RODOLFO FUENTES et al v. NLRC, 5th Div et al, [G.R. No.
L-48926 December 14, 1987
110017. January 2, 1997]
The State is bound under the Constitution to afford full
protection to labor and when conflicting interests of
labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of
social justice the heavier influence of the latter should
be counterbalanced with the sympathy and compassion
the law accords the less privileged workingman. This is
only fair if the worker is to be given the opportunity
and the right to assert and defend his cause not as a
subordinate but as part of management with which he
can negotiate on even plane. Thus labor is not a mere
employee of capital but its active and equal partner.
75 petitioners who are regular employees Agusan
Plantations, Inc. Agusan Plantations claimed that it was
suffering business losses which resulted to
retrenchment as decided by its head office in Singapore.
They filed a complaint with DOLE-CDO for illegal
dismissal and unpaid backwages among others.
Agusan Planters contended that they conducted
grievance conferences with the vrepresentative labor
org and the 30-day notices of termination were duly
sent.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of
the petitioners but it was reversed by the NLRC.
Issue: W/N the retrenchment was valid
Held: No, Art 283 of the Labor Code provides that
employer may also terminate the employment of any
employee .retrenchment to prevent losses or the
closing or cessation of operation of the establishment
or undertaking .In case of retrenchment to prevent
losses and in case of closure or cessation of operations
of establishment or undertaking not due to serious
business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay
shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-
half (1/2) month pay for every year of service,
whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months
shall be considered one (1) whole year.
Under Art. 283 retrenchment may be valid only
when the following requisites are met: (a) it is to
prevent losses; (b) written notices were served on the
workers and the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) at least one (1) month before the effective date
of retrenchment; and, (c) separation pay is paid to the
affected workers.
The closure of a business establishment is a ground
for the termination of the services of an employee but
while business reverses can be a just cause for
terminating employees, they must be sufficiently
proved by the employer.
In the case before us, Agusan Plantation merely
alleged the causes of losses and did not present any
other documentary proof of their alleged losses which
could have been easily proven in the financial
statements which unfortunately were not shown.
There is no question that an employer may reduce
its work force to prevent losses. However, these losses
must be serious, actual and real.[ Otherwise, this
ground for termination of employment would be
susceptible to abuse by scheming employers who might
be merely feigning losses in their business ventures in
order to ease out employees.
G.R. No.
MANUEL SOSITO vs. AGUINALDO DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
Manuel Sosito was employed in 1964 by AGUINALDO
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a logging company
He went on indefinite leave with the consent of the
company in January 1976 . Later the company
announced a retrenchment program and offered
separation pay to employees in the active service as of
June 30, 1976, who would tender their resignations not
later than July 31, 1976. Sosito decided to accept this
offer and so submitted his resignation on July 29, 1976,
However, his resignation was not acted upon and he
was never given the separation pay he expected.
He went to DOLE and the company was ordered to pay
him of his salary. NLRC reversed nthe decision holding
that Sosito is not covered by retrenchment program.
Issue: W/n the retrenchment was valid
Held: YES, It is clear from the memorandum that the
offer of separation pay was extended only to those who
were in the active service of the company as of June 30,
1976. It is equally clear that the petitioner was not
eligible for the promised gratuity as he was not actually
working with the company as of the said date. Being on
indefinite leave, he was not in the active service of the
private respondent although, if one were to be
technical, he was still in its employ. Even so, during the
period of indefinite leave, he was not entitled to receive
any salary or to enjoy any other benefits available to
those in the active service.
While the Constitution is committed to the policy of
social justice and the protection of the working class, it
should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be
automatically decided in favor of labor. Management
also has its own rights which, as such, are entitled to
respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair
play. Out of its concern for those with less privileges in
life, this Court has inclined more often than not toward
the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the
employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded us
to the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving,
to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and
the applicable law and doctrine.
G.R. No. 110518 August 1, 1994
JOSE L. GARCIA, et al vs.NLRC
The main issue before the Court in this petition
for certiorari is the validity of the retrenchment of the
fifty-one petitioners by private respondent National
Service Corporation (NASECO) as upheld by the Labor
Arbiter and later by the National Labor Relations
Commission.
NASECO is a government-owned or controlled
corporation engaged in providing manpower services
such as security guards, radio operators, janitors and
clerks, principally for the Philippine National Bank.
The petitioners were its employees who were either
members of the NASECO Employees Union (NASECO-
EU) or of the Alliance of Concerned Workers of NASECO
(ACW-NASECO). On November 19, 1988, they were
among those who staged a strike and picketed the
premises of the PNB.
On November 21, 1988, the PNB filed a complaint for
damages with preliminary injunction against the labor
unions with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. It was
docketed as Civil Case No. 88-46938 in Branch 22. On
December 5, 1988, the court granted the application for
a preliminary injunction and issued the writ ordering
the lifting of the picket.
NASECO also filed on November 21, 1988, a petition
with the National Labor Relations Commission to
declare the strike illegal. This was docketed as NLRC
Case No. 00-11-04766-88. On February 17, 1989, the
NLRC rendered its decision sustaining NASECO. 1 The
union officers who knowingly and actively participated in the
strike, as well as the members of the respondent union who
committed illegal acts in the course of the strike, were
deemed to have legally lost their employment status.
The rest of the striking members, including the herein
fifty-one petitioners, were ordered to report for work
immediately.
The complaint of the labor union against the PNB for
unfair labor practice and illegal lockout was dismissed
on the ground that there was no employer-employee
relationship between the PNB and the labor unions. 2
On March 1, 1989, the petitioners reported for work at
the NASECO office but they could not be given
assignments because the PNB had meanwhile
contracted with another company to fill the positions
formerly held by the petitioners.
NASECO inquired from the PNB whether or not the
petitioners could still be accepted to their former
positions in light of the Service Agreement between
NASECO and the PNB giving the latter the right to reject
or replace any and all of NASECO's employees assigned
to it, for inefficiency or other valid reasons.
In reply, the PNB manifested that it was no longer
accepting the petitioners back to their former positions
as these were no longer vacant.
NASECO then sought new assignments for the
petitioners with its other clients, but the petitioners
insisted on their reassignment to the PNB. In the
meantime, starting April 1, 1989, NASECO paid the
salaries and other benefits of the petitioners although
they were not actually working. 3
On October 13, 1989, the petitioners received notice of
separation from NASECO, effective thirty days
thereafter. The reason given was the financial losses
NASECO was incurring at that time due mainly to the
salaries being paid to the employees who could not be
posted despite efforts to place them. 4
Conformably to Art. 283 of the Labor Code, the
Department of Labor and Employment was likewise
given a 30-day notice of the intended retrenchment.
The management of NASECO even offered a better
separation package equivalent to three-fourths of the
estimated new basic monthly salary for every year of
service, compared to the statutory requirement of only
1/2 month pay for every year of service. 5
The petitioners refused to acknowledge receipt of the
notice and instead, on October 26, 1989, filed with
NLRC a complaint against NASECO for unfair labor
practice, illegal dismissal, non-payment of wages and
damages. 6
On November 13, 1989, NASECO sent notice to the
petitioners that their termination from the service
would take effect not on November 16, 1989, but on
November 30, 1989, for humanitarian considerations.
The effective date was again extended to December 15,
1989, and finally to December 31, 1989.
On June 22, 1990, Labor Arbiter Potenciano Canizares
Jr. rendered a decision finding that the petitioners had
been "fairly discharged by the respondent (NASECO) in
a valid act of simple retrenchment." 7
On July 11, 1990, the petitioners appealed to the NLRC.
On September 11, 1992, they filed a manifestation that
the private respondent had been hiring new personnel,
but no proof was offered to support the charge.
On December 21, 1992, the NLRC issued a resolution
affirming the decision of the labor arbiter. 8 A motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners on January 15, 1993,
was denied by the NLRC on February 10, 1993. 9
It is now asserted in this petition that the NLRC gravely
abused its discretion in holding that the petitioners
were validly dismissed on the ground of retrenchment;
that NASECO is not guilty of unfair labor practice; and
that their monetary claims for increases under Republic
Acts 6640 and 6727, as well as for moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees, should be denied.
On the first two issues, the petitioners fault the NLRC
for completely disregarding the requisites of a valid
retrenchment as laid down in Lopez Sugar Corporation
vs. Federation of Free Workers. 10
The requisites are: 1) the losses expected should be
substantial and not merely de minimis in extent; 2) the
substantial losses apprehended must be reasonably
imminent; 3) the retrenchment must be reasonably
necessary and likely to effectively prevent the expected
losses; and 4) the alleged losses, if already incurred, and
the expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled,
must be proved by sufficient and convincing evidence.
The petitioners assert that NASECO failed to show with
convincing evidence that the incurred losses, if any,
were substantial. The claimed losses were belied by the
fact that NASECO hired new personnel before and after
the dismissal of the petitioners. NASECO also failed to
pursue other measures to forestall losses, short of
dismissing the petitioners. It did not follow the "first in,
last out" rule that in cases of retrenchment, employees
with long years of service with the company, like the
petitioners, should not be the first to be retrenched.
They attribute their dismissal to their participation in
the strike of November 19, 1988. Thus, their dismissal
was an act of unfair labor practice for being
discriminatory and violative of their rights to self-
organization and to engage in concerted activities.
We have to disagree.
The losses incurred by NASECO for the year 1989
amounted to P1,457,700.42 and were adequately
proved by it.11 These losses were directly caused by the
salaries and other benefits paid to the petitioners during the
period from April 1 to December 31, 1989. The amount of
these payments is not insubstantial in light of the economic
difficulties of the country during that year when several coups
d' etat adversely affected the nation's economic growth.
It is also not true that respondent NASECO did not look
for other measures to cut back on its losses. NASECO
had in fact tried to place the petitioners with its other
clients but it was the petitioners themselves who
refused reassignment.
The particular facts of this case preclude application of
the "first in, last out" rule in the retrenchment of
employees. There was no discrimination against the
petitioners. NASECO could not compel the PNB to take
the petitioners back to their former positions in view of
its contractual right to reject any employee of NASECO
for inefficiency and other valid reasons. The PNB had
already filled the vacated positions of the petitioners
during the strike, to ensure the continued operation of
its business.
The monetary claim under RA 6640 and RA 6727 is
another matter. RA 6640, which took effect on
December 14, 1987, and RA 6727, which took effect on
July 1, 1989, provide for P10.00 and a P25.00 increases
respectively in the minimum wage of laborers. The
NLRC denied this claim on the ground that the
petitioners had failed to include it in their basic
complaint. This contention is not acceptable because
the claim was clearly included and prayed for in their
position paper.
The Revised Rules of the NLRC provide under Sec. 3,
Rule V, that parties should not be allowed to allege facts
not referred to or included in the complaint, or position
paper, affidavits and other documents. This would
mean that although not contained in the complaint, any
claim can still be averred in the position paper, as was
done by the petitioners, or in an affidavit or other
documents.
We also hold that the increases in the petitioners'
minimum wage under RA 6640 and RA 6720 should be
granted since they became effective before the
petitioners' retrenchment. Said increases should be
considered in the computation of their separation pay
in accordance with Art. 283 of the Labor Code.
Moral damages are recoverable only where the
dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or
fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor or was
done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy. 12Exemplary damages may be awarded only if
the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or
malevolent manner. 13None of these grounds has been
proven. However, the Court will grant the claim for attorney's
fees in an amount equivalent to 10% of the total amount
awarded to the petitioner as authorized by the Labor Code. 14
The constitutional policy of providing full protection to
labor is not intended to oppress or destroy
management. The employer cannot be compelled to
retain employees it no longer needs, to be paid for work
unreasonably refused and not actually performed.
NASECO bent over backward and exerted every effort
to help the petitioners look for other work, postponed
the effective date of their separation, and offered them
a generous termination pay package. The unflagging
commitment of this Court to the cause of labor will not
prevent us from sustaining the employer when it is in
the right, as in this case.
San Miguel Brewery Sales Force Union(PTGWO) vs. Hon.
Blas Ople G.R. No. L-53515, February 8, 1989
FACTS:
For 3 years, a collective bargaining agreement was
being implemented by San Miguel Corporation Sales
Force Union (PTGWO), and San Miguel Corporation.
Section 1, of Article IV of which provided Employees
within the appropriate bargaining unit shall be entitled
to a basic monthly compensation plus commission
based on their respective sales. Then, the company
introduced a marketing scheme known as
Complementary Distribution System(CDS) whereby its
beer products were offered for sale directly to
wholesalers through San Miguels Sales Offices. The
union alleged that the new marketing scheme violates
Sec 1, Art IV f the CBA because the introduction of the
CDS would reduce the take home pay of the salesmen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the new marketing scheme should be
upheld considering that the act was unilaterally made
by the employer.
RULING:
Yes, because it is a valid exercise of managerial
prerogative. So long as a companys management
prerogatives are exercised in good faith for the
advancement of the employers interest and not for the
purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the
employees under special laws or under valid
agreements, this Court will uphold them. San Miguel
Corporations offer to compensate the members of its
sales force who will be adversely affected by the
implementation of the CDS by paying them a so-called
back adjustment commission to make up for the
commissions they might lose as a result of the CDS
proves the companys good faith and lack of intention
to bust their union.
DOLE PHILIPPINES V. PAWIS NG MAKABAYANG
OBREROG.R. No. 146650 / JANUARY 13, 2003 /
CORONA, J. / LABOR Collective BargainingAgreement
Nature: Petition For Review Of CA Decision
Dole Philippines and Pawis ng Makabayang Obrero
executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
There was a disputed section on the CBA regarding free
meals for workers who rendered three hours of
overtime work. The parties agreed to submit the
dispute to a voluntary arbitration, wherein the decision
was in favor of the respondent. DOLE filed a petition
for review on certiorari to the CA but was denied. Thus,
this petition.
Case Doctrine. An employee shall be entitled to a free
meal if he has rendered exactly, or no less than, 3 hours
of overtime work, not after more than or in excess of
three hours overtime work.
Facts
.On February 22, 1996, a new five-year Collective
Bargaining Agreement for the period starting February
1996 up to February 2001, was executed by petitioner
Dole Philippines, Inc., and private respondent Pawis Ng
Makabayang Obrero-NFL (PAMAO-NFL). Among the
provisions of the new CBA is the disputed section on
meal allowance under Section 3 of Article XVIII on
Bonuses and Allowances
Some departments of Dole reverted to the previous
practice of granting free meals after exactly three hours
of actual overtime work. However, other departments
continued the practice of granting free meals only after
more than three hours of overtime work.
Issue.
1. WON the Dole employees can be granted free meals
if he has rendered exactly or no less than three hours of
overtime work YES
Ratio.1. WON the Dole employees can be granted free
meals if he has rendered exactly or no lessthan three
hours of overtime work. YES
The disputed provision of the CBA is clear and
unambiguous. The terms are explicit and the language
of the CBA is not susceptible to any other
interpretation. Hence, the literal meaning of free meals
after three (3) hours of overtime work shall prevail,
which is simply that an employee shall be entitled to a
free meal if he has rendered exactly, or no less than,
three hours of overtime work, not after more than or in
excess of three hours overtime work
The exercise of management prerogative is not
unlimited. It is subject to the limitations found in law, a
collective bargaining agreement or the general
principles of fair play and justice.[9] This situation
constitutes one of the limitations. The CBA is the norm
of conduct between petitioner and private respondent
and compliance therewith is mandated by the express
policy of the law
UST vs NLRC, 182 SCRA 371
FACTS:
UST terminated the employment of 16 union officers
and directors of UST Faculty Union for grave
misconduct, etc on the ground that "in publishing or
causing to be published in Strike Bulletin No. 5 the
libelous and defamatory attacks against the Father
Rector.
Some faculty members staged mass leaves of absence
disrupting classes in all levels at the University.
The faculty union filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
and unfair labor practice with the DOLE.
The labor arbiter, on a prima facie showing that the
termination was causing a serious labor dispute,
certified the matter to the Secretary of DOLE for a
possible suspension of the effects of termination.
Secretary Franklin Drilon issued an order to accept
the 16 terminated employees back to work under the
same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their
dismissal in the interest of industrial peace.
Secretary Drilon issued another order which certifies
the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration.
NLRC issued a resolution directing UST to comply and
faithfully abide with the Orders of the Secretary
Drilon by immediately reinstating or readmitting the
16 faculty members under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to the present dispute or
merely reinstate them in the payroll.
UST states that it has already actually reinstated 6 of
the dismissed faculty members; As to 2 professors
whose teaching assignments were partially taken over
by new faculty members, they were given back their
remaining teaching loads (not taken by new faculty
members) but were given substantially equivalent
academic assignments corresponding to their
teachings loads already taken over by new faculty
 members; The remaining 7 faculty members were
given substantially equivalent academic assignments
in lieu of actual teaching loads because all of their
teaching loads originally assigned to them at the start
of the first semester were already taken over by new
faculty members; 1 dismissed faculty had been
"absent without official leave" or AWOL.
SC issued a TRO enjoining NLRC from enforcing or
executing the NLRC resolution.
UST argues that actual reinstatement of the dismissed
faculty members whose teaching assignments were
previously taken over by new faculty members is not
feasible nor practicable since this would compel UST
to violate and terminate its contracts with the faculty
members who were assigned to and had actually
taken over the courses.
UST claims that to change the faculty member when
the semester is about to end would seriously impair
and prejudice the welfare and interest of the students
because dislocation, confusion and loss in
momentum, if not demoralization will surely ensue.
UST contended that it has the sole and exclusive right
and prerogative to determine the nature and kind of
work of its employees and to control and manage its
own operations.
ISSUE: W/N the grant of substantially equal acad
assignments tantamount to compliance with DOLE Sec
order of reinstatement
RULING:
No, The grant of substantially equivalent academic
assignments cannot be sustained. The giving of
substantially equivalent academic assignments,
without actual teaching loads, cannot be considered a
reinstatement under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike.
The phrase "under the same terms and conditions"
contemplates actual reinstatement or the return of
actual teaching loads to the dismissed faculty
members.
Article 263(g) was devised to maintain the status quo
between the workers and management in a labor
dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in
an industry indispensable to the national
interest, pending adjudication of the controversy. The
grant of substantially equivalent academic
assignments would evidently alter the existing status
quo since the temporarily reinstated teachers will not
be given their usual teaching loads.
The order of NLRC did not amount to grave abuse of
discretion. Such error is merely an error of judgment
which is not correctible by a special civil action for
certiorari. The NLRC was only trying its best to work
out a satisfactory ad hoc solution to a festering and
serious problem.
The hiring, firing, transfer, demotion and promotion of
employees are traditionally identified as management
prerogatives. However, these are not absolute
prerogatives. They are subject to limitations found in
law, a collective bargaining agreement, or general
principles of fair play and justice.
Article 263(g) is one such limitation provided by law.
To the extent that Art. 263(g) calls for the admission
of all workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike, UST is restricted from
exercising its generally unbounded right to transfer or
reassign its employees.
The first semester is about to end and to change the
faculty members around the time of final
examinations would adversely affect and prejudice
the students whose welfare and interest we consider
to be of primordial importance and for whom both
the University and the faculty union must subordinate
their claims and desires. The actual reinstatement of
the non-reinstated faculty members may take effect
at the start of the second semester.
The contracts of new professors cannot prevail over
the right to reinstatement of the dismissed personnel.
DOUGLAS MILLARES and ROGELIO LAGDA, petitioners,
vs. NLRC et al
FACTS:
Douglas Millares was employed by ESSO International
Shipping Company through its local manning
agency,Trans-Global Maritime Agency, as a machinist ,
- he was promoted as Chief Engineer which position
Millares applied for a leave of absence for almost 1mon.
the Trans-Global, approved the request for leave of
absence.
- Millares wrote to the Operations Manager of Exxon
International Co. informing him of his intention to avail
of the optional retirement plan considering that he had
already rendered more than 20 years of continuous
service.
The request was denied because:
(1) he was employed on a contractual basis;
(2) his contract of enlistment (COE) did not provide for
retirement before the age of sixty (60) years; and
(3) he did not comply with the requirement for claiming
benefits under the CEIP
Millares requested for an extension of his leave of
absence for another 15 days.
The Crewing Manager, Ship Group A, Trans-Global,
wrote petitioner Millares advising him that Esso
International "has corrected the deficiency in its
manpower requirements specifically in the Chief
Engineer rank by promoting a First Assistant Engineer to
this position as a result of (his) previous leave of
absence which expired last August 8, 1989. The
adjustment in said rank was required in order to meet
manpower schedules as a result of (his) inability.
Esso International advised Millares that his absence
without leave, which is equivalent to abandonment of
his position,
On the other hand Lagda was employed by Esso
International as wiper/oiler
He was promoted as Chief Engineer in 1980, a position
he continued to occupy until his last COE expired on
April 10, 1989.
Lagda applied for a leave of absence from June 19,1989
up to the whole month of August 1989. Then the Trans-
Globals approved petitioner Lagdas leave of absence
from June 22, 1989 to July 20, 1989[7] and advised him
to report for re-assignment on July 21, 1989.
Lagda wrote a letter to Operations Manager of Esso
International, through Trans-Globals President
informing him of his intention to avail of the optional
early retirement plan in view of his twenty (20) years
continuous service in the company Trans-Global denied
petitioner Lagdas request for availment of the optional
early retirement scheme on the same grounds upon
which petitioner Millares request was denied.
he requested for an extension of his leave of absence
up to August 26, 1989 and the same was approved.
However Esso International advised petitioner Lagda
that in view of his "unavailability for contractual sea
service," he had been dropped from the roster of crew
members effective September 1, 1989.
Millares and Lagda filed a complaint-affidavit, for illegal
dismissal and non-payment of employee benefits
against Esso International and Trans-Global, before the
POEA.
POEA: dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
NLRC dismissed petitioners appeal and denying their
motion for new trial for lack of merit.
ISSUE: W/N THEY ARE REGULAR EMPLOYEES.
RULING: No, Citing Pablo Coyoca v. NLRC, Brent School
Inc. v. Zamora, it is clear that seafarers are considered
contractual employees. They cannot be considered as
regular employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code.
Their employment is governed by the contracts they
sign everytime they are rehired and their employment
is terminated when the contract expires. Their
employment is contractually fixed for a certain period of
time. They fall under the exception of Article 280 whose
employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has
been determined at the time of engagement of the
employee or where the work or services to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is
for the duration of the season
Pacific Consultants v. Schonfeld
Callejo, 2007, Third
Facts: Klaus Schonfeld, a Canadian citizen, had been a
consultant in the field of environmental engineering
and water supply and sanitation.
- Pacicon Philippines Inc., a subsidiary of Pacific
Consultants International of Japan, is a corporation with
the primary purpose to engage in the business of
providing specialty and technical services both in and
out of the Philippines.
- The president of PPI, Jens Peter Henrichsen, who was
also the director of PCIJ, was based in Tokyo, Japan.
Respondent was employed by PCIJ, through Henrichsen,
as Sector Manager of PPI in its Water and Sanitation
Department.
-However, PCIJ assigned him as PPI sector manager in
the Philippines.
-Respondent arrived in the Philippines and assumed his
position as PPI Sector Manager.
-He was accorded the status of a resident alien. PPI
applied for an Alien Employment Permit for respondent
before the DOLE and the DOLE granted the application
and issued the Permit to respondent.
-Respondent later received a letter from Henrichsen
informing him that his employment had been
terminated for the reason that PCIJ and PPI had not
been successful in the water and sanitation sector in the
Philippines.
-Respondent filed with PPI several money claims. PPI
partially settled some of his claims, but refused to pay
the rest.
-Respondent filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal.
Issue:
The principle of forum non conveniens was also invoked
by petitioners in Pacific Consultants International Asia,
Inc. vs. Schonfeld, [G.R. No. 166920, Feb. 19, 2007].
Petitioners insisted on the application of the said
principle since the respondent is a Canadian citizen and
was a repatriate.
Held: No, In rejecting petitioners contention, the
Supreme Court cited the following reasons that do not
warrant the application of the said principle:
First. The Labor Code of the Philippines does not
include forum non conveniens as a ground for the
dismissal of the complaint. (See PHILSEC Investment
Corporation vs. CA, G.R. No. 103493, June 19, 1997, 274
SCRA 102).
Second. The propriety of dismissing a case based on
this principle requires a factual determination; hence, it
is properly considered as defense. (Id.).
Third. In Bank of America, NT&SA, Bank of America
International, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals, [448 Phil. 181,
196 (2003)], it was held that:xxx [a] Philippine Court
may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do
so; provided, that the following requisites are met: (1)
that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties
may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court
is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the
law and the facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has
or is likely to have power to enforce its decision. Xxx.
[Forum non conveniens is a discretionary power that
allows courts to dismiss a case where another court, or
forum, is much better suited to hear the case. This
dismissal does not prevent a plaintiff from re-filing his
or her case in the more appropriate forum]