CIVIL LAW Digest

Author: Elreen Joy O.
de Guzman
Taada vs. Tuvera
GR No. 63915 (1986)
Petition: Motion for reconsideration of previous decision
Petitioner: Taada
Defendant: Tuvera
Ponente: Cruz
Doctrine: Publication
Article 2 of Civil Code Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. (Take Not no amendments yet regarding newspaper of general circulation)
Facts:
Petitioner Lorenzo M. Taada invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as
required by law.
The government argued that while publication was a necessary rule it is not needed when the decrees themselves declared that they would become effective
immediately upon approval.
The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect and ordered the respondents to
publish in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general application.
The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not. The publication means complete
publication, and that publication must be made in the official gazette.
In a comment required of the Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed. And on the
clause unless otherwise provided in Article 2 of the new civil code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the publication
when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette.
Issues:
1. Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.
2. Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in full.
3. Whether or not publication be made in the Official Gazette considering its releases and limited readership.
Ruling + Ratio
1. Yes. The unless it is otherwise provided clause refers to the date of effectivity and not the publication requirement. Publication is indispensable in every case
because omission would offend the due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.
2. Yes. The publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the law.
3. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The
Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
Disposition
All laws as above define shall immediately upon their approval or as soon thereafter as possible be published in fill in the Official Gazette to become effective only
after 15 days from their publication or another date specified by legislature.
Author: Elreen Joy O. de Guzman
De Roy vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. 80718 (1988)
Petition: Special civil action for certiorari seeks to review the resolutions of the CA
Petitioner: Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al.

Defendant: Court of Appeals
Ponente: Cortes
Doctrine: Publication
Facts:
The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop owned by the family of respondents resulting in injuries to
respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter.
Private respondents have been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop but the former failed to do so.
In the RTC, petitioners were found guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On the last day of the 15-day period to file an
appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the appellate court. They again filed for a
motion for reconsideration but was subsequently denied.
The Supreme Court finds that Court of Appeal did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habulayas vs Japzon that the 15-day period for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
Counsel for petitioner contends that the said case should not be applied because of its non-publication in the Official Gazette.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the rule in the Habaluyas decision, stating that the 15-dayperiod for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended, could
be applied to the case at bar notwithstanding the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette.
Ruling + Ratio
1. Yes. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions on the Official Gazette before they can be binding as a condition to their becoming
effective. It is bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been
clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law journals.
Disposition
Petition denied for lack of merit.

Navarro vs. Domagtoy
GR No. 961088 (1996)
Petition: Administrative matter in the SC. Gross misconduct and inefficiency

Petitioner: Rodolfo G. Navarro
Defendant: Judge Hernando Domagtoy
Ponente: Romero
Doctrine:
Facts:
Mayor Navarro of Dapa, Surigao del Norte filed a complaint on two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando
Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in office and ignorance of the law.
It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja despite the lack of a summary proceeding for the declaration of Mr.
Tagadans first wifes (Ida Pearanda) presumptive death. Respondent states that the joint affidavit presented by the groom confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan
and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years is sufficient proof of Ida Pearandas presumptive death, and therefore, an sufficient reason for
him to proceed with the marriage ceremony.
It was alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction. The judge
holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his
residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the marriages solemnized by the respondent judge are valid under the Family Code.
Ruling + Ratio
1. No and Yes. The first marriage is not valid. Article 41 of the Family Code requires that even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage. Since Gaspar
Tagadan failed to present such judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Respondent judge erred in accepting the joint affidavit submitted by
the groom. The marriage solemnized has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage as provided under Article 35 of the Family Code, The following
marriage shall be void from the beginning; (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not falling under Article 41.
Second marriage is valid. Under Article 7(1), marriage may be solemnized by, among others, any incumbent member of the Judiciary within the Courts
jurisdiction. Respondent Judge solemnized wedding in place which does not fall within his jurisdictional area. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his
courts jurisdiction, while there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, the validity of the marriage is not affected. It is the
officiating official, respondent Judge, who shall be subject to administrative liability.
Disposition
Judge Domagtoy is suspended for 6 months and given a stern warning that a repetition of same acts will be dealt more severely.
Beso vs. Daguman
GR No. 991211 (2000)
Petition: Administrative matter in the SC. Neglect of duty and abuse of authority
Petitioner: Zenaida S. Beso
Defendant: Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr.
Ponente: Ynares- Santiago
Facts:
Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing marriage outside his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not
registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar.
On August 28, 1997, the complainant and complainants fiance, Bernardito A. Yman, got married under the solemnization of the respondent in the respondents
residence in Calbayog City, Samar despite the fact that defendants jurisdiction is in Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar and that after the wedding,
Yman abandoned the complainant.
When Yman left, the complainant inquired to the City Civil Registrar to inquire regarding her Marriage Contract. The complainant found out that her marriage
was not registered and she wrote to the respondent to inquire and the former found out that all the copies were taken by Yman and no copy was retained by the
respondent.
The respondent stated with the following rationale: Respondent solemnized the marriage because of the urgent request of the complainant and Yman. He also
believed that being a Filipino overseas worker, the complainant deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government policy;
Respondent was also leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may be not too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married;
Respondents failure to file the marriage contract was beyond his control because Yman absconded with the missing copies of the marriage certificate and he
however, tried to recover custody of the missing documents.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated, August 11, 1998 found the respondent Judge committed non-feasance in office
and recommended that he be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000).
Issue:
1. Whether or not respondent Judge is liable for solemnizing the marriage outside of his courts jurisdiction.
2. Whether or not respondent Judge is liable for negligently not retaining a copy and not registering the marriage before the office of the Local Civil Registry.
Ruling + Ratio
1. Yes. The judge solemnized a marriage outside of his jurisdiction. Article 7 of the Family Code provides that marriage may be solemnized by, Any incumbent
member of the judiciary with the courts jurisdiction. In relation , according to Article 8 of the Family Code, there are only three instances with which a judge
may solemnize a marriage outside of his jurisdiction:
when either or both the contracting parties is at the point of death, when the residence of either party is located in a remote place and where both of the
parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to
that effect. In this case, none of the three instances is present.
2. Yes. The judge committed negligence. Pursuant to Article 23 of the Family code, such duty to register the marriage is the respondents duty. There is no
justification for missing records save fortuitious events. However, the records show that the loss was occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judges part.
Disposition
Respondent Judge is fined 5,000 and sternly warned.
Chu Jan vs. Bernas
GR No. 10010 (1916)
Petition: Appeal from a judgement of the Court of First Instance of Albay

Petitioner: Chinaman, Chu Jan
Defendant: Lucio Bernas
Ponente: Araullo
Facts:
A cockpit match was held and the referee declared the defendants cock the winner and so the plaintiff brought a suit against the defendant asking that his own
roster be declared a inner.
The justice of the peace court decided that the bout was a draw where defendant appealed this decision praying judgment and ordering defendant to abide and
comply with rules and regulations governing cockfights, to pay stipulated wager of P160 and return the other amount which is in safekeeping of Cockpit owner
Tomas Almonte.
Defendant denied allegations and moved to dismiss cost against plaintiff.
Court of First Instance rendered judgment dismissing the appeal without special findings.
Included in plaintiff's motion, an order to provincial treasurer and if possible, Municipal Treasurer of Tabacco to release Deposit of P160 and return to plaintiff
Chu Jan. Proceedings was forwarded to Supreme Court by means of the proper bill of exceptions.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing the case since the ground for dismissal was that he is not familiar with the rules governing cockfights and
duties of referees; that he does not know where to find the law and that he knows of no law that governs the right to plaintiff and defendants concerning
cockfights.
Ruling + Ratio
1. Yes. Ignorance of the court or lack of knowledge regarding law applicable to a case submitted to him for decision are not reasons that can serve to excuse the
court for terminating the proceedings by dismissing them without deciding on the issue. Such excuse is less acceptable because foreseeing that a case may arise
to which no law would be applicable, the Civil Code in 2nd paragraph of Art 6, provides that Customs of the place shall be observed and in absence thereof, the
general principles of law.
Disposition
Judgment and the order appealed from are reversed and the record of the proceedings shall be remanded to the court from whence they came for due trial and
judgment as provided by law.

People vs. Veneracion
GR No. 119987-88 (1995)
Petition: Petition for certiorari to review a decision of the RTC.

Petitioner: People
Defendant: Veneracion
Ponente: Kapunan
Facts:
A cadaver of young girl later identified as Angel Alquiza, wrapped in a sack and yellow table cloth tied with a nylon cord with both feet and left hand protruding
was seen floating in Binondo, Manila.
Abundio Lagunday, a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey and Henry Lagarto y Petilla were later charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide in an Information dated August 8, 1994
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital Judicial Region.
The trial court rendered a decision finding the defendants Henry Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero y Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Rape with Homicide and sentenced both accused with the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided for by law.
City Prosecutor of Manila filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that the Decision be modified in that the penalty of death be imposed against respondents
Lagarto and Cordero, in place of the original penalty (reclusion perpetua) which was denied by the court.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the judge is allowed any discretion in imposing either the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or Death.
Ruling + Ratio
1. No. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are
guided by the Rule of law and ought to protect and enforce without fear or favor, resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the
interference of their own personal beliefs. In this case the respondent judge must impose the death penalty. This is consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil
Code Article 9 that no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.
Disposition
The case is hereby remanded to the RTC for the imposition of the penalty of death.
People vs. Purisima
GR No. 42050-66,46229-32,46313-16,46997 (1978)
Petition: Petition for review of the decisions of the Courts of First of Manila dn Samar
Petitioner: Gamboa, Martin, Cajucom, Office of the City Fiscal of Manila and the Office of Provincial Fiscal of Samar
Defendant: Paro, de la Marced, de Jesus, Apostol, Purisima
Ponente: Muoz Palma
Facts:
There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office
of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.
On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them the details of which will be
recounted below an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the
offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the petitioners arguments as to the intention and scope of PD No. 9 (3) correct.
Ruling + Ratio
1. No. The peoples interpretation of PD 9 (3) results in absurdity at times. We may add a situation where a law-abiding citizen, a lawyer by profession, after
gardening in his house remembers to return the bolo used by him to his neighbor who lives about 30 meters or so away and while crossing the street meets a
policeman. The latter upon seeing the bolo being carried by that citizen places him under arrest and books him for a violation of P.D. 9(3). Could the presidential
decree have been conceived to produce such absurd, unreasonable, and insensible results?
The Supreme Court reiterates that the intention of PD No. 9 (3) is to penalize the acts which are those related to the desired result of Proc. No. 1081 and Gen.
Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are to suppress those who commit or abet lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts and the like.
Disposition
We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and We AFFIRM the Orders of respondent Judges dismissing or quashing the Information concerned.
Articles 11-12 Customs
MARTINEZ vs VAN BUSKIRK (year)
Plaintiffs-appellees: S.D. Martinez and Carmen Ong de Martinez
Defendant-Appellant: William Van Buskirk
Ponente: Moreland
FACTS:
1. Carmen Ong de Martinez was riding in a carromata on Calle Real in Ermita, Manila. She and her child were severely
wounded when the delivery wagon of William Van Buskirk ran into the carromata that they were riding.
2. The servant of the defendant ran away.
ISSUE
Whether or not the force of custom is above the law.
Held: No
Ratio:
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to deliver merchandise of
the kinds of that being delivered at the time of injury, in the manner in w/c that was then being delivered; and that it is the
universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at the time of the accident. This is the custom in
all cities. It has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has
acquiesced for years without objection. Ought the public now, through the courts, without prior objection or notice, to be
permitted to reverse the practice of decades and thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every reason and assurance
to believe that he was acting under the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces, the custom of a people. The contrary is
true.
Ruling: The judgment is reversed, without special finding as to costs. So ordered.
YAO KEE vs SY-GONZALES

Petitioners: Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen
Respondents: Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manula Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe, Rodolfo Sy and Honorable Court of Appeals
Ponente: Cortes
FACTS:
1. Sy-Kiat, a Chinese national died in Caloocan City where he was tehn residing. He left behind real and personal properties
here in the Philippines worth P300,000 more or less.
2. Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuwl Sy, Teresity Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition that they are the children of the
deceased with Asuncion Gillego, to their knowledge Sy Kiat died intestate, they do not recognize Sy Kiats marriage to Yao
Kee and they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as adminitratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased.
3. The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged that: Yao Kee is the lawful wife
of Sy Kiat, the other oppositors are legitimate childeren of the deceased with Yao Kee and Sze SOok Wah is the eldest among
them and is competent, willing and desirous to become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat.
4. Finding of the court: Sy Kiat legally married Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chum Yen are the legitimate
children of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat and Aida Sy-Gonzales and her siblings are acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with
Asuncion Gillego.
5. The probate court rendered judgment in favor of the oppositors; this was modified and set aside by the CA w/c held that
both sets of children were acknowledged natural children. Both parties moved for partial reconsideration.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent court of appeals seriously erred in declaring the marriage of Sy-Kiat to Yao Yee as not have
been proven valid in accordance with lawas of the Peoples Republic of China.
HELD: No
RATIO
Because the plaintiff failed to present evidence of foreign law or custom vis-a-vis the validity of the marriage in accordance
to the proposed custom, the marriage cannot be recognized.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally
binding and obligatory." The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence." On
this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right can not be considered by a court of justice
unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact." The same evidence, if not one of a
higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.
In the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as ours.
RULING:
the decision of the Courts of Appeals I hereby affirmed.
Article 13 Computation of Period and Time
GARCIA vs RECIO
Petitioner: Grace J. Garcia
Respondent: Rederick Recio
Ponente: Panganiban
FACTS:
1. Rederick Recio (Filipino) was married to Editha Samson (Australian citizen) in Malabon, Rizal in 1987 and lived together as
husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, their marriage was dissolved by decree of divorce issued by the Australian Family
Court.
2. In 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship" from the Australian
government.
3. In 1994, Recio married petitioner Grace Garcia (a Filipina) in Cabanatuan City where the respondent was declared as
"single" and "Filipino"
4. In 1995, Recio and Garcia lived separately without prior dissolution of marriage with their conjugal assets divided in 1996
in Australia.
5. In 1998, Garcia filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of "bigamy" because Recio was
alleged to have a subsisting marriage at the time of his marriage with Garcia in 1994. Garcia claimed that she only knew
about the previous marriage in 1997.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the divorce between Recio and Samson was proven.
2. Whether or not Recio has Legal Capacity to remarry.
HELD
1.Yes
2.No
Ratio:
1. Samson and Recio's divorce appears to be authentic as issued by an Australian family court. Compliance iwth the Family
Code is not necessary. Recio was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in
1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with a political and civil rights belonging to a
citizen. By becoming an Australian, Recio severed his allegiance to the Philippine and the vinculum juris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws
2.
3. .
4. The court held that respondents presentation of a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree-a conditional or provisional
judgment of divorce showed that the divorce obtained may have been restricted; it did not absolutely establish his legal
capacity to remarry according to national law. Respondent also failed to submit a Certificate of Legal Capacity together with
the application for a marriage license required by Article 21 of the Family Code which would have been admitted as a prima
facie evidence of his legal capacity to marry. The Court finds no absolute evidence that proves that respondent, who was
then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994.
RULING
The Supreme Court REMAND the case to the RTC of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.
Article 15 Nationality Rule
VAN DORN vs RONILLO, JR., et al
[Petition of Certiorari and Prohibition]: petioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the orders of the respondent Judge
which denied her Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 1075-P and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order
Petitioner: Alicia Van Dorn
Respondents: Hon. Manuel Romillo, Jr. And Richard Upton
Ponente: Melencio-Herrera
FACTS:
1.Petitioner Alicia Reyes is a Filipino citizen while the private respondent is an American citizen. The two were married in
Hongkong in 1972 and then established their residence in the Philippines. They had 2 children. The parties were divorced in
Nevada, USA in 1982.
2. Alicia Reyes re-married in Nevada this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
3. Private respondent filed suit against Alicia Reyes Van Dorn stating that petitioner's business(Galleon Shop) in Ermita,
Manila is a CONJUGAL property of the parties and asking that the petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that
business and that private respondent be declared with RIGHT to MANAGE the conjugal property.
4. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is bared by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community
property".
5. The Court denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce
Decree has no bearing in the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Galleon Shop, a property situated in Ermita, Manila, can still be considered as a conjugal property
between the petitioner and the private respondent after their divorce obtained in USA.
Held: No
RATIO:
1. Pursuant to the national law of the private respondent, he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by
the Decision of his county's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him,and whose decision he does not deny, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
2. To maintain that the private respondent is still married to the petitioner is unjust. Petitioner should not be subject to a
wife's obligation. The private respondent should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
RULING:
Petition is granted and the respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed by the private respondent (Case No.
1075-P)
BARRETO vs GONZALES
Plaintiffs-appellee: Manuela Barretto Gonzalez
Defendant-Appellant: Augusto C. Gonzalez
Ponente: Hull
FACTS:
1. Plaintiff and defendant are Filipino citizens and residents of Manila. They were married in 1919 in Manila and lived
together as husband and wife until 1926. They had 4 children.
2. It was mutually agreed to allow the plaintiff for her support and that of her children, P500 monthly (to be increased in case
of illness or necessity) and the title of certain properties to be put inher name.
3. Husband went to Reno, Nevada and secured in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion in 1927
and on the same date married another Filipina (with whom he had 3 children). He then lived in California and returned to the
Philippines in 1928 where he has since remained. When the defendant left he reduced the amount he had agreed to pay
monthly for the support of his wife and 4 minor children and has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as
alimony.
4. After his return, the wife brought action in the Court of 1st Instance of Manila requesting that the courts of the PH confirm
and ratify the decree of divorce issued in Nevada: The decree of divorce shall dissolve the community of property as soon as
such decree becomes final, but shall not dissolve the bonds of matrimony until 1 year thereafter.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce obtained in Nevada, USA be recognized and approved by the Philippine courts.
Held: No
RATIO:
1. The entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted to this court, in which
both parties prayed for the ratification and confirmation of the Reno divorce, clearly indicates a purpose to circumvent the
laws of the PH regarding divorce and to secure themselves a change of status for reasons and under conditions not
authorized by the PH laws.
2. At all times the matrimonial domicile of the couple has been within the Philippines and the residence acquired in the State
of Nevada by the husband of the purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not grant jurisdiction
upon the Court of that State to dissolve the bonds if matrimony in which he had entered in 1919.
Doctrine:
Article 11
... The prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and those intended to promote public order and
good morals, shall not be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or judgments or by anything done or agreements
entered into a foreign country
RULING:
Judgment of the Court of 1st Instance of City of Manila must be REVERSED and defendant ABSOLVED from the demands
made against him in this action without prejudice to any right of maintenance that plaintiff and the intervenors may have
against defendant
GOVERNMENT vs FRANK
Plaintiffs-appellee: The Government of the Philippine Islands
Defendant-Appellant: George Frank
Ponente: Johnson
FACTS:
1. April 17, 1903, in Chicago, the defendant through a representative of the Insular Gov't of the PH, entered into contract for
a period of 2 years with the plaintiff by which the defendant was to receive a salary of 1,200 USD per year as a stenographer
in the service of the said plaintiff, and in addition thereto was to be paid in advance the expenses incurred in traveling from
Chicago to Manila and 1/2 salary during said period of travel.
2. Said contract contained a provision that in case of a violation of its terms on the part of the defendant, he should become
liable to the plaintiff for the amount expended by the Gov't by way of expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to Manila
and 1/2 salary paid during such period
3. The defendant entered upon the performance of his contract upon April 30, 1903, and was paid 12 salary from the date
until June 4, 1903, the date of his arrival in the Philippines.
4. On February 11, 1904, the defendant left the service of the plaintiff and refused to make a further compliance with the
terms of the contract
5. On December 3, 1904, the plaintiff filed an action in the Court of 1st Instance in Manila to recover from the defendant the
sum of 269.23 USD.
6. It was expressly agreed between the parties to said contract that Laws No. 80 and 224 should constitute a part of said
contract.
7. Lower court rendered a judgment against the defendant who shall pay the plaintiff 265.90USD. (minus the 3.33USD owed
by the plaintiff to the defendant)
8. Defendant appealed purporting the following errors: (1) sustaining plaintiff's objections to defendants special defenses
and (2) rendering judgment against the defendant on the facts
9. Defendant claims that he was an adult when he left Chicago but was a minor when he arrived at Manila; that he was an
adult when he made the contract but was a minor at the time the plaintiff attempted to enforce the contract, more than a
year later
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant was already an adult when he made the contract with the plaintiff to make the latter valid.
Held: Yes
RATIO:
The defendant being fully qualified to enter into the contract at the place and time the contract was made, he cannot plead
infancy as defense at the place where the contract is being enforced.
RULING:
Judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs.
BARNUEVO vs FUSTER
Plaintiff-appellant: Constanza Barnuevo
Defendant-Appellant: Gabriel Fuster
Ponente: Johnson
FACTS:
1. On February 7, 1875, Gabriel Fuster and Contanza Barnuevo married in a Catholic marriage in Malaga, Spain.
2. On February 1892, Gabriel Fuster came to the Philippines and acquired real and personal property. Towards the middle of
1896, Contanza came to Manila and lived with her husband in conjugal relations until April 1899.
3. On April 4, 1899, they made an agreement in a public document by which they "resolved to separate and live apart, both
consenting to such separation, and by virtue thereof the husband authorized the wife to move to Spain, there to reside in
such place as the said lady pleases"
4. Fuster undertook in the same document to send his wife a sum of 300 pesetas monthly for her support, payable in Madrid
from June 1899 but he only complied until August 1899.
5. Contanza Barnuevo returned to Manila in 1909 to file a divorce against her husband on the ground of adultery committed
by Fuster.
6. Fuster denied that either he or his wife was a resident of the city of Manila. He argued that they had their domicile in
Barcelona, Spain and he alleged that both of them were natives and subjects of Spain.
7. Fuster denied Barnuevo's statements concerning the possession of real and personal property of the conjugal partnership,
the statement of their amount, and their qualification as being all conjugal property.
8. The Court of 1st Instance of Manila held to have jurisdiction, decreed the suspension of life in common between Barnuevo
and Fuster and directed the communal property to be divided between the parties.
9. Both parties appealed but the partition of the property by means of commissioners was proceeded.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila has jurisdiction over the divorce filed by Barnuevo against
Fuster who are citizens of Spain.
2. Whether or not the the Philippine courts has jurisdiction over the partition of properties of a Spanish couple who were
married in Spain obtained their divorce in the Philippines
Held:
1. Yes
2. Yes
RATIO:
The Court of 1st Instance of Manila did not lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic
subjects, they were residents of Manila and had their domicile herein.
a) The defendant had not proved that he had elsewhere a legal domicile other than which he manifestly had in the
Philippines during the 17 years preceding the date of the complaint. He had kept open house and had acquired in
the city of Manila quite a little real property which is not the object of conjugal society. The plaintiff, without the
proof to the contrary, that his wife resided in Manila from middle of 1896 until April 1899.
b) Article 36 of the Civil Code: "Spaniards who change their domicile to a foreign country, where they may be
considered as natives without other conditions than that of residents therein, shall be required in order to preserve
the Spanish nationality, to state that such is their wish before the Spanish diplomatic or consular agent, who must
record them in the registry of Spanish residents, as well as their spouses, should they be married, and any children
they may have."
RULING:
Partition of property decreed in the judgment appealed should be confirmed.
The 2 judgments appealed from are confirmed

VAN DORN v. ROMILLO, JR. (1985)
PETITION: Certiorari & Prohibition
PETITIONER: Alice Reyes Van Dorn
DEFENDANTS: Hon. Manuel V. Romillo, Jr., Richard Upton
PONENTE: Melencio-Herrera
DOCTRINE: While it is true that Article 15 of the Civil Code states that only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces because it is against our concept of public policy and morality, aliens, HOWEVER, may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines provided that they are valid in their national law.
FACTS
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Philippine citizen, and respondent Richard Upton, a U.S. citizen, were married in Hongkong in 1972, and
afterwards established their residence here in the Philippines. They got divorced in Nevada, U.S., in 1982. The petitioner also re-married in
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
On June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Regional Trial Court in Pasay City. According to him, the business property
of the parties is conjugal, and he was asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business and for him to be declared
rightful in managing said property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment
in the divorce proceedings in Nevada court where the respondent acknowledged he had no community property with petitioner as of June 11,
1982.
Court denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines and therefore the Divorce Decree
has no bearing in the case.
The denial was submitted as a subject to Certiorari proceeding, wherein petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on
the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American court that they had no
community of property, that Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondents claim is barred by prior
judgment. Respondent on the other hand stated that divorce decree issued by Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the
Philippines and its declared national policy, that the acts and declarations of a foreign court cannot divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WON the divorce decree obtained in Nevada is valid and binding in the Philippine jurisdiction as it is contrary to local law and public
policy.
PROVISION & ELEMENTS
Article 15 of the Civil Code
Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad.
HOWEVER, aliens may obtain divorces abroad and may be recognized in the Philippines provided that they are valid in their national law.
RATIO & RULING

YES, divorce decree obtained in Nevada is valid and binding in Philippine jurisdiction.
In accordance with respondents national law, he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue as the
petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own countrys Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision does not repudiate him, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
DISPOSITION: Petition is granted, and respondent Judge ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court
add, the right of the former wife to a share in the testators estate
TESTATE ESTATE OF BOHANAN had already been passed upon adversely against her in an order
v. BOHANAN, et al. (1960) which had become final and which she did not appear to have
appealed therefrom to question its validity. When she filed for a
PETITION: Appeal against an order of the Court of First
motion to withdraw a sum from the funds of the estate, court in
Instance of Manila
its said order found that there existed no community property
PETITIONERS: Testate Estate of C.O. Bohanan, Philippine
owned by decedent and former wife at the time of the decree of
Trust Co.
divorce was issued. The latter has no legal claim to any portion of
DEFENDANT: Magdalena Bohanan, Edward Bohanan, Mary
the estate.
Lydia Bohanan
PONENTE: Labrador
ISSUE: Whether or not the testamentary dispositions, especially
DOCTRINE: The validity of testamentary dispositions are to be
those for the children which are short of the legitime given them
governed by the national law of the testator.
by the Civil Code of the Philippines are valid.
FACTS
The testator C.O. Bohanan was born in Nebraska and
therefore was a citizen of that state. Notwithstanding long
Real property as well as personal property is subject to the
residence of the decedent in the Philippines, his stay here was
law of the country where it is situated.
merely temporary and he remained a citizen of the United
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
States and of the state of his particular choice, which is Nevada.
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
Magdalena Bohanan and her two children questioned the successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of the estate, testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
claiming that they have been deprived of the legitime that the law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
laws of the forum concede to them. Out of the total estate of whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless
P211, 639.33 in cash, the testator gave his grandson P90,819.67 of the country where said property may be found.
and one half of all shares of stock of several mining companies RATIO & RULING
to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children he YES, the testamentary dispositions are valid.
gave a legacy of only P6,000 each. The will has not given the
It is not disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to
wife, Magdalena, any share in the estate.
dispose of all his properties by will. The failure of the testator to
It was argued by the widow that the trial court committed an give his children two thirds of the estate left by him at the time
error in recognizing the Reno divorce secured by the testator of his death is accordance to the laws of the forum.
from her, and that said divorce should be declared a nullity in
this jurisdiction. The court refused to recognize such claim on DISPOSITION: Order of the court approving the project of
the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions is
citizen, allowed him to dispose all of his properties without affirmed, with costs against appellants.
requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife. To
law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
BELLIS v. BELLIS (1967) whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless
PETITION: Appeal to the Supreme Court from an order of the of the country wherein said property may be found.
Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving Art. 16 renders applicable the national law of the decedent, in
the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. intestate or testamentary successions with regards to four items:
37089 therein. (a) the order of succession;
PETITIONERS: Testate Estate of Amos G. Bellis, People's Bank (b) the amount of successional rights;
and Trust Company, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma (c) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and
Bellis (d) the capacity to succeed.
DEFENDANTS: Edward A. Bellis, et al. Article 1039 of the Civil Code
PONENTE: Bengzon
DOCTRINE: Whatever public policy or good customs may be Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of
involved in our System of Legitimes, Congress has not intended the decedent.
to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it RATIO & RULING
has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of YES, national law should apply.
successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of
provisions must prevail over general ones. Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. Even if
FACTS there was a conflict of law between domicile and nationality rule,
Amor G. Bellis was born in and a citizen of Texas. He had five it would still refer back to Texas law and would not result to the
legitimate children with his first wife (whom he divorced), three doctrine of renvoi. Given that the decedent executed two wills,
legitimate children with his second wife and three illegitimate even if it is assumed that the intention of executing one as a
children. separate Philippine will was so that the Philippine law would
August 5, 1952 Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the govern, properties would still not be distributed according to
Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations Philippine law as such is illegal and void; national law cannot be
and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable ignored regarding those matters.
estate should be divided, in trust, in an order and manner he
specified. He wanted 1) his first wife to get $240,000.00; 2) his DISPOSITION: Order of the probate court is affirmed in toto,
three illegitimate children to get P120,000.00 (or P40,000.00 with costs against appellants
each); and after these two have been satisfied, 3) the remainder
to go, in equal shares, to his seven surviving children by his first
and second wives.
July 8, 1958 Amos died a resident of Texas.
September 15, 1958 - His will was admitted to probate at the
Court of First Instance, Manila. The Peoples Bank and Trust
Company, as the will executor, paid all bequests to the first wife
and three illegitimate children. Their respective legacies were
released from time to time as how the lower court approved and
allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three
requesting partial advances.
January 8, 1964 Executor submitted and filed a report
regarding the satisfaction of the legacies of the first wife and
three illegitimate children, and the project of partition on the
division of the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the
legitimate children.
January 17, 1964 Two illegitimate children, Maria Cristina and
Miriam Palma, filed oppositions to the project of partition,
saying that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children and thus compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Lower court overruled their oppositions and their motions for
reconsideration have been denied.
Oppositors-appellants appealed to the Supreme Court to raise
the issue of which law is to be applied, Texas or Philippine.
ISSUE: WON the national (Texas) law should apply in the

execution of the will of the decedent.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen
AZNAR v. GARCIA (1963) of the United States and of the State of California at the time of
PETITION: Appeal from a decision of the Court of First his death. There is also no question that at the time of his death
Instance of Davao he was domiciled in the Philippines.
PETITIONERS: Adolfo C. Aznar & Lucy Christensen The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the
DEFENDANT: Helen Christensen Garcia conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question
PONENTE: Labrador has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law
DOCTRINE: The theory of the doctrine of renvoi is that the of California provides no legitime for children while the
court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must Philippine law.
take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but
also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the DISPOSITION: The decision appealed from is reversed and the
actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction case returned to the lower court with instructions that the
prescribe. partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
FACTS Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees
Edward Christensen, a citizen of the United States (California),
was domiciled in the Philippines, yet still recognized himself as
a citizen of the former.
He made a will which was executed in the Philippines on
March 5, 1951 acknowledging his natural daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen as his only heir. He left an amount of money to
Maria Helen Christensen, his daughter which the Supreme
Court later on declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of
his, even if he declared in the will that she was not in any way
related to him. He declared that the remainder and residue of
his income, real and personal property, etc., was to be given to
Maria Lucy.
Helen filed an opposition to the partition, stating that it
deprived her of her legitime as acknowledged natural child of
the deceased. According to her, the distribution should be
governed by the laws of the Philippines, and that she was
entitled to one-half of the estate in full ownership. The Court of
First Instance, however, ruled that as Edward was a citizen of
the United States and the State of California at the time of his
death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the
provisions of his will are to be governed by the law of that state,
meaning the testator has the right to dispose of his property in
the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over
his property is sacred and inviolable.
Various motions for reconsideration were filed by Helen. But
they were denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law of the State of California is to

govern the validity of the testamentary dispositions of the
deceased.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both
with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless
of the country where said property may be found.
RATIO & RULING
YES, the law of the State of California governs, as it is the
national law of the deceased. But the national law mentioned in
Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the
California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the
reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's
domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946,
Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not
domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar.
ISSUE:
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE WON there was a perfected contract of insurance for DBP MRI
PHILIPPINES v. CA (1994) Pool to be held liable.
PETITION: For review on Certiorari
WON the DBP exceeded the scope of its authority when it
PETITIONERS: Development Bank of the Philippines
accepted Dan's application for MRI by collecting the insurance
DEFENDANT: Court of Appeal, the Estate of the late Juan B.
premium, and deducting its agent's commission and service fee.
Dans represented by Candida G. Dans & the DBP Mortgage
Redemption Insurance Pool
PONENTE: Quiason
DOCTRINE: Inasmuch as the non-disclosure of the limits of the
agency carries with it the implication that a deception was
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
perpetrated on the unsuspecting client, the provisions of
performance of his duties, act with justice give everyone his
Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines come
due and observe honesty and good faith.
into play.
FACTS
May 1987 Juan Dans, together with his wife Candida, son and
Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently
daughter-in-law, applied for a loan with the Development Bank
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
of the Philippines (DBP), Basilan Branch. As the principal
same.
mortgagor, Dans, 76 years of age, was advised by DBP to obtain
a mortgage redemption insurance (MRI) with the DBP Mortgage
Redemption Pool (DBP MRI Pool).
Any person, who willfully causes loss or injury to another in
A loan in a reduced amount was approved by DBP on August a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
4, 1987 and released on August 11, 1987. From the proceeds of the policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
loan, DBP deducted P1,476.00 as payment for the MRI premium. RATIO & RULING
On August 15, 1987, Dans accomplished and submitted the MRI NO, the DBP MRI Pool cannot be held liable. While the power
Application for Insurance and the Health Statement for DBP to approve MRI applications is lodged with the DBP MRI Pool, it,
MRI Pool. On August 20, 1987, the MRI premium of Dans, less however, did not approve the application of Dans. There is also
the DBP service fee of ten percent, was credited to DBP to the no showing that it accepted the sum of P1,476.00, which DBP
savings account of the DBP MRI Pool. DBP MRI Pool was credited to its account with full knowledge that it was payment
advised of the credit. for Dan's premium. There was, as a result, no perfected contract
September 3, 1987 Dans died of cardiac arrest. DBP relayed of insurance.
information to the DBP MRI Pool. BUT THE LIABILITY OF DBP IS ANOTHER MATTER.
September 23, 1988 DBP MRI Pool notified DBP that Dans YES, the DBP exceeded its authority. DBP, as a matter of policy
was not eligible for MRI coverage, because he was over the and practice, required Dans, the borrower, to
acceptance age limit of 60 years old at time of application.
Ocober 21, 1987 DBP told Candida Dans of disapproval of her
late husbands MRI application. DBP offered to refund the
premium which deceased has paid, but the wife refused to
accept it, demanding payment of face value of the MRI or an
amount equivalent to the loan. She also refused to accept an ex
gratia settlement DBP later offered.
February 10, 1989 respondent Estate, through Candida Dans,
filed a complaint with RTC against DBP and insurance pool for
Collection of Sum of Money with Damages. Respondent Estate
alleged that Dans became insured by the DBP MRI Pool when
DBP, with FULL KNOWLEDGE of Dans age at the time of
application, required him to apply for MRI, and later collected
the insurance premium. Respondent Estate prayed: 1) that the
sum of P139,500.00 it paid under protest for the loan be
reimbursed; 2) that the
mortgage debt of the deceased be declared fully paid; and 3) that
damages be awarded.
March 10, 1990 - the trial court rendered a decision in favor of
respondent Estate and against DBP. The DBP MRI Pool,
however, was absolved from liability, after the trial court found
no privity of contract between it and the deceased. The trial
court declared DBP in estoppel for having led Dans into
applying for MRI and actually collecting the premium and the
service fee, despite knowledge of his age ineligibility.
The DBP appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in
toto the decision of the trial court. The DBP's motion for
reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated April 20, 1993
thus this petition.
secure MRI coverage. DBP compelled him to apply with the DBP
MRI Pool for MRI coverage.
In dealing with Dans, DBP was wearing two legal hats: the first
as a lender, and the second as an insurance agent.
As an insurance agent, DBP made Dans go through the motion
of applying for said insurance, thereby leading him and his
family to believe that they had already fulfilled all the
requirements for the MRI and that the issuance of their policy
was forthcoming. Apparently, DBP had full knowledge that
Dans application was never going to be approved.
The DBP is not authorized to accept applications for MRI
when its clients are more than 60 years of age. Knowing all the
while that Dans was ineligible for MRI coverage because of his
advanced age, DBP exceeded the scope of its authority when it
accepted Dans application for MRI by collecting the insurance
premium, and deducting its agent's commission and service fee.
The liability of an agent who exceeds the scope of his authority
depends upon whether the third person is aware of the limits of
the agent's powers. There is no showing that Dans knew of the
limitation on DBP's authority to solicit applications for MRI.
Thus, Dans had been deceived by the non-disclosure thereof by
the agent, and the latter is liable for damages to him. The rule
that the agent is liable when he acts without authority is
founded upon the supposition that there has been some wrong
or omission on his part either in misrepresenting, or in
affirming, or concealing the authority under which he assumes
to act.
The DBP's liability, however, cannot be for the entire value of
the insurance policy. While Dans is not entitled to
compensatory damages, he is entitled to moral damages.
DISPOSITION: Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.-CV

No. 26434 is MODIFIED and petitioner DBP is ORDERED: (1) to
REIMBURSE respondent Estate of Juan B. Dans the amount of
P1,476.00 with legal interest from the date of the filing of the
complaint until fully paid; and (2) to PAY said Estate the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages
and the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as
attorney's fees. With costs against petitioner.
Every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the
UYPITCHING v. QUIAMCO performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
(2006) RATIO & RULING
PETITION: For review on Certiorari YES, the petitioner corporation abused the exercise of its right
PETITIONERS: Ernesto Ramos Uypitching & Ramas Uypitching as seller-mortgagee.
Sons, Inc. While it is true that a mortgagee may take steps to recover the
DEFENDANT: Ernesto Quiamco mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect its
PONENTE: Corona foreclosure right, there is, however, a well-defined procedure for
DOCTRINE: There is an abuse of right when it is exercised the recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee
solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise of a right must is unable to obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale
be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover such
and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial
intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to foreclosure.
the injured party will attach. Petitioner corporation, acting through its co-petitioner
FACTS Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the lawful procedure for the
1982 Respondent was approached by three men; Davalan, enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of respondent.
Gabutero and Generoso, to settle the civil aspect of a criminal Petitioners acts violated the law as well as public morals, and
case for robbery filed by Quiamco against them. They transgressed the proper norms of human relations.
surrendered to him a red Honda motorcycle and a photocopy of Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right,"
its certificate of registration. The three never came back when prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or
asked for the original certificate of registration. contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself
Turned out that on October 1981 The motorcycle was sold on to liability. It seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use,
installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner Ramas Uypitching a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends.
Sons, Inc. which was owned and managed by the petitioner.
When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan DISPOSITION: Petition is DENIED. The July 26, 2000 decision
assumed the obligation and continued the payments. In and October 18, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
September 1982, however, Davalan stopped paying the G.R. CV No. 47571 are AFFIRMED. Triple costs against
remaining installments and told the petitioner corporations petitioners, considering that petitioner Ernesto Ramas
collector that motorcycle had been taken by respondents men. Uypitching is a lawyer and an officer of the court, for his
January 26, 1991 Petitioner, accompanied by policemen, went improper behavior.
to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the motorcycle. Police
team also tried to find the respondent. Uypitching paced back
and forth inside the establish ment, saying Quimco is a thief of
a motorcycle. The respondent was not found. On petitioners
instructions and over the clerks objection, the police took the
motorcycle.
February 18, 1991 Petitioner filed a criminal complaint for
qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law against
respondent. Respondent moved for the dismissal because the
complaint did not charge an offense because he neither stole nor
bought the motorcycle. The complaint was dismissed and
petitioner was denied motion for reconsideration.
Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioner for
the following: 1) unlawful taking of the motorcycle; 2) utterance
of a defamatory remark (that respondent was a thief); and 3)
precipitate filing of a baseless and malicious complaint. Such
acts humiliated and embarrassed the respondent and injured his
reputation and integrity.
The Trial Court rendered a decision finding petitioner was
motivated with malice and ill will when he did aforementioned
actions against respondent.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed it.
Petitioners also sought reconsideration but it was denied. Thus
they filed petition.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner corporation abused the exercise of

its right as seller-mortgagee to recover the mortgaged vehicle
preliminary to the enforcement of its right to foreclose on the
mortgage in case of default.
VILLALVA v. RCBC SAVINGS BANK (2006)
PETITION: For review on Certiorari
PETITIONERS: SPS. Mario & Corazon Villalva
DEFENDANT: RCBC Savings Bank
PONENTE: Puno
DOCTRINE: Enrichment consists of every patrimonial, physical, or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in money. It may also take the form of avoidance of
expenses and other indispensable reductions in the patrimony of a person, as well as the prevention of a loss or injury.
FACTS
Petitioner spouses issued 48 checks to cover installment payments due on promissory note executed in favor of Toyota, Quezon Avenue for the purchase of a Toyota
Corolla.
The promissory notes were secured by a Chattel Mortgage executed by the petitioner spouses on the vehicle in favor of Toyota Quezon Ave. Under the Deed of
Chattel Mortgage, the petitioners were to insure the vehicle against loss or damage.
The promissory notes and chattel mortgage were assigned to RCBC Savings Bank. Evidence showed that the petitioner spouses faithfully complied with the
obligation of insuring the mortgaged vehicle from 1993 to 1996. From August 14, 1996 to August 14, 1997, the petitioners procured the necessary insurance but did not
deliver such to the respondent until January 17, 1997. As a consequence, the respondent had the mortgaged vehicle insured from October 21, 1996 to October 21, 1997.
The insurance policy obtained by respondent was cancelled due to the insurance policy secured by the petitioner spouses over the mortgaged vehicle, and the
respondent was reimbursed by Malayan Insurance Company. The premium paid by respondent bank exceeded the reimbursed amount.
February 10, 1999 Respondent sent a letter of demand to petitioners for an amount of money allegedly representing their unpaid obligations on the promissory
notes and mortgage as of January 31, 1999. Respondent demanded petitioners to surrender the vehicle within five days of notice. Petitioners ignored the demand
letter.
April 5, 1999 Complaint was filed by respondent for Recovery of Possession with Replevin with the MTC of Pasay. Petitioner spouses answered with Compulsory
Counterclaim, and asserted that they insured the mortgaged vehicle in compliance with the Deed of Chattel Mortgage.
The MTC ruled in favor of the petitioner spouses. The respondents Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Respondent appealed the decision to the RTC of Pasay,
which affirmed judgment of MTC.
The respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the
RTC. Petitioners filed Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied. Thus the petition.
ISSUE: WON petitioners failed to comply with their obligation to insure the subject vehicle under the Deed of Chattel Mortgage.
Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
RATIO & RULING
No, petitioners did not fail to comply with their obligation.
In the case at bar, respondent failed to demand that petitioners comply with their obligation to secure insurance coverage for the mortgaged vehicle. Petitioners had
not defaulted on their obligation to insure mortgaged vehicle and the condition sine qua non for respondent to exercise its right to pay the insurance premiums over
the subject vehicle has not been established.
The petitioner spouses, contrary to what the respondent contends, were not unjustly enriched when the latter obtained insurance coverage for the mortgaged
vehicles as the former had already obtained the required insurance coverage from August 14, 1996 to August 14, 1997.
DISPOSITION: Petition is granted. The decision of the Seventh Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated on July 8, 2004 and its resolution promulgated on September 28,
2004, are reversed and set aside. The June 28, 2002 decision and September 16, 2002 resolution of the MTC, Pasay City, Branch 45, as well as the March 21, 2003, decision of
the RTC, Pasay City, Branch 114, are reinstated. No costs.
Author: Mary Aubbrey Leigh B. Lim
PILAPIL vs. IBAY-SOMERA

GR No. 80116 June 30, 1989
Petition: Special civil action for certiorari and prohibition to review the order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. XXVI
Petitioner: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, wife

Respondents: Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera, Presiding Judge of RTC of Manila, Br. XXVI
Hon. Luis C. Victor, City Fiscal of Manila
Erich Ekkehard Geiling, husband
Ponente: Regalado, J.
Doctrine: Divorce and Nationality Principle

The fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country is admitted and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as the private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of the status of
persons.
FACTS:
1. On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen was married to private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling,
a German national in the Federal Republic of Germany.
2. After 3 and a half years of marriage, private respondent initiated a divorce proceeding against the petitioner in Germany and on January
15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of
failure of marriage of the petitioner. The records show that under the German law, said court was locally and internationally competent
for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that
foreign jurisdiction.
3. On June 27, 1986 or more than 5 months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed for two complains of adultery
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to said respondent, petitioner had an affair with William Chia as early as
1982 and with Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.
4. The respondent city fiscal approved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. The case
entitled People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge
while the other case entitled People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua was assigned to Judge Cruz of Branch XXV.
5. The Secretary of Justice in response to the petition filed by the petitioner directed the respondent city fiscal to defer any arraignment
proceedings if the accused has not yet been arraigned and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review.
Consequently, Judge Cruz suspended the proceedings in the case against Pilapil and Chua while the respondent judge on the other hand,
merely reset the date if the arraignment in the case against Pilapil and Chia. In an order dated September 8, 1987, the respondent Judge
denied the motion to quash filed by the petitioner and directed the arraignment of Pilapil and Chia. On October 21, 1987 this Court
issued a TRO enjoining the respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with
the criminal case. On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
6. Petitioner argues that the court is without jurisdiction to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense, since the
complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to
his filing of the criminal complaint.
ISSUE: WoN it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the
accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the filing of the criminal action.
PROVISION:
Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed
by the offended spouse.
RULING + RATIO:
Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence an adultery case under the imposture that
he was the offended spouse at the time he filed the suit.
The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse, and nobody else. Thus, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so
at the time of the filing of the criminal action. The person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this meant that he
is still married to the accused spouse at the time of the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that the private respondent obtained a valid divorce in Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may
be recognized in the Philippines insofar as the private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter
of the status of persons.
Furthermore, the allegation of the private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he
obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. The
severance of the marital bond had the effect of disassociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect
or cast obloquy on the other.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioners motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the
complaint in the Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is
hereby made permanent.
SAN LUIS vs. SAN LUIS

GR No. 133743 and GR No. 134029 February 6, 2007
Petition: Consolidated petitions for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the
Resolutions of the RTC of Makati denying petitioners motion for reconsideration
Petitioners: Edgar San Luis and Rodolfo San Luis

Respondent: Felicidad Sagalongos (alias Felicidad San Luis)
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.
Doctrine:
Divorce
When a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under the Philippine law.
Co-ownership
The rules on co-ownership shall govern the property acquired by either or both of the parties through their work or industry or their salaries and
wages under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code, whichever is applicable.
Meaning of the term residence for purposes of fixing the venue of actions
In election cases, residence and domicile are treated synonymous terms. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court,
the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
FACTS:
1. Felicisimo T. San Luis, the settlement of whose estate is involved in the present case has contracted three marriages during his lifetime.
First Marriage. On March 17, 1942, he married Virginia Sulit and they had six children. Virginia died on August 11, 1963.
Second Marriage. Five years later, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, an American Citizen, with whom he had a son. However, the
latter filed a divorce in Hawaii, USA and a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody was subsequently issued.
Third Marriage. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis in California, USA. He had no children with her but
he lived with her for 18 years up to his death on December 1992.
2. Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. Consequently, she filed
a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City praying that said letters of administration be issued
to her.
3. Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis who was later joined by Linda, children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed motions to dismiss which the
trial court denied. Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis separately filed motions for reconsideration. The
petitioners have the following arguments:
The petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of
residence, the latter being the Governor of the said province.
The respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the
time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
Paragraph 2, article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage with
Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 of the Family Code.
4. Respondent on the other hand, has the following oppositions:

She submitted documentary evidence that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went
home to their house in Alabang, Metro Manila.
She presented the decree of absolute divorce issued in Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already
been dissolved.
She claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the
doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
5. On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration.
6. Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court. The petitioners filed separate
motions for reconsideration which were denied. Hence, the current case appealing the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:
1. WoN the venue was properly laid
2. WoN respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration
PROVISIONS:
Art. 26 par. (2) of the Family Code

Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, xxx.
Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court

SECTION 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person xxx.
RULING + RATIO:
1. We Find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court.
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that residence for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
synonymous with domicile. For purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the residence of a person is his personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency.
Respondent proved that Felicisimo maintained residence in Alabang through presentation of evidence like the Deed of Absolute Sale,
billing statements, membership of the deceased in Ayala Alabang Village Association, letter-envelopes, and calling cards of the deceased
stating Alabang, Muntinlupa as his address.
2. We need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient
jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
As cited in the case of Republic v. Orbecido III, paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn
v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to re-marry under Philippine
Law. As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse.
With the enactment of paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial
precedent.
3. Notwithstanding the insufficiency of evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage if
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the USA, we find that the respondent has the legal personality to file the subject petition
for letters of administration as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired
through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved and therefore, this case must be remanded to
the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree and the subsequent marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
The respondent would qualify as an interested person who has direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo. Her legal capacity to file the
letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Art. 144 of the Civil Code
or Art. 148 of the Family Code.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the Feburuary 28, 1994 Order
of the RTC which denied petitioners motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed the petitioners motion for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
REPUBLIC vs. IYOY

GR No. 152577 September 21, 2005
Petition: Review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (represented by the Office of the Solicitor General)
Respondent: CRASUS L. IYOY
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
Doctrine:
Psychological Incapacity (Santos v Court of Appeals)
Definition
. . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68
of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated
Characteristics
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved
FACTS:
1. Respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City and had five children. In
1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a
letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent
Crasus learned that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. Fely continued to live with her American
family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A.
2. On March 25, 1997, respondent Crasus filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 22. Conversely, Fely filed her answer and counterclaim with the RTC on June 5, 1997.
3. Respondent Crasus alleges the following:

Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant
Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity
of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Respondent Crasus also questioned the personality of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to
institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages.
4. Fely on the other hand, alleges the following:

She was already an American citizen since 1988 and that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an
American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality.
Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint and that she left for abroad for financial reasons
as respondent Crasus had no job.
5. On October 30, 1998, the RTC declared the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio on the ground that it finds that
defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as striving for
family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support.
6. Petitioner Republic filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed
the appealed Judgment of the RTC, saying in addition that Fely has undoubtedly acquired her American husbands citizenship and thus
Art. 26 par (2) of the Family Code shall apply.
ISSUES:
1. WoN the totality of the evidence presented by respondent Crasus during trial is sufficient to support the finding of psychological
incapacity of Fely.
2. WoN Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar.
3. WoN the Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity
of marriages.
PROVISIONS:
Art. 36 of the Family Code
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization
Art. 26 par (2) of the Family Code

When a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under the Philippine law.
Art 48 of the Family Code

In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
RULING + RATIO:
1. The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely;
marriage of Crasus and Fely remains valid and susisting.
This Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological
incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines. It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on
the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical
abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under the said Article.
This Court sustains the validity and exi stence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most,
Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation
under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declarat ion of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the same Code.
2. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is not applicable to the case at bar.
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code cannot be applied because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was
still a Filipino citizen . Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted that she o btained a
divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984. In the same Answer, she
alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a
Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal
capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Thus, Fely could not have validly o btained a divorce fro m
respondent Crasus.
3. The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General
in several cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it. Furthermore, the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which became effective on 15 March 2003, as
issued by the Supreme Court recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated
30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.
REPUBLIC vs. ORBECIDO III

GR No. 154380 October 5, 2005
Petition: Petition for review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution dated July 4,
2002 denying the motion for reconsideration, declaring that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry
Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Respondent: CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III
Ponente: QUISUMBING, J.
Doctrine:
Expanded Applicability of Art 26 par (2) of the Family Code

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
Twin elements for the application of Art 26 par (2) of the Family Code:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
Reckoning Point for Art 26 par (2) of the Family Code

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
FACTS:
1. On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an,
Ozamis City. In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered
that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley.
2. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code.
Although he admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case, he insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce
decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.
3. The OSG on the other hand, contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it
only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy,
according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.
ISSUE: WoN respondent can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code
PROVISION:
Art. 26 par (2) of the Family Code
RULING + RATIO:
We are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has
been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry.
We hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an
American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. The naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present
in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
DISPOSITION: ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
NIAL vs. BAYADOG

GR No. 133778 March 14, 2000
Petition: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner: ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL,
JR.
Respondent: NORMA BAYADOG
Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Doctrine:
Rationale for exemption from marriage license requirement for 5-year cohabitation
The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant
with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. The
publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the
peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it
wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
Void marriage vs. Voidable marriage

A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as
having never to have taken place and cannot be the source of rights.
The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified.
A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally.
Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of
the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly
valid.
Action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes.
Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses, regarding co-
ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,1[23] and its effect on the children born to such void marriages as provided in
Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime
governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate.
FACTS:
1. On September 26, 1974, Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones. However, on April 24, 1985, Teodulfa was shot by Pepito
resulting in her death. One year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage
license stating in an affidavit that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from
securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died.
2. Petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack
of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioners successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are
not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
3. Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition saying that petitioners
should have filed the action to declare null and void their fathers marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article
47 of the Family Code.
ISSUES:
1. WoN plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased father,
Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead
2. WoN the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio
3. WoN plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved due to their fathers death
PROVISIONS:
The two marriages involved in this case were solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code and thus the provisions of the Civil Code will
apply being the law in effect at the time of their celebration.
Art. 53 of the NCC, now Art. 3 of the FC requisites for a valid marriage
Art. 80 of the NCC, now Art. 4 of the FC marriage solemnized without a marriage license shall be void ab initio save marriages of
exceptional character
Art. 58 of the NCC
Art. 76 of the NCC, now Art. 34 of the FC ratification of marital cohabitation
RULING + RATIO:
1. Petitioners have a cause of action.
Article 47 of the Family Code cannot be applied even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage because such provision
pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is
silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage.
Furthermore, the Court cited that a void marriage, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in
which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before
or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be
disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts.
2. The cohabitation between respondent and Pepito Nial was not the cohabitation contemplated by law thus it cannot be covered by
the exception to the requirement of a marriage license and is void ab initio lacking such element.
From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed.
Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the
spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing
Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
VILLANUEVA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 132955 October 27, 2006
Petition: Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela
Petitioner: ORLANDO VILLANUEVA

Respondent: HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA
Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
Doctrine:
Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage.

Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the spouses who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate.
The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as
lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence.
FACTS:
1. On April 13, 1988, Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married in Puerto Princesa,
Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage.
2. Petitioner alleges the following:
That threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant
prior to the marriage; that he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's
child died during delivery on August 29, 1988
That respondent Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in not granting the annulment of marriage, the
consent of petitioner having been vitiated by fraud and intimidation and that there was no cohabitation
The there were harassing phone calls from the appellee and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the
premises of the University of the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed
member of the New Peoples Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired by appellee and who accompanied him in going
to her home province of Palawan to marry her and that he was made to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with
his child when they were married.
3. Private respondent on the other hand refutes petitioners allegations arguing that the latter freely and voluntarily married her thus
praying for the dismissal of the petition and for the payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs.
4. The trial court dismissed the petition and ordered the plaintiff to pay moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00, exemplary damages
in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit.
5. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision but reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and
P25,000.00, respectively.
ISSUES:
1. WoN the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent
2. WoN petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees and costs
PROVISION:
Art. 45 par (3) and (4) of the Family Code
A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of marriage:
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud,
freely cohabitated with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such
party thereafter freely cohabitated with the other as husband and wife
RULING + RATIO:
1. Petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled due to the
absence of cohabitation between him and his wife since lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage.
The Court is disturbed by the circumstance that it was only on November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less than four (4) years and
eight (8) months when Orlando took serious step to have the same marriage annulled. The prolonged inaction evidently finds basis in
Lilias allegation that this annulment suit was filed by Orlando in the hope that the annulment may bring about his acquittal in the
criminal case for bigamy against him.
The Court is also not convinced that appellants apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to
enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage considering that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a security
guard in a bank. It is reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or the proper way to keep himself out of
harms way.
Furthermore, appellants excuse that he could not have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during their tryst
is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee. His
counsel also conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual relationship with the appellee.
As to the appellants allegation on the lack of cohabitation, the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any
of those grounds that may vitiate consent, hence the validity of his marriage must be upheld.
2. Private respondent is entitled to attorneys fees but the award of moral and exemplary damages is deleted for lack of factual and
legal basis.
There is no reference to any testimony of private respondent detailing her alleged physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as would entitle her to moral
damages. Also, as private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori, she is not entitled to exemplary damages since no
exemplary damages can be awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral damages.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 26, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832
affirming with modification the January 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No.
3997-V-92 dismissing petitioners petition for the annulment of his marriage with private respondent, is AFFIRMED. However, the award of
moral and exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of basis.
SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 112019 January 4, 1995
Petition: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner: LEOUEL SANTOS
Respondent: THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA BEDIA-SANTOS
Ponente: VITUG, J.
Doctrine:
Psychological Incapacity
Art 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our
law on marriage. The use of the phrase psychological incapacity under Art 36 of the Family Code has not been meant to comprehend
all such possible cases of psychoses, as likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity,
and like circumstances.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensibility or inability to give meaning and significance to marriage.
A spouses obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in marriage, unless there are
overpowering reasons such as, for instance, an incurable contagious disease on part of a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on
insanity. There may be also instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and have to live separately, but the marital
bond between the spouses always remains. (Padilla, J., Dissenting Opinion)
FACTS:
1. On September 20, 1986, Leouel Santos and Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos exchanged vows before Judge Lazaro of the Municipal Trial Court
of Iloilo City, followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding.
2. On May 1998, Julia left for the United States to work as a nurse despite Leouels pleas to dissuade her. She promised him through a
phone call seven months later that she would return home but she never did. When Leouel went to the US for a training program, he
desperately tried to locate Julia but his efforts were of no avail.
3. Leouel filed with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for Voiding of Marriage Under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the ground that Julias failure to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years
are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.
4. On November 6, 1991, the court a quo dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
5. Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUE:
WoN the wifes failure to communicate or at least to get in touch with his husband would constitute psychological incapacity under Art 36 of the
Family Code and would therefore render their marriage void.
PROVISION:
Art. 36 of the Family Code

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
RULING + RATIO:
The facts of the case at bench do not come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage.
The Court cited the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee and said the use of the phrase psychological incapacity under Art 36
of the Family Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses, as likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical
authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always
provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
DIGESTS FOR PERSONS & FAMILY RELATIONS
ANTONIO V. REYES
(Art. 36 of Family Code)

FACTS
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA). CA had reversed the judgment of the Makati
RTC declaring the marriage of Leonilo Antonio and Marie Ivonne Reyes, null and void.
Barely a year after their first meeting, Antonio and Reyes got married. After almost 2 years of being together, the petitioner filed a petition to have his
marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists
up to the present. Petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational
attainment and other events or things, to wit:
- Respondent concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, and introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of
her family. She confessed the truth when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage.
- She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters.
- She altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income.
- She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over her husband to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented a psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that respondents
persistent and constant lying to the petitioner was abnormal or pathological.
The lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held that respondents propensity to lying about almost anything had been duly established.
Such ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage.
Respondent filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals regarding the ruling of the lower court. CA ruled that the totality of the evidence presented was
insufficient to establish respondents psychological incapacity.
ISSUE
WON the state of facts as presented by Antonio (petitioner) sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Art. 36
of the Family Code.
HELD
YES. The petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Art. 36 was able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence.
Aside from the petitioners own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior.
Moreover, the root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, as proven by experts. Such incapacity was
established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. The gravity of respondents incapacity is sufficient to
prove her disability to assume the essential marital obligations and that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
RULING
Petition is granted. The decision of RTC, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code is
reinstated.
REPUBLIC V. QUINTERO-HAMANO
FACTS
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA). CA affirmed the decision of the Rizal RTC declaring as null
and void the marriage contracted between respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.
Respondent and Toshio, who is a Japanese national, started a common-law relationship in Japan and later lived in the Philippines. Respondent gave birth
to their child. After 2 years, they were married by a judge in the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite.
Unknown to the respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities which became manifest only after the
marriage. Toshio returned to Japan one month after the marriage and promised to return soon. He stopped giving financial support after two months. She
wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their
child.
Respondent then filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The trial court rendered a decision, declaring the marriage between petitioner and Toshio Hamano, null and void on the ground that Toshio failed to
fulfill his obligations as husband to the petitioner and father to their child. He remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his
family. Such behavior could be traced to respondents mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life.
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines, appealed to CA. The Court of Appeals ruled that Toshio
leaving the respondent and their child, with the promise of returning, and unable to send any support to nor communicated with them despite the letters
respondent sent is sufficient to prove that he was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his family and to observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support (Art. 68 of Family Code).
ISSUE
WON abandonment by one spouse is tantamount to psychological incapacity.
HELD
NO. Mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute psychologically incapacity. The totality of
evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. His act of abandonment
was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. No other evidence, besides Toshio
abandoning them, was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder.
RULING
Petition is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and set aside.
LANDICHO V. RELOVA
FACTS
This is an original petition in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
Landicho (petitioner) was charged before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense, of bigamy. It was
alleged in the information that petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia."
A couple of months later, an action was filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, likewise presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe Lourdes
Pasia, seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the alleged use of force, threats and intimidation allegedly
employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly bigamous character.
Petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a third-party complaint, against the third-party defendant, Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his
marriage with the said third-party defendant be declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation, she compelled
him to appear and contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.
Petitioner moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal case pending the decision on the question of the validity of the two marriages involved in the
pending civil suit. Respondent Judge denied the motion for lack of merit. Then came a motion for reconsideration to set aside the above order, which
was likewise denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
WON the validity of his marriage is a prejudicial question to warrant a suspension of petitioners bigamy charge.
HELD
NO. The validity of the marriage is not a prejudicial question and thus may not suspend the bigamy case. Parties to a marriage should not be permitted
to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is
beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. Such was the situation of the
petitioner.
There is no occasion to indulge in the probability that the third-party complaint against the first wife brought almost 5 months after the prosecution for
bigamy was started could have been inspired by the thought that he could thus give color to a defense based on an alleged prejudicial question. The
above judicial decisions preclude a finding that respondent judge abused, much less gravely abused, his discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as
sought by the petitioner.
RULING
Petition for certiorari is denied and the writ of preliminary injunction issued dissolved.
DONATO V. LUNA
FACTS
This is an petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to review the resolution of the Court of First Instance.
An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was filed on January 23, 1979 with the lower court in Manila. This was based on the
complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan. Before the petitioners arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978. Said civil case was
based on the ground that Paz consented to entering into the marriage which was Donatos second since she had no previous knowledge that Donato was
already married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping.
Donato defensed that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue
influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage.
Prior to the solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for 5 years
proven by a joint affidavit executed by them for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil
Code. Donato continued to live with Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their home upon learning that Donato already previously married.
Petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the criminal case contending that the civil case seeking the annulment of his second marriage
filed by private respondent raises prejudicial question which must first be determined before the criminal case can proceed. Hon. Luna denied the
motion, and also the motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
WON a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Instance of Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of
marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question.
HELD
NO. The issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner
Donatos guilt of innocence in the crime of bigamy.
A case of annulment of marriage can be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, only if it is proved that the petitioners
consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an
involuntary one and such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. In the case at bar, petitioner has not sufficiently shown that his consent to the
second marriage has been obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation.
Furthermore, it was petitioners second wife, Abayan, who filed the complaint for annulment on the second marriage on the ground that her consent
was obtained through deceit, not knowing that petitioners first marriage was still subsisting.
A prejudicial question one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case. It is one
based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Respondent judge did not err in his earlier order. There is no pivotal issue that must be preemptively resolved in the civil case before proceedings in the
criminal action for bigamy can be undertaken.
RULING
Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

WEIGEL V. SEMPIO-DY
FACTS
This is a petition to review the orders of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan.
Respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff) asked for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia Oliva Wiegel on the ground of Lilias previous
existing marriage to one Eduardo Maxion. Lilia, while admitting the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that such marriage was null and
void, she and the first husband having been allegedly forced to enter said marital union. Moreover, Lilia likewise alleged that Karl was married to
another woman before their marriage.
ISSUE
WON Lilias first marriage, which was contracted with force, is void.
HELD
NO. It is voidable. The presence of force only makes a marriage voidable, not void. Such marriage is valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet
been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly married to her first husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void. Likewise,
there is no need of introducing evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for then such marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration before he can
remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilias marriage are regarded void under the law.
RULING
Petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the Orders complained of are hereby affirmed.
ROBERTO DOMINGO V. CA, ET AL.
FACTS
This is a petition to review of the decision of the Court of Appeals ruling finding no grave abuse of discretion in the lower courts order denying
petitioners motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property.
Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property before the Pasig
RTC. She did not know that Domingo had been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz. She came to know the previous marriage when the latter
filed a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto
cohabited with another woman and had been disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because their
marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the declaration of the
nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the
marriage.
The petition of Soledad Domingo prayed that a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from
exercising any act of administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect; and Soledad
be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage.
Petitioner Roberto filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that it does no state a cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the
declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. He also added that Soledad has no property which is in his possession.
The judge of Pasig RTC issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. With respect to the right of the second wife, the Court
observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still
there is a need for judicial declaration of its nullity.
A motion for reconsideration was filed and likewise was denied. Hence this petition.
ISSUE
WON a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of
remarriage.
HELD
YES. The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz
was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is void from the beginning.
An explicit declaration of the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is required for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable
in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void (Art. 40).
Art. 40 denotes that such final judgment declaring previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. One can conceive of
other instances where a party might well invoke the such nullity for purposes of liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between
spouses, as well as action for custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters presumptive legitimes (Art. 43). In such
cases, evidence need not be limited solely to a final judgment declaring previous marriage void.
CA ruled that the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity may be raised together with other incident of their marriage such as the separation of
properties. Soledads prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage. Hence, the petitioners suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is
baseless
RULING
Petition is denied. The decision of respondent Court and the Resolution are affirmed.
BELTRAN V. PEOPLE
FACTS
This is a petition to review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals denying the petitioners prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin Judge Cervantes from proceeding with the trial of the criminal case, a concubinage case against the petitioner on the ground that the
pending petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner against his wife constitutes a prejudicial question.
After 24 years of marriage and four children, Meynardo Beltran (petitioner) filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioners wife, Charmaine Felix, answered by alleging that it was the petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman
named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage under Art. 334 of the Revised Penal Code against
petitioner and his paramour, who in a Resolution found probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information against them,
Six months after the filing, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance
of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. He argued that the pendency of civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial
question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge Cervantes of the Makati Metropolitan Trial Court denied the foregoing motion in the Order and
likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Petitioner went to the Makati RTC on certiorari, questioning the denial of Judge Cervantes and
praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. RTC denied the petition for certiorari and likewise his motion for reconsideration. Hence
this petition.
ISSUE/S
WON the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage based on psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code is a
prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife.
HELD
NO. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioners marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. Article 40 of the
Family Code provides that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage
void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action
involving an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.
Assuming that the first marriage was null and void, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity is
so declared can it be held as void.
Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage
does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.
RULING
Petition is granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
ART. 40
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of marriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.
Mercado vs. Tan (1 August 2000)

G.R. No. 137110
FACTS:
- Dr. Vincent Mercado (petitioner) was married to Ma. Thelma Oliva (first wife) on April 10, 1976.
- Mercado, who has a subsisting marriage with Oliva, sought a second marriage with Ma. Consuelo Tan (second wife) in a civil marriage on
June 27, 1991, further confirmed by a church ceremony on June 29, 1991.
- On October 5, 1992, Tan filed for a bigamy case against Mercado.
- On November 13, 1992, Mercado (petitioner) filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Oliva, more than a month
after the bigamy case was filed against him.
- On May 6, 1993, the marriage between Mercado and Oliva was declared null and void.
ISSUE(S):
(a) WON judicial declaration of nullity of marriage must be obtained first before a person can remarry.
(b) WON Mercado was guilty of bigamy.
HELD/RATIO:
(a) Yes. It is expressly provided in Art. 40 of the Family Code that, The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the
purpose of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. In this case, while the previous marriage
was judicially declared null and void, such was made only after the subsequent marriage was contracted, thus the subsequent marriage shall be
deemed to be null and void.
(b) Yes. Mercado was guilty of bigamy since all the elements of the crime under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code were present,
namely:
1. That the offender has been legally married;

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
In this case, the petitioner contracted the second marriage prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage, which at that
time was still valid and subsisting. The court ruled that bigamy is committed if a subsequent marriage is contracted by a person without first
obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity. In addition, bigamy is determined not by the fact that the first marriage is void but by virtue of
contracting a subsequent marriage absent a judicial declaration of nullity of such previous marriage.
Art. 41
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Art. 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
Republic vs. Nolasco (17 March 1993)

G.R. No. 94053
FACTS:
- Gregorio Nolasco (respondent), a seaman, got married to Janet Monica Parker, a British subject he met in a bar in England, on January
15, 1982 in San Jose, Antique.
- After their marriage, Nolasco obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in Antique.
- Sometime in January 1983, he received a letter from his mother informing him that his wife had given birth and had also left Antique.
- He returned in Antique on November 1983, about nine months after his knowledge of his wifes disappearance.
- He secured another employment contract in London, and tried to look for his wife whenever his ship docked there.
- He sent letters to his wife addressed to the bar in England where they first met, but such were all returned to him.
- He did not report his wifes disappearance to the Philippine authorities.
- He filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife (Parker), or in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null
and void, on August 5, 1988, and such petition for declaration of presumptive death was granted on October 12, 1988 by the trial court,
and was furthermore affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE(S):
(a) WON there existed a well-founded belief on the part of Nolasco that Parker was already dead.
(b) WON the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts declaration of presumptive death of Parker.
HELD/RATIO:
(a) No. Art. 41 of the Family Code prescribes a well-founded belief that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of
presumptive death may be granted. Based on the facts, the court held that the respondent failed to conduct a search for his wife with such
diligence as to give rise to a well-founded belief that she is dead. The investigation he had done to ascertain his wifes whereabouts was too
sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. Moreover, the court did not give much credence to
his assertion that he had inquired from their friends her whereabouts since he did not identify those friends in his testimony. Also, respondent
failed to explain his failure to ask for help from the authorities of London and Liverpool. The court found it difficult to regard the claim of a well-
founded belief of death under the circumstances of Parkers departure and respondents subsequent behaviour.
(b) Yes. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial courts declaration of presumptive death of Parker was reversed and
hereby nullified by the Supreme Court by virtue of the respondents failure to establish that he had a well-founded belief required by law that
his wife was already dead.
Armas vs. Calisterio (6 April 2000)
G.R. No. 136467
FACTS:
- On April 24, 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land.
- Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta Calisterio (respondent), who was previously married to James Bounds on January 13,
1946.
- Teodorico and Marietta got married on May 8, 1958, 11 years after the disappearance of Bounds, without Marietta having secured a
judicial declaration of presumptive death of her first husband.
- Antonia Armas (petitioner), the surviving sister of Teodorico, petitioned to be the sole surviving heir of Teodorico, and asserted that the
marriage between Teodorico and Marietta is bigamous, therefore null and void.
- Armas prayed that her son be appointed administrator of the estate and that the inheritance be adjudicated to her.
- Marietta opposed the petition claiming that her first marriage had been dissolved due to Bounds absence for eleven years before she
contracted a second marriage.
ISSUE(S):
(a) WON the marriage between Teodorico and Marietta was valid despite the absence of judicial declaration of presumptive death.
(b) WON Marietta is the rightful heir of the estate as the surviving spouse.
HELD/RATIO:
(a) The marriage between Teodorico and Marietta was solemnized on May 8, 1958 in which the law in effect at that time was the Civil
Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on Aug. 3, 1988. Art. 256 of the Family Code limited its retrospective governance only
to cases not prejudicial to acquired/vested rights in accordance with Civil Code or other laws. The Court ruled that the applicable
provision in this case is Art. 83 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person
other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) XXX
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present
having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered
as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to Art. 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by
competent court.
Accordingly, the Court held that a judicial declaration of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of
absence is met, and that the present spouse contracted the second marriage in good faith to render the subsequent marriage as valid.
Thus, the second marriage having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code should be deemed valid notwithstanding the
absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death.
(b) The properties of Teodorico and Marietta pertain to them in common (Absolute Community of Property) absent a property regime,
and thus should be divided equally- one portion to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse.
Therefore, having considered their marriage as valid, Marietta is entitled to one-half of the estate, and the other-half goes to Armas.
Manuel vs. People (29 November 2005)

476 SCRA 461
FACTS:
- Eduardo Manuel (petitioner) was charged with bigamy.
- Eduardo was first married to Rubylus Gana on July 28, 1975.
- Eduardo contracted a second marriage with Tina Gandalera on April 22, 1996; in their marriage contract, it appeared that Manuel was
single.
- Tina inquired and learned from the NSO that Eduardo was previously married.
- Eduardo asserted that he declared single in his marriage contract because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid;
that Rubylus (first wife) was imprisoned in 1975 and never saw her again three months after he visited her; that he believed that his
previous marriage was no longer valid since he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.
ISSUE(S):
- WON Eduardo Manuel is guilty of bigamy.
HELD/RATIO:
- In this case, the Court ruled in favor of the prosecution which proved that Eduardo was married to Rubylus in 1975, and that such
marriage was not judicially declared a nullity hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist. It was also proven that Eduardo married Tina in
1996, when the Family Code was already in effect. As provided in Art. 41 of the Family Code:
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Art. 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
The Court held that it was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he contracted the subsequent marriage, he was
of well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years, and that he should
have instituted a judicial declaration for presumptive death so as not to be held guilty of bigamy. However, as was stated, no judicial
declaration of presumptive death was instituted by Eduardo, thus making his previous marriage to be valid and subsisting. Moreover,
elements of bigamy can be gleaned from the case, such being the (1) existence of an undissolved marriage; (2) a subsequent marriage
with all the essential requisites of validity. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals convicting the petitioner for the crime
of bigamy.
Morigo vs. People (6 February 2004)

422 SCRA 376
FACTS:
- On August 30, 1990, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete got married at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional.
- On September 8, 1990, Barrete returned to Canada to report back to her work
- On Aug. 19, 1991, Barrete filed with the Ontario Court in Canada a petition for divorce against Morigo which was granted on January 17,
1992 and took effect on Feb. 17, 1992.
- On Oct. 4, 1992, Morigo married Maria Lumbago.
- On Sept. 21, 1993, Morigo filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that no marriage ceremony
actually took place.
- On Oct. 19, 1993, Morigo was charged with Bigamy.
ISSUE(S):
- WON Morigo committed bigamy, and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
HELD/RATIO:
- The elements of bigamy are:

2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent;
- In this case, the trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing
officer, but merely signing of marriage contract without the presence of a solemnizing officer, thus making the marriage void ab initio.
The first element of bigamy that the accused must be legally married was therefore absent. Hence, the Supreme Court held that the
mere signing of marriage contract cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which the petitioner might be liable
for bigamy, and thus, under the circumstances, the petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, the petitioners defense of good faith
for relying on the divorce decree of Ontario Court, and lack of criminal intent in contracting the second marriage, has been declared as
moot and academic.
Tenebro vs. Court of Appeals (18 February 2004)

423 SCRA 272
FACTS:
- Veronico Tenebro (petitioner) contracted marriage with Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990 before a judge of city trial court of Lapu-lapu
City.
- Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been married to Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986; showed her a photocopy of their
marriage certificate; and left their conjugal dwelling.
- On January 25, 1993, Tenebro contracted another marriage with Nilda Villegas before a judge of Cebu City RTC.
- Ancajas, after the confirmation of Villareyes of their marriage through a handwritten letter, filed a complaint for bigamy against
Tenebro.
- During trial, Tenebro denied the validity of marriage claiming that no marriage ceremony took place and merely signing of marriage
contract, and that no record of such marriage was recorded in the Civil Register of Manila as confirmed by his brother.
- The RTC of Lapu-lapu City convicted him of the crime of bigamy which was also affirmed by the Court of Appeals (respondent).
ISSUE(S):
(a) WON there exists a first marriage with Villareyes.
(b) WON the judicial declaration of nullity of subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity will not make the petitioner
liable for bigamy.
HELD/RATIO:
(a) The petitioner presented certification from NSO and City Civil Registry of Manila that such offices have no record of a marriage
between Tenebro and Villareyes. However, the prosecution was able to present sufficient evidence to prove the existence of the first
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes. A copy of marriage contract as certified by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila, and a
handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas confirming that Tenebro was legally married to Villareyes were presented as evidences.
Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the original of a document is in the
custody of a public officer, or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in
custody thereof. Hence, the certified copy of the marriage contract issued by the public officer in custody thereof was admissible as the
best evidence. As such, the Court ruled that there was sufficient evidence presented to prove the first and second requisites for the
crime of bigamy being: (1) that the offender has been legally married; (2) that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his
or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
(b) The court held that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not
retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippine penal laws are concerned. As such, and consistent with
Art. 41 of the Family Code, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the marriage is void ab initio. Pertinently, Art. 349 of the Revised
Penal Code criminalizes any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of judgment rendered in proper proceedings. It
can be inferred that this provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage.
Art. 45
The marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and
the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian, or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in
that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and
wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting fraud
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation, or undue influenc, unless the same having disappeared or ceased,
such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such capacity continues and appears to be
incurable;
(6) That either party was inflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable.
Sarao vs. Guevarra(31 May 1940)

G.R. No. 47063; 40 OG 263
FACTS:
- Felix Sarao (plaintiff) and Pilar Guevarra (defendant) were married in Manila on June 3, 1936.
- In the afternoon of the same day, Sarao tried to have carnal knowledge of Guevarra, but the latter showed reluctance and begged him
to wait until evening.
- When night came, the plaintiff again approached the defendant and tried to have carnal act with her, but she complained of pains in her
private parts and he noticed some purulent matter offensive to the smell coming out from her genital.
- Every attempt on plaintiffs part to have carnal act with his wife failed because she would complain of pains in her genital organs, and he
did not want her to suffer.
- Upon the advice of a physician, defendant submitted to an operation on Aug. 7, 1936, and as her uterus and ovaries were affected with
the tumor, these organs were removed with the consent of the plaintiff.
- The removal of said organs rendered defendant incapable of procreation, but not of copulation.
- Plaintiff, however, declared that from the time he witnessed the operation he lost all desire to have carnal act with her, and has tried
not to do it since then.
ISSUE(S):
- WON incapacity to procreate can be construed as physically incapable of entering into the married state, and is a valid ground for
annulment.
HELD/RATIO:
- Under the marriage law at that time, and as consistently applied in the provision in Art. 45 (5) of the Family Code, marriage may be
annulled if either party was, at the time of marriage, physically incapable of entering into the married state, and such incapacity
continues, and appears to be incurable. It is held that the test of impotency is not the ability to procreate, but the ability to copulate. In
this case, the defendant was not impotent at the time the marriage was celebrated, as supported by the opinion of the doctor that the
existence of fibrous tumor in the ovaries did not necessarily render her incapable of copulation or even procreation. The removal of her
uterus and ovaries rendered her sterile but did not make her unfit for sexual intercourse. Thus, the defendants sterility cannot be a
ground for annulment since what the law provides as a ground for annulment is the incapacity to copulate, and not to procreate.
Buccat v. Buccat (1941)

Petition: Motion for Appeal on the decision of Court of First Instance of Baguio dismissing the Complaint of petitioner to annul marriage.
Petitioner: Godofredo Buccat

Respondent: Luida Mangonon de Buccat
Ponente: Horrilleno
DOCTRINE: fraudulent consent

A marriage may be annulled due to fraudulent consent where the wife conceals that she is pregnant from another man other than her husband
at the time of the marriage. Existence of fraud, however, is denied on the absence of binding evidence.
Facts:
1. Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon met on March 1938 and were engaged on September 19 of the same year.
2. On November 26 of the same year, they got married in the Catholic Cathedral of Baguio City.
3. Eighty-nine days after the marriage, Luida gave birth to a child of nine months on February 23, 1939.
4. Petitioner left the respondent and filed a Complaint for annulment in the lower court on the grounds of fraud against respondent for
concealing to her husband-to-be that she was not a virgin and that she was pregnant by a man other than her husband at the time of the
marriage.
5. Lower court denied his complaint thus the appeal herein.
PROVISION + ELEMENTS:
Article 46, New Civil Code
Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding Article:
1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude;
2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband;
3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the marriage; or
4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give ground for action for the
annulment of marriage.
RULING + RATIO:
Marriage is a sacred institution and a foundation on which society rests. Annulment of such requires clear and convincing evidence.
Petitioner, however, failed to present reasonable evidence on accounts of fraud that he was indeed unaware of the pregnancy of respondent. At
the time of their marriage, respondent was already more or less six months pregnant and it would be uncommon, lest ridiculous, that petitioner
was unaware of the said pregnancy.
DISPOSITION: The court affirms the decision of lower court. Complaint to annul marriage is dismissed.
Aquino v. Delizo (1960)

Petition: Petition for certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Rizal which dismissed
petitioner's complaint for annulment of his marriage with respondent Conchita Delizo.
Petitioner: Fernando Aquino

Respondent: Conchita Delizo
Ponente: Gutierrez David
Doctrine: Fraudulent Consent
A marriage may be annulled due to fraudulent consent of husband upon concealment of the wife that she was pregnant by a man other than her
husband at the time of the marriage.
Facts:
1. On December 27, 1954, Fernando Aquino was married to Conchita Delizo.
2. Sometime in April 1955, or about four months after their marriage, respondent gave birth to a child.
3. Petitioner filed on the Court of First Instance of Rizal a complaint for annulment of his marriage with respondent Conchita Delizo on the
ground of fraud wherein respondent, on the date of their marriage, concealed from petitioner the fact that she was pregnant by another
man.
4. Defendant, however, claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the plaintiff.
5. Trial Court dismissed the complaint on June 1695 noting that no birth certificate was presented to show that the child was born within
180 days after the marriage between the parties, and holding that concealment of pregnancy as alleged the plaintiff does not constitute
such fraud as would annul a marriage.
6. Petitioner appealed on the court of Appeals.
7. Court of Appeals held that there has been excusable neglect in plaintiff's inability to present the proof of the child's birth. However, it
was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse during their engagement so that the child could be their
own, and finding unbelievable plaintiff's claim that he did not notice or even suspect that defendant was pregnant when he married her.
8. Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint hence this petition.
Issue: Whether the complaint was validly dismissed on the grounds that marriage cannot be annulled due to fraudulent consent.
Article 46, New Civil Code
1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude;
2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband;
3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the marriage; or
4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give ground for action for the
annulment of marriage.
RULING + RATIO:
Petitioner's complaint was not validly dismissed.
Wife was alleged to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are not prepared to say
that her pregnancy was readily apparent. It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a
height above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. If, as claimed by plaintiff, defendant is "naturally
plump", he could hardly be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of their marriage more so
because she must have attempted to conceal the true state of affairs.
The appellate court also said that it was not impossible for plaintiff and defendant to have had sexual intercourse before they got married and
therefore the child could be their own. This statement, however, is purely conjectural and finds no support or justification in the record.
Justice would be better served if a new trial were ordered.
DISPOSITION: Wherefore, the decision complained of is set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for new trial. Without costs.
Tuason v. Court of Appeals (1996)

Petition: Petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set aside decision of Court of Appeals denying petitioner's appeal from an order of
the Makati RTC.
Petitioner: Emilio R. Tuason

Respondents: Court of Appeals and Maria Victoria Tuason
Ponente: Puno
DOCTRINE: Collusion
Marriage may not be annulled if there were collusion between the parties and evidence was fabricated or suppressed.
FACTS:
1. Maria Victoria Tuason and Emilio Tuason were married on June 3, 1972 and begot two children.
2. Maria Victoria Tuason filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati a petition for annulment of her marriage to petitioner Emilio Tuason.
3. Private respondent, in her complaint, alleged that at the time of her marriage, petitioner was already psychologically incapacitated to
comply with his essential marital obligations for the following reasons:
violent fights between husband and wife
petitioner inflicted physical injuries on private respondent
petitioner used prohibited drugs and has not been rehabilitated
petitioner was a womanizer
left the conjugal dwelling, cohibated with three women in succession, and gave minimal support to the family
petitioner became a spendthrift and abused his administration of the conjugal partnership
attempts of reconciliation were made but they all failed because of petitioner's refusal to reform
Private respondent prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation and annulment of
marriage.
4. Petitioner answered denying the imputations against him. His defense:

it was only in 1982 that they began to have serious personal differences when his wife did not accord the respect and dignity
due him as a husband
1984, he temporarily left the conjugal home for a "cooling-off period"
it is private respondent who had been taking prohibited drugs and had a serious affair with another man
petitioner's work as owner and operator of a radio and television station exposed him to malicious gossip
Petitioner prayed to allow him to return to the conjugal home and continue his administration of the conjugal partnership.
5. During the trial, private respondent presented four witnesses and submitted documentary evidence proving her allegations against
petitioner.
6. Petitioner filed his Opposition to private respondent's petition for appointment as administratix of the conjugal partnership of gains.
7. Petitioner failed to appear on the hearing. Court declared petitioner to have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the case
submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented.
8. Trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of private respondent's marriage to petitioner and awarding the custody of the
children to private respondent.
9. No appeal was taken from the decision by the counsel for petitioner.
10. Private respondent filed a Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties
11. Petitioner opposed to the motion. Through new counsel, he filed with the trial court a petition for relief from judgment of the decision.
Trial court denied the petition.
12. Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals the order of the trial court denying his petition for relief from judgment.
13. Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of the trial court. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether Order of Makati RTC has become final and executory, thus, a petition for relief from judgment is not valid.
Article 48, Civil Code
In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In all cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
RULING + RATIO:
Trial court did not err in granting the declaration of annulment of marriage on the grounds that there was no collusion between parties or that
evidence was not fabricated or suppressed.
Yes, The decision annulling petitioner's marriage to private respondent had already become final and executory when petitioner failed to appeal
during the reglementary period.
The decision of the trial court was not in violation of his right to due process, thus it is not null and void. After failing to appear on two scheduled
hearing, the trial court deemed him to have waived his right to present evidence and rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence for private
respondent.
Counsel of petitioner did not inform the trial court of petitioner's confinement for rehabilitation. And when the court rendered its decision, the
same counsel was out of the country for which reason the decision became final and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom.
Petitioner has not given any reason why his former counsel did not inform the court of the scheduled hearings. This led the trial court to order
the case deemed submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence.
Disposition: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision dated July 29, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37925 is
affirmed.
CORPUS V. OCHOTORENA (2004)

Petition: Complaint against RTC Judge Ochotorena for bias, partiality and violation of judicial conduct in declaring the nullity of marriage in a civil
case Macias v. Macias and asserting the court to sanction respondent judge.
Petitioner: Margie Macias Corpus (Mrs. Macias)

Respondent: Judge Wilfredo Ochotorena
Ponente: Tinga
DOCTRINE: (annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage; collusion between parties)
In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. No judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
Facts:
1. A verified Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed before respondents court against Mrs. Macias by Mariano Joaquin S.
Macias (Mr. Macias), her husband and incumbent presiding Judge of RTC, Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte.
2. Petitioner was informed of such complaint through the publication of Summons. Mrs. Macias claims she learned of the aforesaid
publication of Summons during the first week of April 2001 and filed a Motion to Dismiss which she set for hearing on April 20, 2001.
3. Instead of first acting upon the motion, the respondent judge set the hearing on April 19, 2001.
4. On April 19, 2001, respondent judge denied the Motion to Dismiss and re-set the hearing.
5. Various motions and manifestations were filed by the counsel of Mrs. Macias opposing the hearing on the merits of the case before the
respondent judge. One was denied while the rest were ignored. The respondent proceeded with the hearing on April 30, 2001 without
resolving the other motions and manifestations.
6. Public Prosecutor Arturo Paculanag filed a Certification with the respondent judges's court stating that he appeared in behalf of the
Solicitor General during the ex-parte presentation of plaintiff's (Mr. Corpus) evidence, cross-examining plaintiff and his witness.
7. After the scheduled hearings, respondent judge terminated the proceedings and declared the case submitted for decision declaring
absolute nullity of marriage of Mrs. Macias and Mr. Macias.
8. Mrs. Macias filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
9. Mrs. Macias also filed an instant Complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator against Respondent Judge with similar
allegations of her petition with CA:
respondent judge deprived her of the fundamental right to due process with utmost bias and partiality.
issued an order directing respondent judge to desist from taking any further action in the subject case
and imposing an administrative sanction against him.
10. Without waiting for the OCAs Indorsement, respondent judge submitted his Comment/Answer:
- the instant Complaint by Mrs. Macias is fatally defective
- Complaint was filed with malice, bad faith, and the intention to harass, embarass and humiliate him
- disputes violating Mrs. Macias' right to due process. He argues that Mrs. Macias was given the opportunity to be heard but chose not to give
her side, as shown by her failure to appear during the trial despite prior notice.
- records of the case would show that the proceeding was done in good faith and based on law and jurisprudence.
- even if he may have committed an error, such should be corrected by availing of judicial remedies and not by resorting to the filing of an
administrative action.
- only after the SC finds that a judge had committed malice or gross ignorance that he should be administratively sanctioned.
-a Petition containing similar allegations as the instant complaint was filed before the CA
Respondent Judge insists that his Decision in the Civil Case (declaring the nullity of marriage of Mrs. Macias and Mr. Macias) is valid and
prays for the dismissal of the instant Complaint for lack of merit.
11. Respondent judge retired.
12. CA decision in favor of Mrs. Macias (Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
13. Mrs. Macias' reply:

-admits having filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
-claims that the CA decided in her favor finding respondent judge blatantly transgressing her right to due process and ignorant of the basic
rudiments of Civil Procedure.
- the CA decision nullified the assailed proceeding and the Decision rendered by the respondent judge in Civil Case.
- instant charge against respondent judge may simply be verified by checking the records of the case.
14. Pursuant to Resolution of the Court, the Court retained the amount of P40,000 from his retirement benefits to answer for whatever
administrative sanction the Court may impose in relation to the instant case.
15. In this case, Mrs. Macias now asserts before the Court that the respondent judges actuations constitute bias, partiality and conduct
unbecoming a judge. Conclusive from the records, the respondent is grossly ignorant of the law and procedure and that the Court should
sanction him.
Issue: Whether respondent judge acted with bias, partiality and violation of judicial conduct in declaring the nullity of marriage in civil case
Sec. 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: If the defending party in action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no
collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
Article 48, New Civil Code.

In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In all cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
Collusion is an agreement between two or more parties, sometimes illegal and therefore secretive, to limit open competition by deceiving,
misleading, or defrauding others of their legal rights, or to obtain an objective forbidden by law typically by defrauding or gaining an unfair
advantage. In legal terms, all acts affected by collusion are considered void.
RULING + RATIO:
YES, respondent judge acted with bias, partiality and violation of judicial conduct in declaring the nullity of marriage in civil case.
Respondent judge totally disregarded Mrs. Marcias right to due process when he proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case
completely ignoring the fact that her Motion to Dismiss, which was filed within the 30-day reglementary period, was still pending
resolution.
Respondent judge disregarded the provisions of Rules on Civil Procedure: After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall be
the duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex-parte that the case be set for pre-trial. Considering that the last pleading was Mrs. Macias
Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge should have first resolved the motion and then waited for Mr. Macias motion to set the case
for pre-trial.
Rail-roading or procedural short-cut Instead of resolving the Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge completely ignored it and
proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case by receiving Mr. Macias evidence ex-parte.
Respondent judge compounded his blunder when, after denying Mrs. Macias Motion to Dismiss, he continued with the reception of Mr.
Macias evidence ex-parte, ordered the termination of the trial and thereafter, considered the case submitted for decision despite Mrs.
Macias filing of a Motion for Reconsideration of the order denying her Motion to Dismiss. In holding the trial of the case up to its
completion, the respondent judge had acted utterly oblivious to the pending Motion for Reconsideration.
Even if Mrs. Macias failed to file her answer to the complaint after the period therefor had elapsed, the respondent judge was not
authorized to conduct a hearing of the case on its merits. The Rules of Court prohibits default proceeding in cases involving declaration
of nullity of marriage.
Mrs. Macias had already filed her Motion to Dismiss where she indicated her address and, hence, can be notified by the Public
Prosecutor of his investigation.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and incompetence and is hereby FINED
the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos to taken from the amount earlier withheld from his retirement benefits. The Fiscal Management Office of
the OCA is DIRECTED to immediately release to the respondent judge the remaining balance of Twenty Thousand Pesos from the aforesaid
retained amount, unless there are other valid reasons for its further retention.
CERVANTES v. FAJARDO (1989)
Petition: Petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus of Minor Angelie Anne C. Cervantes
Petitioners: Nelson L. Cervantes and Zenaida Carreon Cervantes

Respondents: Gina Carreon Fajardo and Conrado Fajardo
Ponente: Padilla
Doctrine: Child custody and care
Facts:
1. Angelie Anne C. Cervantes was born on 14 February 1987 to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon, who are common-law
husband and wife.
2. The child was then known as Angelie Anne Fajardo.
3. Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreon's sister and brother-in-law, petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and
Nelson Cervantes, who took care and custody of the child when she was barely two weeks old.
4. An Affidavit of Consent to the adoption of the child by petitioners was also executed by respondent Gina Carreon on 29 April 1987.
5. The petition for adoption was filed by petitioners over the child before the RTC of Rizal on 20 August 1987, rendered a decision granting
the petition.
6. The court ordered that the child be "freed from parental authority of her natural parents as well as from legal obligation and
maintenance to them and that from now on shall be, for all legal intents and purposes, known as Angelie Anne Cervantes, a child of
herein petitioners and capable of inheriting their estate."
7. Petitioners received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back
their child.
8. Petitioners refused to acced to the demand.
9. 11 September 1987m while petitioners were out at work, the respondent Gina Carreon took the child from her "yaya" at the petitioner's
residence and brought the child to her house.
10. Petitioners demanded the return of the child, but Gina Carreon refused, saying that she had no desire to give up her child for adoption
and that the affidavit of consent to the adoption she had exectued was not full explained to her. She will, however, return the child to
the petitioners if she were paid the amount.
11. 27 October 1987 Felisa Tansingco, the social worker who had conducted the case study on the adoption and submitted a report thereon
to the RTC of Rizal in the adoption case, testified before the Executive Judge, RTC Pasig declaring that she had interviewed respondent
Gina Carreon and that respondent maniffested to the social worker her desire to have the child adopted by the petitioners.
Issue: Whether custody and care of minor Angelie Anne Cervantes be granted to the petitioners.
Art. 363 of the New Civil Code, as amended by Art. 17 of PD 603
In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children the latters welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated
from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure.
Art. 39, PD 603

Effects of Adoption. - The adoption shall:
1. Give to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter: Provided, That an adopted child cannot acquire
Philippine citizenship by virtue of such adoption;
2. Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parent or parents, except where the adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent;
3. Entitle the adopted person to use the adopter's surname; and
4. Make the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter: Provided, That if the adopter is survived by legitimate parents or ascendants and by an adopted person,
the latter shall not have more successional rights than an acknowledged natural child: Provided, further, That any property received gratuitously by the adopted
from the adopter shall revert to the adopter should the former predecease the latter without legitimate issue unless the adopted has, during his lifetime,
alienated such property: Provided, finally, That in the last case, should the adopted leave no property other than that received from the adopter, and he is
survived by illegitimate issue or a spouse, such illegitimate issue collectively or the spouse shall receive one-fourth of such property; if the adopted is survived by
illegitimate issue and a spouse, then the former collectively shall receive one-fourth and the latter also one-fourth, the rest in any case reverting to the adopter,
observing in the case of the illegitimate issue the proportion provided for in Article 895 of the Civil Code.
Art. 189(2) of the Family Code of the Philippines, EO. 209 as amended by EO 227
Adoption shall have the following effects:
(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be vested in the adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of
the parent by nature of the adopted, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses;
Art. 17, PD 603

Joint Parental Authority. - The father and mother shall exercise jointly just and reasonable parental authority and responsibility over their legitimate or adopted
children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
In case of the absence or death of either parent, the present or surviving parent shall continue to exercise parental authority over such children, unless in case of
the surviving parent's remarriage, the court, for justifiable reasons, appoints another person as guardian.
In case of separation of his parents, no child under five years of age shall be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to do so.
RULING + RATIO:
The court affirmed the decision of RTC granting petitioners of custody and care of minor Angelie Anne Cervantes and ruled that the petition for
writ of Habeas Corpus be granted.
In all controversies regarding custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical and social welfare of the child concerned,
taking into account the resources and moral as well as social standing of the contending parents. Provision that no mother shall be separated
from a child under 5 years of age will not apply where the court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise.
Petitioners who are legally married appear to be morally, physically, financially, and socially capable of supporting the minor and giving her a
future better than what the natural mother, who is not only jobless but also maintains an illicit relation with a married man, can most likely give
her.
The minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect,
among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child. The adopting parents have the right to care and
custody of the adopted child (Art. 189(2) of Family Code) and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him (Art 17, PD 603).
DISPOSITION: ACCORDINGLY, and as recommended by the Executive Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Hon. Eutropio Migrino, the Petition is
GRANTED. The custody and care of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes are hereby granted to petitioners to whom they properly belong, and
respondents are ordered (if they still have not) to deliver said minor to the petitioners immediately upon notice hereof.
Espiritu v. CA (1995)
Petition: Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals granting custody to Teresita Masauding over the two children.
Petitioner: Reynaldo Espiritu and Guillerma Layug

Respondent: Court of Appeals and Teresita Masauding
Ponente: Melo
DOCTRINE: Custody and care of children
Facts:
1. In 1984, Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania.
2. Rosalind Therese, their daughter, was born on October 7, 1987.
3. While they were on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the United States,
their second child, Reginald was born on January 12, 1988.
4. The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to separate sometime in 1990.
5. Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went
back to California where she used to work as a nurse.
6. Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh and had to leave his children
with his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family.
7. Teresita returned to the Philippines and on December 8, 1992, filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two
petitioners to gain custody over the children.
8. On June 30, 1993, the trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over the two
children and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with visitation rights to be agreed upon by the parties and
to be approved by the Court.
9. On February 16, 1994, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and gave custody to Teresita and visitation rights on
weekends to Reynaldo. The Court of Appeals invoked provisions of the Civil Code and Family Code as basis of granting custody to
respondent.
10. Petitioners now come to this Court on a petition for review, in the main contending that the Court of Appeals disregarded the factual
findings of the trial court; that the Court of Appeals further engaged in speculations and conjectures, resulting in its erroneous
conclusion granting custody of the children to respondent Teresita.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that child custody should be given to respondent Teresita.
Art 363, Civil Code:
In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of the children, the latters welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure.
Art. 213 of the Family Code:

In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
RULING + RATIO:
The court ruled that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that child custody should be given to respondent Teresita.
The findings and conclusions of the regional trial court is sustained because it gave greater attention to the choice of Rosalind and considered in
detail all the relevant factors bearing on the issue of custody.
Court of Appeals resolved the question of custody over the children through an automatic and blind application of the age proviso of Article 363
of the Civil Code and of Article 213 of the Family Code.
The Court of Appeals was unduly swayed by an abstract presumption of law rather than an appreciation of relevant facts and the law which
should apply to those facts. The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial function to be determined by
a simple determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or over seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always be
the child's interests.
Discretion is given to the court to decide who can best assure the welfare of the child, and award the custody on the basis of that consideration.
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is
not conclusive. It can be overcome by compelling reasons. If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by
that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it
deems fit under the circumstances.
Error of the Court of Appeals: Instead of scrutinizing the records to discover the choice of the children and rather than verifying whether that
parent is fit or unfit, respondent court simply followed statutory presumptions and general seven-year age limit was mechanically treated as an
arbitrary cut off period and not a guide based on a strong presumption.
This court affirms the decision of the trial court denying respondent Teresita of custody on the grounds that:
1. Her morality is questionable as shown by her marrying Reynaldo at the time she had a subsisting marriage with another man.
2. She is guilty of grave indiscretion in carrying on a love affair with one of Reynaldos fellow NSC employees.
3. She is incapable of providing the children with necessities and conveniences commensurate to their social standing because she does
not even own any home in the Philippines.
4. She is emotionally unstable with ebullient temper.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside, and the decision of
Trial Court awarding custody of the minors Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu to their father, Reginald Espiritu, is reinstated.
Mangonon v. CA (2006)
Petition: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeal holding and ordering Francisco Delgado to give
support pendente lite.
Petitioners: Ma. Belen B. Mangonon, for and in behalf of her minor children Rebeccas Angela Delgado and Regina Isabel Delgado
Respondents: Court of Appeals, Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Federico C. Delgado and Francisco C. Delgado
Doctrine: support pendente lite
Facts:
1. On February 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married.
2. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without
the required consent Civil Code provides, it was annulled on August 11, 1975.
3. On March 25, 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. Private
respondents had totally abandoned them.
4. On March 17, 1994, petitioner filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and
Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati.
5. At the time of the institution of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of America where petitioner,
together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in.
6. Petitioner compells that private respondent Federico offer support for the education of their children since petitioner's monthly income
from her 2 jobs can hardly give general support to Rica and Rina's education.
7. Petitioner likewise demands Federico's father, Francisco for general support. Aside from being known to be financially well-off, Family
Code provides that in case of default on the part of the parents, the obligation to provde support falls upon the grandparents of the
children.
8. Trial court orders respondents to provide a monthtly support pendente lite of P5,000 each or a total of P10,000 for the education of Rica
and Rina.
9. Unsatisfied with the Order of the trial court, petitioner brought the case to the CA.
10. CA affirmed the holding of the trial court. Hence, this petition.
11. Petitioner claims the following error of CA:
12. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in concluding that respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in fixing the amount of
monthly support pendente lite granted to petitioner's children at a measley P5,000.00 per child, obviously inadequate to support the
educational requirements of the recipients.
PROVISION + ELEMENTS
Article 49, Family Code
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for
the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material
welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation
rights of the other parent. (n)
Under Art. 199 of the Family Code

Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
Under Art. 204 of the Family Code

Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in
the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.
(299a)
RULING + RATIO
There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent
Federico are primarily charged to support their children's college education. In view however of their incapacities, the obligation to furnish said
support should be borne by respondent Francisco.
Under Art. 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his
granddaughters in default of their parents. It having been established that respondent Francisco has the financial means to support his
granddaughters' education, he, in lieu of petitioner and respondent Federico, should be held liable for support pendente lite.
Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, the obligor is given the choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to give support. Thus, he may give
the determined amount of support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to stay in the family dwelling.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Order of
the RTC fixing the amount of support pendente lite to P5,000 for Rica and Rina, are hereby MODIFIED.
ARTICLE 55
FRANCISCO vs TAYAO (1927)

Petition: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila
Plaintiff and appellant: Juanaria Francisco
Defendant and appelle: Lope Tayao
Ponente: Malcolm
DOCTRINE:
Under the Philippine Divorce Law, the guilt of a defendant on accusations of concubinage has to be established first by final judgment in a
criminal action before filing a civil suit for legal separation.
FACTS:
1. Francisco and Tayao contracted marriage in Manila in 1912
2. They got separated in 1917.
3. The husband then moved to Zamboanga. When he was there, he had an affair with a married woman named Bernardina Medrano, wife of
Ambrosio Torres.
4. Torres filed a criminal case against Tayao and his wife. They were then sentenced to suffer three years, six months, and twenty-one days
imprisonment (prision correccional), and to pay costs.
5. Relying on this criminal case, Francisco filed to sever the bonds of their marriage in the Court of First Instance of Manila, and was later denied
by its judge. The judges decision was based on the fact that Francisco was not an innocent spouse within the meaning of Sections 1 and 3 of the
Divorce Law.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Francisco can secure a divorce from Tayao, where the latter has been convicted of adultery and not of concubinage, although the
acts for which he was convicted of adultery may also constitute concubinage
During this time, a statute governs the causes for divorce, Philippine Divorce Law (Act No. 2710). It states that there are two causes of action for
divorce: adultery on the part of the wife, and concubinage on the part of the husband.
Section 1 reads, A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband.
Section 3 states, The divorce may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the
adultery or concubinage, as the case may be.
But Section 8 becomes the foundation of the Courts argument: A divorce shall not be granted without the guilt of the defendant being
established by final sentence in a criminal action.
RULING + RATIO:
1. Francisco could not secure a divorce precisely because she was not the innocent spouse who filed the criminal case against Tayao. Notice that
Tayao was convicted of the crime of adultery, not concubinage, which is the only cause of action for filing a divorce against a husband. The
institution of a criminal case by the injured wife is essential for the proper initiation of a prosecution for concubinage, and subsequently, for the
proper filing of legal separation. What Francisco was asking of the Court was to convict the defendant of the crime of concubinage, although she
had not established a prosecution for the same.
DISPOSITION: For somewhat different reasons but with the same result, the judgment appealed from must be affirmed without special
pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
GANDIONCO vs PEARANDA (1987)

Petition: Special civil action for certiorari to review the orders of the RTC of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18
Petitioner: Froilan Gandionco
Respondents: Hon. Senen Pearanda (Presiding Judge of the RTC of Misamis Oriental) and Teresita Gandionco
Ponent: Padilla
DOCTRINE:
A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderence of evidence in the action for legal
separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
FACTS:
1. On May 29, 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed with the RTC of Misamis Oriental, presided over by judge
respondent, a complaint against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages.
2. On October 13, 1986, private respondent also filed with the Municipal Trial Court of General Santos City, a complaint against petitioner for
concubinage as criminal case.
3. Respondent Judge ordered the payment of support pendente lite.
4. Petitioner contends that the civil action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto (support and damages) should be suspended in
view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him. To support his argument, petitioner cites Art. 111, Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which states: Whenever the offended party shall have instituted the civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the
offense the following should be observed: (a) After a criminal action has been commenced, the pending civil action arising from the same
offense shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered.
ISSUES:
1. whether or not the civil action for legal separation on the ground of concubinage is inextricably tied to the criminal action, and thus have to be
suspended to await conviction or acquittal for concubinage in the criminal case.
Petitioner failed to put into context the ruling he cited. It should be measured against the first paragraph of Sec. 1 Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure pertains to a civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged.
RULING + RATIO:
The amendment under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure states that a civil action for legal separation, based on concubinage, may proceed
ahead of, or simultaneously with a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from
the offense even if the civil and criminal actions arise from the same offense.
This civil action for legal separation is intended to acquire the right to live separately, with other legal consequences appended to it, like
dissolution of conjugal partnership of properties, custody, among others.
Besides, a decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, maybe issued upon preponderence of evidence. Conviction in the
criminal offense is not necessary to decide on the judgment of the civil case. This is a far cry from the doctrine made in Francisco vs Tayao, which
as modified in the present Civil Code (and now amended by EO No. 229 or the Family Code).
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
ONG vs ONG (2006)

Petition: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner: Ong Eng Kiam (aka William Ong)
Respondent: Lucita Ong

Ponente: Austria-Martinez
DOCTRINE:
This is basically Art. 55 of the Family Code in action.
FACTS:
1. William Ong and Lucita Ong were married on July 13, 1975 in Manila. They have three children all of whom are of legal age.
2. On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a complaint for legal separation under Art. 55 Paragraph 1 of the Family Code before the Regional Trial Court,
insisting that her life with William was embedded with physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct.
3. Lucita claims her marriage life with William is filled with quarrels almost everyday. William corroborates this claim, but disagrees on the
account that he places harm on his wife.
4. Some of the violence inflicted on Lucita by William: throwing a steel chair at her and their children; slapping and uttering insulting words at
her; using his belt in hitting their children; pinning Lucita against the wall almost strangling her. William would hit her and their children because
of petty reasons, such as when he could not find something, he would take it on them.
5. On December 14, 1995, Lucita could not take it anymore. After receiving the worst (according to her) beating from his husbandhe even
pointed a gun at her and ordered her to leave the houseLucita decided to go to her sisters house to seek help.
5. William obviously denies all of the accusations. He claims that the reason as to why Lucita wanted to divorce him is that she could take control
of their conjugal properties, and give the same to her family.
6. Court of Appeals sided with the decision of the RTC to grant the legal separation.
Lucita cited the first paragraph of Art. 55 of the Family Code in arguing for her case.
A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner.
RULING + RATIO:
The Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals. Unlike the RTC and CA, the Supreme Court has no opportunity of observing the
deportment of witnesses on the stand, it has to rely heavily on the persuasive decisions of the lower courts. In this case, the witnesses and accounts
posited by Lucita are indeed sufficient to grant her the legal separation.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
ARTICLE 56
BUGAYONG vs GINEZ (1956)

Petition: Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
Plaintiff and appellant: Benjamin Bugayong
Defendant and appellee: Leonila Ginez
Ponente: Felix
DOCTRINE:
Any cohabitation with the guilty party, after the commission of the offense, and with the knowledge or belief on the part of the injured party of its
commission, will amount to conclusive evidence of condonation. Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for
legal separation.
FACTS:
1. Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, married Leonila Ginez on August 27, 1949 in Pangasinan.
2. They lived together with Bugayongs sisters. Bugayong had to leave to report for duty, but he and Ginez had come into an agreement that she
would continue living with his sisters.
3. Ginez and Bugayongs sisters moved to Sampaloc, Manila. After some time, or about July 1951, Ginez left the house of her sisters-in-law and
informed her husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her mother in Pangasinan.
4. The same month and year, Bugayong claimed that he began receiving letters from his sister and from anonymous writers telling him that his
wife is committing infidelity. He also claimed that Ginez admitted that a certain Eliong had kissed her.
5. In August 1952 (one year after he allegedly received news of his wifes infidelity), Bugayong went back to Pangasinan and sought his wife. She
came along with him to his cousins house. They spent two nights and one day together as husband and wife.
6. On the second day, Bugayong tried to verify from his wife the allegations against her. Instead of answering him, Ginez packed her things up and
left. Bugayong took this as confirmation of her acts of infidelity.
7. On November 18, 1952, Bugayong filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife. Ginez, on her part, denied the allegations the she
committed adultery.
8. The lower courts denied Bugayongs petition because the acts committed by Ginez have been condoned by him during those two nights they
spent together in Pangasinan.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the husbands decision to sleep with his wife for two nights despite his alleged belief that she was unfaithful to him, amount to
condonation of her supposed adulterous acts
Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that,
The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain
legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.
RULING + RATIO:
The lower courts failed to be persuaded that Ginez actually committed infidelity, but for the purposes of this case (Bugayong failed to present the
letters that allegedly informed him of his wifes adultery, and that the identity of Eliong could not be confirmed), they still decided on whether or
not they would grant the legal separation to Bugayong whose under the assumption that his wife committed adultery.
The Court is convinced that there was clearly a condonation on the part of Bugayong for the supposed acts of infidelity committed by
Ginez.
In Shackleton vs Shackleton, it has been held that condonation is implied from sexual intercourse after knowledge of the other infidelity.
Such acts necessarily implied forgiveness.
Thus, the two nights Bugayong and Ginez spent together deprive him of obtaining legal separation. A legal separation cannot be granted
for adultery where the spouses continue to live together as husband and wife after becoming knowledgeable of the acts amounting to adultery.
DISPOSITION:
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. It is so ordered.
LAPUZ vs EUFEMIO (1972)

Petition: Petition for review by certiorari of an order of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila
Petitioner-appellant: Carmen Lapuz Sy, represented by her substitute Macario Lapuz
Respondent-appellee: Eufemio S. Eufemio (aka Eufemio Sy Uy)
Ponente: Reyes, J.B.L.
DOCTRINE:
Death of the spouse during the pendency of action for legal separation abates the said action.
FACTS:
1. Carmen Lapuz Sy and Eufemio S. Eufemio were married civilly on September 21, 1934, and canonically on September 30 of the same year.
2. In 1943, Eufemio abandoned Carmen.
3. They had no child, but they had acquired properties during their marriage.
4. Carmen discovered that his husband had been cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok, and that they had obtained marriage
celebrated according to Chinese law and customs.
5. On August 18, 1953, Carmen filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio, also asking that Eufemio be deprived of his share of the
conjugal partnership profits.
6. Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen, on the ground of his marriage to Go Hiok.
7. On May 31, 1969, before the case could even be finished, Carmen died in a vehicular accident.
8. On June 9, 1969, Eufemio moved that the case for legal separation be dismissed on the ground, among others, that Carmens death abated the
action for legal separation.
9. On June 26, 1969, Macario Lapuz, Carmens father, substituted Carmen as petitioner.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the death of Carmen, before the final judgment of action for legal separation, abate the action
Art. 244, Section 3 of the Civil Code:
. When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage is dissolved. the heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the
death of the spouse takes place during the course of the suit.
RULING + RATIO:
Following the idea that the action for legal separation is pure personal, the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself
actio personalis moritur cum persona. Furthermore, Eufemios petition for declaration of nullity ab initio also becomes moot and academic.
Now when it comes to the liquidation of the conjugal properties of the spouses, the heirs of the appellant can raise the proper action for
partition in a separate proceeding, not in the annulment proceeding.
DISPOSITION:
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations is hereby affirmed. No special pronouncement
as to costs.
ARTICLE 63
ESPIRITU vs COURT OF APPEALS (1995)

Petition: Petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners: Reynaldo Espiritu and Guillerma Layug
Respondents: Court of Appeals and Teresita Masauding
Ponente: Melo
DOCTRINE:
The paramount consideration in choosing the parent to give the custody of a child is the childs interests, not his or her age/minority.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding first met sometime in 1976 in Iligan City.
2. Teresita left for California to work as a nurse in 1977. Reynaldo was sent by his emplyer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pennsylvania as its
liaison officer. Reynaldo and Teresita began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife.
3. In 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born.
4. In 1987, while on a brief vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married. Upon their return to the United States, their second
child, Reginald Vince, was born in 1988.
5. Their relationship started to deteriorate, and sometime in 1990, the two of them separated. Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back
to California.
6. Reynaldo had to leave his children with his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug, because Reynaldo was once again assigned by his company to
go back to Pennsylvania.
7. Teresita claimed that she did not immediately follow her children because Reynaldo had filed a criminal case of bigamy against her and she was
afraid of being arrested. But she decided to go back to the Philippines, and filed a petition to gain custody of her children.
8. Trial court sided with Reynaldo, and gave him sole parental authority over their children, but with rights visitation to be agreed upon by the
parties and to be approved by the Court.
9. Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision, gave the custody to Teresita, invoking Articles 363 and 213 of the Civil Code.
ISSUES:
whether or not the mother, despite her illicit or immoral behavior, is fit to gain custody of her children
Article 363 of the Civil Code reads, In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of the children, the latters welfare shall be
paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure.
Article 213 of the Civil Code states, In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years or age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit.
RULING + RATIO:
The Court finds that the Court of Appeals erred in using the above stated articles in this case. The task of choosing the parent to whom custody
shall be awarded is not a ministerial function to be determined by a simple determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or
over seven years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the childs interests. Discretion is given to the court to decide who can best assure
the welfare of the child, and award the custody on the basis of that consideration. In Unson III vs Navarro, the court laid down the rule that the
sole and foremost consideration is the physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective
resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents.
If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not
conclusive. It can be overcome by compelling reasons.
In this case, Rosalind and Reginald are both over seven years of age, fairly intelligent children, quite capable of thoughtfully determining
the parent with whom they would want to live. Once the choice has been made, the burden returns to the court to investigate if the parent thus
chosen is fit or unfit to assume parent authority and custodial responsibility.
Both Rosalind and Reginald chose to stay with their father. In addition to that, it was found out that Teresitas illicit and immoral activities
had already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values, at least in Rosalind, after she took a
psychological test in grade school. Because of these records, Reynaldo seems to be the more fit parent to gain custody of the two children.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside, and the decision of Branch 96 of
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Quezon City and presided over by the Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin
in its Civil Case No. Q-92-14206 awarding custody of the minors Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu to their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated.
No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
ARTICLE 68
GOITIA vs CAMPOS RUEDA (1916)

Petition: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila
Petitioner: Eloisa Goitia y De La Camara (plaintiff and appellant)
Respondent: Jose Campos Rueda (defendant and appellee)
Ponente: Trent
FACTS:
1. It was decided in the CFI that the defendant cannot be compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a
judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation from the defendant.
2. The parties were legally married in Manila in 1915, and immediately thereafter established their residence at Calle San Marcelino, where they
lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff returned to her parents home.
3. The plaintiffs allegations are as follows:
That the defendant, one month after he had contracted marriage with the plaintiff, demanded of her that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts
on his genital organs; that the plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid
cohabitation. The defendant, according to plaintiff, continued his lewd demands of which plaintiff always declined.
4. Because of her refusals, defendant got exasperated and induced him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her lips, her face
and different parts of her body.
5. The wife then was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.
ISSUES:
whether or not husband can refuse to support his wife who left the conjugal dwelling
Article 149 of the Civil Code reads, The person obliged to give support may, at his option, satisfy it, either by paying the pension that maybe
fixed or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the person having the right to the same.
Article 152 of the same Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall cease. The failure of wife to live with her husband is not
one of them.
Note: Law of Civil Marriage of 1870 was the law in force at that time.
RULING + RATIO:
Petition granted. Defendant must continue supporting his wife. Neither spouse can be compelled to support the other outside of the
conjugal abode, unless it be by virtue of a final judgment granting the injured one a divorce or separation from the other.
The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on
the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is
of such vital concern to the state itself that the law will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek
protection in her parental home.
DISPOSITION:
No disposition included, but the court decided to grant the petition.
Arroyo v. Vasquez
G.R. No. L-17014, August 11, 1921
ARTICLE 68.
Rights & Obligations of Husband and Wife
Mariano Arroyo, Plaintiff-Appellant

Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo, Defendant-Appellee
FACTS:
1. Mariano Arroyo (husband) and Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo (wife) were married for 10 years.
2. The wife went away from their common home with the intention of living separately from her husband Mariano.
3. The husband made efforts inducing the wife to resume marital relations but to no avail.
4. The husband initiated an action to compel his wife to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful
wife.
5. The wife admitted the fact of marriage and that she left home without his consent but she averred by way of defense and cross-
complaint that she had been compelled to leave because of cruel treatment imposed by her husband. Thus, she in turn prayed
for affirmative relief, to consist of: (1) decree of separation; (2) liquidation of conjugal property; (3) and an allowance for
counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance.
6. The lower court gave judgement in favour of the defendant-appellee (the wife). The lower court reached the conclusion that the
husband was more to be blamed than the wife due to his continued ill-treatment which is a sufficient justification of her
abandonment of the conjugal home.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the wife absented herself from the marital home with sufficient justification
(2) Whether or not the wife can be compelled to live with her husband
HELD:
(1) The wife absented herself from the marital home WITHOUT sufficient justification.
(2) The wife CANNOT be compelled to live with her husband.
RATIO:
1. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court. As based on evidence, it is the opinion of the high court that the
wifes abandonment of the marital home was without sufficient justification because the wife was rather afflicted with a
disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree.
2. It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and
render conjugal rights to, the other. The experience of other countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel
the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus, the court cannot
order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile but he is entitled to judicial declaration that wifes abandonment
of marital home is without sufficient justification and that it is her duty to return home.
Ligeralde v. Patalinghug
G.R. No. 168796, April 15, 2010
From additional cases.

Art. 36. Psychological Incapacity.
Silvino Ligeralde, Petitioner

May Ascension Patalinghug and Republic of the Philippines, Respondents
FACTS:
1. Silvino (husband) and May (wife) were married and blessed with four children.
2. The husband caught his wife for several times having extra-marital affairs with other men. But the husband, for the sake of
their children, wanted to reconcile with her wife and to start a new life.
3. The couple started a new life but few months later, the wife continued a promiscuous behaviour. The wife confessed that she
does not love him anymore. The husband realized that their marriage was hopeless. They then lived separately.
4. The husband filed a complaint. RTC declared their marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity based on
the Psychological Report of Dr. Tina Nicdao-Basilio.
5. Later, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision on the ground that Mays alleged sexual infidelity and
emotional immaturity do not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code and the
psychologist failed to identify and prove the root cause thereof that the incapacity was medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.
6. Hence, this petition seeks to set aside the CA decision which reversed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not sexual infidelity automatically constitute psychological incapacity.
HELD: No. Sexual Infidelity DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY constitute psychological incapacity.
Ratio:
(1) Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by: a) gravity; b) juridical antecedence; and 3) incurability.
(2) The psychological incapacity must be:
a) grave or serious that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage;
b) medically or clinically identified and shown to be permanent or incurable; and
c) existing at the time of the celebration.
(3) The psychologist failed to identify and prove the root cause thereof that the incapacity was medically or clinically permanent
or incurable.
(4) The husband failed to establish that the unfaithfulness of the respondent is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which
makes her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
Jarillo v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 164435, September 29, 2009
From additional cases. About Bigamy.
Victoria S. Jarillo, Petitioner

People of the Philippines, Respondent
FACTS:
1. Jarillo, being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos
Uy.
2. Emmanuel Uy filed against Jarillo a civil case for annulment of marriage before the RTC of Manila. Thereafter, Jarillo was
charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City.
3. Jarillo also filed against Alocillo before the RTC of Makati for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
4. RTC of Manila finds Jarillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy. Jarillo was sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of 6 years of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision mayor, as maximum. The motion
for reconsideration was denied.
5. Hence, this petition for certiorari was filed by Jarillo, Petitioner.
6. Jarillo argues that her marriage to Alocillo was null and void because the latter was married to another woman at the time of
their marriage. Furthermore, she argued that her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of valid
marriage. She also insisted that the action had prescribed since Uy knew about the marriage to Alocillo for 20 years.
7. While the said petition for certiorari was pending, RTC of Makati City declared her marriage with Alocillo null and void ab
initio on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity. Thus, petitioner invoked this as ground for the reversal of her
conviction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can be acquitted from conviction of Bigamy after the subsequent marriage was declared void ab
initio.
HELD: No.
RATIO:
1. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of
nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
2. All that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted.
3. A marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
4. The declaration of nullity of marriage shall first be secured before another marriage be contracted.
Ablaza v. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010
From additional cases.
Isidro Ablaza, Petitioner

Republic of the Philippines, Respondent
FACTS:
1. Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted between his late brother
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. Petitioner argued that marriage was celebrated without a marriage license, thereby
rendering the marriage vid ab initio.
2. Petitioner insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half
of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest. The determination
of the validity of marriage is necessary in the determination of the properties he is entitled to.
3. The petition was dismissed by RTC on the ground that it was filed out of time and of being a non-party to the marriage. A
motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied.
4. The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but the petition was also dismissed. Though the CA expressed that the
declaration of marriage void ab initio does not prescribe, the petitioner is still not a party to the said marriage. Hence, the
dismissal of the petition.
5. Hence, this petition for certiorari was filed before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother
in order to determine and avail a substantial right.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
1. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the
estate of a deceased brother under conditions stated in Articles 1001 and 1003 of the Civil Code.
2. The right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants,
ascendants, or children (whether legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresencianos surviving
heir.
3. The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of RTC and CA in order that the substantial right of the petitioner, if any, may not
be prejudiced.
4. The Court however noted that the petitioner should have implead Leonila, the wife of the petitioners brother. Her participation
in this action is made all the more necessary in order to shed llight on whether the marriage had been celebrated without a
marriage license and whether the marriage might have been a marriage excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.
SPOUSES REX and CONCEPCION AGGABAO v. DIONISIO Z. PARULAN, JR. and MA. ELENA PARULAN
Petition: For review on certiorari, seeking to reverse the decision of Court of Appeals
Petitioner: Rex and Concepcion Aggabao
Defendant: Dionisio Parulan, Jr. and Ma. Elena Parulan
Ponente: Bersamin
Doctrine: CONJUGAL PROPERTY
Its administration and enjoyment shall belong to both spouses jointly. If one is unable to participate, the other spouse may assume role
of administration but this does not include disposition. In the absence of such consent, the disposition shall be void.
Facts:
1. The case involves two parcels of land located in No. 49 Miguel Cuaderno Street, Executive Village, BF Homes, Paraaque City and
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 63376 and TCT No. 63377 in the name of respondents Spouses Maria Elena A.
Parulan and Dionisio Z. Parulan, Jr.
2. Respondent spouses have been estranged from one another.
3. Real estate broker Atanacio offered the property to petitioners.
4. The petitioners already met with Ma. Elena and made payment arrangements.
5. On March 18, 1991, the petitioners delivered the final amount of P700,000.00 to Ma. Elena, who executed a deed of absolute sale in
their favor. However, Ma. Elena did not turn over the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 63376, claiming that said copy was in the
possession of a relative who was then in Hongkong. She assured them that the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 63376 would be
turned over after a week.
6. The petitioners learned that the duplicate owners copy of TCT No. 63376 had been all along in the custody of Atty. Jeremy Z. Parulan,
who appeared to hold an SPA executed by his brother Dionisio authorizing him to sell both lots.
7. They recalled that Atty. Parulan smugly demanded P800,000.00 in exchange for the duplicate owners copy of TCT No. 63376, because
Atty. Parulan represented the current value of the property to be P1.5 million. As a counter-offer, however, they tendered P250,000.00,
which Atty. Parulan declined.
8. Atty. Parulan decided to call them on April 5, 1991, but they informed him that they had already fully paid to Ma. Elena.
9. Dioniso, through Atty. Parulan, commenced the action.
Issues:
1. Which between Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should apply to the sale of the conjugal property
executed without the consent of Dionisio?
2. Whether or not the petitioners be considered in good faith at the time of their purchase of the property
Provisions + Elements:
1. Art. 124 of the Family Code

The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five
years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties,
the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
2. Art. 173 of the Civil Code
The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of
any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband
which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or
her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
3. Art. 256 of the Family Code
This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws.
Ruling + Ratio:
1. Art. 124 of the Family Code prevails.

Art. 173 of the Civil Code was already repealed by the Family Code.
The sale was made on 1991, after the effectivity of the Family Code.
According to Art. 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family Code may apply retroactively provided no vested rights
are impaired.
Petitioners failed to substantiate their contention that Dionisio, while holding the administration over the property, had
delegated to his brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration of the property, considering that they did not present in court the SPA
granting to Atty. Parulan the authority for the administration.
The petitioners insistence that Atty. Parulans making of a counter-offer during the March 25, 1991 meeting ratified the sale
merits no consideration because a transaction without Dionisios written consent would be void. There was nothing to be
ratified.
2. Due diligence is required in verifying vendors title and agents authority to sell property.
The petitioners knew fully well that the law demanded the written consent of Dionisio to the sale, but yet they did not present
evidence to show that they had made inquiries into the circumstances behind the execution of the SPA purportedly executed by
Dionisio in favor of Ma. Elena.
The final payment of P700,000.00 even without the owners duplicate copy of the TCT No. 63376 being handed to them by Ma.
Elena indicated a revealing lack of precaution on the part of the petitioners.
They did not take immediate action against Ma. Elena upon discovering that the owners original copy of TCT No. 63376 was in
the possession of Atty. Parulan, contrary to Elenas representation.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
PIMENTEL v. PIMENTEL
Petition: For review assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner: Joselito R. Pimentel
Defendant: Maria Chrysantine L. Pimentel and People of the Philippines
Ponente: Carpio
Doctrine: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE DUE TO PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
Facts:
1. Private respondent filed an action for frustrated parricide against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
2. Petitioner was summoned in the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
3. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings in RTC QC on the ground of existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner
asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the civil case
would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
4. The RTC QC ruled that the case in RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of criminal case before it.
5. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. RTC QC denied it.
6. Petitioner assails the decision of RTC QC in Court of Appeals. The petition was denied.
Issue: Whether or not the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the
criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.
Art. 36 of the Civil Code: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals: the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to
the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned.
Ruling + Ratio:
1. Annulment of Marriage is not a prejudicial question in criminal case of parricide.

a. The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder or homicide. However,
the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further,
the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
b. Even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the
time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
2. Tenebro v. Court of Appeals cannot be applied to this case.
a. The issue in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case.
b. Also, the Court declared in that case that a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
BOLOS v. BOLOS
Petition: For review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a review of a decision of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner: Cynthia S. Bolos
Defendant: Danilo T. Bolos
Ponente: Mendoza
Doctrine: Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is permanent and inviolable.
Facts:
1. Petitioner Cynthia filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo under Art. 36 of the Family
Code. The RTC granted the petition for annulment on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both petitioner and
respondent.
2. Respondent Danilo filed a Notice of Appeal. The RTC denied it due to failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new
trial. He filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of appeal, which was likewise denied. The RTC declared the decision to be
final.
3. Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically
capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family
home and their children. The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the orders of the RTC.
4. Cynthia sought for motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration. The CA denied this.
Issue: Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, is applicable to this case
Article 36 of the Family Code: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Article 1 of the Family Code: Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
Ruling + Ratio:
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages is not applicable to this case.
As per section 1 which indicates the scope of the statute, the coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.
The appellate court was correct in denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration considering that the
reglementary period for filing the said motion for reconsideration is non-extendible.
The rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with.
The 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution. Its permanence and inviolability is emphasized by Article 1
of the Family Code.
Petitioners earlier motion for extension of time did not suspend/toll the running of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion
for reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA decision has already attained finality when petitioner filed its motion for
reconsideration.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
BACCAY v. BACCAY
Petition: For review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, this petition assails the Decision dated August
26, 2005 and Resolution dated June 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals. The CA reversed the February 5, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 38, which declared the marriage of petitioner Noel B. Baccay (Noel) and Maribel Calderon-Baccay (Maribel) void on the
ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Petitioner: Noel Baccay
Defendant: Maribel Baccay and the Republic of the Philippines
Ponente: Villarama
Doctrine:
Facts:
1. The petitioner and private respondent were schoolmates at Mapua Institute of Technology. The two became sweethearts. Noel
considered Maribel as the snobbish and hard-to-get type.
2. Noels family was aware of their relationship for he used to bring her to their house. Noel observed that Maribel was inordinately shy
when around his family. During special occasions, he would invite her to come with his family but he would always try to avoid his
invitations. Noel talked to her about her attitude towards his family and she said she would change, but she never did.
3. Noel decided to break up with Maribel. Maribel refused and offered to accept Noels relationship with another woman only if they
would not sever their ties. They remained friends.
4. Despite their efforts to keep their meetings strictly friendly, they had several romantic moments together. Noel took their sexual
relations casually since Maribel never demanded anything aside from his company.
5. Maribel told Noel that she was pregnant with his child. Upon the advice of his mother, Noel grudgingly agreed to marry Maribel. They
got married.
6. After the marriage ceremony, Noel and Maribel agreed to live with Noels family in their house at Rosal, Pag-asa, Quezon City. During all
the time she lived with Noels family, Maribel remained aloof and did not go out of her way to endear herself to them.
7. Noel noticed that he never observed any symptoms of the pregnancy of Maribel. He asked her officemates and they confirmed that she
does not manifest such signs. Maribel did not go home for a day, and when she came home she announced to Noel and his family that
she had a miscarriage and was confined at the Chinese General Hospital where her sister worked as a nurse.
8. When Noel confronted her about her alleged miscarriage, it escalated into an intense quarrel that led Noels parents to ask them to
leave her house. Maribel left and went to her family, and she rejected any efforts of Noel to try to communicate with her.
9. After less than two years of marriage, Noel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Despite summons, Maribel did not
participate in the proceedings.
10. The marriage was declared null and void in the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City. However, the OSG appealed, and the CA reversed the
decision of the lower court.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between the parties is null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
solemnization.
Article 46 of the Family Code:
(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband;
(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the marriage; or
(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for
action for the annulment of marriage.
Ruling + Ratio:
The totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated.
Noels evidence merely established that Maribel refused to have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him
after their quarrel when he confronted her about her alleged miscarriage.
He failed to prove the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence,
and incurability.
The report of the psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder traceable to her
experiences during childhood, did not establish how the personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential
obligations of the marriage.
The same psychologist testified that Maribel was capable of entering into a marriage except that it would be difficult for her to sustain
one. Mere difficulty, it must be stressed, is not the incapacity contemplated by law.
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal, or a neglect in the performance of some marital obligations.
An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
AGRAVIADOR v. AGRAVIADOR
Petition: For review on certiorari the decision dated May 31, 2005 and the resolution dated December 6, 2005 of the Court of Appeals. The
challenged decision reversed the Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 276, Muntinlupa City, declaring the marriage of the petitioner
and Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador (respondent) null and void on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity. The assailed resolution, on the
other hand, denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner: Enrique Agraviador y Alunan
Defendant: Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador
Ponente: Brion
Doctrine: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY its gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability must be proven to be constitute as a ground for the
nullity of a marriage.
Facts:
1. Petitioner was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of Customs while the respondent was a 17-year old waitress when they first
met at a beerhouse where the respondent worked. They got married and had four children. The petitioners family was apprehensive
about this marriage because of the nature of the respondents work and because she came from a broken family.
2. The petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the respondent, under Article 36 of the
Family Code. He alleged that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as she
was carefree and irresponsible, and refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their house for long
periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate;
and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her activities. He also claimed that the respondent refused to have sex with him since
1993 because she became very close to a male tenant in their house.
3. Aside from the petitioners testimony, he also presented a certified true copy of their marriage contract and the psychiatric evaluation
report of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac.
4. The RTC nullified the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent in its decision. It saw merit in the petitioners testimony and Dr.
Patacs psychiatric evaluation report.
5. The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed and set
aside the RTC resolution, and dismissed the petition.
Issue: Whether or not there is basis to nullify the petitioners marriage to the respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity to comply
with the essential marital obligations.
solemnization.
Santos v. Court of Appeals:
o The Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c)
incurability.
o It should refer to "no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
o It must be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage
Ruling + Ratio:
The petitioners testimony failed to establish that the respondents condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted on
some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that makes her completely unable to discharge the essential marital
obligations.
o Petitioner merely showed that the respondent had some personality defects that showed their manifestation during the
marriage
o Petitioner failed to discuss the gravity of the respondents condition; neither did he mention that the respondents malady was
incurable, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the respondents means to undertake
The Court finds that Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report fell short in proving that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated
to perform the essential marital duties.
o Dr. Patac relied only on the information fed by the petitioner, the parties second child, Emmanuel, and household helper.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
ANTONE v. BERONILLA
Petition: For review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify and set aside the issuances of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner: Myrna P. Antone
Defendant: Leo R. Beronilla
Ponente: Perez
Doctrine: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such marriage void. (Article 40 of the Family Code)
Facts:
1. Petitioner Myrna P. Antone executed an Affidavit-Complaint for Bigamy against Leo R. Beronilla before the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Pasay City. She alleged that her marriage with respondent in 1978 had not yet been legally dissolved when the latter contracted a
second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo in 1991.
2. Respondent moved to quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. He argued that his
marriage with petitioner was declared null and void by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran.
3. After a hearing on the motion, the court quashed the Information. Applying Morigo v. People, it ruled that: The first element of bigamy
as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married
to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of.
4. The prosecution, through herein petitioner, moved for reconsideration of the said Order. The court denied it.
5. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. CA dismissed the petition. She requested for a motion for
reconsideration. It was denied.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion when it sustained respondents
motion to quash on the basis of a fact contrary to those alleged in the information.
Article 40 of the Family Code: The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such marriage void.
Ruling + Ratio:
The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when, in so quashing the Information in Criminal Case No. 07-0907-CFM, it considered an
evidence introduced to prove a fact not alleged thereat disregarding the settled rules that a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the
facts stated in the information; and that facts not alleged thereat may be appreciated only under exceptional circumstances, none of which is
obtaining in the instant petition.
It would be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this stage of the proceedings and to dismiss the information on the basis only of the
petitioners evidence. The Court sees no apparent defect in the allegations in the Information in the case at bar.
The documents showing that: (1) the court has decreed that the marriage of petitioner and respondent is null and void from the
beginning; and (2) such judgment has already become final and executory and duly registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar of Naval,
Biliran are pieces of evidence that seek to establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the Information that a first valid marriage was
subsisting at the time the respondent contracted a subsequent marriage. This should not have been considered at all because matters of
defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash.
The issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the
subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does
not constitute an offense.
Disposition: The rulings of the lower courts are SET ASIDE, and the criminal case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
DOLINA v. VALLECERA
Petition: For review of the decision of the RTC
Petitioner: Cherryl B. Dolina
Defendant: Glenn D. Vallecera
Ponente: Abad
Doctrine: Claim for temporary support of an unacknowledged child
Facts:
1. Petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order against respondent Glenn D.
Vallecera before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City for alleged woman and child abuse under Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.
Dolina also prayed for financial support from Vallecera for their supposed child, which she based on the childs Certificate of Live Birth
which listed defendant as the father. Petition also asked the RTC to order Philippine Airlines, Valleceras employer, to withhold from his
pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem appropriate.
2. Vallecera argued that the petition was just for financial support and not for protection against abuses, that the signature on the
Certificate of Live Birth is not his, and that he has never lived with Dolina.
3. The RTC dismissed the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolinas action for temporary protection and denied her application for temporary support for
her child.
Provisions + Elements: RA No. 9262 entitled AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINSTWOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE
MEASURESFOR VICTIMS, PRESCRIBING PENALTIESTHEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Ruling + Ratio:
Dolina filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child.
1. The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or
violence. Issuance of a protection order can include a grant of legal support for the wife and child.
2. It became apparent to the RTC upon hearing that this was not the case since, contrary to her claim, because neither she nor her child
ever lived with Vallecera. The abuse cannot just be assumed.
3. To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or
acknowledged. Since Dolinas demand for support for her son is based on her claim that he is Valleceras illegitimate child, the latter is
not entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him. Vallecera denied the
allegation.
4. The childs remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition.
Disposition: ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban Citys Order that dismissed
petitioner Cherryl B. Dolinas action.
Contents:
1. Marable v. Marable (GR no. 178741, Jan 17, 2011)
2. Dino v. Dino (GR. No. 178044, Jan. 19, 2011)
3. Yambao v. RP and Yambao (GR No. 184063, Jan. 24, 2011)
4. Aguete v. PNB (GR No. 170166, Apr. 6, 2011)
5. Flores v. Lindo (GR No. 183984, Apr. 13, 2011)
6. Sultan v. Macalinog Abdulla (AM No. SCC-11-16-P)
7. (to follow) Ochosa v. (GR No. 181881, Jan. 26, 2011)
Case I found did not match the GR no. with the title Will follow this up asap
Thank you for your patience everyone!
Title: Marable v. Marable (GR no. 178741, Jan 17, 2011)
New Civil Code: Article 36
A. Petition: On appeal is the Decision dated February 12, 2007 and Resolution dated July 4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 which reversed and set aside the Decision dated January 4, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 72, Antipolo City, in Civil Case No. 01-6302.
a. The RTC had granted petitioners prayer that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void on the ground that he is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
B. Petitioner: ROSALINO L. MARABLE,

C. Respondent: MYRNA F. MARABLE
D. Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR.
E. Doctrine: psychological incapacity to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage, and must refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
F. Facts:
a. Petitioner and respondent met in 1967 while studying at Arellano University. Petitioner courted respondent and they
eventually became sweethearts even though petitioner already had a girl friend.
b. On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before Mayor
Antonio C. Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison
and their marriage was blessed with five children.
c. As the years went by, however, their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels became common occurrences.
They fought incessantly and petitioner became unhappy because of it.
d. Longing for peace, love and affection, petitioner developed a relationship with another woman. Respondent learned about
the affair, and petitioner promptly terminated it.
e. When he could not bear his lot any longer, petitioner left the family home and stayed with his sister in Antipolo City. He
gave up all the properties which he and respondent had accumulated during their marriage in favor of respondent and their
children. Later, he converted to Islam after dating several women.
f. On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds. On said date, he filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of his marriage to respondent on the ground of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential responsibilities
of marital life.
g. He pointed that he constantly longed for affection coming from a miserable childhood experience.
h. In support of his petition, petitioner presented the Psychological Report of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist from
the National Center for Mental Health, stating that petitioner is suffering from Antisocial Personality Disorder,
characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness and lack
of remorse.
i. It was Dr. Tayags conclusion that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.
j. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision annulling petitioners marriage to respondent on the ground of petitioners
psychological incapacity.
k. Upon appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the CA reversed the RTC decision.
l. The CA held that the circumstances related by petitioner are insufficient to establish the existence of petitioners
i. The appellate court emphasized that the root cause of petitioners psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision.
ii. In addition, the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
petitioner to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
G. Issues:
a. Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the RTCs decision
b. Whether or not Petitioner is really Psychologically Incapacitated enough to bring disability to perform his
essential marital obligations
H. Provision + Elements:
a. Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
i. The term psychological incapacity to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage.
ii. These are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and
significance to the marriage he or she has contracted
iii. Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants
I. Ruling+ Ratio:
a. Petitioner completely relied on the psychological examination conducted by Dr. Tayag on him to establish his psychological
incapacity. The result of the examination and the findings of Dr. Tayag however, are insufficient to establish petitioner's
i. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social
Personality Disorder but there was no factual basis stated for the finding that petitioner is a socially deviant person,
rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful.
ii. There was no established link between petitioners acts to his alleged psychological incapacity. It is indispensable
that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself
b. The records would show that the petitioner acted responsibly during their marriage and in fact worked hard to provide for
the needs of his family, most especially his children. Their personal differences do not reflect a personality disorder
tantamount to psychological incapacity.
c. Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer for a father, was one of the reasons why he
engaged in extra-marital affairs during his marriage. However, it appears more likely that he became unfaithful as a result of
a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in his personal history.
i. . It has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering
from psychological incapacity
d. Santos v. Court of Appeals, the intention of the law is to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage
e. The totality of the evidence presented is insufficient to establish petitioners psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential
marital obligations.
J. Disposition: WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The February 12, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 and its Resolution dated July 4, 2007 are hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
Title: Dino v. Dino (GR. No. 178044, Jan. 19, 2011)
New Civil Code: Article 36, Article 147
A. Petition: Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 18 October 2006 Decision2 and the 12 March 2007 Order3 of the Regional
Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil Case No. LP-01-0149.
B. Petitioner: ALAIN M. DIO
C. Defendant: MA. CARIDAD L. DIO
D. Ponente: CARPIO, J
E. Doctrine: Finality Marriages declared void ab initio under Art. 36- marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36
of the Family Code, should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties
F. Facts:
a. Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Dio (respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started
living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together
again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias City
b. On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that respondent failed in her marital obligation to give
love and support to him, and had abandoned her responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees
and gallivanting with her friends that depleted the family assets
c. Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of the petition, was already
living in the United States of America. After no response from the espondent, petitioner learned that she had alrady filed
for a divorce/dissolution of their marriage which was granted by theSuperior Court of California, and that on Oct. 5, 2001,
respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara
d. Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing that respondent was
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in her system since her early formative years,
long-lasting, hence incurable
e. The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish respondents psychological
incapacity, however, declaring that:
i. A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50
and 51 of the Family Code.
ii. Petitioner partially appealed to this order which ten led the court to modify it as:
1. A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code
f. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.
G. Issues: The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall
only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code
a. Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
i. Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned
by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.
ii. For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void
I. Ruling+ Ratio:
a. The court agrees with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be
issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
b. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of
the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides:
a. Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of
absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
b. It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which are declared
void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code
c. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article 36 of
the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the properties of the parties
d. In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and not under
Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner and respondent are
the rules on co-ownership
e. Therefore, it is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity
of marriage
J. Disposition: WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the decree of absolute
nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial courts decision without waiting for the liquidation, partition, and
distribution of the parties properties under Article 147 of the Family Code
Title: Yambao v. RP and Yambao (GR No. 184063, Jan. 24, 2011)
A. Petition: Petitioner Cynthia E. Yambao (petitioner) is assailing the Decisiondated April 16, 2008 and the Resolution dated August
4, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89262. The CA affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City, which denied petitioners Petition for the annulment of her marriage to respondent Patricio E. Yambao
(respondent) on the ground of psychological incapacity
B. Petitioner: CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO
C. Defendant: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and PATRICIO E. YAMBAO
D. Ponente: NACHURA, J
E. Doctrine: Psychological incapacity under Art. 36: For a marriage to be annulled under Article 36 of the Family Code, the
psychologically incapacitated spouse must be shown to suffer no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes him or her to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
F. Facts:
a. Petitioner and respondent were married on December 21, 1968 at the Philamlife Church in Quezon City.
b. On July 11, 2003, after 35 years of marriage, petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC, Makati City, praying that the
marriage be declared null and void by reason of respondents psychological incapacity, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code.
c. In her petition before the RTC, petitioner narrated that, since the beginning, her and respondents married life had been
marred by bickering, quarrels, and recrimination due to the latters inability to comply with the essential obligations of
married life
d. Petitioner averred that through all the years of their married life, she was the only one who earned a living and took care of the
children.
e. Petitioner also claimed that, when their children were babies, respondent did not even help to change their diapers or feed them, even
while petitioner was recovering from her caesarean operation, proffering the excuse that he knew nothing about children
f. In his Answer, respondent denied that he has refused to work. He claimed that he had been trying to find a decent job, but was always
unable to because of his old age and lack of qualifications
g. As to the care of their children, respondent countered that no fault should be attributed to him because that is the duty of the
household help
h. On February 9, 2007, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit
i. The court said that, even as petitioner claimed to be unhappy in the marriage, it is incontrovertible that the union lasted for over thirty
years and the parties were able to raise three children into adulthood without suffering any major parenting problems
j. In a Decision[26] dated April 16, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision. The CA held that petitioner failed to show that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage
G. Issues: Whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations based on evidence presented
by the petitioner
Article 36 of the Family Code states:

a. Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.
I. Ruling+ Ratio:
a. The petition has no merit and, perforce, must be denied.
b. The Court reiterates its recent pronouncement that each case for declaration of nullity under the foregoing provision must be judged,
not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections, or generalizations, but according to its own facts.
c. In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[45] the Court held that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.
d. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition
e. On the contrary to petitioners allegations, respondents efforts, though few and far between they may be, showed an understanding of
his duty to provide for his family, albeit he did not meet with much success. Whether his failure was brought about by his own
indolence or irresponsibility, or by some other external factors, is not relevant. What is clear is that respondent, in showing an
awareness to provide for his family, even with his many failings, does not suffer from psychological incapacity
f. Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty,
refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will.[51] This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability
to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage:
the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality.
g. Respondent may not have turned out to be the ideal husband, or may have failed to meet petitioners exacting standards. Yet this
Court finds it impossible to believe that, as petitioner alleges, there was nothing but heartache and strife in their over 35 years (prior to
filing the petition for declaration of nullity) of marriage
h. Certainly, the marriage was beset by difficulties, or as petitioner puts it, marred by bickerings, quarrels, and recrimination. It is a fact,
however, that all marriages suffer through the same trials at one point or another, with some going through more rough patches than
others; that they had gone through 35 years together as husband and wife is an indication that the parties can, should they choose to do
so, work through their problems
J. Disposition: WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 16, 2008 and the
Resolution dated August 4, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89262 are AFFIRMED
Title: Aguete v. PNB (GR No. 170166, Apr. 6, 2011)
New Civil Code: Article
A. Petition: G.R. No. 170166 is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on 17 October 2005 by the Court of
Appeals (appellate court) in CA-G.R. CV No. 76845.
a. The appellate court granted the appeal filed by the Philippine National Bank Laoag Branch (PNB). The appellate court
reversed the 29 June 2001 Decision of Branch 15 of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City (trial court) in Civil Case No.
7803
b. The trial court declared the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed by spouses Jose A. Ros3 (Ros) and Estrella Aguete
(Aguete) (collectively, petitioners), as well as the subsequent foreclosure proceedings, void. Aside from payment of
attorneys fees, the trial court also ordered PNB to vacate the subject property to give way to petitioners possession
B. Petitioner: JOE A. ROS and ESTRELLA AGUETE
C. Defendant: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK- LAOAG BRANCH
D. Ponente: CARPIO
E. Doctrine: Obligations for the benefit of Conjugal partnership- Where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the
family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership
F. Facts:
a. On January 13, 1983, spouses Jose A. Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate
Mortgage and all legal proceedings taken thereunder against PNB, Laoag Branch before the Court of First Instance, Ilocos
Norte docketed as Civil Case No. 7803. The complaint was later amended and was raffled to the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 15, Laoag City
b. The averments in the complaint disclosed that plaintiff-appellee Joe A. Ros obtained a loan of P115,000.00 from PNB
Laoag Branch on October 14, 1974 and as security for the loan, plaintiff-appellee Ros executed a real estate mortgage
involving a parcel of land Lot No. 9161 of the Cadastral Survey of Laoag, with all the improvements thereon described
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9646
c. Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, PNB instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the
mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of PNB, Laoag as the
highest bidder
d. After the lapse of one (1) year without the property being redeemed, the property was consolidated and registered in the
name of PNB, Laoag Branch on August 10, 1978
e. Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee Estrella Aguete) has no knowledge of the loan obtained by her husband nor she
consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal property a complaint was filed to annul the proceedings pertaining
to the mortgage, sale and consolidation of the property interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on the
documents were forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family
f. In its answer, PNB prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action, and insists that it was plaintiffs-
appellees own acts [of] omission/connivance that bar them from recovering the subject property on the ground of
estoppel, laches, abandonment and prescription
g. On 29 June 2001, the trial court rendered its Decision5 in favor of petitioners. The trial court declared that Aguete did not
sign the loan documents, did not appear before the Notary Public to acknowledge the execution of the loan documents, did
not receive the loan proceeds from PNB, and was not aware of the loan until PNB notified her in 14 August 1978 that she
and her family should vacate the mortgaged property because of the expiration of the redemption period
h. PNB filed its Notice of Appeal7 of the trial courts decision on 13 September 2001
i. The trial court allowed petitioners to occupy the subject property with the condition that petitioners would voluntarily
vacate the premises and waive recovery of improvements introduced should PNB prevail on appeal
j. On 17 October 2005, the appellate court rendered its Decision13 and granted PNBs appeal. The appellate court reversed
the trial courts decision, and dismissed petitioners complaint
k. The appellate court declared that Aguete affixed her signatures on the documents knowingly and with her full consent
l. Assuming arguendo that Aguete did not give her consent to Ros loan, the appellate court ruled that the conjugal
partnership is still liable because the loan proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family
G. Issues: Whether or not Ros loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership, which debt is chargeable to the
conjugal partnership
Art. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition
be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
(2) That which is obtained by the industry, or work or as salary of the spouses, or of either of them;
(3) The fruits, rents or interest received or due during the marriage, coming from the common property or from the
exclusive property of each spouse
Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
(1) All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by
the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership;
(2) Arrears or income due, during the marriage, from obligations which constitute a charge upon property of either spouse
or of the partnership;
(3) Minor repairs or for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either the husband or
the wife; major repairs shall not be charged to the partnership;
(4) Major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) The maintenance of the family and the education of the children of both husband and wife, and of legitimate children of
one of the spouses;
(6) Expenses to permit the spouses to complete a professional, vocational or other course
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the
annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract
of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to
exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage may demand the value of the property fraudulently alienated
by the husband
I. Ruling+ Ratio: The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the appellate court
a. The Civil Code was the applicable law at the time of the mortgage. The subject property is thus considered part of the
conjugal partnership of gains
b. There is no doubt that the subject property was acquired during Ros and Aguetes marriage. Ros and Aguete were married
on 16 January 1954, while the subject property was acquired in 1968.15 There is also no doubt that Ros encumbered the
subject property when he mortgaged it for P115,000.00 on 23 October 1974.16 PNB Laoag does not doubt that Aguete, as
evidenced by her signature, consented to Ros mortgage to PNB of the subject property
c. The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife
d. The same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared
only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent
e. The documents disavowed by Aguete are acknowledged before a notary public, hence they are public documents. Every
instrument duly acknowledged and certified as provided by law may be presented in evidence without further proof, the
certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved.18 The
execution of a document that has been ratified before a notary public cannot be disproved by the mere denial of the alleged
signer
f. A notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and it has in its
favor the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong and convincing as to exclude
all controversy as to the falsity of the certificate
g. Furthermore, an allegation of forgery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and whoever alleges it has the
burden of proving the same
h. Ros himself cannot bring action against PNB, for no one can come before the courts with unclean hands. In their
memorandum before the trial court, petitioners themselves admitted that Ros forged Aguetes signature
i. The application for loan shows that the loan would be used exclusively for additional working [capital] of buy & sell of
garlic & virginia tobacco.
j. Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or profession by which he contributes to the
support of the family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive and private debts
k. If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to be used in
or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term x x x x obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
l. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so,
that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership
J. Disposition: WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76845
promulgated on 17 October 2005 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners
Title: Flores v. Lindo (GR No. 183984, Apr. 13, 2011)
A. Petition: Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 30 May 2008 Decision and the 4 August 2008 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94003
B. Petitioner: ARTURO SARTE FLORES
C. Defendant: SPOUSES ENRICO L. LINDO, JR and EDNA C. LINDO
D. Ponente: CARPIO,
E. Doctrine: Unjust Enrichment- The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching himself at
the expense of another without just cause or consideration. The principle of unjust enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a person
is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of another
F. Facts:
a. On 31 October 1995, Edna Lindo (Edna) obtained a loan from Arturo Flores (petitioner) amounting to P400,000 payable
on 1 December 1995 with 3% compounded monthly interest and 3% surcharge in case of late payment.
b. To secure the loan, Edna executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage4 (the Deed) covering a property in the name of Edna
and her husband Enrico (Enrico) Lindo, Jr. (collectively, respondents). Edna also signed a Promissory Note and the Deed
for herself and for Enrico as his attorney-in-fact.
c. Edna issued three checks as partial payments for the loan. All checks were dishonored for insufficiency of funds, prompting petitioner
to file a Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage with Damages against respondents
d. In its 30 September 2003 Decision,6 the RTC, Branch 33 ruled that petitioner was not entitled to judicial foreclosure of the mortgage.
The RTC, Branch 33 found that the Deed was executed by Edna without the consent and authority of Enrico
e. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its Order7 dated 8 January 2004, the RTC, Branch 33 denied the motion for lack of
merit
f. The RTC, Branch 42 ruled that the RTC, Branch 33 expressly stated that its decision did not mean that petitioner could no longer
recover the loan petitioner extended to Edna
g. Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order before the Court of Appeals
h. In its 30 May 2008 Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside the 22 July 2005 and 8 February 2006 Orders of the RTC, Branch 42 for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
i. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 3, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may not institute more than one
suit for a single cause of action. If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one on a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available ground for the dismissal of the others
j. The Court of Appeals ruled that on a nonpayment of a note secured by a mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the
debtor, that is recovery of the credit with execution of the suit
k. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner had only one cause of action against Edna for her failure to pay her obligation and he could
not split the single cause of action by filing separately a foreclosure proceeding and a collection case. By filing a petition for foreclosure
of the real estate mortgage, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner had already waived his personal action to recover the amount
covered by the promissory note.
G. Issues: whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in dismissing the complaint for collection of sum of money on the
ground of multiplicity of suits
The principle of unjust enrichment is provided under Article 22 of the Civil Code which provides
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him
There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person
retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.
The principle of unjust enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or
justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of another
I. Ruling+ Ratio: The petition has merit
a. The rule is that a mortgage-creditor has a single cause of action against a mortgagor-debtor, that is, to recover the debt. The mortgage-
creditor has the option of either filing a personal action for collection of sum of money or instituting a real action to foreclose on the
mortgage security.
b. The real estate mortgage executed by petition Edna Lindo over their conjugal property is undoubtedly an act of strict dominion and
must be consented to by her husband to be effective. In the instant case, the real estate mortgage, absent the authority or consent of
the husband, is necessarily void
c. Indeed, where a mortgage is not valid, the principal obligation which it guarantees is not thereby rendered null and void.
d. In case of nullity, the mortgage deed remains as evidence or proof of a personal obligation of the debtor and the amount due to the
creditor may be enforced in an ordinary action.
e. In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were executed on 31 October 1995. The Special Power of
Attorney was executed on 4 November 1995. The execution of the SPA is the acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the
continuing offer as a binding contract between the parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract
f. However, The Court of Appeals stated that petitioner merely relied on the declarations of these courts that he could file a separate
personal action and thus failed to observe the rules and settled jurisprudence on multiplicity of suits, closing petitioners avenue for
recovery of the loan. Nevertheless, petitioner still has a remedy under the law
g. The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of another
without just cause or consideration.
h. The principle is applicable in this case considering that Edna admitted obtaining a loan from petitioners, and the same has not been
fully paid without just cause. The Deed was declared void erroneously at the instance of Edna, first when she raised it as a defense
before the RTC, Branch 33 and second, when she filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC, Branch 93.
i. Petitioner could not be expected to ask the RTC, Branch 33 for an alternative remedy, as what the Court of Appeals ruled that he
should have done, because the RTC, Branch 33 already stated that it had no jurisdiction over any personal action that petitioner might
have against Edna
j. Considering the circumstances of this case, the principle against unjust enrichment, being a substantive law, should prevail
over the procedural rule on multiplicity of suits
k. Edna should not be allowed to unjustly enrich herself because of the erroneous decisions of the two trial courts when she questioned
the validity of the Deed
J. Disposition: WHEREFORE, the 30 May 2008 Decision and the 4 August 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94003
are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 is directed to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 04-110858
Title: Sultan v. Macalinog Abdulla (AM No. SCC-11-16-P)
New Civil Code: Muslim Code of the Philippines
A. Petition: The present administrative matter stemmed from the November 29, 2009 letter-complaint of Sultan Pandagaranao A.
Ilupa (complainant) charging Clerk of Court II Macalinog S. Abdullah (respondent) of the Sharia Circuit Court (SCC) in Marawi
City with abuse of authority in relation with the issuance of a certificate of divorce
B. Petitioner: SULTAN PANDAGARANAO A. ILUPA
C. Defendant: MACALINOG S. ABDULLAH
D. Ponente: BRION,
E. Doctrine:
a. Divorce, as found under Muslim law, is recognized in the Philippines.
b. Administrative duty-It is a settled rule in administrative proceedings that the complainant has the burden of proving the
allegations in his or her complaint with substantial evidence. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption
that the respondent has regularly performed his duties will prevail
F. Facts:
a. The complainant alleges in support of the charge that the respondent exhibited ignorance of his duties as clerk of court
when he issued a certificate of divorce, (OCRG Form No. 102) relying mainly on an illegal Kapasadan or Agreement
b. He claims that the respondent took away his beautiful wife by force or had a personal interest in her
c. The complainant believes that the respondent should not have issued the divorce certificate because divorce is not
recognized in the country and the Kapasadan or separation agreement had already been revoked by Philippine civil law
d. To save his marriage with Nella Rocaya Mikunug originally solemnized on May 19, 1959, based on the Maranao culture,
and later renewed through a civil wedding before a Marawi City judge the complainant filed a petition for restitution of
marital rights with the SCC, Marawi City
e. To his dismay, the judge dismissed the petition without any notice or summons to him. He suspects that the dismissal was
due to the respondents hukos-pukos or manipulation
f. The respondent argues that contrary to the complainants claim, there was a divorce agreement, in the Maranao dialect,
attached to the divorce certificate. The complainant even signed both pages of the agreement.
g. Although the agreement was not labeled as such, its essence indicates that the couple agreed to have a divorce and it was so
understood also by their children and the witnesses who signed the agreement
h. On the complainants claim that there is no divorce in the Philippines, the respondent points out that this is true only as far
as the civil law is concerned, but not under the Muslim Law which recognizes divorce
i. In compliance with the Courts Resolution dated August 25, 2010, Executive Judge Gamor B. Disalo of the RTC, 12th
Judicial Region, Marawi City, investigated the complaint, and submitted a Report and Recommendation dated January 19,
2010
j. The complainants non-cooperation prompted Judge Disalo to close the investigation and to conclude, based on the facts
gathered by the OCA and on the cited applicable laws, that sufficient grounds existed to dismiss the complaint
G. Issues: Whether or not the issuance of a certificate of divorce is within the respondents duties, as defined by law
Articles 81 and 83 of the Muslim Code of the Philippines provide:
Article 81. District Registrar. - The Clerk of Court of the Sharia District Court shall, in addition to his regular functions, act as
District Registrar of Muslim Marriages, Divorces, Revocations of Divorces, and Conversions within the territorial jurisdiction of said court.
The Clerk of Court of the Sharia Circuit Court shall act as Circuit Registrar of Muslim Marriages, Divorces, Revocations of Divorces, and
Conversations within his jurisdiction.
Article 83. Duties of Circuit Registrar. - Every Circuit Registrar shall:
a) File every certificate of marriage (which shall specify the nature and amount of the dower agreed upon), divorce or
revocation of divorce and conversion and such other documents presented to him for registration;
b) Compile said certificates monthly, prepare and send any information required of him by the District Registrar;
c) Register conversions involving Islam;
d) Issue certified transcripts or copies of any certificate or document registered upon payment of the required fees
I. Ruling+ Ratio: We agree with the OCA and Judge Disalo that the complaint is devoid of merit
a. Evidently, respondent Clerk of Court merely performed his ministerial duty in accordance with the foregoing
provisions. The alleged erroneous entries on the Certificate of Divorce cannot be attributed to respondent Clerk of Court
considering that it is only his duty to receive, file and register the certificate of divorce presented to him for registration
b. Further, even if there were indeed erroneous entries on the certificate of divorce, such errors cannot be corrected nor
cancelled through [his] administrative complaint. The issue is judicial in nature which cannot be assailed through this
administrative proceeding
c. On the allegation that the respondent Clerk of Court manipulated the dismissal of his petition for restitution of marital
rights, we find the same unsubstantiated.
d. Aside from complainants bare allegation, there was no substantial evidence presented to prove the charge.
e. It is a settled rule in administrative proceedings that the complainant has the burden of proving the allegations in his or her
complaint with substantial evidence. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption that the respondent
has regularly performed his duties will prevail (Rafael Rondina, et al. v. Associate Justice Eloy Bello, Jr., A.M. No. CA-
5-43, 8 July 2005)
J. Disposition: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the administrative matter against Macalinog S. Abdullah, Clerk of Court II,
Sharia Circuit Court, Marawi City, for abuse of authority is DISMISSED for lack of merit
Aurelio v Aurelio
G.R. No. 175367, June 6, 2011
Petition: Petition for review on certiorari, seeking to set aside the October 6, 2005 Decision and October 26, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner: Danilo A. Aurelio
Respondent: Vida Ma. Corazon P. Aurelio
Ponente: Peralta
Doctrine: Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

Facts:
1. On May 9, 2002, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
2. Respondent alleged that both she and petitioner were psychologically incapacitated of performing and complying with their respective essential marital
obligations and such state of psychological incapacity was present prior and during the time of the marriage ceremony.
3. Respondent said that psychological incapacity was manifested by lack of financial support from the husband, lack of drive and incapacity to discern the
plight of his working wife, exhibited consistent jealousy and distrust towards his wife, alteration of moods, arrogance, and insensitivity, among others. The
husband, petitioner, suffers from passive aggressive(negativistic) personality disorder that renders him immature and irresponsible to assume to normal
obligations of a marriage.
4. Respondent claims that she is effusive and displays her feelings openly and freely, has low tolerance for boredom. She claims that she is emotionally
immature. She also cannot stand frustration or disappointment and cannot delay to gratify her needs. She suffers from a Histrionic Personality Disorder
with Narcissistic features.
5. On November 8, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition. Petitioner argued that petition failed to state cause of action and that it failed to
meet the standards set by the Court for the interpretation and implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
6. On February 21, 2003, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC.
7. On February 16, 2004, petitioner appealed that the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals(CA) via petition for certiorari. CA dismissed the petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Court of Appeals violated the applicable law and jurisprudence when it held that the allegations contained in the petition for declaration of
the nullity of marriage are sufficient for the court to declare the nullity of the marriage between Vida and Danilo;
2. Whether or not the a Court of Appeals violated the applicable and jurisprudence when it denied petitioners action for certiorari despite the fact that the
denial of his motion to dismiss by the trial court is patiently and utterly tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
Article 36 of the Family Code
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Molina Doctrine
-guidelines to aid the courts in the disposition of cases involving psychological incapacity
(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife, as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
Ruling + Ratio:
1. No. The Court of Appeals did not violate the applicable law and jurisprudence.
Contrary to petitioners assertion, this Court finds that the root cause of psychological incapacity was stated and alleged in the complaint. The
manifestation of respondent that the family backgrounds of both petitioner and respondent were discussed in the complaint as the root causes of
their psychological incapacity. An expect psychologist clinically identified the same root causes.
The illness of both parties was of such grave a nature as to bring about a disability for them to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The
incapacity of both parties to perform their marital obligations was alleged to be grave, incorrigible and incurable.
The essential marital obligations that were not complied with were alleged in the petition.
2. No. The Court of Appeals did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. The CA properly dismissed the petitioners petition.
As a general rule, the denial of a motion to dismiss is not reviewable for certiorari. Petitioners remedy is to reiterate the grounds in his motion to
dismiss as defenses in his answer to the petition for nullity of marriage, proceed trial and, in case of an adverse decision, appeal the decision in due
time.
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the petition is DENIED. The October 6, 2005 Decision and October 26, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R.
SP No. 82238, are AFFIRMED.
Lucas v Lucas
G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011
Petition: Petition for review on certiorari
Petitioner: Jesse U. Lucas
Respondent: Jesus S. Lucas
Ponencia: Nachura
Doctrine: Establishing Illegitimate Filiation and Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing
Facts:
1. On July 26, 2007, petitioner Jesse U. Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Valenzuela City.
2. According to the petitioner, in 1967, his mother Elsie Uy migrated to Manila and eventually got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas and an intimate
relationship developed between the two. Elsie got pregnant and give birth to petitioner on March 11, 1969.
3. The name of petitioners father was not stated in petitioners certificate of live birth. However, Elsie told petitioner that the respondent is the father. On
August 1, 1969, petitioner was baptized at San Isidro Parish, Taft Avenue, Pasay City.
4. Responent allegedly extended financial support to Elsie and petitiober for a period of about two years. When the relationship of Elsie and petitioner ended,
Elsie raised the petitioner on her own. When petitioner was growing up, attempts were made to introduce petitioner to respondent but all attempts were in
vain.
5. Attached in the petitioner were the following:
a. Petitioners certificate of live birth
b. Petitioners baptismal certificate
c. Petitioners college diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology
d. His Certificate of Graduation from the same school
e. Certificate of Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of Music;
f. Clippings of several articles from different news papers about petitioner as a musical prodigy.
6. Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation. On August 29, 2007, his counsel
went to the trial court and obtained a copy of the petition.
7. Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. On September 3, 2007, the RTC issued the Order setting the case for hearing and
urging anyone who has any objection to file his opposition.
8. On September 4, 2007, unaware of the issuance of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a Special Appearance and Comment. He manifested that:
1) he did not receive the summons and a copy of the petition;
2) the petition was adversarial in nature and summons should be served on him as respondent;
3) should the court agree that summons was required, he was waiving service of summons and making a voluntary appearance; and
4) notice by publication of the petition and the hearing was improper because of the confidentiality of the subject matter.
9. After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed for a motion for reconsideration that the petition was not due in form and substance because
petitioner could not have personally known that matters were alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation
pointing to respondent as petitioners father. At the same time, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence.
10. On July 30, 2008, the RTC acting on the respondents motion for reconsideration dismissed the case.
11. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC resolved in his favor, setting aside the previous order of dismissing the case.
12. On October 20, 2008, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration and for Dismissal of Petition.
13. On January 19, 2009, the RTC denied the motion and rescheduled the hearing.
14. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On September 25, 2009, the CA decided the petition for certiorari in favor of the
respondent. The CA held that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent as no summons has been served on him. The CA
remarked that petitioner filed the petition to establish illegitimate filiation.
15. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December 17, 2009, the CA denied the motion for lack of merit.
Issues:
1. Whether or not a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the
results may require confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a
suit or proceeding is commenced.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or
proceeding is commenced.
Ruling + Ratio:
YES. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of
paternity.
Herrara v. Alba
-applied by RTC and CA
-four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case
-procedural aspects are only applicable during trial when parties have presented their evidence and not during the initial stage of proceedings, such in this case
that the petition to establish filiation has only been filed.
-CA erred in observing that that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie casethe first procedural aspect in a paternity case
prima facie case
-built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA evidence
Rule on DNA Evidence
-enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system -prescribed parameters on the requisite elements
for reliability and validity (i.e., the proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the available objections to
the admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as the probative value of DNA evidence
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence
-merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing
Court order for blood testing equivalent to search under the Constitution.
-there must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of
paternity or good cause for the holding of the test
The Supreme Court of Louisiana explained:
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a
proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory
blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost
universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We
agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that
there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to
voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits.
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated December 17,
2009 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated October 20, 2008 and January 19, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City are AFFIRMED.
Teves v. People
G.R. No. 188775, August 24, 2011

Petition: Petition for Review
Petitioner: Cenon R. Tevez
Respondent: People of the Philippines and Danilo Bongalon
Ponencia: Perez
Doctrine: Bigamy
Facts:
1. Petition for Review seeking the reversal of the January 21, 2009 decision of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court in
Malolos City which found petitioner Cenon R. Tevez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy penalized under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code.
2. On November 26, 1992, a marriage was solemnized between Cenon Tevez and Thelma Jaime-Tevez at the Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City,
Metro Manila.
3. After the marriage, Thelma worked abroad. In 2002, she came home to the Philippines for vacation and she was informed that her husband had
contracted marriage with a certain Edita Calderon.
4. Based on the copy of Certificate of Marriage from the National Statistics Office, Cenon and Edita married on December 10, 2001 at the Divine Trust
Consulting Services, Meycauayan, Bulacan.
5. On February 13, 2006, the uncle of Thelma, Danilo Bongalon, filed before the Provincial Prosecutor of Malolos City a complaint accusing petitioner of
committing bigamy.
6. Petitioner was charged with bigamy on June 8, 2006.
7. On May 4, 2006, the Regional Trial Court Branch 130 in Caloocan City rendered a decision declaring the marriage of petitioner and Thelma null and void on
the ground that Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. On June 27,
2006, said decision became final by virtue of a Certification of Finality.
8. On August 15, 2007, the trial court rendered its decision finding Cenon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy.
9. Petitioner appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals contending that the court erred in not ruling that his criminal action or liability has already
been extinguished.
10. On January 21, 2009, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy
Provision + Elements
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code states:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of this crime are as follows:
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to
the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
Ruling + Ratio
Yes. Petitioner has committed bigamy

Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage was declared null and void, there is in effect no marriage at all, and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of. He
differentiates a previous valid or voidable marriage from a marriage null and void ab initio, and posits that the former requires a judicial dissolution before one
can validly contract a second marriage but a void marriage, for the same purpose, need not be judicially determined.
Petitioner further contends that the ruling of the Court in Mercado v. Tan is inapplicable in his case because in the Mercado case the prosecution for bigamy
was initiated before the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed. In petitioners case, the first marriage had already been legally dissolved at the time the
bigamy case was filed in court.
The instant case has all the elements of the crime of bigamy. Thus, the CA was correct in affirming the conviction of petitioner.
A marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void. The remarrying spouse must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else,
what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner on 10 December 2001 when he contracted a second marriage with Edita. The finality on 27 June 2006 of the
judicial declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma cannot be made to retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage.
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED and the assailed Decision dated 21 January 2009 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against petitioner.

Cabreza Jr., et al. v Cabreza
G.R. No. 181962, January 16, 2012
Petition: Petition seeking to annul the Court of Appeals Decision that reversed a lower courts dismissal of a Complaint for declaration of nullity of the Deed of
Sale of a conjugal dwelling on the ground of litis pendentia
Petitioner: Ceferino S. Cabreza, Jr., BJD Holdings Corp.
Respondent: Amparo Robles Cabreza
Ponente: Sereno
Doctrine: Conjugal Partnership, litis pendentia
Facts:
1. Respondent Ceferino S. Cabreza, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to
petitioner Amparo Robles Cabreza.
2. On January 3, 2001, the petition was granted. Marriage of petitioner and respondent is nullified pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. Conjugal
partnership is dissolved and is to be liquidated in accordance with Art. 129 of the Family Code.
3. Cerefino moved that their only conjugal property, their conjugal home be sold and proceeds distributed as mandated by law.
4. On May 26, 2003, the RTC granted his motion. Such motion became final when the Supreme Court dismissed on technicalities, Amparos petition
questioning said Order.
5. Ceferino thereafter filed an Omnibus Motion (1) to approve the Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed of Sale); (2) to authorize petitioner-movant to sign the Deed
of Sale for and on behalf of Amparo; and (3) to order the occupants of the premises to vacate the property. Despite notice to Amparo, only Ceferino and
his counsel appeared during the scheduled hearing on the Motion. On October 2, 2003, the RTC granted the Omnibus Motion.
6. Ceferino then executed the Deed of Sale in favor of BJD Holdings Corporation. He then filed a Motion for Writ of Possession and to Divide the Purchase
Price. RTC Br. 70 then issued a Writ of Possession followed by a June 30, 2004 Notice to Vacate.
7. Amparo filed a Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate, arguing that (1) the parties had another conjugal lot apart from
the conjugal dwelling; and (2) under Article 129 of the Family Code, the conjugal dwelling should be adjudicated to her as the spouse, with whom four of
the five Cabreza children were staying. RTC Br. 70 denied her Motion and the Court of Appeals upheld the denial, prompting her to file with the file with
the SC a Petition for Review of this CA Decision, docketed as G.R. No. 171260.
8. On September 11, 2009, the SC in G.R. No. 171260 denied Amparos petition since the May 26 2003 Order of RTC Br. 70 is already final, authorizing the
sale of the family home.
9. On January 26, 2005, during the pendency of the CA Petition which culminated in G.R. No. 171260, Amparo filed with Pasig RTC Br. 67a complaint to
annul the Deed of Absolute Sale for being void due to lack of her consent thereto. RTC Br. 67 dismissed the Complaint with prejudice, on the basis of litis
pendentia and forum shopping.
10. Amparo appealed to the CA, which reversed the Resolution of RTC Br. 67. Holding that there was no litis pendentia and therefore no forum shopping, the
appellate court directed that the case be remanded for trial on the merits.
11. Ceferino moved for consideration of the CA ruling but his Motion was denied. He then filed the present petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not litis pendentia was properly invoked as a ground for dismissing the action
The following requisites must be present for the proper invocation of litis pendentia as a ground for dismissing an action:
1. Identity of parties or representation in both cases;

2. Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts and the same basis; and
3. Identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
Ruling + Ratio:
No. Litis pendentia was not properly invoked in dismissing the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale.
Regarding the first requisite, there is no dispute that the two cases have substantially the same parties.
Regarding the second requisite, the CA correctly noted that to determine whether there is identity of the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for grounded on
the same facts and bases, the following tests may be utilized: (1) whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and the second causes of
action; or (2) whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other.
The CA held that using the first test, the evidence in the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale would be the Deed of Sale itself; while in the
case impugning the Writ of Possession, it would be the trial courts Order applying Article 129 of the Family Code. The CA failed to consider that RTC Br. 70
issued an Order dated 2 October 2003, which granted authority to Ceferino to sign the Deed of Sale on Amparos behalf. This same Order also contained, in its
dispositive portion, a directive that (a)fter the sale of the subject property shall have been consummated, all the occupants thereof shall vacate and clear the
same to enable the buyer to take complete possession and control of the property. Thus, using the first test, the same evidence the 2 October 2003 Order of
RTC Br. 70 would defeat both Amparos Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale and her Petition impugning the Writ of Possession. Notably,
Amparo failed to timely question RTC Br. 70s Order dated 2 October 2003.
The CA also held that, using the second test, the defenses raised in one case will not necessarily be used in the other. It reasoned that although the grant of the
Petition impugning the Writ of Possession would result in the nullification of the Deed of Sale, the denial of the Petition would not bar a ruling on the
Complaint for nullification of the Deed of Sale, which was based on Amparos lack of consent thereto.
As to the last requisite, a final judgment on the merits by a court that has jurisdiction over the parties and over the subject matter in the Petition to nullify the
Writ of Possession would have barred subsequent judgment on the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale based on the principle of res
judicata.
The Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Sale cannot prosper, because, like the Petition to nullify the Writ of Possession, it effectively seeks the
modification of an already final Order of RTC Br. 70.
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 25 October 2007 and Resolution dated 27 February 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86511 are REVERSED. The 5 May 2005 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court Branch 67, Pasig City in Civil Case No. 70269, which
dismissed the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale on the ground of the litis pendencia and forum shopping, is REINSTATED.
Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr., et al. v Servacio and Go
G.R. No. 157537, September 7, 2011
Petition: Petition for Review on Certioari
Petitioners: Heirs Of Protacio Go, Sr. and Marta Barola, namely: Leonor, Simplicio, Protacio, Jr., Antonio, Beverly Ann Lorrainne, Tita, Consolacion, Leonora and
Asuncion, all Surnamed Go
Respondents: Ester L. Servacio and Rito B. Go
Ponente: Bersamin
Doctrine:
The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving spouse without the prior liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code is
not necessarily void if said portion has not yet been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At any rate, the
requirement of prior liquidation does not prejudice vested rights.
Facts:
1. On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land with a total area of 17,140 square meters situated in Southern Leyte to Protacio B. Go, Jr.
Twenty three years later, on May 29, 1999, Protacio Jr. executed an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver that it was his father who purchased the land.
2. On November 25, 1987, Marta Barola Go died, wife of Protacio, Sr. and mother of the petitioners. On December 28, 1999, Protacio, Sr. and his son Rito B.
Go (joined by Ritos wife Dina B. Go) sold a portion of the property with an area of 5,560 square meters to Ester L. Servacio (Servacio) for 5,686,768.00,
3. On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand. After barangay proceedings failed to
resolve the dispute, they sued Servacio and Rito in the Regional Trial Court in Maasin City, Southern Leyte (RTC) for the annulment of the sale of the
property.
4. The petitioners averred that following Protacio, Jr.s renunciation, the property became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio
without the prior liquidation of the community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void.
5. Servacio and Rito countered that Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the property because he had purchased it with his own money.
6. On October 3, 2002, the RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr.,
because there were three vendors in the sale to Servacio (namely: Protacio, Sr., Rito, and Dina); that the participation of Rito and Dina as vendors had
been by virtue of their being heirs of the late Marta; that under Article 160 of the Civil Code, the law in effect when the property was acquired, all property
acquired by either spouse during the marriage was conjugal unless there was proof that the property thus acquired pertained exclusively to the husband
or to the wife; and that Protacio, Jr.s renunciation was grossly insufficient to rebut the legal presumption.
7. The RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the property. The RTCs denial of their motion for reconsideration prompted the petitioners to appeal
directly to the Court on a pure question of law.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Article 130 of the Family Code is the applicable law;
2. Whether or not the sale by Protacio, Sr., et al. to Servacio was void for being made without prior liquidation.
Article 130 of the Family Code reads:
Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-
judicially within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or
encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of
complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
Article 130 is to be read in consonance with Article 105 of the Family Code, viz:
Article 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership of gains shall govern their
property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this
Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256.
Held:
Appeal lacks merit.
1. No.
Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. This provision gives reason not to declare the sale as entirely void. Such
declaration prejudices the rights of Servacio who had already acquired the shares of Protacio, Sr. and Rito in the property subject of the sale.
2. No.
In Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that:
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-
owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making
the buyer a co-owner of the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the
third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to
remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra].
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire
property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised
Rules of Court. xxx
Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold to her. The following
observations of Justice Paras are explanatory of this result, viz:
xxx [I]f it turns out that the property alienated or mortgaged really would pertain to the share of the surviving spouse, then said transaction is valid. If
it turns out that there really would be, after liquidation, no more conjugal assets then the whole transaction is null and void. But if it turns out that
half of the property thus alienated or mortgaged belongs to the husband as his share in the conjugal partnership, and half should go to the estate of
the wife, then that corresponding to the husband is valid, and that corresponding to the other is not. Since all these can be determined only at the
time the liquidation is over, it follows logically that a disposal made by the surviving spouse is not void ab initio. Thus, it has been held that the sale of
conjugal properties cannot be made by the surviving spouse without the legal requirements. The sale is void as to the share of the deceased spouse
(except of course as to that portion of the husbands share inherited by her as the surviving spouse). The buyers of the property that could not be
validly sold become trustees of said portion for the benefit of the husbands other heirs
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRM the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Spouses Araceli Oliva-De Mesa, et al. v Spouses Claudio D. Acero, Jr., et al.
G.R. No. 185064, 16 January 2012
Petitioner: Spouses Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto S. De Mesa

Respondent: Spouses Claudio D. Acero, Jr. and Ma. Rufina D. Acero, Sheriff Felixberto L. Samonte and Registrar Alfredo Santos
Ponente: Reyes
Doctrine: (Family Home)
It is incumbent upon the debtor to invoke and prove that the subject property is his family home within the prescribed period, otherwise laches will set in.
Facts:
1. Claudio D. Acero Jr., being the highest bidder, acquired the ownership of a parcel of land formerly owned by petitioners Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and
Ernesto S. De Mesa.
2. The property was sold at a public auction after Spouses De Mesa failed to pay the loan they secured from Acero. Thereafter, respondents Acero and
his wife Rufina leased the subject property to its former owners who then defaulted in the payment of the rent.
3. Unable to collect the rentals due, Spouses Acero filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) against Spouses De Mesa.
4. The MTC ruled in Spouses Aceros favor.
5. Spouses De Mesa filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), seeking to nullify the MTC ruling in favor of Spouses Aceroon the basis that the
subject property is a family home which is exempt from execution under the Family Code, and thus, could have not been validly levied upon for
purposes of satisfying their unpaid loan.
6. The RTC dismissed their complaint. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTCs Decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the family home is exempted from execution
Article 153
The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as
any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as
hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:
For nonpayment of taxes;

For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the
construction of the building.
Held + Ratio:
Petition DENIED.
Family Home
-sacred symbol of family love and is the repository of cherished memories that last during ones lifetime
-from the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, is generally exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
-a right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment andcannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases
-right can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set up and prove the status of the property as a family home at the time of the levy or a
reasonable time thereafter
-exception stated is a personal right
-incumbent upon Spouses De Mesa to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriffs duty to presume or raise the status of
the subject property as a family home
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 79391, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. 1058-M-99 and dismissed the complaint
for declaration of nullity of TCT No. 221755 (M) and other documents, and the October 23, 2008 Resolution denying reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
ANTONIA R. DELA PEA and ALVIN JOHN B. DELA PEA v. GEMMA REMILYN AVILA and FAR EAST BANK & TRUST CO. (FEBTC-BPI)
GR No. 197490; February 8, 2012
APPLICABLE ARTICLE:
Art. 160 of the Civil Code:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife.
FACTS:
Antonia R. Dela Pea (married to Antegono A. Dela Pea) executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the 277 square meter parcel of land located
in Marikina City in favor of Aguila for the purpose of securing a loan.
Parcel of land: mortgaged for the purpose of securing the payment of the loan obligation.
Antonia executed a notarized Deed of Absolut Sale over the property in controversy in favor of Gemma Avila (respondent) for the consideration of
600,000 php. Thus, Avila is now the owner of the subject in question.
Avila, as the new owner of the property, constituted a real estate mortgage over said parcel of land located in Marikina in favor of Far East Bank &
Trust Co. (now BPI) for purposes of securing a loan.
Gemma issued several promissory notes:
Promissory Note Date Amount Maturity
BDS#970779 12/02/97 P300,000.00 04/30/98
BDS#970790 12/15/97 P100,000.00 04/14/98
BDS#980800 01/16/98 P100,000.00 04/30/98
BDS#980805 02/06/98 P100,000.00 04/30/98
BDS#980817 02/27/98 P150,000.00 04/30/98
BDS#980821 03/10/98 P450,000.00 04/30/98
FEBTC-BPI caused the Extra Judicial Foreclosure of the said property due to Avilas failure to pay the secured loan. Being the highest bidder, the
property in controversy now belongs to FEBTC-BPI when the latter caused the property to be entitled to its name.
Antonia filed an Adverse Claim to that effect, amongst others, that she was the true and lawful owner of the property in question.
Antonia with the son (Alvin) filed a petition for the annulment of the deed of sale against Gemma Avila.
Contention:
1. The questioned property is CONJUGAL.
o The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed by Antonia in favor of Aguila was NOT CONSENTED by Antegono, who by then
was already dead, thus, the REM is not valid.
o The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by Antonia because she was misled by Avila into believing that the transfer to the
latter was necessary to secure a loan (which Avila promised to secure on Antonias behalf).
Deed of Absolute Sale:
SIMULATED
DEROGATORY OF ALVINS SUCCESIONAL RIGHTS.
ISSUE:
W/NOT THE PROPERTY IN CONTROVERSY IS A CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF ANTONIA AND ANTEGONO DELA PEA.
HELD:
The said property was NOT A CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF ANTONIA AND ANTEGONO DELA PEA. It was the PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY OF ANTONIA
thus, the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Gemma Avila is VALID.
RATIO:
According to Art. 160 of the Civil Code, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. In this case, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in
controversy was acquired during the marriage.
Proof of acquisition during marriage: a condition necessary for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugality (conjugal
partnership) (Francisco v. CA)
Dela Peas failure to establish that the questioned property was acquired during the marriage of Antonia and Antegono caused the non-applicability of
the presumption of conjugality in the case at bar. Their failure constituted that such property was the paraphernal property of Antonia.
The contention of Dela Pea that the registration of the said property in the name of Antonia R. Dela Pea, of legal age, married to Antegono Dela
Pea is sufficient proof to establish conjugality is bereft of merit.
The phrase married to is merely descriptive of the civil status of the wife and cannot be interpreted to mean that the husband is also a
registered owner of such property because it is possible that it was acquired by the wife when she was still single but only registered after she
was married. Thus, this will not be a sufficient proof to establish conjugal partnership. (Ruiz v. CA)
MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN vs. LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE

GR No. 183622; February 8, 2012
APPLICABLE FAMILY CODE ARTICLES:

Paragraph 2, Article 26:
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order
227)
Art. 11:
Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local
civil registrar which shall specify the following: xxx
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled; xxx
Art. 13:
In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal
certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the
judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage.
In case the death certificate cannot be secured, the party shall make an affidavit setting forth this circumstance and his or her actual civil status and
the name and date of death of the deceased spouse. (61a)
Art. 52:
The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of
the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect
third persons. (n)
FACTS:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the US from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a
subsequent marriage with Merope De Catalan, the petitioner.
(2004) Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.
(2005 February 25) Merope De Catalan filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the
intestate estate of Orlando at RTC-Burgos, Pangasinan. (Special Proceeding No. 228)
(2005 March 3) While Spec. Proc No. 228 was pending, Louella Catalan-Lee, respondent, one of the children of Orlando in his first marriage, filed a
similar petition with the RTC. (Spec. Proc. No. 232)
These two special proceedings were consolidated.
o Louella Catalan-Lees contention:
Merope De Catalan is not considered an interested person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of administration of the estate
of Orlando.
In support thereof, she alleged that a criminal case for BIGAMY was filed against De Catalan before RTC-Alaminos,
Pangasinan.
Felicitas Amor, first wife of Orlando, filed a complaint for BIGAMY, alleging that De Catalan contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite being
married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959. (Crim. Case No. 2699-A)
o On 6 August 1998, RTC had acquitted De Catalan of BIGAMY.
Orlando and De Catalans marriage was NOT VALID since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since DIVORCE WAS
NOT RECOGNIZED UNDER PHILIPPINE JURISDICTION.
De Catalan, in the first place, had never been married to Eusebio Bristol.
(2006) RTC-Burgos, Pangasinan: dismissed the petition of De Catalan for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando and granted such to Catalan-Lee.
o (contrary to the findings of Crim. Case No. 2699-A) RTC-Burgos, Pangasinan held that the marriage between De Catalan and Eusebio Bristol
was valid and and subsisting when she married Orlando.
o De Catalan was not an interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
De Catalan filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. But CA dismissed the petition for lack of married and subsequently denied her motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, a petition for review filed at the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
W/NOT THE MARRIAGE OF MEROPE DE CATALAN AND ORLANDO B. CATALAN MAY BE RECOGNIZED AS VALID.
W/NOT BURDEN OF PROVING AUSTRALIAN LAW FALLS UPON DE CATALAN.
W/NOT THE COURTS CAN TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAWS IN THE EXERCISE OF SOUND DISCRETION.
HELD:
1. THE MARRIAGE OF MEROPE DE CATALAN AND ORLANDO B. CATALAN MAY BE RECOGNIZED AS VALID.
Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. (Doctrine in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr)
i. It is true that the nationality principle embodied in Art. 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine Nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces, the same being contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens my obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their nation law.
Once proven that one is no longer a Filipino Citizen when he validly obtained a divorce from the other spouse, such other spouse could very
well lose her right to inherit from him. (Quita v. CA)
Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized
Citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian,
Orlando had severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to the Philippine personal laws.
2. YES, THE BURDEN OF PROOF DOES NOT FALL UPON DE CATALAN BUT INSTEAD TO CATALAN-LEE HAS THE BURDEN TO PROVE SUCH.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF FALLS UPON THE PARTY WHO ALLEGES THE EXISTENCE OR A FACT OR THING NECESSARY IN THE PROSECUTION OR
DEFENSE OF AN ACTION.
i. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the
answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.
ii. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely
upon him.
3. THE COURTS CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAWS.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and
proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The
power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Fact of divorce must first be proven.
i. A foreign judgement is given presumptive evidentiary value; the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A
divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgement is the judgement itself.
(Garcia v. Recio)
ii. According to Sec. 24 and 25 of Rule 132 on Presentation of Evidence:
Section 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign
service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
(25a)
Section 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as
the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (26a)
THUS, THE PETITION WAS PARTIALLY GRANTED AND THE DECISION OF THE CA (affirming the decision of RTC-Burgos, Pangasinan) WAS REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. THIS CASE IS REMANDED TO RTC-Burgos, Pangasinan FOR FURTHER RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THE FACT OF DIVORCE.
PACIFIC ACE FINANCE LTD. (PAFIN) vs. EIJI YANAGISAWA

GR No. 175303; April 11, 2012
FACTS:
Eiji Yanagisawa, a Japanese national, is the husband of Evelyn Castaeda, a Filipina. Their marriage was contracted on July 12, 1989.
Yanagisawa filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of BIGAMY.
o Yanagisawa, during the pendency of the case, filed a motion for the issuance of a TRO against Castaeda and an application for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction asking that Castaeda be enjoined from disposing or encumber all of the properties registered in her name (including
the property in controversy: 152 square meter townhouse unit in Paraaque).
However, Castaeda, with her counsel, voluntarily undertook not to dispose of the property in her name during the pendency of the
trial. THUS, THE ABOVECITED PETITION OF YANAGISAWA WAS DISMISSED BECAUSE IT BECAME MOOT AND ACADEMIC UPON THE
VOLUNTARY STATEMENT OF CASTANEDA.
An order was then issued with regard to the aforementioned:

ORDER
In view of the commitment made in open court by Atty. Lupo Leyva, counsel for the defendant [Evelyn], together with his client, the
defendant in this case, that the properties registered in the name of the defendant would not be disposed of, alienated or
encumbered in any manner during the pendency of this petition, the Motion for the Issuance of a Restraining Order and
Application for a Writ of a Preliminary Injunction scheduled today is hereby considered moot and academic.
During the pendency of the trial, Castaeda obtained a loan from PAFIN and in order to secure payment of the loan, she executed a Real Estate
Mortgage (REM) in favor of PAFIN over the Paraaque Town House Unit (property in question).
At the time of the mortgage, RTC-MAKATI declared the nullity of the marriage of Yanagisawa and Castaeda, Also, it ordered the liquidation of their
registered properties including the property in controversy.
Yanagisawa filed a complaint for the annulment of the REM against Castaeda and PAFIN for violating the October 2, 1996 ruling of RTC-MAKATI
(declaration of Castaeda in open court)
o RTC-Paraaque denied the petition for the annulment of REM.
o CA-annulled the REM.
Hence, a petition for review.
ISSUES:
W/NOT RTC-PARAAQUE HAS THE JURISDICTION TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERHIP.
W/NOT IT WAS IMPERATIVE FOR RTC-PARAAQUE TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP BECAUSE IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR THE DETERMINATION
OF THE VALIDITY OF THE REM.
HELD:
1. NO, RTC-PARAAQUE HAS NO JURISDICTION TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP BECAUSE THE SAME ISSUE WAS ALREADY RULED UPON BY THE
RTC-MAKATI AND IS PENDING APPEAL IN THE CA.
2. NO, IT WAS NOT IMPERATIVE FOR RTC-PARAAQUE TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP. IT WAS NOT ESSENTIAL FOR THE DETERMINATION OF
THE VALIDITY OF THE REM.
RATIO:
1. NO, RTC-PARAAQUE HAS NO JURISDICTION TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP BECAUSE THE SAME ISSUE WAS ALREADY RULED UPON BY THE
RTC-MAKATI AND IS PENDING APPEAL IN THE CA.
Contrary to petitioners stance, the CA did not make any disposition as to who between Yanagisawa and Castaeda owns the Paraaque
townhouse unit. It simply ruled that the Makati RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the said question and should not have been interfered with
by the Paraaque RTC.
RTC-PARAAQUE VIOLATED THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY OR NON-INTERFERENCE
o The assumption by the Makati RTC over the issue operates as an "insurmountable barrier" to the subsequent assumption by the RTC -
Paraaque. By insisting on ruling on the same issue, the Paraaque RTC effectively interfered with the Makati RTCs resolution of the
issue and created the possibility of conflicting decisions.
o It is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, its authority
continues, subject only to the appellate authority, until the matter is finally and completely disposed of, and that no court of co-ordinate
authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. This doctrine is applicable to civil cases, to criminal prosecutions, and to courts-martial.
The principle is essential to the proper and orderly administration of the laws; and while its observance might be required on the
grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it does not rest upon such considerations exclusively, but is enforced to prevent unseemly,
expensive, and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of the process. (Cojuanco v. Villegas)
2. NO, IT WAS NOT IMPERATIVE FOR RTC-PARAAQUE TO RULE ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP. IT WAS NOT ESSENTIAL FOR THE DETERMINATION OF
THE VALIDITY OF THE REM.
Yanagisawa did not claim ownership of the Paraaque townhouse unit or his right to consent to the REM as his bases for seeking its annulment.
Instead, Yanagisawa invoked his right to rely on Castaedas commitment not to dispose of or encumber the property (as confirmed in the
October 2, 1996 Order of the RTC- Makati), and the annotation of the said commitment on TCT No. 99791.
It was Castaeda and PAFIN that raised Yanagisawas incapacity to own real property as their defense to the suit. They maintained that
Yanagisawa, as an alien incapacitated to own real estate in the Philippines, need not consent to the REM contract for its validity. But this
argument is beside the point and is not a proper defense to the right asserted by Yanagisawa.
o This defense does not negate Yanagisawas right to rely on the October 2, 1996 Order of the Makati RTC and to hold third persons, who
deal with the registered property, to the annotations entered on the title. Thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint based on this
defense.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (RP) VS. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA

GR No. 187512; June 13, 2012
Article 41:
A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
Article 238:
Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules provided for in this Title shall apply as regards separation in fact between husband and
wife, abandonment by one of the other, and incidents involving parental authority. (n)
Article 247:
The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. (n)
Article 253:
The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 127, insofar
as they are applicable. (n)
FACTS:
Yolanda Granada was married to Cyrus Granada on 3 March 1993. Their marriage resulted in the birth of their son, Cyborg Granada.
Cyrus Granada went to Taiwan to seek employment sometime in May 1994. From that time, Yolanda had not received any communication from him,
notwithstanding efforts to locate him.
o Yolandas brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latters whereabouts, to no avail.
After 9 years of waiting, Yolanda filed a petition to have Cyrus declared PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD.
RTC-Lipa rendered a decision declaring Cyrus as PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD,
RP represented by OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration of such decision under the same court but RTC-Lipa DENIED the motion and soon after, CA
also DENIED the Motion for Recon.
o RP Contention:
Yolanda failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead.
Hence, a rule 45 petition seeking the reversal of the Resolution of the CA (which affirmed the decision of RTC-Lipa)
ISSUES:
W/NOT A PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH IS A SUMMARY PROCEEDING THUS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY
AND NOT SUBJECT TO APPEAL.
W/NOT THERE IS A WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF ON THE PART OF YOLANDA TO DECLARE CYRUS AS PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD.
HELD:
1. A PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH IS A SUMMARY PROCEEDING THUS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND NOT
SUBJECT TO APPEAL.
According to Articles 41, 238, 247, and 253 of the Family Code, since the petition for the declaration of presumptive death for the purposes of
remarrying is a summary proceeding, the judgment of RTC-LIPA shall be IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because
the judgements rendered thereunder, by express provision of Art. 247 of the Family Code, are immediately final and executory (Republic
v. Bermudez-Lorino)
2. THERE IS A WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF ON THE PART OF YOLANDA TO DECLARE CYRUS AS PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD.
The SC used the following cases as the authorities on the subject:
1. Republic v. Nolasco:
The Family Code provision prescribes a "well-founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of
presumptive death can be granted. As noted by the Court in that case, the four requisites for the declaration of presumptive death
under the Family Code are as follows:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance
occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
2. US v. Biasbas:
In Biasbas, the Court held that defendant Biasbas failed to exercise due diligence in ascertaining the whereabouts of his first wife,
considering his admission that that he only had a suspicion that she was dead, and that the only basis of that suspicion was the fact
of her absence.
3. Republic v. CA and Allegro:
Republic sought the reversal of the CA ruling affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the
absent spouse on the ground that the respondent therein had not been able to prove a "well-founded belief" that his spouse was
already dead. The Court reversed the CA, granted the Petition, and provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a
"well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code:
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute
a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
is already dead before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded
belief.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the
whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse
present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made
by present spouse. (Republic v. CA and Allegro)
RPs contention that Yolanda failed to exert earnest efforts to locate her absent spouse Cyrus thus failed to prove her well-founded belief
that he was already dead is well-taken by the court. However, SC is constrained to dent the petition since RTC-LIPAs ruling on the issue of
whether respondent was able to prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to
declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed.
Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived
to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.
VALERIO E. KALAW vs. MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ

GR No. 166357; September 19, 2011
APPLICABLE FAMILY CODE ARTICLE:
Article 36:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by Executive Order
227)
FACTS:
Valerio Kalaw and Ma. Elena Fernandez were married in November 4, 1976 at Hong Kong and they had four children, Valerio (Rio), Maria Eva (Ria),
Ramon Miguel (Miggy or Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro (Jay).
Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejao who gave birth to their son in March 1983.
Malyn left their conjugal home and their four (4) children on May 1985. Soon after, Kalaw started living with Jocelyn who bore him three more children.
9 years after the de facto separation from his wife, Fernandez, Kalaw filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family
Code.
o Kalaws contention: Fernandez was suffering from a psychological incapacity rendering her incapable of performing and complying with the
essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. As manifested in the following acts of respondent:
she left the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night;
she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following day; and
she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered in flagrante delicto.
o Kalaw also presented a psychologist, Dr. Gates, and a canon law expert, Fr. Healy to testify on Fernandezs physcological incapacity.
Dr. Gates explanation: (diagnosis: based on the facts revealed by her interviews with Kalaw)
Fernandezs sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong playing, and frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a narcissistic
personality disorder (NPD).
o NPD is present when a person is obsessed to meet her wants and needs in utter disregard of her significant others.
Fernandezs NPD is manifest in her utter neglect of her duties as a mother.
Her personality disorder may have been evident even prior to their marriage because it is rooted in her family
background and upbringing.
Fr. Healys testimony: (opinion: based on the facts revealed by his interviews with Kalaw)
He corroborated with Dr. Gates assessment.
Fernandez was psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties.
Her psychological incapacity was grave and incurable.
o Fernandezs defense:
She did not neglect her duties as wife and mother.
She admitted playing majong but only 2 to 3 times a week between 1-6 pm with kalaws permission to do such and that she
would often bring the children and their respective yayas with her. (fact proven by the testimonies of their children)
She left Kalaw because the latter was a physically abusive husband.
She denied the allegation of adultery.
She contended that it was Kalaw who was suffering from Psychological Incapacity.
ISSUE:
W/NOT FERNANDEZ IS SUFFERING IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO PERFORM AND COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS
OF MARRIAGE.
HELD:
NO, Fernandez was not psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
RATIO:
Kalaw failed to prove that his wife, Fernandez, was suffering from psychological incapacity.
o Burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff (Kalaw)
he who alleges must prove the same.
Kalaw must prove that the incapacitated party, based on her actions, suffers from a serious psychological incapacity that
completely disables her from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state.
Psychological Incapacity must be:
o Grave
o Existed at the time of the marriage; and
o Incurable
o The testimonies of the two supposed expert (Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy) were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of Fernandez
which had not been sufficiently proven.
o There was no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. The totality of the evidence presented proved
that Fernandez was not psychologically incapacitated.
Fernandez did not neglect her duties as a mother and a wife.
o She admitted playing majong but only 2 to 3 times a week between 1-6 pm with Kalaws permission to do such and that she would often bring
their children and their respective yayas with her which where later corroborated by their children through their testimonies.
o At the testimonies of their children, not once did they cite that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took
care of them, was around when they were sick and cooked food that they like.
o Fernandez made real efforts to see and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their father.
o While Kalaw cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link
their academic shortcomings to Fernandezs actions.
Sexual Infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
MANUEL O. FUENTES and LETICIA L. FUENTES vs. CONRADO G. ROCA, ANNABELLE R. JOSON, ROSE MARIE R. CRISTOBAL and PILAR
MALCAMPO
G.R. No. 178902; April 21, 2010

Par. 2, Article 105:
xxx The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this
Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256.
Par. 2, Article 124:
xxx In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse
may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall
be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)
APPLICABLE CIVIL CODE ARTICLES:
Article. 1410:
The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.
Article 429:
The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may
use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his
property. (n)
FACTS:
The case is about a husbands sale of conjugal property, employing an alleged affidavit of consent from an estranged wife. The buyers claim valid
consent, loss of right to declare nullity of the sale, and prescription.
Tarciano Roca was married to Rosario Gabriel Roca.
Tarciano offer to sell the 358 square meter lot in Zamboanga City to Manuel and Leticia Fuentes.
o Agreement:
Fuentes spouses were required to pay Tarciano a downpayment of 60, 000 php for the transfer of lots title to him.
Within 6 months, Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario
Roca.
o In line with the agreement of the parties, Atty. Plagata went to see Rosario in one of his trips to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of
consent.
1989, Tarciano executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the Fuentes spouses.
Tarciano and Rosario both died sometime in 1990.
Eight years later (1997), the children of Tarciano and Rosario et al (respondent) filed an action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land
against the Fuentes spouses before the RTC-Zamboanga City. They also prayed that the property in controversy be reconveyed to them upon
reimbursement of the price the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.
o Rocas contentions:
Sale to the Fuentes spouses was VOID since Rosario did not give her consent to it.
Signature of Rosario: forged
ISSUES:
W/NOT ROSARIOS SIGNATURE ON THE DOCUMENT OF CONSENT TO HER HUSBAND TARCIANOS SALE OF THEIR CONJUGAL LAND TO THE FUENTES
SPOUSES WAS FORGED.
W/NOT ROCAS ACTION FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THAT SALE TO THE FUENTES SPOUSES ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
W/NOT ROSARIO, THE WIFE WHOSE CONSENT WAS NOT HAD, COULD BRING ACTION TO ANNUL THE SALE.
HELD:
1. ROSARIOS SIGNATURE ON THE DOCUMENT OF CONSENT WAS FORGED.
Rosarios signature strokes on the affidavit appears heavy, deliberate, and forced. Her specimen signatures, on the other hand, are
consistently of a lighter stroke and more fluid. The way the letters "R" and "s" were written is also remarkably different. The variance is
obvious even to the untrained eye.
Rosarios specimen signatures were made at about the time that she signed the supposed affidavit of consent. They were, therefore, reliable
standards for comparison. The Fuentes spouses presented no evidence that Rosario suffered from any illness or disease that accounted for
the variance in her signature when she signed the affidavit of consent.
Atty. Plagata admittedly falsified the jurat of the affidavit of consent. That jurat declared that Rosario swore to the document and signed it in
Zamboanga City on January 11, 1989 when, as Atty. Plagata testified, she supposedly signed it about four months earlier at her residence in
Paco, Manila on September 15, 1988.
That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the notarized affidavit as proof of Rosarios consent does not matter. The sale is still void without
an authentic consent.
2. ROCAS ACTION FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THAT SALE TO THE FUENTES SPOUSES HAS NOT YET PRESCRIBED.
Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few
months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Thus, the law applicable to the case at bar is the Family Code and not the Civil
Code.
According to Art. 105 of the Family Code:
xxx The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the
effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as
provided in Article 256.
When Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, the law that governed the disposal of that lot was already
the Family Code.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who
gave no consent may assail her husbands sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other spouses written
consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. It
cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription.
But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it aside, when any of its terms have been
performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it.
According to Art. 1410 of the Civil Code: The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does
not prescribe.
The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action.
3. ROCAS (HEIRS OF TARCIANO AND ROSARIO) HAVE THE RIGHT TO HAVE THE SALE DECLARED VOID.
Since the sale was void from the beginning, the land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died,
they passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As lawful owners, the Rocas had the right, under Article 429
of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its enjoyment and disposal.
JULIO FLORES (deceased), substituted by his heirs; BENITO FLORES (deceased), substituted by his heirs; DOLORES FLORES and VIRGINIA
FLORES-DALERE, represented by their Attorney-in-Fact, JIMENA TOMAS vs. MARCIANO BAGAOISAN
GR No. 173365; April 15, 2010
LAW APPLICABLE:
Sec 118 of the Public Land Act:
Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, lands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions
shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval of the application and for a term of five years from and after
the date of issuance of the patent and grant, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of
said period, but the improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, associations, or corporations.
No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead after five years and before twenty-five years after the issuance of title shall be valid
without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, which approval shall not be denied except on constitutional and legal
grounds.
FACTS:
The case involves a 13,552-square meter portion of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-118802[2] in the name of the
Heirs of Victor Flores, namely: Julio, Benito, Dolores, and Virginia, herein petitioners. OCT No. P-11880 was issued pursuant to Homestead Patent No. 138892,
given on November 12, 1973. This property is located in the Municipality of Piddig, Ilocos Norte.
Flores et al, together with their mother Luisa Viernes, executed a Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim in favor of Vicento Lazo.
o Through this document, petitioners agreed to sell, cede, convey, grant, and transfer by way of QUITCLAIM the subject property to Lazo.
The property in controversy was then bought by Marciano Bagaoisan as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated Feb 20, 1977.
Viernes and petitioner Virginia Flores-Dalere executed an affidavit, attesting to the fact that they conveyed to Lazo the subject property through the
Deed of Confirmation and Quitclaim.
Bagaoisan filed an action for ownership, quieting of title, partition and damages against petitioners, praying that he be declared as the true owner of
the subject property and that the entire property covered by OCT No. P-11880 be partitioned among them.
o Bagaoisans contention:
He was a tenant of Lazo and that he had been working on the subject property since time immemorial.
Since he bought the property in 1977, he possessed the land as owner and paid real property tax thereon.
Petitioners had denied his ownership of the land and asserted their ownership thereof by working and harvesting the crops thereon.
o Flores et als reply:
They did not relinquish ownership or possession of the land to lazo.
Petitioners admitted that they executed a deed of confirmation and quitclaim in favor of Lazo. They contend that they
were misled into signing the same. (Lazo taking advantage of their lack of education.
ISSUE:
W/NOT THE DEED OF CONFIRMATION AND QUITCLAIM IS VOID AND VIOLATIVE OF SEC 118 OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT.
HELD:
THE DEED OF CONFIRMATION AND QUITCLAIM IS VOID AND VIOLATIVE OF SEC 118 OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT.
The deed of confirmation and quitclaim is void for violating the five-year prohibitory period against alienation of lands acquired through
homestead patent under Sec 118 of the Public land Act.
The use of words confirmation and quitclaim in the title of the document was an obvious attempt to circumvent the prohibition
imposed by law. Labeling the deed as a confirmation of non-ownership or as a quitclaim of rights would actually make no difference,
as the effect would still be the alienation or conveyance of the property.
Public Land Act was enacted to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that
the State had gratuitously given to him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it.
Basic objective: to promote public policy, that is to provide home and decent living for destitutes, aimed at providing a class
of independent small landholders which is the bulwark of peace and order.
Any act which would have the effect of removing the property subject of the patent from the hands of a grantee
will be struck down for being violative of the said law.
Bagaoisan, respondent, failed to present sufficient evidence to surmount the conclusiveness and indefeasibility of the certificate of
title.
Bagaoisan did not allege in his complaint or prove during the trial that fraud attended the registration of the subject
property in petitioners names. In fact, there was no allegation as to how petitioners were able to secure title to the
property despite the alleged ownership of respondents predecessor.
Bagaoisan failed to prove that he has title to the subject property. He merely asserted that his predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the property since 1940.
The Public Land Act requires that the possessor or his predecessors-in-interest must be in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land for at least thirty years.
Bagaoisan merely established that he had been in possession of the property and that he had been paying real property
taxes thereon since 1977. The only evidence on record attesting to the fact that respondent and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the property since 1940 was the affidavit executed by some of petitioners. This,
however, would not suffice.

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