RESOURCE ARTICLE

Toxic and flammable gases

in research laboratories:
Considerations for controls
and continuous leak detection
What additional controls are required when adding toxic or flammable compressed gas cylinders or liquefied
gases to an existing laboratory has sometimes been a perplexing one. Code officials, architects, engineers,
EHS professionals, and research laboratory users may have different perspectives on the applicability of
regulations and risk. This paper presents the decision making process for the installation of continuous leak
detection systems to existing laboratories in business occupancy in light of current National Fire Protection
Association and International Building Code requirements and future roll out of the Globally Harmonized
System.

By Markus E. Schaufele
INTRODUCTION
There are many instances in research
laboratories where portable gas snif-
fers or portable gas detection devices
can provide information and warning.
Large quantities of compressed gases,
potentially hydrogen enriched atmo-
spheres in glove boxes, use of toxic
and flammable gases in vapor deposi-
tion processes in semiconductor and
crystal growth research, and the use of
large hydrogen generators are all
examples where some form of fixed
leak detection may be desirable. This
article focuses only on aspects where a
continuous leak detection system may
be required or useful. Researchers
inside a laboratory, as well as building
occupants in the vicinity of a labora-
tory, benefit from audible and visual
alarm warnings to take appropriate
action. The electronic signal generated
by a leak alarm also can trigger engi-
neering controls such as mechanical
gas cylinder shut off valves, purge
Markus E. Schaufele is affiliated with
Northwestern University, Office for
Research Safety, 2145 Sheridan Rd,
Evanston, IL 60208, United States.
ventilation or power shut off to heating
devices and other equipment.
Toxic and flammable gases are used or
generated in numerous applications in
academic research laboratories. Com-
pressed gas cylinders that range in size
from small lecture bottles to larger cylin-
ders, and hydrogen or ozone generators
can be gas sources in laboratories. Gas
leaks at any point of the gas delivery
system can be hazardous. Most aca-
demic research laboratories are located
in business occupancy, as classified by
the US building codes. The code require-
ments of other occupancy classifica-
tions are excluded from the scope of
this article, for example bulk storage of
toxic and flammable gases, special gas
cylinder storage rooms, issues related to
explosion safe/proof design, oxygen
deficiency, natural gas utilities and
National Fuel Gas Code, industrial scale
transfer of gases or cryogenic liquids,
filling and shipping of gas cylinders,
and recommended separation distances
or barriers between compressed gas
cylinders and other building activity.
There are many possible controls
that can reduce the risk of exposure
to toxic concentrations, fire or explo-
sion. The discussion of prescribed con-
trols in this article focuses on selected
US standards and the decision making
process to install a fixed gas leak detec-
tion system.
The terms continuous leak detec-
tion and fixed leak detection are
used interchangeably throughout the
document.
The author presented the content of
this article at the 2012 Campus Safety
and Environmental Management
Association (CSHEMA) Conference
in Portland, Oregon.
LIMITATIONS OF CONTINUOUS LEAK
DETECTION SYSTEMS
The first gas detectors were developed
in the mid 1920s in response to mining
disasters. As then, the detection of oxy-
gen deficiency, and the detection of
toxic or potentially explosive atmo-
spheres remain the main objectives.
The chemical process industry has uti-
lized gas monitoring or leak detection
systems in many industrial applica-
tions. Some of the experience and rea-
sons for deployments of fixed gas and
vapor detection systems continue to be
insightful for the laboratory environ-
ment. In many cases the degree of
protection provided by leak detection
may be more cost effectively provided
by better planning of the research
activities and operational controls.
Gas and vapor detection systems can
only be configured to maximize detec-
tion success but cannot guarantee it.

8 Division of Chemical Health and Safety of the American Chemical Society 1871-5532/$36.00
Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jchas.2012.11.002
Table 1. Toxic Gas Health-Hazard Classification.
Pure Gas LC50 in
Parts Per Million (ppm)
International Building Code
NFPA 704
GHS Health Hazard:
Acute Toxicity
Inhalation Hazard Category
Even in the relatively well defined con-
fines of a laboratory, there are many
variables affecting the travel and dis-
persal of airborne releases. The Center
for Chemical Process Safety1 includes
the following advice.
There are two motives for gas and vapor
detection that should be avoided. Firstly,
gas and vapor detection should not be
used in lieu of good facility design and
preventive maintenance. When a new use
for gas detection has been proposed, first
ask Have we done everything possible to
minimize the potential for a release to the
atmosphere? . . ..Secondly, avoid using
gas detection systems to satisfy individuals
or groups of personnel.
Addressing a recognized hazard
directly through preventive efforts,
avoiding a false sense of security, and
creating unnecessarily high expecta-
tions to the monitoring performance
are other reasons why alternatives to
fixed gas leak detections systems must
first be considered.
The design and installation of fixed
gas and vapor detection systems is
solved with technical and engineering
expertise. Incorporating such a techni-
cal solution into the day to day opera-
tion of a research laboratory building
requires systematic oversight. The
decentralized culture in which most
academic research is conducted has
to be considered when setting up a
support structure. Keeping fixed gas
leak detection systems functional and
effecting adequate emergency
response requires close coordination
between the laboratory research staff,
the facilities, security, safety staff, out-
side vendors and other building users.
The man machine interfaces of contin-
uous leak detection systems can be
quite complex. The successful perfor-
mance of routine maintenance, testing,
Journal of Chemical Health & Safety, May/June 2013
<200 1,000
Highly Toxic
toxic
4 3
1 2
calibration and emergency response
requires financial resources, planning,
and coordination. Gas and vapor
detection technology and the related
communication network requires
know how similar to other sensing
technologies in smart-buildings.
Assigning the maintenance of fixed
gas detection systems to an operational
entity such as facilities operations or
building management may be the most
successful and sustainable model. Risk
assessments and the coordination of
emergency plans are better assigned
to engineering, safety or security staff.
RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS
A thorough risk assessment process
should not only review building use,
regulations and standards but also
consider laboratory size and ventila-
tion, inhalation toxicity, flammability,
volume/quantity, pressure, and flow of
the gas in question.2
INHALATION TOXICITY
In recent years, much effort has been
made by the Occupational Health and
Safety Administration (OSHA) and
other national and international enti-
ties to adopt the Globally Harmonized
System (GHS)3 for chemical hazard
classification, hazard communication
and labeling. It likely will take several
more years before these harmonization
efforts will be reflected in US local
building codes. The International
Building Code (IBC) and its opera-
tional code for laboratories the Inter-
national Fire Code (IFC), the National
Fire Protection Association Standard
704 and the GHS all base the
classification of an inhalation hazard
2,000 3,000 5,000
NA
2
3 4
on published animal toxicity studies.
Albeit, each standard uses a different
language or classification scheme to
communicate classification and
thresholds. For example, in the NFPA
system escalating numbers (14) indi-
cate increasing hazard, where in
GHS the escalation is inverted; with
1 indicating the greatest hazard
(Table 1).
The applicable classification scheme
can have a significant impact on the
decision making process to consider
engineering or operational controls.
For example the IFC states4: Where
gases or liquids have a hazard ranking
of Health Hazard 3 or 4, Flammability
Class 4 Reactivity Class 3 or 4 in accor-
dance with NFPA 704 are carried in
pressurized piping above 15 pounds
per square inch gauge pressure (psig),
an approved means of leak detection
and emergency shutoff or excess flow
control shall be provided.
The inhalation toxicity of a particu-
lar concentrated gas may require a leak
detection system, where the same gas,
less concentrated, may not. In many
cases, the research objective does not
require the use of concentrated toxic
gases. A highly toxic or toxic gas may
be declassified when diluted with an
inert gas. The safety professional
should push back on end user initial
demands to find a workable concen-
tration for a particular toxic gas before
decisions about controls are made.
Procurement of diluted gases with
inhalation toxicity can greatly simplify
the control strategies. For example,
plasma enhanced chemical vapor
deposition of iron sulfide can work
using diluted hydrogen sulfide. Many
experiments involving carbon monox-
ide can be done at very low concentra-
tions, and fluorine for excimer lasers
can be ordered at low concentrations.
9
 The applicable formula for a binary
dilution calculation5 with an inert gas
is
LC50 of the mixture
LS50 of Gas A
fraction by volume of Gas
A in the mixture
Many gases with inhalation toxicity
exhibit other hazardous characteristics
such as flammability, reactivity or, in
the case of ammonia, the potential to
thermally decompose into twice its
volume.6 Specific standards advise on
controls, for example, NFPA 55
Compressed Gases and Cryogenic
fluids Chapter 14 advises on the spe-
cific hazards of ethylene oxide use, and
NFPA 318 Standard for the Protection
of Semiconductor Fabrication Facil-
ities has specific requirements for the
use of bulk silane gas and other pyr-
ophoric hydride gases. The OSHA Z-
table sets permissible exposure limits
(PEL) and short term exposure limits
(STEL). The American Conference of
Governmental Industrial Hygienists
(ACGIH) publishes threshold limit
values (TLV) for a number of toxic
gases and vapors such as ammonia,
arsine, carbon monoxide, carbon dis-
ulfide, ethylene, fluorine, halothane,
hydrogen sulfide, nitrogen dioxide,
nitromethane, 1-nitropropane, 2-
nitropropane, nitrous oxide, oxygen
difluoride, phosgene, phosphine, and
sulfur dioxide. The National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) publishes the Immediately
Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH)
values. In addition, the Compressed
Gas Association (CGA) has standards
for classification of toxic gas mixtures,
and separate standards for arsine,
phosphine, fluorine, hydrogen sulfide,
sulfur dioxide, anhydrous ammonia
and other gases.
FLAMMABILITY
The classification of compressed gas
flammability is determined by the gas
cylinder vendor, who, in the US, is
required to follow the OSHA Hazard
Communication standard and the
Department of Transportation (DOT)
regulations in its labeling and hazard
communication practices. OSHA and
10
DOT are phasing in the classification
and labeling requirements of GHS in
the next few years. The impact that
GHS may have on the applicable defi-
nitions, classifications and threshold
quantities in the fire and building
codes remains to be seen. Beyond sim-
ply looking at flammability, other phy-
sical characteristics and applicable
codes should be considered in a risk
assessment. For example, hydrogen,
acetylene and carbon disulfide gas
exhibit much lower ignition energy
requirements than other flammable
gases. Acetylene gas with a partial
pressure of >15 psig can detonate,
and improper use of copper tubing
can lead to the formation of explosive
copper acetylides.6
The flammable gas definition used
by most building codes includes that
the material is a gas at normal tem-
perature and pressure with less than
13% (volume/volume) in air is ignita-
ble at normal temperature or has a
flammable range with air wider than
12%, at atmospheric temperature and
pressure, regardless of the lower limit.
The physical state in which a flam-
mable gas exists has an impact on
allowable quantities. Fire codes distin-
guish between partially liquid states
and non-liquefied (gaseous) states.
The distinction between liquefied and
non-liquefied compressed gases
becomes important when applied to
the IBC/IFC compliance concept of
a Maximum Allowable Quantity
(MAQ) within a chemical control
zone. MAQs thresholds are dependent
on the building use, protective mea-
sures, the number of chemical control
zones and floor level within a building.
Mixing a flammable gas with an inert
gas can reduces the flammability but
caution must be taken when a dilution
scheme is applied to certain flammable
gases. For example, a binary mixture of
up to 5.7% hydrogen in nitrogen is
considered non-flammable. Non-flam-
mable is a binary mixture of up to 3.9%
hydrogen in helium. The hydrogen
concentration must be even lower to
be classified as non-flammable when
mixed with the other noble gases.7
As part of a flammable gas risk
assessment, one should keep in mind
the requirements of NFPA 70 the
National Electric Code for hazardous
Journal of Chemical Health & Safety, May/June 2013
(classified) locations. While labora-
tories in business occupancy are
usually not a hazardous (classified)
location, an apparatus where a flam-
mable gas is used at high concentra-
tions should be designed intrinsically
safe. NFPA 70 covers the likelihood
that a flammable or combustible con-
centration is present and the require-
ments for wiring in classified locations.
Examples of related code language
where continuous leak detection for
hydrogen or lighter than air fuels is
required in other occupancies can be
found in the International Fire Code
Section 2211-Repair Garages. There,
the activation of a hydrogen gas detec-
tion system must initiate a distinct
audible and visual alarm, deactivate
all heating systems and activate
mechanical ventilation. Another
example is the International Fire Code
Section 608 Stationary Lead-Acid Bat-
tery Systems, which stipulates building
systems able to keep the hydrogen con-
centration below 1%.
In addition, there are standards spe-
cific to flammable gases for example
OSHA 1910.102 Acetylene, OSHA
1910.103 Hydrogen, OSHA 1910.307
Hazardous (Classified) Locations,
NFPA 2: Hydrogen Technologies
Code, NFPA 51: Standard for the
Design and Installation of Oxygen-
Fuel Gas Systems for Welding, Cutting,
and Allied Processes, ANSI Z49.1
Safety in Welding, Cutting and Allied
Processes and NFPA 55: Compressed
Gases and Cryogenic Fluids Code. In
addition, the CGA published separate
standards for hydrogen, acetylene and
other flammable gases.
VOLUME AND QUANTITY
In the US, the locally adopted fire codes
for business occupancy apply stricter
quantity limits than volume or quantity
limitations in the OSHA standards for
general industry. Gas volumes or cylin-
der quantities above certain thresholds
require the installation of gas cylinder
storage rooms. For very large industrial
scale quantities the regulations for bulk
gas storage facilities apply.
Currently, there is no agreement
between the IFC and NFPA 55 Com-
pressed Gases and Cryogenic fluids
Table 2. International Fire Code (IFC) 2003.8 Maximum Allowable Quantities in Exhausted Storage Enclosure (Gas Cylinder
Cabinet(s)) per Control Area. Unless Constructed to High Hazard Group (H-2 or H-3) Specifications.
Hazardous Below Grade/ 1st Floor/Grade 2nd Floor 3rd Floor 4th7th Floor
Material Basement (75%MAQ) (100% MAQ) (75% MAQ) (50% MAQ) (12.5% MAQ)
Highly toxic 20 ft 3 20 ft 3 20 ft 3 20 ft 3 20 ft 3
Toxic 1,214 ft 3 1,620 ft 3 1,214 ft 3 810 ft 3 202 ft 3

Table 3. NFPA 45/55. Maximum Allowable Quantities of Toxic Gases per Laboratory Unit in Vented Enclosure.
Hazardous Material Class A, B, C Labs Class D Labs Instructional Labs
Lecture bottles (all hazards) 25 25 10
Highly toxic liquefied 8 lb 4 lb 0.8 lb
Highly toxic non liquefied 40 ft 3 20 ft 3 4 ft 3
Toxic liquefied 600 lb 300 lb 60 lb
Toxic non liquefied 3.240 ft 3 1,620 ft 3 324 ft 3
Note: Health Hazard 3 and 4 gases are not permitted in educational laboratory work areas.

Table 4. International Fire Code (IFC) 2003. Maximum Allowable Quantities in Use and Storage Per Control Area. With Automatic
Sprinklers and in Approved Exhausted Enclosure (i.e. Gas Cylinder Cabinets).
Hazardous Material Below Grade/ 1st Floor/ 2nd Floor 3rd Floor 4th7th Floor
Basement Grade
Flammable gas 3,000 ft 3 4,000 ft 3 3,000 ft 3 2,000 ft 3 500 ft 3
(gaseous)
Flammable gas 100 gal 120 gal 100 gal 60 gal 15 gal
(liquefied)

code language applied to the term
maximum allowable quantity.
Actual limitations therefore depend
on the applicable code, interpretation
of the code by the authority having
jurisdiction, building and use classifi-
cation, chemical control zone or
laboratory unit within the building
and floor level, proximity to other
occupancy classifications, hazardous
characteristic of the gas, and employed
control technologies such as sprinklers
and vented enclosures (i.e. gas cylinder
cabinets).
For toxic gases the storage limits in
gas cylinder cabinets or other
exhausted enclosure as per Interna-
tional Fire Code and NFPA are as
shown below (Tables 2 and 3).
The storage limits for flammable
gases are shown below (Table 4).
Two NFPA standards have to be con-
sulted when determining the maximum
allowable quantity of flammable gases
in laboratories. NFPA 45 classifies
laboratories in hazard class A, B, C
and D, and also introduces more
strict limits for educational and instruc-
tional laboratories. Most information
regarding maximum allowable quanti- including all gases with a critical tem-
ties can be gleaned from NFPA 55. perature 50 8C.
Further limitations apply to storage A threshold pressure of >15 psig
quantities below grade. may trigger additional control require-
Per NFPA 45 11.1.6.8, instructional ments under IFC. Under NFPA 55 any
laboratory work areas only allow 10% pressure above normal atmospheric
of the amounts shown in Table 5, or 10 pressure and >25 psig for gases with
lecture bottle size cylinders. no health of physical hazards is con-
sidered compressed. NFPA 318
Standard for the Protection of Semi-
PRESSURE conductor Fabrication Facilities and
the US Department of Transportation
There is no agreement between the also applies a threshold pressure
various US regulation and standards of >25 psig. The US Department
to the definition of a compressed of Transportation expands the
gas. Under GHS, the definition reads: definition further to any material or
A gas, which when packaged under mixture having an absolute pressure in
pressure is entirely gaseous at 50 8C; excess of 104 psi at 130 F, or any liquid
Table 5. NFPA 55.9 Maximum Allowable Quantities of Flammable Gases per Control
Area for Sprinklered Area.
Material Within Exhausted Gas Cylinder
Cabinet or Exhausted Enclosure
Flammable gas liquefied 600 lb (272 kg)
Flammable gas non liquefied 4,000 ft3 (112 m3)
Pyrophoric gas liquefied 8 lb (3.6 kg)
Pyrophoric gas non liquefied 100 ft3 (2.8 m3)

Journal of Chemical Health & Safety, May/June 2013 11

 [(Fig._1)TD$IG]
flammable material having an absolute
vapor pressure exceeding 40 psi at
100 F.
Most compressed gas cylinders used
in the laboratory will be in 2,000
2,640 psig (138182 bar) range, but spe-
cial cylinders may have pressures up to
6,000 psig (414 bar).10 In the laboratory,
downstream regulators may be single
stage regulators, dual stage regulators
or mass flow controllers. Most labora-
tory regulators are rated for a maximum
inlet pressure of 3,000 psig. Compo-
Fig. 1. Gas leak scenario outside the gas cylinder cabinet.
nents of the engineered gas delivery sys- [(Fig._2)TD$IG]
tem that can limit a leak occurrence
downstream from a compressed gas
cylinder are the restrictive flow orifice
(RFO), regulators, or the pipe diameter.
The mass flow quality of a gas depends
on its molecular weight.
At a given pressure the maximum
possible leak rate is depended on the
smallest diameter orifice within the
system. The flow restricting orifice
may be the pipe or tube diameter itself,
or a specially installed restrictive flow
orifice. In order to determine if a gas
pipe break at a given pressure and
normal temperature is a safety concern
the equation in NFPA 55 2010 Fig. 2. Location of restrictive flow orifice (RFO).
7.9.3.6.2 can be used.
28:96=MW1=2
CFM 767  A  P
60
CONTROL STRATEGIES or small closet has higher risks than the
where CFM is the cubic feet per min- installation in a large well ventilated
ute of gas flow, A the area of orifice in The laboratory lay out and its ventila- laboratory. CGA assigns standard
inch2, P the supply pressure of gas in tion has to be part of a risk assessment cylinder valve outlet connections
pounds per square inch absolute and features in control strategies. and dimensions for specific gases.
(psia), and MW is the molecular Installation of toxic or flammable gas The control strategies prescribed by a
weight of gas. systems in an unventilated cold room standard, code, regulation or deduced
As part of a risk assessment, and [(Fig._3)TD$IG]
with knowledge of the laboratory air
volume or air exchange rate, it can be
assessed when threshold values such
as PEL, STEL, or LEL are reached as
a result of a leak scenario. Leak rate
calculations are useful to include as
part of a risk assessment, but incom-
plete mixing of leaked gas and labora-
tory air must be considered. Where a
hazardous compressed gas cylinder is
stored in an exhausted gas cylinder
cabinet and the gas is delivered
through a small diameter tube to a
laboratory apparatus this type of cal-
culations can determine the maxi-
mum leak rate at any point
downstream from the vented enclo-
sure (Figs. 13). Fig. 3. Location examples for ambient detection points.

12 Journal of Chemical Health & Safety, May/June 2013

from thorough risk assessments can be
summarized as such:
 Keep quantities of compressed gases
low to reduce the toxic release
hazard or fuel loading.
 Reduce the hazard by reducing the
toxic/flammable concentration of
the gas source.
 Consider onsite gas generation espe-
cially for hydrogen gas to reduce the
fuel load and reduce a possible leak-
age rate. An onsite generated gas
must be used up or exhausted as it
is generated. As an operational con-
trol, prohibit the collection and sto-
rage of hydrogen gas unless
specifically designed controls are in
place. A risk assessment may show
that a table top hydrogen generator,
which generates 200 cc of gas per
minute at 90 psig, is unlikely to
require continuous leak detection.
 Reduce potential rate of hazardous
gas release through restrictive flow
orifices.11 Many laboratory gas sup-
pliers allow toxic and flammable
gases to be procured with RFOs
installed. Where a regular cylinder
valve may have an orifice of 4 mm
when fully opened, a RFO can
reduce the opening to 0.35 mm,
0.25 mm or even 0.15 mm. For
example, a nominal nitrogen flow
rate at 2,000 psig (138 bar) could
thus be reduced to 150, 75, or
30 liters per minute.
 Consider the installation of mechan-
ical excess flow control valves.
Excess flow control valves are spring
loaded devices which close automa-
tically when a specified gas flow is
exceeded. Excess flow control valves
perform on a flow curve. As the
upstream pressure decreases the
valve will close at lower and lower
gas flows. The Matheson 6295-An
excess flow control valve at
1,000 psig will shut off a standard
gas flow at 5 standard liters/min
and at 100 psig the shut off occurs
at 1 standard liter/min.
 Install a vented gas cylinder cabinet.
While lecture bottle and small cylin-
ders may be used in a regular labora-
tory fume hood, larger compressed
gas cylinders of toxic or pyrophoric
gas require a separate vented enclo-
sure. Vented gas cylinder cabinets
Journal of Chemical Health & Safety, May/June 2013
increase the amount of gas that is
code allowable in a laboratory. IFC
and NFPA stipulate a maximum of 3
cylinders per cabinet and a door vent
face velocity of 200 feet per min-
ute.12 The installation of cabinet fire
sprinklers is required for toxic gases
as per IFC12 and NFPA 55.9 Effec-
tively controlling residual highly
toxic gas during cylinder change
out may require fully automated
vacuum assisted purging, a logic-
controlled manifold system, an auto-
matic changeover system or a single-
station manifold.6 Manual kill
switches can also be part of a logic
controlled system.
 Install fixed gas leak detection
coupled with automatic shut off
valves and/or dilution/purge venti-
lation. Certain moderately toxic
gases have good physiological warn-
ing properties, which may influence
the risk assessment process and the
desirable control technologies. The
selection and design of leak detec-
tion systems and associated logic
can be a complex endeavor, where
advice from an experienced engineer
or industrial hygienist advisable. For
flammable gases the alarm level can
be set at 10% of the lower explosive
limit (LEL) in a confined space13
and less than 25% LEL in a well-
ventilated laboratory. Most gas leak
detectors can be set to lower alarm
threshold limits. According to NFPA
55, the sensing interval must be less
than five minutes and the sensitivity
for toxic gas detection at least to the
PEL of the gas.14
There are a variety of gas sensor
technologies available. An explana-
tion of the pro and cons of each
technology go beyond the scope of
this article and more comprehen-
sive resources should be con-
sulted.1518 In general, recently
developed technologies allow for
more sensitive and more specific
gas detection. Even with continued
improvements, gas and vapor
detection systems can only be con-
figured to maximize detection suc-
cess but cannot guarantee it. Alarm
levels for detection points within
an enclosure, for example in an
exhaust duct, may be set higher
than detection points that measure
concentration in ambient air.
Determining the number and loca-
tion of detection points within a
laboratory is not an exact science.
Ambient air detection points for
lighter than air gases should be at
the ceiling of a lab and in the area
where the gas is most likely to pool,
or migrate towards a return air
duct. Similarly, detection points
for heavier than air gases are
installed where gases will migrate
due to air currents, low points or
laboratory lay out. Ambient air
detection points for toxic gases
should be in the breathing zone
of the laboratory worker
mounted at 60 inches height.
 Double walled piping is sometimes
specified for the conveyance of
highly toxic gases. It is a robust engi-
neering control, which can be set up
to alarm when a pressure drop in the
annular space indicates a possible
leak.
 Waste gas treatment systems are a
required control when the dilution
in the exhaust air stream cannot
adequately reduce the hazard.
Burn boxes or catalytic converters
are used for flammable gases. For
the treatment of toxic waste gases
there are a number of different
technical options. Waste gas treat-
ment systems can be found in clean
rooms for semiconductor research
where highly toxic or explosive
gases such as arsine, phosphine,
diborane and silane in significant
quantities are used. They should
only be designed and specified by
an experienced engineer. A waste
treatment system for toxic gases
always requires a fixed toxic gas
detection system. NFPA and IFC
require that the gas concentration
past a toxic gas treatment system
not to exceed one half the IDLH of
the toxic gas.
 In hazardous (classified) locations,
specially designed equipment and
special installation techniques must
be used to protect against the risk of
explosion. Within the scope of
allowable laboratory use of flam-
mable gases in business occupancy,
such intrinsically safe or explosion
proof design may be required for gas
cylinder cabinets, fume hoods,
13
 refrigerators or other laboratory
apparatus where explosive atmo-
spheres could accumulate.19
CONTINUOUS LEAK DETECTION
SYSTEMS ALARM ACTIVATION
The alarm activation of a simple gas
leak detection system triggers a visual
and audible device inside the labora-
tory. Additional strobes and horns
may be required or desired to be
installed outside the laboratory. If
the status of the continuous leak
detection system is to be monitored
24 hours, the alarm signal needs to
be sent to a central station. At univer-
sities in most cases, an alarm signal is
sent to the security or police dis-
patcher. The dispatcher is supplied
with a communication algorithm to
determine action steps as part of a
response plan. In cases where a gas
leak could significantly affect the
health and safety of persons outside
the laboratory perimeter, an interface
with the fire alarm system may be
advisable or required by the authority
having jurisdiction. A tie-in of the con-
tinuous leak detection system into the
fire alarm system can initiate a build-
ing evacuation for example.
The activation of a gas leak detection
system can also initiate additional
engineering controls for example the
closing of automatic gas shut off valves,
the activation of purge ventilation20 or
roof vents.
CONCLUSION
A continuous leak detection system
can provide additional information
and warning to users of toxic or flam-
mable gases in laboratories. Before
such a system is considered for instal-
lation, all other control options should
be thoroughly researched. Controls
14
for gas delivery and maximum concen-
trations, available engineering or
operational controls, assessment of
the size and ventilation of the labora-
tory, physical characteristics, and
flammability or toxicity levels of the
compressed gas should be considered
in a thorough risk assessment.
The current diversity of toxic and
flammable gas related definitions,
thresholds and units in US regulations
and standards represents an unneces-
sary layer of complexity, which may
lead to conflicting advisories and inter-
pretation. Full adoption of GHS termi-
nology, definitions and thresholds in
all related standards can simplify and
streamline a risk assessment process.
CREDITS
Graphics created by Cindi Mason,
Northwestern University Office for
Research Safety.
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