29. JENNY AGABON, ET AL VS NLRC- Toni
Respondents filed
Facts: Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged
in the business of selling and installing ornamental
and construction materials. It employed Virgilio
Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and
cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February
23, 1999 when they were dismissed for
abandonment of work. The Agabons filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA, who
ruled in their favor. The NLRC reversed on appeal.
The CA sustained the NLRCs decision. The Agabons
further appealed to the SC, disputing the finding of
abandonment, and claiming that the company did
not comply with the twin requirements of notice and
hearing.
Issue: WON the Agabons were illegally dismissed?
Ruling: No. The dismissal should be upheld because
it was established that the Agabons abandoned their
jobs to work for another company. Riviera Home,
however, did not follow the notice requirements and
instead argued that sending notices to the last
known addresses would have been useless because
they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately,
this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates
the twin notice requirements to the employees last
known address. Thus, it should be held liable for
non-compliance with the procedural requirements
of due process.
When the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of
statutory due process should not nullify the
dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual.
However, the employer should indemnify the
employee for the violation of his statutory rights.
30. JAKA FOOD PROCESSING CORPORATION, vs.
DARWIN PACOT, ROBERT PAROHINOG, DAVID
BISNAR, MARLON DOMINGO, RHOEL LESCANO and
JONATHAN CAGABCAB. G.R. No. 151378. March 28,
2005- Julius
Facts: Respondents were earlier hired by petitioner
JAKA Foods Processing Corporation until the latter
terminated their employment because the
corporation was in dire financial straits. It is not
disputed, however, that the termination was
effected without JAKA complying with the
requirement under Article 283 of the Labor Code
regarding the service of a written notice upon the
employees and the Department of Labor and
Employment at least one (1) month before the
intended date of termination.
complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment of
wages and nonpayment of service incentive leave
and 13th month pay against JAKA. The Labor Arbiter
rendered a decision declaring the termination illegal
and ordering JAKA to reinstate respondents with full
backwages, and separation pay if reinstatement is
not possible. The Court of Appeals reversed said
decision and ordered respondent JAKA to pay
petitioners separation pay equivalent to one (1)
month salary, the proportionate 13th month pay
and, in addition, full backwages from the time their
employment was terminated.
Issue: What are the legal implications of a situation
where an employee is dismissed for cause but such
dismissal was effected without the employers
compliance with the notice requirement under the
Labor Code.
Ruling: It was established that there was ground for
respondents dismissal, i.e., retrenchment, which is
one of the authorized causes enumerated under
Article 283 of the Labor Code. Likewise, it is
established that JAKA failed to comply with the
notice requirement under the same Article.
Considering the factual circumstances in the instant
case, the Court deem it proper to fix the indemnity
at P50, 000.00. The Court of Appeals have been in
error when it ordered JAKA to pay respondents
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary
for every year of service. In all cases of business
closure or cessation of operation or undertaking of
the employer, the affected employee is entitled to
separation pay. This is consistent with the state
policy of treating labor as a primary social economic
force, affording full protection to its rights as well as
its welfare. The exception is when the closure of
business or cessation of operations is due to serious
business losses or financial reverses; duly proved, in
which case, the right of affected employees to
separation pay is lost for obvious reasons.
31. Abbott vs. Alcaraz- Juneey
Facts: On June 27, 2004, Abbott Laboratories,
Philippines (Abbott) caused the publication in a
major broadsheet newspaper of its need for a
Medical and Regulatory Affairs Manager. Alcaraz
showed interest and submitted her application on
October 4, 2004. On December 7, 2004, Abbott
formally offered Alcaraz the above-mentioned
position which was an item under the companys
Hospira Affiliate Local Surveillance Unit (ALSU)
department. In Abbotts offer sheet, it was stated
that Alcaraz was to be employed on a probationary
basis. Later that day, she accepted the said offer and
received an electronic mail (e-mail) from Abbotts
Recruitment Officer, Teresita C. Bernardo
(Bernardo), confirming the same. Attached to
Bernardos e-mail were Abbotts organizational chart
and a job description of Alcarazs work. On February
12, 2005, Alcaraz signed an employment contract
which stated that she was to be placed on probation
for a period of six (6) months beginning February 15,
2005 to August 14, 2005. On March 3, 2005, Maria
Olivia T. Yabut-Misa, Abbotts Human Resources (HR)
Director, sent Alcaraz an e-mail which contained an
explanation of the procedure for evaluating the
performance of probationary employees and further
indicated that Abbott had only one evaluation
system for all of its employees. Alcaraz was also
given copies of Abbotts Code of Conduct and
Probationary Performance Standards and Evaluation
(PPSE) and Performance Excellence Orientation
Modules (Performance Modules) which she had to
apply in line with her task of evaluating the Hospira
ALSU staff. On May 23, 2005, Walsh, Almazar, and
Bernardo personally handed to Alcaraz a letter
stating that her services had been terminated
effective May 19, 2005. Alcaraz felt that she was
unjustly terminated from her employment and thus,
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages
against Abbott and its officers, namely, Misa,
Bernardo, Almazar, Walsh, Terrible, and Feist. She
claimed that she should have already been
considered as a regular and not a probationary
employee given Abbotts failure to inform her of the
reasonable standards for her regularization upon her
engagement as required under Article 295 of the
Labor Code. In this relation, she contended that
while her employment contract stated that she was
to be engaged on a probationary status, the same
did not indicate the standards on which her
regularization would be based.
Issue: WON Alcaraz was validly terminated from her
employment
Ruling: NO. Abbott failed to follow the above-stated
procedure in evaluating Alcaraz. For one, there lies a
hiatus of evidence that a signed copy of Alcarazs
PPSE form was submitted to the HRD. It was not
even shown that a PPSE form was completed to
formally assess her performance. Neither was the
performance evaluation discussed with her during
the third and fifth months of her employment. Nor
did Abbott come up with the necessary Performance
Improvement Plan to properly gauge Alcarazs
performance with the set company standards. The
Court modified Agabon v. NLRC in the case of Jaka
Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot where it
created a distinction between procedurally defective
dismissals due to a just cause, on one hand, and
those due to an authorized cause, on the other. If
the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article
296 of the Labor Code but the employer failed to
comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to
be imposed upon him should be tempered because
the dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by an
act imputable to the employee
If the dismissal is based on an authorized cause
under Article 297 but the employer failed to comply
with the notice requirement, the sanction should be
stiffer because the dismissal process was initiated by
the employers exercise of his management
prerogative.
Alcarazs dismissal proceeded from her failure to
comply with the standards required for her
regularization. As such, it is undeniable that the
dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by an act
imputable to the employee, akin to dismissals due to
just causes under Article 296 of the Labor Code.
32. ALU-TICP vs NLRC-Mamugay
Facts: National Steel Corporation (NSC) employed
petitioners in connection with its Five Year
Expansion Program. It undertook this program with
the end in view of expanding the volume and
increasing the kinds of products that it may offer for
sale to the public.
The expansion program would consist of the
ff.projects: 1. setting up ofa cold rolling mill
expansion project; 2. establishment of a billet steel-
making plant; 3. acquisition andinstallation of a Five-
stand TDM; and 4. the Cold Mill Peripherals Project.
Instead of contracting out with an outside or
independent contractor the tasks of constructing the
buildings with related civil and electrical works that
would house the new machineries and equipment,
the company chose to execute and carry out the
expansion projects in house, as it were, by
administration. The carrying out of this program
constitutes a distinct undertaking identifiable from
the ordinary business activity of the company (NSC is
not in the business of construction).
Thus, the components of the program, to which
complainants were assigned, were distinguishable
from regular business of NSC which is production of
steel products.
Petitioners filed a complaint for unfair labor
practice, regularization and monetary benefits. Their
contention was that they should be considered
regular employees because their jobs are necessary,
desirable and work related to NSCs main business
which is steel making and that they have rendered
service for more than six years.
Issue: Are the petitioners entitled to such benefits?
Ruling: No. Petitioners are project employees. As
discussed above, the nature of their work is not that
of a regular employee. Besides, each component
project, of course, begins and ends at specified times
which had already been determined by the time
petitioners were engaged.
Issue: Can the service of more than 6 years make
them regular?
Ruling: No. The simple fact that the employment of
the petitioners as project employees had gone
beyond 1 year does not detract from or legally
dissolve their status as project employees. The 1
year period in Article 280 of LC refers to casual
employees not project employees.
33. Cosmos Bottling Corp., vs NLRC- June
Facts: Gil C. Castro was employed by Cosmos
Bottling Corporation for a specific period. Having
satisfactorily served the company for two (2) terms,
Castro was recommended for reemployment with
the companys Maintenance Team for the Davao
Project, he was re-hired and assigned to the
Maintenance Division of the Davao Project tasked to
install the private respondents annex plant
machines in its Davao plant. Castros employment
was terminated due to the completion of the special
project. Cosmos Bottling Corporation in valid
exercise of its management prerogative terminated
the services of some 228 regular employees by
reason of retrenchment. For obvious reasons, Castro
was not among the list of those regular employees
whose services were terminated by reason of
retrenchment or those who voluntarily resigned.
Castro filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
Cosmos Bottling Corporation with the Labor Arbiter
contending that being a regular employee, he could
not be dismissed without a just and valid cause. The
company alleged that Castro was a mere project
employee whose employment was co-terminous
with the project for which he was hired.
Issue: Whether or not private respondent Gil C.
Castro was illegally dismissed?
Ruling:
No. Castro being a project employee, or to use the
correct term, seasonal employee, considering that
his employment was limited to the installation and
dismantling of petitioners annex plant machines
after which there was no more work to do, his
employment legally ended upon completion of the
project. That being the case, the termination of his
employment cannot and should not constitute an
illegal dismissal. Neither should it constitute
retrenchment as private respondent was a seasonal
employee whose services were already terminated
on May 21, 1990 prior to the termination of the
other regular employees of Cosmos by reason of
retrenchment.
34. Purefoods v. NLRC 283 SCRA 136 [1997]- Krizza
Facts: The private respondents (numbering 906)
were hired by petitioner Pure Foods Corporation to
work for a fixed period of five months at its tuna
cannery plant. After the expiration of their
respective contracts of employment, their services
were terminated. They then executed a Release
and Quitclaim stating that they had no claim
whatsoever against Pure Foods. The private
respondents filed before the NLRC Sub-Regional
Arbitration Branch, a complaint for illegal dismissal
against the petitioner and its plant manager. Pure
Foods Corp submits that the private respondents are
now estopped from questioning their separation
from petitioners employ in view of their express
conformity with the five-month duration of their
employment contracts. Besides, they fell within the
exception provided in Article 280 of the Labor Code
which reads: except where the employment has
been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the
completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee. Moreover, the first paragraph of the said
article must be read and interpreted in conjunction
with the proviso in the second paragraph, which
reads: Provided that any employee who has
rendered at least one year of service, whether such
service is continuous or broken, shall be considered
a regular employee with respect to the activity in
which he is employed.... In the instant case, the
private respondents were employed for a period of
five months only. In any event, private respondents'
prayer for reinstatement is well within the purview
of the Release and Quitclaim they had executed
wherein they unconditionally released the petitioner
from any and all other claims which might have
arisen from their past employment with the
petitioner.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue
that contracts with a specific period of employment
may be given legal effect provided, however, that
they are not intended to circumvent the
constitutional guarantee on security of tenure. They
submit that the practice of the petitioner in hiring
workers to work for a fixed duration of five months
only to replace them with other workers of the same
employment duration was apparently to prevent the
regularization of these so-called casuals, which is a
clear circumvention of the law on security of tenure.
Issue: Whether employees hired for a definite period
and whose services are necessary and desirable in
the usual business or trade of the employer are
regular employees.
Ruling: We find the petition devoid of merit. Article
280 of the Labor Code defines regular and casual
(See codal)
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is
not covered by the preceding paragraph; Provided,
That, any employee who has rendered at least one
year of service, whether such service is continuous
or broken, shall be considered a regular employee
with respect to the activity in which he is employed
and his employment shall continue while such
activity exists. Thus, the two kinds of regular
employees are (1) those who are engaged to
perform activities which are necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer; and
(2) those casual employees who have rendered at
least one year of service, whether continuous or
broken, with respect to the activity in which they are
employed. In the instant case, the private
respondents activities consisted in the receiving,
skinning, packing, and casing-up of tuna fish, which
were then exported by the petitioner. Indisputably,
they were performing activitieswhich were
necessary and desirable in petitioners business or
trade.
ADDITIONAL DETAILS:
Contrary to petitioner's submission, the private
respondents could not be regarded as having been
hired for a specific project or undertaking. The term
specific project or undertaking under Article 280 of
the Labor Code contemplates an activity which is not
commonly or habitually performed or such type of
work which is not done on a daily basis but only for a
specific duration of time or until completion; the
services employed are then necessary and desirable
in the employers usual business only for the period
of time it takes to complete the project. The fact
that the petitioner repeatedly and continuously
hired workers to do the same kind of work as that
performed by those whose contracts had expired
negates petitioners contention that those workers
were hired for a specific project or undertaking only.
Where from the circumstances it is apparent that
the periods have been imposed to preclude
acquisition of tenurial security by the employee,
they should be struck down or disregarded as
contrary to public policy and morals.
NOTE: criteria under which term employment
cannot be said to be in circumvention of the law on
security of tenure:
1) The fixed period of employment was knowingly
and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties without
any force, duress, or improper pressure being
brought to bear upon the employee and absent any
other circumstances vitiating his consent; or
2) It satisfactorily appears that the employer and the
employee dealt with each other on more or less
equal terms with no moral dominance exercised by
the former or the latter.
None of these criteria had been met in the present
case.This scheme of the petitioner was apparently
designed to prevent the private respondents and the
other casual employees from attaining the status
of a regular employee. It was a clear circumvention
of the employees right to security of tenure and to
other benefits like minimum wage, cost-of-living
allowance, sick leave, holiday pay, and 13th month
pay. Indeed, the petitioner succeeded in evading the
application of labor laws. Also, it saved itself from
the trouble or burden of establishing a just cause for
terminating employees by the simple expedient of
refusing to renew the employment contracts.The
five-month period specified in private respondents
employment contracts having been imposed
precisely to circumvent the constitutional guarantee
on security of tenure should, therefore, be struck
down or disregarded as contrary to public policy or
morals
35. Phil. Fruit and Vegetable Industries v. NLRC
[1999]-DURON
Facts:Private respondent Philippine Fruit and
Vegetable Workers Union-Tupas Local Chapter, for
and in behalf of 127 of its members, filed a
complaint for unfair labor practice and/or illegal
dismissal with damages against Petitioner
Corporation.They alleged that the dismissals were
due to complainants' involvement in union activities
and were without just cause. Labor Arbiter rendered
judgment that Philippine Fruit & Vegetable
Industries, Inc (PFVII) were indeed guilty of Illegal
Dismissal. On appeal, NLRC set aside the Labor
Arbiters decision and remanded the said case to the
Arbitration Branch for further proceedings.
Arbitration Branch rendered a decision finding PFVII
liable for illegal dismissal. On appeal, NLRC affirmed
the Arbitration Branchs decision but modified the
awards of attorneys fees. PFVII filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by NLRC
One of PFVIIs contentions is that the
complainants are seasonal workers.
According to them, its operation starts only
in February with the processing of
tomatoes into tomato paste and ceases by
the end of the same month when the
supply is consumed. It then resumes
operations at the end of April or early May,
depending on the availability of supply with
the processing of mangoes into purees and
ceases operation in June. The severance of
complainants' employment from petitioner
corporation was a necessary consequence
of the nature of seasonal employment; and
since complainants are seasonal workers as
defined by the Labor Code, they cannot
invoke any tenurial benefit
Issue:Whether or not the complainants were illegal
dismissed by PFVII
Ruling: By the very nature of things in a business
enterprise like PFVII, the services of the
complainants are, indeed, more than six (6) months
a year. The company did not confine itself just to the
processing of tomatoes and mangoes. It also
processed guyabano, calamansi, papaya, pineapple,
etc. Besides, they have the office of administrative
functions, cleaning and upkeeping of machines and
other duties and tasks to keep up a big food
processing corporation. Considering, therefore, that
under Article 280 of the Labor Code "the provisions
of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and considering further that the
tasks which complainants performed were usually
necessary and desirable in the employers usual
business or trade, Supreme Court held that
complainants are regular seasonal employees, thus,
entitled to security of tenure. The Labor Code
provides an employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities that are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employers, except where the employment has been
fixed for a specific project. An employment shall be
deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the
preceding paragraph; provided, that, any employee
who has rendered at least one year of service
whether such service is continuous or broken, shall
be considered a regular employee with respect to
the activity in which he is employed and his
employment shall continue while such actually
exists.
In the case at bar, the work of complainants as
seeders, operators, sorters, slicers, janitors, drivers,
truck helpers, mechanics and office personnel is
without doubt necessary in the usual business of a
food processing company like petitioner PFVII. It
should be noted that complainants' employment has
not been fixed for a specific project or undertaking
the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of their appointment or
hiring. Neither is their employment seasonal in
nature. While it may be true that some phases of
petitioner company's processing operations is
dependent on the supply of fruits for a particular
season, the other equally important aspects of its
business, such as manufacturing and marketing are
not seasonal. The fact is that large-scale food
processing companies such as Petitioner Company
continue to operate and do business throughout the
year even if the availability of fruits and vegetables is
seasonal. PETITION DENIED. COMPLAINANTS ARE
REGULAR EMPLOYEES BY VIRTUE OF THE FACT THAT
THEY PERFORMED FUNCTIONS, WHICH ARE
NECESSARY AND DESIRABLE IN THE USUAL BUSINESS
OF PFVII.
36. PHILIPS SEMICONDUCTORS (PHILS.), INC., vs.
ELOISA FADRIQUELA- Karen
Facts: Philips Semiconductors is a domestic
corporation engaged in the production and assembly
of semiconductors such as power devices, RF
modules, CATV modules, RF and metal transistors
and glass diods. Aside from contractual employees,
the petitioner employed 1,029 regular workers. The
employees were subjected to periodic performance
appraisal based on output, quality, attendance and
work attitude. One was required to obtain a
performance rating of at least 3.0 for the period
covered by the performance appraisal to maintain
good standing as an employee.
Eloisa Fadriquela executed a Contract of
Employment with the petitioner in which she was
hired as a production operator with a daily salary
of P118. Her initial contract was for a period of three
months up to August 8, 1992, but was extended for
two months when she garnered a performance
rating of 3.15. Her contract was again renewed for
two months or up to December 16, 1992, when she
received a performance rating of 3.8. After the
expiration of her third contract, it was extended
anew, for three months, that is, from January 4,
1993 to April 4, 1993.
After garnering a performance rating of 3.4, the
respondents contract was extended for another
three months, that is, from April 5, 1993 to June 4,
1993. She, however, incurred five absences in the
month of April, three absences in the month of May
and four absences in the month of June. Line
supervisor Shirley F. Velayo asked the respondent
why she incurred the said absences, but the latter
failed to explain her side. The respondent was
warned that if she offered no valid justification for
her absences, Velayo would have no other recourse
but to recommend the non-renewal of her
contract. The respondent still failed to respond, as a
consequence of which her performance rating
declined to 2.8. Velayo recommended to the
petitioner that the respondents employment be
terminated due to habitual absenteeism, in
accordance with the Company Rules and
Regulations. Thus, the respondents contract of
employment was no longer renewed.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent was still a contractual
employee of the petitioner as of June 4, 1993?
HELD:
No. Article 280 of the Labor Code of
the Philippines was emplaced in our statute books to
prevent the circumvention by unscrupulous
employers of the employees right to be secure in his
tenure by indiscriminately and completely ruling out
all written and oral agreements inconsistent with the
concept of regular employment defined therein.The
language of the law manifests the intent to protect
the tenurial interest of the worker who may be
denied the rights and benefits due a regular
employee because of lopsided agreements with the
economically powerful employer who can maneuver
to keep an employee on a casual or temporary
status for as long as it is convenient to it. In tandem
with Article 281 of the Labor Code, Article 280 was
designed to put an end to the pernicious practice of
making permanent casuals of our lowly employees
by the simple expedient of extending to them
temporary or probationary appointments, ad
infinitum.
The two kinds of regular employees under the law
are (1) those engaged to perform activities which are
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade
of the employer; and (2) those casual employees
who have rendered at least one year of service,
whether continuous or broken, with respect to the
activities in which they are employed. The primary
standard to determine a regular employment is the
reasonable connection between the particular
activity performed by the employee in relation to
the business or trade of the employer. The test is
whether the former is usually necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer. If the
employee has been performing the job for at least
one year, even if the performance is not continuous
or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated
and continuing need for its performance as sufficient
evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability of
that activity to the business of the employer. Hence,
the employment is also considered regular, but only
with respect to such activity and while such activity
exists. The law does not provide the qualification
that the employee must first be issued a regular
appointment or must be declared as such before he
can acquire a regular employee status.
In this case, the respondent was employed by the
petitioner on May 8, 1992 as production
operator. She was assigned to wirebuilding at the
transistor division. There is no dispute that the work
of the respondent was necessary or desirable in the
business or trade of the petitioner. She remained
under the employ of the petitioner without any
interruption since May 8, 1992 to June 4, 1993 or for
one (1) year and twenty-eight (28) days. The original
contract of employment had been extended or
renewed for four times, to the same position, with
the same chores. Such a continuing need for the
services of the respondent is sufficient evidence of
the necessity and indispensability of her services to
the petitioners business. By operation of law, then,
the respondent had attained the regular status of
her employment with the petitioner, and is thus
entitled to security of tenure as provided for in
Article 279 of the Labor Code which reads:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause or
when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive
of allowances, and to his other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time
of his actual reinstatement.
The respondents re-employment under contracts
ranging from two to three months over a period of
one year and twenty-eight days, with an express
statement that she may be reassigned at the
discretion of the petitioner and that her
employment may be terminated at any time upon
notice, was but a catch-all excuse to prevent her
regularization. Such statement is contrary to the
letter and spirit of Articles 279 and 280 of the Labor
Code.
37. Alcira vs NLRC, G. R. No. 149859, June 9, 2004-
Christal
Facts: Radin Alcira, was hired by the respondent
Middleby Philippines Corporation as engineering
support services supervisor under probationary
status for 6 months. Afterwards, the service of the
petitioner was terminated by the respondent on the
ground that the latter was not satisfied on the
performance of the former. At certain occasions, he
was late, absent and did not wear the prescribed
uniform. As a result, Alcira filed a complaint foe
illegal dismissal in the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) against the respondent.
Petitioner contended that his termination in the
service tantamount to illegal dismissal since he
attained the status of a regular employee as of the
time of dismissal. He presented the appointment
paper showing that he was hired on May 20, 1996,
consequently, his dismissal on November 20, 1996
was illegal because at that time, he was already a
regular employee since the 6-month probationary
period ended on November 16, 1996. The
respondent, on the other hand, asserted that during
the petitioners probationary period, he showed
poor performance on his assigned tasks, was late
couple of times and violated the companys rule.
Thus, the petitioner was terminated and his
application to become a regular employment was
disapproved. The respondent also insisted that the
removal of the petitioner from office was within the
probationary period.
Issue: Should the exact calendar days be counted to
determine the probationary period?
Held: No. Since, one month is composed of 30 days,
then, 6 months shall be understood to be composed
of 180 days. And the computation of the 6- month
period is reckoned from the date of appointment up
to the same calendar date of the 6th month
following. Since, the number of days of a particular
month is irrelevant, petitioner was still a
probationary employee at the time of his dismissal.
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed. (Alcira counted
the exact calendar days in the month to reach 180
days, he did not count 30 days x 6, which is the right
method.)
38. MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILIPPINES CORP VS.
CHRYSLER PHILIPPINES LABOR UNION (R-U, Glenna)
Facts: Private respondent Nelson Paras first worked
with Mitsubishi Philippines as a shuttle bus driver on
March 19, 1976. He resigned on June 16, 1982
because he went to Saudi Arabia and worked there
as a diesel mechanic and heavy machine operator
from 1982 to 1993. Upon his return, Mitsubishi
Philippines re-hired him as a welder-fabricator at a
tooling shop from November 1, 1994 to March 3,
1995. On May 1996, Paras was re-hired again, this
time as a probationary manufacturing trainee at the
Plant Engineering Maintenance Department. He had
an orientation on May 15, 1996 and afterwhich, with
respect to the companys rules and guidelines,
started reporting for work on May 27, 1996. Paras
was evaluated by his immediate supervisors after six
months of working. The supervisors rating Paras
performance were Lito R. Lacambacal and Wilfredo
J. Lopez, as part of the MMPCs company policies.
Upon this evaluation, Paras garnered an average
rating. Later, respondent Paras was informed by his
supervisor, Lacambacal, that he received an average
performance rating but it is a rate which would still
qualify him to be regularized. But as part of the
company protocols, the Division Managers namely
A.C. Velando, H.T. Victoria and Dante Ong reviewed
the performance evaluation made on Paras. Despite
the recommendations of the supervisors, they
unanimously agreed that the performance was
unsatisfactory. As a consequence, Paras was not
considered for regularization. Paras received a
Notice of Termination on November 26, 1996 which
was dated November 25, 1996. This letters intent is
to formally relieve him off of his services and
position effective the date since he failed to meet
the companys standards.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Paras termination
was legal or not.
Held: The Court holds that a company employer may
indeed hire an employee on a probationary basis in
order to determine his fitness to perform work. The
Court stresses the existence of the statements under
Article 281 of the Labor Code which specifies that
the employer must inform the employee of the
standards they were to meet in order to be granted
regularization and that such probationary period
shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the
employee started working, unless specified in the
apprenticeship agreement. Respondent Paras was
employed on a probationary basis and was apprised
of the standards upon which his regularization would
be based during the orientation. His first day to
report for work was on May 27, 1996. As per the
company's policy, the probationary period was from
three (3) months to a maximum of six (6) months.
Applying Article 13 of the Civil Code, the
probationary period of six (6) months consists of one
hundred eighty (180) days. The Court conforms with
paragraph one, Article 13 of the Civil Code providing
that the months which are not designated by their
names shall be understood as consisting of thirty
(30) days each. This case, the Labor Code pertains to
180 days. Also, as clearly provided for in the last
paragraph of Article 13, it is said that in computing a
period, the first day shall be excluded and the last
day included. Thus, the one hundred eighty (180)
days commenced on May 27, 1996, and ended on
November 23, 1996. The termination letter dated
November 25, 1996 was served on respondent Paras
only at 3:00 a.m. of November 26, 1996. The Court
held that by that time, he was actually already a
regular employee of the petitioner under Article 281
of the Labor Code. His position as a regularized
employee is thus secured until further notice.
39. PANGILINAN vs. GENERAL MILLING-Kate
FACTS: The respondent General Milling Corporation
is a domestic corporation engaged in the production
and sale of livestock and poultry. It is, likewise, the
distributor of dressed chicken to various restaurants
and establishments nationwide. As such, it employs
hundreds of employees, some on a regular basis and
others on a casual basis, as emergency workers.
The petitioners were employed by the respondent
on different dates as emergency workers at its
poultry plant in Cainta, Rizal, under separate
temporary/casual contracts of employment for a
period of five months. Most of them worked as
chicken dressers, while the others served as packers
or helpers. Upon the expiration of their respective
contracts, their services were terminated. They later
filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal and
non-payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay, night-
shift differential and service incentive leave pay
against the respondent before the Arbitration
Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission.
The petitioners alleged that their work as chicken
dressers was necessary and desirable in the usual
business of the respondent, and added that although
they worked from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., they were
not paid night-shift differential. They stressed that
based on the nature of their work, they were regular
employees of the respondent; hence, could not be
dismissed from their employment unless for just
cause and after due notice. They asserted that the
respondent GMC terminated their contract of
employment without just cause and due notice.
They further argued that the respondent could not
rely on the nomenclature of their employment as
temporary or casual.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were regular
employees of the respondent GMC when their
employment was terminated.
HELD: The SC held the petitioners were employees
with a fixed period, and, as such, were not regular
employees. Article 280 of the Labor Code
comprehends three kinds of employees: (a) regular
employees or those whose work is necessary or
desirable to the usual business of the employer; (b)
project employees or those whose employment has
been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the
completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee or where the work or services to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season; and,
(c) casual employees or those who are neither
regular nor project employees.
A regular employee is one who is engaged to
perform activities which are necessary and desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer as
against those which are undertaken for a specific
project or are seasonal.[41] There are two separate
instances whereby it can be determined that an
employment is regular: (1) if the particular activity
performed by the employee is necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer; and,
(2) if the employee has been performing the job for
at least a year. Article 280 of the Labor Code does
not proscribe or prohibit an employment contract
with a fixed period. It does not necessarily follow
that where the duties of the employee consist of
activities usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business of the employer, the parties are forbidden
from agreeing on a period of time for the
performance of such activities. There is thus nothing
essentially contradictory between a definite period
of employment and the nature of the employees
duties.
Stipulations in employment contracts providing for
term employment or fixed period employment are
valid when the period were agreed upon knowingly
and voluntarily by the parties without force, duress
or improper pressure, being brought to bear upon
the employee and absent any other circumstances
vitiating his consent, or where it satisfactorily
appears that the employer and employee dealt with
each other on more or less equal terms with no
moral dominance whatever being exercised by the
former over the latter. An examination of the
contracts entered into by the petitioners showed
that their employment was limited to a fixed period,
usually five or six months, and did not go beyond
such period. The records reveal that the stipulations
in the employment contracts were knowingly and
voluntarily agreed to by the petitioners without
force, duress or improper pressure, or any
circumstances that vitiated their consent. Similarly,
nothing therein shows that these contracts were
used as a subterfuge by the respondent GMC to
evade the provisions of Articles 279 and 280 of the
Labor Code.
The petitioners were hired as emergency workers
and assigned as chicken dressers, packers and
helpers at the Cainta Processing Plant. While the
petitioners employment as chicken dressers is
necessary and desirable in the usual business of the
respondent, they were employed on a mere
temporary basis, since their employment was limited
to a fixed period. As such, they cannot be said to be
regular employees, but are merely contractual
employees. Consequently, there was no illegal
dismissal when the petitioners services were
terminated by reason of the expiration of their
contracts. Lack of notice of termination is of no
consequence, because when the contract specifies
the period of its duration, it terminates on the
expiration of such period. A contract for
employment for a definite period terminates by its
own term at the end of such period. Petition is
denied.
40. RAVAGO vs ESSO EASTERN MARINE, G.R. No.
158324. March 14, 2005- Garry
FACTS: Esso Eastern Marine, now the Petroleum
Shipping Ltd. is a foreign company based in
Singapore and engaged in maritime commerce. It is
represented in the Philippines by its manning agent
and co-respondent Trans-Global, a corporation
organized under the Philippine laws. Roberto Ravago
was hired by Trans-Global to work as a seaman on
board various Esso vessels. On February 13, 1970,
Ravago commenced his duty as S/N wiper on board
the Esso Bataan under a contract that lasted until
February 10, 1971. Thereafter, he was assigned to
work in different Esso vessels where he was
designated diverse tasks, such as oiler, then assistant
engineer. He was employed under a total of 34
separate and unconnected contracts, each for a
fixed period, by three different companies, namely,
Esso Tankers, Inc. (ETI), EEM and Esso International
Shipping (Bahamas) Co., Ltd. (EIS), Singapore Branch.
Ravago worked with Esso vessels until August 22,
1992, a period spanning more than 22 years.
Shortly after completing his latest contract with
Esso, Ravago was granted a vacation leave with pay.
Preparatory to his embarkation under a new
contract, he was ordered to report for a Medical Pre-
Employment Examination, which, according to the
records, he passed. He, likewise, attended a Pre-
Departure Orientation Seminar conducted by the
Capt. I.P. Estaniel Training Center, a division of
Trans-Global. One night, a stray bullet hit Ravago on
the left leg while he was waiting for a bus ride in
Cubao, Quezon City. He fractured his left proximal
tibia and was hospitalized at the Philippine
Orthopedic Hospital. Ravagos wife, Lolita, informed
the petitioners of the incident for purposes of
availing medical benefits. As a result of his injury,
Ravagos doctor opined that he would not be able to
cope with the job of a seaman and suggested that he
be given a desk job. For this reason, the company
physician found him to have lost his dexterity,
making him unfit to work once again as a seaman.
Consequently, instead of rehiring Ravago, Esso paid
him his Career Employment Incentive Plan (CEIP) as
of and his final tax refund. However, Ravago filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for
reinstatement, backwages, damages and attorneys
fees against Trans-Global and Esso with the POEA
Adjudication Office. Respondents denied that
Ravago was dismissed without notice and just cause.
Rather, his services were no longer engaged in view
of the disability he suffered which rendered him
unfit to work as a seafarer. This fact was further
validated by the company doctor and Ravagos
attending physician. They averred that Ravago was a
contractual employee and was hired under 34
separate contracts by different companies. Ravago
insisted that he was fit to resume pre-injury
activities and that he was not a mere contractual
employee because the respondents regularly and
continuously rehired him for 23 years and, for his
continuous service, was awarded a CEIP payment
upon his termination from employment.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Ravago is a regular
employee of respondent Esso
HELD: The SC held that seafarers are contractual, not
regular, employees. Seamen and overseas contract
workers are not covered by the term regular
employment as defined in Article 280 of the Labor
Code. Clearly, petitioner cannot be considered as a
regular employee notwithstanding that the work he
performs is necessary and desirable in the business
of respondent company. As expounded,
an exception is made in the situation of
seafarers. The exigencies of their work necessitates
that they be employed on a contractual basis.
41.Hacienda Bino/Hortencia Starke vs. Cuenca ,G.R.
No. 150478, April 15, 2005- SAL
Facts: Hacienda Bino, represented by owner and
operator Hortencia L. Starke, is a 236- hectare sugar
plantation in Kabankalan City. The 76 individual
respondents were part of its workforce, consisting of
220 workers, performing various tasks in the
planting and harvesting of sugarcane. In 1996,
during the off-milling season, Starke issued an Order
of Notice to the employees, which stated: Please
bear in mind that all those who signed in favor of
CARP are expressing their desire to get out of
employment on their own volition. Wherefore,
beginning today, July 18, only those who did not sign
for CARP will be given employment by Hda. Bino.
Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal,
wage differentials, 13th month pay, holiday pay and
premium pay for holiday, service incentive leave pay,
and moral and exemplary damages with the NLRC. In
their Joint Sworn Statement, they alleged that they
were dismissed because they applied as
beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) over the land owned by
Starke.
The Labor Arbiter found that Starkes notice was
tantamount to a termination of the respondents
services, thus guilty of illegal dismissal. Petitioner
was ordered to pay backwages and wage
differentials. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter, with additional payment of holiday
pay. The CA deleted the award for holiday pay and
premium pay for holidays.
Issue: WON the CA violated the doctrine of stare
decisis laid down by the Supreme Court as to the
status of the sugar workers.
Ruling: NO. Starke contends that the CA violated the
doctrine of stare decisis in not applying the ruling in
Mercado vs. NLRC, which held that sugar workers
are seasonal employees, whose employment legally
ends upon completion of the project or the season.
Thus, the employment of respondents, being sugar
workers, may be terminated at the end of the
season and such termination cannot be considered
an illegal dismissal.
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, when a court has
laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain
state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and
apply it to all future cases in which the facts are
substantially the same. Where the facts are
essentially different, however, stare decisis does not
apply, for a perfectly sound principle as applied to
one set of facts might be entirely inappropriate
when a factual variance is introduced. The CA
correctly found that the facts involved in this case
are different from the Mercado case; therefore, the
ruling in that case cannot be applied to the case at
bar.
Respondents in the instant case are REGULAR
EMPLOYEES. Although in the Mercado case, the
Supreme Court held the sugar workers were not
regular but seasonal workers, nevertheless, the
same does not operate to abandon the settled
doctrine that sugar workers are considered regular
and permanent farm workers of a sugar plantation
owner. The disparity in facts between the Mercado
case and the instant case is best exemplified by the
fact that the former decision ruled on the status of
employment of farm laborers, who, as found by the
labor arbiter, work only for a definite period for a
farm worker, after which they offer their services to
other farm owners, considering the area in question
being comparatively small, comprising of seventeen
and a half (1712) hectares of land, such that the
planting of rice and sugar cane thereon could not
possibly entail a whole year operation. The herein
case presents a different factual condition as the
enormity of the size of the sugar hacienda of
petitioner, with an area of two hundred thirty-six
(236) hectares, simply do not allow for private
respondents to render work only for a definite
period.
The primary standard for determining regular
employment is the reasonable connection between
the particular activity performed by the employee in
relation to the usual trade or business of the
employer. There is no doubt that the respondents
were performing work necessary and desirable in
the usual trade or business of an employer. Hence,
they can properly be classified as regular employees.
For respondents to be excluded from those classified
as regular employees, it is not enough that they
perform work or services that are seasonal in nature.
They must have been employed only for the
duration of one season. While the records
sufficiently show that the respondents work in the
hacienda was seasonal in nature, there was,
however, no proof that they were hired for the
duration of one season only. In fact, the payrolls,
submitted in evidence by the petitioners, show that
they availed the services of the respondents since
1991. Absent any proof to the contrary, the general
rule of regular employment should, therefore, stand.
42. G.R. No. 157214 June 7, 2005 PHILIPPINE
GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS, INC., petitioner,vs.
RICARDO DE VERA, respondent.(re: case#8)-CEL
Facts:Respondent Ricardo De Vera is a physician by
profession whom petitioner enlisted to attend to the
medical needs of its employees. Thru a letter De
Vera, offered his services to the petitioner,
tproposing his plan of works required of a
practitioner in industrial medicine. The parties
agreed and formalized respondent's proposal in a
document denominated as RETAINERSHIP
CONTRACT which will be for a period of one year
subject to renewal.Said contract was renewed
yearly. The retainership arrangement went on from
1981 to 1994 with changes in the retainer's fee.
However, for the years 1995 and 1996, renewal of
the contract was only made verbally. However, in
December 1996 when Philcom, thru a letter bearing
on the subject boldly written as "TERMINATION
RETAINERSHIP CONTRACT", informed De Vera of its
decision to discontinue the latter's "retainer's
contract with the Company effective at the close of
business hours of December 31, 1996" because
management has decided that it would be more
practical to provide medical services to its
employees through accredited hospitals near the
company premises. Both the NLRC and the CA ruled
that respondent is petitioners regular employee at
the time of his separation.
Issue: Is respondent petitioners regular employee?
Held: No. The appellate courts premise that regular
employees are those who perform activities which
are desirable and necessary for the business of the
employer is not determinative in this case. For, [the
Court] take it that any agreement may provide that
one party shall render services for and in behalf of
another, no matter how necessary for the latters
business, even without being hired as an employee.
This set-up is precisely true in the case of an
independent contractorship as well as in an agency
agreement. Indeed, Article 280 of the Labor Code,
quoted by the appellate court, is not the yardstick
for determining the existence of an employment
relationship. As it is, the provision merely
distinguishes between two (2) kinds of employees,
i.e., regular and casual. It does not apply where, as
here, the very existence of an employment
relationship is in dispute. Buttressing his contention
that he is a regular employee of petitioner,
respondent invokes Article 157 of the Labor Code,
and argues that he satisfies all the requirements.
Had only respondent read carefully the very
statutory provision invoked by him, he would have
noticed that in non-hazardous workplaces, the
employer may engage the services of a physician "on
retained basis." As correctly observed by the
petitioner, while it is true that the provision requires
employers to engage the services of medical
practitioners in certain establishments depending on
the number of their employees, nothing is there in
the law which says that medical practitioners so
engaged be actually hired as employees, adding that
the law, as written, only requires the employer "to
retain", not employ, a part-time physician who
needed to stay in the premises of the non-hazardous
workplace for 2 hours.
Respondent takes no issue on the fact that
petitioners business of telecommunications is not
hazardous in nature. As such, what applies here is
the last paragraph of Article 157 which, to stress,
provides that the employer may engage the services
of a physician and dentist "on retained basis",
subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor
may prescribe. The successive "retainership"
agreements of the parties definitely hue to the very
statutory provision relied upon by respondent.
Deeply embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule
that courts may not construe a statute that is free
from doubt. Where the law is clear and
unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what
it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it
that the mandate is obeyed. As it is, Article 157 of
the Labor Code clearly and unequivocally allows
employers in non-hazardous establishments to
engage "on retained basis" the service of a dentist or
physician. Nowhere does the law provide that the
physician or dentist so engaged thereby becomes a
regular employee. The very phrase that they may be
engaged "on retained basis", revolts against the idea
that this engagement gives rise to an employer-
employee relationship.
43. INTEGRATED CONTRACTOR AND PLUMBING
WORKS INC. VS NLRC- Toni
Facts: Integrated Contractor and plumbing works is a
plumbing contractor. Its business depends on the
number and frequency of the projects it is able to
contract with its clients. Solon worked for petitioner,
on February 23, 1998, while he was about to log out
from work, he was informed by the warehouseman
that the main office had instructed them to tell him
it was his last day of work as he had been
terminated. When he went to the office on February
24, 1998 to verify his status, he found out that
indeed, he had been terminated. He went back to
Integrated Contractors office on February 27, 1998
to sign a clearance so he could claim his 13th month
pay and tax refunds. However, he had second
thoughts and refused to sign the clearance when he
read the clearance indicating he had resigned. He
filed a complaint alleging that he was illegally
dismissed without just cause and without due
process.
Issue: WON Solon is a project employee of the
petitioner or a regular employee and illegally
dismissed?
Ruling: Solon is a regular employee. The test to
determine whether employment is regular or not is
the reasonable connection between the particular
activity performed by the employee in relation to
the usual business or trade of the employer. Also, if
the employee has been performing the job for at
least one year, even if the performance is not
continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems
the repeated and continuing need for its
performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity,
if not indispensability of that activity to the business.
Thus, we held that where the employment of project
employees is extended long after the supposed
project has been finished, the employees are
removed from the scope of project employees and
are considered regular employees.
While length of time may not be the
controlling test for project employment, it is vital in
determining if the employee was hired for a specific
undertaking or tasked to perform functions vital,
necessary and indispensable to the usual business or
trade of the employer. Here, Solon had been a
project employee several times over. His
employment ceased to be coterminous with specific
projects when he was repeatedly re-hired due to the
demands of petitioners business. Where from the
circumstances it is apparent that periods have been
imposed to preclude the acquisition of tenurial
security by the employee, they should be struck
down as contrary to public policy, morals, good
customs or public order.
Further, Policy Instructions No. 20 requires
employers to submit a report of an employees
termination to the nearest public employment office
every time his employment was terminated due to a
completion of a project. The failure of the employer
to file termination reports is an indication that the
employee is not a project employee. Department
Order No. 19 superseding Policy Instructions No. 20
also expressly provides that the report of
termination is one of the indications of project
employment. In the case at bar, there was only one
list of terminated workers submitted to the
Department of Labor and Employment. If private
respondent was a project employee, petitioner
should have submitted a termination report for
every completion of a project to which the former
was assigned.
As a regular worker, private respondent is
entitled to security of tenure under Article 279 of
the Labor Code and can only be removed for cause.
We found no valid cause attending to Solons
dismissal and found also that his dismissal was
without due process.
Additionally, Article 277(b) of the Labor Code
provides that
... Subject to the constitutional right of workers to
security of tenure and their right to be protected
against dismissal except for a just and authorized
cause and without prejudice to the requirement of
notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer
shall furnish the worker whose employment is
sought to be terminated a written notice containing
a statement of the causes for termination and shall
afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and
to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative if he so desires in accordance with
company rules and regulations promulgated
pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of
Labor and Employment
The failure of the petitioner to comply with
these procedural guidelines renders its dismissal of
private respondent, illegal. An illegally dismissed
employee is entitled to reinstatement with full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
benefits computed from the time his compensation
was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement, pursuant to Article 279 of the Labor
Code.
44. Lacuesta v Ateneo De Manila G.R. No. 152777
(2005)-JAY
Issue: Whether petitioner was illegally dismissed?
Facts:Respondent hired, on a contractual basis,
petitioner as a part-time lecturer in its English
Department for the second semester of school year
1988-1989. She was re-hired, still on a contractual
basis, for the first and second semesters of school
year 1989-1990. On July 13, 1990, the petitioner was
first appointed as full-time instructor on probation,
in the same department effective June 1, 1990 until
March 31, 1991. Thereafter, her contract as faculty
on probation was renewed effective April 1, 1991
until March 31, 1992. She was again hired for a third
year effective April 1, 1992 until March 31, 1993.
During these three years she was on probation
status.
Later on, the petitioner was informed that her
contract would no longer be renewed because she
did not integrate well with the English Department.
President of the Ateneo informed petitioner was not
being terminated but her contract would simply
expire. Petitioner was offered as book editor but at
the same time applied for her clearance as
instructor. Upon expiry of her book editor contract,
she also processed her clearance. She then filed for
illegal dismissal.
Ruling: As previously held, a part-time teacher
cannot acquire permanent status. Only when one
has served as a full-time teacher can he acquire
permanent or regular status. The petitioner was a
part-time lecturer before she was appointed as a
full-time instructor on probation. As a part-time
lecturer, her employment as such had ended when
her contract expired. Thus, the three semesters she
served as part-time lecturer could not be credited to
her in computing the number of years she has
served to qualify her for permanent status.
Completing the probation period does not
automatically qualify her to become a permanent
employee of the university. Petitioner could only
qualify to become a permanent employee upon
fulfilling the reasonable standards for permanent
employment as faculty member. Consistent with
academic freedom and constitutional autonomy, an
institution of higher learning has the prerogative to
provide standards for its teachers and determine
whether these standards have been
met.http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/d
ec2005/152777.htm - _ftn19 At the end of the
probation period, the decision to re-hire an
employee on probation, belongs to the university as
the employer alone.
We reiterate, however, that probationary employees
enjoy security of tenure, but only within the period
of probation. Likewise, an employee on probation
can only be dismissed for just cause or when he fails
to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with
the reasonable standards made known by the
employer at the time of his hiring. Upon expiration
of their contract of employment, academic
personnel on probation cannot automatically claim
security of tenure and compel their employers to
renew their employment contracts. In the instant
case, petitioner, did not attain permanent status and
was not illegally dismissed. As found by the NLRC,
her contract merely expired.
45. POSEIDON FISHING vs NLRC- Julius
FACTS: Private respondent was employed by
Poseidon Fishing in January 1988 as Chief Mate.
After five years, he was promoted to Boat Captain. In
1999, petitioners, without reason, demoted
respondent from Boat Captain to Radio Operator of
petitioner Poseidon. As a Radio Operator, he
monitored the daily activities in their office and
recorded in the duty logbook the names of the
callers and time of their calls.
On 3 July 2000, private respondent failed to record a
7:25 a.m. call in one of the logbooks. However, he
was able to record the same in the other logbook.
Consequently, when he reviewed the two logbooks,
he noticed that he was not able to record the said
call in one of the logbooks so he immediately
recorded the 7:25 a.m. call after the 7:30 a.m. entry.
Around 9:00 oclock in the morning of 4 July 2000,
petitioner Jesus, the manager, detected the error in
the entry in the logbook. Subsequently, she asked
private respondent to prepare an incident report to
explain the reason for the said oversight.
At around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of that same
day, petitioner Poseidons secretary, summoned
private respondent to get his separation pay
amounting to Fifty-Five Thousand Pesos
(P55,000.00). However, he refused to accept the
amount as he believed that he did nothing illegal to
warrant his immediate discharge from work.
Private respondent then filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with the Labor Arbiter. He averred that
petitioner Poseidon employed him as a Chief Mate
sometime in January 1988. He claimed that he was
promoted to the position of Boat Captain five years
after. However, in 1999, he was demoted from Boat
Captain to Radio Operator without any reason and
shortly, he was terminated without just cause and
without due process of law.
Conversely, petitioners Poseidon and Terry de Jesus
strongly asserted that private respondent was a
contractual or a casual employee whose services
could be terminated at the end of the contract even
without a just or authorized cause in view of Article
280 of the Labor Code. Petitioners further posited
that when the private respondent was engaged, it
was made clear to him that he was being employed
only on a por viaje or per trip basis and that his
employment would be terminated at the end of the
trip for which he was being hired. As such, the
private respondent could not be entitled to
separation pay and other monetary claims.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Estoquia is a
regular employee of petitioner.
HELD: The SC held that the ruling in the Brent case
could not apply in the case at bar. The acid test in
considering fixed-term contracts as valid is: if from
the circumstances it is apparent that periods have
been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial
security by the employee, they should be
disregarded for being contrary to public policy. The
SC will not hesitate to nullify employment contracts
stipulating a fixed term after finding that the
purpose behind these contracts was to evade the
application of the labor laws, since this is contrary to
public policy.
Moreover, unlike in the Brent case where the period
of the contract was fixed and clearly stated, note
that in the case at bar, the terms of employment of
private respondent as provided in the Kasunduan
was not only vague, it also failed to provide an actual
or specific date or period for the contract. There is
nothing in the contract that says complainant, who
happened to be the captain of said vessel, is a
casual, seasonal or a project worker. The date July 1
to 31, 1998 under the heading Pagdating had been
placed there merely to indicate the possible date of
arrival of the vessel and is not an indication of the
status of employment of the crew of the vessel.
Furthermore, as petitioners themselves admitted in
their petition before this Court, private respondent
was repeatedly hired as part of the boats crew and
he acted in various capacities onboard the vessel.
The test to determine whether employment is
regular or not is the reasonable connection between
the particular activity performed by the employee in
relation to the usual business or trade of the
employer. And, if the employee has been performing
the job for at least one year, even if the performance
is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law
deems the repeated and continuing need for its
performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity,
if not indispensability of that activity to the business.
Ostensibly, in the case at bar, at different times,
private respondent occupied the position of Chief
Mate, Boat Captain, and Radio Operator. The act of
hiring and re-hiring in various capacities is a mere
gambit employed by petitioner to thwart the
tenurial protection of private respondent. Such
pattern of re-hiring and the recurring need for his
services are testament to the necessity and
indispensability of such services to petitioners
business or trade.
Even if petitioners contention that its industry is
seasonal in nature, once a project or work pool
employee has been: (1) continuously, as opposed to
intermittently, re-hired by the same employer for
the same tasks or nature of tasks; and (2) these tasks
are vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual
business or trade of the employer, then the
employee must be deemed a regular employee.
In fine, inasmuch as private respondents functions
as described above are no doubt usually necessary
or desirable in the usual business or trade of
petitioner fishing company and he was hired
continuously for 12 years for the same nature of
tasks, we are constrained to say that he belongs to
the ilk of regular employee. Being one, private
respondents dismissal without valid cause was
illegal.
46. Abesco v. Ramirez- Juneey
FACTS: Petitioner company was engaged in a
construction business where respondents were hired
on different dates from 1976 to 1992 either as
laborers, road roller operators, painters or drivers. In
1997, respondents filed two separate complaints for
illegal dismissal against the company and its General
Manager, Oscar Banzon, before the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioners allegedly dismissed them without a valid
reason and without due process of law. The
complaints also included claims for non-payment of
the 13th month pay, five days service incentive
leave pay, premium pay for holidays and rest days,
and moral and exemplary damages. The LA later on
ordered the consolidation of the two
complaints. Petitioners denied liability to
respondents and countered that respondents were
project employees since their services were
necessary only when the company had projects to
be completed. Petitioners argued that, being project
employees, respondents employment was
coterminous with the project to which they were
assigned. They were not regular employees who
enjoyed security of tenure and entitlement to
separation pay upon termination from work.
ISSUE: Whether respondents were project
employees or regular employees.
HELD: The SC held that respondents were regular
employees. The principal test for determining
whether employees are project employees or
regular employees is whether they are assigned to
carry out a specific project or undertaking, the
duration and scope of which are specified at the
time they are engaged for that project. Such
duration, as well as the particular work/service to be
performed, is defined in an employment agreement
and is made clear to the employees at the time of
hiring.
In this case, petitioners did not have that kind of
agreement with respondents. Neither did they
inform respondents of the nature of the latters
work at the time of hiring. Hence, for failure of
petitioners to substantiate their claim that
respondents were project employees, we are
constrained to declare them as regular employees.
47. Cebu Metal Corp. vs Saliling- Mamugay
Facts: Cebu Metal Corporation is engaged in buying
and selling of scrap iron. In the Bacolod branch it has
(3) regular employees holding such positions as
Officer-in-Charge, a scaler, and a yardman, whose
salaries are paid directly by its main office in Cebu.
The complainants, Gregorio Saliling, Elias Bolido,
Manuel Alquiza, Benjie Amparado are the one who
undertakes pakiao work in the unloading of scrap
iron. The Bacolod buying station is mainly a
stockyard where scrap metal delivered by its
suppliers are stockpiled. The supply of scrap metal is
not steady as it depends upon many factors, such as
availability of supplies, price, competition and
demand among others. There are weeks were there
are no delivery while there are weeks were a quite
of number of trucks are delivered to the stockyard.
The arrivals of these trucks and the deliveries of
scrap metal iron are not regular and the schedules of
deliveries to the stockyard are not known before
hand by the respondent Cebu Metal Corporation.
These trucks have their own driver and truck boys
employed by the different suppliers. Sometimes,
these trucks do not have any truck boys, and in these
instances, the corporation hires the services of
people for the unloading of the scrap metal from
these trucks. It is for this reason that the unloaders
hired by the respondent to unload are basically
seasonal workers. They are hired whenever there
are trucks of suppliers do not have any
accompanying truck boys. Whoever is available and
whoever are willing to help unload on a particular
occasion are hired to unload. The complainants
maintained that they are hired by Cebu Metal
Corparation as employees and filed a complaint with
the regional arbitration in Bacolod City for
underpayment of wages and non-payment of the
benefits and then claimed illegal dismissal because
they were dismissed after the filing of the complaint.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of the
complainants. Aggrieved, Cebu Metal Corporation
filed an appeal with the NLRC. The NLRC reversed
and set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter and
held that the complainants were not regular
employees, thus, they could not have been illegally
dismissed.
The NLRC order of the reversal was based on the
Commissions finding that the petty cash vouchers
submitted by Cebu Metal Corporation confirmed the
fact that unloaders were paid on pakiao or task
basis at Php 15.00 per metric ton. The Commission
further rationalized that with the irregular nature of
the work involved in the stoppage and resumption of
which depended solely on the availability or supply
of scrap metal, it necessarily follows that after the
job of unloading was completed and unloaders are
paid the contract price, the latters working
relationship with Cebu Metal Corporation legally
ended. They were then free to offer their services to
others.
The complainants challenged the decision of the
NLRC with the Court of Appeals, and it rendered the
decision annulling the decision of the NLRC and
reinstated the decision made by the Labor Arbiter.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Were they illegally dismissed?
Ruling: No. There can be no illegal dismissal to speak
of. Besides, the complainants cannot claim regularity
in the hiring every time a truck comes loaded with
scrap metal. This is confirmed in the Petty Cash
Vouchers which are in the names of different leaders
who apportion the amount earned among its
members.
And, quite telling is the fact that not every truck
delivery of scrap metal requires the services of
respondent complainants when particular truck is
accompanied by its own unloader. And whenever
required, respondent complainants were not always
the ones contracted to undertake the unloading of
the trucks since the work was offered to whomever
were available at a given time.
It should be remembered that the Philippine
Constitution, while inexorably committed towards
the protection of the working class from exploitation
and unfair treatment, nevertheless mandates the
policy of social justice so as to strike a balance
between an avowed predilection for labor, on the
one hand, and the maintenance of the legal rights of
capital, the proverbial hen that lays the golden egg,
on the other.
48. Liganza v. RBL shipyard- June
Facts: After working as a carpenter for respondent
RBL since August 1991, petitioner Liganzas
employment was terminated on 30 October 1999.
Such event prompted petitioner to file a complaint
for illegal dismissal, alleging that on said date he was
verbally informed that he was already terminated
from employment and barred from entering the
premises. On the same occasion, he was told to look
for another job. Thus, he claimed that he was
unceremoniously terminated from employment
without any valid or authorized cause. On the other
hand, respondent insisted that petitioner was a
mere project employee who was terminated upon
completion of the project for which he was hired.
Issue: WON Liganza was illegally dismissed?
Ruling:
Yes. Even assuming that petitioner is a project
employee, respondent failed to prove that his
termination was for a just and valid cause. While it is
true that the employment contract states that the
contract ends upon a specific date, or upon
completion of the project, respondent failed to
prove that the last project was indeed completed so
as to justify petitioner's termination from
employment.
In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on
the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just
cause. Respondent could have easily proved that the
project or phase for which petitioner was hired has
already been completed. A certificate from the
owner of the vessel serviced by the company,
pictures perhaps, of the work accomplished, and
other proof of completion could have been procured
by respondent. However, all that we have is
respondent's self-serving assertion that the project
has been completed.
The Court has held that an employment ceases to be
co-terminous with specific projects when the
employee is continuously rehired due to the
demands of employer's business and re-engaged for
many more projects without interruption. In
Maraguinot, Jr. v. NLRC (Second Division), the Court
ruled that "once a project or work pool employee
has been: (1) continuously, as opposed to
intermittently, rehired by the same employer for the
same tasks or nature of tasks; and (2) these tasks are
vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual
business or trade of the employer, then the
employee must be deemed a regular employee,
pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code and
jurisprudence."
Petitioner, as carpenter, was tasked to "make and
repair cabinet, flooring, quarters, ceiling, windows,
doors, kitchen and other parts of the vessel that
needs to be repaired." As such, petitioner's work
was necessary or desirable to respondent's business.
Assuming, without granting that petitioner was
initially hired for specific projects or undertakings,
the repeated re-hiring and continuing need for his
services for over eight (8) years have undeniably
made him a regular employee.
Respondent capitalizes on the ruling in D.M.
Consunji, Inc. v. NLRC which reiterates the rule that
the length of service of a project employee is not the
controlling test of employment tenure but whether
or not "the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the
time of the engagement of the employee."
Surely, length of time is not the controlling test for
project employment. Nevertheless, it is vital in
determining if the employee was hired for a specific
undertaking or tasked to perform functions vital,
necessary and indispensable to the usual business or
trade of the employer.
 In the case at bar, respondent had been a project
employee several times over. His employment
ceased to be coterminous with specific projects
when he was repeatedly re-hired due to the
demands of petitioner's business. Where from the
circumstances it is apparent that periods have been
imposed to preclude the acquisition of tenurial
security by the employee, they should be struck
down as contrary to public policy, morals, good
customs or public order.
The circumstances of this case reveal that there are
serious doubts in the evidence on record that
petitioner is a project employee, or that he was
terminated for just cause. These doubts shall be
resolved in favor of petitioner, in line with the policy
of the law to afford protection to labor and construe
doubts in favor of labor.
49. Fabeza v. San Miguel Corp., G.R. No. 150658,
February 9, 2007- Krizza
Facts: Petitioners were hired by respondent San
Miguel Corporation (SMC) as "Relief Salesmen" for
the Greater Manila Area (GMA) under separate but
almost similarly worded "Contracts of Employment
With Fixed Period." After having entered into
successive contracts of the same nature with SMC,
the services of petitioners, as well as de Lara and
Alovera, were terminated after SMC no longer
agreed to forge another contract with them. SMC
and its co-respondent Arman Hicarte, who was its
Human Resources Manager, claimed that the hiring
of petitioners was not intended to be permanent, as
the same was merely occasioned by the need to fill
in a vacuum arising from SMCs gradual transition to
a new system of selling and delivering its products.
While some of the qualified regular salesmen were
readily upgraded to the position of Accounts
Specialist, respondents claimed that SMC still had to
sell its beer products using the conventional routing
system during the transition stage, thus giving rise to
the need for temporary employees; and the
members of the regular Route Crew then existing
were required to undergo a training program to
determine whether they possessed or could be
trained for the necessary attitude and aptitude
required of an Accounts Specialist, hence, the hiring
of petitioners and others for a fixed period, co-
terminus with the completion of the transition
period and Training Program for all prospective
Accounts Specialists. The petitioners alleged that
they were illegally dismissed by SMC.
The Labor Arbiter held petitioners were illegally
dismissed. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter was
affirmed on appeal by the NLRC. Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and of the
NLRC
Issue: WON the termination of the petitioners is
valid?
Ruling: Article 280 of the Labor Code defines regular
employment(SEE DEFINITION
In Pure Foods Corp. v. NLRC, Supreme Court held
that under the above-quoted provision, there are
two kinds of regular employees, namely: (1) those
who are engaged to perform activities which are
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade
of the employer, and (2) those casual employees
who have rendered at least one year of service,
whether continuous or broken, with respect to the
activity in which they are employed.
In Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora, the Supreme Court
laid out that Article 280 of the Labor Code appears
to prevent circumvention of the employees right to
be secure in his tenure, the clause in said
article indiscriminately and completely ruling out all
written or oral agreements conflicting with the
concept of regular employment as defined therein
should be construed to refer to the substantive evil
that the Code itself has singled out: agreements
entered into precisely to circumvent security of
tenure. It should have no application to instances
where a fixed period of employment was agreed
upon knowingly and voluntarily by the parties,
without any force, duress or improper pressure
being brought to bear upon the employee and
absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent,
or where it satisfactorily appears that the employer
and employee dealt with each other on more or less
equal terms with no moral dominance whatever
being exercised by the former over the latter.
Since respondents attribute the termination of
petitioners employment to the expiration of their
respective contracts, a determination of whether
petitioners were hired as project or seasonal
employees, or as fixed-term employees without any
force, duress or improper pressure having been
exerted against them is in order. If petitioners fall
under any of these categories, then indeed their
termination follows from the expiration of their
contracts. The NLRC had sufficient basis to believe
that the shift of SMC to the Pre-Selling System was
not the real basis for the forging of fixed-term
contracts of employment with petitioners and that
the periods were fixed only as a means to preclude
petitioners from acquiring security of tenure. That
petitioners themselves insisted on the one-year
fixed-term is not even alleged by respondents. In
fact, the sustained desire of each of the petitioners
to enter into another employment contract upon the
termination of the earlier ones clearly indicates their
interest in continuing to work for SMC. Moreover,
respondents have not established that the
engagement of petitioners services, which is not in
the nature of a project employment, required a
definite date of termination as a sine qua non.
50. Soriano vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 165594, April 23,
2007, citing 2005 Filipina Pre-fabricated Bldg.
System (Filisystem)- Duron
Facts:Petitioner and certain individuals namely
Sergio Benjamin (Benjamin), Maximino Gonzales
(Gonzales), and Noel Apostol (Apostol) were
employed by the respondent as Switchman Helpers
in its Tondo Exchange Office (TEO). After
participating in several trainings and seminars,
petitioner, Benjamin, and Gonzales were promoted
as Switchmen. Apostol, on the other hand, was
elevated to the position of Frameman. One of their
duties as Switchmen and Frameman was the manual
operation and maintenance of the Electronic
Mechanical Device (EMD) of the TEO. In November
1995, respondent PLDT implemented a company-
wide redundancy program. Subsequently, the
respondent PLDT gave separate letters dated 15 July
1996 to petitioner, Benjamin, Gonzales, and Apostol
informing them that their respective positions were
deemed redundant due to the above-cited reasons
and that their services will be terminated on 16
August 1996.10 They requested the respondent
PLDT for transfer to some vacant positions but their
requests were denied since all positions were
already filled up. Hence, on 16 August 1996,
respondent PLDT dismissed the four from
employment.
Issue: WON illegal dismissal is present in this case
Ruling: The Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of
Appeals all found that substantial evidence supports
the absence of illegal dismissal in the present case.
Article 283 of the Labor Code provides that an
employer may dismiss from work an employee by
reason of redundancy. The same provision also
states the procedural requirements for the validity
of the dismissal. It is clear that the foregoing
documentary evidence constituted substantial
evidence to support the findings of Labor Arbiter
Lustria and the NLRC that petitioners employment
was terminated by respondent PLDT due to a valid or
legal redundancy program since substantial evidence
merely refers to that amount of evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. The records show that
respondent PLDT had sufficiently established the
existence of redundancy in the position of
Switchman. It is evident from the foregoing facts
that respondent PLDTs utilization of high technology
equipment in its operation such as computers and
digital switches necessarily resulted in the reduction
of the demand for the services of a Switchman since
computers and digital switches can aptly perform
the function of several Switchmen. Indubitably, the
position of Switchman has become redundant. As to
whether Lazam was competent to testify on the
effects of respondent PLDTs adoption of new
technology vis--vis the petitioners position of
Switchman, the records show that Lazam was highly
qualified to do so. He is a licensed electrical engineer
and has been employed by the respondent PLDT
since 1971. He was a Senior Manager for Switching
Division in several offices of the respondent PLDT,
and had attended multiple training programs on
Electronic Switching Systems in progressive
countries. He was also a training instructor of
Switchmen in the respondents office. The fact that
respondent PLDT hired contractual employees after
implementing its redundancy program does not
necessarily negate the existence of redundancy. As
amply stated by the respondent PLDT, such hiring
was intended solely for winding up operations using
the old system. Since the respondent PLDT
determined that petitioners services are no longer
necessary either as a Switchman or in any other
position, and such determination was made in good
faith and in furtherance of its business interest, the
petitioners contention that he should be the last
switchman to be laid-off by reason of his
qualifications and outstanding work must fail.
51 CASERES vs UNIVERSAL ROBINA SUGAR MILLING
CORP. (URSUMCO) -Karen
Facts: URSUMCO is a corporation engaged in the
cane sugar milling business. Pedy Caseres started
working for respondent in 1989, while Andito Pael in
1993. At the start of their respective employments,
they were made to sign a Contract of Employment
for Specific Project or Undertaking. Petitioners'
contracts were renewed from time to time, until
May 1999 when they were informed that their
contracts will not be renewed anymore.
Petitioners contend that respondent's repeated
hiring of their services qualifies them to the status of
regular employees.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE
REGULAR EMPLOYEES OF RESPONDENTS?
HELD: No. The fact that petitioners were constantly
re-hired does not ipso facto establish that they
became regular employees. Their respective
contracts with respondent show that there were
intervals in their employment. In
petitioner Caseres's case, while his employment
lasted from August 1989 to May 1999, the duration
of his employment ranged from one day to several
months at a time, and such successive employments
were not continuous. With regard to petitioner Pael,
his employment never lasted for more than a month
at a time. These support the conclusion that they
were indeed project employees, and since their work
depended on the availability of such contracts or
projects, necessarily the employment of
respondents work force was not permanent but co-
terminous with the projects to which they were
assigned and from whose payrolls they were paid. As
ruled in Palomares v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[18] it would be extremely burdensome
for their employer to retain them as
permanent employees and pay them wages even if
there were no projects to work on.
Moreover, even if petitioners were repeatedly and
successively re-hired, still it did not qualify them as
regular employees, as length of service is not the
controlling determinant of the employment tenure
of a project employee, but whether the employment
has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking,
its completion has been determined at the time of
the engagement of the employee. Further, the
proviso in Article 280, stating that an employee who
has rendered service for at least one (1) year shall be
considered a regular employee, pertains to
casual employees and not to project employees.
52. PIER 8 ARRASTRE & STEVEDORING SERVICES,
INC. and/ or ELIODORO C. CRUZ- versus -JEFF B.
BOCLOT, G.R. No. 173849, September 28, 2007-
CHRISTAL
Facts: Boclot worked on and off as a stevedore at
PASSI. He only worked when there were other
employees who could not report for work. He
worked for an uncontinuos period in PASSi which
totaled 228.5 days. He argued that he was a casual
worker since he started working at PASSI. He argued
thathe was supposed to be a regular employee
according to the CBA which states: The Company
agrees to convert to regular status all incumbent
probationary or casual employees and workers in
the Company who have served the Company for an
accumulated service term of employment of not less
than six (6) months from his original date of hiring.
Issue: Whether or not he has attained regular
status?
Ruling: Under the CBA, he qualifies as a regular
employee The Supreme Court still finds respondent
to be a regular employee on the basis of pertinent
provisions under the CBA between PASSI and its
Workers union, wherein it was stated that it agrees
to convert to regular status all incumbent
probationary or casual employees and workers in
the Company who have served the Company for an
accumulated service term of employment of not less
than six (6) months from his original date of hiring.
Respondent assents that he is not a member of the
union, as he was not recognized by PASSI as its
regular employee, but this Court notes that PASSI
adopts a union-shop agreement, culling from Article
II of its CBA. Under a union-shop agreement,
although nonmembers may be hired, an employee is
required to become a union member after a certain
period, in order to retain employment. This
requirement applies to present and future
employees. The same article of the CBA stipulates
that employment in PASSI cannot be obtained
without prior membership in the union. Hence,
applying the foregoing provisions of the CBA,
respondent should be considered a regular
employee after six months of accumulated service.
Having rendered 228.5 days, or eight months of
service to petitioners since 1999, then respondent is
entitled to regularization by virtue of the said CBA
provisions.
Note: if there was no such stipulation in the CBA
agreement, he would not have been considered a
regular employee under the Labor Code. Although
his work was necessary and desirable, he was a mere
reliever. He cannot also be a casual employee turned
regular since he did not work for at least a year ( he
only worked for 228.5 days.)
53. Pacquing et. al. vs. Coca-Cola Phils. (R-U,
Glenna)
Facts:Petitioners were part of a complement of
three personnel comprised of a driver, a salesman
and a regular route helper, for every delivery truck.
They worked exclusively at respondent's plants, sales
offices, and company premises. On October 22,
1996, petitioners filed a Complaint against
respondent for unfair labor practice and illegal
dismissal with claims for regularization, recovery of
benefits under the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA), moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees. In their Position Paper, petitioners alleged that
they should be declared regular employees of
respondent since the nature of their work as
cargadores-pahinantes was necessary or desirable to
respondent's usual business and was directly related
to respondent's business and trade. In its Position
Paper, respondent denied liability to petitioners and
countered that petitioners were temporary workers
who were engaged for a five-month period to act as
substitutes for an absent regular employee.
Issue: Whether petitioners are regular employees.
Applying the principle stare decisis et non quieta
movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb
what has been settled), SC applied the ruling in
Magsalin v. National Organization of Working Men
to this case.
Held: The basic law on the case is Article 280, now
295 (LCP).
In determining whether an employment should be
considered regular or non-regular, the applicable
test is the reasonable connection between the
particular activity performed by the employee in
relation to the usual business or trade of the
employer. The standard, supplied by the law itself, is
whether the work undertaken is necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer, a fact that can be assessed by looking into
the nature of the services rendered and its relation
to the general scheme under which the business or
trade is pursued in the usual course. It is
distinguished from a specific undertaking that is
divorced from the normal activities required in
carrying on the particular business or trade.
But, although the work to be performed is only for a
specific project or seasonal, where a person thus
engaged has been performing the job for at least
one year, even if the performance is not continuous
or is merely intermittent, the law deems the
repeated and continuing need for its performance as
being sufficient to indicate the necessity or
desirability of that activity to the business or trade of
the employer. The employment of such person is
also then deemed to be regular with respect to such
activity and while such activity exists.
The argument of petitioner that its usual business or
trade is softdrink manufacturing and that the work
assigned to respondent workers as sales route
helpers so involves merely post production
activities, one which is not indispensable in the
manufacture of its products, scarcely can be
persuasive. If, as so argued by petitioner company,
only those whose work are directly involved in the
production of softdrinks may be held performing
functions necessary and desirable in its usual
business or trade, there would have then been no
need for it to even maintain regular truck sales route
helpers. The nature of the work performed must be
viewed from a perspective of the business or trade
in its entirety and not on a confined scope.
The repeated rehiring of respondent workers and
the continuing need for their services clearly attest
to the necessity or desirability of their services in the
regular conduct of the business or trade of
petitioner company.
Being regular employees of respondent, petitioners
are entitled to security of tenure, as provided in
Article 279 of the Labor Code, and may only be
terminated from employment due to just or
authorized causes. Because respondent failed to
show such cause, the petitioners are deemed
illegally dismissed and therefore entitled to back
wages and reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges.

54. Cocomangas Hotel Beach Resort and/or Susan
Munro v. Federico Visca, Johnny Baredo,
Ronald Tibus, Richard Visca, and Raffie Visca- KATE
Facts: Visca et. al., who worked for the maintenance
and repairs of the petitioner, filed complaint against
Cocomangas for illegal dismissal. They alleged that
they were regular employees, but were eventually
informed by Cocomangas not to report for work
because they caused irritation and annoyance to
resorts guests, and budgetary constraints.
Eventually, they found out that Cocomangas hired
new employees as their replacement.
Cocomangas alleged that there was no employer-
employee relationship, and that Visca was an
independent contractor who was called upon from
time to time when repairs were needed.
Labor Arbiter ruled that Visca was an independent
contractor, and that the other respondents were
hired by him; and that there was no illegal dismissal
but rather completion of projects; and that
respondents were project workers, not regular
employees.
NLRC affirmed the decision. CA reversed.
Issue:
Whether or not Visca et. al. were regular employees.
Held: Yes, Visca et. al. were regular employees.
A project employee is one whose employment has
been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the
completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee or where the work or service to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
Before an employee hired on a per-project basis can
be dismissed, a report must be made to the nearest
employment office, of the termination of the
services of the workers every time completes a
project, pursuant to Policy Instruction No. 20.
Visca cannot be classified as project employees,
since they worked continuously for Cocomangas
from three to twelve years without any mention of a
project to which they were specifically assigned.
While they had designations as foreman, carpenter
and mason, they performed work other than
carpentry or masonry. They were tasked with the
maintenance and repair of the furniture, motor
boats, cottages, and windbreakers and other resort
facilities. There was likewise no evidence of the
project employment contracts covering Viscas
alleged periods of employment. More importantly,
there is no evidence that Cocomangas reported the
termination of Viscas supposed project employment
to the DOLE as project employees. Department
Order No. 19, as well as the old Policy Instructions
No. 20, requires employers to submit a report of an
employees termination to the nearest public
employment office every time his employment is
terminated due to a completion of a project.
Cocomangas failure to file termination reports is an
indication that Visca et. al. were not project
employees but regular employees.
An employment ceases to be coterminous with
specific projects when the employee is continuously
rehired due to the demands of employers business
and re-engaged for many more projects without
interruption. Once a project or work pool employee
has been: (1) continuously, as opposed to
intermittently, rehired by the same employer for the
same tasks or nature of tasks; and (2) these tasks are
vital, necessary and indispensable to the usual
business or trade of the employer, then the
employee must be deemed a regular employee,
pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code and
jurisprudence.
55. Price et. al. vs. Innodata, G.R. No. 178505- Garry
FACTS: Respondent Innodata Philippines,
Inc./Innodata Corporation (INNODATA) was a
domestic corporation engaged in the data encoding
and data conversion business. It employed encoders,
indexers, formatters, programmers, quality/quantity
staff, and others, to maintain its business and
accomplish the job orders of its clients. INNODATA
had since ceased operations due to business losses
in June 2002. Petitioners herein were employed as
formatters by INNODATA. The parties executed an
employment contract denominated as a "Contract of
Employment for a Fixed Period," stipulating that the
contract shall be for a period of one year. During
their employment as formatters, petitioners were
assigned to handle jobs for various clients. Once they
finished the job for one client, they were
immediately assigned to do a new job for another
client. On 16 February 2000, the HRAD Manager of
INNODATA wrote petitioners informing them of their
last day of work. INNODATA averred that petitioners
employment already ceased due to the end of their
contract.
Petitioners filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and
damages against respondents. Petitioners claimed
that they should be considered regular employees
since their positions as formatters were necessary
and desirable to the usual business of INNODATA as
an encoding, conversion and data processing
company. Petitioners finally argued that they could
not be considered project employees considering
that their employment was not coterminous with
any project or undertaking, the termination of which
was predetermined.
Respondents asserted that petitioners were not
illegally dismissed, for their employment was
terminated due to the expiration of their terms of
employment. Petitioners contracts of employment
with INNODATA were for a limited period only.
There being no illegal dismissal, respondents
likewise maintained that petitioners were not
entitled to reinstatement and backwages.
ISSUE: Is the nature of employment of petitioners
regular or fixed?
RULING: Regular. The following employees are
accorded regular status: (1) those who are engaged
to perform activities which are necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer, regardless of the length of their
employment; and (2) those who were initially hired
as casual employees, but have rendered at least one
year of service, whether continuous or broken, with
respect to the activity in which they are employed.
Undoubtedly, petitioners belong to the first type of
regular employees. Under Article 280 of the Labor
Code, the applicable test to determine whether an
employment should be considered regular or non-
regular is the reasonable connection between the
particular activity performed by the employee in
relation to the usual business or trade of the
employer.
In the case at bar, petitioners were employed by
INNODATA as formatters. The primary business of
INNODATA is data encoding, and the formatting of
the data entered into the computers is an essential
part of the process of data encoding. Formatting
organizes the data encoded, making it easier to
understand for the clients and/or the intended end
users thereof. Undeniably, the work performed by
petitioners was necessary or desirable in the
business or trade of INNODATA.
After considering petitioners contracts in their
entirety, as well as the circumstances surrounding
petitioners employment at INNODATA, the Court is
convinced that the terms fixed therein were meant
only to circumvent petitioners right to security of
tenure and are, therefore, invalid.
The contracts of employment submitted by
respondents are highly suspect for not only being
ambiguous, but also for appearing to be tampered
with.
56. Agusan Del Norte Electric Cooperative vs.
Cagampang ,G.R. No. 167627, October 10, 2008 -
SAL
Facts: Joel Cagampang and Glenn Garzon started
working as linemen for Agusan del Norte Electric
Cooperative (ANECO) in 1990, under an employment
contract for a period not exceeding 3 months. They
were required to work 8 hours a day and sometimes
on Sundays, with a daily salary of P122.00. When the
contract expired, the two were laid-off for one to
five days and then ordered to report back to work
but on the basis of job orders. Their job orders, with
employment periods of about 3 months each, were
renewed several times, until 1998 & 1999 when such
contracts were no longer renewed, resulting in their
loss of employment. In 2001, they filed a case for
illegal dismissal against ANECO, and prayed for
payment of backwages, salary differential,
allowances, premium for alleged work during
holidays and rest days, service incentive leave, and
separation pay. The Labor Arbiter (LA) declared the
dismissal illegal and ordered ANECO to pay their
money claims. The NLRC set aside the LA decision
except the portions granting service incentive leave
pay; attorney's fees, fixed at ten percent (10%) of
the total money award to both respondents; and
salary differential to Garzon. The CA reinstated the
LA decision.
ISSUE: WON the respondents were illegally
dismissed
RULING: Yes. The test to determine whether
employment is regular or not is the reasonable
connection between the particular activity
performed by the employee in relation to the usual
business or trade of the employer. Also, if the
employee has been performing the job for at least
one year, even if the performance is not continuous
or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated
and continuing need for its performance as sufficient
evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability of
that activity to the business. Thus, we held that
where the employment of project employees is
extended long after the supposed project has been
finished, the employees are removed from the scope
of project employees and are considered regular
employees.
Respondents in the present case being regular
employees, ANECO as the employer had the burden
of proof to show that the respondents' termination
was for a just cause. Unfortunately, however, what
petitioners did was merely to refuse, without
justifiable reason, to renew respondents' work
contracts for the performance of what would
otherwise be regular jobs in relation to the trade or
business of the former. Such conduct dismally falls
short of the requirements of our labor laws
regarding dismissals. No twin notices of termination
were issued to the employees; hence, the employer
did not observe due process in dismissing them from
their employment. Their dismissals were patently
illegal.
57. G.R. No. 183250 March 10, 2010
WILLIAM UY CONSTRUCTION CORP. and/or
TERESITA UY and WILLIAM UY, Petitioners,
vs. JORGE R. TRINIDAD, Respondent.- CEL
Facts: Respondent Jorge R. Trinidad filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal and unpaid benefits against
petitioner company claiming that he had been
working with the latter company for 16 years since
1988 as driver of its service vehicle, dump truck, and
transit mixer. He had signed several employment
contracts which identified him as a project employee
although he had always been assigned to work on
one project after another with some intervals.
Respondent further alleged that petitioner company
terminated him from work after it shut down
operations because of lack of projects. He learned
later, however, that although it opened up a project
in Batangas, it did not hire him back for that project.
Petitioner company countered that it was in the
construction business and that by the nature of such
business, it had to hire and engage the services of
project construction workers, including respondent
Trinidad, whose employments had to be co-
terminous with the completion of specific company
projects. For this reason, every time the company
employed Trinidad, he had to execute an
employment contract with it, called Appointment as
Project Worker. Petitioner company stressed that
employment intervals or gaps were inherent in the
construction business. Petitioner company
submitted an establishment termination report to
DOLE. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint.
The Labor Arbiter, however, ordered petitioner
company to pay Trinidad P1,500.00 in unpaid service
incentive leave, taking into consideration the three-
year prescriptive period for money claims, holding
that, since Trinidad was a project employee and
since his company submitted the appropriate
establishment termination report to DOLE, his loss of
work cannot be regarded as unjust dismissal. NLRC
affirmed the Labor Arbiters ruling. The CA reversed
the NLRCs findings.
Issue: Does petitioner companys repeated rehiring
of respondent as project employee makes him a
regular employee?
Ruling: No. The test for distinguishing a project
employee from a regular employee is whether or
not he has been assigned to carry out a specific
project or undertaking, with the duration and scope
of his engagement specified at the time his service is
contracted. Here, it is not disputed that petitioner
company contracted respondent Trinidads service
by specific projects with the duration of his work
clearly set out in his employment contracts. He
remained a project employee regardless of the
number of years and the various projects he worked
for the company. Generally, length of service
provides a fair yardstick for determining when an
employee initially hired on a temporary basis
becomes a permanent one, entitled to the security
and benefits of regularization. But this standard will
not be fair, if applied to the construction industry,
simply because construction firms cannot guarantee
work and funding for its payrolls beyond the life of
each project. And getting projects is not a matter of
course. Construction companies have no control
over the decisions and resources of project
proponents or owners. There is no construction
company that does not wish it has such control but
the reality, understood by construction workers, is
that work depended on decisions and developments
over which construction companies have no say.
Respondent Trinidads series of employments with
petitioner company were co-terminous with its
projects. When its Boni Serrano-Katipunan
Interchange Project was finished, Trinidads
employment ended with it. He was not dismissed.
His employment contract simply ended with the
project for which he had signed up. His employment
history belies the claim that he continuously worked
for the company. Intervals or gaps separated one
contract from another. Petitioner company needed
only to show the last status of Trinidads
employment, namely, that of a project employee
under a contract that had ended and the companys
compliance with the reporting requirement for the
termination of that employment. Indeed, both the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC were satisfied that the
fact of petitioner companys compliance with DOLE
Order 19 had been proved in this case. Court
REINSTATES the decision of NLRC.
58. DACUITAL, ET AL vs. LM CAMUS ENGINEERING
CORP- Toni
Facts: L.M. Camus Engineering Corporation (LMCEC)
is a domestic corporation engaged in construction,
engineering, and air-conditioning business and Luis
M. Camus (Camus) is the company president. Judy O.
Dacuital (Dacuital), Eugenio L. Mondano, Jr., Joseph
Galer (Galer), Mariano Morales, Roberto Ruance
(Ruance), Joseph Porcadilla, Raulito Palad (Palad),
Ricardo Digamon (Digamon), Nonito Prisco, Eulogio
M. Tutor, Melvin Pepito, Helyto N. Reyes (Reyes),
Randolf C. Baludo (Baludo), Alberto Epondol, Rodelo
A. Susper, Evaristo Vigori, Jonathan P. Ayaay, Felipe
Erilla, Aris A. Garcia (Aris), Roy A. Garcia (Roy), and
Restituto Tapanan (Tapanan) were hired by LMCEC
as welder, tinsmith, pipefitter, and mechanical
employees.
During the months of January, February and March
2001, Dacuital, et al were required by LMCEC to
surrender their identification cards and ATM cards
and were ordered to execute contracts of
employment. Most of the petitioners did not comply
with the directive as they believed that it was only
LMs strategy to get rid of petitioners regular status
since they would become new employees
disregarding their length of service. Petitioners were
later dismissed from employment.
The complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment
of monetary benefits was filed and the employees
alleged that they were illegally dismissed from
employment and that their employer failed to pay
them their holiday pay, premium pay for holiday,
rest day, service incentive leave pay, and 13th
month pay during the existence and duration of their
employment. They also averred that they were not
provided with sick and vacation leaves.
59. Millennium Erectors Corp v Magallanes G.R. No.
184362 (2010)-JAY
Issue: Whether respondent has attained the status
of a regular employee?
Facts: Respondent started working in 1988 as a
utility man for Millennium Erectors Corporation
(petitioner) and Kenneth Construction
Corporation. He was assigned to different
construction projects undertaken by petitioner in
Metro Manila, the last of which was for a building in
Libis, Quezon City. In July of 2004 he was told not to
report for work anymore allegedly due to old age,
prompting him to file on August 6, 2004 an illegal
dismissal complaint before the Labor Arbiter.
Petitioner claimed that respondent was a project
employee whom it hired for a building project in
Libis on January 30, 2003, to prove which it
submitted the employment contract signed by
him; that on August 3, 2004, respondents services
were terminated as the project was nearing
completion; and he was given financial assistance in
the amount of P2,000, for which he signed a
quitclaim and waiver. Petitioner likewise submitted a
termination report to the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) dated August 17, 2004.
Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner and
dismissed the complaint, holding that respondent
knew of the nature of his employment as a project
employee. NLRC set aside the Arbiters decision
holding that respondent was a regular employee,
not a project employee. CA affirmed. MR was
denied, hence this case.
Ruling: The Court finds that, indeed, respondent was
a regular, not a project employee.
Saberola v. Suarez reiterates the well-settled
definition of project employee, viz:
A project employee is one whose "employment has
been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the
completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee or where the work or service to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season."
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And Equipment Technical Services v. Court of
Appeals emphasizes the difference between a
regular employee and a project employee:
As the Court has consistently held, the service
of project employees are coterminus with the
project and may be terminated upon the end or
completion of that project or project phase for
which they were hired. Regular employees, in
contrast, enjoy security of tenure and are entitled to
hold on to their work or position until their services
are terminated by any of the modes recognized
under the Labor Code. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Petitioners various payrolls dating as early as 2001
show that respondent had been employed by it. As
aptly observed by the appellate court, these
documents, rather than sustaining petitioners
argument, only serve to support respondents
contention that he had been employed in various
projects, if not for 16 years, at the very least two
years prior to his dismissal.
Assuming arguendo that petitioner hired
respondent initially on a per project basis, his
continued rehiring, as shown by the sample payrolls
converted his status to that of a regular
employee. Following Cocomangas Beach Hotel
Resort v. Visca, the repeated and continuing need
for respondents services is sufficient evidence of the
necessity, if not indispensability, of his services to
petitioner's business and, as a regular employee, he
could only be dismissed from employment for a just
or authorized cause.
60.EXODUS VS BISCOCHO- Julius
Facts: Exodus is a duly licensed labor contractor for
the painting of residential houses, condominium
units and commercial buildings. Exodus obtained
from Dutch Boy a contract for the painting of the
Imperial Sky Garden. Dutch Boy awarded another
contract to Exodus for the painting of Pacific Plaza
Towers. Exodus hired Biscocho, Pereda, Mariano and
were assigned at the Imperial Sky Garden, Bellita
was assigned to work at the house of Yap in Ayala,
Alabang,, and Bobillo, who, together with the four,
was assigned Pacific Plaza Towers. Later, the five
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-
payment of holiday pay, service incentive leave pay,
13th month pay, and night shift differential pay.
Exodus denied the allegations and contended that
Gregorio absented himself from work and applied as
a painter with SAEI-EEI which is the general building
contractor of Pacific plaza Towers. Since then, he
never reported back to work; Guillermo absented
himself from work without leave. When he reported
for work the following day, he was reprimanded for
being aabsent without leave and thereafter was
unheard of after until the filing of this complaint,
and Fernando, Ferdinand, and Miguel were caught
eating during working hours for which they were
reprimanded by their foreman. Since then, they no
longer reported for work.
Issue: WON the respondents are non-project
employees.
Ruling: there are two types of employees in the
construction industry. The first is project employees
or those employed in connection with a particular
construction project and such employment is
coterminous with each project to which they were
assigned. The second is non-project employee or
those employed without reference to any project.
The second category is where respondents are
classified. As such, they are regular employees. It is
clear that when one project is completed,
respondents were automatically transferred to
another project.
61. Leyte Geothermal vs PNOC-Juneey
FACTS: Respondent is a GOCC while petitioner is a
legitimate labor organization. Among respondents
geothermal projects is the Leyte Geothermal Power
Project located at the Greater Tongonan Geothermal
Reservation in Leyte. Thus, the respondent hired and
employed hundreds of employees on a contractual
basis, whereby, their employment was only good up
to the completion or termination of the project and
would automatically expire upon the completion of
such project. Majority of the employees hired by
respondent in its Leyte Geothermal Power Projects
had become members of petitioner. In view of that
circumstance, the petitioner demands from the
respondent for recognition of it as the collective
bargaining agent of said employees and for a CBA
negotiation with it. However, the respondent did not
heed such demands of the petitioner. Sometime in
1998 when the project was about to be completed,
the [respondent] proceeded to serve Notices of
Termination of Employment upon the employees
who are members of the petitioner. On December
28, 1998, the petitioner filed a Notice of Strike with
DOLE against the [respondent] on the ground of
purported commission by the latter of unfair labor
practice for refusal to bargain collectively, union
busting and mass termination. On the same day,
the petitioner declared a strike and staged such
strike. Secretary of Labor intervened and ordered all
workers to return to work. However, petitioner did
not abide. NLRC: ruled that the employees are
PROJECT EMPLOYEES, and the strike as ILLEGAL
Petitioner Union contends that its officers and
members performed activities that were usually
necessary and desirable to respondents usual
business.
ISSUE: WON they are project employees
HELD: They are PROJECT EMPLOYEES
By entering into such a contract, an employee is
deemed to understand that his employment is
coterminous with the project. He may not expect to
be employed continuously beyond the completion of
the project. It is of judicial notice that project
employees engaged for manual services or those for
special skills like those of carpenters or masons, are,
as a rule, unschooled. However, this fact alone is not
a valid reason for bestowing special treatment on
them or for invalidating a contract of employment.
Project employment contracts are not lopsided
agreements in favor of only one party thereto. The
employers interest is equally important as that of
the employees for theirs is the interest that propels
economic activity. While it may be true that it is the
employer who drafts project employment contracts
with its business interest as overriding consideration,
such contracts do not, of necessity, prejudice the
employee. Neither is the employee left helpless by a
prejudicial employment contract. After all, under the
law, the interest of the worker is paramount. Unions
own admission, both parties had executed the
contracts freely and voluntarily without force, duress
or acts tending to vitiate the worker[s] consent.
Thus, we see no reason not to honor and give effect
to the terms and conditions stipulated therein. The
test to determine whether an individual is a project
employee lies in setting a fixed period of
employment involving a specific undertaking which
completion or termination has been determined at
the time of the particular employees engagement.
62. St. Paul College Quezon City vs Ancheta-
Mamugay
Facts: Remigio Ancheta was a full-time
probationary teacher in the School Year 1996-1997
which was renewed in the following SY 1997-1998.
His wife, Cynthia was hired as a part time teacher of
the Mass Communication Department in the second
semester of SY 1996-1997 and her appointment was
renewed for SY 1997-1998. On February 13, 1998,
respondents signified their intentions to renew their
contracts for SY 1998-1999.
They were later sent two letters informing them that
the school is extending to them new contracts for SY
1998-1999. A letter was written to Remigio Michael,
enumerating the departmental and instructional
policies that spouses failed to comply with, such as
the late submission of final grades, failure to submit
final test questions to the Program Coordinator, the
giving of tests in the essay form instead of the
multiple choice format as mandated by the school,
failure to report to work on time; the high number of
students with failing grades in the classes that they
handled, and not being open to suggestions to
improve themselves as teachers, among others. Sr.
Bernadette (Department Coordinator) endorsed the
immediate termination of the teaching services of
the spouses.
Respondent spouses were given an opportunity to
comment on the letter-recommendation.
Subsequently however, they received their
respective letters of termination. Thus, spouses filed
a Complaint for illegal dismissal. St. Paul contends
that it did not extend the contracts of respondent
spouses. Although, it has sent letters to the spouses
informing them that the school is extending to them
new contracts for the coming school year, the letters
do not constitute as actual employment contracts
but merely offers to teach on the said school year.
Issue: Were the spouses Anchetta illegally
dismissed?
Ruling: No. It is important that the contract of
probationary employment specify the period or term
of its effectivity.
Section 91 of the Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools, states that:
Section 91.Employment Contract. Every contract
of employment shall specify the designation,
qualification, salary rate, the period and nature of
service and its date of effectivity, and such other
terms and condition of employment as may be
consistent with laws and rules, regulations and
standards of the school. A copy of the contract shall
be furnished the personnel concerned.
The failure to stipulate its precise duration could
lead to the inference that the contract is binding for
the full three-year probationary period. Therefore,
the letters sent by petitioner Sr. Bernadette, which
were void of any specifics cannot be considered as
contracts. The closest they can resemble to are that
of informal correspondence among the said
individuals. As such, petitioner school has the right
not to renew the contracts of the respondents, the
old ones having been expired at the end of their
terms.
Even assuming that the employment contracts
between the school and the spouses were renewed,
there was a valid and just cause for their dismissal.
The Labor Code commands that before an employer
may legally dismiss an employee from the service,
the requirement of substantial and procedural due
process must be complied with. Under the
requirement of substantial due process, the grounds
for termination of employment must be based on
just or authorized causes.
The plain admissions of the charges against them
were the considerations taken into account by the
petitioner school in their decision not to renew the
respondent spouses' employment contracts. This is a
right of the school that is mandated by law and
jurisprudence. It is the prerogative of the school to
set high standards of efficiency for its teachers since
quality education is a mandate of the Constitution.
As long as the standards fixed are reasonable and
not arbitrary, courts are not at liberty to set them
aside.
Schools cannot be required to adopt standards
which barely satisfy criteria set for government
recognition. The same academic freedom grants the
school the autonomy to decide for itself the terms
and conditions for hiring its teacher, subject of
course to the overarching limitations under the
Labor Code. The authority to hire is likewise covered
and protected by its management prerogative the
right of an employer to regulate all aspects of
employment, such as hiring, the freedom to
prescribe work assignments, working methods,
process to be followed, regulation regarding transfer
of employees, supervision of their work, lay-off and
discipline, and dismissal and recall of workers.
63. Lynvil Fishing Enterprises vs. Ariola, G.R. No.
181974, February 1, 2012-June
Facts: Petitioner Lynvil Fishing Enterprises, Inc.
(Lynvil) is engaged in deep-sea fishing. Respondents
services were engaged in various capacities: Andres
G. Ariola, captain; Jessie D. Alcovendas, chief mate;
Jimmy B. Calinao, chief engineer; Ismael G. Nubla,
cook; Elorde Baez, oiler; and Leopoldo G. Sebullen,
bodegero.
On Aug. 1, 1998, Lynvil received a report from
Ramonito Clarido, one of its employees, that on July
31, 1998, he witnessed that while on board the
company vessel Analyn VIII, respondents conspired
with one another and stole eight tubs of pampano
and tangigue fish and delivered them to another
vessel.
Petitioner filed a criminal complaint against
respondents before the office of the City Prosecutor
of Malabon City which found probable cause for
indictment of respondents for the crime of qualified
theft. Relying on the finding and Nasipit Lumber
Company v. NLRC, 257 Phil. 937 (1989), Lynvil
asserted there was sufficient basis for valid
termination of employment of respondents based
on serious misconduct and/or loss of trust and
confidence.
Issue: 1) WON Ariola et.al were illegally dismissed?
2) WON Lynvil complied with the procedural
requirement of due process in Section 2, Rule XXIII,
Book V of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code in
its dismissal of Ariola et. al?
Ruling: 1)No. The Court ruled that there was valid
cause for respondents dismissal. In illegal dismissal
cases, the employer bears the burden of proving
that the termination was for a valid or authorized
cause.
Just cause is required for a valid dismissal. The Labor
Code provides that an employer may terminate an
employment based on fraud or willful breach of the
trust reposed on the employee. Such breach is
considered willful if it is done intentionally,
knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse,
as distinguished from an act done carelessly,
thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It must
also be based on substantial evidence and not on the
employers whims or caprices or suspicions
otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at
the mercy of the employer. Loss of confidence must
not be indiscriminately used as a shield by the
employer against a claim that the dismissal of an
employee was arbitrary. And, in order to constitute a
just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must
be work-related and shows that the employee
concerned is unfit to continue working for the
employer. In addition, loss of confidence as a just
cause for termination of employment is premised on
the fact that the employee concerned holds a
position of responsibility, trust and confidence or
that the employee concerned is entrusted with
confidence with respect to delicate matters, such as
the handling or care and protection of the property
and assets of the employer. The betrayal of this trust
is the essence of the offense for which an employee
is penalized.
Breach of trust is present in this case.(in arriving at
this conclusion, the court took into account the
positive and clear narration of facts of the three
witnesses to the commission of qualified theft.)
2.) No. It is required that the employer furnish the
employee with two written notices: (1) a written
notice served on the employee specifying the ground
or grounds for termination, and giving to said
employee reasonable opportunity within which to
explain his side; and (2) a written notice of
termination served on the employee indicating that
upon due consideration of all the circumstances,
grounds have been established to justify his
termination.
From the records, there was only one written notice
which required respondents to explain within five (5)
days why they should not be dismissed from the
service. Alcovendas was the only one who signed the
receipt of the notice. The others, as claimed by
Lynvil, refused to sign. The other employees argue
that no notice was given to them. Despite the
inconsistencies, what is clear is that no final written
notice or notices of termination were sent to the
employees.
The twin requirements of notice and hearing
constitute the elements of due process in cases of
employee's dismissal. The requirement of notice is
intended to inform the employee concerned of the
employer's intent to dismiss and the reason for the
proposed dismissal. Upon the other hand, the
requirement of hearing affords the employee an
opportunity to answer his employer's charges
against him and accordingly, to defend himself
therefrom before dismissal is effected. Obviously,
the second written notice, as indispensable as the
first, is intended to ensure the observance of due
process.
Applying the rule to the facts at hand, the Court
granted a monetary award of P50,000.00 as nominal
damages, pursuant to the fresh ruling of the Court
in Culili v. Eastern Communication Philippines,
Inc. Due to the failure of Lynvil to follow the
procedural requirement of two-notice rule, nominal
damages are due to respondents despite their
dismissal for just cause.
64. D.M. Consunji Inc. vs. Jamin, G.R. No. 192514,
April 18, 2012 (citing Maraguinot)- krizza
Facts: On December 17, 1968, petitioner D.M.
Consunji, Inc. (DMCI), a construction company, hired
respondent Estelito L. Jamin as a laborer. Sometime
in 1975, Jamin became a helper carpenter. Since his
initial hiring, Jamins employment contract had been
renewed a number of times. On March 20, 1999, his
work at DMCI was terminated due to the completion
of the SM Manila project. This termination marked
the end of his employment with DMCI as he was not
rehired again. On April 5, 1999, Jamin filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal, with several money
claims (including attorneys fees), against DMCI and
its President/General Manager, David M. Consunji.
Jamin alleged that DMCI terminated his employment
without a just and authorized cause at a time when
he was already 55 years old and had no independent
source of livelihood. He claimed that he rendered
service to DMCI continuously for almost 31 years. In
addition to the schedule of projects (where he was
assigned) submitted by DMCI to the labor arbiter, he
alleged that he worked for three other DMCI
projects: Twin Towers, Ritz Towers, from July 29,
1980 to June 12, 1982; New Istana Project, B.S.B.
Brunei, from June 23, 1982 to February 16, 1984;
and New Istana Project, B.S.B. Brunei, from January
24, 1986 to May 25, 1986. DMCI denied liability. It
argued that it hired Jamin on a project-to-project
basis, from the start of his engagement in 1968 until
the completion of its SM Manila project on March
20, 1999 where Jamin last worked. With the
completion of the project, it terminated Jamins
employment. It alleged that it submitted a report to
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
everytime it terminated Jamins services.
ISSUE: Whether there was violation of security of
tenure?
RULING: YES. Jamin worked for DMCI for almost 31
years, initially as a laborer and, for the most part, as
a carpenter. Through all those years, DMCI treated
him as a project employee, so that he never
obtained tenure. On the surface and at first glance,
DMCI appears to be correct. Jamin entered into a
contract of employment (actually an appointment
paper to which he signified his conformity) with
DMCI either as a field worker, a temporary worker, a
casual employee, or a project employee every time
DMCI needed his services and a termination of
employment paper was served on him upon
completion of every project or phase of the project
where he worked. The CA pierced the cover of
Jamins project employment contract and declared
him a regular employee who had been dismissed
without cause and without notice. To reiterate, the
CAs findings were based on: (1) Jamins repeated
and successive engagements in DMCIs construction
projects, and (2) Jamins performance of activities
necessary or desirable in DMCIs usual trade or
business.
We reviewed Jamins employment contracts as the
CA did and we noted that while the contracts indeed
show that Jamin had been engaged as a project
employee, there was an almost unbroken string of
Jamins rehiring from December 17, 1968 up to the
termination of his employment on March 20, 1999.
While the history of Jamins employment (schedule
of projects) relied upon by DMCI shows a gap of
almost four years in his employment for the period
between July 28, 1980 (the supposed completion
date of the Midtown Plaza project) and June 13,
1984 (the start of the IRRI Dorm IV project), the gap
was caused by the companys omission of the three
projects.
Jamins employment history with DMCI stands out
for his continuous, repeated and successive rehiring
in the companys construction projects. In all the 38
projects where DMCI engaged Jamins services, the
tasks he performed as a carpenter were indisputably
necessary and desirable in DMCIs construction
business. He might not have been a member of a
work pool as DMCI insisted that it does not maintain
a work pool, but his continuous rehiring and the
nature of his work unmistakably made him a regular
employee. In Maraguinot, Jr. v. NLRC, the Court held
that once a project or work pool employee has been:
(1) continuously, as opposed to intermittently,
rehired by the same employer for the same tasks or
nature of tasks; and (2) these tasks are vital,
necessary and indispensable to the usual business or
trade of the employer, then the employee must be
deemed a regular employee.
65. ANTONIO E. UNICA vs. ANSCOR SWIRE SHIP
MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,February 12, 2014-
Duron
FACTS: Since the late 1980s, petitioner Antonio
Unica was employed by respondent Anscor Swire
Management Corp (a manning agency) under
various contracts. In his last contract, petitioner was
deployed for a period of 9 months, from January 29,
2000 to October 25, 2000. Since the vessel was at
sea, petitioner was only repatriated on November
14, 2000, or 20 days after the expiration of his
contract of employment. Petitioner claims that since
he was allowed to stay in the vessel for another 20
days, there was an implied renewal of his
employment contract. Hence, when he was
repatriated on November 14, 2000 without a valid
cause, he was illegally dismissed. Petitioner filed a
case against the respondent for illegal dismissal,
payment of retirement, disability and medical
benefits, separation and holiday pay. Respondent, in
its defense, argues that petitioner was hired for a
fixed period, the duration of which depends upon
the mutual agreement of the parties. Petitioners
employment was, therefore, co-terminus with the
term of his contract. Hence when he was
repatriated, the term of his contract was completed.
LA ruled in petitioner's favor. It held that since
petitioner was not repatriated at the expiration of
his contract on October 25 and was allowed to
continue working on board respondent's vessel until
November 14, his contract with respondent was
impliedly renewed for another 9 months.
NRLC affirmed LA's decision with modification. NLRC
ruled that the contract did not expire on October 25,
2000, but was impliedly extended for another nine
months. This is because it was only on November 14,
2000 when petitioner was told by respondent to
disembark because he would be repatriated. Since
there was an implied extension of the contract for
another nine months, petitioner is, therefore,
entitled to payment of the unexpired term of his
implied contract.
CA set aside the decision of the NLRC. The CA ruled
that there was no implied renewal of contract and
the 20 days extension was due to the fact that the
ship was still at sea.
ISSUE: WON there was an implied renewal of
Petitioner's contract of employment with
respondent
RULING: No implied renewal. Petitioner's late
disembarkation was not without valid reason (note:
employment contract ended on Oct. 25 2000,
disembarked on November 14 2000). Respondent
could not have disembarked petitioner on the date
of the termination of his employment contract as
the vessel was still in the middle of the sea. Clearly,
it was impossible for petitioner to safely disembark
immediately upon the expiration of his contract,
since he must disembark at a convenient port. Thus,
petitioner's stay in the vessel for another 20 days
should not be interpreted as an implied extension of
his contract. A seaman need not physically
disembark from a vessel at the expiration of his
employment contract to have such contract
considered terminated.
As a rule, seafarers are considered contractual
employees. Their employment is governed by the
contracts they sign everytime they are rehired and
their employment is terminated when the contract
expires. Their employment is contractually fixed for
a certain period of time.
Thus, when petitioner's contract ended on October
25, 2000, his employment is deemed automatically
terminated, there being no mutually-agreed renewal
or extension of the expired contract. However,
petitioner is entitled to be paid his wages after the
expiration of his contract until the vessel's arrival at
a convenient port. Section 19 of the Standard Terms
and Conditions Governing the Employment of
Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels is
clear on this point:
REPATRIATION. A. If the vessel is outside the
Philippines upon the expiration of the contract, the
seafarer shall continue his service on board until the
vessel's arrival at a convenient port and/or after
arrival of the replacement crew, provided that, in
any case, the continuance of such service shall not
exceed three months. The seafarer shall be entitled
to earned wages and benefits as provided in his
contract.
CA affirmed. Petition denied. Respondent is
DIRECTED to PAY petitioner his salary from October
26, 2000 until November 14, 2000.
66. IMASEN PHILIPPINE MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION v. ALCON-Karen
Facts: Imasen is a domestic corporation engaged in
the manufacture of auto seat-recliners and slide-
adjusters. It hired the respondents as manual
welders in 2001. On October 5, 2002, the
respondents reported for work on the second shift -
from 8:00 pm to 5:00 am of the following day. At
around 12:40 am, Cyrus A. Altiche, Imasen's security
guard on duty, went to patrol and inspect the
production plant's premises. When Altiche reached
Imasen's Press Area, he heard the sound of a
running industrial fan. Intending to turn the fan off,
he followed the sound that led him to the plant's
"Tool and Die" section. At the "Tool and Die" section,
Altiche saw the respondents having sexual
intercourse on the floor, using a piece of carton as
mattress. Altiche immediately went back to the
guard house and relayed what he saw to Ogana,
another security guard on duty. Ogana made a
follow-up inspection. Ogana went to the "Tool and
Die" section and saw several employees, including
the respondents, already leaving the area. He
noticed, however, that Alcon picked up the carton
that Altiche claimed the respondents used as
mattress during their sexual act, and returned it to
the place where the cartons were kept. Altiche then
submitted a handwritten report of the incident to
Imasen's Finance and Administration Manager.
On October 14, 2002, Imasen issued the respondents
separate interoffice memoranda informing them of
Altiche's report on the October 5, 2002 incident and
directing them to submit their individual
explanation. The respondents complied with the
directive; they claimed that they were merely
sleeping in the "Tool and Die" section at the time of
the incident. They also claimed that other employees
were near the area, making the commission of the
act charged impossible.
On October 22, 2002, Imasen issued the respondents
another interoffice memorandum directing them to
appear at the formal hearing of the administrative
charge against them. The hearing was conducted on
October 30, 2002, presided by a mediator and
attended by the representatives of Imasen, the
respondents, Altiche and Ogana. Altiche and Ogana
reiterated the narrations in Altiche's handwritten
report.
On December 4, 2002, Imasen issued the
respondents separate interoffice
memoranda terminating their services. It found the
respondents guilty of the act charged which it
considered as "gross misconduct contrary to the
existing policies, rules and regulations of the
company."
ISSUE: WON the act of engaging in sexual
intercourse inside company premises during work
hours is serious misconduct?
HELD: Yes. Misconduct is defined as an improper or
wrong conduct. It is a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden
act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and
implies wrongful intent and not mere error in
judgment. For misconduct or improper behavior to
be a just cause for dismissal, the following elements
must concur: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b)
it must relate to the performance of the employee's
duties showing that the employee has become unfit
to continue working for the employer; and (c) it
must have been performed with wrongful intent.
Sexual acts and intimacies between two consenting
adults belong, as a principled ideal, to the realm of
purely private relations. Whether aroused by lust or
inflamed by sincere affection, sexual acts should be
carried out at such place, time and circumstance
that, by the generally accepted norms of conduct,
will not offend public decency nor disturb the
generally held or accepted social morals. Under
these parameters, sexual acts between two
consenting adults do not have a place in the work
environment.
Indisputably, the respondents engaged in sexual
intercourse inside company premises and during
work hours. These circumstances, by themselves, are
already punishable misconduct. Added to these
considerations, however, is the implication that the
respondents did not only disregard company rules
but flaunted their disregard in a manner that could
reflect adversely on the status of ethics and morality
in the company.
Additionally, the respondents engaged in sexual
intercourse in an area where co-employees or other
company personnel have ready and available access.
The respondents likewise committed their act at a
time when the employees were expected to be and
had, in fact, been at their respective posts, and when
they themselves were supposed to be, as all other
employees had in fact been, working.
Under these factual premises and in the context of
legal parameters we discussed, we cannot help but
consider the respondents' misconduct to be of grave
and aggravated character so that the company was
justified in imposing the highest penalty available
dismissal. Their infraction transgressed the bounds
of socially and morally accepted human public
behavior, and at the same time showed brazen
disregard for the respect that their employer
expected of them as employees. By their
misconduct, the respondents, in effect, issued an
open invitation for others to commit the same
infraction, with like disregard for their employer's
rules, for the respect owed to their employer, and
for their co-employees' sensitivities. Taken together,
these considerations reveal a depraved disposition
that the Court cannot but consider as a valid cause
for dismissal.
67. Cheryll Santos Leus vs, St. Scholasticas College,
G.R. No. 187226, January 28, 2015- Christal
Facts: Cheryll was a non-teaching personnel at St.
Scholaticas College, a Catholic School. They adapt
the teaching of the Roman Catholic faith. Cheryll
became pregnant out of wedlock with her boyfriend.
The school dismissed her since under the 1992
Manual for Regulation of Public Schools (1992
MRPS), one of the grounds for dismissal is
disgraceful or immoral conduct.
Issue: May an employer dismiss an employee on the
ground that the latter got pregnant out of wedlock?
(What if the employer is a strict Catholic school that
imposes strict religious regulations, will this alone
validate the dismissal made to the erring employee?)
Ruling:No. Her pregnancy out of wedlock does not
constitute a valid ground to terminate her
employment.
Disgraceful conduct is viewed in two ways, the
public and secular view and religious view. Our a validation engineer for an agreed period of two
laws concern the first view. The jurisdiction of the
court is limited to the first view. Disgraceful conduct
per se will not amount to violation of the law the
conduct must affect or poses a danger to the
conditions of society, for example, the sanctity of
marriage, right to privacy and the like. If the Court
will entertain the second view then it would limit
religious freedom.
The Court cited Estrada vs. Escritur in the said case,
stating the following relevant explanation;
(1) if the father of the child is himself unmarried,
the woman is not ordinarily administratively liable
for disgraceful and immoral conduct. It may be a
not-so-ideal situation and may cause complications
for both mother and child but it does not give cause
for administrative sanction. There is no law which
penalizes an unmarried mother under those
circumstances by reason of her sexual conduct or
proscribes the consensual sexual activity between
two unmarried persons. Neither does the situation
contravene any fundamental state policy as
expressed in the Constitution, a document that
accommodates various belief systems irrespective of
dogmatic origins.
(2) if the father of the child born out of wedlock is
himself married to a woman other than the mother,
then there is a cause for administrative sanction
against either the father or the mother. In such a
case, the disgraceful and immoral conduct consists
of having extramarital relations with a married
person. The sanctity of marriage is constitutionally
recognized and likewise affirmed by our statutes as a
special contract of permanent union. Accordingly,
judicial employees have been sanctioned for their
dalliances with married persons or for their own
betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. In this case, it
was not disputed that, like respondent, the father of
her child was unmarried. Therefore, respondent
cannot be held liable for disgraceful and immoral
conduct simply because she gave birth to the child
Christian Jeon out of wedlock.
68. DEOFERIO VS. INTEL TECH PHILIPPINES (R-U,
Glenna)
Facts: Intel Technology Philippines, Inc. employed
Deoferio as a product quality and reliability
engineer. Intel assigned him to the United States as
years. However, Deoferio was repatriated to the
Philippines after being confined at Providence St.
Vincent Medical Center for major depression with
psychosis. In the Philippines, he worked as a product
engineer. Deoferio underwent a series of medical
and psychiatric treatment at Intels expense after his
confinement in the United States. He was diagnosed
by several physicians that suffering from mood
disorder, major depression and auditory
hallucination. After several consultations, Dr. Lee
issued a psychiatric report concluding and stating
that Deoferios psychotic symptoms are not curable
within a period of six months and will negatively
affect his work and social relation with his co-
workers. Pursuant to these findings, Intel issued
Deoferio a notice of termination on March 10, 2006.
Deoferio responded to his termination of
employment by filing a complaint for illegal dismissal
with prayer for money claims against respondents
Intel and Mike Wentling (respondents). He denied
that he ever had mental illness and insisted that he
satisfactorily performed his duties as product
engineer. He argued that Intel violated his statutory
right to procedural due process when it summarily
issued a notice of termination.
In defense, the respondents argued that Deoferios
dismissal was based on Dr. Lees certification that:
(1) His schizophrenia was not curable within a period
of six months even with proper medical treatment;
and (2) His continued employment would be
prejudicial to his and to the other employees health.
The respondents also insisted that Deoferios
presence at Intels premises would pose an actual
harm to his co-employees as shown by his previous
acts. On May 8, 2003, Deoferio emailed an Intel
employee with this message: All souls day back to
work Monday WW45.1 On January 18, 2005, he cut
the mouse cables, stepped on the keyboards, and
disarranged the desks of his co-employees. The
respondents also highlighted that Deoferio incurred
numerous absences from work due to his mental
condition, specifically, from January 31, 2002 until
February 28, 2002, from August 2002 until
September 2002, and from May 2003 until July 2003.
Deoferio also took an administrative leave with pay
from January 2005 until December 2005.
The respondents further asserted that the twin-
notice requirement in dismissals does not apply to
terminations under Article 284 of the Labor Code.
They emphasized that the Labor Codes
implementing rules (IRR) only requires a competent
public health authoritys certification to effectively
terminate the services of an employee.
Issues:
Whether Deoferio was suffering from schizophrenia
and whether his continued employment was
prejudicial to his health, as well as to the health of
his co-employees;
Whether the twin notice requirement in dismissals
applies to terminations due to disease; and
Whether Deoferio is entitled to salary differential,
backwages, separation pay, moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorneys fees.
Ruling:
Labor Arbiter ruled that Deoferio had been validly
dimissed.
NLRC affirmed LAs ruling.
CA affirmed NLRCs decision.
1. Yes.
The third element substantiates the contention that
the employee has indeed been suffering from a
disease that: (1) is prejudicial to his health as well as
to the health of his co-employees; and (2) cannot be
cured within a period of six months even with proper
medical treatment. Without the medical certificate,
there can be no authorized cause for the employees
dismissal. The absence of this element thus renders
the dismissal void and illegal.
The present case involves termination due to disease
an authorized cause for dismissal under Article 284
of the Labor Code. As substantive requirements, the
Labor Code and its IRR33 require the presence of the
following elements:
(1) An employer has been found to be suffering from
any disease.
(2) His continued employment is prohibited by law
or prejudicial to his health, as well as to the health of
his co-employees.
(3) A competent public health authority certifies that
the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it
cannot be cured within a period of six months even
with proper medical treatment. With respect to the
first and second elements, the Court liberally
construed the phrase "prejudicial to his health as
well as to the health of his co-employees" to mean
"prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-
employees." We did not limit the scope of this
phrase to contagious diseases for the reason that
this phrase is preceded by the phrase "any disease"
under Article 284 of the Labor Code, to wit:
Art. 284. Disease as ground for termination. An
employer may terminate the services of an
employee who has been found to be suffering from
any disease and whose continued employment is
prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as
well as to the health of his co-employees: Provided,
That he is paid separation pay equivalent to at least
one (1) month salary or to one-half (1/2) month
salary for every year of service, whichever is greater,
a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered
as one (1) whole year.
2. Yes. Section 2, Rule 1, Book VI of the IRR expressly
states that the employee should be afforded
procedural due process in all cases of dismissals.
3. Yes.
Intels violation of Deoferios right to statutory
procedural due process warrants the payment of
indemnity in the form of nominal damages. In Jaka
Food Processing Corp. v. Pacot,41 we distinguished
between terminations based on Article 282 of the
Labor Code42 and dismissals under Article 283 of the
Labor Code.43 We then pegged the nominal
damages at P30,000.00 if the dismissal is based on a
just cause but the employer failed to comply with
the twin-notice requirement. On the other hand, we
fixed the nominal damages at P50,000.00 if the
dismissal is due to an authorized cause under Article
283 of the Labor Code but the employer failed to
comply with the notice requirement. The reason is
that dismissals for just cause imply that the
employee has committed a violation against the
employer, while terminations under Article 283 of
the Labor Code are initiated by the employer in the
exercise of his management prerogative.
With respect to Article 284 of the Labor Code,
terminations due to disease do not entail any
wrongdoing on the part of the employee. It also
does not purely involve the employers willful and
voluntary exercise of management prerogative a
function associated with the employer's inherent
right to control and effectively manage its
enterprise.44 Rather, terminations due to disease
are occasioned by matters generally beyond the
worker and the employer's control.
In fixing the amount of nominal damages whose
determination is addressed to our sound discretion,
the Court should take into account several factors
surrounding the case, such as: (1) the employers
financial, medical, and/or moral assistance to the
sick employee; (2) the flexibility and leeway that the
employer allowed the sick employee in performing
his duties while attending to his medical needs; (3)
the employers grant of other termination benefits in
favor of the employee; and (4) whether there was a
bona fide attempt on the part of the employer to
comply with the twin-notice requirement as
opposed to giving no notice at all.
69. EMERITUS CASE- KATE
Facts: In August 2000, petitioner hired respondent as
one of its security guards. During his employment,
respondent was assigned to petitioner's various
clients. On 10 December 2005, respondent was
relieved from his post.On 27 January 2006,
respondent filed a complaint for underpayment of
wages, non-payment of legal and special holiday
pay, premium pay for rest day and underpayment of
ECOLA before the Department of Labor and
Employment, National Capital Region. The hearing
officer recommended the dismissal of the complaint
since the claims were already paid.
On 16 June 2006, respondent filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal and payment of separation pay
against petitioner before the Conciliation and
Mediation Center of the NLRC. On 14 July 2006,
respondent filed another complaint for illegal
dismissal, underpayment of salaries and non-
payment of full backwages before the NLRC.
Respondent claimed that on various dates in
December 2005 and from January to May 2006,4 he
went to petitioners office to follow-up his next
assignment. After more than six months since his
last assignment, still respondent was not given a
new assignment. Respondent argued that if an
employee is on floating status for more than six
months, such employee is deemed illegally
dismissed.
Petitioner denied dismissing respondent. Petitioner
admitted that it relieved respondent from his last
assignment and petitioner required respondent to
report to the head office within 48 hours from
receipt of the order of relief. Respondent allegedly
failed to comply. Petitioner also claimed that there
was no showing that respondent was prevented
from returning to his work..
Issue: W/N respondent was illegally dismissed?
Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner admits relieving respondent from his
post as security guard on 10 December 2005. There
is also no dispute that respondent remained on
floating status at the time he filed his complaint for
illegal dismissal on 16 June 2006. In other words,
respondent was on floating status from 10
December 2005 to 16 June 2006 or more than six
months. Petitioners allegation of sending
respondent a notice sometime in January 2006,
requiring him to report for work, is unsubstantiated,
and thus, self-serving.
The Court agrees with the ruling of the Labor Arbiter,
NLRC and Court of Appeals that a floating status of a
security guard, such as respondent, for more than six
months constitutes constructive dismissal. In
Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc. v.
Valderama,8 the Court held:
x x x the temporary inactivity or "floating status" of
security guards should continue only for six months.
Otherwise, the security agency concerned could be
liable for constructive dismissal. The failure of
petitioner to give respondent a work assignment
beyond the reasonable six-month period makes it
liable for constructive dismissal.
Issue: W/N he is entitled to separation pay?
Ruling:
Article 279 of the Labor Code of the Philippines
mandates the reinstatement of an illegally dismissed
employee, to wit:
Security of Tenure. - x x x An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to his full back wages, inclusive
of allowances, and to his other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time
of his actual reinstatement.
Thus, reinstatement is the general rule, while the
award of separation pay is the exception.
In this case, petitioner claims that it complied with
the reinstatement order of the Labor
Arbiter.1wphi1 On 23 January 2008, petitioner sent
respondent a notice informing him of the Labor
Arbiters decision to reinstate him. Accordingly, in
February 2008, respondent was assigned by
petitioner to Canlubang Sugar Estate, Inc. in
Canlubang, Laguna, and to various posts thereafter.
At the time of the filing of the petition, respondent
was assigned by petitioner to MD Distripark Manila,
Inc. in Bian, Laguna.
Respondent admits receiving a reinstatement notice
from petitioner. Thereafter, respondent was
assigned to one of petitioner's clients. However,
respondent points out that he was not reinstated by
petitioner Emeritus Security and Maintenance
Systems, Inc. but was employed by another
company, Emme Security and Maintenance Systems,
Inc. (Emme). Thus, according to respondent, he was
not reinstated at all.
Petitioner counters that Emeritus and Emme are
sister companies with the same Board of Directors
and officers, arguing that Emeritus and Emme are in
effect one and the same corporation.
Considering petitioner's undisputed claim that
Emeritus and Emme are one and the same, there is
no basis in respondent's allegation that he was not
reinstated to his previous employment. Besides,
respondent assails the corporate personalities of
Emeritus and Emme only in his Comment filed
before this Court. Further, respondent did not
appeal the Labor Arbiter's reinstatement order.
Contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling, there is
nothing in the records showing any strained
relations between the parties to warrant the award
of separation pay. There is neither allegation nor
proof that such animosity existed between
petitioner and respondent. In fact, petitioner
complied with the Labor Arbiter's reinstatement
order.
Considering that (1) petitioner reinstated
respondent in compliance with the Labor Arbiter's
decision, and (2) there is no ground, particularly
strained relations between the parties, to justify the
grant of separation pay, the Court of Appeals erred
in ordering the payment thereof, in lieu of
reinstatement.
70. WENPHIL CORPORATION, vs.ALMER R. ABING
and ANABELLE M. TUAZON-GARRY
Facts: Labor Arbiter Geobel A. Bartolabac ruled that
the respondents had been illegally dismissed by
Wenphil. According to him, the allegation of serious
misconduct against the respondents had no factual
and legal basis. Consequently, he ordered Wenphil
to immediately reinstate the respondents to their
respective positions or to equivalent ones. Also, he
ordered Wenphil to pay the respondents their
backwages from February 3, 2000 until the date of
their actual reinstatement

Because of the unfavorable LA decision, Wenphil
appealed to the NLRC. In the meantime, the
respondents moved for the immediate execution of
the LAs decision.
On October 29, 2001, Wenphil and the respondents
entered into a compromise agreement before LA
Bartolabac. They agreed to the respondents payroll
reinstatement while Wenphils appeal with the NLRC
was ongoing. Wenphil also agreed to pay the
accumulated salaries of the respondents for the
payroll.
The NLRC issued a resolution affirming LA
Bartolabacs decision with modifications. Instead of
ordering the respondents reinstatement, the NLRC
directed Wenphil to pay the respondents their
respective separation pay. Also, the NLRC found that
while the respondents had been illegally dismissed,
they had not been illegally suspended. Thus, the
period from February 3 to February 28, 2000 during
which the respondents were on preventive
suspension was excluded by the NLRC in the
computation of the respondents backwages.
CA reversed the NLRCs finding that the respondents
had been illegally dismissed. According to the CA,
there was enough evidence to show that the
respondents had been guilty of serious misconduct;
thus, their dismissal was for a valid cause. Also, the
CA ruled that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it affirmed the LAs computed
period which was from February 15, 2002 to
November 8, 2002. In arriving at this conclusion, the
CA cited the case of Pfizer v. Velasco where this
Court ruled that even if the order of reinstatement
of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is
obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate
and pay the dismissed employees wages during the
period of appeal until reversal by the higher court.
The CA construed this "higher court" to be the CA,
not the SC.
The CA reasoned out that it was a "higher court"
than the NLRC when it reversed the NLRCs rulings;
thus, the period for computation should end when it
promulgated its decision reversing that of the NLRC,
and not on the date when the SC affirmed its
decision
Issue: Is the CA correct?
Ruling: Yes. As we held in the case of Garcia v.
Philippine Airlines:
The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even
if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is
reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the
employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the
dismissed employee during the period of appeal
until reversal by the higher court. It settles the view
that the Labor Arbiter's order of reinstatement is
immediately executory and the employer has to
either re-admit them to work under the same terms
and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal, or
to reinstate them in the payroll, and that failing to
exercise the options in the alternative, employer
must pay the employees salaries.
71. Manila Water Company vs Del Rosario , G.R. No.
188747, January 29, 2014- SAL
Facts: Del Rosario was employed as Instrument
Technician by Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System (MWSS). Sometime in 1996,
MWSS was reorganized pursuant to Republic Act No.
8041 or the National Water Crisis Act of 1995, and its
implementing guidelines Executive Order No. 286.
Because of the reorganization, Manila Water
absorbed some employees of MWSS including Del
Rosario. In August 1997, Del Rosario officially
became an employee of Manila Water.
Sometime in May 2000, Manila Water discovered
that 24 water meters were missing in its stockroom.
Upon initial investigation, it appeared that Del
Rosario and his co-employee were involved in the
pilferage and the sale of water meters to the
companys contractor. Consequently, Manila Water
issued a Memorandum, directing Del Rosario to
explain in writing within 72 hours why he should not
be dealt with administratively for the loss of the said
water meters. In his letter-explanation, Del Rosario
confessed his involvement in the act charged and
pleaded for forgiveness, promising not to commit
similar acts in the future.
In June 2000, Manila Water conducted a hearing to
afford Del Rosario the opportunity to personally
defend himself and to explain and clarify his
defenses to the charge against him. During the
formal investigation Del Rosario was found
responsible for the loss of the water meters and
therefore liable for violating Section 11.1 of the
Companys Code of Conduct. Manila Water
proceeded to dismiss Del Rosario from employment.
This prompted Del Rosario to file an action for illegal
dismissal claiming that his severance from
employment is without just cause. In his Position
Paper submitted before the labor officer, Del Rosario
averred that his admission to the misconduct
charged was not voluntary but was coerced by the
company. Such admission therefore, made without
the assistance of a counsel, could not be made basis
in terminating his employment.
Refuting the allegations of Del Rosario, Manila Water
pointed out that he was indeed involved in the
taking of the water meters from the companys stock
room and of selling these to a private contractor for
personal gain. Invoking Section 11.1 of the
Companys Code of Conduct, Manila Water averred
that such act of stealing the companys property is
punishable by dismissal. The company invited the
attention of this Court to the fact that Del Rosario
himself confessed his involvement to the loss of the
water meters not only in his letter-explanation, but
also during the formal investigation, and in both
instances, pleaded for his employers forgiveness.
The Labor Arbiter issued a Decision dismissing for
lack of merit the complaint filed by Del Rosario who
was, however, awarded separation pay. According to
the Labor Arbiter, Del Rosarios length of service for
21 years, without previous derogatory record,
warrants the award of separation pay.
Issue: WON the court erred in awarding separation
pay to respondent
Ruling: YES. As a general rule, an employee who has
been dismissed for any of the just causes
enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is
not entitled to a separation pay. Section 7, Rule I,
Book VI of the Omnibus Rules implementing the
Labor Code provides:
Sec. 7. Termination of employment by employer.
The just causes for terminating the services of an
employee shall be those provided in Article 282 of
the Code. The separation from work of an employee
for a just cause does not entitle him to the
termination pay provided in the Code, without
prejudice, however, to whatever rights, benefits and
privileges he may have under the applicable
individual or collective agreement with the employer
or voluntary employer policy or practice.
In exceptional cases, however, the Court has granted
separation pay to a legally dismissed employee as an
act of "social justice" or on "equitable grounds." In
both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1)
was not for serious misconduct; and (2) did not
reflect on the moral character of the employee.
The attendant circumstances in the present case
considered, we are constrained to deny Del Rosario
separation pay since the admitted cause of his
dismissal amounts to serious misconduct. He is not
only responsible for the loss of the water meters in
flagrant violation of the companys policy but his act
is in utter disregard of his partnership with his
employer in the pursuit of mutual benefits.
That Del Rosario rendered 21 years of service to the
company will not save the day for him. Indubitably,
the appellate court erred in awarding separation pay
to Del Rosario without taking into consideration that
the transgression he committed constitutes a serious
offense. The grant of separation pay to a dismissed
employee is determined by the cause of the
dismissal. The years of service may determine how
much separation pay may be awarded. It is,
however, not the reason why such pay should be
granted at all.
In sum, we hold that the award of separation pay or
any other kind of financial assistance to Del Rosario,
under the nomenclature of compassionate justice, is
not warranted in the instant case. A contrary rule
would have the effect of rewarding rather than
punishing an erring employee, disturbing the noble
concept of social justice.
72. G.R. No. 167286
February 5, 2014INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL MANILA
AND/OR BRIAN McCAULEY, Petitioners,
vs.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS
(ISAE) AND MEMBERS REPRESENTED BY RAQUEL
DAVID CHING, PRESIDENT, EVANGELINE SANTOS,
JOSELYN RUCIO AND METHELYN FILLER,
Respondents- CEL
Facts: Respondent Evangeline Santos was a faculty of
the International School Manila since 1978. In 1992
she applied for a leave of absence. When she
returned in 1993, only one teaching load for Spanish
was available, thus she agreed to teach 4 Filipino
classes. As per evaluation during the year 1993,
respondents evaluation stated that she needed
improvement in key areas such as use of effective
questioning techniques and enforcement of
academic and classroom behavior among others.
The following school year, Santos expressed that she
will be teaching for the school year and that she did
not prefer a change in the teaching assignments. For
that school year, she was again evaluated and her
evaluation results mirrored those areas in which she
needed improvement. The situation was the same
for school year 1995-1996. In 1996, a Professional
Growth Plan was signed by Santos wherein she
undertook to focus and improve on the specifically
stated areas of her teaching that she need to
improve on. Phase 1 was Planning. But even with the
Plan and the series of meetings and consultations
conducted her benefit, her over-all performance did
not improve. In fact, 8 months into the
implementation of the Professional Growth Plan, she
was still in Phase 1. In April 10, 1997, the school then
wrote a letter to Santos asking her to explain why
her services should not be terminated in view of her
performance way below the standards set by said
school. Santos was given the chance to answer. A
meeting was then conducted where Santos was
allowed to bring counsel or representative. Santos
was accompanied by Raquel Ching, President of the
International School Alliance of Educators. Santos
was being charged by the school with gross
inefficiency or negligence in the performance of
duties. An administrative investigation followed. The
committee who conducted the investigation
recommended that the employment of Santos
cannot be continued. Santos was informed in a letter
of her termination effective June 7, 1997, based on
the finding of the committee that despite 3 years of
consultations with her supervisors, no appreciable
improvement was seen in her performance.
Issue: Was Santos illegally dismissed?
Ruling: No. To constitute a valid dismissal from
employment, two requisites must concur: (1) the
dismissal must be for any of the causes provided in
Article 282 of the Labor Code; and, (2) the employee
must be given an opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself.
In the collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
between the School and ISAE for the years 1992-
1995, Section 13 of Appendix A thereof expressly
states that "termination of employment shall be in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines as
presented in the LABOR CODE.
In Century Iron Works, Inc. v. Baas, the concept of
gross and habitual neglect of duties is explained as:
Gross negligence connotes want or absence of or
failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the
entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless
disregard of consequences without exerting any
effort to avoid them. Fraud and willful neglect of
duties imply bad faith of the employee in failing to
perform his job, to the detriment of the employer
and the latters business. Habitual neglect, on the
other hand, implies repeated failure to perform
ones duties for a period of time, depending upon
the circumstances.
In Lim v. National Labor Relations Commission:
Gross inefficiency falls within the purview of "other
causes analogous to the foregoing," and constitutes,
therefore, just cause to terminate an employee
under Article 282 of the Labor Code. One is
analogous to another if it is susceptible of
comparison with the latter either in general or in
some specific detail; or has a close relationship with
the latter. "Gross inefficiency" is closely related to
"gross neglect," for both involve specific acts of
omission on the part of the employee resulting in
damage to the employer or to his business.
In Buiser vs. Leogardo, the Court ruled that failure to
observe prescribed standards of work, or to fulfill
reasonable work assignments due to inefficiency
may constitute just cause for dismissal.
Viewed in light of the above doctrines, the Court is
not convinced that the actuations of Santos
complained of by the petitioners constituted gross
and habitual neglect of her duties.
What can be gathered from a thorough review of the
records of this case is that the inadequacies of
Santos as a teacher did not stem from a reckless
disregard of the welfare of her students or of the
issues raised by the School regarding her teaching.
Far from being tainted with bad faith, Santoss
failings appeared to have resulted from her lack of
necessary skills, in-depth knowledge, and expertise
to teach the Filipino language at the standards
required of her by the School.
The petitioners had sufficiently proved the charge of
gross inefficiency, which warranted the dismissal of
Santos from the School.
The Court enunciated in Pea v. National Labor
Relations Commission73 that "it is the prerogative of
the school to set high standards of efficiency for its
teachers since quality education is a mandate of the
Constitution. As long as the standards fixed are
reasonable and not arbitrary, courts are not at
liberty to set them aside." Moreover, the prerogative
of a school to provide standards for its teachers and
to determine whether these standards have been
met is in accordance with academic freedom, which
gives the educational institution the right to choose
who should teach.
The Court finds that, not only did the petitioners
documentary evidence sufficiently prove Santoss
inefficient performance of duties, but the same also
remained unrebutted by respondents own
evidence. On the contrary, Santos admits in her
pleadings that her performance as a teacher of
Filipino had not been satisfactory but she prays for
leniency on account of her prior good record as a
Spanish teacher at the School. Indeed, even the
Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals
agreed that Santos was not without fault but the
lower tribunals deemed that termination was too
harsh a penalty.
Nonetheless, the Court finds that petitioners had
satisfactorily discharged the burden of proving the
existence of gross inefficiency on the part of Santos,
warranting her separation from the school.
As regards the requirements of procedural due
process, Section 2(d) of Rule 1 of The Implementing
Rules of Book VI states that:
For termination of employment based on just causes
as defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code:
(i) A written notice served on the employee
specifying the ground or grounds for termination,
and giving said employee reasonable opportunity
within which to explain his side.
(ii) A hearing or conference during which the
employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel
if he so desires is given opportunity to respond to
the charge, present his evidence, or rebut the
evidence presented against him.
(iii) A written notice of termination served on the
employee, indicating that upon due consideration of
all the circumstances, grounds have been
established to justify his termination
The School complied with the above requirements.
After a thorough evaluation of Santoss
performance, the School held a series of conferences
and meetings with Santos, in order to improve her
performance. On March 29, 1996, the School
required Santos to undertake a Professional Growth
Plan. Thereafter, when the intervention of the
School failed to yield any considerable improvement
on Santos, McCauley wrote her a letter on April 10,
1997, which required her to explain in writing within
forty-eight (48) hours why her employment should
not be terminated in view of her failure to meet the
standards of the School on very specific areas of
concern. On April 16, 1997, Santos responded to
McCauleys letter, asking why she was being
required to explain. On April 21, 1997, McCauley
wrote Santos a letter informing her that an
administrative investigation would be conducted on
April 23, 1997 where she would be given the
opportunity to be heard. On April 23, 1997, an
administrative investigation was conducted. Santos
appeared therein with the assistance of ISAE
President Ching. In a letter dated May 29, 1997, the
School informed Santos of its decision to terminate
her employment on the ground of her failure to
meet the standards of the School, which as
discussed was tantamount to gross inefficiency.