and North-east Asia in particular -
where conflict is endemic. The constructive engagement of outsiders is
important, but so is genuine regional co-operation that appears ever
fleeting. And there are a bevy of problems with important strategic
consequences, such as nuclear proliferation and mass migration, that
have no special territorial focus, but require complex forms of inter-
national co-operation if they are to be attenuated.
In the absence of the conceptual clarity provided by the Cold War, the
primary obligation of the strategist is to identify the principal features of
the evolving international system and the consequences for policy-
makers. New axioms are needed to determine the conditions under
which military force might be used and the diplomatic, economic and
military instruments of war prevention or pacification. To establish pri-
orities for action in a world self-evidently interdependent, there is not
only a need to go beyond the narrow confines of strategic studies as prac-
tised during the Cold War, but also to go beyond the 'grand strategies'
and Realpolitik that shaped foreign policy in the nineteenth century.

Features of the international system

The end of the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War did not usher in a
new international system without resemblance to its predecessors. The
future is always a compromise between novelty and continuity. But a
number of trends that affect the capacity of individual states to
 112 John Chipman

implement changes at home and abroad were given greater impetus by

these events, and these trends need to be absorbed by strategists. These
features of the evolving international system fix the framework within
which strategic action may or may not take place.

DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

The first of these is the now obvious intermingling of domestic and
international security. Now that people, information and resources
cross boundaries with increasing ease, international strategic interests
can be affected by decisions and actions initially purely domestic in ori-
gin and purpose. Political dissent and fervour easily become
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transnational. Regional affairs are made complex by the fact that the
domestic politics of one's neighbour can quickly become part of one's
own. Security can no longer be compartmentalized into national,
regional and international categories. There is limited 'sovereignty' to
the problems of strategic calculation. Strategy needs to be inter-
nationally conceived because national borders cannot clearly demar-
cate areas of security from those of instability.
Refugee movements are the clearest manifestation of this, particu-
larly when they are caused by the ruthless acts of dictators repressing
groups whose political organization or reawakening is feared. Once the
consequences of a policy enacted for domestic purposes become exter-
nal, the policy itself is open to international comment and action, with
proclamations of 'sovereign rights' being no defence against outside
interference. It was at least partially on this basis that the operation to
save the Kurds in northern Iraq in 1991 could be justified within the
context of international law.
Resource management is another area in which the links between
domestic and international activity have important security conse-
quences. This is strikingly true in the case of water that, in the Nile
Valley, the Jordan catchment area and around the Tigris and Euphrates
Rivers, among other places, creates so much controversy. Because
neither surface nor subterranean water resources respect international
boundaries, the domestic policies of food self-sufficiency, conservation
and dam construction carry international consequences that are seen by
others in security terms. Even if the rhetoric of the 'water weapon' in
the Middle East carries with it the tendency for exaggeration
unfortunately so common in this region, it remains the case that threats
by states to withhold water resources or attack hydraulic installations
are part of the regional strategic calculus. Certainly, the politics related
to fulfilling the demands of Palestinian self-determination - one of the
great strategic problems of the day - are intimately connected to the
minutiae, inter alia, of fair access to water.
 The future of strategic studies 113

Arms flows may also be triggered by events largely domestic in origin.

By their own trade in arms, combatants in civil wars invariably affect
the flow in neighbouring states and thus provide the means for others to
use force in the settlement of political disputes. Security in Pakistan in
the late 1980s and early 1990s was intimately affected by the Afghan
'civil war'. The stability of the various states of Central America
throughout the 1980s was in part made hostage to the fortunes of guer-
rillas fighting for domestic rights. The activity of the United Nations
(UN) in monitoring arms transfers within Central America paid hom-
age to the reality that in tense regions, civil wars are commutable. This
fact is not lost on the leaders and opposition movements of the states
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that have replaced the former Soviet Union.

The strategic difficulty associated with intermeshing domestic and
international security is compounded by the fact that many
transnational issues pose, almost by definition, threats that are not of a
territorial nature. It is also in the nature of environmental issues,
migration, drugs and religious fundamentalism that the exporter of the
problem will have a radically different view of the issue than the
importer. International negotiation is made difficult by the fact that the
interest in managing such issues is by no means mutual. Central govern-
ments, in any case, may be powerless to address problems whose ori-
gins are diffuse. The concerns held by Tunisia's leadership about the
victory of Islamicists in Algeria and the types of policies that govern-
ments in southern Europe could contemplate to contain refugee
influxes from North Africa are striking examples of these dilemmas.

THE RISE OF NATIONALISM AND THE PULL OF INTEGRATION

Despite the fact that domestic security is vulnerable to regional and
transnational forces and that the coinage of territorial sovereignty is
therefore of declining value, the rise in nationalism is the most evident
characteristic of the new international system. It is also closely tied in
many areas to calls for democratization. The most celebrated example
of this came from the demonstrators in Leipzig who, in October 1989,
rebelled against the authorities and shouted 'We are the people'. When
in November they took to the streets after the fall of the Berlin Wall,
they proclaimed 'We are one people'. In this semantic road travelled by
those who eventually found themselves in a reunified Germany, there is
summarized the path from minimal democratic desires to maximalist
nationalist demands later seen throughout the former Soviet Union.3
The struggles of this kind that have taken place throughout
ex-communist Europe also reflect the tensions (which have their origins
in Central European history) between an ethnolinguistic concept of the
nation and a concept founded on popular sovereignty.
 114 John Chipman

The more the former is favoured over the latter, the greater the scope
for conflict. Although the denial of nationality (for example, under
communism) is the denial of political liberty, the theory of nationality
that makes the state and the nation one and the same reduces, as Lord
Acton once argued, 'practically to a subject condition all other
nationalities that may be within its boundary. . . . It is a confutation
of democracy, because it sets limits to the exercise of the political will,
and substitutes for it a higher principle'.4
Furthermore, the definition of 'nationality' is forever subject to finer
interpretations, as secessionist movements around the world now tes-
tify. Even when there is agreement - as in Somalia, arguably the only
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homogeneous nation-state in Sub-Saharan Africa - clan affiliations can

lead to horrific internal violence. What may attenuate the worst effects
of nationalism in Europe (less so in South Asia and other regions), is
that new 'nations' generally seek international recognition not only
through membership in the United Nations, but also through affiliation
with regional organizations, like the European Community (EC), which
would eventually force them to pool their newly held sovereignty with
that of others. The co-ordinated loss of sovereignty is what such
affiliation is all about. Withholding recognition from states that do not
respect minority rights may be helpful, although perhaps difficult to
sustain. In the long run, providing these states with a regional reposi-
tory for nationalist ambitions will be necessary if these forces are to be
dampened. The paradox remains that although national interests are
now more difficult to conceive and promote, given the decline in the
power of sovereign states to control their affairs, nationalism still
shapes world politics.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

The rise of nationalism combined with the confusion between dom-
estic and international security and the irrelevance of communism as a
bond among like-minded states has brought about enormous changes in
international political geography. As a result, the fault lines of inter-
national security are shifting in many directions. Old 'regions' such as
'Eastern Europe' or 'South-west Asia' have lost the geopolitical salience
they once possessed for 'Western' leaders. New or reborn regions, such
as 'Central Europe' or 'Central Asia', now describe more accurately,
even if only temporarily, local perceptions and regional aspirations.
With the collapse of empires, national offspring, such as the Ukraine
Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan, can become regional powers with the
capacity to affect domestic life in nearby states. Similarly, states that
were previously mere neighbours of the Soviet empire, such as Turkey
or Iran, can entertain political and economic ambitions towards Cen-
 The future of strategic studies 115

tral Asia. These states may wish to resuscitate ethnic and religious
allegiances that existed in a previous era. Strategists must be aware of
this, although in calculating the capacity of states to exercise an
imperial or cultural suzerainty from the past, they would do well to
examine the contemporary constraints on state action. Entrenching
influence derived from long-passed historical context may not be so
easy.
Diplomats have, in any case, new leaders to court if they wish to gain
access and influence in these new areas. Chinese recognition of repub-
lics in Central Asia reflects the concern that Central Asian nationalism
is a greater threat to China than the collapse of communism in the for-
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mer Soviet Union. If Beijing is to contain nationalist aspirations in

Xinjiang, for example, it must have more fluid relations with its neigh-
bours. By the same token, a deepening of American and European
relations with the states of the former Soviet Union is the best way to
ensure that new states have a stake in behaving responsibly in regional
and international affairs. In a world in which political geography is in
such great flux, however, conceiving, constructing and maintaining
military balances of power has become nearly fruitless and will con-
tinue to be so as long as political allegiances are unsettled and the dip-
lomacy of musical chairs proceeds at an allegro vivace pace. Defining
security interests in geographical terms is becoming a declining stra-
tegic art. Europeans, for example, can have no truck with the stale dis-
tinctions, inherited from a questionable reading of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) Treaty, between 'in-area' and 'out-
of-area' threats. Indeed, the moral of the story for the strategist is that
threats have to be looked at generically, not territorially.

THE US AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The United States is able to look at threats generically. In the clich of
the times, the United States is the one remaining superpower. Yet, the
possession of military and economic power coupled with cultural
attractiveness will not enable the United States to manage the inter-
national system on its own. The pre-eminence of the United States is
heavily qualified by the complex algebra of power and interests that the
interplay of local and regional actors throughout the world produces.
Some of its tools are not always relevant to the tasks at hand. Military
power is not useful in meeting most non-territorial threats, while US
economic leverage is weakened by the trade deficits it routinely runs.
One of the most important strategic challenges that the United States
perceives - economic rivalry from Japan - needs to be met not only by
external activity (seeking concessions from Tokyo), but also from dom-
estic renewal - reducing the federal budget deficit and improving the
 116 John Chipman

quality of the goods the United States seeks to export. In general,

American power is diminished by the diffusion of military and econ-
omic power elsewhere and the consequent difficulty in identifying tar-
gets for its diplomatic, economic and military techniques of per-
suasion. Of course, when vague threats become clear-cut military
challenges (as happened in August 1990 in the Gulf), military power
can regain its primordial relevance. At other times, it is a less convinc-
ing adjunct to diplomacy. When the international body politic is fluid,
pressure points are few and ineffective.
The United States, however, still possesses a rallying power that
derives from its international prestige, an often underestimated resource.
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The United States has neither a desire nor a capacity to impose, as some
in distant capitals (through prejudice rather than clear thinking) fear, a
Pax Americana on violent regions. The United States is still in the pro-
cess of defining its strategic interests, and these are most likely to be
shaped, as is right for a superpower, by the 'workings' of the international
system itself. Its experience during the 1991 Gulf War served to inculcate
the view that rallying others to a good cause is the most elegant proof of
global leadership. Such a coalition will probably not be seen again, but
the lessons of its formation will affect the manner in which the United
States addresses issues of strategic importance.
Now that the need to counter Soviet power no longer exists, it will be
possible and necessary for the United States, often through a
reinvigorated United Nations, to return to the elaboration and pro-
motion of first principles in international affairs. US promotion of the
values of democracy, free market economics and international law will
be less fettered by the Realpolitik requirement to put the containment
of another superpower above all other strategic goals. Because these
values can only be advanced through a collaborative effort, there will be
a consistent need, if the United States decides to promote these values,
to act with other states in an ad hoc coalition. This means that others
will have a say in defining the rules for the evolving international sys-
tem in which the grand strategies of individual states are of less conse-
quence than the development of widely accepted norms of inter-
national behaviour. The patronage of such norms will, in fact, be part
of grand strategy.

Consequences for international strategy

The realities of contemporary international life after the Cold War
have important implications for the context and manner in which stra-
tegic goals can be formulated and advanced. The legal spurs or con-
straints to intervention, the tailoring of military force, the style and
 The future of strategic studies 117

content of arms control and the roles of alliances are all deeply affected
by current trends.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERVENTION

Recent developments have changed the legal context for inter-
vention, even if most states are unwilling to admit this. The inter-
vention to save the Kurds in northern Iraq, although conducted in the
special context of a UN enforcement action, nevertheless served as a
potential precedent for further actions. It is now accepted by many legal
scholars that 'international law still protects sovereignty but - not
surprisingly - it is the people's sovereignty rather than the sovereign's
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sovereignty'.5 The current view clearly supports the assertion that no

state has the right to abuse its monopoly over the domestic instruments
of force, which is a basic attribute of the state, to inverse the logic that
gave it that right. Use of force against one's own citizens (on the pretext
of ensuring domestic harmony) must pass the highest tests of political
necessity to pass unexamined by the international community. States
that abandon their principal raison d'tre - protection of citizens - in
the interests of raison d'tat, chip away at the legitimacy that insulates
them from external interference.
It is precisely the rise in international concern about human rights
and the emphasis on attaching sovereignty to people rather than terri-
tory that has begun to loosen the constraints on interference in the
domestic affairs of states. There is a greater revulsion about using the
term 'sovereignty' to shield an internal usurper of sovereignty from
external action. Thus, 'in modern international law, sovereignty can be
violated as effectively and ruthlessly by an indigenous as by an outside
force'.6 Individuals who seize power against domestic popular wishes
should not in future have the right to invoke 'national sovereignty' to
establish a personal position in international politics. States will also be
required in the future to be more attentive to the attempt by dictators to
immunize themselves from external attack by claiming that the terri-
tory they control has greater rights than the inhabitants they suppress.
This will be especially true if dictators create refugee flows that others
are unable to tolerate. Active strategies of pre-emption, as opposed to
passive strategies of absorption, may be undertaken.
These tendencies may have to be modified by the reality that states
will more often intervene militarily to protect their own citizens than
those of another state, as France and Belgium did in Zaire in 1991, and
the United States did in Liberia the previous year. To date, no one has
suggested the use of military force to restore Burmese sovereignty,
usurped by the ruling military government, which has held the victor of
democratic elections under house-arrest. The United States did use
 118 John Chipman

force in Panama against an internal usurper of power, but the case of

Manuel Noriega's involvement in drugs created extenuating circum-
stances that involved US national interests, still the greatest spur to the
use of military force. Many cases of internal assaults on sovereignty are
awkward to prove, as would be the legitimacy of the 'installation' of a
leader by a foreign power claiming to serve the interests of the local
people.
Still, there has been an increase in the degree to which the inter-
national community and regional organizations interest themselves in
the domestic affairs of states, and this is not only confined to American
or European leaders. Argentina's President Carlos Menem (having
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developments in Haiti in mind) let it be known in late 1991 that he

would support the creation of an Organization of American States
(OAS) Peace Corps whose purpose would be to deter military coups in
the region. The practicality of such a measure notwithstanding, it indi-
cates the degree to which domestic matters have become of inter-
national concern. Human rights and good governance have become
international strategic issues. In this context, the attachment of the pre-
sent Chinese leadership to the principle of 'peaceful co-existence',
which speaks of non-interference in the internal affairs of others, is
wholly anachronistic. It reflects an understandable but wrong-headed
affection for a principle of international law that no longer exists in the
form these leaders restrictively imagine.

THE TAILORING OF MILITARY FORCE

The different areas in which it may be possible for states to intervene
with military force and the existence of risks and challenges to the
security of most of the industrialized states of the world (as opposed to
the monolithic threat of the Warsaw Pact) raise enormous questions
about the structuring of armed forces. All of the great military powers
are thus indulging in 'strategic reviews' of their force structures. Many
have already begun to implement programmes for reducing and
reshaping their forces, which will take in most cases many years to com-
plete. Strategic analysts can contribute to national debates on these
issues by helping define the forces needed to defend territory and to
fulfil international obligations. Increasingly, for the developed powers,
arms procurement programmes will reflect a compromise between
budgetary pressures and residual desires for power projection. The
main constraint will be fiscal and the principal incentive, the mainten-
ance of ambition. Dimensioning force structures in the absence of a
clear threat will often be related to abstract discussions about appropri-
ate capabilities, rather than specific needs. Within Europe, the old
 The future of strategic studies 119

debate on role specialization will gain new salience if there is a further

advance towards the creation of a common defence policy.
While for states that face direct threats, the organization of military
forces into standing armies remains an appropriate system of defence,
this is less the case for the powers of North America and Europe. Hav-
ing arrived in November 1991 at the establishment of a NATO stra-
tegic concept that emphasized the political dimension of security, the
indivisibility of European security and the role of other institutions in
the maintenance of European peace, it remains the case that the
organization of'Western' military force is not as flexible as it should be.
Debates about the NATO rapid reaction corps, West European rapid
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deployment forces, and Franco-German proposals for so-called Euro-

pean armies miss the essential point of the current political scene. The
age of fixed military structures may well be passed. Bespoke tailoring of
military forces has taken over from the prt--porter.
The 1991 Gulf War showed that appropriate military forces could be
assembled by willing allies measured to the task at hand. It also demon-
strated that previous investment in military collaboration (through
NATO) paid dividends in combat. Given the variety of possible tasks
for which European military power might be needed in the future, the
requirement must be to think of a variety of possible forces and to
double, triple or even quadruple 'hat' military forces to various struc-
tures. From a policy-planning point of view, the essential operational
need is to ensure that forces that may be called upon to act simul-
taneously are able to do so collectively and interoperably. Because the
military imperative of the times is flexibility, no harm is done if the
same forces are earmarked to different institutions. A European capa-
bility to act on behalf of a mandate from the UN Security Council, the
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), the West-
ern European Union (WEU), or even at some time in the future the
European Community, should have no adverse implications for a
NATO or US contribution to continental defence. Assigning national
European forces to different structures should not affect the regard with
which the US role is perceived.
There will probably be a rise in the demand for peace-keeping and
peace enforcement forces. 'Pre-emptive' peace-keeping may even
become a new strategic art as international institutions, particularly the
United Nations, become more active in crisis-management The
changes in international law described above mean that, in the future, it
may be less unusual for states, with the approval of international
organizations such as the United Nations, to intervene in 'civil' wars.
The need to conduct anti-terrorist activities and to protect the lives of
citizens abroad is unlikely to disappear. In this context, the develop-
 120 JohnChipman

ment of smaller, but strategically and tactically mobile forces seems

obvious. Yet, the inherent flexibility of these forces should not be
shackled by their adherence to only one alliance or political structure.
Within budgetary limits (and these will be severe), such forces should,
where possible, exercise together under different types of commands.
Even if some states may argue that 'le nuclaire ne se partage pas'
(although the British 'double hat' nuclear forces to NATO and to a
national authority), the same should not be true of rapid deployment
forces.

REGIONAL ALLIANCE SYSTEMS

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It nonetheless remains the case that forces will continue to be ear-

marked or tied to specific alliance arrangements. The diffusion of threats
to national and regional security is such that the organization of alliance
systems is more difficult in Europe than in the recent past. In addition, the
membership of existing organizations is not perfectly co-extensive with
those states that now genuinely share the same strategic interests. NATO,
for example, is not impeccably configured to deal with the amorphous
threats to security that many aspirants to membership perceive. The
difficulty in updating and reforming alliance structures is the cause of
Europe's main strategic headache. Outside of Europe, where threats often
take a structured form, few regional security organizations can boast of
success in promoting the strategic goals of their members. Rarely are they
organized to deal with either the internal or external security threats to
member-states. More often than not, they are hampered by internal
rivalries, and the world's changing political geography will force some to
change their strategic outlooks dramatically.
In the European theatre, NATO was a tremendous strategic asset dur-
ing the Cold War. It remains a vital tool for organizing the European-
American security dialogue and co-ordinating the defence policies and
strategic outlook of its member-states. It can forge important policies
for European stability. Members have every reason to continue paying
the premiums for the insurance policy that NATO provides. Whether it
can maintain itself by a policy of expansion (with all the risks of
dilution this entails) remains an open question. It is at the lowest a curi-
osity, at the highest an absurdity, that former Soviet republics are
invited to join the newly established North Atlantic Co-operation
Council (NACC), but that Sweden or Finland are not. On the surface,
Morocco would have a higher claim for assocation to North Atlantic
structures than Tajikistan.
There is also a curious and anachronistic quality about the desire of
Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic to seek
formal NATO membership; because it was useful in the past, they
 The future of strategic studies 121

believe NATO will continue to be valuable in the future. Their desire

for membership may be motivated more by a yearning to 'belong' to the
best institutions of Western life, of which NATO is a prime example,
than by a rational assessment of the security blanket it could reasonably
provide. This may be an example of Lewis Namier's classic dictum:
'One would expect people to remember the past and imagine the future.
But in fact. . . they imagine [history] in terms of their own experience
and when trying to gauge the future they cite supposed analogies of the
past: till, by a double process of repetition, they imagine the past and
remember the future'.7 It may well prove excellent political manage-
ment for NATO to have established the NACC, involving former War-
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saw Pact countries, Baltic states and republics (even from Central
Asia) of the former Soviet Union in close consultations. However, it
also extends NATO's activities from collective defence into the realm
of collective security. It must be remembered that military alliances
should bring together states with shared strategic interests, and that
mere possession of a threat is not a ticket for entry. A NATO involved
in collective security risks confusing its activities with those of the
CSCE. This will become more evident once the pressures for new mem-
bership become greater.
Europeans must keep in mind that the variety of security
organizations that exist in Europe is itself a strategic asset. It is now
becoming more widely acknowledged that the architectural metaphors
used to describe the challenge of creating structures for a more perma-
nent European peace have no application to the fluid context of Euro-
pean geopolitics. Each institution has certain comparative advantages.
The interlocking of different institutions can contribute to inter-
national security. Avoiding a temptation to create a security hierarchy
among NATO, the WEU or CSCE will be important. This is not to
neglect the importance of the emergence of the EC as an influential, if
still underestimated, conflict manager. After all, it was the EC that sent
observers, tried to negotiate cease-fires between military forces and
sought diplomatic solutions, in the case of the Yugoslav civil war. What
will happen when the membership of NATO, CSCE, WEU and the EC
begins to merge will be an important subject for strategic reflection as
the 1990s unfold.
Security analysts outside Europe have plenty of cause for reflection
as they look at their own alliances. It would be a mistake for outsiders to
believe that, in the evolving international order, it will be easy to 'del-
egate' regional security entirely to local arrangements. Since at least
the late 1970s, it has been taken as almost axiomatic by some analysts
that the creation of local security arrangements was the best insurance
against regional conflict. This argument rested in part on the fact that
 122 John Chipman

the United Nations encouraged the existence of regional organizations

that could be linked to it. The political and logistic challenges caused by
outside intervention, as well as its costs, reinforced the view that
efficiency mandated locally organized security. To this might have been
added the moral argument that regional arrangements legitimately
reflected local politics. There is the rub.8
Because many of these organizations exhibit confusion between the
aims of a collective defence organization and one for collective secur-
ity, it follows that, institutionally, they will often be subject to the
fissiparous tendencies that the politics of the region might display.
Despite subtle diplomatic efforts by outside powers, the Gulf
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Co-operation Council (GCC) is not moving quickly to establish even a

modest local deterrent force. Many problems - command and control,
troop contributions, finances and deployment sites - have slowed dis-
cussions among chiefs of staff. The clear preference for security is
reliance on the pseudo-guarantee that Western, particularly US, forces
have provided by a willingness to train with local armies and arrange
for some pre-positioning of equipment. The South Asian Association
for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) pays respect to the great frictions
that exist among its member-states - principally, but not exclusively,
India and Pakistan - by excluding the discussion of bilateral issues. It
thus heavily circumscribes its impact on regional security. The Econ-
omic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) acted more as an
instrument of Nigeria's foreign policy, in the case of the Liberian civil
war, than as an effective security manager. Although the Association of
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has effectively dampened conflict
among its member-states, it will have to look again at its role as the
Cambodian conflict winds down. Those who argue that a multilateral
security framework could help to address the problems of North Asia
must bear the burden of proving why, given the patchy record of other
regional organizations.

THE MILITARY IMPERATIVE AND ARMS CONTROL

The continuing centrality of military power means that one cannot
ignore the requirement for various forms of arms control. In Europe,
the basis for the formal arms control process of the past has disappeared
with the dissipation of the East-West tension; arms control based on
balance-of-power calculations is no longer possible. Agreements on
conventional arms control - when former enemies are quasi-allies -
will be difficult to devise. Current agreements, like the Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty actually maintain, given the dis-
solution of the Soviet Union, totally unrealistic balances of power.
Creating new agreements would mean imposing an artificial balance.
 The future of strategic studies 123

The main incentive for nuclear arms control is no longer the fear that
unequal levels of forces could lead to adventurist policies, but the per-
ception that the security of nuclear weapons, their production centres
and their custodians in Russia, the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan
and elsewhere is less than perfect. These new problems will require
novel arms control solutions. It will also be important to de-emphasize
the psychological/political uses of nuclear weapons by, for example,
de-linking the implied connection between nuclear status and perma-
nent membership of the UN Security Council.
In the Middle East and Asia, the demand for arms is strong, as politi-
cal disputes continue unabated. In the Gulf, especially, a fascination
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with technologically sophisticated armaments persists. Many govern-

ments still have not absorbed two of the primary lessons of the 1991
Gulf War: the more sophisticated the military technology, the greater
the requirement for large logistic systems, and precision is only as good
as the accuracy of the intelligence on which it relies. Yet, the prospects
for locally organized arms control based on European models is lim-
ited, either because finding balances of power around which to
configure negotiations is difficult or because even the minimal level of
dtente required for arms control negotiations does not exist. And one
must not forget that, during the Cold War in Europe, arms control was
detente-consuming as much as dtente-producing. As a result, outside
powers tend to rely on supplier-oriented approaches to the weapons
proliferation problem. This itself requires ordered sets of principles and
guidelines on the distinctions between 'stabilizing' and 'destabilizing'
arms transfers, which the permanent five of the UN Security Council,
which met twice in 1991 on this subject, found challenging to elaborate.
In this context, arms control will take a multiplicity of forms. In
special circumstances, there will be arms control by Diktat, such as UN
Resolution 687, which imposed restrictions on Iraq and whose respect
is a precondition for a more secure Gulf order. Before the formal end of
the Soviet Union, there was the beginning of arms control by example;
steps taken by President George Bush in September 1991 and President
Mikhail Gorbachev in October 1991 to reduce American and Soviet
nuclear forces were unilateral, but mutually reinforcing, measures.
They could be read as partial fulfilment of the pledge in Article 5 of the
Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to depreciate the value of nuclear
weapons. The collapse of the Soviet Union has created a form of arms
control by assistance. The US Congress has thus created a programme
to help some of the states of the former Soviet Union to fulfil the Stra-
tegic Arms Reduction Talks (START) Treaty obligations and give
effect to their intention to reduce nuclear inventories. The United
States will extend technical co-operation to safeguard, remove to cen-
 124 John Chipman

tral storage, disable and destroy a wide variety of strategic and tactical
nuclear weapons.9 There will always be examples of arms control by
political pressure, as in the refusal of established states to recognize new
states or extend assistance unless new leaders desist from certain types
of arms procurement. Even within international organizations, there is
evolving a form of arms control by economic sanction. The Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) has indicated that it will take into
account the defence expenditures of developing states (particularly in
Africa) when it assesses assistance levels. The establishment of a UN
register of arms transfers can be interpreted as a form of arms control
by publicity, on the perhaps tenuous basis that if states know that their
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activities will be widely known, they will shy away from those that
might prove to be embarrassing.
However, the most tenacious and politically sensitive form of arms
control will be supplier controls. Supplier control regimes, such as the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the NPT, will be the
mechanisms of choice to deny the introduction of a particularly danger-
ous military capacity to conflict-ridden regions. More challenge
inspections would give greater credence to the effectiveness of the NPT
regime. Because so much prestige is attached to the possession of ballis-
tic missiles and nuclear weapons, the problems of control are consider-
able. As states assess the types of technologies that require constraints,
they will also see that a widening range of conventional technologies
and military support systems will need to be subject to control. And
they will have to measure the advantages of controlling technologies
against the possible effects that the restrictions might have on the
incentives states, which will have to build up their own arms industries.

The strategist's 'intellectual' policy agenda

These security problems demonstrate that there is still a pressing
need for conflicts to be managed. No formulas exist for this, yet it is
necessary to have certain principles in mind if strategic action is to be
taken in favour of just and durable stability. All of the subjects thus far
discussed provide ample fodder for those engaged in strategic studies.
Almost any of the propositions advanced needs full analytic treatment
by strategic thinkers, but if the profession of strategic studies is to be
true to itself, it must also have on its agenda topics that help to create an
intellectual framework for addressing individual policy challenges.
Policy-makers are guided, consciously or unconsciously, by concepts
and axioms as they address particular strategic challenges. When the
verities of international politics begin to shift, the strategic analyst
should provide policy-makers with conceptual tools that can be applied
to the task at hand.
 The future of strategic studies 125

SELF-DETERMINATION AND REVOLUTIONS

Because many of the world's strategic problems derive from various
forms of national self-assertion, a fuller treatment of the applicability of
the principle of self-determination is needed. Seccessionism in many
corners of the world indicates that, in the absence of either a legal or
consensual understanding of the limits to self-determination, inter-
national diplomacy in the 1990s could be preoccupied with the prob-
lem of differentiating between the need to protect the rights of minori-
ties and the obligation to provide those minorities with a state
congruent with their nationalist aspirations. More important, the
absence of such understanding makes the problem of self-
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determination part of the security agenda, as military forces will inevi-

tably become engaged in one way or another.
Because the scope of both 'peoples' and 'nations' is subject to self-
definition, the instances in which groups might seek statehood as a way
of promoting their interests are not easily limited. Yet, there will be
many cases in which both justice and security will be best met by sol-
utions that fall short of statehood. It is a difficult task, but policy-
makers may have to flesh out a concept that had an easier application
in the period of decolonization than it has today. Certainly, the social
forces that give rise to ethnic or national discontent need to be a more
regular part of the strategic analyst's concern. The causes and anatomy
of revolutions, not merely of war itself, are of strategic consequence in
an age when domestic changes can have such resounding international
impact. A failure to understand social forces in decomposing societies
(especially those with important military forces at their disposal) is a
form of strategic negligence.
Given that domestic changes can spawn new states, a more ordered
assessment is needed of the circumstances in which recognition is con-
ducive to peace or can lead to greater turmoil. The pragmatic desider-
ata of the past - Is a state in control of its territory, and does it have rec-
ognized borders? - will have to be moved to a broader political and
moral plane. The EC's criteria on this score include observance of the
UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, guarantees of the rights of eth-
nic and national minorities, respect for national frontiers, acceptance
of existing commitments on disarmament and non-proliferation and a
commitment to settle by negotiation the problems of successor states or
regional differences.10 The EC's recognition of Croatia took place under
circumstances in which neither of the two pragmatic criteria for recog-
nition had been met. There was hardly the clear respect for human
rights, which the moral conditions implied. Whether the political con-
ditions could be enforceable, especially after recognition was granted,
is debatable. What happens if a state renegues on its commitments?
 126 John Chipman

These conditions were cast in language that makes them relevant to the
cases of Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union and possibly the Czech
and Slovak Federal Republic, but not to non-European cases in which,
presumably, the old practice would apply. Such conditions evolved out
of internal EC manoeuvrings, but a more universally applicable set of
recognition 'rules' need to be elaborated. The strategic consequences of
the recognition of new states certainly needs more conceptual study, as
the debate in December 1991 about whether recognition of Croatia
would result in the extension of conflict to Bosnia-Herzegovina illus-
trated. As a method of terminating war, it remains extraordinarily
dubious. Conditional recognition may help to mould the attitudes of
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new members of the international community, but ending wars

requires more sustained diplomacy than a single act of recognition.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND WAR TERMINATION

The UN involvement in Yugoslavia confirms that there are no longer
any implicit 'no go' areas for the United Nations. Europe is not
immune to the involvement of the global security organization now
invested with greater political (although not yet financial) capital to
enforce international norms. In Europe, as elsewhere, there is still work
to be done to clarify the issues that might trigger action by collective
security organizations in the service of preventive diplomacy, conflict
management and war termination. There is currently confusion in Eur-
ope about the distinction between collective defence and collective
security, which obscures clear thinking on the future of NATO and
other defence and conflict management institutions. The principles of
collective defence - agreement on a common view of security threats,
vulnerabilities and responses, coupled with political and military
mechanisms for co-ordinating the exercise and application of force -
are well understood and practised. Yet, those regional security
organizations, particularly in Europe, that wish to become strong
instruments of collective security will have to contribute to the elabor-
ation of norms relevant to the current security challenges of their
member-states, thus taking on the role of regulating an internal system
of stability, as opposed to protecting the system from outside inter-
ference. These norms, if breached, would trigger international actions.
They would necessarily relate to a number of non-military risks of
security relevant to the times. Organizations such as the CSCE still
need still to work on arbitration measures between ethnic groups and
sovereign states. A statute on minorities might be needed. Just as the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
issues reports on the economic health of states, the CSCE might study
their political and security disorders. The strategic analyst can assist
 The future of strategic studies 127

policy-makers by identifying the type of information needed to assess

risks and the sorts of risks against which states should move
pre-emptively.
In light of the evolution of such norms, the principles associated with
war termination, such as they are, will also have to be reviewed. The
manner in which the US-led coalition chose to end the war against Iraq
surprised many precisely because the end corresponded too closely to
the initially declared war aim of removing the Iraqi army from Kuwait.
Establishing a more just internal order in Iraq (which would have
involved inter alia satisfying Kurdish and Shiite demands for greater
rights) was dismissed as being too ambitious a design. In the future, war
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termination will be just as complicated because of the greater demand

for international involvement in civil wars, the politics of which still
crush against the tenets of an international law in transition, but not yet
entirely transformed. The need for peace enforcement in states such as
Yugoslavia and Somalia must involve fuller study of the political ends
of pacification and of the relevance of different diplomatic, military
and economic instruments of peace-making.

ECONOMICS AND SECURITY

Just as wars have costs, so too does conflict prevention. The maxim
of the 1970s - that development assistance should be seen as part of
security policy - may well now have a new lease on life. One notices the
range of proposals that incorporate economic inducements to elicit
congenial strategic behaviour by the successor states of the former Sov-
iet Union or the tacit security considerations that inspire the EC to
increase its aid to the states of North Africa. A deeper appreciation of
the power of economic inducements, boycotts and sanctions in affect-
ing political behaviour remains important, not least in an era in which
a greater number of states are re-entering the global market economy.
Many states have learned the lesson that passing protectionist legis-
lation, placing restrictions on the free movement of people and relying
on arcane investment codes may harm prospects for receiving needed
investment or technical assistance. These reactions to domestic econ-
omic problems will simply lead to more isolation and deprivation. For
many, the practice of economic and financial protection in the name of
national independence is an increasing danger now that there are more
demandeurs for aid from the rich industrialized states. Yet, this does
not necessarily mean that leaders will be deterred from irresponsible
behaviour by economic threats. Too much of the thinking on sanctions,
as demonstrated during the Gulf crisis, has concentrated on their econ-
omic effects, rather than on whether different societies or regimes are
able to absorb their costs in order to pursue strategic aims.
 128 John Chipman

Equally, the widening of the range of countries adopting (at least at

the level of rhetoric) liberal economic systems, raises questions as to
whether the 'trade wars' predicted in the past now have more potential
combatants. Perhaps too much is made of the strategic consequences of
the creation of trading blocs in Europe, Asia and North America, but
their formation does make domestic microeconomic policies of
member-states a matter of international concern. As ideological
affiliations come to matter less than economic relationships, domestic
economic practices that were tolerated at the height of the Cold War
now become more matters of bilateral and international agitation, as
can be seen in US-Japan relations. But the greatest danger lies in using
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the language of strategy - threat, enemy, war - to analyse an activity

(trade) that is essentially co-operative in nature and, when competitive,
depends on the strength of producers and the choices of consumers,
more than on government activity.
In addition, as 'sovereignty' shifts in economics too, from the nation
to the consumer, managing international economic competition
depends more on mediating a domestic battle between protected and
sometimes dying industries than on seeking to wage phoney wars
between states." Yet, because the tendency exists to see in the restric-
tion of trade an assault against 'security', success in the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations - or movement
towards a new 'Bretton Woods' series of rules for the economic game -
may become a more important feature of international affairs.

ETHICS AND STRATEGY

If there is less likely to be disputes about economic values (as
opposed to strategies) than in the past, competing political values will
continue to affect the strategic landscape. The most celebrated problem
is the rise of Islamic dissent in various parts of the Islamic world that
co-mingles with desires for popular democracy. The perceived threat
that Islamic regimes pose to Western societies derives from the avowed
anti-Westernism of their leaders, but this is not something that those in
the West can easily attenuate. The strategy of providing economic
assistance to countries whose poor and disaffected populations might
otherwise be gathered up in a tide of Islamic protest has proved to be
ineffective. Leaders at risk often use the internal Islamic threat as a
fund-raising device, and this can create the domestic impression that
unpopular leaders are being propped up from the outside. When
Islamic groups gain access to political power through democratic elec-
tions (as has happened in Jordan and Algeria), it does not lie in the
mouth of Western leaders (or others) to question the legitimacy or the
appropriateness of these developments. The promotion of democracy
 The future of strategic studies 129

carries with it the risk that one's 'strategic allies' may be replaced. Only
if the democratic process is suspended by new groups when they come
to power can there be legitimate external comment or action. Age-old
dilemmas such as the ones the philosopher Blaise Pascal posed to the
Jesuits ('you claim in the name of our principles, liberties which you
refuse in the name of yours') still attend situations in which anti-
democratic forces seek power through the mechanisms of liberal
institutions.12
This raises the awkward issue of whether the promotion of a value -
such as democratic practices - should be overridden by the need to
assure certain strategic interests. This is both a philosophical and secur-
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ity issue. There might be specific instances in which it is dip-

lomatically prudent to emphasize one issue over another. These present
difficult choices. Is it fair that Yemen, which has adopted some demo-
cratic practices, be treated less well than other countries in the Gulf
simply because it failed to act as an ally during the Gulf crisis? Should
the United States, for example, give pride of place to human rights in its
discussions with Chinese leaders or to the need to inhibit the prolifer-
ation of nuclear weapons in North Korea? Must not France value
democracy in Algeria more than a short-term threat from Islamicists
who will, in any case, need to deal with France? These are the awkward
questions now posed in an era in which the link between the advance-
ment of ethical and strategic goals is strong. More than any other time
in the recent past, the current international situation allows for and
demands the application of general international principles, often
through international institutions. How much old-fashioned
Realpolitik persists will be directly related to the degree to which core
national interests of any kind remain directly threatened.

Conclusion: beyond grand strategy

Given that the structuring element of strategic analysis must be the
possible use of force* it is important that in re-equilibrating strategic
studies towards the factors that now have more influence on the use of
force, strategic analysts do not throw out the bath with the bath water.
The continued utility of military force for good or evil has not been
eliminated, nor have principles of deterrence (whether conventional or
nuclear) lost strategic relevance. Non-military aspects of security may
occupy more of the strategist's time, but the need for peoples, nations,
states or alliances to procure, deploy, engage or withdraw military
forces must remain a primary purpose of the strategic analyst's
inquiries. This still leaves enormous scope for the strategist to draw on
the work of others in constructing the priorities to ensure that security,
widely defined, is attained and protected by strategic action. In a demo-
 130 John Chipman

cratic age, the support of public opinion will always be central to these
efforts. Fewer will be the political leaders who will able to fashion state
goals that are indistinguishable from partisan or career ones. Greater
will be the public demand for the achievement of a political order that
guarantees the place of principles in international affairs, which
institutions in the past promised, but could not deliver.
It is, nevertheless, worth remembering that morality in international
politics does not derive merely from a sense of civility or ethical tra-
dition in foreign policy; it is also the result of possessing security. The
greater a state's margin of security, the more it can act as an enlightened
power if its culture inspires it thus; the greater the state's sense of
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insecurity, the more self-preservation becomes the value that

overwhelms all other ideals.13 It follows that the greater the number of
states that feel the absence of a direct threat, the more each can act to
uphold values that are dear to the system as a whole. If there are too
many powers that breach a common standard of morality, the standard
loses its capacity to compel moderation in others.
The need to go beyond grand strategy - the need to go beyond power
politics and the ruthless practice of Realpolitik - comes from the fact
that, as happens from time to time, there is now an opportunity to re-es-
tablish 'rules of the game' that diminish certain risks of insecurity and
correspondingly heighten the possibilities of moral interaction among
states. Although insecurity is indeed rife - hence, the derision that met
the use of the phrase 'new world order' by President Bush in 1990 - it is
also true that as many of the world's great powers experience a reduced
sense of external threat, the opportunity to base international activity
on the rule of law is greater than before. There will always be problems
that will require hard-headed attention to specific political and military
realities. In addressing these problems, strategic analysts need to keep
broad political goals at the centre of their reflections. The moral
element for the general in war, or the analyst in peace, must never be far
away. Stratgie oblige.

Notes
1
A number of papers have reviewed
the evolution of the strategic studies
and international security fields in
light of recent developments. See, in
particular, Stephan M. Walt, 'The
Renaissance of Security Studies,'
International Studies Quarterly, vol.
35, no. 2, June 1991, pp. 211-39;
Sean M. Lynn-Jones, 'International
Security Studies After the Cold War:
An Agenda for the Future', Paper
prepared for presentation at the Annual
Meeting of the International Security
Studies Section of the International
Studies Association, Annapolis,
Maryland, 7-9 November 1991.
2
Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution
of Nuclear Strategy (London:
 The future of strategic studies
Macmillan, 1983), p. 400.
3
This issue is eloquently discussed in
Dominique Moisi and Jacques
Rupnik, Le Nouveau Continent:
Plaidoyer pour une Europe renaissante
(Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1991), pp.
96-109.
4 10
John Emerich Edward
Dalberg-Acton (First Baron Acton),
Essays on Freedom and Power
(Boston: The Beacon Press, 1948), pp.
193-4. The passage quoted is of
nineteenth century origin because
Downloaded by [Arizona State University] at 14:33 03 July 2012
Acton, of course, died in 1902.
5
W. Michael Reisman, 'International
Law After the Cold War', American
Journal of International Law, vol. 84,
no. 4, October 1990, p. 869.
6 13
Ibid., p. 872.
7
Sir Lewis Namier, 'Symmetry and
Repetition', in John Gross, ed., The
Oxford Book of Essays (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1991 ), p. 431.
8
A brief but useful theoretical
discussion of these dilemmas is in
Shahram Chubin, 'Post-war Gulf
Security', Survival, vol 33, no. 2,
March-April 1991, p. 141.
131
9
See Kurt M. Campbell, Ashton B.
Carter, Steven E. Miller and Charles
A. Zakret, Soviet Nuclear Fission:
Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a
Disintegrating Soviet Union, CSIA
Studies in International Security, no.
1, November 1991.
An excellent discussion of the
dilemmas inherent in this approach is
in Ian Davidson, 'No Harm in
Wishful Thinking', Financial Times, 6
January 1992, p. 28.
11
See Kenichi Ohmae, 'Looking for
an enemy in Japan', The Wall Street
Journal, 17-18 January 1992.
12 These issues are raised in 'Quelle
dmocratie?', Le Monde, 14 January,
1992, p. 1.
See Martin Wight, Power Politics,
Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad,
eds. (London: Penguin Books for the
Royal Institute for International
Affairs, 1979), p. 292. Wight quotes
Harold Nicolson on British policy in
the nineteenth century: 'We could
afford the luxury of gentleness
because we were completely
unafraid'.