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Q: When you said you have (sic) a short Although every office in the government
lived relationship from 8 to 9 months, you service is a public trust, no position exacts a
mean to tell the Court that you have (sic) a greater demand for moral righteousness and
sexual union with this woman? uprightness from an individual than in the
judiciary. 23 That is why this Court has firmly
A: Yes ma'am. 19 (Emphasis and laid down exacting standards morality and
underscoring supplied). decency expected of those in the service of the
judiciary. 24 Their conduct, not to mention
Respondent justified his pursuing a behavior, is circumscribed with the heavy
relationship with complainant's wife with the burden of responsibility, 25 characterized by,
spouses having priorly entered into a among other things, propriety and decorum so
settlement with respect to their marriage as to earn and keep the public's respect and
which was embodied in a "Kasunduan," the confidence in the judicial service. 26 It must
pertinent portions of which are reproduced be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only
hereunder: with respect to their duties in the judicial
Kami, EDWIN AGUINALDO ACEBEDO at branch but also to their behaviour outside the
DEDJE IRADER ACEBEDO, may sapat na court as private individuals. 27 There is no
dichotomy of morality; court employees are
taong gulang, mag-asawa, Pilipino, at
kasalukuyang nakatira sa Poblacion, Broke's also judged by their private morals. 28
(sic) Point, Palawan, ay malayang nagkasundo Respondent's act of having illicit relations with
ng mga sumusunod: complainant's wife is, within the purview of
Section 46(5) of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of
1. Na, yayamang hindi kami magkasundo
bilang mag-asawa, at magiging miserable Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as
lamang ang aming mga buhay kung aming the Administrative Code of 1987, a disgraceful
ipagpapatuloy pa ang aming pagsasama and immoral conduct.
bilang mag-asawa, kami ay malayang Under Rule IV, Section 52A(15) of the Revised
nagkasundo ngayon na maghiwalay na bilang Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the
mag-asawa, at ang bawat isa sa amin ay may Civil Service, an immoral conduct is classified
kalayaan na humanap na ng kaniyang as a grave offense which calls for a penalty of
makakasama sa buhay bilang asawa at hindi suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day
kami maghahabol sa isat isa sa alin pa mang to one (1) year for the first offense, and
hukuman; dismissal is imposed for the second offense.
Since the present charge of immorality against SECOND DIVISION
respondent constitutes his first offense, his
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day [A.C. No. 9081. October 12, 2011.]
is in order. RODOLFO A. ESPINOSA and MAXIMO A.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent GLINDO, complainants, vs. ATTY. JULIETA
Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the A. OMAA, respondent.
Municipal Trial Court of Brooke's Point, DECISION
Palawan, GUILTY of immorality, for which he
is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months and CARPIO, J p:
one (1) day without pay with a STERN
WARNING that commission of the same or The Case
similar acts shall be dealt with severely. Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment
HAaDTE filed by Rodolfo A. Espinosa (Espinosa) and
Let a copy of this decision be filed in the Maximo A. Glindo (Glindo) against Atty.
personal record of respondent. Julieta A. Omaa (Omaa). SHacCD
REPUBLIKA NG PILIPINAS
BAYAN NG GUMACA
LALAWIGAN NG QUEZON
KASUNDUAN NG PAGHIHIWALAY
Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the The error of the trial court in ruling that
Civil Registrar General, Manila, it, likewise, without the marriage certificate, no other
issued a Certification (Exhibit "B") stating proof of the fact can be accepted, has been
that: aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v. Court of
Appeals. 29 Thus:
records from 1932 up to early part of 1945
were totally destroyed during the liberation of It should be stressed that the due execution
Manila on February 4, 1945. What are and the loss of the marriage contract, both
presently filed in this office are records from constituting the conditio sine qua non for the
the latter part of 1945 to date, except for the introduction of secondary evidence of its
city of Manila which starts from 1952. Hence, contents, were shown by the very evidence
this office has no way of verifying and could they have disregarded. They have thus
not issue as requested, certified true copy of confused the evidence to show due execution
the records of marriage between [Eustaquio] and loss as "secondary" evidence of the
and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court
30th September 1942, in Talibon, Bohol. 27 clarified this misconception thus: DcHaET
In the absence of the marriage contract, the . . . [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in
trial court did not give credence to the holding that parol evidence of the execution of
testimony of Tecla and her witnesses as it the instrument was barred. The court
considered the same as mere self-serving confounded the execution and the contents of
assertions. Superior significance was given to the document. It is the contents, . . . which
the fact that Tecla could not even produce her may not be prove[n] by secondary evidence
own copy of the said proof of marriage. Relying when the instrument itself is accessible.
on Section 3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Proofs of the execution are not dependent on
Rules of Court, the trial court declared that the existence or non-existence of the
Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first document, and, as a matter of fact, such
marriage. HICEca proofs of the contents: due execution, besides
the loss, has to be shown as foundation for In the case at bench, the celebration of
the introduction of secondary evidence of the marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO
contents. was established by the testimonial evidence
furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be
xxx xxx xxx present during the marriage ceremony, and by
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event.
the last analysis, necessarily collateral or The loss was shown by the certifications
primary. It generally consists of parol issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol.
testimony or extrinsic papers. Even when the These are relevant, competent and admissible
document is actually produced, its authencity evidence. Since the due execution and the loss
is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its of the marriage contract were clearly shown by
face or recital of its contents but by parol the evidence presented, secondary evidence
evidence. At the most, failure to produce the testimonial and documentary may be
document, when available, to establish its admitted to prove the fact of marriage. In
execution may effect the weight of the PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the Supreme Court held
evidence presented but not the admissibility of that "marriage may be proven by any
such evidence. competent and relevant evidence. The
testimony by one of the parties to the marriage
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial or by one of the witnesses to the marriage has
court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by been held to be admissible to prove the fact of
relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even marriage. The person who officiated at the
there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] solemnization is also competent to testify as
by other competent evidence. an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."
The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage
to the crime charged on arraignment. Law, and provides the penalty for violation of
the latter law. Applying these laws, the MTC
The prosecution's witnesses, Joseph and Mary imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of
Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the P200.00. 12 DISHEA
ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while
The RTC Ruling
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and that the contracting parties personally
added that the circumstances surrounding the declared that they take each other as husband
act of the petitioner in "blessing" the couple and wife. 18
unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony
had transpired. It further ruled that the Second, under the principle of separation of
positive declarations of the prosecution church and State, the State cannot interfere
witnesses deserve more credence than the in ecclesiastical affairs such as the
petitioner's negative statements. 13 The RTC, administration of matrimony. Therefore, the
however, ruled that the basis of the fine State cannot convert the "blessing" into a
should be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of "marriage ceremony." 19
the Marriage Law. Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as
The CA Decision he conducted the "blessing" in good faith for
purposes of giving moral guidance to the
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's ruling. couple. 20
The CA observed that although there is no
prescribed form or religious rite for the Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case
solemnization of marriage, the law provides against the couple in violating Article 350 of
minimum standards in determining whether a the RPC, as amended, should preclude the
marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: filing of the present case against him. 21
(1) the contracting parties must appear Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended,
personally before the solemnizing officer; and does not provide for a penalty. The present
(2) they should declare that they take each case is not covered by Section 44 of the
other as husband and wife in the presence of Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found
at least two witnesses of legal age. 14 violating its provisions nor a regulation
According to the CA, the prosecution duly promulgated thereafter. 22
proved these requirements. It added that the
presence of a marriage certificate is not a THE COURT'S RULING:
requirement in a marriage ceremony. 15
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner's
criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC, The elements of the crime
as amended, is not dependent on whether punishable under Article 352 of the
Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty
under Article 350 of the same Code. 16 RPC, as amended, were proven by
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal the prosecution
basis for the imposition of the fine is Section
44 of the Marriage Law since it covers Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes
violation of regulations to be promulgated by an authorized solemnizing officer who shall
the proper authorities such as the RPC. perform or authorize any illegal marriage
ceremony. The elements of this crime are as
The Petition follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer;
and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the
ceremony.
following grounds: SDHITE
In the present case, the petitioner admitted
First, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is that he has authority to solemnize a marriage.
vague and does not define what constitutes Hence, the only issue to be resolved is
"an illegal marriage ceremony." Assuming that
whether the alleged "blessing" by the
a marriage ceremony principally constitutes petitioner is tantamount to the performance of
those enunciated in Article 55 of the Civil an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is
Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as
provisions require the verbal declaration that
amended. ITcCSA
the couple take each other as husband and
wife, and a marriage certificate containing the While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended,
declaration in writing which is duly signed by does not specifically define a "marriage
the contracting parties and attested to by the ceremony" and what constitutes its "illegal"
solemnizing officer. 17 The petitioner likewise performance, Articles 3 (3) and 6 of the Family
maintains that the prosecution failed to prove Code are clear on these matters. These
provisions were taken from Article 55 23 of the that tend to destroy the theory of one party.
New Civil Code which, in turn, was copied 28
from Section 3 24 of the Marriage Law with no
substantial amendments. At any rate, if the defense found the line of
questioning of the judge objectionable, its
Article 6 25 of the Family Code provides that failure to timely register this bars it from
"[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the belatedly invoking any irregularity.
solemnization of the marriage is required. It
shall be necessary, however, for the In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and
contracting parties to appear personally before Mary Anne, and even the petitioner's
the solemnizing officer and declare in the admission regarding the circumstances of the
presence of not less than two witnesses of ceremony, support Florida's testimony that
legal age that they take each other as there had indeed been the declaration by the
husband and wife." 26 couple that they take each other as husband
and wife. The testimony of Joey disowning
Pertinently, Article 3 (3) 27 mirrors Article 6 of their declaration as husband and wife cannot
the Family Code and particularly defines a overcome these clear and convincing pieces of
marriage ceremony as that which takes place evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show
with the appearance of the contracting parties that the prosecution witnesses, Joseph and
before the solemnizing officer and their Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify
personal declaration that they take each other against the petitioner.
as husband and wife in the presence of not
less than two witnesses of legal age. We also do not agree with the petitioner that
the principle of separation of church and State
Even prior to the date of the enactment of precludes the State from qualifying the church
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule "blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary
was clear that no prescribed form of religious to the petitioner's allegation, this principle has
rite for the solemnization of the marriage is been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family
required. However, as correctly found by the Code when it provides that no prescribed form
CA, the law sets the minimum requirements or religious rite for the solemnization of
constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there marriage is required. This pronouncement
should be the personal appearance of the gives any religion or sect the freedom or
contracting parties before a solemnizing latitude in conducting its respective marital
officer; and second, their declaration in the rites, subject only to the requirement that the
presence of not less than two witnesses that core requirements of law be observed.
they take each other as husband and wife. CTSHDI
As to the first requirement, the petitioner We emphasize at this point that Article 15 29
admitted that the parties appeared before him of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an
and this fact was testified to by witnesses. On inviolable social institution and that our
the second requirement, we find that, contrary family law is based on the policy that marriage
to the petitioner's allegation, the prosecution is not a mere contract, but a social institution
has proven, through the testimony of Florida, in which the State is vitally interested. The
that the contracting parties personally State has paramount interest in the
declared that they take each other as husband enforcement of its constitutional policies and
and wife. cDSAEI the preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To
this end, it is within its power to enact laws
The petitioner's allegation that the court asked and regulations, such as Article 352 of the
insinuating and leading questions to Florida RPC, as amended, which penalize the
fails to persuade us. A judge may examine or commission of acts resulting in the
cross-examine a witness. He may propound disintegration and mockery of marriage.
clarificatory questions to test the credibility of
the witness and to extract the truth. He may From these perspectives, we find it clear that
seek to draw out relevant and material what the petitioner conducted was a marriage
testimony though that testimony may tend to ceremony, as the minimum requirements set
support or rebut the position taken by one or by law were complied with. While the
the other party. It cannot be taken against petitioner may view this merely as a
him if the clarificatory questions he "blessing," the presence of the requirements of
propounds happen to reveal certain truths the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony
qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage bishop or officer, priest, or minister of any
ceremony" as contemplated by Article 3 (3) of church, religion or sect the regulations and
the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, practices whereof require banns or
as amended. publications previous to the solemnization of a
marriage in accordance with section ten, who
We come now to the issue of whether the authorized the immediate solemnization of a
solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage that is subsequently declared illegal;
marriage ceremony was illegal. or any officer, priest or minister solemnizing
Under Article 3 (3) of the Family Code, one of marriage in violation of this act, shall be
the essential requisites of marriage is the punished by imprisonment for not less than
presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the one month nor more than two years, or by a
present case, the petitioner admitted that he fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor
knew that the couple had no marriage license, more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis
yet he conducted the "blessing" of their ours]
relationship. On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the Law states that:
marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the Section 44. General Penal Clause. Any
essential and formal requirements of marriage violation of any provision of this Act not
set by law were lacking. The marriage specifically penalized, or of the regulations to
ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The be promulgated by the proper authorities,
petitioner's knowledge of the absence of these shall be punished by a fine of not more than
requirements negates his defense of good two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not
faith. more than one month, or both, in the
We also do not agree with the petitioner that discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]
the lack of a marriage certificate negates his CDAcIT
criminal liability in the present case. For From a reading of the provisions cited above,
purposes of determining if a marriage we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the
ceremony has been conducted, a marriage MTC that the penalty imposable in the present
certificate is not included in the requirements case is that covered under Section 44, and not
provided by Article 3 (3) of the Family Code, as Section 39, of the Marriage Law.
discussed above. DaAISH
The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No.
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal 3613 do not include the present case. As
complaint against the couple negate criminal correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was
liability of the petitioner. Article 352 of the not found violating the provisions of the
RPC, as amended, does not make this an Marriage Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as
element of the crime. amended. It is only the imposition of the
The penalty imposed is proper penalty for the violation of this provision
which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this
On the issue on the penalty for violation of point, Article 352 falls squarely under the
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which
provision clearly provides that it shall be provides for the penalty for any violation of the
imposed in accordance with the provision of regulations to be promulgated by the proper
the Marriage Law. The penalty provisions of authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as
the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 amended, which was enacted after the
which provide as follows: Marriage Law, is one of such regulations.
Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that: Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the
penalty of fine of P200.00 pursuant to Section
Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage. 44 of the Marriage Law.
Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage
without being authorized by the Director of WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and
the Philippine National Library or who, upon affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals
solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the dated April 3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.
authorization in force when called upon to do
SO ORDERED.
so by the parties or parents, grandparents,
guardians, or persons having charge and any Carpio, Del Castillo, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION until Gloria told him later. He further testified
that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply
[G.R. No. 183896. January 30, 2013.] for a marriage license, and that he had never
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, petitioner, vs. resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, respondent. to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and
DECISION was asked to show a copy of their marriage
contract wherein the marriage license number
VELASCO, JR., J p: could be found. 5 The Municipal Civil
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, questioning the Decision 1 of the the marriage license number appearing in the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 marriage contract he submitted, Marriage
in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the License No. 9969967, was the number of
another marriage license issued to a certain
Decision 2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM
dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. 6
Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the Said certification reads as follows: DcSACE
CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying 11 July 2003
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the
CA Decision. aSIDCT TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
The present case stems from a petition filed by This is to certify as per Registry Records of
petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of
Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay MR. ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA
City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382- MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993.
CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed
alleged the absence of a marriage license, as No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been
provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS
Executive Order No. 269, * otherwise known GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed
ground for the annulment of his marriage to Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or
Gloria. intents it may serve. 7
In the Marriage Contract 3 of Gloria and Syed, On cross-examination, Syed testified that
it is stated that Marriage License No. Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in
9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the
January 8, 1993, was presented to the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite
solemnizing officer. It is this information that to get certification on whether or not there was
is crucial to the resolution of this case. a marriage license on advice of his counsel. 8
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic
testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil
in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared
August 9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in under a letter of authority from the Municipal
Taiwan. 4 He arrived in the Philippines in Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and
December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at brought documents pertaining to Marriage
around 5 o'clock in the afternoon, he was at License No. 9969967, which was issued to
his mother-in-law's residence, located at 2676 Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on
F. Muoz St., Malate, Manila, when his January 20, 1993. 9 Bagsic testified that their
mother-in-law arrived with two men. He office issues serial numbers for marriage
testified that he was told that he was going to licenses and that the numbers are issued
undergo some ceremony, one of the chronologically. 10 He testified that the
requirements for his stay in the Philippines, certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued
but was not told of the nature of said and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion,
ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona,
signed a document. He claimed that he did Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No.
not know that the ceremony was a marriage 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and
Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and house, showed her the marriage license before
that their office had not issued any other returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it
license of the same serial number, namely to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. 24 She
9969967, to any other person. 11 further testified that she did not read all of the
contents of the marriage license, and that she
For her part, Gloria testified on her own was told that the marriage license was
behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, obtained from Carmona. 25 She also testified
Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria
Ann Ceriola. ETISAc against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that Manila, evidenced by an information for
he was a minister of the Gospel and a Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending
barangay captain, and that he is authorized to before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court
solemnize marriages within the Philippines. 12 of Manila. 26
He testified that he solemnized the marriage of As to Mary Ann Ceriola's testimony, the
Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a)
residence of the bride on January 9, 1993. 13 she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of
He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9,
Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos
Ann Ceriola. 14 He testified that he had been and she could identify all the persons depicted
solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that in said photos; and (c) her testimony
he is familiar with the requirements. 15 Rev. corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty.
Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave Sanchez. cTCaEA
him the marriage license the day before the
actual wedding, and that the marriage The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is
contract was prepared by his secretary. 16 her husband, and presented the marriage
After the solemnization of the marriage, it was contract bearing their signatures as proof. 27
registered with the Local Civil Registrar of She and her mother sought the help of Atty.
Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and
marriage contract and copy of the marriage asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain
license with that office. 17 Qualin went to their house and said that he
will get the marriage license for them, and
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be after several days returned with an application
the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and for marriage license for them to sign, which
Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with
Felicitas Goo. 18 He testified that he the marriage license, they gave the license to
requested a certain Qualin to secure the Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
marriage license for the couple, and that this solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she
Qualin secured the license and gave the same and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at
to him on January 8, 1993. 19 He further their residence. 28
testified that he did not know where the
marriage license was obtained. 20 He attended Gloria further testified that she has a
the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993.
signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and 29
witnessed the signing of the marriage contract
by the couple, the solemnizing officer and the Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy
other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola. 21 case against Syed, who had married a certain
Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her existence of the previous marriage, and that
daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in- the case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
law, and that she was present at the wedding 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila. 30
ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her
house. 22 She testified that she sought the Gloria stated that she and Syed had already
help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan,
in securing the marriage license, and that a but that she did not know if said marriage had
week before the marriage was to take place, a been celebrated under Muslim rites, because
male person went to their house with the the one who celebrated their marriage was
application for marriage license. 23 Three Chinese, and those around them at the time
days later, the same person went back to their were Chinese. 31
The Ruling of the RTC THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING
THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE
RTC held that no valid marriage license was TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE
issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING
Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, THAT THERE WAS ONE.
as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been
issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra II
Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
marriage license had been issued for Gloria CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID
and Syed. 32 It also took into account the fact MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING
that neither party was a resident of Carmona, EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE
Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE
9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING
the Family Code. 33 As the marriage was not PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING
one of those exempt from the license OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL
requirement, and that the lack of a valid DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH
marriage license is an absence of a formal OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE
requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO
January 9, 1993 was void ab initio. cCESaH WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
The petition is meritorious. EHCaDS We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual
solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied
Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the on the marriage contract as well as the
Philippines, is the applicable law. The testimonies of her witnesses to prove the
pertinent provisions that would apply to this existence of said license. To prove that no
particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35 (3), such license was issued, Syed turned to the
which read as follows: office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: said license. It was there that he requested
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; certification that no such license was issued.
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals 43
(2) A valid marriage license except in the such certification was allowed, as permitted
cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; by Sec. 29, * Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
and which reads:
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A
with the appearance of the contracting parties written statement signed by an officer having
before the solemnizing officer and their the custody of an official record or by his
personal declaration that they take each other deputy that after diligent search, no record or
as husband and wife in the presence of not entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in
less than two witnesses of legal age. the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as
evidence that the records of his office contain relied on the Certification issued by the Civil
no such record or entry. Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that
the alleged marriage license could not be
In the case of Republic, in allowing the located as the same did not appear in their
certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to records. Nowhere in the Certification was it
prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, categorically stated that the officer involved
the Court held: SDAcaT conducted a diligent search, nor is a
The above Rule authorized the custodian of categorical declaration absolutely necessary
the documents to certify that despite diligent for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to
search, a particular document does not exist apply. IEHDAT
in his office or that a particular entry of a Under Sec. 3 (m), Rule 131 of the Rules of
specified tenor was not to be found in a Court, it is a disputable presumption that an
register. As custodians of public documents, official duty has been regularly performed,
civil registrars are public officers charged with absent contradiction or other evidence to the
the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register contrary. We held, "The presumption of
book where they are required to enter all regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
applications for marriage licenses, including affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
the names of the applicants, the date the perform a duty." 46 No such affirmative
marriage license was issued and such other evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil
relevant data. 44 Registrar was lax in performing her duty of
The Court held in that case that the checking the records of their office, thus the
certification issued by the civil registrar presumption must stand. In fact, proof does
enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to exist of a diligent search having been
maintain records of data relative to the conducted, as Marriage License No. 9969967
issuance of a marriage license. was indeed located and submitted to the
court. The fact that the names in said license
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed
Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria does not overturn the presumption that the
and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a registrar conducted a diligent search of the
certification to the effect that no such records of her office.
marriage license for Gloria and Syed was
issued, and that the serial number of the It is telling that Gloria failed to present their
marriage license pertained to another couple, marriage license or a copy thereof to the court.
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A She failed to explain why the marriage license
certified machine copy of Marriage License No. was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location
9969967 was presented, which was issued in where, admittedly, neither party resided. She
Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of took no pains to apply for the license, so she
Gloria and Syed do not appear in the is not the best witness to testify to the validity
document. and existence of said license. Neither could
the other witnesses she presented prove the
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the existence of the marriage license, as none of
wording of the certification, stating that it did them applied for the license in Carmona,
not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not
Rules of Court. even testify as to the contents of the license,
having admitted to not reading all of its
The CA deduced that from the absence of the contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors,
words "despite diligent search" in the whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for
certification, and since the certification used assistance in securing the license, admitted
stated that no marriage license appears to not knowing where the license came from. The
have been issued, no diligent search had been task of applying for the license was delegated
conducted and thus the certification could not to a certain Qualin, who could have testified
be given probative value. as to how the license was secured and thus
impeached the certification of the Municipal
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the
case of Republic v. Court of Appeals. 45 It is Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her
worth noting that in that particular case, the representative. As Gloria failed to present this
Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar still enjoys probative value. STcAIa
court that a marriage license was lacking,
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer which shows appellee signing the Marriage
testified that the marriage contract and a copy Contract. SETaHC
of the marriage license were submitted to the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of xxx xxx xxx
the marriage license could have simply been The parties have comported themselves as
secured from that office and submitted to the husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring,
court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15
so, further weakening her claim that there June 1993. It took appellee more than ten (10)
was a valid marriage license issued for her years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his
and Syed. Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
In the case of Cario v. Cario, 47 following under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take
the case of Republic, 48 it was held that the serious note that said Petition appears to have
certification of the Local Civil Registrar that been instituted by him only after an
their office had no record of a marriage license Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10
was adequate to prove the non-issuance of January 2003 was filed against him for
said license. The case of Cario further held contracting a second or subsequent marriage
that the presumed validity of the marriage of with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T.
the parties had been overcome, and that it Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward
became the burden of the party alleging a (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his
valid marriage to prove that the marriage was marriage and give him his freedom and in the
valid, and that the required marriage license process allow him to profit from his own deceit
had been secured. 49 Gloria has failed to and perfidy. 50
discharge that burden, and the only All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a
conclusion that can be reached is that no wedding ceremony was conducted and a
valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be marriage contract was signed does not operate
said that there was a simple irregularity in the to cure the absence of a valid marriage
marriage license that would not affect the license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear
validity of the marriage, as no license was when it says, "The absence of any of the
presented by the respondent. No marriage essential or formal requisites shall render the
license was proven to have been issued to marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of Article 35 (2)." Article 35 (3) of the Family
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Code also provides that a marriage solemnized
Cavite and Gloria's failure to produce a copy without a license is void from the beginning,
of the alleged marriage license. except those exempt from the license
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter
evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria 2, Title I of the same Code. 51 Again, this
and Syed were validly married. To quote the marriage cannot be characterized as among
CA: the exemptions, and thus, having been
solemnized without a marriage license, is void
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, ab initio.
testimonial and documentary, that appellant
and appellee have been validly married and As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul
there was compliance with all the requisites his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his
laid down by law. Both parties are legally motives are less than pure, that he seeks to
capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the
capacity was even issued by the Embassy of same does not make up for the failure of the
Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties respondent to prove that they had a valid
herein gave their consent freely. Appellee marriage license, given the weight of evidence
admitted that the signature above his name in presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid
the marriage contract was his. Several marriage license cannot be attributed to him,
pictures were presented showing appellant as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the
and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, same. The law must be applied. As the
the witnesses and other members of marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly
appellant's family, taken during the marriage absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is
ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where void ab initio. aESHDA
the lunch was held after the marriage
ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C"
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the SECOND DIVISION
petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated March 11, 2008 and [G.R. No. 201061. July 3, 2013.]
Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, petitioner, vs.
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., respondent.
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay DECISION
City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No.
03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of CARPIO, J p:
petitioner with respondent on January 9, The Case
1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
Before the Court is a petition for review 1
No costs. assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision 2 and
SO ORDERED. the 14 March 2012 Resolution 3 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
Peralta, Abad, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., CSDTac
concur.
The Antecedent Facts
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Other properties shall be adjudicated in a
decision reads: later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of
A.M. No. 02-11-10.
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN
BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March Respondent's claim of spousal support,
7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is children support and counterclaims are
hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no
is further declared NON-EXISTENT. cDACST declaration of the status of the parties'
children.
Respondent's claim as co-owner or conjugal
owner of the thirty-seven (37) properties under No other relief granted. HAaDTE
TCT Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725,
126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, Furnish copy of this decision to the parties,
TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the
194620, 194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, Solicitor General and the Registry of Deeds in
194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629, Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.
194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, SO ORDERED. 6
194635, 194636, 194637, 194638, 194639,
198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for
and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In
The registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. its Order dated 27 August 2009, 7 the trial
Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo court denied the motion. Sally appealed the
B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the trial court's decision before the Court of
owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go". Appeals.
Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for
Quezon City and Manila are directed to delete The Decision of the Court of Appeals
the words "married to Sally Go" from these In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of
thirty[-]seven (37) titles. Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err
190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are in submitting the case for decision. The Court
properties acquired from petitioner's money of Appeals noted that there were six resettings
without contribution from respondent, hence, of the case, all made at the instance of Sally,
these are properties of the petitioner and his for the initial reception of evidence, and Sally
lawful wife. Consequently, petitioner is was duly warned to present her evidence on
appointed the administrator of these five (5) the next hearing or the case would be deemed
properties. Respondent is ordered to submit submitted for decision. However, despite the
an accounting of her collections of income warning, Sally still failed to present her
from these five (5) properties within thirty (30) evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin
days from notice hereof. Except for lot under who was not around and was not subpoenaed
TCT No. 61722, respondent is further directed despite the presence of her other witnesses.
within thirty (30) days from notice hereof to ICHcaD
The Court of Appeals rejected Sally's allegation Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in
that Benjamin failed to prove his action for Civil Case No. 04-109401 are hereby
declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT
Appeals ruled that Benjamin's action was Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively
based on his prior marriage to Azucena and owned by the petitioner-appellee while the
there was no evidence that the marriage was properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and
annulled or dissolved before Benjamin 253681 as well as [CCT] Nos. 8782 and 8783
contracted the second marriage with Sally. shall be solely owned by the respondent-
The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722
committed no error in declaring Benjamin's shall be owned by them and common and to
marriage to Sally null and void. be shared equally but the share of the
petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property conjugal partnership under his first marriage
relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed while the share of respondent-appellant shall
by Article 148 of the Family Code. The Court accrue to her. The rest of the decision stands.
of Appeals ruled that only the properties AHDacC
acquired by the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or SO ORDERED. 8
industry shall be owned by them in common
in proportion to their respective contribution. Sally moved for the reconsideration of the
The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37 Court of Appeals' decision. In its 14 March
properties being claimed by Sally rightfully 2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
belong to Benjamin and his siblings. her motion.
As regards the seven properties claimed by Hence, the petition before this Court.
both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that The Issues
only the properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and
190860 registered in the name of Benjamin Sally raised the following issues before this
belong to him exclusively because he was able Court:
to establish that they were acquired by him
solely. The Court of Appeals found that the (1) Whether the Court of Appeals
properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and committed a reversible error in affirming the
253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 trial court's ruling that Sally had waived her
were exclusive properties of Sally in the right to present evidence;
absence of proof of Benjamin's actual (2) Whether the Court of Appeals
contribution in their purchase. The Court of committed a reversible error in affirming the
Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No.
trial court's decision declaring the marriage
61722 registered in the names of Benjamin between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab
and Sally shall be owned by them in common, initio and non-existent; and
to be shared equally. However, the share of
Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal (3) Whether the Court of Appeals
partnership under his existing marriage with committed a reversible error in affirming with
Azucena while Sally's share shall accrue to modification the trial court's decision
her in the absence of a clear and convincing regarding the property relations of Benjamin
proof of bad faith. IaDSEA and Sally. IEHSDA
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally The Ruling of this Court
failed to present clear and convincing evidence
that would show bias and prejudice on the The petition has no merit.
part of the trial judge that would justify his
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
inhibition from the case.
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals'
affirming the trial court's ruling that she
decision reads:
waived her right to present her evidence. Sally
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the alleges that in not allowing her to present
instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The evidence that she and Benjamin were married,
assailed Decision and Order dated March 26, the trial court abandoned its duty to protect
2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the marriage as an inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for were allowed to present her evidence, she
continuance or postponement is not a matter would have proven her marriage to Benjamin.
of right but is addressed to the discretion of To prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally
the trial court. 9 In this case, Sally's asked this Court to consider that in acquiring
presentation of evidence was scheduled on 28 real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife
February 2008. Thereafter, there were six by declaring he was "married to" her; that
resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and Benjamin was the informant in their
11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, children's birth certificates where he stated
and 28 November 2008. They were all made at that he was their father; and that Benjamin
Sally's instance. Before the scheduled hearing introduced her to his family and friends as his
of 28 November 2008, the trial court warned wife. In contrast, Sally claims that there was
Sally that in case she still failed to present her no real property registered in the names of
evidence, the case would be submitted for Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges
decision. On the date of the scheduled that Benjamin was not the informant in the
hearing, despite the presence of other birth certificates of his children with Azucena.
available witnesses, Sally insisted on
presenting Benjamin who was not even First, Benjamin's marriage to Azucena on 10
subpoenaed on that day. Sally's counsel September 1973 was duly established before
insisted that the trial court could not dictate the trial court, evidenced by a certified true
on the priority of witnesses to be presented, copy of their marriage contract. At the time
disregarding the trial court's prior warning Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported
due to the numerous resettings of the case. marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage
Sally could not complain that she had been between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and
deprived of her right to present her evidence subsisting. IHCDAS
because all the postponements were at her On the purported marriage of Benjamin and
instance and she was warned by the trial Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration
court that it would submit the case for Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig
decision should she still fail to present her City, testified that there was no valid marriage
evidence on 28 November 2008. AEITDH license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros
We agree with the trial court that by her confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos.
continued refusal to present her evidence, she 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the
was deemed to have waived her right to month of February 1982. Marriage License No.
present them. As pointed out by the Court of N-07568 did not match the series issued for
Appeals, Sally's continued failure to present the month. Oliveros further testified that the
her evidence despite the opportunities given local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue
by the trial court showed her lack of interest Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin
to proceed with the case. Further, it was clear and Sally. The certification from the local civil
that Sally was delaying the case because she registrar is adequate to prove the non-
was waiting for the decision of the Court of issuance of a marriage license and absent any
Appeals on her petition questioning the trial suspicious circumstance, the certification
court's denial of her demurrer to evidence, enjoys probative value, being issued by the
despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did officer charged under the law to keep a record
not issue any temporary restraining order as of all data relative to the issuance of a
Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the marriage license. 11 Clearly, if indeed
trial court of failing to protect marriage as an Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage
inviolable institution because the trial court contract, the marriage was void from the
also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds beginning for lack of a marriage license. 12
despite the deliberate delay and refusal to It was also established before the trial court
proceed by one of the parties. 10 that the purported marriage between
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the
and Sally local civil registrar and the National Statistics
Office. The lack of record was certified by
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Julieta B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the
Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Benjamin because a marriage could not be Municipality of Pasig; 13 Teresita R. Ignacio,
non-existent and, at the same time, null and Chief of the Archives Division of the Records
void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she Management and Archives Office, National
Commission for Culture and the Arts; 14 and Except for the modification in the distribution
Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in
Registration Department of the National all aspects the trial court's decision and ruled
Statistics Office. 15 The documentary and that "[t]he rest of the decision stands." 22
testimonial evidence proved that there was no While the Court of Appeals did not discuss
marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from
pointed out by the trial court, the marriage the dispositive portion of the decision
between Benjamin and Sally "was made only declaring that "[t]he rest of the decision
in jest" 16 and "a simulated marriage, at the stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the
instance of [Sally], intended to cover her up trial court's discussion that the marriage
from expected social humiliation coming from between Benjamin and Sally is not bigamous.
relatives, friends and the society especially The trial court stated:
from her parents seen as Chinese
conservatives." 17 In short, it was a fictitious On whether or not the parties' marriage is
marriage. IScaAE bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in bigamous. It is required that the first or
the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley former marriage shall not be null and void.
was not a proof of the marriage between The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena
Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that shall be assumed as the one that is valid,
Benjamin was the informant in Bernice's birth there being no evidence to the contrary and
certificate which stated that Benjamin and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on
Sally were married on 8 March 1982 18 while the face of their marriage contract. However, if
Sally was the informant in Bentley's birth the second marriage was void not because of
certificate which also stated that Benjamin the existence of the first marriage but for
and Sally were married on 8 March 1982. 19 other causes such as lack of license, the crime
Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married of bigamy was not committed. In People v. De
on 7 March 1982 which did not match the Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that
dates reflected on the birth certificates. what was committed was contracting marriage
against the provisions of laws not under
We see no inconsistency in finding the Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised
marriage between Benjamin and Sally null Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of the
and void ab initio and, at the same time, non- parties is therefore not bigamous because
existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, there was no marriage license. The daring and
a marriage solemnized without a license, repeated stand of respondent that she is
except those covered by Article 34 where no legally married to petitioner cannot, in any
license is necessary, "shall be void from the instance, be sustained. Assuming that her
beginning." In this case, the marriage between marriage to petitioner has the marriage
Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license, yet the same would be bigamous,
license. It was duly established that no civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated
marriage license was issued to them and that by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner
Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match and Azucena. 23
the marriage license numbers issued by the
local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent
of February 1982. The case clearly falls under marriage must have all the essential requisites
Section 3 of Article 35 20 which made their for validity except for the existence of a prior
marriage void ab initio. The marriage between marriage. 24 In this case, there was really no
Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just
Applying the general rules on void or signed a purported marriage contract without
inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the a marriage license. The supposed marriage
Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely was not recorded with the local civil registrar
simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void and the National Statistics Office. In short, the
from the beginning." 21 Thus, the Court of marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not
Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial exist. They lived together and represented
court's ruling that the marriage between themselves as husband and wife without the
Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio benefit of marriage. CaDATc
and non-existent. EDSAac
Property Relations Between Benjamin and
Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the Sally 28 with the descriptive title "married to
property relations of Benjamin and Sally is Benjamin" while the properties under TCT
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in
which states: the name of Sally as a single individual. We
have ruled that the words "married to"
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not preceding the name of a spouse are merely
falling under the preceding Article, only the descriptive of the civil status of the registered
properties acquired by both of the parties owner. 29 Such words do not prove co-
through their actual joint contribution of ownership. Without proof of actual
money, property, or industry shall be owned contribution from either or both spouses,
by them in common in proportion to their there can be no co-ownership under Article
respective contributions. In the absence of 148 of the Family Code. 30
proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be Inhibition of the Trial Judge
equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidences Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G.
of credit. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself
from hearing the case. She cited the failure of
If one of the parties is validly married to Judge Gironella to accommodate her in
another, his or her share in the co-ownership presenting her evidence. She further alleged
shall accrue to the absolute community of that Judge Gironella practically labeled her as
conjugal partnership existing in such valid an opportunist in his decision, showing his
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is partiality against her and in favor of
not validly married to another, his or her Benjamin. cIHCST
share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the We have ruled that the issue of voluntary
preceding Article. inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience
and sound discretion on the part of the judge.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise 31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must
apply even if both parties are in bad faith. be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad
AaCEDS faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition
to palpable error which may be inferred from
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the the decision or order itself. 32 In this case, we
benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties have sufficiently explained that Judge
acquired by them through their actual joint Gironella did not err in submitting the case for
contribution of money, property, or industry decision because of Sally's continued refusal
shall be owned by them in common in to present her evidence.
proportion to their respective contributions.
Thus, both the trial court and the Court of We reviewed the decision of the trial court and
Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties while Judge Gironella may have used
being claimed by Sally which were given by uncomplimentary words in writing the
Benjamin's father to his children as advance decision, they are not enough to prove his
inheritance. Sally's Answer to the petition prejudice against Sally or show that he acted
before the trial court even admitted that in bad faith in deciding the case that would
"Benjamin's late father himself conveyed a justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.
number of properties to his children and their
respective spouses which included Sally. . . ." WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August
25 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
As regards the seven remaining properties, we CV No. 94226.
rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals
is more in accord with the evidence on record. SO ORDERED. CHDaAE
Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 Brion, Bersamin, * Del Castillo and Perez, JJ.,
was registered in the names of Benjamin and concur.
Sally as spouses. 26 The properties under TCT
Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of
Benjamin 27 with the descriptive title "married
to Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos.
8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of
FIRST DIVISION both Pepito and respondent had started living
with each other that has already lasted for five
[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000.] years, the fact remains that their five-year
ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE contemplated by law. It should be in the
NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & nature of a perfect union that is valid under
PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA the law but rendered imperfect only by the
BAYADOG *, respondent. absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he
Roldan R. Mangubat for petitioners. started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each
Daryll A. Amante for private respondent. other, Pepito had already been separated in
SYNOPSIS fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence
of the marriage even where there was actual
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones. severance of the filial companionship between
Out of their marriage were born herein the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by
petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito either spouse with any third party as being
resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One one as "husband and wife." The Court also
year and 8 months thereafter, Pepito and ruled that petitioners have the personality to
respondent Norma Badayog got married file a petition to declare their father's marriage
without any marriage license. On February void because a void marriage can be attacked
19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After collaterally and can be questioned even after
their father's death, petitioners filed a petition the death of either party.
for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Pepito to Norma alleging that the said SYLLABUS
marriage was void for lack of a marriage 1. CIVIL LAW; CIVIL CODE; MARRIAGE;
license. The case was filed under the MARRIAGES OF EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER;
assumption that the validity or invalidity of THE 5-YEAR COHABITATION PERIOD
the second marriage would affect petitioner's CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 76 OF THE
successional rights. Norma filed a motion to CIVIL CODE SHOULD BE THE YEARS
dismiss on the ground that petitioners have IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE DAY OF THE
no cause of action since they are not among MARRIAGE AND IT SHOULD BE A PERIOD
the persons who could file an action for OF COHABITATION CHARACTERIZED BY
"annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of EXCLUSIVITY MEANING NO THIRD PARTY
the Family Code. The lower court ruled that WAS INVOLVED AT ANY TIME WITHIN THE 5
petitioners should have filed the action to YEARS AND CONTINUITY THAT IS
declare null and void their father's marriage to UNBROKEN. Working on the assumption
respondent before his death, applying by that Pepito and Norma have lived together as
analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which husband and wife for five years without the
enumerates the time and the persons who benefit of marriage, that five-year period
could initiate an action for annulment of should be computed on the basis of a
marriage. Hence, this petition. AcTDaH cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the only missing factor is the special contract of
marriage to validate the union. In other words,
assailed decision of the trial court. The Court
ruled that the second marriage involved in the five-year common-law cohabitation period,
this case is not covered by the exception to the which is counted back from the date of
requirement of a marriage license, therefore, it celebration of marriage, should be a period of
legal union had it not been for the absence of
is void ab initio because of the absence of
the marriage. This 5-year period should be the
such element. According to the Court, it can
not be said that Pepito and respondent have years immediately before the day of the
lived with each other as husband and wife for marriage and it should be a period of
at least five years prior to their wedding day. cohabitation characterized by exclusivity
meaning no third party was involved at any
From the time Pepito's first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with time within the 5 years and continuity that
respondent, only about twenty months had is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-
elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his year cohabitation is computed without any
distinction as to whether the parties were
first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter
capacitated to marry each other during the It is immaterial that when they lived with each
entire five years, then the law would be other, Pepito had already been separated in
sanctioning immorality and encouraging fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence
parties to have common law relationships and of the marriage even where there was actual
placing them on the same footing with those severance of the filial companionship between
who lived faithfully with their spouse. the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by
Marriage being a special relationship must be either spouse with any third party as being
respected as such and its requirements must one as "husband and wife." aESHDA
be strictly observed. The presumption that a
man and a woman deporting themselves as 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITIONERS HAVE
husband and wife is based on the THE PERSONALITY TO FILE A PETITION TO
approximation of the requirements of the law. DECLARE THEIR FATHER'S MARRIAGE VOID
The parties should not be afforded any excuse EVEN AFTER HIS DEATH; VOID MARRIAGES
to not comply with every single requirement CAN BE ATTACKED COLLATERALLY AND
and later use the same missing element as a CAN BE QUESTIONED EVEN AFTER THE
pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their DEATH OF EITHER PARTY. Contrary to
marriage. There should be no exemption from respondent judge's ruling, Article 47 of the
securing a marriage license unless the Family Code cannot be applied even by
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of
the exception. It should be noted that a marriage. The second ground for annulment of
license is required in order to notify the public marriage relied upon by the trial court, which
that two persons are about to be united in allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment
matrimony and that anyone who is aware or suit "at any time before the death of either
has knowledge of any impediment to the party" is inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to
union of the two shall make it known to the the grounds, periods and persons who can file
local civil registrar. an annulment suit, not a suit for declaration
of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR; THE who can file a petition to declare the nullity of
FIVE-YEAR COHABITATION OF a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are
PETITIONERS' FATHER AND PRIVATE not identical. A marriage that is annullable is
RESPONDENT WAS NOT THE valid until otherwise declared by the court;
COHABITATION CONTEMPLATED BY LAW; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is
THE SUBSISTENCE OF THE MARRIAGE considered as having never to have taken
EVEN WHERE THERE WAS ACTUAL place and cannot be the source of rights. The
SEVERANCE OF THE FILIAL first can be generally ratified or confirmed by
COMPANIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SPOUSES free cohabitation or prescription while the
CANNOT MAKE ANY COHABITATION BY other can never be ratified. A voidable
EITHER SPOUSE WITH ANY THIRD PARTY AS marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except
BEING ONE AS "HUSBAND AND WIFE." In in a direct proceeding while a void marriage
this case, at the time of Pepito and can be attacked collaterally. Consequently,
respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that void marriages can be questioned even after
they have lived with each other as husband the death of either party but voidable
and wife for at least five years prior to their marriages can be assailed only during the
wedding day. From the time Pepito's first lifetime of the parties and not after death of
marriage was dissolved to the time of his either, in which case the parties and their
marriage with respondent, only about twenty offspring will be left as if the marriage had
months had elapsed. Even assuming that been perfectly valid. That is why the action or
Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike
and thereafter both Pepito and respondent voidable marriages where the action
had started living with each other that has prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable
already lasted for five years, the fact remains marriage can assail it but any proper
that their five-year period cohabitation was interested party may attack a void marriage.
not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It Void marriages have no legal effects except
should be in the nature of a perfect union that those declared by law concerning the
is valid under the law but rendered imperfect properties of the alleged spouses, regarding
only by the absence of the marriage contract. co-ownership or ownership through actual
Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time joint contribution, and its effect on the
when he started cohabiting with respondent. children born to such void marriages as
provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 (3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped
and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the from assailing the validity of the second
Family Code. On the contrary, the property marriage after it was dissolved due to their
regime governing voidable marriages is father's death. 1
generally conjugal partnership and the
children conceived before its annulment are Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners
legitimate. should have filed the action to declare null
and void their father's marriage to respondent
DECISION before his death, applying by analogy Article
47 of the Family Code which enumerates the
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p: time and the persons who could initiate an
May the heirs of a deceased person file a action for annulment of marriage. 2 Hence,
petition for the declaration of nullity of his this petition for review with this Court
marriage after his death? grounded on a pure question of law.
Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones This petition was originally dismissed for non-
on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the
were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because
shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April "the verification failed to state the basis of
24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter petitioner's averment that the allegations in
or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and the petition are 'true and correct.'" It was thus
respondent Norma Badayog got married treated as an unsigned pleading which
without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, produces no legal effect under Section 3, Rule
Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated 7, of the 1997 Rules. 3 However, upon motion
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the
together as husband and wife for at least five dismissal and reinstated the petition for
years and were thus exempt from securing a review. 4
marriage license. On February 19, 1997, The two marriages involved herein having
Pepito died in a car accident. After their been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
father's death, petitioners filed a petition for Family Code (FC), the applicable law to
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito determine their validity is the Civil Code which
to Norma alleging that the said marriage was was the law in effect at the time of their
void for lack of a marriage license. The case celebration. 5 A valid marriage license is a
was filed under the assumption that the requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage Civil Code, 6 the absence of which renders the
would affect petitioner's successional rights. marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground 80(3) 7 in relation to Article 58. 8 The
that petitioners have no cause of action since requirement and issuance of marriage license
they are not among the persons who could file is the State's demonstration of its involvement
an action for "annulment of marriage" under and participation in every marriage, in the
Article 47 of the Family Code. LibLex maintenance of which the general public is
Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional interested. 9 This interest proceeds from the
Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, constitutional mandate that the State
dismissed the petition after finding that the recognizes the sanctity of family life and of
Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, affording protection to the family as a basic
insufficient" to resolve the following issues: "autonomous social institution." 10
Specifically, the Constitution considers
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause marriage as an "inviolable social institution,"
of action against defendant in asking for the and is the foundation of family life which shall
declaration of the nullity of marriage of their be protected by the State. 11 This is why the
deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her Family Code considers marriage as "a special
specially so when at the time of the filing of contract of permanent union" 12 and case law
this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is considers it not just an adventure but a
already dead; lifetime commitment." 13
(2) Whether or not the second marriage of However there are several instances
plaintiffs' deceased father with defendant is recognized by the Civil Code wherein a
null and void ab initio; marriage license is dispensed with, one of
which is that provided in Article 76, 14 marriage, should be a period of legal union
referring to the marriage of a man and a had it not been for the absence of the
woman who have lived together and marriage. This 5-year period should be the
exclusively with each other as husband and years immediately before the day of the
wife for a continuous and unbroken period of marriage and it should be a period of
at least five years before the marriage. The cohabitation characterized by exclusivity
rationale why no license is required in such meaning no third party was involved at any
case is to avoid exposing the parties to time within the 5 years and continuity that
humiliation, shame and embarrassment is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-
concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation year cohabitation is computed without any
of persons outside a valid marriage due to the distinction as to whether the parties were
publication of every applicant's name for a capacitated to marry each other during the
marriage license. The publicity attending the entire five years, then the law would be
marriage license may discourage such persons sanctioning immorality and encouraging
from legitimizing their status. 15 To preserve parties to have common law relationships and
peace in the family, avoid the peeping and placing them on the same footing with those
suspicious eye of public exposure and contain who lived faithfully with their spouse.
the source of gossip arising from the Marriage being a special relationship must be
publication of their names, the law deemed it respected as such and its requirements must
wise to preserve their privacy and exempt be strictly observed. The presumption that a
them from that requirement. cda man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife is based on the
There is no dispute that the marriage of approximation of the requirements of the law.
petitioners' father to respondent Norma was The parties should not be afforded any excuse
celebrated without any marriage license. In to not comply with every single requirement
lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating and later use the same missing element as a
that "they have attained the age of majority, pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their
and, being unmarried, have lived together as marriage. There should be no exemption from
husband and wife for at least five years, and securing a marriage license unless the
that we now desire to marry each other." 16 circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of
The only issue that needs to be resolved the exception. It should be noted that a
pertains to what nature of cohabitation is license is required in order to notify the public
contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil that two persons are about to be united in
Code to warrant the counting of the five year matrimony and that anyone who is aware or
period in order to exempt the future spouses has knowledge of any impediment to the
from securing a marriage license. Should it be union of the two shall make it known to the
a cohabitation wherein both parties are local civil registrar. 17 The Civil Code
capacitated to marry each other during the provides:
entire five-year continuous period or should it
be a cohabitation wherein both parties have Article 63: ". . . . This notice shall request all
lived together and exclusively with each other persons having knowledge of any impediment
as husband and wife during the entire five- to the marriage to advice the local civil
year continuous period regardless of whether registrar thereof. . . . ."
there is a legal impediment to their being
lawfully married, which impediment may have Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged
either disappeared or intervened sometime impediment to the marriage, the local civil
during the cohabitation period? registrar shall forthwith make an
investigation, examining persons under oath. .
Working on the assumption that Pepito and . ."
Norma have lived together as husband and
wife for five years without the benefit of This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:
marriage, that five-year period should be Article 17 provides in part: ". . . . This notice
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as shall request all persons having knowledge of
"husband and wife" where the only missing any impediment to the marriage to advise the
factor is the special contract of marriage to local civil registrar thereof. . . . ."
validate the union. In other words, the five-
year common-law cohabitation period, which Article 18 reads in part: ". . . . In case of any
is counted back from the date of celebration of impediment known to the local civil registrar
or brought to his attention, he shall note down Contrary to respondent judge's ruling, Article
the particulars thereof and his findings 47 of the Family Code 20 cannot be applied
thereon in the application for a marriage even by analogy to petitions for declaration of
license. . . . ." cdrep nullity of marriage. The second ground for
annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial
This is the same reason why our civil laws, court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file
past or present, absolutely prohibited the an annulment suit "at any time before the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the death of either party" is inapplicable. Article
same person during the same period. Thus, 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and
any marriage subsequently contracted during persons who can file an annulment suit, not a
the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
and void, 18 subject only to the exception in Code is silent as to who can file a petition to
cases of absence or where the prior marriage declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and
was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal void marriages are not identical. A marriage
Code complements the civil law in that the that is annullable is valid until otherwise
contracting of two or more marriages and the declared by the court; whereas a marriage
having of extramarital affairs are considered that is void ab initio is considered as having
felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and never to have taken place 21 and cannot be
adultery. 19 The law sanctions monogamy. the source of rights. The first can be generally
In this case, at the time of Pepito and ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or
respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that prescription while the other can never be
they have lived with each other as husband ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be
and wife for at least five years prior to their assailed collaterally except in a direct
wedding day. From the time Pepito's first proceeding while a void marriage can be
marriage was dissolved to the time of his attacked collaterally. Consequently, void
marriage with respondent, only about twenty marriages can be questioned even after the
months had elapsed. Even assuming that death of either party but voidable marriages
Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
and thereafter both Pepito and respondent parties and not after death of either, in which
had started living with each other that has case the parties and their offspring will be left
already lasted for five years, the fact remains as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. 22
that their five-year period cohabitation was That is why the action or defense for nullity is
not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
should be in the nature of a perfect union that where the action prescribes. Only the parties
is valid under the law but rendered imperfect to a voidable marriage can assail it but any
only by the absence of the marriage contract. proper interested party may attack a void
Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects
when he started cohabiting with respondent. except those declared by law concerning the
It is immaterial that when they lived with each properties of the alleged spouses, regarding
other, Pepito had already been separated in co-ownership or ownership through actual
fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence joint contribution, 23 and its effect on the
of the marriage even where there was actual children born to such void marriages as
severance of the filial companionship between provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43
the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the
either spouse with any third party as being Family Code. On the contrary, the property
one as "husband and wife." regime governing voidable marriages is
generally conjugal partnership and the
Having determined that the second marriage children conceived before its annulment are
involved in this case is not covered by the legitimate.
exception to the requirement of a marriage
license, it is void ab initio because of the Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the death
absence of such element. of petitioner's father extinguished the alleged
marital bond between him and respondent.
The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds
have the personality to file a petition to from a wrong premise that there was a
declare their father's marriage void after his marriage bond that was dissolved between the
death? two. It should be noted that their marriage
was void hence it is deemed as if it never
existed at all and the death of either directly instituted to question the same so
extinguished nothing. cdasia long as it is essential to the determination of
the case. This is without prejudice to any
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states issue that may arise in the case. When such
that no judicial decree is necessary in order to need arises, a final judgment of declaration of
establish the nullity of a marriage. 24 "A void nullity is necessary even if the purpose is
marriage does not require a judicial decree to other than to remarry. The clause "on the
restore the parties to their original rights or to basis of a final judgment declaring such
make the marriage void but though no previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the
sentence of avoidance be absolutely Family Code connotes that such final
necessary, yet as well for the sake of good judgment need not be obtained only for
order of society as for the peace of mind of all purpose of remarriage.
concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of
the marriage should be ascertained and WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
declared by the decree of a court of competent assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court,
jurisdiction." 25 "Under ordinary Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil
circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET
so far as concerns the conferring of legal ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.
rights upon the parties, is as though no cdtai
marriage had ever taken place. And therefore,
being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity SO ORDERED.
can be maintained in any proceeding in which Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Kapunan, JJ.,
the fact of marriage may be material, either concur.
direct or collateral, in any civil court between
any parties at any time, whether before or Pardo, J., is on official business abroad.
after the death of either or both the husband
and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts
rendering such marriage void, it will be
disregarded or treated as non-existent by the
courts." It is not like a voidable marriage
which cannot be collaterally attacked except
in direct proceeding instituted during the
lifetime of the parties so that on the death of
either, the marriage cannot be impeached,
and is made good ab initio. 26 But Article 40
of the Family Code expressly provides that
there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void,
before a party can enter into a second
marriage 27 and such absolute nullity can be
based only on a final judgment to that effect.
28 For the same reason, the law makes either
the action or defense for the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.
29 Corollarily, if the death of either party
would extinguish the cause of action or the
ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible.
Similarly, we are not impressed by the Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has
ratiocination of the Republic that as a laid down the rule that the five-year common-
marriage under a license is not invalidated by law cohabitation period under Article 76
the fact that the license was wrongfully means a five-year period computed back from
obtained, so must a marriage not be the date of celebration of marriage, and refers
invalidated by a fabricated statement that the to a period of legal union had it not been for
parties have cohabited for at least five years as the absence of a marriage. 57 It covers the
required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The years immediately preceding the day of the
former is with reference to an irregularity of marriage, characterized by exclusivity
the marriage license, and not to the absence of meaning no third party was involved at any
one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. time within the five years and continuity
Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in that is unbroken. 58
the sworn affidavit relating to the period of WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The
Jose and Felisa's cohabitation, which would Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals,
have qualified their marriage as an exception dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No.
to the requirement for a marriage license, 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot
cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is
quintessential fact that the law precisely AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their
required to be deposed and attested to by the criminal liability, if any. No costs. aAEIHC
parties under oath. If the essential matter in
the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a SO ORDERED.
mere scrap of paper, without force and effect.
Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all. Austria-Martinez, Tinga, * Velasco, Jr. ** and
caTIDE Reyes, JJ., concur.
Since then, Estrellita has been representing Instead of submitting her answer, however,
Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss 11 on
herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano's
wife, and upon his death, his widow. February 20, 1995 where she declared that
AIDTSE Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims
who were married under the Muslim rites, as
On November 23, 1994, private respondents had been averred in the latter's disbarment
Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and complaint against Sen. Tamano. 12 Estrellita
her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in argued that the RTC has no jurisdiction to
their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of take cognizance of the case because under
Sen. Tamano's legitimate children with Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1083, or the Code
Zorayda, 5 filed a complaint with the RTC of of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines
Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of (Muslim Code), questions and issues involving
marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano Muslim marriages and divorce fall under the
for being bigamous. The complaint 6 alleged, exclusive jurisdiction of shari'a courts.
inter alia, that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda
The trial court denied Estrellita's motion and
on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that
this marriage remained subsisting when he asserted its jurisdiction over the case for
declaration of nullity. 13 Thus, Estrellita filed
in November 1995 a certiorari petition with aforementioned judgment declaring Estrellita's
this Court questioning the denial of her marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio.
Motion to Dismiss. On December 15, 1995, we 28
referred the petition to the CA 14 which was
docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP No. 39656. Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
ECDaAc The RTC, finding that the marital ties of Sen.
During the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. Tamano and Zorayda were never severed,
39656, the RTC continued to try the case declared Sen. Tamano's subsequent marriage
since there can be no default in cases of to Estrellita as void ab initio for being
declaration of nullity of marriage even if the bigamous under Article 35 of the Family Code
respondent failed to file an answer. Estrellita of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the
was allowed to participate in the trial while Civil Code of the Philippines. 29 The court
her opposing parties presented their evidence. said: ADcHES
When it was Estrellita's turn to adduce A comparison between Exhibits A and B
evidence, the hearings set for such purpose 15 (supra) immediately shows that the second
were postponed mostly at her instance until marriage of the late Senator with [Estrellita]
the trial court, on March 22, 1996, suspended was entered into during the subsistence of his
the proceedings 16 in view of the CA's first marriage with [Zorayda]. This renders the
temporary restraining order issued on subsequent marriage void from the very
February 29, 1996, enjoining it from hearing beginning. The fact that the late Senator
the case. 17 declared his civil status as "divorced" will not
Eventually, however, the CA resolved the in any way affect the void character of the
petition adverse to Estrellita in its Decision second marriage because, in this jurisdiction,
dated September 30, 1996. 18 Estrellita then divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse is not
elevated the appellate court's judgment to this an acceptable method of terminating the
Court by way of a petition for review on effects of a previous marriage, especially,
certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 126603. 19 where the subsequent marriage was
solemnized under the Civil Code or Family
Subsequent to the promulgation of the CA Code. 30
Decision, the RTC ordered Estrellita to present
her evidence on June 26, 1997. 20 As Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Estrellita was indisposed on that day, the In her appeal, 31 Estrellita argued that she
hearing was reset to July 9, 1997. 21 The day was denied her right to be heard as the RTC
before this scheduled hearing, Estrellita again rendered its judgment even without waiting
asked for a postponement. 22 for the finality of the Decision of the Supreme
Unhappy with the delays in the resolution of Court in G.R. No. 126603. She claimed that
their case, Zorayda and Adib moved to submit the RTC should have required her to file her
the case for decision, 23 reasoning that answer after the denial of her motion to
Estrellita had long been delaying the case. dismiss. She maintained that Sen. Tamano is
Estrellita opposed, on the ground that she has capacitated to marry her as his marriage and
not yet filed her answer as she still awaits the subsequent divorce with Zorayda is governed
outcome of G.R. No. 126603. 24 cHAaCE by the Muslim Code. Lastly, she highlighted
Zorayda's lack of legal standing to question
On June 29, 1998, we upheld the jurisdiction the validity of her marriage to the deceased.
of the RTC of Quezon City, 25 stating as one of cEASTa
the reasons that as shari'a courts are not
vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction In dismissing the appeal in its Decision dated
in cases of marriages celebrated under both August 17, 2004, 32 the CA held that
the Civil Code and PD 1083, the RTC, as a Estrellita can no longer be allowed to file her
court of general jurisdiction, is not precluded answer as she was given ample opportunity to
from assuming jurisdiction over such cases. In be heard but simply ignored it by asking for
our Resolution dated August 24, 1998, 26 we numerous postponements. She never filed her
denied Estrellita's motion for reconsideration answer despite the lapse of around 60 days, a
27 with finality. period longer than what was prescribed by the
rules. It also ruled that Estrellita cannot rely
A few days before this resolution, or on August on her pending petition for certiorari with the
18, 1998, the RTC rendered the higher courts since, as an independent and
original action, it does not interrupt the finality. She maintains that she merely
proceedings in the trial court. participated in the RTC hearings because of
the trial court's assurance that the
As to the substantive merit of the case, the CA proceedings will be without prejudice to
adjudged that Estrellita's marriage to Sen. whatever action the High Court will take on
Tamano is void ab initio for being bigamous, her petition questioning the RTC's jurisdiction
reasoning that the marriage of Zorayda and and yet, the RTC violated this commitment as
Sen. Tamano is governed by the Civil Code, it rendered an adverse judgment on August
which does not provide for an absolute 18, 1998, months before the records of G.R.
divorce. It noted that their first nuptial No. 126603 were remanded to the CA on
celebration was under civil rites, while the November 11, 1998. 37 She also questions the
subsequent Muslim celebration was only lack of a report of the public prosecutor anent
ceremonial. Zorayda then, according to the a finding of whether there was collusion, this
CA, had the legal standing to file the action as being a prerequisite before further proceeding
she is Sen. Tamano's wife and, hence, the could be held when a party has failed to file an
injured party in the senator's subsequent answer in a suit for declaration of nullity of
bigamous marriage with Estrellita. HTaSEA marriage. EDaHAT
In its September 13, 2005 Resolution, 33 the Estrellita is also steadfast in her belief that
CA denied Estrellita's Motion for her marriage with the late senator is valid as
Reconsideration/Supplemental Motion for the latter was already divorced under the
Reconsideration where it debunked the Muslim Code at the time he married her. She
additional errors she raised. The CA noted asserts that such law automatically applies to
that the allegation of lack of the public the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased
prosecutor's report on the existence of without need of registering their consent to be
collusion in violation of both Rule 9, Section 3 covered by it, as both parties are Muslims
(e) of the Rules of Court 34 and Article 48 of whose marriage was solemnized under Muslim
the Family Code 35 will not invalidate the trial law. She pointed out that Sen. Tamano
court's judgment as the proceedings between married all his wives under Muslim rites, as
the parties had been adversarial, negating the attested to by the affidavits of the siblings of
existence of collusion. Assuming that the the deceased. 38
issues have not been joined before the RTC,
the same is attributable to Estrellita's refusal Lastly, Estrellita argues that Zorayda and
to file an answer. Lastly, the CA disregarded Adib have no legal standing to file suit
Estrellita's allegation that the trial court because only the husband or the wife can file
erroneously rendered its judgment way prior a complaint for the declaration of nullity of
to our remand to the RTC of the records of the marriage under Supreme Court Resolution
case ratiocinating that G.R. No. 126603 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. 39
pertains to the issue on the denial of the
Motion to Dismiss, and not to the issue of the Refuting the arguments, the Solicitor General
validity of Estrellita's marriage to Sen. (Sol Gen) defends the CA's reasoning and
Tamano. stresses that Estrellita was never deprived of
her right to be heard; and, that filing an
The Parties' Respective Arguments original action for certiorari does not stay the
proceedings of the main action before the
Reiterating her arguments before the court a RTC.
quo, Estrellita now argues that the CA erred in
upholding the RTC judgment as the latter was As regards the alleged lack of report of the
prematurely issued, depriving her of the public prosecutor if there is collusion, the Sol
opportunity to file an answer and to present Gen says that this is no longer essential
her evidence to dispute the allegations against considering the vigorous opposition of
the validity of her marriage. She claims that Estrellita in the suit that obviously shows the
Judge Macias v. Macias 36 laid down the rule lack of collusion. The Sol Gen also supports
that the filing of a motion to dismiss instead of private respondents' legal standing to
an answer suspends the period to file an challenge the validity of Estrellita's purported
answer and, consequently, the trial court is marriage with Sen. Tamano, reasoning that
obliged to suspend proceedings while her any proper interested party may attack
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of directly or collaterally a void marriage, and
jurisdiction has not yet been resolved with Zorayda and Adib have such right to file the
action as they are the ones prejudiced by the reasoning of the CA which, apparently, is
marital union. DaCEIc Estrellita's basis for her argument, to wit:
Zorayda and Adib, on the other hand, did not However, she opted to file, on April 10, 2001,
file any comment. a 'Motion to Dismiss,' instead of filing an
Answer to the complaint. The filing of said
Issues motion suspended the period for her to file her
The issues that must be resolved are the Answer to the complaint. Until said motion is
following: resolved by the Respondent Court with
finality, it behooved the Respondent Court to
1. Whether the CA erred in affirming the suspend the hearings of the case on the
trial court's judgment, even though the latter merits. The Respondent Court, on April 19,
was rendered prematurely because: a) the 2001, issued its Order denying the 'Motion to
judgment was rendered without waiting for Dismiss' of the Petitioner. Under Section 6,
the Supreme Court's final resolution of her Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
certiorari petition, i.e., G.R. No. 126603; b) [now Section 4], the Petitioner had the balance
she has not yet filed her answer and thus was of the period provided for in Rule 11 of the
denied due process; and c) the public said Rules but in no case less than five (5)
prosecutor did not even conduct an days computed from service on her of the
investigation whether there was collusion; aforesaid Order of the Respondent Court
within which to file her Answer to the
2. Whether the marriage between complaint: . . . 41 (Emphasis supplied.)
Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was
bigamous; and Estrellita obviously misappreciated Macias. All
we pronounced therein is that the trial court
3. Whether Zorayda and Adib have the is mandated to suspend trial until it finally
legal standing to have Estrellita's marriage resolves the motion to dismiss that is filed
declared void ab initio. before it. Nothing in the above excerpt states
that the trial court should suspend its
Our Ruling
proceedings should the issue of the propriety
Estrellita's refusal to file an answer or impropriety of the motion to dismiss be
raised before the appellate courts. In Macias,
eventually led to the loss of her right the trial court failed to observe due process in
the course of the proceeding of the case
to answer; and her pending petition
because after it denied the wife's motion to
for certiorari/review on certiorari dismiss, it immediately proceeded to allow the
husband to present evidence ex parte and
questioning the denial of the motion resolved the case with undue haste even
when, under the rules of procedure, the wife
to dismiss before the higher courts
still had time to file an answer. In the instant
does not at all suspend the trial case, Estrellita had no time left for filing an
answer, as she filed the motion to dismiss
proceedings of the principal suit beyond the extended period earlier granted by
the trial court after she filed motions for
before the RTC of Quezon City.
extension of time to file an answer. HEcSDa
Firstly, it can never be argued that Estrellita
Estrellita argues that the trial court
was deprived of her right to due process. She
prematurely issued its judgment, as it should
was never declared in default, and she even
have waited first for the resolution of her
actively participated in the trial to defend her
Motion to Dismiss before the CA and,
interest. DIAcTE
subsequently, before this Court. However, in
Estrellita invokes Judge Macias v. Macias 40 upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ruled that
to justify the suspension of the period to file the pendency of a petition for certiorari does
an answer and of the proceedings in the trial not suspend the proceedings before the trial
court until her petition for certiorari court. "An application for certiorari is an
questioning the validity of the denial of her independent action which is not part or a
Motion to Dismiss has been decided by this continuation of the trial which resulted in the
Court. In said case, we affirmed the following rendition of the judgment complained of." 42
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is explicit in
stating that "[t]he petition shall not interrupt and serve copies thereof on the parties and
the course of the principal case unless a their respective counsels, if any.
temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued (2) If the public prosecutor finds that
against the public respondent from further collusion exists, he shall state the basis
proceeding in the case." 43 In fact, the trial thereof in his report. The parties shall file
court respected the CA's temporary their respective comments on the finding of
restraining order and only after the CA collusion within ten days from receipt of a
rendered judgment did the RTC again require copy of the report. The court shall set the
Estrellita to present her evidence. report for hearing and if convinced that the
parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the
Notably, when the CA judgment was elevated petition.
to us by way of Rule 45, we never issued any
order precluding the trial court from (3) If the public prosecutor reports that no
proceeding with the principal action. With her collusion exists, the court shall set the case
numerous requests for postponements, for pre-trial. It shall be the duty of the public
Estrellita remained obstinate in refusing to file prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-
an answer or to present her evidence when it trial. SCEHaD
was her turn to do so, insisting that the trial Records show that the trial court immediately
court should wait first for our decision in G.R. directed the public prosecutor to submit the
No. 126603. Her failure to file an answer and required report, 45 which we find to have been
her refusal to present her evidence were sufficiently complied with by Assistant City
attributable only to herself and she should not Prosecutor Edgardo T. Paragua in his
be allowed to benefit from her own dilatory Manifestation dated March 30, 1995, 46
tactics to the prejudice of the other party. wherein he attested that there could be no
Sans her answer, the trial court correctly collusion between the parties and no
proceeded with the trial and rendered its fabrication of evidence because Estrellita is
Decision after it deemed Estrellita to have not the spouse of any of the private
waived her right to present her side of the respondents.
story. Neither should the lower court wait for
the decision in G.R. No. 126603 to become Furthermore, the lack of collusion is evident
final and executory, nor should it wait for its in the case at bar. Even assuming that there
records to be remanded back to it because is a lack of report of collusion or a lack of
G.R. No. 126603 involves strictly the propriety participation by the public prosecutor, just as
of the Motion to Dismiss and not the issue of we held in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 47 the
validity of marriage. ACTIcS lack of participation of a fiscal does not
invalidate the proceedings in the trial court:
The Public Prosecutor issued a report as
The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
to the non-existence of collusion. in annulment of marriage and legal separation
Aside from Article 48 of the Family Code and proceedings is to determine whether collusion
Rule 9, Section 3 (e) of the Rules of Court, the exists between the parties and to take care
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void that the evidence is not suppressed or
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) 44 also the annulment proceedings negates the
requires the participation of the public conclusion that collusion existed between the
prosecutor in cases involving void marriages. parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner
It specifically mandates the prosecutor to that evidence was suppressed or fabricated by
submit his investigation report to determine any of the parties. Under these circumstances,
whether there is collusion between the parties: we are convinced that the non-intervention of
a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of
Sec. 9. Investigation report of public collusion between the contending parties is
prosecutor. (1) Within one month after not fatal to the validity of the proceedings in
receipt of the court order mentioned in the trial court. 48 SETAcC
paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public
prosecutor shall submit a report to the court The Civil Code governs the marriage of
stating whether the parties are in collusion Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano; their
marriage was never invalidated by PD every case of doubt will be resolved against
the retroactive operation of laws. Article 186
1083. Sen. Tamano's subsequent aforecited enunciates the general rule of the
marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio. Muslim Code to have its provisions applied
prospectively, and implicitly upholds the force
The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and effect of a pre-existing body of law,
and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, specifically, the Civil Code in respect of civil
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. 49 acts that took place before the Muslim Code's
The only law in force governing marriage enactment. 54
relationships between Muslims and non-
Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, An instance of retroactive application of the
under the provisions of which only one Muslim Code is Article 186 (2) which states:
marriage can exist at any given time. 50 A marriage contracted by a Muslim male prior
Under the marriage provisions of the Civil to the effectivity of this Code in accordance
Code, divorce is not recognized except during with non-Muslim law shall be considered as
the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 51 one contracted under Muslim law provided the
which was not availed of during its effectivity. spouses register their mutual desire to this
As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. effect. DcCITS
Tamano's prior marriage to Zorayda has been Even granting that there was registration of
severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, 52 mutual consent for the marriage to be
the law that codified Muslim personal laws. considered as one contracted under the
However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Muslim law, the registration of mutual
Firstly, Article 13 (1) thereof provides that the consent between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano
law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein will still be ineffective, as both are Muslims
both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the whose marriage was celebrated under both
male party is a Muslim and the marriage is civil and Muslim laws. Besides, as we have
solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or already settled, the Civil Code governs their
this Code in any part of the Philippines." But personal status since this was in effect at the
we already ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that time of the celebration of their marriage. In
"Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a view of Sen. Tamano's prior marriage which
situation where the parties were married both subsisted at the time Estrellita married him,
in civil and Muslim rites." 53 their subsequent marriage is correctly
Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on adjudged by the CA as void ab initio.
February 4, 1977, and this law cannot Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties,
retroactively override the Civil Code which
already bestowed certain rights on the have the legal personalities to file the
marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. The
former explicitly provided for the prospective declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M.
application of its provisions unless otherwise No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the
provided: DcaSIH
husband or the wife the filing of a
Art. 186. (1). Effect of code on past acts.
Acts executed prior to the effectivity of this petition for nullity is prospective in
Code shall be governed by the laws in force at
the time of their execution, and nothing herein application and does not shut out the
except as otherwise specifically provided, shall
prior spouse from filing suit if the
affect their validity or legality or operate to
extinguish any right acquired or liability ground is a bigamous subsequent
incurred thereby.
marriage.
It has been held that:
Her marriage covered by the Family Code of
The foregoing provisions are consistent with the Philippines, 55 Estrellita relies on A.M. No.
the principle that all laws operate 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15,
prospectively, unless the contrary appears or 2003 claiming that under Section 2 (a) 56
is clearly, plainly and unequivocably thereof, only the husband or the wife, to the
expressed or necessarily implied; accordingly, exclusion of others, may file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity, therefore only a subsequent marriage benefit from the
she and Sen. Tamano may directly attack the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected
validity of their own marriage. SIEHcA that they would file an action to declare the
marriage void and thus, in such
Estrellita claims that only the husband or the circumstance, the "injured spouse" who
wife in a void marriage can file a petition for should be given a legal remedy is the one in a
declaration of nullity of marriage. However, subsisting previous marriage. The latter is
this interpretation does not apply if the reason clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous
behind the petition is bigamy. marriage not only threatens the financial and
In explaining why under A.M. No. 02-11-10- the property ownership aspect of the prior
SC only the spouses may file the petition to marriage but most of all, it causes an
the exclusion of compulsory or intestate heirs, emotional burden to the prior spouse. The
we said: subsequent marriage will always be a
reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and
The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of the disregard of the prior marriage which
Voidable Marriages and Declaration of sanctity is protected by the Constitution.
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal
Separation and Provisional Orders explicates Indeed, Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz.: precludes the son from impugning the
subsequent marriage. But in the case at bar,
(1) Only an aggrieved or injured spouse both Zorayda and Adib have legal
may file petitions for annulment of voidable personalities to file an action for nullity. Albeit
marriages and declaration of absolute nullity the Supreme Court Resolution governs
of void marriages. Such petitions cannot be marriages celebrated under the Family Code,
filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of such is prospective in application and does
the spouses or by the State. [Section 2; not apply to cases already commenced before
Section 3, paragraph a] ITSacC March 15, 2003. 58
Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration
petition for annulment of voidable marriages of nullity of Estrellita's marriage in November
or declaration of absolute nullity of void 1994. While the Family Code is silent with
marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by respect to the proper party who can file a
compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
or by the State. The Committee is of the belief prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been
that they do not have a legal right to file the held that in a void marriage, in which no
petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have marriage has taken place and cannot be the
only inchoate rights prior to the death of their source of rights, any interested party may
predecessor, and hence can only question the attack the marriage directly or collaterally
validity of the marriage of the spouses upon without prescription, which may be filed even
the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
settlement of the estate of the deceased marriage. 59 Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does
spouse filed in the regular courts. On the not apply, Adib, as one of the children of the
other hand, the concern of the State is to deceased who has property rights as an heir,
preserve marriage and not to seek its is likewise considered to be the real party in
dissolution. 57 interest in the suit he and his mother had
filed since both of them stand to be benefited
Note that the Rationale makes it clear that or injured by the judgment in the suit. 60
Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to
the "aggrieved or injured spouse." If Since our Philippine laws protect the marital
Estrellita's interpretation is employed, the union of a couple, they should be interpreted
prior spouse is unjustly precluded from filing in a way that would preserve their respective
an action. Surely, this is not what the Rule rights which include striking down bigamous
contemplated. DSETcC marriages. We thus find the CA Decision
correctly rendered. HCDAcE
The subsequent spouse may only be expected
to take action if he or she had only discovered WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
during the connubial period that the marriage assailed August 17, 2004 Decision of the
was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762, as
bliss had already vanished. Should parties in
well as its subsequent Resolution issued on SECOND DIVISION
September 13, 2005, are hereby AFFIRMED.
[G.R. No. 145226. February 6, 2004.]
SO ORDERED.
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs.
Corona, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
and Perez, JJ., concur.
Jordan M. Pizarras and Joselito T. Lopez for
petitioner.
SYNOPSIS
SYLLABUS
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed
Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other. down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688,
as follows:
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive
a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered,
former replied and after an exchange of the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho
letters, they became sweethearts. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven
left again for Canada to work there. While in (7) Months of Prision Correccional as
Canada, they maintained constant minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of
communication. Prision Mayor as maximum.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS (2) the first marriage has not been legally
ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE absent, the absent spouse has not been
FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE judicially declared presumptively dead;
ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.
17 (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage;
and
To our mind, the primordial issue should be
whether or not petitioner committed bigamy (4) the subsequent marriage would have
and if so, whether his defense of good faith is been valid had it not been for the existence of
valid. the first. aDcTHE
The petitioner submits that he should not be Applying the foregoing test to the instant case,
faulted for relying in good faith upon the we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R.
divorce decree of the Ontario court. He CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1,
highlights the fact that he contracted the handed down the following decision in Civil
second marriage openly and publicly, which a Case No. 6020, to wit:
person intent upon bigamy would not be WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
doing. The petitioner further argues that his is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of
lack of criminal intent is material to a the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio
conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990
crime of bigamy, just like other felonies in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local
punished under the Revised Penal Code, is Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the
mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of cancellation of the marriage contract.
criminal intent are allowed as a complete
defense. He stresses that there is a difference SO ORDERED. 21
between the intent to commit the crime and
the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does The trial court found that there was no actual
not necessarily follow that his intention to marriage ceremony performed between Lucio
contract a second marriage is tantamount to and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead,
an intent to commit bigamy. what transpired was a mere signing of the
marriage contract by the two, without the
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial
General (OSG) submits that good faith in the court thus held that the marriage is void ab
instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. initio, in accordance with Articles 3 22 and 4
The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in 23 of the Family Code. As the dissenting
Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, 18 which held that opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly
bigamy can be successfully prosecuted puts it, This simply means that there was no
provided all the elements concur, stressing marriage to begin with; and that such
that under Article 40 19 of the Family Code, a declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of
judicial declaration of nullity is a must before the first marriage. In other words, for all
a party may re-marry. Whether or not the intents and purposes, reckoned from the date
petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no of the declaration of the first marriage as void
account as everyone is presumed to know the ab initio to the date of the celebration of the
law. The OSG counters that petitioners first marriage, the accused was, under the
contention that he was in good faith because eyes of the law, never married." 24 The
he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario records show that no appeal was taken from
court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No.
No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of 6020, hence, the decision had long become
nullity of his marriage to Lucia. CIDTcH final and executory.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of The first element of bigamy as a crime
good faith and lack of criminal intent, we requires that the accused must have been
legally married. But in this case, legally The law abhors an injustice and the Court is
speaking, the petitioner was never married to mandated to liberally construe a penal statute
Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage in favor of an accused and weigh every
to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity circumstance in favor of the presumption of
of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the innocence to ensure that justice is done.
two were never married from the beginning. Under the circumstances of the present case,
The contract of marriage is null; it bears no we held that petitioner has not committed
legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not
conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense
not married to Lucia at the time he contracted of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which
the marriage with Maria Jececha. The is now moot and academic. DcITHE
existence and the validity of the first marriage
being an essential element of the crime of WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated
said offense cannot be sustained where there October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in
is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the
must, perforce be acquitted of the instant resolution of the appellate court dated
charge. IAETSC September 25, 2000, denying herein
petitioners motion for reconsideration, is
The present case is analogous to, but must be REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner
distinguished from Mercado v. Tan. 25 In the Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the
latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt
the first marriage was likewise obtained after has not been proven with moral certainty.
the second marriage was already celebrated.
We held therein that: SO ORDERED.
The Agreement for Separation and Property Article 175. The conjugal partnership of
Settlement gains terminates:
was void for lack of court approval (1) Upon the death of either spouse;
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for (2) When there is a decree of legal
Separation and Property Settlement separation;
(Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna and
Eugenia had entered into and executed in (3) When the marriage is annulled;
connection with the divorce proceedings before (4) In case of judicial separation of
the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican property under Article 191.
Republic to dissolve and liquidate their
conjugal partnership was enforceable against The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty.
Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible Luna and Eugenia did not per se dissolve and
error in decreeing otherwise. liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains.
The approval of the Agreement by a competent
The insistence of the petitioner was court was still required under Article 190 and
unwarranted. Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had Article 190. In the absence of an express
not entered into any marriage settlement prior declaration in the marriage settlements, the
to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the separation of property between spouses
system of relative community or conjugal during the marriage shall not take place save
partnership of gains governed their property in virtue of a judicial order. (1432a) cCaSHA
relations. This is because the Spanish Civil
Code, the law then in force at the time of their Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask
marriage, did not specify the property regime for the separation of property, and it shall be
of the spouses in the event that they had not decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has
entered into any marriage settlement before or been sentenced to a penalty which carries
at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the with it civil interdiction, or has been declared
Civil Code clearly so provides, to wit: absent, or when legal separation has been
granted.
Article 119. The future spouses may in the
marriage settlements agree upon absolute or xxx xxx xxx
relative community of property, or upon
complete separation of property, or upon any The husband and the wife may agree upon the
other regime. In the absence of marriage dissolution of the conjugal partnership during
settlements, or when the same are void, the the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All
system of relative community or conjugal the creditors of the husband and of the wife,
partnership of gains as established in this as well as of the conjugal partnership shall be
Code, shall govern the property relations notified of any petition for judicial approval or
between husband and wife. ACcaET the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, so that any such creditors may
Article 142 of the Civil Code has defined a appear at the hearing to safeguard his
conjugal partnership of gains thusly: interests. Upon approval of the petition for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the
Article 142. By means of the conjugal court shall take such measures as may
partnership of gains the husband and wife protect the creditors and other third persons.
place in a common fund the fruits of their
separate property and the income from their After dissolution of the conjugal partnership,
work or industry, and divide equally, upon the the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall
apply. The provisions of this Code concerning polygamous, or incestuous marriages as
the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to determined by Philippine law.
501 shall be applicable. (1433a)
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by
But was not the approval of the Agreement by contracting a second or subsequent marriage
the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican before the first marriage has been legally
Republic sufficient in dissolving and dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains been declared presumptively dead by means of
between the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia? a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings. 23 A bigamous marriage is
The query is answered in the negative. There considered void ab initio. 24 cDTCIA
is no question that the approval took place
only as an incident of the action for divorce Due to the second marriage between Atty.
instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, Luna and the petitioner being void ab initio by
indeed, the justifications for their execution of virtue of its being bigamous, the properties
the Agreement were identical to the grounds acquired during the bigamous marriage were
raised in the action for divorce. 21 With the governed by the rules on co-ownership,
divorce not being itself valid and enforceable conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code,
under Philippine law for being contrary to viz.:
Philippine public policy and public law, the
approval of the Agreement was not also legally Article 144. When a man and a woman live
valid and enforceable under Philippine law. together as husband and wife, but they are
Consequently, the conjugal partnership of not married, or their marriage is void from the
gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in beginning, the property acquired by either or
the lifetime of their marriage. HSEIAT both of them through their work or industry
or their wages and salaries shall be governed
3. by the rules on co-ownership.(n)
Atty. Luna's marriage with Soledad, being In such a situation, whoever alleges co-
bigamous, ownership carried the burden of proof to
confirm such fact. To establish co-ownership,
was void; properties acquired during their therefore, it became imperative for the
marriage petitioner to offer proof of her actual
were governed by the rules on co-ownership contributions in the acquisition of property.
Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without
What law governed the property relations of sufficient and competent evidence, would
the second marriage between Atty. Luna and warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court
Soledad? explained in Saguid v. Court of Appeals: 25
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna's In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos
subsequent marriage to Soledad on January v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
12, 1976 was void for being bigamous, 22 on ownership of properties acquired by the
the ground that the marriage between Atty. parties to a bigamous marriage and an
Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled
the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. that proof of actual contribution in the
Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had acquisition of the property is essential. The
subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on claim of co-ownership of the petitioners
July 12, 1997. therein who were parties to the bigamous and
adulterous union is without basis because
The Court concurs with the CA. they failed to substantiate their allegation that
In the Philippines, marriages that are they contributed money in the purchase of the
disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court
bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are
of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the
void. Article 71 of the Civil Code clearly states:
controverted property was titled in the name
Article 71. All marriages performed outside of the parties to an adulterous relationship is
the Philippines in accordance with the laws in not sufficient proof of co-ownership absent
force in the country where they were evidence of actual contribution in the
performed, and valid there as such, shall also acquisition of the property.
be valid in this country, except bigamous,
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof was required for Article 144 of the New Civil
rests upon the party who, as determined by Code and Article 148 of the Family Code to
the pleadings or the nature of the case, apply as to cases where properties were
asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must acquired by a man and a woman living
be proved by competent evidence and reliance together as husband and wife but not married,
must be had on the strength of the party's or under a marriage which was void ab initio.
own evidence and not upon the weakness of Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the
the opponent's defense. This applies with rules on co-ownership would govern. But this
more vigor where, as in the instant case, the was not readily applicable to many situations
plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex and thus it created a void at first because it
parte. The plaintiff is not automatically applied only if the parties were not in any way
entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives incapacitated or were without impediment to
the defendant some measure of protection as marry each other (for it would be absurd to
the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in create a co-ownership where there still exists
the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted a prior conjugal partnership or absolute
only after the court is convinced that the facts community between the man and his lawful
proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. wife). This void was filled upon adoption of the
Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only
burden of proving it and a mere allegation is the property acquired by both of the parties
not evidence. 26 aDHCEA through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned in
The petitioner asserts herein that she common and in proportion to their respective
sufficiently proved her actual contributions in contributions. Such contributions and
the purchase of the condominium unit in the corresponding shares were prima facie
aggregate amount of at least P306,572.00, presumed to be equal. However, for this
consisting in direct contributions of presumption to arise, proof of actual
P159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. contribution was required. The same rule and
Luna had obtained from Premex Financing presumption was to apply to joint deposits of
and Banco Filipino totaling P146,825.30; 27 money and evidence of credit. If one of the
and that such aggregate contributions of parties was validly married to another, his or
P306,572.00 corresponded to almost the her share in the co-ownership accrued to the
entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of absolute community or conjugal partnership
the condominium unit amounting to existing in such valid marriage. If the party
P362,264.00 of the unit's purchase price of who acted in bad faith was not validly married
P1,449,056.00. 28 to another, his or her share shall be forfeited
The petitioner further asserts that the in the manner provided in the last paragraph
lawbooks were paid for solely out of her of the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture
personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna had applied even if both parties were in bad faith.
even sent her a "thank you" note; 29 that she SDTIHA
had the financial capacity to make the Co-ownership was the exception while
contributions and purchases; and that Atty. conjugal partnership of gains was the strict
Luna could not acquire the properties on his rule whereby marriage was an inviolable social
own due to the meagerness of the income institution and divorce decrees are not
derived from his law practice. recognized in the Philippines, as was held by
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of the Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez
proof on the co-ownership? vs. Escao, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29,
1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus:
In resolving the question, the CA entirely
debunked the petitioner's assertions on her xxx xxx xxx
actual contributions through the following As to the 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY.
findings and conclusions, namely: LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by failed to prove that she made an actual
preponderance of evidence that her own contribution to purchase the said property.
independent funds were used to buy the law She failed to establish that the four (4) checks
office condominium and the law books subject that she presented were indeed used for the
matter in contention in this case proof that acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in the
condominium unit. This was aptly explained no participation in the law firm or in the
in the Decision of the trial court, viz.: purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD
failed to prove that she had anything to
". . . The first check, Exhibit "M" for contribute and that she actually purchased or
P55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz paid for the law office amortization and for the
Sison was issued on January 27, 1977, which law books. It is more logical to presume that it
was thirteen (13) months before the was ATTY. LUNA who bought the law office
Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit "7" was space and the law books from his earnings
signed. Another check issued on April 29, from his practice of law rather than
1978 in the amount of P97,588.89, Exhibit "P" embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD
was payable to Banco Filipino. According to money for use of the law firm that he headed.
the plaintiff, this was in payment of the loan of 30 STcEaI
Atty. Luna. The third check which was for
P49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated The Court upholds the foregoing findings and
May 19, 1979, also for payment of the loan of conclusions by the CA both because they were
Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit "M", for substantiated by the records and because we
P4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980. have not been shown any reason to revisit and
None of the foregoing prove that the amounts undo them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the
delivered by plaintiff to the payees were for the party claiming the co-ownership, did not
acquisition of the subject condominium unit. discharge her burden of proof. Her mere
The connection was simply not established. . . allegations on her contributions, not being
." EDcIAC evidence, 31 did not serve the purpose. In
contrast, given the subsistence of the first
SOLEDAD's claim that she made a cash marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the
contribution of P100,000.00 is presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the
unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is no basis for properties out of his own personal funds and
SOLEDAD's claim of co-ownership over the effort remained. It should then be justly
25/100 portion of the condominium unit and concluded that the properties in litis legally
the trial court correctly found that the same pertained to their conjugal partnership of
was acquired through the sole industry of gains as of the time of his death.
ATTY. LUNA, thus: Consequently, the sole ownership of the
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", 25/100 pro indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the
covering the condominium unit was in the condominium unit, and of the lawbooks
name of Atty. Luna, together with his partners pertained to the respondents as the lawful
in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff does heirs of Atty. Luna.
not appear as vendee or as the spouse of Atty. WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the
Luna. The same was acquired for the use of decision promulgated on November 11, 2005;
the Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans from and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of
Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank suit.
and Trust Company were loans of Atty. Luna
and his partners and plaintiff does not have SO ORDERED.
evidence to show that she paid for them fully
or partially. . . ." Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Villarama,
Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently,
CCT No. 21761 were in the name of "JUAN
LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna"
was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner
of the condominium unit. Acquisition of title
and registration thereof are two different acts.
It is well settled that registration does not
confer title but merely confirms one already
existing. The phrase "married to" preceding
"Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the
civil status of ATTY. LUNA.
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff- After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution,
appellee abroad, has remarried, and is now dated 08 March 2002, 17 denied its Motion for
permanently residing in the United States. Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the
Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as instant Petition before this Court, based on
one of his reasons for seeking the declaration the following arguments/grounds
of nullity of their marriage. . .
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity
xxx xxx xxx of respondent's wife do not per se constitute
psychological incapacity. SDEHIa
II. The Court of Appeals has decided basic marital covenants that concomitantly
questions of substance not in accord with law must be assumed and discharged by the
and jurisprudence considering that the Court parties to the marriage which, as so expressed
of Appeals committed serious errors of law in by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the mutual obligations to live together, observe
Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar. love, respect and fidelity and render help and
18 support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the
In his Comment 19 to the Petition, respondent meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
Crasus maintained that Fely's psychological most serious cases of personality disorders
incapacity was clearly established after a full- clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 or inability to give meaning and significance to
of the Family Code of the Philippines was the marriage. This psychological condition
indeed applicable to the marriage of must exist at the time the marriage is
respondent Crasus and Fely, because the celebrated. . .
latter had already become an American
citizen. He further questioned the personality The psychological incapacity must be
of petitioner Republic, represented by the characterized by
Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the
instant Petition, because Article 48 of the (a) Gravity It must be grave or serious
Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the such that the party would be incapable of
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
trial court, not the Solicitor General, to marriage;
intervene on behalf of the State, in (b) Juridical Antecedence It must be
proceedings for annulment and declaration of rooted in the history of the party antedating
nullity of marriages. the marriage, although the overt
After having reviewed the records of this case manifestations may emerge only after the
and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, marriage; and
this Court finds the instant Petition to be (c) Incurability It must be incurable or,
meritorious. even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
I beyond the means of the party involved. 21
The totality of evidence presented during trial More definitive guidelines in the interpretation
is insufficient to support the finding of and application of Article 36 of the Family
psychological incapacity of Fely. Code of the Philippines were handed down by
this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Article 36, concededly one of the more Molina, 22 which, although quite lengthy, by
controversial provisions of the Family Code of its significance, deserves to be reproduced
the Philippines, reads below
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity
party who, at the time of the celebration, was of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
psychologically incapacitated to comply with doubt should be resolved in favor of the
the essential marital obligations of marriage, existence and continuation of the marriage
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
becomes manifest only after its solemnization. rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
Issues most commonly arise as to what and unity of the family. Thus, our
constitutes psychological incapacity. In a Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
series of cases, this Court laid down Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
guidelines for determining its existence. nation." It decrees marriage as legally
DcAEIS "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, 20 the term dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both
psychological incapacity was defined, thus the family and marriage are to be "protected"
by the state. HaAISC
". . . [P]sychological incapacity" should refer to
no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity The Family Code echoes this constitutional
that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability incapacitates the person from really accepting
and solidarity. and thereby complying with the obligations
essential to marriage. cTIESD
(2) The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically (6) The essential marital obligations must
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly the Family Code as regards the husband and
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
Family Code requires that the incapacity must the same Code in regard to parents and their
be psychological not physical, although its children. Such non-complied marital
manifestations and/or symptoms may be obligation(s) must also be stated in the
physical. The evidence must convince the petition, proven by evidence and included in
court that the parties, or one of them, was the text of the decision.
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the (7) Interpretations given by the National
obligations he was assuming, or knowing Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
them, could not have given valid assumption Church in the Philippines, while not
thereof. Although no example of such controlling or decisive, should be given great
incapacity need be given here so as not to respect by our courts. . .
limit the application of the provision under the (8) The trial court must order the
principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
such root cause must be identified as a General to appear as counsel for the state. No
psychological illness and its incapacitating decision shall be handed down unless the
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may Solicitor General issues a certification, which
be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
psychologists. 23 therein his reasons for his agreement or
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
existing at "the time of the celebration" of the The Solicitor General, along with the
marriage. The evidence must show that the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
illness was existing when the parties court such certification within fifteen (15) days
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of from the date the case is deemed submitted
the illness need not be perceivable at such for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
time, but the illness itself must have attached General shall discharge the equivalent
at such moment, or prior thereto. function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095. 24
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, 25 further
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute clarified that there is no requirement that the
or even relative only in regard to the other defendant/respondent spouse should be
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against personally examined by a physician or
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such psychologist as a condition sine qua non for
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption the declaration of nullity of marriage based on
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no
those not related to marriage, like the exercise longer necessary to allege expert opinion in a
of a profession or employment in a job. . . petition under Article 36 of the Family Code of
the Philippines. 26 Such psychological
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to incapacity, however, must be established by
bring about the disability of the party to the totality of the evidence presented during
assume the essential obligations of marriage. the trial.
Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional Using the guidelines established by the afore-
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds
The illness must be shown as downright that the totality of evidence presented by
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or respondent Crasus failed miserably to
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, establish the alleged psychological incapacity
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for
in the person, an adverse integral element in declaring their marriage null and void under
the personality structure that effectively
Article 36 of the Family Code of the mental defect that is serious or grave, and
Philippines. HTDCAS which has been in existence at the time of
celebration of the marriage, and is incurable.
The only substantial evidence presented by Even when the rules have been relaxed and
respondent Crasus before the RTC was his the personal examination of Fely by a
testimony, which can be easily put into psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer
question for being self-serving, in the absence mandatory for the declaration of nullity of
of any other corroborating evidence. He their marriage under Article 36 of the Family
submitted only two other pieces of evidence: Code of the Philippines, 30 the totality of
(1) the Certification on the recording with the evidence presented during trial by respondent
Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract Crasus, as spouse seeking the declaration of
between respondent Crasus and Fely, such nullity of marriage, must still prove the
marriage being celebrated on 16 December gravity, judicial antecedence, and incurability
1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of of the alleged psychological incapacity; 31
Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely which, it failed to do so herein. HTCAED
used her American husband's surname. Even
considering the admissions made by Fely Moreover, this Court resolves any doubt shall
herself in her Answer to respondent Crasus's be resolved in favor of the validity of the
Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is marriage. 32 No less than the Constitution of
not enough to convince this Court that Fely 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen
had such a grave mental illness that the family as the basic social institution and
prevented her from assuming the essential marriage as the foundation of the family. 33
obligations of marriage.
II
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines contemplates Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of
downright incapacity or inability to take the
cognizance of and to assume the basic marital Philippines is not applicable to the case at
obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or bar.
difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse. 27 Irreconcilable differences, According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity Family Code of the Philippines
and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
abandonment, by themselves, also do not and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
under the said Article. 28 by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
As has already been stressed by this Court in have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
previous cases, Article 36 "is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers
marital bond at the time the causes therefore to a special situation wherein one of the
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious married couple is a foreigner who divorces his
psychological illness afflicting a party even or her Filipino spouse. By its plain and literal
before the celebration of marriage. It is a interpretation, the said provision cannot be
malady so grave and so permanent as to applied to the case of respondent Crasus and
deprive one of awareness of the duties and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.
about to assume." 29 Although the exact date was not established,
Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed
Fely's hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; before the RTC that she obtained a divorce
her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her from respondent Crasus sometime after she
marriage to an American; and even her left for the United States in 1984, after which
flaunting of her American family and her she married her American husband in 1985.
American surname, may have hurt and In the same Answer, she alleged that she had
embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest been an American citizen since 1988. At the
of the family. Nonetheless, the afore-described time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a
characteristics, behavior, and acts of Fely do Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the
not satisfactorily establish a psychological or nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still proceedings for annulment and declaration of
bound by Philippine laws on family rights and nullity of marriages by preventing collusion
duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, between the parties, or the fabrication or
even when she was already living abroad. suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind
Philippine laws, then and even until now, do that the Solicitor General is the principal law
not allow and recognize divorce between officer and legal defender of the land, then his
Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have intervention in such proceedings could only
validly obtained a divorce from respondent serve and contribute to the realization of such
Crasus. cSCTEH intent, rather than thwart it. DSIaAE
In 1986, Cipriano's wife left for the United Section 1. Who may file petition Any
States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A person interested under a deed, will, contract
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his or other written instrument, or whose rights
wife had been naturalized as an American are affected by a statute, executive order or
citizen. regulation, ordinance, or other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
son that his wife had obtained a divorce Regional Trial Court to determine any
decree and then married a certain Innocent question of construction or validity arising,
Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove thereunder.
Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
xxx xxx xxx
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a
petition for authority to remarry invoking The requisites of a petition for declaratory
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the controversy; (2) the controversy must be
petition, the court granted the same. The between persons whose interests are adverse;
Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal
of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought interest in the controversy; and (4) that the
reconsideration but it was denied. issue is ripe for judicial determination. 8
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure This case concerns the applicability of
question of law: Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage
between two Filipino citizens where one later
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce
REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The
FAMILY CODE 4 interests of the parties are also adverse, as
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article petitioner representing the State asserts its
26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the duty to protect the institution of marriage
instant case because it only applies to a valid while respondent, a private citizen, insists on
mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated a declaration of his capacity to remarry.
between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The Respondent, praying for relief, has legal
proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file interest in the controversy. The issue raised is
a petition for annulment or for legal also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch
separation. 5 Furthermore, the OSG argues as when respondent remarries, litigation
there is no law that governs respondent's ensues and puts into question the validity of
situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter his second marriage. SCHIcT
of legislation and not of judicial determination. Coming now to the substantive issue, does
6 Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
For his part, respondent admits that Article apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily,
26 is not directly applicable to his case but we must dwell on how this provision had come
insists that when his naturalized alien wife about in the first place, and what was the
obtained a divorce decree which capacitated intent of the legislators in its enactment?
her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by Brief Historical Background
operation of law pursuant to Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution. 7 On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon
Aquino signed into law Executive Order No.
At the outset, we note that the petition for 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code,"
authority to remarry filed before the trial court which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article
actually constituted a petition for declaratory 26 thereof states:
relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court provides: All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in
RULE 63 force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also made into law only after more widespread
be valid in this country, except those consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
Legislative Intent
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of
the original Family Code, Executive Order No. Records of the proceedings of the Family Code
227 was likewise signed into law, amending deliberations showed that the intent of
Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge
second paragraph was added to Article 26. As Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
so amended, it now provides: Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside married to the alien spouse who, after
the Philippines in accordance with the laws in obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to
force in the country where they were the Filipino spouse. AETcSa
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
36, 37 and 38. Romillo, Jr. 10 The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen foreigner. The Court held therein that a
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to consequently, the Filipino spouse is
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied) Does the same principle apply to a case where
at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
On its face, the foregoing provision does not the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on,
appear to govern the situation presented by one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
the case at hand. It seems to apply only to naturalization?
cases where at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the
and a foreigner. The instant case is one where 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. 11 In
at the time the marriage was solemnized, the Quita, the parties were, as in this case,
parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, Filipino citizens when they got married. The
the wife was naturalized as an American wife became a naturalized American citizen in
citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year.
granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter
she remarried an American citizen while dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his
residing in the U.S.A. naturalized foreign spouse is no longer
married under Philippine law and can thus
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public remarry.
Hearings 9 on the Family Code, the Catholic
Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) Thus, taking into consideration the legislative
registered the following objections to intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold
Paragraph 2 of Article 26: that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties
1. The rule is discriminatory. It who, at the time of the celebration of the
discriminates against those whose spouses marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,
are Filipinos who divorce them abroad. These one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
spouses who are divorced will not be able to citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
validly divorce them abroad can. remarry as if the other party were a foreigner
at the time of the solemnization of the
2. This is the beginning of the recognition marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
of the validity of divorce even for Filipino sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the
citizens. For those whose foreign spouses interpretation of a statute according to its
validly divorce them abroad will also be exact and literal import would lead to
considered to be validly divorced here and can mischievous results or contravene the clear
re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason, However, we note that the records are bereft of
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of competent evidence duly submitted by
the law. A statute may therefore be extended respondent concerning the divorce decree and
to cases not within the literal meaning of its the naturalization of respondent's wife. It is
terms, so long as they come within its spirit or settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the
intent. 12 burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence. 13
If we are to give meaning to the legislative
intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Accordingly, for his plea to prosper,
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien respondent herein must prove his allegation
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no that his wife was naturalized as an American
longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce
instant case must be deemed as coming decree can be recognized by our own courts,
within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of the party pleading it must prove the divorce as
Article 26. AHDTIE a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it. 14 Such foreign law
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin must also be proved as our courts cannot take
elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other
Article 26 as follows: fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.
1. There is a valid marriage that has been 15 Furthermore, respondent must also show
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a that the divorce decree allows his former wife
foreigner; and to remarry as specifically required in Article
26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to enter into another marriage.
remarry.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
the parties at the time of the celebration of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a
valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship
and remarried, also to remarry. However,
In this case, when Cipriano's wife was considering that in the present petition there
naturalized as an American citizen, there was is no sufficient evidence submitted and on
still a valid marriage that has been celebrated record, we are unable to declare, based on
between her and Cipriano. As fate would have respondent's bare allegations that his wife,
it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently who was naturalized as an American citizen,
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to had obtained a divorce decree and had
remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the remarried an American, that respondent is
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration
both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the could only be made properly upon
"divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed respondent's submission of the aforecited
to remarry. evidence in his favor. CcAHEI
We are also unable to sustain the OSG's ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic
theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed
spouse is to file either a petition for Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution
annulment or a petition for legal separation. dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court
Annulment would be a long and tedious of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are
process, and in this particular case, not even hereby SET ASIDE.
feasible, considering that the marriage of the
parties appears to have all the badges of No pronouncement as to costs.
validity. On the other hand, legal separation
would not be a sufficient remedy for it would SO ORDERED.
not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally Davide, Jr., C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and
separated Filipino spouse would still remain Azcuna, JJ., concur.
married to the naturalized alien spouse.
THIRD DIVISION judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as
he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that
[G.R. No. 186571. August 11, 2010.] only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy,
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN
Family Code, 8 in order for him or her to be able to
TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
remarry under Philippine law. 9 Article 26 of the
GENERAL, respondents.
Family Code reads:
DECISION
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
BRION, J p: Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
review on certiorari 2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court (present petition). ASaTHc Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
naturalization on November 29, 2000. 3 On Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent remarry under Philippine law. TDESCa
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. 4
Due to work and other professional commitments, This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with
Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He the legislative intent behind the enactment of the
returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido
that his wife was having an affair with another III; 10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the
man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The remains married to the alien spouse who, after
Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Canada granted Gerbert's petition for divorce on Filipino spouse." 11
December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a
THE PETITION
month later, on January 8, 2006. 5
From the RTC's ruling, 12 Gerbert filed the present
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on
petition. 13
and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of
marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is
Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that
Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a
decree on his and Daisylyn's marriage certificate. determination of his rights under the second
Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking
official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) into account the rationale behind the second
informed Gerbert that the marriage between him paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he
and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to contends that the provision applies as well to the
be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC
first be judicially recognized by a competent ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido
Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, by limiting the standing to file the petition only to
series of 1982. 6 IHDCcT the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims
to be contrary to the essence of the second
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He
recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
considers himself as a proper party, vested with
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC.
sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as
Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any
there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted
responsive pleading but submitted instead a
for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the
notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court.
Philippines since two marriage certificates,
She offered no opposition to Gerbert's petition and,
involving him, would be on file with the Civil
in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case
Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General
herself but was prevented by financial and
and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments, 14
personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that
both support Gerbert's position. SAcaDE
she be considered as a party-in-interest with a
similar prayer to Gerbert's. Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
In its October 30, 2008 decision, 7 the RTC denied
Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court
Gerbert's petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert
was not the proper party to institute the action for
of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign obligations . . . cannot be just. [The Filipino
divorce decree. spouse] should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
THE COURT'S RULING [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue
to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
The alien spouse can claim no right
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
under the second paragraph of against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served. 22 aCHDST
Article 26 of the Family Code as the
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was
substantive right it establishes is in included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
favor of the Filipino spouse alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse." 23 The
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino
legislative history and intent behind the second
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status,
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of
defective marriages void 15 and voidable 16 the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial substantive right to have his or her marriage to the
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating
marriage exists before or at the time of the him or her to remarry. 24 Without the second
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the
contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce,
for cause arising after the marriage. 17 Our family whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for
laws do not recognize absolute divorce between that purpose or as a related issue in another
Filipino citizens. 18 proceeding, would be of no significance to the
Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; 25
in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by
legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The
19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of
amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its the Family Code provides the direct exception to
present wording, as follows: CaSHAc this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the
dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid Additionally, an action based on the second
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce
and (6), 36, 37 and 38. decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is capacitated to contract another marriage. No court
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the declaration for the alien spouse (other than that
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to already established by the decree), whose status
remarry under Philippine law. and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law. 26 ACDIcS
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into Given the rationale and intent behind the
the law this Court's holding in Van Dorn v. enactment, and the purpose of the second
Romillo, Jr. 20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 21 In paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the
both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the
alien spouse's assertion of marital rights after a provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In
foreign court's divorce decree between the alien other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke
and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
the foreign divorce had already severed the marital Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under
bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in this provision.
Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
The foreign divorce decree is
To maintain . . . that, under our laws, [the Filipino
spouse] has to be considered still married to [the presumptive evidence of a right that
alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's
clothes the party with legal interest to himself or herself. 29 The recognition may be made
in an action instituted specifically for the purpose
petition for its recognition in this or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
jurisdiction
defense.
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the
In Gerbert's case, since both the foreign divorce
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
decree and the national law of the alien,
bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce,
complementary statement that this conclusion is
purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority,
not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert's petition
Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes
before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability
into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1)
of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
official publications or (2) copies attested by the
Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of
officer having legal custody of the documents. If
legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition
the copies of official records are not kept in the
of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
with the alien's national law have been duly proven
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
stationed in the foreign country in which the
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
his office.
Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. This Section states: aTEScI The records show that Gerbert attached to his
petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final
required certificates proving its authenticity, 30
orders. The effect of a judgment or final order of
but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
divorce. 31 Under this situation, we can, at this
to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more
specific thing, the judgment or final order is appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and determine whether the divorce decree is consistent
with the Canadian divorce law. DCASIT
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against
a person, the judgment or final order is We deem it more appropriate to take this latter
presumptive evidence of a right as between the course of action, given the Article 26 interests that
parties and their successors in interest by a will be served and the Filipina wife's (Daisylyn's)
subsequent title. obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at
the same time, will allow other interested parties to
In either case, the judgment or final order may be oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want petitioner's presumptive evidence of a right by
of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a
mistake of law or fact. party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be
To our mind, direct involvement or being the taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a
subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
clothe a party with the requisite interest to recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata 32
institute an action before our courts for the between the parties, as provided in Section 48,
recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 33
situation, we have declared, no less, that the
divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be In fact, more than the principle of comity that is
recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of
is valid according to his or her national law. 27 foreign judgments between nations, the res
CDAcIT judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign recognition and for considering the alien spouse
divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained it not for the substantive rule that the second
that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a provides.
tribunal of another country." 28 This means that
the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be Considerations beyond the
proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the alien's applicable national law to recognition of the foreign divorce
show the effect of the judgment on the alien
decree (3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption,
change of name and naturalization register.
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note cAaETS
that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already
recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and But while the law requires the entry of the divorce
Daisylyn's marriage certificate based on the mere decree in the civil registry, the law and the
presentation of the decree. 34 We consider the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso
recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to facto authorize the decree's registration. The law
draw attention of the bench and the bar to what should be read in relation with the requirement of
had been done. ScaCEH a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment
before it can be given res judicata effect. In the
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, context of the present case, no judicial order as yet
events and judicial decrees concerning the civil exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus,
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out
register." The law requires the entry in the civil of turn and without authority of law when it
registry of judicial decrees that produce legal annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert
consequences touching upon a person's legal and Daisylyn's marriage certificate, on the strength
capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was
his own will, such as his being legitimate or aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as
illegitimate, or his being married or not." 35 it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, 36 and
Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although 1982 37 both of which required a final order
a foreign one, affecting a person's legal capacity from a competent Philippine court before a foreign
and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered
3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the
specifically requires the registration of divorce registration of the decree. For being contrary to
decrees in the civil registry: law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial recognition is
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is
patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.
established for recording the civil status of
persons, in which shall be entered: Another point we wish to draw attention to is that
the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
(a) births;
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself,
(b) deaths; authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign
(c) marriages; judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
(d) annulments of marriages; cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
STHDAc
(e) divorces; EHDCAI
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry
(f) legitimations;
in a civil register shall be changed or corrected,
(g) adoptions; without judicial order." The Rules of Court
supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by
(h) acknowledgment of natural children; specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry
(i) naturalization; and may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108
of the Rules of Court sets in detail the
(j) changes of name.
jurisdictional and procedural requirements that
xxx xxx xxx must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars annotated in the civil registry. It also requires,
shall keep and preserve in their offices the among others, that the verified petition must be
following books, in which they shall, respectively filed with the RTC of the province where the
make the proper entries concerning the civil status corresponding civil registry is located; 38 that the
of persons: civil registrar and all persons who have or claim
any interest must be made parties to the
(1) Birth and death register. proceedings; 39 and that the time and place for
hearing must be published in a newspaper of
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered
general circulation. 40 As these basic jurisdictional
not only the marriages solemnized but also
requirements have not been met in the present
divorces and dissolved marriages.
case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed
with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the SECOND DIVISION
Rules of Court.
[G.R. No. 196049. June 26, 2013.]
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling
should not be construed as requiring two separate MINORU FUJIKI, petitioner, vs. MARIA PAZ
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA,
decree in the civil registry one for recognition of LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON
the foreign decree and another specifically for CITY, and THE ADMINISTRATOR AND
cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the
CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special
respondents.
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
DECISION
of Court) is precisely to establish the status or
right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule CARPIO, J p:
108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the
appropriate adversarial proceeding 41 by which the The Case
applicability of the foreign judgment can be
measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional This is a direct recourse to this Court from the
infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. ETDaIC Quezon City, through a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on
certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 on a pure question of law. The petition assails
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, the Order 1 dated 31 January 2011 of the
Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its
We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying
for further proceedings in accordance with our petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The
ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial
furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs. Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
SO ORDERED.
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on
improper venue and the lack of personality of
Carpio Morales, Bersamin, Abad * and Villarama petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
Jr., JJ., concur. IEHScT
The Facts
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
states: preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary,
person interested in any act, event, order or when Section 2 (a) states that "[a] petition for
decree concerning the civil status of persons declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
which has been recorded in the civil register, may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"
may file a verified petition for the cancellation 75 it refers to the husband or the wife of
or correction of any entry relating thereto, the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35 (4)
with the Regional Trial Court of the province of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are
where the corresponding civil registry is void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a
located. (Emphasis supplied) bigamous marriage are neither the husband
nor the wife under the law. The husband or
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the
recognize the Japanese Family Court one who has the personality to file a petition
judgment nullifying the marriage between for declaration of absolute nullity of void
Marinay and Maekara on the ground of marriage under Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-
bigamy because the judgment concerns his 11-10-SC.
civil status as married to Marinay. For the
same reason he has the personality to file a Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, which
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of declares bigamous marriages void from the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of
civil registry on the basis of the decree of the the Revised Penal Code, 76 which penalizes
Japanese Family Court. aETDIc bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus,
anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a because any citizen has an interest in the
personal and material interest in maintaining prosecution and prevention of crimes. 77 If
the integrity of the marriage he contracted and anyone can file a criminal action which leads
the property relations arising from it. There is to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous
also no doubt that he is interested in the marriage, 78 there is more reason to confer
cancellation of an entry of a bigamous personality to sue on the husband or the wife
marriage in the civil registry, which of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse
compromises the public record of his does not only share in the public interest of
marriage. The interest derives from the prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also
substantive right of the spouse not only to personally interested in the purely civil aspect
preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) 68 of protecting his marriage. TAaEIc
his most intimate human relation, but also to
When the right of the spouse to protect his Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997
marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
injured party and is therefore interested in the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
judgment of the suit. 79 Juliano-Llave ruled registry may be filed in the Regional Trial
that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved Court "where the corresponding civil registry
party as the bigamous marriage not only is located." 87 In other words, a Filipino
threatens the financial and the property citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the
ownership aspect of the prior marriage but mere expedient of changing his entry of
most of all, it causes an emotional burden to marriage in the civil registry. AcISTE
the prior spouse." 80 Being a real party in
interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in However, this does not apply in a petition for
order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For correction or cancellation of a civil registry
this purpose, he can petition a court to entry based on the recognition of a foreign
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the judgment annulling a marriage where one of
bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
fact that such judgment is effective in the There is neither circumvention of the
Philippines. Once established, there should be substantive and procedural safeguards of
no more impediment to cancel the entry of the marriage under Philippine law, nor of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry. jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No.
8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is
III. not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this presupposes a case which was already tried
Court held that a "trial court has no and decided under foreign law. The procedure
jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of petition to recognize a foreign judgment
entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 81 annulling a bigamous marriage where one of
Thus, the "validity of marriage[] . . . can be the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
questioned only in a direct action" to nullify Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the
the marriage. 82 The RTC relied on Braza in jurisdiction of the foreign court.
dismissing the petition for recognition of
foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the Article 26 of the Family Code confers
marriage between Marinay and Maekara. jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
EAcTDH effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino
spouse without undergoing trial to determine
Braza is not applicable because Braza does the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment The second paragraph of Article 26 of the
nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage
the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
To be sure, a petition for correction or validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
cancellation of an entry in the civil registry validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a capacitating him or her to remarry, the
marriage. A direct action is necessary to Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
prevent circumvention of the substantive and under Philippine law." In Republic v.
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Orbecido, 88 this Court recognized the
Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other legislative intent of the second paragraph of
related laws. Among these safeguards are the Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd
requirement of proving the limited grounds for situation where the Filipino spouse remains
the dissolution of marriage, 83 support married to the alien spouse who, after
pendente lite of the spouses and children, 84 obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to
the liquidation, partition and distribution of the Filipino spouse" 89 under the laws of his
the properties of the spouses, 85 and the or her country. The second paragraph of
investigation of the public prosecutor to Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes
determine collusion. 86 A direct action for Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a
declaration of nullity or annulment of foreign divorce decree precisely because the
marriage is also necessary to prevent Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a case for petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
divorce. under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not
the only remedy available to him or her.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a Philippine courts have jurisdiction to
corrective measure to address the anomaly recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a
that results from a marriage between a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a
Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and criminal prosecution for bigamy.
a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce.
The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse In the recognition of foreign judgments,
being tied to the marriage while the foreign Philippine courts are incompetent to
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his substitute their judgment on how a case was
or her country. The correction is made by decided under foreign law. They cannot decide
extending in the Philippines the effect of the on the "family rights and duties, or on the
foreign divorce decree, which is already status, condition and legal capacity" of the
effective in the country where it was rendered. foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited
Family Code is based on this Court's decision to the question of whether to extend the effect
in Van Dorn v. Romillo 90 which declared that of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a
the Filipino spouse "should not be foreign judgment relating to the status of a
discriminated against in her own country if marriage involving a citizen of a foreign
the ends of justice are to be served." 91 country, Philippine courts only decide whether
IDETCA to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under
the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code 15 of the Civil Code. ATEHDc
applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a
foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment For this purpose, Philippine courts will only
nullifying the marriage on the ground of determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition inconsistent with an overriding public policy
abroad to declare the marriage void on the in the Philippines; and (2) whether any
ground of bigamy. The principle in the second alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e.,
applies because the foreign spouse, after the want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with
or her country. If the foreign judgment is not public policy nor adequate proof to repel the
recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino judgment, Philippine courts should, by
spouse will be discriminated the foreign default, recognize the foreign judgment as part
spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse of the comity of nations. Section 48 (b), Rule
cannot remarry. 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign
judgment is already "presumptive evidence of
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of a right between the parties." Upon recognition
the Family Code, Philippine courts are of the foreign judgment, this right becomes
empowered to correct a situation where the conclusive and the judgment serves as the
Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage basis for the correction or cancellation of entry
while the foreign spouse is free to marry. in the civil registry. The recognition of the
Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
Family Code, Philippine courts already have marriage is a subsequent event that
jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign establishes a new status, right and fact 92
judgment in the Philippines to the extent that that needs to be reflected in the civil registry.
the foreign judgment does not contravene Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency
domestic public policy. A critical difference between the recognition of the effectivity of the
between the case of a foreign divorce decree foreign judgment and the public records in the
and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous Philippines.
marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the
nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with However, the recognition of a foreign judgment
Philippine public policy as expressed in Article nullifying a bigamous marriage is without
35 (4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under
the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. 93 The
has the option to undergo full trial by filing a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is not a ground for THIRD DIVISION
extinction of criminal liability under Articles
89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. [G.R. No. 183805. July 3, 2013.]
Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, petitioner, vs.
Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
crime of bigamy] shall not run when the SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, respondents.
offender is absent from the Philippine
archipelago." CcHDSA DECISION
Contrary to law. 3
In like manner, the Court recently upheld the SPO4 Santiago S. Carino contracted two
ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled marriages. The first was with petitioner with
that what makes a person criminally liable for whom he begot two (2) children, while the
bigamy is when he contracts a second or second, during the subsistence of the first,
subsequent marriage during the subsistence was with respondent with whom he had no
of a valid first marriage. It further held that issue. When he died in 1988 petitioner and
the parties to the marriage should not be respondent filed claims for monetary benefits
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, and financial assistance from various
for the same must be submitted to the government agencies. Petitioner collected
judgment of competent courts and only when P146,000 from MBAI, PCCUI, commutation,
the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it NAPOLCOM and Pag-Ibig, while respondent
be held as void, and so long as there is no collected P21,000 from GSIS and SSS.
such declaration the presumption is that the Respondent, in an action for collection, sought
marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a to recover half the amount collected by
second marriage before the judicial petitioner. She claimed that she had no
declaration of the first marriage assumes the knowledge of the previous marriage with
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. 12 petitioner and presented evidence that the
same was contracted without the necessary
Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal marriage license. Judgment was rendered by
culpability attaches to the offender upon the the trial court in favor of respondent which
commission of the offense, and from that was affirmed on appeal by the Court of
instant, liability appends to him until Appeals. Hence, this recourse.
extinguished as provided by law. 13 It is clear
then that the crime of bigamy was committed The absence of a marriage license, as a
by petitioner from the time he contracted the general rule, renders the marriage void ab
second marriage with private respondent. initio. However, for purposes of remarriage, a
Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of prior judicial declaration of nullity of the
nullity of petitioner's second marriage does previous marriage must be obtained. For other
not impede the filing of a criminal charge for purposes no such judicial action is required.
bigamy against him. CHIaTc Otherwise, the second marriage would also be
void. ICcaST
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is DENIED. The Decision dated Article 148 of the Civil Code governs the
February 1, 2008 and Resolution dated July property regime of bigamous marriages. Only
24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. the properties acquired by the parties through
CR No. 30444 are hereby AFFIRMED. their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them
SO ORDERED. in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. While union of parties who are
Velasco, Jr., Abad, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., legally capacitated and not barred by any
concur. impediment to contract marriage is governed
by co-ownership under Article 147 of the Civil
Code. Thus, the P146,000 from MBAI, PCCUI,
commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-Ibig
earned by the deceased, in the absence of
evidence that respondent contributed money,
property or industry in the acquisition of these exempt from the license requirement. A
monetary benefits, is owned by the deceased marriage license, therefore, was indispensable
alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to the validity of their marriage. This
to claim the same. However, petitioner is notwithstanding, the records reveal that the
entitled to one-half of the subject "death marriage contract of petitioner and the
benefits" as her share in the property regime deceased bears no marriage license number
and the other half shall pass by to petitioner's and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of
children as the decedent's legal heirs. San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no
record of such marriage license. It is beyond
SYLLABUS cavil, therefore, that the marriage between
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased,
MARRIAGE; FINAL JUDGMENT DECLARING having been solemnized without the necessary
PREVIOUS MARRIAGE VOID, NECESSARY marriage license, and not being one of the
FOR PURPOSES OF SECOND MARRIAGE. marriages exempt from the marriage license
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be 3. ID.; FAMILY CODE; FINAL JUDGMENT
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the DECLARING PREVIOUS MARRIAGE VOID,
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such NECESSARY FOR PURPOSES OF SECOND
previous marriage void. Meaning, where the MARRIAGE; WITHOUT SUCH DECLARATION,
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is SECOND MARRIAGE IS ALSO VOID.
sought to be invoked for purposes of Accordingly, the declaration in the instant
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis case of nullity of the previous marriage of the
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does
to be free from legal infirmity, is a final not validate the second marriage of the
judgment declaring the previous marriage deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact
void. However, for purposes other than remains that their marriage was solemnized
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to without first obtaining a judicial decree
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan
other purposes, such as but not limited to the Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. SCaITA
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon 4. ID.; ID.; BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE;
the validity of marriage even after the death of WAGES AND SALARIES EARNED BY EACH
the parties thereto, and even in a suit not PARTY BELONG TO HIM OR HER
directly instituted to question the validity of EXCLUSIVELY. Under Article 148 of the
said marriage, so long as it is essential to the Family Code, which refers to the property
determination of the case. In such instances, regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or relationships, relationships in a state of
documentary, to prove the existence of concubine, relationships where both man and
grounds rendering such a previous marriage woman are married to other persons, multiple
an absolute nullity. These need not be limited alliances of the same married man, the
solely to an earlier final judgment of a court properties acquired by the parties through
declaring such previous marriage void. their actual joint contribution shall belong to
DaAETS the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned
by each party belong to him or her exclusively.
2. ID.; PERSONS AND FAMILY Then too, contributions in the form of care of
RELATIONS; MARRIAGE; LICENSE, the home, children and household, or spiritual
REQUIRED; CASE AT BAR. Under the Civil or moral inspiration, are excluded in this
Code, which was the law in force when the regime.
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid 5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR.
marriage license is a requisite of marriage, Considering that the marriage of respondent
and the absence thereof, subject to certain Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous
exceptions, renders the marriage void ab marriage, having been solemnized during the
initio. In the case at bar, there is no question subsistence of a previous marriage then
that the marriage of petitioner and the presumed to be valid (between petitioner and
deceased does not fall within the marriages the deceased), the application of Article 148 is
therefore in order. The disputed P146,000.00 contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S.
from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Cario, whose "death benefits" is now the
Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, subject of the controversy between the two
and PCCUI, are clearly remunerations, Susans whom he married. SCcHIE
incentives and benefits from governmental
agencies earned by the deceased as a police Before this Court is a petition for review on
officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents certiorari seeking to set aside the decision 1 of
proof to the contrary, it could not be said that the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
she contributed money, property or industry 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of
in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Hence, they are not owned in common by Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
respondent and the deceased, but belong to During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago
the deceased alone and respondent has no S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the
right whatsoever to claim the same. By first was on June 20, 1969, with petitioner
intestate succession, the said "death benefits" Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as
of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two
And, respondent, not being the legal wife of offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario;
the deceased is not one of them. and the second was on November 10, 1992,
6. ID.; ID.; VOID MARRIAGES OF with respondent Susan Yee Cario (hereafter
PARTIES LEGALLY CAPACITATED AND NOT referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had
BARRED BY ANY IMPEDIMENT; PROPERTY no children in their almost ten year
RELATIONSHIP GOVERNED BY CO- cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
OWNERSHIP; CASE AT BAR. As to the In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill
property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by
and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed away on
Code governs. This article applies to unions of November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan
parties who are legally capacitated and not Yee, who spent for his medical and burial
barred by any impediment to contract expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless claims for monetary benefits and financial
void for other reasons, like the absence of a assistance pertaining to the deceased from
marriage license. In contrast to Article 148, various government agencies. Petitioner Susan
under the foregoing article, wages and salaries Nicdao was able to collect a total of
earned by either party during the cohabitation P146,000.00 from "MBAI, PCCUI,
shall be owned by the parties in equal shares Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig," 3
and will be divided equally between them, while respondent Susan Yee received a total of
even if only one party earned the wages and P21,000.00 from "GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and
the other did not contribute thereto. burial (SSS)." 4
Conformably, even if the disputed "death
benefits" were earned by the deceased alone On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee
as a government employee, Article 147 creates filed the instant case for collection of sum of
a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the money against petitioner Susan Nicdao
petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered
no allegation of bad faith in the present case, to return to her at least one-half of the one
both parties of the first marriage are hundred forty-six thousand pesos
presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as
of the subject "death benefits" under scrutiny "death benefits" which she (petitioner) received
shall go to the petitioner as her share in the from "MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
property regime, and the other half pertaining NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig." Despite service of
to the deceased shall pass by, intestate summons, petitioner failed to file her answer,
succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his prompting the trial court to declare her in
children with Susan Nicdao. default.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, Davide, Jr., C .J ., Kapunan and Pardo, JJ.,
the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family concur.
Code, clarified that a prior and separate
declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all Puno, J., is on official leave.
important condition precedent only for
purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party who
is previously married wishes to contract a
second marriage, he or she has to obtain first
a judicial decree declaring the first marriage
void, before he or she could contract said
second marriage, otherwise the second
marriage would be void. The same rule applies
even if the first marriage is patently void
because the parties are not free to determine
for themselves the validity or invalidity or their
marriage. However, for purposes other than to
remarry, like for filing a case for collection of
sum of money anchored on a marriage
claimed to be valid, no prior and separate
judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All
that a party has to do is to present evidence,
testimonial or documentary, that would prove
that the marriage from which his or her rights
flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if
material to the determination of the issues
before it, will rule on the status of the
marriage involved and proceed to determine
the rights of the parties in accordance with
the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus,
in Nial v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:
EICSTa
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992. Having attained legal age at this time and
there being no showing of any disqualification
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise or incompetence to serve as administrator, let
Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, letters of administration over the estate of the
Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued
for Letters of Administration before the to petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City. 3 the approval by this Court of a bond in the
In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M- amount of P100,000.00 to be posted by her. 9
3957, Elise claims that she is the natural
child of Eliseo having been conceived and born On appeal, the decision of the trial court was
at the time when her parents were both affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008
capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on Decision 10 rendered by the Court of Appeals
the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589. In validating the
marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo's findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held
marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and
bigamous for having been contracted during Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by
the subsistence of the latter's marriage with establishing a common residence at No. 26
one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las
filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of
attached to the Petition for Letters of Eliseo's death in 1992. For purposes of fixing
Administration her Certificate of Live Birth 4 the venue of the settlement of Eliseo's estate,
the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
reached by the RTC that the decedent was a appeal from that court, in the original case, or
resident of Las Pias City. The petitioners' when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the record. (Emphasis supplied).
Court of Appeals in its Resolution 11 dated 7
August 2009. The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini
"actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
The Issues residence or domicile." This term "resides,"
like the terms "residing" and "residence," is
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the elastic and should be interpreted in the light
assailed Court of Appeals Decision and of the object or purpose of the statute or rule
Resolution on the following grounds: in which it is employed. In the application of
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature
QUIAZON WAS A RESIDENT OF LAS PIAS residence rather than domicile is the
AND THEREFORE[,] THE PETITION FOR significant factor. 13 Even where the statute
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION WAS uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as
PROPERLY FILED WITH THE [RTC] OF LAS meaning residence and not domicile in the
PIAS[;] technical sense. 14 Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY "domicile" but as generally used in statutes
ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
GARCIA-QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY convey the same meaning as the term
MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO "inhabitant." 15 In other words, "resides"
PRE-EXISTING MARRIAGE[;] [AND] should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS physical habitation of a person, actual
OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE residence or place of abode. 16 It signifies
QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN ANY INTEREST physical presence in a place and actual stay
IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF thereat. 17 Venue for ordinary civil actions
ADMINISTRATION[.] 12 and that for special proceedings have one and
the same meaning. 18 As thus defined,
The Court's Ruling
"residence," in the context of venue provisions,
We find the petition bereft of merit. means nothing more than a person's actual
residence or place of abode, provided he
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of resides therein with continuity and
Court, the petition for letters of administration consistency. 19
of the estate of a decedent should be filed in
the RTC of the province where the decedent Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the
resides at the time of his death: Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for
affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was
settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of properly laid in Las Pias City. It is evident
the Philippines at the time of his death, from the records that during his lifetime,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road,
proved, or letters of administration granted, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For this
and his estate settled, in the Court of First reason, the venue for the settlement of his
Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in the estate may be laid in the said city.
province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign In opposing the issuance of letters of
country, the Court of First Instance [now administration, the petitioners harp on the
Regional Trial Court] of any province in which entry in Eliseo's Death Certificate that he is a
he had estate. The court first taking resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a estate should be settled. While the recitals in
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the death certificates can be considered proofs of
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction a decedent's residence at the time of his
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on death, the contents thereof, however, is not
the place of residence of the decedent, or of binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the
the location of his estate, shall not be Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been
living with Lourdes, deporting themselves as cannot be the source of rights, such that any
husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of interested party may attack the marriage
his death in 1995. This finding is consistent directly or collaterally without prescription,
with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of
action for judicial partition of properties the parties to the marriage. 25
against Amelia before the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 106, on the ground that their Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt
marriage is void for being bigamous. 20 That that Elise, whose successional rights would be
Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital prejudiced by her father's marriage to Amelia,
feud with Amelia before the courts of law may impugn the existence of such marriage
renders untenable petitioners' position that even after the death of her father. The said
Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac marriage may be questioned directly by filing
with Amelia and her children. It disproves an action attacking the validity thereof, or
rather than supports petitioners' submission collaterally by raising it as an issue in a
that the lower courts' findings arose from an proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
erroneous appreciation of the evidence on the deceased spouse, such as in the case at
record. Factual findings of the trial court, bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir,
when affirmed by the appellate court, must be 26 has a cause of action for the declaration of
held to be conclusive and binding upon this the absolute nullity of the void marriage of
Court. 21 Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either
party to the said marriage does not extinguish
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners' such cause of action.
contention that the Court of Appeals erred in
declaring Amelia's marriage to Eliseo as void Having established the right of Elise to
ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no impugn Eliseo's marriage to Amelia, we now
marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be proceed to determine whether or not the
the source of rights. Any interested party may decedent's marriage to Amelia is void for being
attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A bigamous.
void marriage can be questioned even beyond Contrary to the position taken by the
the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. 22 petitioners, the existence of a previous
It must be pointed out that at the time of the marriage between Amelia and Filipito was
celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and sufficiently established by no less than the
Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese
and not the Family Code, making the ruling in of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest of
Nial v. Bayadog 23 applicable four-square to the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in
the case at hand. In Nial, the Court, in no Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is
uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to a competent evidence of marriage and the
file a petition for the declaration of nullity of certification from the National Archive that no
their father's marriage to therein respondent information relative to the said marriage exists
after the death of their father, by does not diminish the probative value of the
contradistinguishing void from voidable entries therein. We take judicial notice of the
marriages, to wit: fact that the first marriage was celebrated
[C]onsequently, void marriages can be more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility
questioned even after the death of either party that a record of marriage can no longer be
but voidable marriages can be assailed only found in the National Archive, given the
during the lifetime of the parties and not after interval of time, is not completely remote.
death of either, in which case the parties and Consequently, in the absence of any showing
their offspring will be left as if the marriage that such marriage had been dissolved at the
had been perfectly valid. That is why the time Amelia and Eliseo's marriage was
action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that
unlike voidable marriages where the action the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore,
prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable void ab initio. 27
marriage can assail it but any proper Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the
interested party may attack a void marriage. petitioners' contention that Elise has not
24 shown any interest in the Petition for Letters
It was emphasized in Nial that in a void of Administration.
marriage, no marriage has taken place and it
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of such as an heir, or one who has a claim
Court lays down the preferred persons who against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in
are entitled to the issuance of letters of estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin"
administration, thus: refers to those whose relationship with the
decedent is such that they are entitled to
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of share in the estate as distributees. 28
administration granted. If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or executors In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory
are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to heir who stands to be benefited by the
give bond, or a person dies intestate, distribution of Eliseo's estate, is deemed to be
administration shall be granted: an interested party. With the overwhelming
evidence on record produced by Elise to prove
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners'
the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the pounding on her lack of interest in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as administration of the decedent's estate, is just
such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, a desperate attempt to sway this Court to
requests to have appointed, if competent and reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
willing to serve; Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good
the case may be, or next of kin, or the person grounds. It is founded on her right as a
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, compulsory heir, who, under the law, is
or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, entitled to her legitime after the debts of the
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of estate are satisfied. 29 Having a vested right
the person to apply for administration or to in the distribution of Eliseo's estate as one of
request that administration be granted to his natural children, Elise can rightfully be
some other person, it may be granted to one considered as an interested party within the
or more of the principal creditors, if competent purview of the law.
and willing to serve; WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
(c) If there is no such creditor competent petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
and willing to serve, it may be granted to such Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed 28
other person as the court may select. November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009
Resolution, are AFFIRMED in toto.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79
provides that a petition for Letters of SO ORDERED.
Administration must be filed by an interested Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Perlas-
person, thus: Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of
administration. A petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an interested
person and must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:
Ten years after their separation, or on October Q. Can you describe your relationship with
8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition the respondent before you got married?
for declaration of nullity of marriage under HCaIDS
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.
She claimed that Angelito was psychologically A. He always go (sic) to our house to court
incapacitated to comply with the essential me.
obligations of marriage. In addition to the Q. Since you cited violence, after
celebration of marriage, will you describe his
behavioural (sic) pattern before you got appear(s) incurable. The disorder was present
married? at the time of the wedding and became
manifest thereafter due to stresses and
A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come pressure of married life. He apparently grew
(sic) to the house. up in a dysfunctional family. Could you
Q. So you cannot say his behavioral explain what does chronic mean? DTAESI
pattern composing of violent nature before you A. Chronic is a clinical language which
got married (sic), is there any signs (sic) of means incurable it has been there long before
violence? he entered marriage apparently, it came
A. None maam (sic), because we were not during early developmental (sic) Basic trust
sweethearts. was not develop (sic).
A. Apparently, the behavior and actuation Q. You also said that this psychological
of the respondent during the time of the disorder is present during the wedding or at
marriage the respondent is suffering from the time of the wedding or became manifest
anti-social personality Disorder this is a thereafter? ECaTDc
serious and severe apparently incurable (sic).
This disorder is chronic and long-standing A. Yes, ma'am."
before the marriage. xxx xxx xxx
Q. And you based your interpretation on Court:
the report given by the petitioner?
Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?
A. Based on the psychological examination
wherein there is no pattern of lying when I A. That is the clinical findings. Personality
examined her, the petitioner was found to be Disorder labeled on Anti-Social Personality
very responsive, coherent, relevant to marital Disorder (sic).
relationship with respondent. ACTIHa
Q. How was shown during the marriage
Q. And the last page of Exhibit "E" which (sic)?
is your report there is a statement rather on
the last page, last paragraph which state: It is A. The physical abuses on the petitioner
the clinical opinion of the undersigned that also correlated without any employment
marriage between the two, had already hit exploitative and silent (sic) on the part of the
bottom rock (sic) even before the actual respondent is clearly Anti-Social Disorder.
celebration of marriage. Respondent('s) Q. Do the respondent know that he has
immature, irresponsible and callous that kind of psychological disorder (sic)?
emotionality practically harbors (sic) the ACTEHI
possibility of having blissful relationship. His
general behavior fulfill(s) the diagnostic A. Usually a person suffering that
criteria for a person suffering from Anti Social psychological disorder will not admit that they
Personality Disorder. Such disorder is serious are suffering that kind of disorder (sic).
and severe and it interferred (sic) in his
capacity to provide love, caring, concern and Court:
responsibility to his family. The disorder is
chronic and long-standing in proportion and
Q. So because of this Anti-Social Disorder significant, respondent allowed wife to work as
the petitioner suffers a lot (sic)? housemaid instead of he who should provide
and the petitioner never receive and enjoy her
A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim earning for the five months that she work and
of hardships of marital relation to the it is also the petitioner who took sustainance
respondent (sic). of the vices. (sic)
Court: Q. And because of that Anti-Social
Q. Was the Anti-Social Personality disorder he had not shown love to the
Disorder also shown to the parents (sic)? petitioner? TcHDIA
A. Yes, according to the petitioner, A. From the very start the respondent has
respondent never give due respect more often no emotion to sustain the marital relationship
than not he even shouted at them for no but what he need is to sustain his vices thru
apparent reason (sic). DACIHc the petitioner (sic).
Court: Court:
A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is A. Not only that up to this time from my
tortured mentally of the respondent (sic). clinical analysis of Anti-Social Personality
Disorder, he is good for nothing person. 4
Court: ADCTac
Q. How was the petitioner tortured? The psychologist also identified the
CAcIES Psychological Report she prepared. The Report
pertinently states: 5
A. She was able to counter-act by the time
she was separated by the respondent (sic). Report on the psychological condition of
JOCELYN M. SUAZO, a petitioner for "Nullity
Court: of Marriage" versus ANGELITO D. SUAZO
Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social GENERAL DATA
disorder is incurable?
[This pertains to Jocelyn's]
A. Yes, sir.
BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY
Court:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Why did you know?
Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old
A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again reached 3rd year high school, a part time
because the person itself, the respondent is tricycle driver, eldest among 4 siblings. Father
not aware that this kind of personality affect is a machine operator, described to be an
the other party (sic). HCaEAT alcoholic, womanizer and a heavy gambler.
While mother is a sales agent. It was a
Court:
common knowledge within their vicinity that
Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally she was also involved in an illicit relationship.
affected the petitioner (sic)? Familial relationship was described to be
stormy, chaotic whose bickering and
A. They do not have children because squabbles were part and parcel of their day to
more often than not the respondent is under day living. ECaAHS
the influence of alcohol, they do not have
peaceful harmonious relationship during the TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION
less than one year and one thing what is
Projective data reveal an introvert person The evidence presented by the petitioner and
whose impulse life is adequately suppressed the testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag,
so much so that it does not create inner points (sic) to one thing that the petitioner
tension and anxiety. She is fully equipped in failed to establish a harmonious family life
terms of drives and motivation particularly in with the respondent. On the contrary, the
uplifting not, only her socio-emotional image respondent has not shown love and respect to
but was as her morale. She may be sensitive the petitioner manifested by the former's being
yet capable of containing the effect of such irresponsible, immature, jobless, gambler,
sensitiveness; in order to remain in goodstead drunkard and worst of all a wife beater. The
(sic) with her immediate environment. petitioner, unable to bear any longer the
misbehavior and attitude of the respondent,
She is pictured as a hard-working man (sic) decided, after one year and four months of
who looks forward for a better future in spite messy days, to leave the respondent.
of difficulties she had gone through in the
past. She is fully aware of external realities of In this regard, the petitioner was able to prove
life that she set simple life goals which is (sic) that right from the start of her married life
commensurate with her capabilities and with the respondent, she already suffered from
limitations. However, she needs to prioritize maltreatment, due to physical injuries
her interest in order to direct her energy inflicted upon her and that she was the one
toward specific goals. Her tolerance for who worked as a housemaid of a relative of
frustration appears to be at par with her her husband to sustain the latter's niece (sic)
coping mechanism that she is able to and because they were living with her
discharge negative trends appropriately. husband's family, she was obliged to do the
CEcaTH household chores an indication that she is
a battered wife coupled with the fact that she
REMARKS: served as a servant in his (sic) husband's
[Already cited in full in the psychologist's family. aTHASC
testimony quoted above] 6 This situation that the petitioner had
The Office of the Solicitor General underwent may be attributed to the fact that
representing the Republic of the Philippines at the time of their marriage, she and her
strongly opposed the petition for declaration of husband are still young and was forced only
nullity of the marriage. Through a to said marriage by her relatives. The
Certification filed with the RTC, it argued that petitioner and the respondent had never
the psychologist failed to examine and test developed the feeling of love and respect,
Angelito; thus, what she said about him was instead, the respondent blamed the
purely hearsay. petitioner's family for said early marriage and
not to his own liking.
THE RTC RULING
Applying the principles and the requisites of
The RTC annulled the marriage under the psychological incapacity enunciated by this
following reasoning: Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals, 7 the
RTC concluded:
While there is no particular instance setforth
(sic) in the law that a person may be The above findings of the psychologist
considered as psychologically incapacitated, [referring to the psychologist' testimony
there as (sic) some admitted grounds that quoted above] would only tend to show that
would render a person to be unfit to comply the respondent was, indeed, suffering from
with his marital obligation, such as psychological incapacity which is not only
"immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of grave but also incurable.
rational judgment and responsibility,
otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of Likewise, applying the principles set forth in
the husband to support the family or the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
excessive dependence on parents or peer Molina, 268 SCRA 198, wherein the Supreme
group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or Court held that: ISADET
the condition by which a person lives for the . . . [At this point, the RTC cited the pertinent
next drink and the next drinks" (The Family Molina ruling]
Code of the Phils., Alicia Sempio-Diy, p. 39,
1988 ed.) aTEScI
The Court is satisfied that the evidence psychologically incapable of entering into the
presented and the testimony of the petitioner marriage state, that is, to assume the
and Dr. Familiar (sic) [the psychologist who essential duties of marriage due to an
testified in this case was Nedy Tayag, not a underlying psychological illness. Only the wife
Dr. Familiar] attesting that there is gave first-hand testimony on the behavior of
psychological incapacity on the part of the the husband, and it is inconclusive. As
respondent to comply with the essential observed by the Court in Marcos, the
marital obligations has been sufficiently and respondent may have failed to provide
clearly proven and, therefore, petitioner is material support to the family and has
entitled to the relief prayed for. resorted to physical abuse, but it is still
necessary to show that they were
A claim that the marriage is valid as there is manifestations of a deeper psychological
no psychological incapacity of the respondent malaise that was clinically or medically
is a speculation and conjecture and without identified. The theory of the psychologist that
moral certainty. This will enhanced (sic) a the respondent was suffering from an anti-
greater tragedy as the battered wife/petitioner social personality syndrome at the time of the
will still be using the surname of the marriage was not the product of any adequate
respondent, although they are now separated, medical or clinical investigation. The evidence
and a grim and sad reminder of her husband that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at
who made here a slave and a punching bag best, could equally show that the behavior of
during the short span of her marriage with the respondent was due simply to causes like
him. The law on annulment should be liberally immaturity or irresponsibility which are not
construed in favor of an innocent suffering equivalent to psychological incapacity, Pesca
petitioner otherwise said law will be an vs. Pesca, 356 SCRA 588, or the failure or
instrument to protect persons with mental refusal to work could have been the result of
illness like the serious anti-social behavior of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that
herein respondent. 8 HCaDET he had been forced into a loveless marriage. In
THE CA RULING any event, the respondent was not under a
permanent compulsion because he had later
The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the on shown his ability to engage in productive
CA. The CA reversed the RTC decision, ruling work and more stable relationships with
that: another. The element of permanence or
incurability that is one of the defining
True, as stated in Marcos vs. Marcos, 343 characteristic of psychological incapacity is
SCRA 755, the guidelines set in Santos vs. not present. cDTaSH
Court of Appeals and Republic vs. Court of
Appeals do not require that a physician There is no doubt that for the short period
personally examine the person to be declared that they were under the same roof, the
psychologically incapacitated. The Supreme married life of the petitioner with the
Court adopted the totality of evidence respondent was an unhappy one. But the
approach which allows the fact of marriage cannot for this reason be
psychological incapacity to be drawn from extinguished. As the Supreme Court intimates
evidence that medically or clinically identify in Pesca, our strict handling of Article 36 will
the root causes of the illness. If the totality of be a reminder of the inviolability of the
the evidence is enough to sustain a finding of marriage institution in our country and the
psychological incapacity, then actual medical foundation of the family that the law seeks to
examination of the person concerned need not protect. The concept of psychological
be resorted to. Applied in Marcos, however, incapacity is not to be a mantra to legalize
the aggregate testimony of the aggrieved what in reality are convenient excuses of
spouse, children, relatives and the social parties to separate and divorce.
worker were not found to be sufficient to prove
psychological incapacity, in the absence of any THE PETITION
evaluation of the respondent himself, the Jocelyn now comes to us via the present
person whose mental and psychological petition to challenge and seek the reversal of
capacity was in question. ASICDH the CA ruling based on the following
In the case at bench, there is much scarcer arguments:
evidence to hold that the respondent was
1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA
the law says, as it totally disregarded the legal committed no reversible error of law in setting
basis of the RTC in declaring the marriage null aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to
and void Tuason v. Tuason (256 SCRA 158; declare Jocelyn's marriage with Angelito a
to be accurate, should be Tuason v. Court of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code
Appeals) holds that "the finding of the Trial and its related jurisprudence. AaIDHS
Court as to the existence or non-existence of
petitioner's psychological incapacity at the The Law, Molina and Te
time of the marriage is final and binding on us Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a
(the Supreme Court); petitioner has not marriage contracted by any party who, at the
sufficiently shown that the trial court's factual time of the celebration, was psychologically
findings and evaluation of the testimonies of incapacitated to comply with the essential
private respondent's witnesses vis--vis marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
petitioner's defenses are clearly and manifestly be void even if such incapacity becomes
erroneous"; SEDICa manifest only after its solemnization.
2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not A unique feature of this law is its intended
define psychological incapacity; this omission open-ended application, as it merely
was intentional to give the courts a wider introduced an abstract concept
discretion to interpret the term without being psychological incapacity that disables
shackled by statutory parameters. Article 36 compliance with the contractual obligations of
though was taken from Canon 1095 of the marriage without any concrete definition or,
New Code of Canon Law, which gives three at the very least, an illustrative example. We
conditions that would make a person unable must therefore apply the law based on how
to contract marriage from mental incapacity the concept of psychological incapacity was
as follows: shaped and developed in jurisprudence.
"1095. They are incapable of contracting aSADIC
marriage: Santos v. Court of Appeals 9 declared that
(1) who lack the sufficient use of reason; psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical
(2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should
of judgment concerning essential matrimonial refer to "no less than a mental (not physical)
rights and duties which are to be mutually incapacity that causes a party to be truly
given and accepted; incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and
(3) who are not capable of assuming the discharged by the parties to the marriage." It
essential obligations of matrimony due to must be confined to "the most serious cases of
causes of a psychic nature." IEcDCa personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, an utter insensitivity or inability to give
intelligently conforms to these criteria. The meaning and significance to the marriage." 10
RTC, being clothed with discretionary The Court laid down more definitive guidelines
functions, applied its finding of psychological in the interpretation and application of the law
incapacity based on existing jurisprudence in Republic v. Court of Appeals 11 (Molina) as
and the law itself which gave lower court follows:
magistrates enough latitude to define what
constitutes psychological incapacity. On the (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity
contrary, she further claims, the OSG relied of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
on generalities without being specific on why doubt should be resolved in favor of the
it is opposed to the dissolution of a marriage existence and continuation of the marriage
that actually exists only in name. and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution
Simply stated, we face the issue of whether and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
there is basis to nullify Jocelyn's marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Code. Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the
THE COURT'S RULING nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both The illness must be shown as downright
the family and marriage are to be "protected" incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
by the state. HASDcC difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
The Family Code echoes this constitutional in the person, an adverse integral element in
edict on marriage and the family and the personality structure that effectively
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability incapacitates the person from really accepting
and solidarity. and thereby complying with the obligations
(2) The root cause of the psychological essential to marriage. DCAHcT
incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically (6) The essential marital obligations must
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly the Family Code as regards the husband and
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of
Family Code requires that the incapacity must the same Code in regard to parents and their
be psychological not physical, although its children. Such non-complied marital
manifestations and/or symptoms may be obligation(s) must also be stated in the
physical. The evidence must convince the petition, proven by evidence and included in
court that the parties or one of them was the text of the decision.
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the (7) Interpretations given by the National
obligations he was assuming, or knowing Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
them, could not have given valid assumption Church in the Philippines, while not
thereof. Although no example of such controlling or decisive, should be given great
incapacity need be given here so as not to respect by our courts . . .
limit the application of the provision under the
principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless (8) The trial court must order the
such root cause must be identified as a prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
psychological illness and its incapacitating General to appear as counsel for the state. No
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may decision shall be handed down unless the
be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical Solicitor General issues a certification, which
psychologists. CDcaSA will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
existing at "the time of the celebration" of the The Solicitor General, along with the
marriage. The evidence must show that the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
illness was existing when the parties court such certification within fifteen (15) days
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of from the date the case is deemed submitted
the illness need not be perceivable at such for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
time, but the illness itself must have attached General shall discharge the equivalent
at such moment, or prior thereto. function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095. 12 SECIcT
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds,
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute merely expounded on the basic requirements
or even relative only in regard to the other of Santos. 13
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, 14 further
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption clarified that there is no requirement that the
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to defendant/respondent spouse should be
those not related to marriage, like the exercise personally examined by a physician or
of a profession or employment in a job. . . . psychologist as a condition sine qua non for
the declaration of nullity of marriage based on
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no
bring about the disability of the party to longer necessary to introduce expert opinion
assume the essential obligations of marriage. in a petition under Article 36 of the Family
Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, Code if the totality of evidence shows that
mood changes, occasional emotional psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes.
juridical antecedence, and incurability can be jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court
duly established. 15 decided Te v. Yu-Te 17 (Te) which revisited the
Molina guidelines.
Pesca v. Pesca 16 clarifies that the Molina
guidelines apply even to cases then already Te begins with the observation that the
pending, under the reasoning that the court's Committee that drafted the Family Code did
interpretation or construction establishes the not give any examples of psychological
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law; incapacity for fear that by so doing, it would
the latter as so interpreted and construed limit the applicability of the provision under
would thus constitute a part of that law as of the principle of ejusdem generis; that the
the date the statute is enacted. It is only when Committee desired that the courts should
a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
overruled, and a different view is adopted, that guided by experience, by the findings of
the new doctrine may have to be applied experts and researchers in psychological
prospectively in favor of parties who have disciplines, and by decisions of church
relied on the old doctrine and have acted in tribunals that, although not binding on the
good faith in accordance therewith under the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect
familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit." since the provision itself was taken from the
HIaTCc Canon Law. 18 Te thus assumes it a basic
premise that the law is so designed to allow
On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration some resiliency in its application. 19 ISAaTH
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. Te then sustained Santos' doctrinal value,
08-11-10 SC, Rules) promulgated by the Court saying that its interpretation is consistent
took effect. Section 2 (d) of the Rules with that of the Canon Law.
pertinently provides:
Going back to its basic premise, Te said:
(d) What to allege. A petition under
Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically Conscious of the law's intention that it is the
allege the complete facts showing that either courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should
or both parties were psychologically determine whether a party to a marriage is
incapacitated from complying with the psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in
essential marital obligations of marriage at the sustaining the lower court's judgment of
time of the celebration of marriage even if annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,
such incapacity becomes manifest only after ruled that the findings of the trial court are
its celebration. final and binding on the appellate courts.
The complete facts should allege the physical Again, upholding the trial court's findings and
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of declaring that its decision was not a judgment
psychological incapacity at the time of the on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of
celebration of the marriage but expert opinion Appeals, explained that when private
need not be alleged. DITEAc respondent testified under oath before the
lower court and was cross-examined by the
Section 12 (d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial adverse party, she thereby presented evidence
brief containing all the evidence presented, in the form of testimony. Importantly, the
including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic
or describing the nature and purpose of these marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless
pieces of evidence. Section 14 (b) requires the and protracted refusal of one of the parties to
court to consider during the pre-trial fulfill the marital obligation of procreating
conference the advisability of receiving expert children is equivalent to psychological
testimony and such other matters as may aid incapacity. IcAaSD
in the prompt disposition of the petition.
Under Section 17 of the Rules, the grounds for With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack
the declaration of the absolute nullity or on Molina. It said that the resiliency with
annulment of marriage must be proved. which the concept should be applied and the
case-to-case basis by which the provision
All cases involving the application of Article should be interpreted, as so intended by its
36 of the Family Code that came to us were framers, had, somehow, been rendered
invariably decided based on the principles in ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict
the cited cases. This was the state of law and standards in Molina. Molina, to Te, has
become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit noteworthy for its evidentiary approach in
into and be bound by it; wittingly or these cases, which it expounded on as follows:
unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently
applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed By the very nature of Article 36, courts,
sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, despite having the primary task and burden of
narcissists and the like, to continuously decision-making, must not discount but,
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. instead, must consider as decisive evidence
the expert opinion on the psychological and
Te then enunciated the principle that each mental temperaments of the parties.
case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or xxx xxx xxx
generalizations, but according to its own facts. Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the
Courts should interpret the provision on a importance of presenting expert testimony to
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the establish the precise cause of a party's
findings of experts and researchers in psychological incapacity, and to show that it
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of existed at the inception of the marriage. And
church tribunals. aDHCAE as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no
As a final note though, Te expressly stated requirement that the person to be declared
that it is not suggesting the abandonment of psychologically incapacitated be personally
Molina, but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it examined by a physician, if the totality of
merely looked at other perspectives that evidence presented is enough to sustain a
should also govern the disposition of petitions finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the
for declaration of nullity under Article 36. The evidence must show a link, medical or the
subsequent Ting v. Velez-Ting 20 follows Te's like, between the acts that manifest
lead when it reiterated that Te did not psychological incapacity and the psychological
abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, disorder itself. cADEIa
it simply suggested the relaxation of its This is not to mention, but we mention
stringent requirements, cognizant of the nevertheless for emphasis, that the
explanation given by the Committee on the presentation of expert proof presupposes a
Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the thorough and in-depth assessment of the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and
Marriages: 21 incurable presence of psychological
To require the petitioner to allege in the incapacity. 23 [Underscoring * supplied]
petition the particular root cause of the This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting
psychological incapacity and to attach thereto v. Velez-Ting. 24
the verified written report of an accredited
psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be Under this evolutionary development, as
too expensive for the parties. They adversely shown by the current string of cases on Article
affect access to justice of poor litigants. It is 36 of the Family Code, what should not be lost
also a fact that there are provinces where on us is the intention of the law to confine the
these experts are not available. Thus, the application of Article 36 to the most serious
Committee deemed it necessary to relax this cases of personality disorders, clearly
stringent requirement enunciated in the demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
Molina Case. The need for the examination of inability to give meaning and significance to
a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical the marriage; that the psychological illness
psychologist and the presentation of that must have afflicted a party at the
psychiatric experts shall now be determined inception of the marriage should be a malady
by the court during the pre-trial conference. so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
TEHIaD awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond he or she is about to
Te, therefore, instead of substantially assume. 25 It is not enough that the
departing from Molina, 22 merely stands for a respondent, alleged to be psychologically
more flexible approach in considering incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages his marital obligations, or was unwilling to
based on psychological incapacity. It is also perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor an adverse
integral element in the respondent's be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the
personality structure that effectively parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
incapacitated him from complying with his conclusive diagnosis of a psychological
essential marital obligations must be incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.
shown. 26 Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in
the performance of marital obligations or ill In saying this, we do not suggest that a
will on the part of the spouse is different from personal examination of the party alleged to
incapacity rooted in some debilitating be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory;
psychological condition or illness; jurisprudence holds that this type of
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or examination is not a mandatory requirement.
perversion, emotional immaturity and While such examination is desirable, we
irresponsibility and the like, do not by recognize that it may not be practical in all
themselves warrant a finding of psychological instances given the oftentimes estranged
incapacity under Article 36, as the same may relations between the parties. For a
only be due to a person's refusal or determination though of a party's complete
unwillingness to assume the essential personality profile, information coming from
obligations of marriage. 27 ScTaEA persons intimately related to him (such as the
party's close relatives and friends) may be
If all these sound familiar, they do, for they helpful. This is an approach in the application
are but iterations of Santos' juridical of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same
antecedence, gravity and incurability time that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the
requisites. This is proof of Santos' continuing credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert
doctrinal validity. opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of
information. aEAIDH
The Present Case
From these perspectives, we conclude that the
As the CA did, we find Jocelyn's evidence psychologist, using meager information
insufficient to establish Angelito's coming from a directly interested party, could
psychological incapacity to perform essential not have secured a complete personality
marital obligations. We so conclude based on profile and could not have conclusively formed
our own examination of the evidence on an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito's
record, which we were compelled to undertake psychological condition. While the report or
because of the differences in the trial court evaluation may be conclusive with respect to
and the appellate court's appreciation and Jocelyn's psychological condition, this is not
evaluation of Jocelyn's presented evidence. true for Angelito's. The methodology employed
a. The Expert Opinion Evidence simply cannot satisfy the required depth and
comprehensiveness of examination required to
Both the psychologist's testimony and the evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a
psychological report did not conclusively show psychological disorder. In short, this is not the
the root cause, gravity and incurability of psychological report that the Court can rely on
Angelito's alleged psychological condition. as basis for the conclusion that psychological
cCSDTI incapacity exists.
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or Other than this credibility or reliability gap,
evaluating the expert opinion evidence the both the psychologist's report and testimony
psychologist's testimony and the psychological simply provided a general description of
evaluation report that Jocelyn presented. Angelito's purported anti-social personality
Based on her declarations in open court, the disorder, supported by the characterization of
psychologist evaluated Angelito's psychological this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable.
condition only in an indirect manner she The psychologist was conspicuously silent,
derived all her conclusions from information however, on the bases for her conclusion or
coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause the particulars that gave rise to the
cannot of course be doubted. Given the source characterization she gave. These particulars
of the information upon which the are simply not in the Report, and neither can
psychologist heavily relied upon, the court they be found in her testimony. aDSHIC
must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the
opinion with due care and with the application For instance, the psychologist testified that
of the more rigid and stringent set of Angelito's personality disorder is chronic or
standards outlined above, i.e., that there must incurable; Angelito has long been afflicted
with the disorder prior to his marriage with materially affects her cause, as the law and its
Jocelyn or even during his early related jurisprudence require that the
developmental stage, as basic trust was not psychological incapacity must exist at the time
developed. However, she did not support this of the celebration of the marriage. DCIEac
declaration with any factual basis. In her
Report, she based her conclusion on the Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal
presumption that Angelito apparently grew up to find a job, while indicative of psychological
in a dysfunctional family. Quite noticeable, incapacity, do not, by themselves, show
though, is the psychologist's own equivocation psychological incapacity. All these simply
on this point she was not firm in her indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to
conclusion for she herself may have realized perform marital obligations that, as the cited
that it was simply conjectural. The veracity, jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to
too, of this finding is highly suspect, for it was be constitutive of psychological incapacity in
based entirely on Jocelyn's assumed the absence of proof that these are
knowledge of Angelito's family background manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some
and upbringing. debilitating psychological condition or illness.
From the foregoing, it has been shown that In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove
petitioner is indeed suffering from that his wife (respondent) suffers from
psychological incapacity that effectively psychological incapacity. He presented the
renders him unable to perform the essential testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses
obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the who concluded that respondent is
marriage between petitioner and respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the
declared null and void. conclusions of these witnesses were premised
on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration which had not been sufficiently proven.
is hereby GRANTED. The April 16, 2008 Petitioner's experts heavily relied on
resolution of this Court and the January 26, petitioner's allegations of respondent's
2004 decision and September 24, 2004
constant mahjong sessions, visits to the
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. beauty parlor, going out with friends,
CV No. 60010 are SET ASIDE. adultery, and neglect of their children.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig Petitioner's experts opined that respondent's
City, Branch 158 dated April 17, 1998 is alleged habits, when performed constantly to
hereby REINSTATED. the detriment of quality and quantity of time
devoted to her duties as mother and wife,
SO ORDERED. cHDAIS constitute a psychological incapacity in the
form of NPD.
Puno, C.J., Velasco, Jr., * Leonardo-de Castro
and Peralta, ** JJ., concur. But petitioner's allegations, which served as
the bases or underlying premises of the
conclusions of his experts, were not actually
proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary
evidence refuting these allegations of the
petitioner. TIEHSA
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to Since the purpose of including such provision
be medically or clinically permanent or in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute laws with the religious faith of our people, it
or even relative only in regard to the other stands to reason that to achieve such
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against harmonization, great persuasive weight should
everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such be given to decisions of such appellate
incapacity must be relevant to the assumption tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to evidence what is decreed as canonically
those not related to marriage, like the exercise invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, This is one instance where, in view of the
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing evident source and purpose of the Family
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine Code provision, contemporaneous religious
to cure them but may not be psychologically interpretation is to be given persuasive effect.
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise Here, the State and the Church while
his/her own children as an essential remaining independent, separate and apart
obligation of marriage. from each other shall walk together in
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to synodal cadence towards the same goal of
bring about the disability of the party to protecting and cherishing marriage and the
assume the essential obligations of marriage. family as the inviolable base of the nation.
Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, (8) The trial court must order the
mood changes, occasional emotional prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. General to appear as counsel for the state. No
The illness must be shown as downright decision shall be handed down unless the
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or Solicitor General issues a certification, which
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor therein his reasons for his agreement or
in the person, an adverse integral element in opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
the personality structure that effectively The Solicitor General, along with the
incapacitates the person from really accepting prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the
and thereby complying with the obligations court such certification within fifteen (15) days
essential to marriage. from the date the case is deemed submitted
(6) The essential marital obligations must for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of General shall discharge the equivalent
the Family Code as regards the husband and function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of under Canon 1095. 9
the same Code in regard to parents and their The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be
children. Such non-complied marital rigid, such that their application to every
obligation(s) must also be stated in the instance practically condemned the petitions
for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain
rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio,
must not be so strictly and too literally read therefore, the Courts really assiduously
and applied given the clear intendment of the defend and promote the sanctity of marriage
drafters to adopt its enacted version of "less as an inviolable social institution. The
specificity" obviously to enable "some foundation of our society is thereby made all
resiliency in its application." Instead, every the more strong and solid.
court should approach the issue of nullity "not
on the basis of a priori assumptions, Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC
predilections or generalizations, but according as the trial court deserved credence because it
to its own facts" in recognition of the verity was in the better position to view and examine
that no case would be on "all fours" with the the demeanor of the witnesses while they were
next one in the field of psychological testifying. 16 The position and role of the trial
incapacity as a ground for the nullity of judge in the appreciation of the evidence
marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take showing the psychological incapacity were not
pains in examining the factual milieu and the to be downplayed but should be accorded due
appellate court must, as much as possible, importance and respect.
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the
the trial court." 10 aDSHCc Court brushed aside the opinions tendered by
In the task of ascertaining the presence of Dr. Cristina Gates, a psychologist, and Fr.
psychological incapacity as a ground for the Gerard Healy on the ground that their
nullity of marriage, the courts, which are conclusions were solely based on the
concededly not endowed with expertise in the petitioner's version of the events. AaEDcS
field of psychology, must of necessity rely on After a long and hard second look, we consider
the opinions of experts in order to inform it improper and unwarranted to give to such
themselves on the matter, and thus enable expert opinions a merely generalized
themselves to arrive at an intelligent and consideration and treatment, least of all to
judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the
the malady of being grave, antecedent and declaration of the nullity of the marriage.
incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently
experts. 11 and competently described the psychological
II incapacity of the respondent within the
standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) uphold the conclusions reached by the two
on the existence or non-existence of a party's expert witnesses because they were largely
psychological incapacity should be final and drawn from the case records and affidavits,
binding for as long as such findings and and should not anymore be disputed after the
evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the
other evidence are not shown to be clearly and petitioner's factual premises. 17
manifestly erroneous. 12 In every situation
where the findings of the trial court are Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on
sufficiently supported by the facts and the transcript of the petitioner's testimony, as
evidence presented during trial, the appellate well as on her interviews of the petitioner, his
court should restrain itself from substituting sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although
its own judgment. 13 It is not enough reason her findings would seem to be unilateral
to ignore the findings and evaluation by the under such circumstances, it was not right to
trial court and substitute our own as an disregard the findings on that basis alone.
appellate tribunal only because the After all, her expert opinion took into
Constitution and the Family Code regard consideration other factors extant in the
marriage as an inviolable social institution. records, including the own opinions of another
We have to stress that the fulfilment of the expert who had analyzed the issue from the
constitutional mandate for the State to protect side of the respondent herself. Moreover, it is
marriage as an inviolable social institution 14 already settled that the courts must accord
only relates to a valid marriage. No protection weight to expert testimony on the
can be accorded to a marriage that is null and psychological and mental state of the parties
void ab initio, because such a marriage has no in cases for the declaration of the nullity of
legal existence. 15 marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36
of the Family Code the courts, "despite having
the primary task and burden of decision- opinion of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the
making, must not discount but, instead, must respondent's own witness, and those of Dr.
consider as decisive evidence the expert Gates.
opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties." 18 In her Psychological Evaluation Report, 24 Dr.
Dayan impressed that the respondent had
The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately "compulsive and dependent tendencies" to the
necessary herein to enable the trial court to extent of being "relationship dependent."
properly determine the issue of psychological Based from the respondent's psychological
incapacity of the respondent (if not also of the data, Dr. Dayan indicated that:
petitioner). Consequently, the lack of personal
examination and interview of the person In her relationship with people, Malyne is
diagnosed with personality disorder, like the likely to be reserved and seemingly detached
respondent, did not per se invalidate the in her ways. Although she likes to be around
findings of the experts. The Court has stressed people, she may keep her emotional distance.
in Marcos v. Marcos 19 that there is no She, too, values her relationship but she may
requirement for one to be declared not be that demonstrative of her affections.
psychologically incapacitated to be personally Intimacy may be quite difficult for her since
examined by a physician, because what is she tries to maintain a certain distance to
important is the presence of evidence that minimize opportunities for rejection. To
adequately establishes the party's others, Malyne may appear, critical and
psychological incapacity. Hence, "if the totality demanding in her ways. She can be assertive
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a when opinions contrary to those of her own
finding of psychological incapacity, then are expressed. And yet, she is apt to be a
actual medical examination of the person dependent person. At a less conscious level,
concerned need not be resorted to." 20 Malyne fears that others will abandon her.
Malyne, who always felt a bit lonely, placed an
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a enormous value on having significant others
link, medical or the like, between the acts that would depend on most times.
manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. If other evidence xxx xxx xxx
showing that a certain condition could But the minute she started to care, she
possibly result from an assumed state of facts became a different person clingy and
existed in the record, the expert opinion immature, doubting his love, constantly
should be admissible and be weighed as an demanding reassurance that she was the most
aid for the court in interpreting such other important person in his life. She became
evidence on the causation. 21 Indeed, an relationship-dependent. 25
expert opinion on psychological incapacity
should be considered as conjectural or Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the
speculative and without any probative value results of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial
only in the absence of other evidence to Inventory test 26 conducted on the
establish causation. The expert's findings respondent, observing that the respondent
under such circumstances would not obtained high scores on dependency,
constitute hearsay that would justify their narcissism and compulsiveness, to wit:
exclusion as evidence. 22 This is so,
considering that any ruling that brands the Atty. Bretania
scientific and technical procedure adopted by Q: How about this Millon Clinical
Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be Multiaxial Inventory?
eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric
evaluation had been based on the parties' A: Sir, the cut of the score which is
upbringing and psychodynamics. 23 SCaTAc supposed to be normal is 73 percental round
and there are several scores wherein Mrs.
In that context, Dr. Gates' expert opinion Kalaw obtained very high score and these are
should be considered not in isolation but on the score of dependency, narcissism and
along with the other evidence presented here.
compulsion.
Moreover, in its determination of the issue of Q: Would you please tell us again, Madam
psychological incapacity, the trial court was Witness, what is the acceptable score?
expected to compare the expert findings and cADSCT
A: When your score is 73 and above, that Q: Taking these all out, you came to the
means that it is very significant. So, if 72 and conclusion that respondent is self-centered
below, it will be considered as acceptable. and narcissistic? caTIDE
Q: In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain A: Actually respondent has some needs
high score? which tempts [sic] from a deprived childhood
and she is still in search of this. In her several
A: Under dependency, her score is 78; boyfriends, it seems that she would jump from
under narcissism, is 79; under one boyfriend to another. There is this need
compulsiveness, it is 84. 27 for attention, this need for love on other
It is notable that Dr. Dayan's findings did not people.
contradict but corroborated the findings of Dr. Q: And that led you to conclude?
Gates to the effect that the respondent had
been afflicted with Narcissistic Personality A: And therefore I concluded that she is
Disorder as well as with Anti-Social Disorder. self-centered to the point of neglecting her
Dr. Gates relevantly testified: duty as a wife and as a mother. 28
Q: And how does that relate to Q: Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired
psychological incapacity? by accident or congenital or what?
A: That she could not appreciate or absorb A: No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you
or fulfill the obligations of marriage which become a model and still the family was
everybody takes for granted. The depended [sic] upon her and she was a model
concentration on the husband and the at Hyatt and then Rustan's, it began to inflate
children before everything else would be her ego so much that this became the top
subordinated to the marriage with her. It's the priority in her life. It's her lifestyle.
other way around. Her beauty, her going out,
her beauty parlor and her mahjong, they were Q: What you are saying is that, the
their priorities in her life. narcissism of respondent even expanded after
the marriage?
Q: And in medical or clinical parlance,
what specifically do you call this? A: That could have expanded because it
became very obvious after the marriage
because she was neglecting such fundamental these experts and they were asked to give
obligations. professional opinions about a party's mental
capacity at the time of the wedding. These
Q: And how about the matter of curability, opinions were rarely challenged and tended to
is this medically or clinically curable, this be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of
narcissism that you mentioned? valid consent.
A: Let's say, it was manifested for so many The Church took pains to point out that its
years in her life. It was found in her family new openness in this area did not amount to
background situation. Say, almost for sure the addition of new grounds for annulment,
would be incurable now. DTIcSH but rather was an accommodation by the
Q: What specific background are you Church to the advances made in psychology
referring to? during the past decades. There was now the
expertise to provide the all-important
A: Well, the fact when the father died and connecting link between a marriage
she was the breadwinner and her beauty was breakdown and premarital causes. HIAEcT
so important to give in her job and money and
influence and so on. But this is a very During the 1970s, the Church broadened its
unusual situation for a young girl and her whole idea of marriage from that of a legal
position in the family was exalted in a very contract to that of a covenant. The result of
very unusual manner and therefore she had this was that it could no longer be assumed in
that pressure on her and in her accepting the annulment cases that a person who could
pressure, in going along with it and putting it intellectually understand the concept of
in top priority. 31 marriage could necessarily give valid consent
to marry. The ability to both grasp and
Given his credentials and conceded expertise assume the real obligations of a mature,
in Canon Law, Father Healy's opinions and lifelong commitment are now considered a
findings commanded respect. The contribution necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial
that his opinions and findings could add to consent.
the judicial determination of the parties'
psychological incapacity was substantive and Rotal decisions continued applying the
instructive. He could thereby inform the trial concept of incipient psychological incapacity,
court on the degrees of the malady that would "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds
warrant the nullity of marriage, and he could of personality disorders that incapacitate a
as well thereby provide to the trial court an spouse or both spouses from assuming or
analytical insight upon a subject as esoteric to carrying out the essential obligations of
the courts as psychological incapacity has marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely
been. We could not justly disregard his cohabitation or the right of the spouses to
opinions and findings. Appreciating them each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is,
together with those of Dr. Gates and Dr. in its totality the right to the community of the
Dayan would advance more the cause of whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing
justice. The Court observed in Ngo Te v. Yu- lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since
Te: 32 1973 have refined the meaning of
psychological or psychic capacity for marriage
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, as presupposing the development of an adult
despite having the primary task and burden of personality; as meaning the capacity of the
decision-making, must not discount but, spouses to give themselves to each other and
instead, must consider as decisive evidence to accept the other as a distinct person; that
the expert opinion on the psychological and the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the
mental temperaments of the parties. obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-
giving love; and that the spouses must have
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as the capacity for interpersonal relationship
follows: because marriage is more than just a physical
Furthermore, and equally significant, the reality but involves a true intertwining of
personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations
professional opinion of a psychological expert
became increasingly important in such cases. of marriage depends, according to Church
Data about the person's entire life, both before decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
and after the ceremony, were presented to relationship. A serious incapacity for
interpersonal sharing and support is held to
impair the relationship and consequently, the always is proof of someone's failure to carry
ability to fulfill the essential marital out marital responsibilities as promised at the
obligations. The marital capacity of one time the marriage was entered into."
spouse is not considered in isolation but in
reference to the fundamental relationship to Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the
the other spouse. importance of presenting expert testimony to
establish the precise cause of a party's
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists psychological incapacity, and to show that it
six elements necessary to the mature marital existed at the inception of the marriage. And
relationship: as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no
requirement that the person to be declared
"The courts consider the following elements psychologically incapacitated be personally
crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a examined by a physician, if the totality of
permanent and faithful commitment to the evidence presented is enough to sustain a
marriage partner; (2) openness to children and finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the
partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; evidence must show a link, medical or the
(5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to like, between the acts that manifest
cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of psychological incapacity and the psychological
marriage, etc." disorder itself.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the This is not to mention, but we mention
psychological conditions that might lead to the nevertheless for emphasis, that the
failure of a marriage: ACcISa presentation of expert proof presupposes a
"At stake is a type of constitutional thorough and in-depth assessment of the
impairment precluding conjugal communion parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
even with the best intentions of the parties. conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and
Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise incurable presence of psychological
to his or her inability to fulfill marital incapacity. 33 aSTAHD
obligations are the following: (1) antisocial Ngo Te also emphasized that in light of the
personality with its fundamental lack of unintended consequences of strictly applying
loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) the standards set in Molina, 34 the courts
hyperesthesia, where the individual has no should consider the totality of evidence in
real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity
inadequate personality where personal of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
responses consistently fall short of reasonable Code, viz.:
expectations.
The resiliency with which the concept should
xxx xxx xxx be applied and the case-to-case basis by
The psychological grounds are the best which the provision should be interpreted, as
approach for anyone who doubts whether he so intended by its framers, had, somehow,
or she has a case for an annulment on any been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of
other terms. A situation that does not fit into a set of strict standards in Molina, thus:
any of the more traditional categories often fits xxx xxx xxx
very easily into the psychological category.
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the
As new as the psychological grounds are, majority of the Court's membership concurred
experts are already detecting a shift in their in the ponencia of then Associate Justice (later
use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three
the parties' inability to exercise proper justices concurred "in the result" and another
judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of three including, as aforesaid, Justice
due discretion), recent cases seem to be Romero took pains to compose their
concentrating on the parties' incapacity to individual separate opinions. Then Justice
assume or carry out their responsibilities and Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "each
obligations as promised (lack of due case must be judged, not on the basis of a
competence). An advantage to using the priori assumptions, predilections or
ground of lack of due competence is that at generalizations, but according to its own facts.
the time the marriage was entered into civil In the field of psychological incapacity as a
divorce and breakup of the family almost ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to
say that no case is on 'all fours' with another sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to
case. The trial judge must take pains in allow a person afflicted with a psychological
examining the factual milieu and the appellate disorder, who cannot comply with or assume
court must, as much as possible, avoid the essential marital obligations, from
substituting its own judgment for that of the remaining in that sacred bond. It may be
trial court." stressed that the infliction of physical
violence, constitutional indolence or laziness,
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent drug dependence or addiction, and
cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a
standards, without too much regard for the sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be
law's clear intention that each case is to be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage
treated differently, as "courts should interpret to speak of in the first place, as the same is
the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided void from the very beginning. To indulge in
by experience, the findings of experts and imagery, the declaration of nullity under
researchers in psychological disciplines, and Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial
by decisions of church tribunals." to a stillborn marriage.
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate xxx xxx xxx
for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as
the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of Lest it be misunderstood, we are not
psychological incapacity. Understandably, the suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this
Court was then alarmed by the deluge of case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated
petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes,
and was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of there is need to emphasize other perspectives
Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce as well which should govern the disposition of
procedure in the world." The unintended petitions for declaration of nullity under
consequences of Molina, however, has taken Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we
its toll on people who have to live with deviant reiterate once more the principle that each
behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic case must be judged, not on the basis of a
personality anomaly, which, like termites, priori assumptions, predilections or
consume little by little the very foundation of generalizations but according to its own facts.
their families, our basic social institutions. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should
Far from what was intended by the Court, interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all guided by experience, the findings of experts
sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly and researchers in psychological disciplines,
or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently and by decisions of church tribunals. 35
applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed
sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, III
narcissists and the like, to continuously In the decision of September 19, 2011, the
debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Court declared as follows:
Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled
marriages on account of the personality Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it
disorders of the said individuals. HAEDIS was not proven that she engaged in mahjong
so frequently that she neglected her duties as
The Court need not worry about the possible a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted
abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for petitioner's allegations that she played four to
there are ample safeguards against this five times a week. She maintained it was only
contingency, among which is the intervention two to three times a week and always with the
by the State, through the public prosecutor, to permission of her husband and without
guard against collusion between the parties abandoning her children at home. The
and/or fabrication of evidence. The Court children corroborated this, saying that they
should rather be alarmed by the rising were with their mother when she played
number of cases involving marital abuse, child mahjong in their relatives home. Petitioner did
abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape. not present any proof, other than his own
In dissolving marital bonds on account of testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so
either party's psychological incapacity, the frequent that respondent neglected her family.
Court is not demolishing the foundation of While he intimated that two of his sons
families, but it is actually protecting the repeated the second grade, he was not able to
link this episode to respondent's mahjong- How long would she stay playing
playing. The least that could have been done mahjong say one session?
was to prove the frequency of respondent's
mahjong-playing during the years when these WITNESS:
two children were in second grade. This was Really long cuz' we would go to my
not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that aunt's house in White Plains and I think we
respondent played mahjong, its alleged would get there by lunch then leave, we fall
debilitating frequency and adverse effect on asleep. I think it was like one in the morning.
the children were not proven. 36 (Emphasis
supplied) TcEAIH ATTY. PISON: STECAc
The frequency of the respondent's mahjong You, you went there? She brought you?
playing should not have delimited our
determination of the presence or absence of WITNESS:
psychological incapacity. Instead, the Yeah, to play with my cousins, yeah
determinant should be her obvious failure to
and my brothers & sisters.
fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities
of parenthood at the time she made her ATTY. PISON:
marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such
duties and responsibilities, she would have Were you brought all the time?
known that bringing along her children of very
WITNESS:
tender ages to her mahjong sessions would
expose them to a culture of gambling and Yeah, almost all the time but
other vices that would erode their moral fiber. sometimes, I guess she'd go out by herself. 38
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the The fact that the respondent brought her
respondent's obsessive mahjong playing surely children with her to her mahjong sessions did
impacted on her family life, particularly on her not only point to her neglect of parental
very young children. We do find to be duties, but also manifested her tendency to
revealing the disclosures made by Valerio expose them to a culture of gambling. Her
Teodoro Kalaw 37 the parties' eldest son willfully exposing her children to the culture of
in his deposition, whereby the son confirmed gambling on every occasion of her mahjong
the claim of his father that his mother had sessions was a very grave and serious act of
been hooked on playing mahjong, viz.: subordinating their needs for parenting to the
gratification of her own personal and escapist
ATTY. PISON:
desires. This was the observation of Father
From the time. . . before your parent's Healy himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and
separation, do you remember any habit or Dr. Dayan both explained that the current
activity or practice which your mother psychological state of the respondent had
engaged in, before the separation? been rooted on her own childhood experience.
The Majority Opinion opines that the Court From the evidence, it appears that parties are
would be unjust to keep the parties in a both suffering from psychological incapacity to
marriage despite their shared opinion that perform their essential marital obligations
their marriage is beyond repair. under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
parties entered into a marriage without as
However, under the law, the parties' own much as understanding what it entails. They
desire to dissolve their marriage is not a failed to commit themselves to its essential
determining factor in assessing the existence obligations: the conjugal act, the community
of a ground for annulment or declaration of of life and love, the rendering of mutual help,
nullity. Indeed, Article 48 of the Family Code the procreation and education of their
mandates the court to guard against the children to become responsible individuals.
possibility of collusion between the parties: Parties' psychological incapacity is grave, and
serious such that both are incapable of
ARTICLE 48. In all cases of annulment or carrying out the ordinary duties required in
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the marriage. The incapacity has been clinically
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or established and was found to be pervasive,
fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the grave and incurable. 9 (Emphases supplied)
State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that The inadequacy of the trial court's ruling and
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. its understanding of the concept of
psychological incapacity is apparent.
xxx xxx xxx Psychological incapacity, as a ground for the
The Court's Decision should rely solely on the declaration of nullity, is not a lack of
understanding of what marriage entails, nor is
available evidence and the law.
it a "failure to commit" one's self to the
The Majority Opinion claims that our Decision essential marital and familial obligations. 10 It
failed to appreciate the evidence, as found by is a downright inability to understand,
the trial court and by the expect psychologists perform, or comply with, the said duties and
and that the trial court's ruling on the obligations. 11 How can any appellate court
psychological incapacity of the parties should rely on the trial court's assessment of whether
be final and binding on the appellate courts the evidence constituted psychological
when such ruling is based on the facts and on incapacity when there is none and its
opinion of the qualified experts. understanding of the concept of psychological
incapacity is doctrinally flawed?
I agree that the ruling of a lower court should
be given due respect and finality when it is The trial court then characterized the parties'
adequately explained, rests on established psychological incapacity as grave and serious,
facts, and considers the opinion of qualified without even going over the evidence upon
experts. Unfortunately, such kind of trial which it relied in making such conclusion. It
court ruling is not before us; hence, our appears to the Court that the last sentence of
September 19, 2011 Decision did not see fit to the trial court's decision that "the
adopt the findings of the trial court. incapacity has been clinically established"
encapsulates the process by which the trial opinion rests only on his assumption that the
court arrived at its judgment. It relied merely factual allegations are true. 13
and solely on the conclusions of the
psychological experts, without doing its duty It remains my opinion that the factual
to make an independent assessment of the premises for the experts' conclusions in this
evidence. case were not established in court. While the
experts testified that the alleged dysfunction
To reiterate, while I agree that the trial court's in respondent's family and her subsequent
ruling on the psychological incapacity of the actions within her marriage are indicative of a
parties should be final and binding on the Narcissistic Personality Disorder, the court
appellate courts when such ruling is based on records themselves reveal no credible and
the facts and on the opinion of the experts, I preponderant evidence of the supposed family
believe that the trial court's decision in this dysfunction in respondent's childhood and of
case was not based on facts, but solely on the her supposed narcissistic habits later in life.
opinion of the experts. Such blind reliance by There was no independent witness presented,
the trial court was an abdication of its duty to who is knowledgeable of respondent's
go over the evidence for itself. upbringing and of her actions before and after
the celebration of marriage. This is
While the courts may consider the assistance detrimental in proving that the cause of her
of the experts, the courts are duty-bound to psychological incapacity occurred before, or at
assess not only the correctness of the experts' the time of the celebration of the marriage, 14
conclusions, but also the factual premises and renders the experts' opinion on the root
upon which such conclusions are based. The cause of her psychological incapacity
expert's conclusions, like any other opinion, conjectural or speculative. Also there was no
are based on certain assumptions or evidence of respondent's supposed obsessive
premises. It is the court's job to assess desire for attention and selfishness, which
whether those assumptions or premises are in obsession, according to the experts, indicates
fact true or correct, and supported by a narcissistic personality. The most that was
evidence on record. The soundness of experts' proven was a single incident wherein she was
conclusions lie in the quantity and quality of found in a hotel room with another man (after
the input they received in making their they have separated in fact), a penchant for
conclusions. This is precisely where the courts visiting salons and for meeting friends over a
take the reins from these experts. The root mahjong game. This can hardly be considered
cause of psychological incapacity must not as a pattern, defined as "a reliable sample of
only be clinically identified by experts, it must traits, acts or other observable features
also be sufficiently proven and clearly characterizing an individual," 15 much less an
explained in the decision. 12 CSDcTH obsession.
The expertise of courts lies in determining Much is said about respondent's
which facts are admissible, which are undesirability as a mother for supposedly
relevant, which carry weight, which have been exposing her children to the "culture of
proven, which have been debunked. In gambling;" 16 this, from the evidence that she
resolving legal disputes, the courts have the brought her children with her to their "aunt's
expertise in evaluating the quantity, quality, house" where she frequently played mahjong. I
and relevance of the facts to the legal issue find this judgment unsupported by the
involved. Courts have to conduct its evidence and irrelevant. While it has been
independent assessment of the quality of the proven that respondent played mahjong, there
facts that the psychologists relied upon in is no evidence whatsoever that it involved
support of their conclusion. It is only if, and gambling, which is "the act of playing a game
when, the court is convinced that the and consciously risking money or other stakes
psychologists' conclusions are strongly on its outcome." 17 Without the element of
anchored on verifiable, admissible, and gambling, a mother's act of bringing her kids
relevant evidence that it can adopt the with her when she meets with friends (which
psychologists' findings. Even petitioner's is the most that can be said of this matter)
expert witness, Fr. Healy, acknowledged in his can hardly be described as undesirable. Even
testimony that it is the court's job, not that of Fr. Healy acknowledged that playing mahjong
the expert, to verify the truthfulness of the and spending time with friends are not
factual allegations regarding respondent's disorders by themselves. They would only
alleged habits. Fr. Healy cautioned that his
constitute psychological incapacity if 12, Art. XV, Secs. 1-2) The existence of any
inordinate amounts of time are spent on these doubt should still be resolved in favor of the
activities to the detriment of one's familial validity of the marriage.
duties. 18 The Court, in our Decision, applied
Fr. Healy's standards. We concluded that I, therefore, submit that petitioner's Motion for
respondent was not psychologically Reconsideration be denied with finality.
incapacitated because there was no proof that
she spent inordinate amounts of time in these
alleged activities or that her kids were
adversely affected. 19 On the contrary, the
records revealed her efforts to maintain
supervision of her kids, even when she was
among her friends. Further, the kids recalled
that, after respondent left the conjugal home,
she would surreptitiously visit them in their
schools; and, once granted visitation rights,
spent weekends with them and took care of
them at any time they got sick. 20 These are
hardly the actions of a woman with an
inability to understand her filial duties and
obligations. aEIcHA
In the case at bar, apart from his self-serving THE RESPONDENT WIFE WAS ALSO FOUND
declarations, the evidence adduced by Robert BY THE LOWER COURT AS
fell short of establishing the fact that at the PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO
time of their marriage, Luz was suffering from COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL
a psychological defect which in fact deprived OBLIGATIONS.
[her] of the ability to assume the essential
duties of marriage and its concomitant Robert now argues that he has sufficiently
responsibilities. proven the nullity of his marriage even in the
absence of any medical, psychiatric or
xxx xxx xxx psychological examination of the wife by a
competent and qualified professional. To
We commiserate with the plaintiff-appellee's bolster his claim, he avers that the
undeserved marital plight. Yet, Our Metropolitan Tribunal already declared that
paramount duty as a court compels Us to Luz exhibited grave lack of discretion in
apply the law at all costs, however harsh it judgment concerning the essential rights and
may be on whomsoever is called upon to bear obligations mutually given and accepted in
its unbiased brunt. marriage. The said decision was affirmed by
FOR THESE REASONS, the appealed Decision the NAMT.
dated September 20, 2002 in Civil Case No. Robert further argues that the sexual
94-178 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No indiscretion of Luz with different men coupled
costs. with the fact that she failed to function as a
SO ORDERED. 5 home maker to her family and as a housewife
to him incapacitated her from accepting and
Robert filed a motion for reconsideration, but complying with her essential marital
it was denied by the CA in its June 1, 2010 obligations. For said reason, he asserts that
Resolution, 6 stating that the arguments of the case of Luz was not a mere case of sexual
Robert were mere rehash of the same ground, infidelity, but clearly an illness that was
arguments and discussion previously pointed rooted on some debilitating psychological
condition which incapacitated her to carry out incapacitated. The sudden turn-about of the
the responsibilities of a married woman. appellee, in the present recourse, to the extent
Robert avers that a sex maniac is not just a of disowning her testimony in the Court a quo
mere sexual infidel but one who is suffering and even praying for the reversal of the
from a deep psychological problem. Decision of the Trial Court is strongly
suggestive, if not constitutive, of collusion or a
Position of the State modus vivendi between the parties, outlawed
The OSG argues that the CA correctly ruled by the Family Code of the Philippines and the
that the totality of evidence presented by Constitution. . . .
Robert was not sufficient to support a finding The Court's Ruling
that Luz was psychologically incapacitated.
His evidence fell short of establishing his The main issue is whether the totality of the
assertion that at the time of their marriage, evidence adduced proves that Luz was
Luz was suffering from a psychological defect psychologically incapacitated to comply with
which deprived her of the ability to assume the essential obligations of marriage
the essential duties of marriage and its warranting the annulment of their marriage
concomitant responsibilities. under Article 36 of the Family Code.
With regard to the findings of the Metropolitan The petition is bereft of merit.
Tribunal and the NAMT, the OSG claims that
the same were only given persuasive value and A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
were not controlling or decisive in cases of is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code
nullity of marriage. Further, the decision was which provides:
based on grave lack of discretion of judgment Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any
concerning matrimonial rights and obligations party who, at the time of the celebration, was
due to outside factors other than psychologically incapacitated to comply with
psychological incapacity as contemplated in the essential marital obligation of marriage,
Article 36 of the Family Code. The OSG also shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
raises the strong possibility of collusion becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
between the parties as shown by the events
that took place after the issuance of the March "Psychological incapacity," as a ground to
7, 1996 RTC Decision. The OSG wrote: nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the
SEHaDI Family Code, should refer to no less than a
mental not merely physical incapacity
Significantly, the chronological events after that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the trial court issued its March 7, 1996 the basic marital covenants that
Decision unmistakably show the collusion concomitantly must be assumed and
between the parties to obtain the reliefs discharged by the parties to the marriage
pleaded. Among others, respondent's which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the
Retraction of Testimony was executed without Family Code, among others, include their
the presence of counsel sometime in 1998, a mutual obligations to live together; observe
few months before she married an American. love, respect and fidelity; and render help and
This irregularity was even noticed by the support. There is hardly a doubt that the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54261: intendment of the law has been to confine the
xxx xxx xxx meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders
The involvement and active participation of clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
the Solicitor General became indispensable, in or inability to give meaning and significance to
the present recourse, when, in a whirlwind the marriage. 7 CDAEHS
turn of events, the Appellee made a VOLTE
FACE executed a "Retraction of Testimony" Psychological incapacity as required by Article
and a "Waiver of Custody" waiving custody of 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
Franco Mark J. Mallillin, still a minor, her son juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The
by the Appellant. It bears stressing that the incapacity must be grave or serious such that
Appellee, in the Court a quo, obdurately the party would be incapable of carrying out
denied the material allegations of the the ordinary duties required in marriage. It
Appellant's complaint and declared that it was must be rooted in the history of the party
the Appellant who was psychologically antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may only emerge after the petition, proven by evidence and included in
marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it the text of the decision.
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved. 8 (7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo Church in the Philippines, while not
C. De Quintos, Jr., 9 the Court reiterated the controlling or decisive, should be given great
well-settled guidelines in resolving petitions respect by our courts. . . . .
for declaration of nullity of marriage,
embodied in Republic v. Court of Appeals and xxx xxx xxx
Molina, 10 based on Article 36 of the Family (8) The trial court must order the
Code. Thus: prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity General to appear as counsel for the state. . . .
of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any .
doubt should be resolved in favor of the Guided by these pronouncements, the Court
existence and continuation of the marriage is of the considered view that Robert's
and against its dissolution and nullity. . . . . evidence failed to establish the psychological
xxx xxx xxx incapacity of Luz.
(2) The root cause of the psychological First, the testimony of Robert failed to
incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically overcome the burden of proof to show the
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) nullity of the marriage. Other than his self-
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly serving testimony, no other evidence was
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the adduced to show the alleged incapacity of Luz.
Family Code requires that the incapacity must He presented no other witnesses to
be psychological not physical, although its corroborate his allegations on her behavior.
manifestations and/or symptoms may be Thus, his testimony was self-serving and had
physical. . . . . no serious value as evidence.
Two years later, this court in Republic v. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to
Court of Appeals and Molina 24 listed specific be medically or clinically permanent or
guidelines when interpreting and applying incurable. Such insurability may be absolute
Article 36 of the Family Code: or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such
of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
doubt should be resolved in favor of the of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
existence and continuation of the marriage those not related to marriage, like the exercise
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is of a profession or employment in a job. Hence,
a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing Code provision, contemporaneous religious
illnesses of children and prescribing medicine interpretation is to be given persuasive effect.
to cure them but may not be psychologically Here, the State and the Church while
capacitated to procreate, bear and raise remaining independent, separate and apart
his/her own children as an essential from each other shall walk together in
obligation of marriage. synodal cadence towards the same goal of
protecting and cherishing marriage and the
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to family as the inviolable base of the nation. 25
bring about the disability of the party to (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, This court has since applied the Molina
mood changes, occasional emotional guidelines in deciding cases for declaration of
outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. nullity of marriage due to psychological
The illness must be shown as downright incapacity. 26 In all psychological incapacity
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or cases resolved from 1997 to 2009 applying the
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, Molina guidelines, only the parties in Antonio
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor v. Reyes 27 were found to have complied with
in the person, an adverse integral element in all the requirements of Molina. 28
the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting Medical, psychiatric, or
and thereby complying with the obligations psychological examination
essential to marriage.
Luz did not appear during trial. 29 Robert
(6) The essential marital obligations must disclosed that she was already living in
be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of California, USA and was married to an
the Family Code as regards the husband and American. 30 This can explain why no
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of medical, psychiatric, or psychological
the same Code in regard to parents and their examination could be conducted on Luz. In
children. Such non-complied marital any event, the reversal of the trial court's
obligation(s) must also be stated in the finding of psychological incapacity cannot
petition, proven by evidence and included in hinge on this lack of examination.
the text of the decision.
In 2000, this court in Marcos v. Marcos 31
(7) Interpretations given by the National ruled that "if the totality of evidence presented
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
Church in the Philippines, while not incapacity, then actual medical examination of
controlling or decisive, should be given great the person concerned need not be resorted to."
respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 32
36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code This court then issued A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 also known as the Rule on Declaration of
and which provides: Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages. This rule
"The following are incapable of contracting took effect on March 15, 2003.
marriage: Those who are unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage due to The rule provides that "[t]he complete facts
causes of psychological nature." IHAcCS should allege the physical manifestations, if
any, as are indicative of psychological
Since the purpose of including such provision incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil marriage but expert opinion need not be
laws with the religious faith of our people, it alleged." 33 It also states that "[i]n case
stands to reason that to achieve such mediation is not availed of or where it fails,
harmonization, great persuasive weight should the court shall proceed with the pre-trial
be given to decisions of such appellate conference, on which occasion it shall
tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on consider the advisability of receiving expert
evidence what is decreed as canonically testimony and such other matters as may aid
invalid should also be decreed civilly void. in the prompt disposition of the petition." 34
This is one instance where, in view of the cDHCAE
evident source and purpose of the Family
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC thus codified the ruling appear when I say youth, the individual
in Marcos that examination by a physician or display more on a child on him, it is the child
psychologist is not a conditio sine qua non for who is concern with the feeling or reaction, if
a declaration of nullity of marriage. 35 the person react more incapable impulses that
is distracted, he is more of infantile than
In 2010, this court voided the marriage in adult, in the case of Robert Malillin if we cite,
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes 36 discussing that he related to me that he is having some affairs
"[t]he lack of personal examination and with some women so I can see that he is quite
interview of the respondent, or any other speaking of nature and individual getting
person diagnosed with personality disorder, through serious responsibilities of married
does not per se invalidate the testimonies of life. DCcSHE
the doctors [and] [n]either do their findings
automatically constitute hearsay that would Q: Since you stated that you have
result in their exclusion as evidence." 37 interviewed this Robert Malillin, several
incidents, have you talk matters regarding his
Thus, the psychological report of Myrna de los wife?
Reyes Villanueva, a Guidance Psychologist II
of the Northern Mindanao Medical Center in A: Yes, he told me that the wife had
Cagayan de Oro, 38 cannot be considered several affairs in fact, there was a short doubt
hearsay on the ground that Luz was not of his first son because upon learning that he
interviewed and examined. A marriage offered marriage, the woman refused and that
involves two persons only. Necessarily, these fuel his doubt later because he learns that the
two are in the best position to testify on the woman is with another guys and he said that
other's behavior during their marriage. Put in woman contracting loans without his
this context, Robert's testimony cannot be knowledge and the woman is not even taking
disregarded for being self-serving. care of the child.
In any event, Myrna de los Reyes Villanueva Q: Considering that Mr. Malillin had
administered five tests 39 on Robert before dispute with his wife, he would say that the
concluding that "Robert Malillin [sic] is wife is infantile and immature?
psychologically incapacitated to [c]arry out the
responsibility of married life especially with an A: The transaction is the same because
individual who is equally emotionally infertile they were both child and the child here has no
and immature[.]" 40 Robert quoted Myrna de decision made then there is nothing to reach
los Reyes Villanueva's testimony as follows: up.
Q: Can you explain to the court what is Q: Base on your observation with this case
your recommendation? Malillin is infantile and immature?
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition
Appeals, 18 the Court ruled that the present for declaration of presumptive death of his
spouse failed to prove that he had a well- wife, who had been missing for more than four
founded belief that his absent spouse was years. He testified that his efforts to find her
already dead before he filed his petition. His consisted of:
efforts to locate his absent wife allegedly
consisted of the following: (1) Searching for her whenever his ship
docked in England;
(1) He went to his in-laws' house to look
for her; (2) Sending her letters which were all
returned to him; and
(2) He sought the barangay captain's aid to
locate her; (3) Inquiring from their friends regarding
her whereabouts, which all proved fruitless.
(3) He went to her friends' houses to find
her and inquired about her whereabouts The Court held that the present spouse's
among her friends; methods of investigation were too sketchy to
form a basis that his wife was already dead. It
(4) He went to Manila and worked as a stated that the pieces of evidence only proved
part-time taxi driver to look for her in malls that his wife had chosen not to communicate
during his free time; with their common acquaintances, and not
that she was dead.
(5) He went back to Catbalogan and again
looked for her; and Recently, in Republic v. Cantor 20 (Cantor),
the Court considered the present spouse's
(6) He reported her disappearance to the efforts to have fallen short of the "stringent
local police station and to the NBI. standard" and lacked the degree of diligence
Despite these claimed "earnest efforts," the required by jurisprudence as she did not
Court still ruled against the present spouse. actively look for her missing husband; that
The Court explained that he failed to present she did not report his absence to the police or
the persons from whom he made inquiries and seek the aid of the authorities to look for him;
only reported his wife's absence after the OSG that she did not present as witnesses her
filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the missing husband's relatives or their neighbors
RTC. and friends, who could corroborate her efforts
to locate him; that these persons, from whom
Similarly in Republic v. Granada, 19 the Court she allegedly made inquiries, were not even
ruled that the present spouse failed to prove named; and that there was no other
her "well-founded belief" that her absent corroborative evidence to support her claim
spouse was already dead prior to her filing of that she conducted a diligent search. In the
the petition. She simply did not exert diligent Court's view, the wife merely engaged in a
efforts to locate her husband either in the "passive search" where she relied on
country or in Taiwan, where he was known to uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws,
have worked. Moreover, she did not explain neighbors and friends. She, thus, failed to
her omissions. In said case, the Court wrote: conduct a diligent search. Her claimed efforts
IDTSEH were insufficient to form a well-founded belief
that her husband was already dead.
The belief of the present spouse must be the
result of proper and honest to goodness In this case, Edna claimed to have done the
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the following to determine the whereabouts and
whereabouts of the absent spouse and the status of her husband:
whether the absent spouse is still alive or is
already dead. Whether or not the spouse 1. She took a vacation/leave of absence
present acted on a well-founded belief of the from her work and returned to the Philippines
death of the absent spouse depends upon to look for her husband.
inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the
2. She inquired from her parents-in-law in communicating with the herein petitioner as
Iligan City and from their common friends in to the reasons why he left their family abode
the same city and in Valencia City. nor giving them any information as to his
whereabouts; that herein petitioner took
3. She went as far as the birthplace of her vacation/leave of absence from her work and
husband in Escalante, Negros Oriental, so she return to the Philippines, in order to look for
could inquire from her husband's relatives. her husband and made some inquiries with
Despite her efforts, she averred that she her parents-in-law in Iligan City, from their
received negative responses from them common friends in Iligan City and in Valencia
because none of them had knowledge of the City, and even went as far as the birthplace of
existence of her husband who had been her husband, particularly at Escalante,
missing for 15 years. Negros Oriental, inquiring from her husband's
relatives, but she only got negative response
Applying the standard set forth by the Court from them since none of them have any
in the previously cited cases, particularly knowledge as to the present existence of her
Cantor, Edna's efforts failed to satisfy the husband that since the year 1993 up to the
required well-founded belief of her absent present, a period of about fifteen [15] years
husband's death. have elapsed, the person and the body of
petitioner's husband could not be found,
Her claim of making diligent search and located nor traced as there is no any
inquiries remained unfounded as it merely information as to his existence or
consisted of bare assertions without any whereabouts. 23
corroborative evidence on record. She also
failed to present any person from whom she Worse, the CA affirmed the RTC decision when
inquired about the whereabouts of her it dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by
husband. She did not even present her the OSG. The CA should have realized the
children from whom she learned the glaring and patent disregard by the RTC of the
disappearance of her husband. In fact, she rulings in similar situations where petitions
was the lone witness. Following the basic rule for declaration of presumptive death have
that mere allegation is not evidence and is not been denied by this Court. By declaring
equivalent to proof, 21 the Court cannot give Romeo presumptively dead, the CA clearly
credence to her claims that she indeed exerted ignored this Court's categorical
diligent efforts to locate her husband. pronouncements.
DaIAcC
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Moreover, no document was submitted to Accordingly, the October 18, 2013 Decision
corroborate the allegation that her husband and the January 8, 2014 Resolution of the
had been missing for at least fifteen (15) years Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and
already. As the OSG observed, there was not SET ASIDE. The petition of respondent Edna
even any attempt to seek the aid of the Orcelino-Villanueva to have her husband
authorities at the time her husband declared presumptively dead is DENIED.
disappeared. In Cantor, the present spouse SICDAa
claimed to have sought the aid of the
authorities or, at the very least, reported his SO ORDERED.
absence to the police. 22 Yet, the Court denied Carpio, Brion and Perlas-Bernabe, * JJ.,
her pleas. concur.
Verily, it makes sense to conclude that her Leonen, J., see dissenting opinion.
efforts were not diligent and serious enough to
give meaning to her well-founded belief that Separate Opinions
Romeo was already dead. Suffice it to state
that her petition should have been denied at LEONEN, J., dissenting:
the first instance. The RTC, however, granted Edna Orcelino-Villanueva (Edna) was a
it, reasoning domestic helper based in Singapore. In 1993,
. . . that it was in 1993 when the petitioner she came home immediately after she heard
while abroad heard the news from her news from her children that her husband,
children that her husband left their conjugal Romeo L. Villanueva (Romeo), left their
home . . . without informing the children nor conjugal dwelling. She came home, leaving her
work, for the purpose of looking for her spouse. Failure to do so for the period
husband and taking care of her children. She established by law gives rise to the
had limited resources for her search. presumption that the absent spouse is dead,
thereby enabling the spouse present to
For 15 or 16 years, she endured the absence remarry. TAacHE
of her husband. Within those long years,
whether in good times or bad, she never heard Article 41 of the Family Code provides:
from him. He did not discharge any of his
duties as husband. Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any
person during subsistence of a previous
In ruling against her and concluding that she marriage shall be null and void, unless before
did not search hard enough for Romeo, the the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
majority fails to appreciate several crucial the prior spouse had been absent for four
facts: consecutive years and the spouse present has
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
First, Edna turned away from her livelihood, was already dead. In case of disappearance
her modest means of subsistence, just to where there is danger of death under the
search for Romeo. circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Second, Edna did not only embark on a token Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of
search. She did not limit herself to her only two years shall be sufficient. ASTcaE
parents-in-law and to common friends in For the purpose of contracting the subsequent
Iligan City, the place where she and Romeo marriage under the preceding paragraph the
were married. Edna went all the way to spouse present must institute a summary
Romeo's birthplace, which was Escalante, proceeding as provided in this Code for the
Negros Oriental. There, she inquired from declaration of presumptive death of the
Romeo's relatives as to his whereabouts. absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
Third, 15 or 16 years had passed since Edna reappearance of the absent spouse.
was told that Romeo had gone missing when Article 41's requirement of a "well-grounded
she filed her Petition to declare Romeo belief" calls for an inquiry into a spouse's state
presumptively dead. If Edna merely intended of mind. 5 Otherwise abstract, one's state of
to use a petition for declaration of mind can only be ascertained through overt
presumptive death as a convenient means for acts.
circumventing laws that protect the institution
of marriage, it is astounding that she would Article 41 requires this belief to be "well-
await the inconvenience of 15 or 16 years. grounded." It therefore requires nothing more
than for a spouse to have a "reasonable basis
Edna established a well-founded belief that for holding to such belief." 6 Article 41 relies
her husband, Romeo, is already dead. on a basic and plain test: rationality. 7
I vote to sustain the assailed October 18, 2013 What is rational in each case depends on
Decision 1 and January 8, 2014 Resolution 2 context. Rationality is not determined by the
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. blanket imposition of pre-conceived
03768-MIN, affirming the October 8, 2009 standards. Rather, it is better determined by
Judgment 3 of the Regional Trial Court, an appreciation of a person's unique
Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, circumstances. 8
declaring Romeo presumptively dead pursuant
to Article 41 of the Family Code. Moreover, all that Article 41 calls to sustain is
a presumption. By definition, there is no need
I reiterate the position I articulated in my for absolute certainty. A presumption is, by
dissent to Republic of the Philippines v. nature, favorable to a party and dispenses
Cantor. 4 I maintain that a strict standard with the burden of proving. Consequently,
should not be used in evaluating the efforts neither is there a need for conduct that
made by a spouse to ascertain the status and establishes such a high degree of cognizance
whereabouts of an absent spouse. The marital that what is established is proof, and no
obligations provided for by the Family Code longer a presumption:
require the continuing presence of each
spouse. A spouse is well to suppose that this In declaring a person presumptively dead, a
shall be resolutely fulfilled by the other court is called upon to sustain a presumption,
it is not called upon to conclude on verity or to to return to the Philippines to tend to a
establish actuality. In so doing, a court infers missing husband. Twenty-two years ago, when
despite an acknowledged uncertainty. Thus, to she embarked on her search, she could not
insist on such demanding and extracting have been aided by the convenience of ready
evidence to "show enough proof of a well- access to communication networks. To go to
founded belief", is to insist on an inordinate her husband's birthplace and inquire from his
and intemperate standard. 9 relatives, she could not have merely boarded
an hour-long flight; she must have endured
It is improper for the majority to insist upon hours, even days at sea. It is in light of these
the same "strict standard approach" 10 that human realities that Edna's efforts must be
was relied on in Cantor and conclude that appreciated.
Edna's efforts "were not diligent and serious
enough." 11 The majority fails to appreciate This court must realize that insisting upon an
several crucial facts in this case that define ideal will never yield satisfactory results. A
the limits of her situation. DHIcET stringent evaluation of a party's efforts made
out of context will always reveal means
Edna's lack of resources appears in the through which a spouse could have 'done
records. She only had the ability to present more' or walked the proverbial extra mile to
herself as witness. ascertain his or her spouse's whereabouts. A
Concededly, Edna could have engaged in other reason could always be conceived for
efforts asking for the help of police officers, concluding that a spouse did not try 'hard
filing a formal missing-person report, enough.' HDICSa
announcing Romeo's absence in radio or So, too, insisting on Edna's perceived
television programs as would show how shortcomings unjustly puts the blame on her
painstakingly she endeavored to search for and undermines the shortcoming that Romeo
Romeo. Insisting on Edna to have also made himself committed. All marital obligations
these efforts, however, is to insist that she act recognized in the Family Code are predicated
in an ideal manner. It takes her away from her upon each spouse's presence. The primordial
own reality and requires her to fulfill pre- marital obligation is "to live together, observe
conceived notions of what satisfies notice. It mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
fails to appreciate the merit of the lengths she mutual help and support." 12 As I explained
actually went through to search for Romeo. in my dissent in Cantor:
Unless Edna had the ability to gain access to The opinions of a recognized authority in civil
radio or television programs with nationwide law, Arturo M. Tolentino, are particularly
coverage or ensure that her notices were enlightening:
posted in all precincts, then requiring this
type of search would have been futile and Meaning of "Absent" Spouse. The provisions
economically wasteful. If we are to lend truth of this article are of American origin, and must
to the concept of social justice, we have to be construed in the light of American
make judgments based on her context. To jurisprudence. An identical provision (except
reiterate, she is one of the millions who had to for the period) exists in the California civil
go abroad to earn a more prosperous life for code (section 61); California jurisprudence
herself and her children. She had to cut short should, therefore, prove enlightening. It has
her employment to come home and make an been held in that jurisdiction that, as respects
honest search for her husband. To require her the validity of a husband's subsequent
to squander more time and money to reach marriage, a presumption as to the death of his
media and the police would have been first wife cannot be predicated upon an
economically expensive for her. The law absence resulting from his leaving or deserting
should be interpreted in the context of reality her, as it is his duty to keep her advised as to
and ours is different from Edna's. his whereabouts. The spouse who has been
left or deserted is the one who is considered as
Edna was an abandoned wife whose husband the 'spouse present'; such spouse is not
was missing for 15 or 16 years. Her search for required to ascertain the whereabouts of the
Romeo began more than two decades ago in a deserting spouse, and after the required
province in Mindanao, far removed from this number of years of absence of the latter, the
nation's capital. She was an overseas Filipino former may validly remarry.
worker, a domestic helper, who was compelled
Precisely, it is a deserting spouse's failure to marriage and without prejudice to the fact of
comply with what is reasonably expected of reappearance being judicially determined in
him/her and to fulfil the responsibilities that case such fact is disputed. DTCSHA
are all but normal to a spouse which makes
reasonable (i.e., well-grounded) the belief that Moreover, in Santos v. Santos, 14 we
should he/she fail to manifest his/her recognized that in cases where a declaration of
presence within a statutorily determined presumptive death was fraudulently obtained,
reasonable period, he/she must have been the subsequent marriage shall not only be
deceased. The law is of the confidence that terminated, but all other effects of the
spouses will in fact "live together, observe declaration nullified by a successful petition
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render for annulment of judgment:
mutual help and support" such that it is not The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of
the business of the law to assume any other presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud
circumstance than that a spouse is deceased is an action to annul the judgment. An
in case he/she becomes absent. 13 affidavit of reappearance is not the proper
It is Romeo who has been absent. In so doing, remedy when the person declared
he is rightly considered to be no longer in a presumptively dead has never been absent.
position to perform his marital obligations to xxx xxx xxx
Edna. Having been absent for the statutorily
prescribed period despite his legal obligations Therefore, for the purpose of not only
as a married spouse, Romeo should be rightly terminating the subsequent marriage but also
considered presumptively dead. of nullifying the effects of the declaration of
presumptive death and the subsequent
The majority burdened itself with ensuring marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of
that petitions for declaration of presumptive reappearance would not suffice. 15
death are not used as procedural shortcuts
that undermine the institution of marriage. The majority is gripped with the apprehension
While this is a valid concern, the majority goes that a petition for declaration of presumptive
to unnecessary lengths to discharge this death may be availed of as a dangerous
burden. Article 41 of the Family Code expedient. Nothing, in this case, sustains fear.
concedes that there is a degree of risk in A misplaced anxiety is all that there is. As
presuming a spouse to be dead, as the absent things stand, Edna has shown facts that
spouse may, in fact, be alive and well. Thus, warrant a declaration that Romeo is
Article 41 provides that declarations of presumptively dead. Proceeding from these
presumptive death are "without prejudice to merits, this Petition must be denied.
the reappearance of the absent spouse." The
state is thus not bereft of remedies. ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the Petition.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
Consistent with this, Article 42 of the Family G.R. SP No. 03768-MIN, affirming the October
Code provides for the automatic termination of 8, 2009 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
the subsequent marriage entered into by the Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon,
present spouse should the absent spouse declaring Romeo L. Villanueva presumptively
reappear: HcDSaT dead pursuant to Article 41 of the Family
Code, must be affirmed. IDaEHC
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage
referred to in the preceding Article shall be
automatically terminated by the recording of
the affidavit of reappearance of the absent
spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling
the previous marriage or declaring it void ab
initio.
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule
dwelling and this was the last time that the 45 petition before this Court. ITAaCc
respondent ever saw him. Since then, she had
not seen, communicated nor heard anything The Petition
from Jerry or about his whereabouts. The petitioner contends that certiorari lies to
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years challenge the decisions, judgments or final
from the time of Jerry's disappearance, the orders of trial courts in petitions for
respondent filed before the RTC a petition 4 declaration of presumptive death of an absent
for her husband's declaration of presumptive spouse under Rule 41 of the Family Code. It
death, docketed as SP Proc. Case No. 313-25. maintains that although judgments of trial
She claimed that she had a well-founded belief courts in summary judicial proceedings,
that Jerry was already dead. She alleged that including presumptive death cases, are
she had inquired from her mother-in-law, her deemed immediately final and executory
brothers-in-law, her sisters-in-law, as well as (hence, not appealable under Article 247 of
her neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the Family Code), this rule does not mean that
the hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly they are not subject to review on certiorari.
made it a point to check the patients' directory The petitioner also posits that the respondent
whenever she went to a hospital. All these did not have a well-founded belief to justify
earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, the declaration of her husband's presumptive
proved futile, prompting her to file the petition death. It claims that the respondent failed to
in court. EHCaDS conduct the requisite diligent search for her
The Ruling of the RTC missing husband. Likewise, the petitioner
invites this Court's attention to the attendant absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
circumstances surrounding the case, reappearance of the absent spouse. ICTcDA
particularly, the degree of search conducted
and the respondent's resultant failure to meet Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall
the strict standard under Article 41 of the be immediately final and executory.
Family Code. EHcaDT [underscores ours]
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the 3. That the present spouse has a well-
same title reads: founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
"ART. 247. The judgment of the court shall 4. That the present spouse files a
be immediately final and executory." cSDIHT summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee. 12
The Present Spouse Has the Burden suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the
premise that Article 41 of the Family Code
of Proof to Show that All the places upon the present spouse the burden of
Requisites under Article 41 of the proving the additional and more stringent
requirement of "well-founded belief" which can
Family Code are Present only be discharged upon a showing of proper
and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts
The burden of proof rests on the present to ascertain not only the absent spouse's
spouse to show that all the requisites under whereabouts but, more importantly, that the
Article 41 of the Family Code are present. absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
Since it is the present spouse who, for 15 CHTAIc
purposes of declaration of presumptive death,
substantially asserts the affirmative of the The Requirement of Well-Founded
issue, it stands to reason that the burden of
proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact Belief
has the burden of proving it and mere The law did not define what is meant by "well-
allegation is not evidence. 13 CEcaTH founded belief." It depends upon the
Declaration of Presumptive Death circumstances of each particular case. Its
determination, so to speak, remains on a
under Article 41 of the Family Code case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with
this requirement, the present spouse must
Imposes a Stricter Standard prove that his/her belief was the result of
Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to
compared to the old provision of the Civil Code locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes
which it superseded, imposes a stricter
standard. It requires a "well-founded belief" that under the circumstances, the absent
that the absentee is already dead before a spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of
petition for declaration of presumptive death active effort (not a mere passive one).
can be granted. We have had occasion to To illustrate this degree of "diligent and
make the same observation in Republic v. reasonable search" required by the law, an
Nolasco, 14 where we noted the crucial analysis of the following relevant cases is
differences between Article 41 of the Family warranted:
Code and Article 83 of the Civil Code, to wit:
i. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
Under Article 41, the time required for the Appeals (Tenth Div.) 16
presumption to arise has been shortened to
four (4) years; however, there is need for a In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
judicial declaration of presumptive death to Appeals (Tenth Div.), 17 the Court ruled that
enable the spouse present to remarry. Also, the present spouse failed to prove that he had
Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a a well-founded belief that his absent spouse
stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article was already dead before he filed his petition.
83 of the Civil Code merely requires either His efforts to locate his absent wife allegedly
that there be no news that such absentee is consisted of the following:
still alive; or the absentee is generally
considered to be dead and believed to be so by (1) He went to his in-laws' house to look
the spouse present, or is presumed dead for her;
under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. (2) He sought the barangay captain's aid to
The Family Code, upon the other hand, locate her;
prescribes as "well founded belief" that the
absentee is already dead before a petition for (3) He went to her friends' houses to find
declaration of presumptive death can be her and inquired about her whereabouts
granted. among his friends;
Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for (4) He went to Manila and worked as a
such period required by the law), lack of any part-time taxi driver to look for her in malls
news that such absentee is still alive, failure during his free time;
to communicate or general presumption of
absence under the Civil Code would not
(5) He went back to Catbalogan and again she would have sought information from the
looked for her; and Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from
other government agencies in Taiwan or the
(6) He reported her disappearance to the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass
local police station and to the NBI. media for this end, but she did not. Worse,
Despite these alleged "earnest efforts," the she failed to explain these omissions.
Court still ruled against the present spouse. iii. Republic v. Nolasco 21
The Court found that he failed to present the
persons from whom he allegedly made In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition
inquiries and only reported his wife's absence for declaration of presumptive death of his
after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his wife, who had been missing for more than four
petition in the RTC. years. He testified that his efforts to find her
consisted of:
The Court also provided the following criteria
for determining the existence of a "well- (1) Searching for her whenever his ship
founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family docked in England;
Code:
(2) Sending her letters which were all
The belief of the present spouse must be the returned to him; and
result of proper and honest to goodness
inquiries and efforts to ascertain the (3) Inquiring from their friends regarding
whereabouts of the absent spouse and her whereabouts, which all proved fruitless.
whether the absent spouse is still alive or is The Court ruled that the present spouse's
already dead. Whether or not the spouse investigations were too sketchy to form a basis
present acted on a well-founded belief of death that his wife was already dead and ruled that
of the absent spouse depends upon the the pieces of evidence only proved that his
inquiries to be drawn from a great many wife had chosen not to communicate with
circumstances occurring before and after the their common acquaintances, and not that
disappearance of the absent spouse and the she was dead.
nature and extent of the inquiries made by
[the] present spouse. 18 iv. The present case
On June 26, 2009, Maria Fe filed her For the purpose of contracting the subsequent
comment on the Office of the Solicitor marriage under the preceding paragraph the
General's petition. She argued that there was spouse present must institute a summary
no factual or legal basis for the Office of the proceeding as provided in this Code for the
Solicitor General to seek a reversal of the declaration of presumptive death of the
Court of Appeal's decision. She asserted that absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
the declaration of Jerry's death was in order reappearance of the absent spouse. SIaHDA
as it was in accord or consistent with
established facts, as well as with law and Articles 238, 247, and 252 of Title XI of the
jurisprudence on the matter. aESTAI Family Code (Summary Judicial Proceedings
in the Family Law) provide:
This court is asked to decide on the following
issues: Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme
Court, the procedural rules provided for in
1. Whether certiorari lies to challenge this Title shall apply as regards separation in
decisions, judgments or final orders of trial fact between husband and wife, abandonment
courts in petitions for the declaration of by one of the other, and incidents involving
presumptive death of a missing person or parental authority.
absent spouse; and
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall
2. Whether Maria Fe has a well-founded be immediately final and executory.
belief that Jerry is already dead.
Art. 252. The rules in Chapter 2 hereof
Certiorari lies as a remedy to shall also govern summary proceedings under
this Chapter insofar as they are applicable. (n)
annul the judgment of a trial
From these provisions, it is clear that a
court in summary petition for the declaration of presumptive
proceedings for the death of an absent spouse is a summary
proceeding; more so, judgments of a trial
declaration of presumptive court relating to such petitions shall be
considered immediately final and executory.
death of an absent spouse
However, while a trial court's judgment
I agree that certiorari lies as a remedy to relating to a petition for the declaration of
annul a judgment in proceedings for the presumptive death of an absent spouse is
considered immediately final and executory, By express provision of law, the judgment of
the Office of the Solicitor General is not the court in a summary proceeding shall be
entirely without remedy to assail the propriety immediately final and executory. As a matter
of a trial court's judgment. Where the of course, it follows that no appeal can be had
judgment is attended by grave abuse of of the trial court's judgment in a summary
discretion amounting to lack or excess of proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
jurisdiction, the Office of the Solicitor General death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of
may file with the Court of Appeals a petition the Family Code. It goes without saying,
for certiorari under Rule 65 and have the however, that an aggrieved party may file a
judgment annulled. Should the Court of petition for certiorari to question abuse of
Appeals still render an adverse decision, the discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Office of the Solicitor General may then file a Such petition should be filed in the Court of
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of
with this court. This is what the Office of the Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the
Solicitor General did in this case. DHATcE Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the
Any doubt on this matter was settled in Court of Appeals in certain cases, such
Republic v. Granada: 19 concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted
At any rate, four years after Jomoc, this Court freedom of choice of court forum. From the
settled the rule regarding appeal of judgments decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing
rendered in summary proceedings under the party may then file a petition for review on
Family Code when it ruled in Republic v. certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Tango: with the Supreme Court. This is because the
errors which the court may commit in the
"This case presents an opportunity for us to exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of
settle the rule on appeal of judgments judgment which are the proper subject of an
rendered in summary proceedings under the appeal."
Family Code and accordingly, refine our
previous decisions thereon. In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code,
the losing party in a summary proceeding for
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: the declaration of presumptive death may file
SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE a petition for certiorari with the CA on the
FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that ground that, in rendering judgment thereon,
govern summary court proceedings in the the trial court committed grave abuse of
Family Code: discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme party may elevate the matter to this Court via
Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
apply in all cases provided for in this Code 45 of the Rules of Court. 20
requiring summary court proceedings. Such
cases shall be decided in an expeditious Strict standards should not be
manner without regard to technical rules.
imposed upon the present
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code
specifies the cases covered by the rules in spouse in evaluating his or
chapters two and three of the same title. It her efforts to search for the
states:
absent spouse
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2
and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary However, I disagree with the position that
proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, "well-founded belief" should be interpreted as
73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are an imposition of stringent standards in
applicable. (Emphasis supplied.) evaluating the efforts and inquiries made by
the present spouse in ascertaining the absent
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the spouse's status and whereabouts. "Well-
same title reads: founded belief" should be based on the
ART. 247. The judgment of the court shall circumstances of each case. It should not be
be immediately final and executory. based on a prior limited enumeration of what
acts indicate a "well-founded belief."
In cases for declaration of presumptive death The spouse present is, thus, burdened to
under Article 41 of the Family Code, we prove that his spouse has been absent and
cannot ask the impossible from a spouse who that he has a well-founded belief that the
was abandoned. In interpreting this provision, absent spouse is already dead before the
we must keep in mind that both spouses are present spouse may contract a subsequent
under many obligations in the Family Code, marriage. The law does not define what is
21 all of which require their presence. meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon
aASDTE writes that "es menester que su creencia sea
firme se funde en motivos racionales."
Article 41 of the Family Code provides:
Belief is a state of the mind or condition
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be
person during subsistence of a previous proved by direct evidence or circumstantial
marriage shall be null and void, unless before evidence which may tend, even in a slight
the celebration of the subsequent marriage, degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a
the prior spouse had been absent for four determination probably founded in truth. Any
consecutive years and the spouse present has fact or circumstance relating to the character,
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity
was already dead. In case of disappearance and objects of life which usually control the
where there is danger of death under the conduct of men, and are the motives of their
circumstances set forth in the provisions of actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of characterize their disappearance or throw
only two years shall be sufficient. light on their intentions, competence evidence
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent on the ultimate question of his death.
marriage under the preceding paragraph the The belief of the present spouse must be the
spouse present must institute a summary result of proper and honest to goodness
proceeding as provided in this Code for the inquiries and efforts to ascertain the
declaration of presumptive death of the whereabouts of the absent spouse and
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of whether the absent spouse is still alive or is
reappearance of the absent spouse. already dead. Whether or not the spouse
From the text of Article 41, there are two present acted on a well-founded belief of death
substantive requirements and two procedural of the absent spouse depends upon the
requirements for a spouse to be declared inquiries to be drawn from a great many
presumptively dead for the purpose of circumstances occurring before and after the
remarriage. disappearance of the absent spouse and the
nature and extent of the inquiries made by
The two substantive requirements are the present spouse. 23
following: first, the absent spouse has been
missing for four (4) consecutive years or two Applying its construction of what constitutes a
(2) consecutive years if the disappearance "well-founded belief" in Republic v. Nolasco,
occurred under circumstances where there is 24 this court reversed the Regional Trial Court
danger of death per Article 391 of the Civil and Court of Appeals decisions which declared
Code; second, the present spouse has a well- an absent spouse presumptively dead as the
founded belief that the absent spouse is dead. present spouse was deemed to have "failed to
conduct a search for his missing wife with
The two procedural requirements are the such diligence as to give rise to a 'well-
following: first, the present spouse files a founded belief' that she is dead." 25 In 2005,
summary proceeding for the declaration of Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
presumptive death of the absent spouse; and Alegro, 26 which relied heavily on
second, there is the underlying intent of the Nolasco, likewise held that "the respondent
present spouse to remarry. failed to prove that he had a well-founded
belief . . . that his spouse . . . was already
In this case, it is necessary to interpret what dead." 27 In the 2012 case of Republic v.
is meant by "well-founded belief." DCHaTc Granada, 28 while this court denied the Office
We said in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of the Solicitor General's petition on
of Appeals and Alegro: 22 procedural grounds, this court nevertheless
favorably considered the Office of the Solicitor
General's assertions that "respondent was
allegedly not diligent in her search for her well-founded belief that her husband was
husband." 29 already dead. 31
Belief is a state of mind and can only be Maria Fe exerted the best efforts to ascertain
ascertained in reference to a person's overt the location of her husband but to no avail.
acts. In making such an evaluation, one must She bore the indignity of being left behind.
evaluate a case on the basis of its own merits She suffered the indifference of her husband.
cognizant of its unique facts, context, and Such indifference was not momentary. She
other nuances rather than be compelled to anguished through years of never hearing
satisfy a pre-conceived determination of what from him. The absence of a few days between
acts are sufficiently indicative of the belief spouses may be tolerable, required by
being ascertained. necessity. The absence of months may test
one's patience. But the absence of years of
A belief is well-founded when a person has someone who made the solemn promise to
reasonable basis for holding on to such belief. stand by his partner in sickness and in
It is to say that such belief is not arbitrary and health, for richer or poorer, is intolerable. The
whimsical. Such belief must, thus, be waiting is as painful to the spirit as the
evaluated on the basic and uncomplicated endless search for a person that probably did
standard of rationality. HAaDTI not want to be found or could no longer be
In declaring a person presumptively dead, a found.
court is called upon to sustain a presumption. To require more from Maria Fe who did what
It is not called upon to conclude on verity or to she could, given the resources available to
establish actuality. In so doing, a court infers her, is to assert the oppressiveness of our
despite an acknowledged uncertainty. Thus, to laws. It is to tell her that she has to suffer
insist on such demanding and extracting from causes which she cannot understand for
evidence as to practically require enough proof more years to come. It should be in the public
of a well-founded belief, as the Office of the interest to assume that Jerry, or any husband
Solicitor General suggests, is to insist on an for that matter, as a matter of moral and legal
inordinate, intemperate, and non-rational obligation, would get in touch with Maria Fe
standard. even if only to tell her that he is alive.
Maria Fe testified in court that months after It behooves this court not to have pre-
their wedding, she and her husband had a conceived expectations of a standard
violent quarrel, and he had left after the fight. operating procedure for spouses who are
She noted the two (2) causes of the quarrel: abandoned. Instead, it should, with the public
first, she could not "climax" every time they interest in mind and human sensitivity at
would have sexual intercourse; second, Jerry heart, understand the domestic situation.
disrespected her father every time he would IEDHAT
visit them. She likewise stated that she went
to see her mother-in-law, brothers-in-law, A review of the cases that the Office of the
sisters-in-law, neighbors, and friends to ask Solicitor General cited reveals this same
about her husband's whereabouts. She said conclusion.
that every time she would go to a hospital, she
would check its directory to find out anything Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
about her husband, but her efforts proved and Alegro 32 acknowledges that "testimonial
futile. evidence may suffice to prove the well-founded
belief of the present spouse that the absent
The Office of the Solicitor General faulted her spouse is already dead . . . ." 33
for "fall[ing] short of the degree of diligence
required for the search of a missing spouse." In another case cited by the Office of the
30 In effect, the Office of the Solicitor General Solicitor General, Republic v. Nolasco, 34
insinuated that she should have exerted more which similarly considered the matter of
painstaking efforts to ascertain her husband's whether respondent therein was able to
whereabouts. establish a well-founded belief of the death of
his absent spouse, this court cited the 1913
The majority agrees with the Office of the case of United States v. Biasbas, 35 finding it
Solicitor General. The majority views Maria to be "instructive as to degree [sic] of diligence
Fe's efforts as a mere "passive search" that is required in searching for a missing spouse."
short of the diligent search required to form a 36 In Biasbas, defendant Biasbas' defense of a
good faith belief that his wife was already dead weight of her husband's own duty. In the
was not sustained, and his conviction for normal course of things, a spouse is well in a
bigamy was affirmed. Speaking on Biasbas' position to expect that the other spouse will
lack of due diligence, this court said: return to their common dwelling. Article 68 of
the Family Code obliges the husband and the
While the defendant testified that he had wife "to live together, observe mutual love,
made inquiries concerning the whereabouts of respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
his wife, he fails to state of whom he made and support."
such inquiries. He did not even write to the
parents of his first wife, who lived in the The opinions of a recognized authority in civil
Province of Pampanga, for the purpose of law, Arturo M. Tolentino, are particularly
securing information concerning her or her enlightening:
whereabouts. He admits that he had a
suspicion only that his first wife was dead. He Meaning of "Absent" Spouse. The provisions
admits that the only basis of his suspicion of this article are of American origin, and must
was the fact that she had been absent. 37 be construed in the light of American
(Emphasis supplied) jurisprudence. An identical provision (except
for the period) exists in the California civil
What was involved in Biasbas was a mere code (section 61); California jurisprudence
suspicion totally bereft of any other rational should, therefore, prove enlightening. It has
basis. Moreover, the defendant himself been held in that jurisdiction that, as respects
admitted that all he had was a mere the validity of a husband's subsequent
suspicion. marriage, a presumption as to the death of his
first wife cannot be predicated upon an
What is involved in this case is not a mere absence resulting from his leaving or deserting
suspicion. In Biasbas, the defendant could be her, as it is his duty to keep her advised as to
faulted for failing to even write the parents of his whereabouts. The spouse who has been
his wife. Here, Maria Fe testified to her having left or deserted is the one who is considered as
visited and personally inquired with her the "spouse present"; such spouse is not
mother-in-law, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law, required to ascertain the whereabouts of the
neighbors, and friends. Moreover, Maria Fe deserting spouse, and after the required
repeatedly checked hospital entries to check if number of years of absence of the latter, the
her husband was admitted or otherwise was former may validly remarry. 38 (Underscoring
pronounced deceased. supplied)
While it may be true that it would have been Precisely, it is a deserting spouse's failure to
ideal for Maria Fe to have exerted more comply with what is reasonably expected of
exceptional efforts in locating her husband, him or her and to fulfill the responsibilities
the hypothetical issue of what else she could that are all but normal to a spouse which
have done or ought to have done should not makes reasonable (i.e., well-founded) the belief
diminish the import of her efforts. It is for that should he or she fail to manifest his or
Maria Fe to resort to the courses of action her presence within a statutorily determined
permitted to her given her stature and means. reasonable period, he or she must have been
We are called upon to make an appreciation of deceased. The law is of the confidence that
the reasonable, not of the exceptional. In spouses will in fact "live together, observe
adjudicating this case, this court must ground mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
itself on what is real, not dwell on a projected mutual help and support" 39 such that it is
ideal. not the business of the law to assume any
In the case of Maria Fe, she did what, in her other circumstance than that a spouse is
circumstances, are to be considered as an deceased in case he or she becomes absent.
efficient search. Again, she got in touch with It is unfortunate that the majority fails to
her husband's relatives and searched appreciate Maria Fe's predicament and
hospitals. More importantly, she waited for instead places upon her the burden to prove
more than four (4) long years for her husband good faith in her painstaking efforts.
to get in touch with her.
To be present in any human relationship
Also, the insistence on the need for Maria Fe especially that of marriage is a complex affair.
to ascertain the whereabouts of her deserting There are interests to be compromised for
husband undermines the significance and
each other, temperaments to be adjusted, SECOND DIVISION
evolving personalities to be understood in the
crucible of common experiences. The moments [G.R. No. 187061. October 8, 2014.]
of bliss are paid for by the many moments of CELERINA J. SANTOS, petitioner, vs.
inevitable discomfort as couples adjust their RICARDO T. SANTOS, respondent.
many standpoints, attitudes, and values for
each other. It is a journey that takes time and DECISION
in that time, presence.
LEONEN, J p:
This case does not present that kind of
complexity. It is simple enough. Maria Fe was The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of
left behind. She looked for Jerry, in good faith. presumptive death obtained by extrinsic fraud
Jerry could not be found. He did not leave is an action to annul the judgment. An
word. He did not make the slightest effort to affidavit of reappearance is not the proper
get in touch with Maria Fe. His absence did remedy when the person declared
not make the difficult compromises possible. presumptively dead has never been absent.
There were no adjustments in their SaCIDT
temperaments, no opportunities to further This is a petition for review on certiorari filed
understand each other, no journey together. by Celerina J. Santos, assailing the Court of
His absence was palpable: not moments, not
Appeals' resolutions dated November 28, 2008
days, not months, but years. Maria Fe and March 5, 2009. The Court of Appeals
deserves more. The law, in Article 41, allows dismissed the petition for the annulment of
her succor. DIESHT the trial court's judgment declaring her
Given the circumstances, Maria Fe acted presumptively dead.
adequately. Her actions were sufficient to form On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of
the well-founded belief that her husband Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J.
passed away. It was proper that he be Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after her
declared presumptively dead. In the far
husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos
possibility that he reappears and is not dead, (Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of
the law provides remedies for him. In the absence or presumptive death for the purpose
meantime, the Court of Appeals committed no of remarriage on June 15, 2007. 1 Ricardo
reversible error in affirming the Regional Trial
remarried on September 17, 2008. 2
Court's declaration.
In his petition for declaration of absence or
WHEREFORE, I vote to DENY the petition. presumptive death, Ricardo alleged that he
and Celerina rented an apartment somewhere
in San Juan, Metro Manila, after they had
gotten married on June 18, 1980. 3 After a
year, they moved to Tarlac City. They were
engaged in the buy and sell business. 4
Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment Article 42. The subsequent marriage
of judgment that there was fraud when referred to in the preceding Article shall be
Ricardo deliberately made false allegations in automatically terminated by the recording of
the court with respect to her residence. 40 the affidavit of reappearance of the absent
Ricardo also falsely claimed that she was spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling
absent for 12 years. There was also no the previous marriage or declaring it void ab
publication of the notice of hearing of initio.
Ricardo's petition in a newspaper of general A sworn statement of the fact and
circulation. 41 Celerina claimed that because circumstances of reappearance shall be
of these, she was deprived of notice and recorded in the civil registry of the residence of
opportunity to oppose Ricardo's petition to the parties to the subsequent marriage at the
declare her presumptively dead. 42 HTaIAC instance of any interested person, with due
Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting notice to the spouses of the subsequent
Ricardo's petition for declaration of marriage and without prejudice to the fact of
presumptive death were false. 43 Celerina reappearance being judicially determined in
further claimed that the court did not acquire case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis
jurisdiction because the Office of the Solicitor supplied)
General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office In other words, the Family Code provides the
were not given copies of Ricardo's petition. 44 presumptively dead spouse with the remedy of
These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and terminating the subsequent marriage by mere
lack of jurisdiction. Celerina alleged in her reappearance.
petition with the Court of Appeals sufficient The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an
ground/s for annulment of judgment. admission on the part of the first spouse that
Celerina filed her petition for annulment of his or her marriage to the present spouse was
judgment 45 on November 17, 2008. This was terminated when he or she was declared
less than two years from the July 27, 2007 absent or presumptively dead.
decision declaring her presumptively dead and Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article
about a month from her discovery of the 42 reveals that the termination of the
decision in October 2008. The petition was, subsequent marriage by reappearance is
therefore, filed within the four-year period subject to several conditions: (1) the non-
allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud, and existence of a judgment annulling the
before the action is barred by laches, which is previous marriage or declaring it void ab
the period allowed in case of lack of initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the
jurisdiction. 46 residence of the parties to the subsequent
There was also no other sufficient remedy marriage of the sworn statement of fact and
available to Celerina at the time of her circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice
discovery of the fraud perpetrated on her. to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of
the fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of
reappearance must either be undisputed or The choice of the proper remedy is also
judicially determined. SDHacT important for purposes of determining the
status of the second marriage and the
The existence of these conditions means that liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith,
reappearance does not always immediately claimed that the other spouse was absent.
cause the subsequent marriage's termination.
Reappearance of the absent or presumptively A second marriage is bigamous while the first
dead spouse will cause the termination of the subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent
subsequent marriage only when all the marriage may be considered valid when the
conditions enumerated in the Family Code are following are present: cECTaD
present.
1) The prior spouse had been absent for
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still four consecutive years;
subsist despite the absent or presumptively
dead spouse's reappearance (1) if the first 2) The spouse present has a well-founded
marriage has already been annulled or has belief that the absent spouse was already
been declared a nullity; (2) if the sworn dead;
statement of the reappearance is not recorded 3) There must be a summary proceeding
in the civil registry of the subsequent spouses' for the declaration of presumptive death of the
residence; (3) if there is no notice to the absent spouse; and
subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of
reappearance is disputed in the proper courts 4) There is a court declaration of
of law, and no judgment is yet rendered presumptive death of the absent spouse. 55
confirming such fact of reappearance.
TICaEc A subsequent marriage contracted in bad
faith, even if it was contracted after a court
When subsequent marriages are contracted declaration of presumptive death, lacks the
after a judicial declaration of presumptive requirement of a well-founded belief 56 that
death, a presumption arises that the first the spouse is already dead. The first marriage
spouse is already dead and that the second will not be considered as validly terminated.
marriage is legal. This presumption should Marriages contracted prior to the valid
prevail over the continuance of the marital termination of a subsisting marriage are
relations with the first spouse. 48 The second generally considered bigamous and void. 57
marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed Only a subsequent marriage contracted in
valid. 49 The burden of proof to show that the good faith is protected by law.
first marriage was not properly dissolved rests
on the person assailing the validity of the Therefore, the party who contracted the
second marriage. 50 subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not
immune from an action to declare his
This court recognized the conditional nature of subsequent marriage void for being bigamous.
reappearance as a cause for terminating the The prohibition against marriage during the
subsequent marriage in Social Security subsistence of another marriage still applies.
System v. Vda. de Bailon. 51 This court noted 58
52 that mere reappearance will not terminate
the subsequent marriage even if the parties to If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad
the subsequent marriage were notified if there faith when he filed his petition to declare her
was "no step . . . taken to terminate the presumptively dead and when he contracted
subsequent marriage, either by [filing an] the subsequent marriage, such marriage
affidavit [of reappearance] or by court would be considered void for being bigamous
action[.]" 53 "Since the second marriage has under Article 35 (4) of the Family Code. This is
been contracted because of a presumption because the circumstances lack the element of
that the former spouse is dead, such "well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the
presumption continues inspite of the spouse's Family Code, which is essential for the
physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, exception to the rule against bigamous
he or she must still be regarded as legally an marriages to apply. 59
absentee until the subsequent marriage is
The provision on reappearance in the Family
terminated as provided by law." 54 Code as a remedy to effect the termination of
the subsequent marriage does not preclude
the spouse who was declared presumptively
dead from availing other remedies existing in nullity/annulment of the first marriage, and
law. This court had, in fact, recognized that a the merits of the petition.
subsequent marriage may also be terminated
by filing "an action in court to prove the SO ORDERED.
reappearance of the absentee and obtain a Carpio, Del Castillo, Mendoza and Perlas-
declaration of dissolution or termination of the Bernabe, * JJ., concur.
subsequent marriage." 60 STIEHc
CA Disposition III
On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
disposing as follows: ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF
Annulment of Judgment is hereby DENIED. PETITIONER IN HIS SHARE OF THE
The Court AFFIRMS in toto the Decision CONJUGAL ASSETS. 29
(dated November 25, 2005) of the Regional
Trial Court (Branch 254), in Las Pias City, in Our Ruling
Civil Case No. LP-00-0132. No costs. 27 I. The stringent rules of procedures may
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the be relaxed to serve the demands of substantial
wrong remedy by filing the extraordinary justice and in the Court's exercise of equity
remedy of petition for annulment of judgment. jurisdiction.
Said the appellate court: Generally, an appeal taken either to the
It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning Supreme Court or the CA by the wrong or
the propriety of the decision rendered by the inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. 30
lower Court. But the remedy assuming there This is to prevent the party from benefiting
was a mistake is not a Petition for Annulment from one's neglect and mistakes. However, like
of Judgment but an ordinary appeal. An error most rules, it carries certain exceptions. After
of judgment may be reversed or corrected only all, the ultimate purpose of all rules of
by appeal. TCIHSa procedures is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible. 31 ACaTIc
What petitioner is ascribing is an error of
judgment, not of jurisdiction, which is Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a
properly the subject of an ordinary appeal. last remedy. It can not be resorted to if the
ordinary remedies are available or no longer
In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of available through no fault of petitioner. 32
the lower court but he claims excess in the However, in Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals, 33
exercise thereof. "Excess" assuming there was this Court clarified the proper appreciation for
is not covered by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of technical rules of procedure, in this wise:
Civil Procedure. The Rule refers the lack of
jurisdiction and not the exercise thereof. 28 Rules of procedures are intended to promote,
not to defeat, substantial justice and,
Issues therefore, they should not be applied in a very
rigid and technical sense. The exception is
Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse that while the Rules are liberally construed,
via Rule 45, assigning to the CA the following the provisions with respect to the rules on the
errors: manner and periods for perfecting appeals are
strictly applied. As an exception to the resolutions of CSC is by a petition for review."
exception, these rules have sometimes been 40
relaxed on equitable considerations. Also, in
some cases the Supreme Court has given due This Court granted Nerves petition and held
course to an appeal perfected out of time that she had substantially complied with the
where a stringent application of the rules Administrative Circular. The Court stated:
would have denied it, but only when to do so That it was erroneously labeled as a petition
would serve the demands of substantial for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
justice and in the exercise of equity Court is only a minor procedural lapse, not
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 34 fatal to the appeal. . . . ADCTac
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
TDCcAE More importantly, the appeal on its face
appears to be impressed with merit. Hence,
For reasons of justice and equity, this Court the Court of Appeals should have overlooked
has allowed exceptions to the stringent rules the insubstantial defects of the petition . . . in
governing appeals. 35 It has, in the past, order to do justice to the parties concerned.
refused to sacrifice justice for technicality. 36 There is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct about
After discovering the palpable error of his procedural rules, which should be liberally
petition, Manuel seeks the indulgence of this construed in order to promote their object and
Court to consider his petition before the CA assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy,
instead as a petition for certiorari under Rule and inexpensive determination of every action
65. or proceeding. As it has been said, where the
rigid application of the rules would frustrate
A perusal of the said petition reveals that substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a
Manuel imputed grave abuse of discretion to legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in
the lower court for annulling his marriage on exempting a particular case from the
account of his alleged homosexuality. This is operation of the rules. 41 (Underscoring
not the first time that this Court is faced with supplied)
a similar situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service
Commission, 37 petitioner Delia R. Nerves Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v.
elevated to the CA a Civil Service Commission Dumarpa, 42 petitioner Joy G. Tan availed of
(CSC) decision suspending her for six (6) a wrong remedy by filing a petition for review
months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public on certiorari instead of a motion for new trial
school teacher, is deemed to have already or an ordinary appeal. In the interest of
served her six-month suspension during the justice, this Court considered the petition, pro
pendency of the case. Nevertheless, she is hac vice, as a petition for certiorari under Rule
ordered reinstated without back wages. On 65. DEHaAS
appeal, Nerves stated in her petition, inter This Court found that based on Tan's
alia: CcADHI allegations, the trial court prima facie
1. This is a petition for certiorari filed committed grave abuse of discretion in
pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7 of the rendering a judgment by default. If
Constitution of the Philippines and under Rule uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great
65 of the Rules of Court. injustice. The Court elucidated in this wise:
2. But per Supreme Court Revised Indeed, where as here, there is a strong
Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised showing that grave miscarriage of justice
Circular No. 1-91) petitioner is filing the would result from the strict application of the
instant petition with this Honorable Court Rules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in
instead of the Supreme Court. 38 the interest of substantial justice. 43
(Underscoring supplied) (Underscoring supplied)
The CA dismissed Nerves' petition for Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice
certiorari for being the wrong remedy or the will be better served by giving due course to
inappropriate mode of appeal. 39 The CA the present petition and treating petitioner's
opined that "under the Supreme Court CA petition as one for certiorari under Rule
Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 . . . 65, considering that what is at stake is the
appeals from judgments or final orders or validity or non-validity of a marriage.
In Salazar v. Court of Appeals, 44 citing Labad regarded as an act of his client. However,
v. University of Southeastern Philippines, this where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance,
Court reiterated: negligence and dereliction of duty, which
resulted in the client's being held liable for
. . . The dismissal of appeals on purely damages in a damage suit, the client is
technical grounds is frowned upon. While the deprived of his day in court and the judgment
right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural may be set aside on such ground. In the
right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our instant case, higher interests of justice and
judicial system and courts should proceed equity demand that petitioners be allowed to
with caution so as not to deprive a party of the present evidence on their defense. Petitioners
right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every may not be made to suffer for the lawyer's
party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for mistakes. This Court will always be disposed
the proper and just disposition of his cause, to grant relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy,
free from the constraints of technicalities. 45 fraud, reckless inattention and downright
cSATDC incompetence of lawyers, which has the
Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a consequence of depriving their clients, of their
court to excuse a technical lapse and afford day in court. 49 (Emphasis supplied)
the parties a review of the case on the merits EcHaAC
to attain the ends of justice. 46 Clearly, this Court has the power to except a
Furthermore, it was the negligence and particular case from the operation of the rule
incompetence of Manuel's counsel that whenever the demands of justice require it.
prejudiced his right to appeal. His counsel, With more conviction should it wield such
Atty. Christine Dugenio, repeatedly availed of power in a case involving the sacrosanct
inappropriate remedies. After the denial of her institution of marriage. This Court is guided
notice of appeal, she failed to move for with the thrust of giving a party the fullest
reconsideration or new trial at the first opportunity to establish the merits of one's
instance. She also erroneously filed a petition action. 50
for annulment of judgment rather than pursue The client was likewise spared from counsel's
an ordinary appeal. negligence in Government Service Insurance
These manifest errors were clearly indicative System v. Bengson Commercial Buildings, Inc.
of counsel's incompetence. These gravely 51 and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon. 52 Said
worked to the detriment of Manuel's appeal. the Court in Bengson:
True it is that the negligence of counsel binds But if under the circumstances of the case,
the client. Still, this Court has recognized the rule deserts its proper office as an aid to
certain exceptions: (1) where reckless or gross justice and becomes a great hindrance and
negligence of counsel deprives the client of chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to
due process of law; (2) when its application admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a
will result in outright deprivation of the miscarriage of justice. In other words, the
client's liberty and property; or (3) where the court has the power to except a particular
interest of justice so require. 47 AEIHaS case from the operation of the rule whenever
The negligence of Manuel's counsel falls under the purposes of justice require it. 53 cEDIAa
the exceptions. Ultimately, the reckless or II. Concealment of homosexuality is the
gross negligence of petitioner's former counsel proper ground to annul a marriage, not
led to the loss of his right to appeal. He should homosexuality per se.
not be made to suffer for his counsel's grave
mistakes. Higher interests of justice and Manuel is a desperate man determined to
equity demand that he be allowed to ventilate salvage what remains of his marriage.
his case in a higher court. Persistent in his quest, he fought back all the
heavy accusations of incapacity, cruelty, and
In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 48 doubted masculinity thrown at him.
this Court explained thus:
The trial court declared that Leonida's petition
It is settled that the negligence of counsel for nullity had "no basis at all because the
binds the client. This is based on the rule that supporting grounds relied upon can not
any act performed by a counsel within the legally make a case under Article 36 of the
scope of his general or implied authority is
Family Code". It went further by citing during his marriage with plaintiff, the smoke
Republic v. Molina: 54 of doubt about his real preference continued
and even got thicker, reason why obviously
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting defendant failed to establish a happy and solid
personalities, irreconcilable differences, family; and in so failing, plaintiff and their
incessant quarrels and/or beatings, children became his innocent and unwilling
unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices, victims. cTEICD
abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or
failure in the performance of some marital Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if,
obligations do not suffice to establish like herein defendant, he is meticulous over
psychological incapacity. 55 EcaDCI even small details in the house (sic) like
wrongly folded bed sheets, etc. or if a man is
If so, the lower court should have dismissed more authoritative in knowing what clothes or
outright the petition for not meeting the jewelry shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN, 15
guidelines set in Molina. What Leonida December 2003); but these admissions of
attempted to demonstrate were Manuel's defendant taken in the light of evidence
homosexual tendencies by citing overt acts presented apparently showing that he had
generally predominant among homosexual extra fondness of his male friends (sic) to the
individuals. 56 She wanted to prove that the extent that twice on separate occasions (pp. 4-
perceived homosexuality rendered Manuel 7, TSN, 14 February 2001) he was allegedly
incapable of fulfilling the essential marital seen by plaintiff kissing another man lips-to-
obligations. lips plus the homosexual magazines and tapes
But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial likewise allegedly discovered underneath his
court nullified the marriage between Manuel bed (Exhibits "L" and "M"), the doubt as to his
and Leonida on the ground of vitiated consent real sex identity becomes stronger. The
by virtue of fraud. In support of its conclusion, accusation of plaintiff versus thereof of
the lower court reasoned out: defendant may be the name of the game in
this case; but the simple reason of
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 professional rivalry advanced by the defendant
December 2003), when there is smoke surely is certainly not enough to justify and obscure
there is fire. Although vehemently denied by the question why plaintiff should accuse him
defendant, there is preponderant evidence of such a very untoward infidelity at the
enough to establish with certainty that expense and humiliation of their children and
defendant is really a homosexual. This is the family as a whole. 57 CaATDE
fact that can be deduced from the totality of
the marriage life scenario of herein parties. Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to
substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a
Before his marriage, defendant knew very well homosexual and that he concealed this to
that people around him even including his Leonida at the time of their marriage. The
own close friends doubted his true sexual lower court considered the public perception
preference (TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December of Manuel's sexual preference without the
2000; pp. 73-75, 15 December 2003). After corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took
receiving many forewarnings, plaintiff told cognizance of Manuel's peculiarities and
defendant about the rumor she heard but interpreted it against his sexuality.
defendant did not do anything to prove to the
whole world once and for all the truth of all Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that
his denials. Defendant threatened to sue those Manuel is a homosexual, the lower court
people but nothing happened after that. There cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his
may have been more important matters to marriage with Leonida. The law is clear a
attend to than to waste time and effort filing marriage may be annulled when the consent
cases against and be effected by these people of either party was obtained by fraud, 58 such
and so, putting more premiums on as concealment of homosexuality. 59 Nowhere
defendant's denials, plaintiff just the same in the said decision was it proven by
married him. Reasons upon reasons may be preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a
advanced to either exculpate or nail to the homosexual at the onset of his marriage and
cross defendant for his act of initially that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife.
concealing his homosexuality to plaintiff, but 60 It is the concealment of homosexuality, and
in the end, only one thing is certain even not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the
consent of the innocent party. Such
concealment presupposes bad faith and intent However, although there may be similar
to defraud the other party in giving consent to sentiments here in the Philippines, the legal
the marriage. aAcDSC overtones are significantly different. Divorce is
not recognized in the country. Homosexuality
Consent is an essential requisite of a valid and its alleged incompatibility to a healthy
marriage. To be valid, it must be freely given heterosexual life are not sanctioned as
by both parties. An allegation of vitiated grounds to sever the marriage bond in our
consent must be proven by preponderance of jurisdiction. At most, it is only a ground to
evidence. The Family Code has enumerated an separate from bed and board.
exclusive list of circumstances 61 constituting
fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among What was proven in the hearings a quo was a
those cited, but its concealment. relatively blissful marital union for more than
eleven (11) years, which produced three (3)
This distinction becomes more apparent when children. The burden of proof to show the
we go over the deliberations 62 of the nullity of the marriage rests on Leonida.
Committees on the Civil Code and Family Law, Sadly, she failed to discharge this onus.
to wit:
The same failure to prove fraud which
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground purportedly resulted to a vitiated marital
should be eliminated in the provision on the consent was found in Villanueva v. Court of
grounds for legal separation. Dean Gupit, Appeals. 68 In Villanueva, instead of proving
however, pointed out that in Article 46, they vitiation of consent, appellant resorted to
are talking only of "concealment", while in the baseless portrayals of his wife as a perpetrator
article on legal separation, there is actuality. of fraudulent schemes. Said the Court:
Judge Diy added that in legal separation, the CITaSA
ground existed after the marriage, while in
Article 46, the ground existed at the time of Factual findings of the Court of Appeals,
the marriage. Justice Reyes suggested that, especially if they coincide with those of the
for clarity, they add the phrase "existing at the trial court, as in the instant case, are
time of the marriage" at the end of generally binding on this Court. We affirm the
subparagraph (4). The Committee approved findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner
the suggestion. 63 ASEcHI freely and voluntarily married private
respondent and that no threats or
To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a intimidation, duress or violence compelled him
ground for legal separation. It is its to do so, thus
concealment that serves as a valid ground to
annul a marriage. 64 Concealment in this Appellant anchored his prayer for the
case is not simply a blanket denial, but one annulment of his marriage on the ground that
that is constitutive of fraud. It is this he did not freely consent to be married to the
fundamental element that respondent failed to appellee. He cited several incidents that
prove. created on his mind a reasonable and well-
grounded fear of an imminent and grave
In the United States, homosexuality has been danger to his life and safety. . . .
considered as a basis for divorce. It indicates
that questions of sexual identity strike so The Court is not convinced that appellant's
deeply at one of the basic elements of apprehension of danger to his person is so
marriage, which is the exclusive sexual bond overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to
between the spouses. 65 In Crutcher v. enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It
Crutcher, 66 the Court held: is not disputed that at the time he was
allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here a security guard in a bank. Given the
are an infamous indignity to the wife, and rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least,
which would make the marriage relation so the proper way to keep himself out of harm's
revolting to her that it would become way. . . . aTcSID
impossible for her to discharge the duties of a
wife, and would defeat the whole purpose of Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his
the relation. In the natural course of things, marriage, as he was made to believe by
they would cause mental suffering to the appellee that the latter was pregnant with his
extent of affecting her health. 67 SITCEA child when they were married. Appellant's
excuse that he could not have impregnated
the appellee because he did not have an disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, However, the transaction shall be construed
and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is as a continuing offer on the part of the
bereft of any reference to his inability to consenting spouse and the third person, and
copulate with the appellee. . . . may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or
xxx xxx xxx authorization by the court before the offer is
. . . The failure to cohabit becomes relevant withdrawn by either or both offerors.
only if it arises as a result of the perpetration SDATEc
of any of the grounds for annulling the A similar provision, Article 124 72 prescribes
marriage, such as lack of parental consent, joint administration and enjoyment in a
insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue regime of conjugal partnership. In a valid
influence . . . . Since the appellant failed to marriage, both spouses exercise
justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee administration and enjoyment of the property
on any of these grounds, the validity of his regime, jointly.
marriage must be upheld. 69
In the case under review, the RTC decreed a
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse dissolution of the community property of
of discretion, not only by solely taking into Manuel and Leonida. In the same breath, the
account petitioner's homosexuality per se and trial court forfeited Manuel's share in favor of
not its concealment, but by declaring the the children. Considering that the marriage is
marriage void from its existence. CacTSI upheld valid and subsisting, the dissolution
This Court is mindful of the constitutional and forfeiture of Manuel's share in the
policy to protect and strengthen the family as property regime is unwarranted. They remain
the basic autonomous social institution and the joint administrators of the community
marriage as the foundation of the family. 70 property.
The State and the public have vital interest in WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
the maintenance and preservation of these appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET
social institutions against desecration by ASIDE and the petition in the trial court to
fabricated evidence. 71 Thus, any doubt annul the marriage is DISMISSED. HSaEAD
should be resolved in favor of the validity of
marriage. SO ORDERED.
As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio Before this Court is a Petition for Review
for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage seeking the reversal of the Decision 1 of the
to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such action Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No.
became moot and academic upon the death of the 59400 which affirmed in toto the Decision of
latter, and there could be no further interest in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 41,
continuing the same after her demise, that Dagupan City granting the petition for legal
automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any separation filed by herein respondent, as well
property rights acquired by either party as a result as the Resolution 2 of the CA dated April 26,
of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6
2002 which denied petitioner's motion for
could be resolved and determined in a proper
reconsideration. DCScaT
action for partition by either the appellee or by the
heirs of the appellant.
Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were
been void ab initio but only voidable under Article married on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin
83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the Church in Manila. They have three children:
second marriage had been contracted with the first Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are
wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive now all of the age of majority. 3
years, or when she had been generally believed
dead, still the action for annulment became On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint
extinguished as soon as one of the three persons for Legal Separation under Article 55 par. (1)
involved had died, as provided in Article 87, of the Family Code 4 before the Regional Trial
paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 41
for annulment should be brought during the alleging that her life with William was marked
lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And
by physical violence, threats, intimidation and
furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal
grossly abusive conduct. 5
partnership that might have resulted from such
voidable marriage must be carried out "in the
Lucita claimed that: soon after three years of
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased
marriage, she and William quarreled almost
spouse", as expressly provided in Section 2 of the
Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment every day, with physical violence being
proceeding. inflicted upon her; William would shout
invectives at her like "putang ina mo", "gago",
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the "tanga", and he would slap her, kick her, pull
Manila Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations is her hair, bang her head against concrete wall
hereby affirmed. No special pronouncement as to
and throw at her whatever he could reach
costs.
with his hand; the causes of these fights were
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, petty things regarding their children or their
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and business; William would also scold and beat
Makasiar, JJ., concur. the children at different parts of their bodies
using the buckle of his belt; whenever she
tried to stop William from hitting the children,
he would turn his ire on her and box her; on
December 9, 1995, after she protested with
William's decision to allow their eldest son
Kingston to go to Bacolod, William slapped her
and said, "it is none of your business"; on
December 14, 1995, she asked William to
bring Kingston back from Bacolod; a violent
quarrel ensued and William hit her on her
head, left cheek, eye, stomach, and arms;
when William hit her on the stomach and she insulting words and language were heaped
bent down because of the pain, he hit her on upon her. The plaintiff suffered and endured
the head then pointed a gun at her and asked the mental and physical anguish of these
her to leave the house; she then went to her marital fights until December 14, 1995 when
sister's house in Binondo where she was she had reached the limits of her endurance.
fetched by her other siblings and brought to The more than twenty years of her marriage
their parents house in Dagupan; the following could not have been put to waste by the
day, she went to her parent's doctor, Dr. plaintiff if the same had been lived in an
Vicente Elinzano for treatment of her injuries. atmosphere of love, harmony and peace.
6 Worst, their children are also suffering. As
very well stated in plaintiff's memorandum, "it
William for his part denied that he ever would be unthinkable for her to throw away
inflicted physical harm on his wife, used this twenty years of relationship, abandon the
insulting language against her, or whipped the comforts of her home and be separated from
children with the buckle of his belt. While he her children, whom she loves, if there exists
admits that he and Lucita quarreled on no cause, which is already beyond her
December 9, 1995, at their house in Jose endurance. 9
Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila, he
claimed that he left the same, stayed in their William appealed to the CA which affirmed in
Greenhills condominium and only went back toto the RTC decision. In its Decision dated
to their Tondo house to work in their office October 8, 2001, the CA found that the
below. In the afternoon of December 14, 1995, testimonies for Lucita were straightforward
their laundrywoman told him that Lucita left and credible and the ground for legal
the house. 7 separation under Art. 55, par. 1 of the Family
Code, i.e., physical violence and grossly
On January 5, 1998, the RTC rendered its abusive conduct directed against Lucita, were
Decision decreeing legal separation, thus: adequately proven. 10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment As the CA explained:
is hereby rendered decreeing the legal
separation of plaintiff and defendant, with all The straightforward and candid testimonies of
the legal effects attendant thereto, particularly the witnesses were uncontroverted and
the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal credible. Dr. Elinzano's testimony was able to
partnership properties, for which purpose the show that the [Lucita] suffered several injuries
parties are hereby ordered to submit a inflicted by [William]. It is clear that on
complete inventory of said properties so that December 14, 1995, she sustained redness in
the Court can make a just and proper her cheek, black eye on her left eye, fist blow
division, such division to be embodied in a on the stomach, blood clot and a blackish
supplemental decision. ISTCHE discoloration on both shoulders and a "bump"
or "bukol" on her head. The presence of these
SO ORDERED. 8 injuries was established by the testimonies of
The RTC found that: [Lucita] herself and her sister, Linda Lim. The
Memorandum/Medical Certificate also
It is indubitable that plaintiff (Lucita) and confirmed the evidence presented and does
defendant (William) had their frequent not deviate from the doctor's main testimony
quarrels and misunderstanding which made that [Lucita] suffered physical violence on
both of their lives miserable and hellish. This [sic] the hands of her husband, caused by
is even admitted by the defendant when he physical trauma, slapping of the cheek, boxing
said that there was no day that he did not and fist blows. The effect of the so-called
quarrel with his wife. Defendant had regarded alterations in the Memorandum/Medical
the plaintiff negligent in the performance of Certificate questioned by [William] does not
her wifely duties and had blamed her for not depart from the main thrust of the testimony
reporting to him about the wrongdoings of of the said doctor.
their children. (citations omitted)
Also, the testimony of [Lucita] herself
These quarrels were always punctuated by consistently and constantly established that
acts of physical violence, threats and [William] inflicted repeated physical violence
intimidation by the defendant against the upon her during their marriage and that she
plaintiff and on the children. In the process, had been subjected to grossly abusive conduct
when he constantly hurled invectives at her CONJUGAL PROPERTIES AND TO TRANSFER
even in front of their customers and THE SAME TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S
employees, shouting words like, "gaga", FAMILY.
"putang ina mo," tanga," and "you don't know
anything." II
On January 31, 2001, the Court denied We were not convinced that Potenciano
Erlinda Ilusorio's manifestation and motion Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to choose
praying that Potenciano Ilusorio be produced whether to see his wife or not. Again, this is a
before the Court and be medically examined question of fact that has been decided in the
by a team of medical experts appointed by the Court of Appeals.
Court. 11
As to whether the children were in fact taking
On March 27, 2001, we denied with finality control of the corporation, these are matters
Erlinda's motion to reconsider the Court's that may be threshed out in a separate
order of January 31 , 2001. 12 proceeding, irrelevant in habeas corpus.
The issues raised by Erlinda K. Ilusorio in her Third. Petitioner failed to sufficiently convince
motion for reconsideration are mere the Court why we should not rely on the facts
reiterations of her arguments that have been found by the Court of Appeals. Erlinda
resolved in the decision. claimed that the facts mentioned in the
decision were erroneous and incomplete. We
Nevertheless, for emphasis, we shall discuss see no reason why the High Court of the land
the issues thus: need go to such length. The hornbook doctrine
First. Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed that she was states that findings of fact of the lower courts
not compelling Potenciano to live with her in are conclusive on the Supreme Court. 17 We
consortium and that Potenciano's mental state emphasize, it is not for the Court to weigh
evidence all over again. 18 Although there are
was not an issue. However, the very root
cause of the entire petition is her desire to exceptions to the rule, 19 Erlinda failed to
have her husband's custody. 13 Clearly, show that this is an exceptional instance.
Erlinda cannot now deny that she wanted Fourth. Erlinda states that Article XII of the
Potenciano Ilusorio to live with her. 1987 Constitution and Articles 68 and 69 of
Second. One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio the Family Code support her position that as
sought custody of her husband was that spouses, they (Potenciano and Erlinda) are
respondents Lin and Sylvia were illegally duty bound to live together and care for each
other. We agree.
restraining Potenciano Ilusorio to fraudulently
deprive her of property rights out of pure The law provides that the husband and the
greed. 14 She claimed that her two children wife are obliged to live together, observe
were using their sick and frail father to sign mutual love, respect and fidelity. 20 The
away Potenciano and Erlinda's property to sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual
companies controlled by Lin and Sylvia. She affection between husband and wife and not
also argued that since Potenciano retired as
any legal mandate or court order" to enforce EN BANC
consortium. 21
[G.R. No. 182894. April 22, 2014.]
Obviously, there was absence of empathy
between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, FE FLORO VALINO, petitioner, vs.
having separated from bed and board since ROSARIO D. ADRIANO, FLORANTE D.
1972. We defined empathy as a shared feeling ADRIANO, RUBEN D. ADRIANO, MARIA
between husband and wife experienced not TERESA ADRIANO ONGOCO, VICTORIA
only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy ADRIANO BAYONA, and LEAH ANTONETTE
but a deep sense of spiritual communion. D. ADRIANO, respondents.
Marital union is a two-way process. DECISION
Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who MENDOZA, J p:
view the relationship with "amor gignit
amorem" respect, sacrifice and a continuing Challenged in this petition is the October 2,
commitment to togetherness, conscious of its 2006 Decision 1 and the May 9, 2008
value as a sublime social institution. 22 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 61613, which reversed the
On June 28, 2001, Potenciano Ilusorio gave October 1, 1998 Decision 3 of the Regional
his soul to the Almighty, his Creator and Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City (RTC)
Supreme Judge. Let his soul rest in peace and which ruled that petitioner Fe Floro Valino
his survivors continue the much prolonged (Valino) was entitled to the remains of the
fracas ex aequo et bono. cCHETI decedent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we DENY Erlinda's The Facts:
motion for reconsideration. At any rate, the
case has been rendered moot by the death of Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano), a
subject. partner in the Pelaez Adriano and Gregorio
Law Office, married respondent Rosario
SO ORDERED. Adriano (Rosario) on November 15, 1955. The
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares- couple had two (2) sons, Florante and Ruben
Santiago, JJ., concur. Adriano; three (3) daughters, Rosario, Victoria
and Maria Teresa; and one (1) adopted
daughter, Leah Antonette. HSTAcI
The testimony of defendant-appellee Fe Floro The trial court found that there was good faith
Valino that it was the oral wish of Atty. on the part of defendant-appellee Fe Floro
Adriano Adriano that he be interred at the Valino, who, having lived with Atty. Adriano
Floro family's mausoleum at the Manila after he was separated in fact from his wife,
Memorial Park, must bend to the provisions of lovingly and caringly took care of the well-
the law. Even assuming arguendo that it was being of Atty. Adriano Adriano * while he was
the express wish of the deceased to be interred alive and even took care of his remains when
at the Manila Memorial Park, still, the law he had died.
grants the duty and the right to decide what to On the issue of damages, plaintiffs-appellants
do with the remains to the wife, in this case, are not entitled to actual damages. Defendant-
plaintiff-appellant Rosario D. Adriano, as the appellee Fe Floro Valino had all the good
surviving spouse, and not to defendant- intentions in giving the remains of Atty.
appellee Fe Floro Valino, who is not even in Adriano a decent burial when the wife and
the list of those legally preferred, despite the family were all in the United States and could
fact that her intentions may have been very not attend to his burial. Actual damages are
commendable. The law does not even consider those awarded in satisfaction of, or in
the emotional fact that husband and wife had, recompense for, loss or injury sustained. To
in this case at bench, been separated-in-fact be recoverable, they must not only be capable
and had been living apart for more than 30 of proof but must actually be proven with a
years. 12 aEHIDT reasonable degree of certainty. In this case at
As for Valino's contention that there is no bench, there was no iota of evidence presented
point in exhuming and transferring the to justify award of actual damages. EADCHS
remains of Atty. Adriano, it should be said Plaintiffs-appellants are not also entitled to
that the burial of his remains in a place other moral and exemplary damages. Moral
than the Adriano family plot in Novaliches damages may be recovered only if the plaintiff
runs counter to the wishes of his family. It is able to satisfactorily prove the existence of
does not only violate their right provided by the factual basis for the damages and its
law, but it also disrespects the family because causal connection with the acts complained of
the remains of the patriarch are buried in the because moral damages although incapable of
family plot of his live-in partner. pecuniary estimation are designed not to
impose a penalty but to compensate for injury
sustained and actual damages suffered. No spouse. This case is about which between
injury was caused to plaintiffs-appellants, nor them knows his wishes.
was any intended by anyone in this case.
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, may Therefore, I respectfully disagree with the
only be awarded if claimant is able to ponencia in denying this petition.
establish his right to moral, temperate, I vote to set aside the decision of the Court of
liquidated or compensatory damages. Appeals dated October 2, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV
Unfortunately, neither of the requirements to No. 61613, which directs petitioner Fe to have
sustain an award for either of these damages the remains of Atty. Lope Adriano exhumed,
would appear to have been adequately and orders respondents to transfer, transport,
established by plaintiffs-appellants. and inter, at their expense, the remains of the
As regards the award of attorney's fees, it is decedent from Manila Memorial Park to the
an accepted doctrine that the award thereof as family plot in Holy Cross Memorial Park in
an item of damages is the exception rather Novaliches, Quezon City. I vote to sustain the
than the rule, and counsel's fees are not to be decision dated October 1, 1998, of the
awarded every time a party wins a suit. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
power of the court to award attorney's fees 77 in Civil Case No. Q-93-15288, dismissing
under Article 2208 of the New Civil Code respondents' complaint for damages. ScHAIT
demands factual, legal and equitable I disagree with the position that in the
justification, without which the award is a determination of how Atty. Adriano should be
conclusion without a premise, its basis being buried, "the law gives the right and duty to
improperly left to speculation and conjecture. make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she
In this case, we have searched but found being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano,"
nothing in plaintiffs-appellants' suit that 1 in accordance with Article 305 2 of the Civil
justifies the award of attorney's fees. 14 Code in relation to Article 199 3 of the Family
Finally, it should be said that controversies as Code.
to who should make arrangements for the I am of the opinion that Article 305 should
funeral of a deceased have often aggravated only be considered when, first, the deceased
the bereavement of the family and disturbed left no explicit instructions on how he wishes
the proper solemnity which should prevail at to be interred, and second, when none among
every funeral. It is for the purpose of the deceased's surviving relations are willing
preventing such controversies that the Code to make the funeral arrangements and a
Commission saw it best to include the conflict arises. In these situations, the conflict
provisions on "Funerals." 15 must be settled according to the order of
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. preference stated in Article 199. In any other
case, it should be the express wishes of the
SO ORDERED. deceased which should take precedence.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo- This view, in fact, is embodied in Article 307 of
de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del the Civil Code, which states:
Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes and
Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur. Article 307. The funeral shall be in
accordance with the expressed wishes of the
Abad, J., I join Justice Leonen's dissent. deceased. In the absence of such
expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation
Leonen, J., I dissent. See separate opinion. shall determine the funeral rites. In case of
Separate Opinions doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided
upon by the person obliged to make
LEONEN, J., dissenting: arrangements for the same, after consulting
the other members of the family. (Emphasis
We will all die. But what may matter to many supplied)
of us is how we live and how our life is kept in
the memories of those we leave behind. This It is the ponencia's opinion that the wishes of
case is not about whether a common-law wife the deceased contemplated in Article 307 only
has more rights over the corpse of the governs the "form of the funeral" and that the
husband than the latter's estranged legal duty and, more specifically, the right to make
arrangements for the funeral remains with the
persons specified in Article 305 in relation to impediment which disqualified him from even
Article 199. It is my submission, however, that legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI
Article 307 should be interpreted to mean that of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras,
the right to determine one's funeral, including interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code
the right to determine how and where one (Support of Surviving Spouse and Children
wishes to be buried, remains with the During Liquidation of Inventoried Property)
deceased, and it is only in the absence of his stated: "Be it noted however that with respect
express wishes, or in the absence of his to 'spouse', the same must be the legitimate
religious beliefs and affiliations, or if there is 'spouse' (not common-law spouses. . .)."
doubt as to his wishes, that other persons
may assume the right to decide the funeral There is a view that under Article 332 of the
arrangements. Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse"
embraces common law relation for purposes of
This right, like other rights pointed out by the exemption from criminal liability in cases of
ponencia, 4 must not be considered waived or theft, swindling and malicious mischief
renounced except upon clear and satisfactory committed or caused mutually by spouses.
proof of conduct indicative of a free and The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no
voluntary intent to that end. There is neither distinction between a couple whose
indication nor have there been any allegations cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or
that Atty. Adriano did not freely and legal tie and another who are husband and
voluntarily relay his last wishes to his wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply
common-law wife, petitioner Fe. Atty. Adriano, to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that
therefore, did not waive his right to determine the provisions of the Civil Code, unless
where he should be buried, in favor of the expressly providing to the contrary as in
persons indicated in Article 305 in relation to Article 144, when referring to a "spouse"
Article 199. CTEacH contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse.
Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a
Accordingly, it was improper to cite in the lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was
ponencia Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v. Judge Velez. 5 not legally capacitated to marry her in her
In Eugenio, Tomas Eugenio, Sr. claimed the lifetime. 6
right to bury his common-law wife, arguing
that he should be considered a "spouse" under In the present case, petitioner Fe has not
Article 305 in relation to Article 199. The asserted that she be considered a "spouse"
assertion led this court to expound on the under Article 305 in relation to Article 199
interpretation of Article 305 in relation to with the right and the duty to make funeral
Article 199 and conclude that: arrangements for Atty. Adriano. What she
asserts is that she was Atty. Adriano's
. . . . Indeed, Philippine Law does not constant companion for a long time who was
recognize common law marriages. A man and constantly by his side, showing him the love
woman not legally married who cohabit for and devotion as a wife would have, who took
many years as husband and wife, who care of him in his final moments and gave him
represent themselves to the public as a proper burial. As such, there is a
husband and wife, and who are reputed to be presumption that she would be in the best
husband and wife in the community where position to relay his final wishes. DaScAI
they live may be considered legally "married"
in common law jurisdictions but not in the The trial court in its decision dated October 1,
Philippines. 1998 reached the same conclusion, thus:
While it is true that our laws do not just brush Atty. Lope Adriano's wish was established at
aside the fact that such relationships are the trial and shown in the following testimony
present in our society, and that they produce of the defendant, to wit:
a community of properties and interests which
is governed by law, authority exists in case "ATTY. PIZARRAS:
law to the effect that such form of co- Madam witness, what was the wish of
ownership requires that the man and woman Atty. Lope Adriano regarding his burial?
living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage. In any WITNESS:
case, herein petitioner has a subsisting
marriage with another woman, a legal
He wanted to be buried at Manila grants us the autonomy or the space to define
Memorial. who we are. Upon our death, the law does not
cease to respect our earned autonomy. Rather,
Q: Why do you say that? it gives space for us to speak through the
A: We have discussed it long before. agency of she who may have sat at our
bedside as we suffered through a lingering
Q: When did you first discuss this? illness. HDIaET
A: The first time we went to Manila I am of the view that it is that love and caring
Memorial. He wanted that his lawn type lot be which should be rewarded with the honor of
upgraded to estate type. He doesn't want that putting us in that place where we mark our
people will step on his grave. physical presence for the last time and where
we will be eternally remembered.
Q: What happened to this request if his
lawn type lot to be upgraded to estate type? ACCORDINGLY, the petition should be
GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
A: It did not take long. I had it upgraded." Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61613, reversing
(TSN, May 7, 1997, pp. 4-5; the October 1, 1998 decision of the Regional
underscoring supplied) Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City, must be
SET ASIDE.
This crucial fact remained unrefuted.
The petition before us raises both questions of Q: You and your wife acquired that piece
fact and of law. Whether petitioner bank is a of land?
mortgagee in good faith and for value and
whether the subject property was conjugal, A: Yes, sir.
are factual issues that this Court cannot look xxx xxx xxx
into as our examination would entail going
into factual matters and records of the case. Q: May we know from you[,] Mr. Witness,
In Rule 45 petitions, only questions of law how did you acquire this parcel of land
may be put into issue. Questions of fact presently embraced and covered by TCT No. T-
cannot be entertained. 5 EITcaD 44422?
Although there are exceptions to the rule that A: I purchased that piece of land from the
only questions of law may be raised in a Baniqued Family during my incumbency as
petition for certiorari, the petitioner bank Municipal Mayor, sir.
failed to show that this case falls under any of
the established exceptions. Too, since the CA Q: What was your civil status at the time
partially affirmed the findings of the trial court you purchased that piece of land?
and absent any indication that these courts
A: I was already married, sir. (Emphasis
committed a serious error in its findings, this ours, TSN, July 24, 1997, Jose Garcia Sr.) 7
Court is bound by these courts' findings. 6
Because of the petitioner bank's failure to
Moreover, even if we were to review the factual rebut the allegation that the subject property
issues raised by the petitioner bank, we still
was acquired during the former's marriage to
find no reason to depart from the CA's ruling. Ligaya, the legal presumption of the conjugal
DSEIcT nature of the property, in line with Article 160
The Subject Property is Conjugal of the Civil Code, applies to this property.
Proof of the subject property's acquisition
a. All property acquired during during the subsistence of marriage suffices to
render the statutory presumption operative. 8
marriage is presumed conjugal CSDcTA
Since Jose Sr. and Ligaya were married prior b. Registration of the subject
to the effectivity of the Family Code, their
property relations were governed by the property in the name of one
conjugal partnership of gains as provided
under Article 119 of the Civil Code. Under spouse does not destroy the
Article 160 of the Civil Code, "all property of presumption that the property is
the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it can be proven conjugal
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife." The petitioner bank claims that the CA failed
to consider that the subject property was
In his testimony, Jose Sr. admitted that at the registered in the name of Jose Sr. alone.
time he acquired the land through sale, he Likewise, it raises the argument that Jose
was already married. The material portion of Sr.'s change of status in the subject property's
his testimony is as follows: title from "married" to "widower" prior to the
constitution of the real estate mortgage
Q: Upon the death of your wife did you
showed that the property was no longer
and your wife ever own a piece of land? conjugal.
A: Yes, sir. We do not consider this argument persuasive.
Q: Where is that land situated? Registration of a property alone in the name of
A: In Centro, District 2, Mallig[,] Isabela. one spouse does not destroy its conjugal
nature. What is material is the time when the
Q: Is that land titled in your names? property was acquired. 9 The registration of
the property is not conclusive evidence of the benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
exclusive ownership of the husband or the therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
wife. Although the property appears to be even substitute another person in its
registered in the name of the husband, it has enjoyment, except when personal rights are
the inherent character of conjugal property if involved. But the effect of the alienation of the
it was acquired for valuable consideration mortgage, with respect to the co-owners shall
during marriage. 10 It retains its conjugal be limited to the portion which may be allotted
nature. aICHEc to him in the division upon the termination of
the co-ownership." (Emphasis supplied)
In order to rebut the presumptive conjugal
nature of the property, the petitioner must Under this provision, each co-owner has the
present strong, clear and convincing evidence full ownership of his part or share in the co-
of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses. ownership and may, therefore, alienate, assign
11 The burden of proving that the property or mortgage it except when personal rights are
belongs exclusively to the wife or to the involved. Should a co-owner alienate or
husband rests upon the party asserting it. mortgage the co-owned property itself, the
alienation or mortgage shall remain valid but
In the present case, aside from its allegation only to the extent of the portion which may be
that the subject property is no longer conjugal allotted to him in the division upon the
and its assertion that it is a mortgagee in good termination of the co-ownership. 15 In
faith, the petitioner bank offered no evidence, Carvajal v. Court of Appeals, 16 the Court
convincing to this Court, that the subject said: ICcDaA
property exclusively belonged to Jose Sr. As
stated earlier, the petitioner bank failed to While under Article 493 of the New Civil Code,
overcome the legal presumption that the each co-owner shall have the full ownership of
disputed property was conjugal. Thus, the his part and of the fruits and benefits
conclusion of both lower courts that the pertaining thereto and he may alienate, assign
subject property was conjugal property holds. or mortgage it, and even substitute another
Factual findings of the CA affirming those of person in its enjoyment, the effect of the
the trial court are binding on this Court alienation or the mortgage with respect to the
unless there is a clear showing that such co-owners, shall be limited, by mandate of the
findings are tainted with arbitrariness, same article, to the portion which may be
capriciousness or palpable error. 12 aCIHcD allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. He has no
The conjugal partnership was converted right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific, or
into an implied ordinary co-ownership determinate part of the thing in common to
the exclusion of the other co-owners because
upon the death of Ligaya his right over the thing is represented by an
abstract or Ideal portion without any physical
Upon the death of Ligaya on January 21, adjudication. 3 An individual co-owner cannot
1987, the conjugal partnership was adjudicate to himself or claim title to any
automatically dissolved and terminated definite portion of the land or thing owned in
pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the Civil Code, common until its actual partition by
13 and the successional rights of her heirs agreement or judicial decree. Prior to that time
vest, as provided under Article 777 of the Civil all that the co-owner has is an Ideal or
Code, which states that "[t]he rights to the abstract quota or proportionate share in the
succession are transmitted from the moment entire thing owned in common by all the co-
of the death of the decedent." HICcSA owners. 4 What a co-owner may dispose of is
only his undivided aliquot share, which shall
Consequently, the conjugal partnership was
be limited to the portion that may be allotted
converted into an implied ordinary co-
ownership between the surviving spouse, on to him upon partition. [emphasis supplied].
the one hand, and the heirs of the deceased, AHDcCT
on the other. 14 This resulting ordinary co- In the present case, Jose Sr. constituted the
ownership among the heirs is governed by mortgage over the entire subject property after
Article 493 of the Civil Code which reads: the death of Ligaya, but before the liquidation
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full of the conjugal partnership. While under
ownership of his part and of the fruits and Article 493 of the Civil Code, even if he had
the right to freely mortgage or even sell his
undivided interest in the disputed property, he SECOND DIVISION
could not dispose of or mortgage the entire
property without his children's consent. As [G.R. No. 171904. August 7, 2013.]
correctly emphasized by the trial court, Jose BOBBY TAN, petitioner, vs. GRACE
Sr.'s right in the subject property is limited ANDRADE, PROCESO ANDRADE, JR.,
only to his share in the conjugal partnership CHARITY A. SANTIAGO, HENRY ANDRADE,
as well as his share as an heir on the other ANDREW ANDRADE, JASMIN BLAZA,
half of the estate which is his deceased GLORY ANDRADE, MIRIAM ROSE
spouse's share. Accordingly, the mortgage ANDRADE, AND JOSEPH ANDRADE,
contract is void insofar as it extends to the respondents.
undivided shares of his children (Nora, Jose
Jr., Bobby and Jimmy) because they did not [G.R. No. 172017. August 7, 2013.]
give their consent to the transaction. 17
GRACE ANDRADE, CHARITY A. SANTIAGO,
Accordingly, the Amendment of Real Estate HENRY ANDRADE, ANDREW ANDRADE,
Mortgage constituted by Jose Sr. over the JASMIN BLAZA, MIRIAM ROSE ANDRADE,
entire property without his co-owners' consent AND JOSEPH ANDRADE, petitioners, vs.
is not necessarily void in its entirety. The right BOBBY TAN, respondent.
of the petitioner bank as mortgagee is limited
though only to the portion which may be DECISION
allotted to Jose Sr. in the event of a division PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:
and liquidation of the subject property.
ACcISa Before the Court are consolidated petitions for
review on certiorari 1 assailing the Decision 2
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we
dated July 26, 2005 and Resolution 3 dated
hereby AFFIRM the Decision dated September March 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CA-G.R. CV No. 71987 which affirmed with
CV No. 71356. Costs against petitioner modification the Judgment 4 dated April 6,
Philippine National Bank.
2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
SO ORDERED. Branch 19 (RTC) in Civil Case No. CEB 20969.
DSacAE
Carpio, Del Castillo, Perez and Perlas-
Bernabe, JJ., concur. The Facts
On October 7, 1997, Rosario's children, Dissatisfied, the Andrades elevated the matter
namely, Grace, Proceso, Jr., Henry, Andrew, on appeal. IcESaA
Glory, Miriam Rose, Joseph (all surnamed
Andrade), Jasmin Blaza, and Charity A. The CA Ruling
Santiago (Andrades), filed a complaint 13 for On July 26, 2005, the CA rendered the
reconveyance and annulment of deeds of assailed Decision 21 upholding in part the
conveyance and damages against Bobby RTC's ruling.
before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.
CEB 20969. In their complaint, they alleged It found that the subject deed of sale was
that the transaction between Rosario and indeed what it purports to be, i.e., a bona fide
Bobby (subject transaction) was not one of contract of sale. In this accord, it denied the
sale but was actually an equitable mortgage Andrades' claim that the subject transaction
which was entered into to secure Rosario's was an equitable mortgage since their
indebtedness with Bobby. They also claimed allegation that the purchase price was
that since the subject properties were unusually low was left unsupported by any
inherited by them from their father, Proceso evidence. Also, their averment that they have
Andrade, Sr. (Proceso, Sr.), the subject been in continuous possession of the subject
properties were conjugal in nature, and thus, properties was belied by the testimony of
Rosario had no right to dispose of their Andrew Andrade (Andrew) who stated that
respective shares therein. In this light, they Bobby was already in possession of the same.
argued that they remained as co-owners of the 22 CaEIST
subject properties together with Bobby,
despite the issuance of the TCTs in his name. Nevertheless, the CA ruled that the subject
TaSEHD properties belong to the conjugal partnership
of Rosario and her late husband, Proceso, Sr.,
In his defense, Bobby contended that the and thus, she co-owned the same together
subject properties were solely owned by with her children, the Andrades. 23 In this
Rosario per the TCTs issued in her name 14 respect, the sale was valid only with respect to
and that he had validly acquired the same Rosario's pro-indiviso share in the subject
upon Proceso, Jr.'s failure to exercise his properties and it cannot prejudice the share of
option to buy back the subject properties. 15 the Andrades since they did not consent to the
He also interposed the defenses of prescription sale. 24 In effect, a resulting trust was created
and laches against the Andrades. 16 between Bobby and the Andrades 25 and, as
such, prescription and/or laches has yet to
The RTC Ruling set in so as to bar them from instituting the
On April 6, 2001, the RTC rendered a instant case. 26 Accordingly, the CA ordered
Judgment 17 dismissing the Andrades' Bobby to reconvey to the Andrades their share
complaint. SHAcID in the subject properties. 27 aEDCAH
It ruled that the subject transaction was a In view of the CA's pronouncement, the
bona fide sale and not an equitable mortgage parties filed their respective motions for
as can be gleaned from its terms and reconsideration. For the Andrades' part, they
conditions, noting further that the subject sought the reconsideration of the CA's finding
deed of sale was not even questioned by the as to its characterization of the subject
Andrades at the time of its execution. As transaction as one of sale, insisting that it is
Proceso, Jr. failed to exercise his option to buy actually an equitable mortgage. 28 As for
back the subject properties, the titles thereto Bobby's part, he maintained that the sale
were validly consolidated in Bobby's favor, should have covered the entirety of the subject
resulting to the issuance of TCTs in his name properties and not only Rosario's pro-indiviso
which are deemed to be conclusive proof of his share. 29 Both motions for reconsideration
ownership thereto. 18 As regards the nature of were, however, denied by the CA in a
the subject properties, the RTC found that Resolution 30 dated March 3, 2006.
Hence, the present consolidated petitions. With respect to the nature of the subject
properties, the courts a quo were at variance
Issues before the Court such that the RTC, on the one hand, ruled
The present controversy revolves around the that the said properties were exclusive
CA's characterization of the subject properties properties of Rosario, 35 while the CA, on the
as well as of the subject transaction between other hand, pronounced that they are
Rosario and Bobby. cEaCTS conjugal in nature. 36 In this regard, the
consequent course of action would be for the
In G.R. No. 172017, the Andrades submit that Court to conduct a re-examination of the
the CA erred in ruling that the subject evidence if only to determine which among the
transaction is in the nature of a sale, while in two is correct, 37 as an exception to the
G.R. No. 171904, Bobby contends that the CA proscription in Rule 45 petitions.
erred in ruling that the subject properties are
conjugal in nature. Pertinent to the resolution of this second issue
is Article 160 of the Civil Code 38 which states
The Court's Ruling that "[a]ll property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal
A. Characterization of the subject partnership, unless it be proved that it
transaction. pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife." For this presumption to apply, the party
Settled is the rule that when the trial court's invoking the same must, however,
factual findings have been affirmed by the CA, preliminarily prove that the property was
said findings are generally conclusive and indeed acquired during the marriage. As held
binding upon the Court, and may no longer be in Go v. Yamane: 39 CaHcET
reviewed on Rule 45 petitions. 31 While there
exists exceptions to this rule such as when . . . As a condition sine qua non for the
the CA's and RTC's findings are in conflict operation of [Article 160] in favor of the
with each other 32 the Court observes that conjugal partnership, the party who invokes
the presumption must first prove that the
none applies with respect to the ruling that
the subject transaction was one of sale and property was acquired during the marriage.
not an equitable mortgage. Records readily In other words, the presumption in favor of
reveal that both the RTC and the CA observed conjugality does not operate if there is no
that there is no clear and convincing evidence showing of when the property alleged to be
to show that the parties agreed upon a conjugal was acquired. Moreover, the
mortgage. Hence, absent any glaring error presumption may be rebutted only with
therein or any other compelling reason to hold strong, clear, categorical and convincing
otherwise, this finding should now be deemed evidence. There must be strict proof of the
as conclusive and perforce must stand. As exclusive ownership of one of the spouses,
echoed in the case of Ampo v. CA: 33 cAISTC and the burden of proof rests upon the party
. . . Factual findings of the Court of Appeals asserting it. 40 (Citations omitted) cIACaT
are conclusive on the parties and not Corollarily, as decreed in Valdez v. CA, 41 the
reviewable by this Court and they carry presumption under Article 160 cannot be
even more weight when the Court of Appeals made to apply where there is no showing as to
affirms the factual findings of the trial court, when the property alleged to be conjugal was
and in the absence of any showing that the acquired:
findings complained of are totally devoid of
support in the evidence on record, or that they . . . The issuance of the title in the name solely
are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute of one spouse is not determinative of the
serious abuse of discretion, such findings conjugal nature of the property, since there is
must stand. 34 no showing that it was acquired during the
marriage of the Spouses Carlos Valdez, Sr.
Consequently, the Andrades' petition in G.R. and Josefina L. Valdez. The presumption
No. 172017 must therefore be denied. Cdpr under Article 160 of the New Civil Code, that
B. Characterization of the subject property acquired during marriage is conjugal,
does not apply where there is no showing as to
properties. when the property alleged to be conjugal was
acquired. The presumption cannot prevail
when the title is in the name of only one their mother to Bobby. 51 These incidents can
spouse and the rights of innocent third parties but only lead to the conclusion that they were
are involved. Moreover, when the property is well-aware of the subject transaction and yet
registered in the name of only one spouse and only pursued their claim 14 years after the
there is no showing as to when the property sale was executed.
was acquired by same spouse, this is an
indication that the property belongs Due to the above-stated reasons, Bobby's
exclusively to the said spouse. HTcDEa petition in G.R. No. 171904 is hereby granted.
DEcSaI
In this case, there is no evidence to indicate
when the property was acquired by petitioner WHEREFORE, the Court hereby (a) GRANTS
Josefina. Thus, we agree with petitioner the petition of Bobby Tan in G.R. No. 171904;
Josefina's declaration in the deed of absolute and (b) DENIES the petition of Grace Andrade,
sale she executed in favor of the respondent Charity A. Santiago, Henry Andrade, Andrew
that she was the absolute and sole owner of Andrade, Jasmin Blaza, Miriam Rose Andrade,
the property. . . . 42 cDACST and Joseph Andrade in G.R. No. 172017.
Accordingly, the Decision dated July 26, 2005
In this case, records reveal that the conjugal and Resolution dated March 3, 2006 of the
partnership of Rosario and her husband was Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71987 are
terminated upon the latter's death on August hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
7, 1978 43 while the transfer certificates of April 6, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial
title over the subject properties were issued on Court of Cebu City, Branch 19 in Civil Case
September 28, 1979 and solely in the name of No. CEB 20969 is REINSTATED.
"Rosario Vda. de Andrade, of legal age, widow,
Filipino." 44 Other than their bare allegation, SO ORDERED. cESDCa
no evidence was adduced by the Andrades to Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Perez, JJ.,
establish that the subject properties were concur.
procured during the coverture of their parents
or that the same were bought with conjugal
funds. Moreover, Rosario's declaration that
she is the absolute owner of the disputed
parcels of land in the subject deed of sale 45
was not disputed by her son Proceso, Jr., who
was a party to the same. Hence, by virtue of
these incidents, the Court upholds the RTC's
finding 46 that the subject properties were
exclusive or sole properties of Rosario.
(c) The Affidavit of Consolidation of Hence, this petition, raising the following
Ownership executed by the defendant over the issues for this Court's consideration:
residential lot located at Brgy. San Francisco, 1. WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE
San Pablo City, covered by ARP No. 95-091- CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO
1236 entered as Doc. No. 406; Page No. 83, DAILO, JR. ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS
Book No. III, Series of 1996 of Notary Public CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS
Octavio M. Zayas. ICHAaT UNDIVIDED SHARE. ESHcTD
(d) The assessment of real property No. 95- 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONJUGAL
051-1236. PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT
2. The defendant is ordered to reconvey OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE
the property subject of this complaint to the MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING
plaintiff. REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE
FAMILY. 11
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
First, petitioner takes issue with the legal
1. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the provision applicable to the factual milieu of
sum of P40,000.00 representing the value of this case. It contends that Article 124 of the
the car which was burned. Family Code should be construed in relation
to Article 493 of the Civil Code, which states:
ON BOTH CAUSES OF ACTION
ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full
1. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the ownership of his part and of the fruits and
sum of P25,000.00 as attorney's fees; benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
2. The defendant to pay plaintiff therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its
P25,000.00 as moral damages;
enjoyment, except when personal rights are
3. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall
be limited to the portion which may be allotted
4. To pay the cost of the suit. to him in the division upon the termination of
the co-ownership.
The counterclaim is dismissed. jur2005cda
Article 124 of the Family Code provides in
SO ORDERED. 6
part:
Upon elevation of the case to the Court of
ART. 124. The administration and
Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the trial
enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
court's finding that the subject property was
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. .
conjugal in nature, in the absence of clear and
..
convincing evidence to rebut the presumption
that the subject property acquired during the In the event that one spouse is incapacitated
marriage of spouses Dailo belongs to their or otherwise unable to participate in the
conjugal partnership. 7 The appellate court administration of the conjugal properties, the
declared as void the mortgage on the subject other spouse may assume sole powers of
property because it was constituted without administration. These powers do not include
the knowledge and consent of respondent, in the powers of disposition or encumbrance
accordance with Article 124 of the Family which must have the authority of the court or
Code. Thus, it upheld the trial court's order to the written consent of the other spouse. In the
reconvey the subject property to respondent. 8
With respect to the damage to respondent's
absence of such authority or consent, the partnership shall be governed by the rules on
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . . contract of partnership in all that is not in
conflict with what is expressly determined in
Petitioner argues that although Article 124 of the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains)
the Family Code requires the consent of the or by the spouses in their marriage
other spouse to the mortgage of conjugal settlements. 19 Thus, the property relations of
properties, the framers of the law could not respondent and her late husband shall be
have intended to curtail the right of a spouse governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal
from exercising full ownership over the portion Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and,
of the conjugal property pertaining to him suppletorily, by the rules on partnership
under the concept of co-ownership. 12 Thus, under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the
petitioner would have this Court uphold the former prevails because the Civil Code
validity of the mortgage to the extent of the provisions on partnership apply only when the
late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.'s share in the Family Code is silent on the matter. THCASc
conjugal partnership. TcIaHC
The basic and established fact is that during
In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, 13 it was held his lifetime, without the knowledge and
that the sale of a conjugal property requires consent of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
the consent of both the husband and wife. 14 constituted a real estate mortgage on the
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, subject property, which formed part of their
this Court declared that the absence of the conjugal partnership. By express provision of
consent of one renders the entire sale null and Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence
void, including the portion of the conjugal of (court) authority or written consent of the
property pertaining to the husband who other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance
contracted the sale. The same principle in of the conjugal property shall be void.
Guiang squarely applies to the instant case.
As shall be discussed next, there is no legal The aforequoted provision does not qualify
basis to construe Article 493 of the Civil Code with respect to the share of the spouse who
as an exception to Article 124 of the Family makes the disposition or encumbrance in the
Code. same manner that the rule on co-ownership
under Article 493 of the Civil Code does.
Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Where the law does not distinguish, courts
were married on August 8, 1967. In the should not distinguish. 20 Thus, both the trial
absence of a marriage settlement, the system court and the appellate court are correct in
of relative community or conjugal partnership declaring the nullity of the real estate
of gains governed the property relations mortgage on the subject property for lack of
between respondent and her late husband. 15 respondent's consent.
With the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Second, petitioner imposes the liability for the
Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was payment of the principal obligation obtained
made applicable to conjugal partnership of by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the
gains already established before its effectivity conjugal partnership to the extent that it
unless vested rights have already been redounded to the benefit of the family. 21
acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
16 Under Article 121 of the Family Code, "[T]he
conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . . (3)
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply Debts and obligations contracted by either
to the property relations of respondent and spouse without the consent of the other to the
the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. even in a extent that the family may have been
suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal benefited; . . . ." For the subject property to be
partnership of gains is a special type of held liable, the obligation contracted by the
partnership, where the husband and wife late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded
place in a common fund the proceeds, to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
products, fruits and income from their There must be the requisite showing then of
separate properties and those acquired by some advantage which clearly accrued to the
either or both spouses through their efforts or welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a
by chance. 17 Unlike the absolute community conjugal partnership respond for a liability
of property wherein the rules on co-ownership that should appertain to the husband alone is
apply in a suppletory manner, 18 the conjugal to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective of
the new Civil Code to show the utmost SECOND DIVISION
concern for the solidarity and well-being of the
family as a unit. 22 [G.R. No. 141323. June 8, 2005.]
The burden of proof that the debt was DAVID V. PELAYO and LORENZA * B.
contracted for the benefit of the conjugal PELAYO, petitioner, vs. MELKI E. PEREZ,
partnership of gains lies with the creditor- respondent.
party litigant claiming as such. 23 Ei incumbit Cariaga Law Offices for petitioners.
probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who
asserts, not he who denies, must prove). 24 Vivencio Jumamil for respondent.
Petitioner's sweeping conclusion that the loan
obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to SYLLABUS
finance the construction of housing units 1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE;
without a doubt redounded to the benefit of JUDGMENT; LAW OF THE CASE; DEFINED
his family, without adducing adequate proof, AND CONSTRUED; APPLICATION IN CASE AT
does not persuade this Court. Other than
BAR. The issue of whether or not the deed
petitioner's bare allegation, there is nothing of sale is null and void under R.A. No. 6657,
from the records of the case to compel a for respondent's failure to register said
finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the document with the Register of Deeds within
late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the
three months after the effectivity of R.A. No.
benefit of the family. Consequently, the 6657, had been resolved with finality by the
conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for CA in its Decision dated November 24, 1994 in
the payment of the principal obligation. CA-G.R. SP No. 38700. Herein petitioners no
TSEHcA
longer elevated said CA Decision to this Court
In addition, a perusal of the records of the and the same became final and executory on
case reveals that during the trial, petitioner January 7, 1995. In said decision, the CA
vigorously asserted that the subject property interpreted Section 4, in relation to Section 70
was the exclusive property of the late of R.A. No. 6657, to mean thus: . . . the proper
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer interpretation of both sections is that under
filed with the trial court was it alleged that the R.A. No. 6657, the sale or transfer of a private
proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit agricultural land is allowed only when said
of the family. Even on appeal, petitioner never land area constitutes or is a part of the
claimed that the family benefited from the landowner-seller retained area and only when
proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts a the total landholdings of the purchaser-
certain theory in the court below, he will not transferee, including the property sold does
be permitted to change his theory on appeal, not exceed five (5) hectares. Aside from
for to permit him to do so would not only be declaring that the failure of respondent to
unfair to the other party but it would also be register the deed was not of his own fault or
offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice negligence, the CA ruled that respondent's
and due process. 25 A party may change his failure to register the deed of sale within three
legal theory on appeal only when the factual months after effectivity of The Comprehensive
bases thereof would not require presentation Agrarian Reform Law did not invalidate the
of any further evidence by the adverse party in deed of sale as "the transaction over said
order to enable it to properly meet the issue property is not proscribed by R.A. No. 6657".
raised in the new theory. 26 Thus, under the principle of law of the case,
said ruling of the CA is now binding on
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs petitioners. Such principle was elucidated in
against petitioner. TICDSc Cucueco vs. Court of Appeals, to wit: Law of
the case has been defined as the opinion
SO ORDERED. delivered on a former appeal. It is a term
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and applied to an established rule that when an
Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur. appellate court passes on a question and
remands the case to the lower court for
further proceedings, the question there settled
becomes the law of the case upon subsequent
appeal. It means that whatever is once
irrevocably established as the controlling legal
rule or decision between the same parties in
the same case continues to be the law of the decision in question. In this case, petitioners
case, whether correct on general principles or had the opportunity to fully expound on their
not, so long as the facts on which such defenses through a motion for
decision was predicated continue to be the reconsideration. Petitioners did file such
facts of the case before the court. aCSHDI motion but they wasted such opportunity by
failing to present therein whatever errors they
2. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; SALE; believed the CA had committed in its Decision.
CONSENT OF WIFE TO HUSBAND'S Definitely, therefore, the denial of petitioners'
DISPOSITION OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY motion for reconsideration, praying that they
DOES NOT ALWAYS HAVE TO BE EXPLICIT; be allowed to file appellees' brief, did not
PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. Sale is a infringe petitioners' right to due process as
consensual contract that is perfected by mere any issue that petitioners wanted to raise
consent, which may either be express or could and should have been contained in said
implied. A wife's consent to the husband's motion for reconsideration. HICSTa
disposition of conjugal property does not
always have to be explicit or set forth in any DECISION
particular document, so long as it is shown by
acts of the wife that such consent or approval AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:
was indeed given. In the present case, This resolves the petition for review on
although it appears on the face of the deed of certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision
sale that Lorenza signed only as an 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on
instrumental witness, circumstances leading April 20, 1999 which reversed the Decision of
to the execution of said document point to the the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Panabo,
fact that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of Davao, Branch 34, in Civil Case No. 91-46;
their conjugal property and consented to the and the CA Resolution dated December 17,
sale. . . . Under the rules of evidence, it is 1999 denying petitioners' motion for
presumed that a person takes ordinary care of reconsideration. IDTcHa
his concerns. Petitioners did not even attempt
to overcome the aforementioned presumption The antecedent facts as aptly narrated by the
as no evidence was ever presented to show CA are as follows:
that Lorenza was in any way lacking in her
mental faculties and, hence, could not have David Pelayo (Pelayo), by a Deed of Absolute
fully understood the ramifications of signing Sale executed on January 11, 1988, conveyed
the deed of sale. Neither did petitioners to Melki Perez (Perez) two parcels of
present any evidence that Lorenza had been agricultural land (the lots) situated in Panabo,
defrauded, forced, intimidated or threatened Davao which are portions of Lot 4192, Cad.
either by her own husband or by respondent 276 covered by OCT P-16873.
into affixing her signature on the subject Loreza Pelayo (Loreza), wife of Pelayo, and
document. If Lorenza had any objections over another one whose signature is illegible
the conveyance of the disputed property, she
witnessed the execution of the deed.
could have totally refrained from having any
part in the execution of the deed of sale. Loreza, however, signed only on the third page
Instead, Lorenza even affixed her signature in the space provided for witnesses on account
thereto. Moreover, under Article 173, in of which Perez' application for registration of
relation to Article 166, both of the New Civil the deed with the Office of the Register of
Code, which was still in effect on January 11, Deeds in Tagum, Davao was denied.
1988 when the deed in question was executed,
the lack of marital consent to the disposition Perez thereupon asked Loreza to sign on the
of conjugal property does not make the first and second pages of the deed but she
contract void ab initio but merely voidable. refused, hence, he instituted on August 8,
1991 the instant complaint for specific
3. REMEDIAL LAW; MOTIONS; MOTION performance against her and her husband
FOR RECONSIDERATION; DENIAL THEREOF Pelayo (defendants). CcADHI
DOES NOT VIOLATE RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS; RATIONALE. We have The defendants moved to dismiss the
consistently held that a petitioner's right to complaint on the ground that it stated no
due process is not violated where he was able cause of action, citing Section 6 of RA 6656
to move for reconsideration of the order or otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law which took effect on
June 10, 1988 and which provides that The trial court, finding, among others, that
contracts executed prior thereto shall "be valid Perez did not possess, nor pay the taxes on
only when registered with the Register of the lots, that defendant Pelayo was indebted
Deeds within a period of three (3) months after to Perez for services rendered and, therefore,
the effectivity of this Act." the deed could only be considered as evidence
of debt, and that in any event, there was no
The questioned deed having been executed on marital consent to nor actual consideration for
January 10, 1988, the defendants claimed the deed, held that the deed was null and void
that Perez had at least up to September 10, and accordingly rendered judgment the
1988 within which to register the same, but as dispositive portion of which reads:
they failed to, it is not valid and, therefore,
unenforceable. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering and directing the defendants to pay
The trial court thus dismissed the complaint. plaintiff Melki Perez the sum of TEN
On appeal to this Court, the dismissal was set THOUSAND (P10,000.00) Pesos as principal
aside and the case was remanded to the lower with 12% interest per annum starting from
court for further proceedings. the date of filing of the complaint on August 1,
In their Answer, the defendants claimed that 1991 until plaintiff is fully paid.
as the lots were occupied illegally by some The defendants shall likewise pay to plaintiff
persons against whom they filed an ejectment the sum of THREE THOUSAND (P3,000.00) as
case, they and Perez who is their friend and attorney's fees.
known at the time as an activist/leftist, hence
feared by many, just made it appear in the The court further orders that the Deed of
deed that the lots were sold to him in order to Absolute Sale, (Annex 'A') of the complaint and
frighten said illegal occupants, with the (Annex 'C') of the plaintiff's Motion for
intentional omission of Loreza's signature so Summary Judgment is declared null and void
that the deed could not be registered; and that and without force and it is likewise removed
the deed being simulated and bereft of as a cloud over defendants' title and property
consideration is void/inexistent. DTIaCS in suit. . . ." 2
Perez countered that the lots were given to The RTC Decision was appealed by herein
him by defendant Pelayo in consideration of respondent Perez to the CA. Petitioners failed
his services as his attorney-in-fact to make to file their appellees' brief. The CA then
the necessary representation and negotiation promulgated its Decision on April 20, 1999
with the illegal occupants-defendants in the whereby it ruled that by Lorenza's signing as
ejectment suit; and that after his relationship witness to the execution of the deed, she had
with defendant Pelayo became sour, the latter knowledge of the transaction and is deemed to
sent a letter to the Register of Deeds of Tagum have given her consent to the same; that
requesting him not to entertain any herein petitioners failed to adduce sufficient
transaction concerning the lots title to which proof to overthrow the presumption that there
was entrusted to Perez who misplaced and was consideration for the deed, and that
could [not] locate it. petitioner David Pelayo, being a lawyer, is
presumed to have acted with due care and to
Defendant Pelayo claimed in any event, in his have signed the deed with full knowledge of its
Pre-trial brief filed on March 19, 1996, that contents and import. The CA reversed and set
the deed was without his wife Loreza's aside the RTC Decision, declaring as valid and
consent, hence, in light of Art. 166 of the Civil enforceable the questioned deed of sale and
Code which provides: ordering herein petitioner Lorenza Pelayo to
Article 166. Unless the wife has been affix her signature on all pages of said
declared a non compos mentis or a document. CDESIA
spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the
confined in a leprosarium, the husband decision but the same was denied per
cannot alienate or encumber any real property Resolution dated December 17, 1999. The CA
of the conjugal partnership without the wife's found said motion to have been filed out of
consent . . . time and ruled that even putting aside
it is null and void. HTAIcD technicality, petitioners failed to present any
ground bearing on the merits of the case to
justify a reversal or setting aside of the CA ruled that the deed of sale subject of this
decision. case is valid under R.A. No. 6657.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari on Respondent further maintains that the CA
the following grounds: correctly held in its assailed Decision that
there was consideration for the contract and
1. The CA erred in ignoring the specific that Lorenza is deemed to have given her
provision of Section 6, in relation to Section 4 consent to the deed of sale.
of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 Respondent likewise opines that the CA was
which took effect on June 15, 1988 and which right in denying petitioners' motion for
provides that contracts executed prior thereto reconsideration where they prayed that they
shall "be valid only when registered with the be allowed to file their appellees' brief as their
Register of Deeds within a period of three (3) counsel failed to file the same on account of
months after the effectivity of this Act." said counsel's failing health due to cancer of
the liver. Respondent emphasized that in
2. The CA erred in holding that the deed petitioners' motion for reconsideration, they
of sale was valid and considering the did not even cite any errors made by the CA in
P10,000.00 adjudged by the trial court as its Decision. cEAIHa
Perez's remuneration as the consideration for
the deed of sale, instead of declaring the same The issues boil down to the question of
as null and void for being fictitious or whether or not the deed of sale was null and
simulated and on the basis of Art. 491, Par. 2 void on the following grounds: (a) for not
of the New Civil Code which prohibits agents complying with the provision in R.A. No. 6657
from acquiring by purchase properties from that such document must be registered with
his principal under his charge. the Register of Deeds within three months
after the effectivity of said law; (b) for lack of
3. The CA made a novel ruling that there marital consent; (c) for being prohibited under
was implied marital consent of the wife of Article 1491 (2) of the Civil Code; and (d) for
petitioner David Pelayo. lack of consideration.
4. Petitioners should have been allowed to We rule against petitioners.
file their appellees' brief to ventilate their side,
considering the existence of peculiar The issue of whether or not the deed of sale is
circumstances which prevented petitioners null and void under R.A. No. 6657, for
from filing said brief. cTIESD respondent's failure to register said document
with the Register of Deeds within three
On the other hand, respondent points out that months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 6657,
the CA, in resolving the first appeal docketed had been resolved with finality by the CA in its
as CA-G.R. SP No. 38700 3 brought by Decision dated November 24, 1994 in CA-G.R.
respondent assailing the RTC Order granting SP No. 38700. 4 Herein petitioners no longer
herein petitioners' motion to dismiss, already elevated said CA Decision to this Court and
ruled that under R.A. No. 6657, the sale or the same became final and executory on
transfer of private agricultural land is allowed January 7, 1995. 5
only when the area of the land being conveyed
constitutes or is a part of, the landowner- In said decision, the CA interpreted Section 4,
seller retained area and when the total in relation to Section 70 of R.A. No. 6657, to
landholding of the purchaser-transferee, mean thus:
including the property sold, does not exceed
five (5) hectares; that in this case, the land in . . . the proper interpretation of both sections
dispute is only 1.3 hectares and there is no is that under R.A. No. 6657, the sale or
proof that the transferee's (herein respondent) transfer of a private agricultural land is
total landholding inclusive of the subject land allowed only when said land area constitutes
will exceed 5 hectares, the landholding ceiling or is a part of the landowner-seller retained
prescribed by R.A. No. 6657; that the failure of area and only when the total landholdings of
respondent to register the instrument was not the purchaser-transferee, including the
due to his fault or negligence but can be property sold does not exceed five (5) hectares.
attributed to Lorenza's unjustified refusal to Aside from declaring that the failure of
sign two pages of the deed despite several respondent to register the deed was not of his
requests of respondent; and that therefore, the
own fault or negligence, the CA ruled that serious problems, including threats to the life
respondent's failure to register the deed of sale of petitioner David Pelayo, due to conflicts
within three months after effectivity of The with the illegal occupants of the property in
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law did not question, so that respondent, whom many
invalidate the deed of sale as "the transaction feared for being a leftist/activist, offered his
over said property is not proscribed by R.A. help in driving out said illegal occupants.
No. 6657." ACaDTH
Human experience tells us that a wife would
Thus, under the principle of law of the case, surely be aware of serious problems such as
said ruling of the CA is now binding on threats to her husband's life and the reasons
petitioners. Such principle was elucidated in for such threats. As they themselves stated,
Cucueco vs. Court of Appeals, 6 to wit: petitioners' problems over the subject property
had been going on for quite some time, so it is
Law of the case has been defined as the highly improbable for Lorenza not to be aware
opinion delivered on a former appeal. It is a of what her husband was doing to remedy
term applied to an established rule that when such problems. Petitioners do not deny that
an appellate court passes on a question and Lorenza Pelayo was present during the
remands the case to the lower court for execution of the deed of sale as her signature
further proceedings, the question there settled appears thereon. Neither do they claim that
becomes the law of the case upon subsequent Lorenza Pelayo had no knowledge whatsoever
appeal. It means that whatever is once about the contents of the subject document.
irrevocably established as the controlling legal Thus, it is quite certain that she knew of the
rule or decision between the same parties in sale of their conjugal property between her
the same case continues to be the law of the husband and respondent.
case, whether correct on general principles or
not, so long as the facts on which such Under the rules of evidence, it is presumed
decision was predicated continue to be the that a person takes ordinary care of his
facts of the case before the court. concerns. 10 Petitioners did not even attempt
to overcome the aforementioned presumption
Petitioners not having questioned the Decision as no evidence was ever presented to show
of the CA dated November 24, 1994 which that Lorenza was in any way lacking in her
then attained finality, the ruling that the deed mental faculties and, hence, could not have
of sale subject of this case is not among the fully understood the ramifications of signing
transactions deemed as invalid under R.A. No. the deed of sale. Neither did petitioners
6657, is now immutable. present any evidence that Lorenza had been
We agree with the CA ruling that petitioner defrauded, forced, intimidated or threatened
Lorenza, by affixing her signature to the Deed either by her own husband or by respondent
of Sale on the space provided for witnesses, is into affixing her signature on the subject
deemed to have given her implied consent to document. If Lorenza had any objections over
the contract of sale. the conveyance of the disputed property, she
could have totally refrained from having any
Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected part in the execution of the deed of sale.
by mere consent, which may either be express Instead, Lorenza even affixed her signature
or implied. 7 A wife's consent to the husband's thereto. AHCaED
disposition of conjugal property does not
always have to be explicit or set forth in any Moreover, under Article 173, in relation to
particular document, so long as it is shown by Article 166, both of the New Civil Code, which
acts of the wife that such consent or approval was still in effect on January 11, 1988 when
was indeed given. 8 In the present case, the deed in question was executed, the lack of
although it appears on the face of the deed of marital consent to the disposition of conjugal
sale that Lorenza signed only as an property does not make the contract void ab
instrumental witness, circumstances leading initio but merely voidable. Said provisions of
to the execution of said document point to the law provide:
fact that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of Art. 166. Unless the wife has been
their conjugal property and consented to the declared a non compos mentis or a
sale. EScHDA spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is
In their Pre-Trial Brief, 9 petitioners admitted confined in a leprosarium, the husband
that even prior to 1988, they have been having cannot alienate or encumber any real property
of the conjugal property without the wife's xxx xxx xxx
consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give
her consent, the court may compel her to (2) Agents, the property whose
grant the same. administration or sale may have been
entrusted to them, unless the consent of the
xxx xxx xxx principal has been given; TAacCE
Art. 173. The wife may, during the xxx xxx xxx
marriage, and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for the In Distajo vs. Court of Appeals, 12 a
annulment of any contract of the husband landowner, Iluminada Abiertas, designated
entered into without her consent, when such one of her sons as the administrator of several
consent is required, or any act or contract of parcels of her land. The landowner
the husband which tends to defraud her or subsequently executed a Deed of Certification
impair her interest in the conjugal partnership of Sale of Unregistered Land, conveying some
property. Should the wife fail to exercise this of said land to her son/administrator.
right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of Therein, we held that:
the marriage, may demand the value of Under paragraph (2) of the above article, the
property fraudulently alienated by the prohibition against agents purchasing
husband. ECSHAD property in their hands for sale or
Hence, it has been held that the contract is management is not absolute. It does not apply
valid until the court annuls the same and only if the principal consents to the sale of the
upon an action brought by the wife whose property in the hands of the agent or
consent was not obtained. 11 In the present administrator. In this case, the deeds of sale
case, despite respondent's repeated demands signed by Iluminada Abiertas shows that she
for Lorenza to affix her signature on all the gave consent to the sale of the properties in
pages of the deed of sale, showing favor of her son, Rufo, who was the
respondent's insistence on enforcing said administrator of the properties. Thus, the
contract, Lorenza still did not file a case for consent of the principal Iluminada Abiertas
annulment of the deed of sale. It was only removes the transaction out of the prohibition
when respondent filed a complaint for specific contained in Article 1491(2). 13
performance on August 8, 1991 when The above-quoted ruling is exactly in point
petitioners brought up Lorenza's alleged lack with this case before us. Petitioners, by
of consent as an affirmative defense. Thus, if signing the Deed of Sale in favor of
the transaction was indeed entered into respondent, are also deemed to have given
without Lorenza's consent, we find it quite their consent to the sale of the subject
puzzling why for more than three and a half property in favor of respondent, thereby
years, Lorenza did absolutely nothing to seek making the transaction an exception to the
the nullification of the assailed contract. general rule that agents are prohibited from
The foregoing circumstances lead the Court to purchasing the property of their principals.
believe that Lorenza knew of the full import of Petitioners also argue that the CA erred in
the transaction between respondent and her ruling that there was consideration for the
husband; and, by affixing her signature on the sale. We find no error in said appellate court's
deed of sale, she, in effect, signified her ruling. The element of consideration for the
consent to the disposition of their conjugal sale is indeed present. Petitioners, in adopting
property. the trial court's narration of antecedent facts
With regard to petitioners' asseveration that in their petition, 14 thereby admitted that they
the deed of sale is invalid under Article 1491, authorized respondent to represent them in
paragraph 2 of the New Civil Code, we find negotiations with the "squatters" occupying
such argument unmeritorious. Article 1491 (2) the disputed property and, in consideration of
provides: respondent's services, they executed the
subject deed of sale. Aside from such services
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot rendered by respondent, petitioners also
acquire by purchase, even at a public or acknowledged in the deed of sale that they
judicial auction, either in person or through received in full the amount of Ten Thousand
the mediation of another: Pesos. Evidently, the consideration for the sale
is respondent's services plus the Lastly, petitioners claim that they were not
aforementioned cash money. ETHCDS able to fully ventilate their defense before the
CA as their lawyer, who was then suffering
Petitioners contend that the consideration from cancer of the liver, failed to file their
stated in the deed of sale is excessively appellees' brief. Thus, in their motion for
inadequate, indicating that the deed of sale reconsideration of the CA Decision, they
was merely simulated. We are not persuaded. prayed that they be allowed to submit such
Our ruling in Buenaventura vs. Court of appellees' brief. The CA, in its Resolution
Appeals 15 is pertinent, to wit: dated December 17, 1999, stated thus:
. . . Indeed, there is no requirement that the By movant-defendant-appellee's own
price be equal to the exact value of the subject information, his counsel received a copy of the
matter of sale. . . . As we stated in Vales vs. decision on May 5, 1999. He, therefore, had
Villa: fifteen (15) days from said date or up to May
Courts cannot follow one every step of his life 20, 1999 to file the motion. The motion,
and extricate him from bad bargains, protect however, was sent through a private courier
him from unwise investments, relieve him and, therefore, considered to have been filed
from one-sided contracts, or annul the effects on the date of actual receipt on June 17, 1999
of foolish acts. Courts cannot constitute by the addressee Court of Appeals, was
themselves guardians of persons who are not filed beyond the reglementary period.
legally incompetent. Courts operate not Technicality aside, movant has not proffered
because one person has been defeated or any ground bearing on the merits of the case
overcome by another, but because he has why the decision should be set aside. aScIAC
been defeated or overcome illegally. Men may
do foolish things, make ridiculous contracts, Petitioners never denied the CA finding that
use miserable judgment, and lose money by their motion for reconsideration was filed
them indeed, all they have in the world; but beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period.
not for that alone can the law intervene and On that point alone, the CA is correct in
restore. There must be, in addition, a violation denying due course to said motion. The
of the law, the commission of what the law motion having been belatedly filed, the CA
knows as an actionable wrong, before the Decision had then attained finality. Thus, in
courts are authorized to lay hold of the Abalos vs. Philex Mining Corporation, 18 we
situation and remedy it. 16 held that:
Verily, in the present case, petitioners have . . . Nothing is more settled in law than that
not presented proof that there has been fraud, once a judgment attains finality it thereby
mistake or undue influence exercised upon becomes immutable and unalterable. It may
them by respondent. It is highly unlikely and no longer be modified in any respect, even if
contrary to human experience that a layman the modification is meant to correct what is
like respondent would be able to defraud, perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of
exert undue influence, or in any way vitiate fact or law, and regardless of whether the
the consent of a lawyer like petitioner David modification is attempted to be made by the
Pelayo who is expected to be more court rendering it or by the highest court of
knowledgeable in the ways of drafting the land.
contracts and other legal transactions.
HDaACI Moreover, it is pointed out by the CA that said
motion did not present any defense or
Furthermore, in their Reply to Respondent's argument on the merits of the case that could
Memorandum, 17 petitioners adopted the CA's have convinced the CA to reverse or modify its
narration of fact that petitioners stated in a Decision.
letter they sent to the Register of Deeds of
Tagum that they have entrusted the titles over We have consistently held that a petitioner's
subject lots to herein respondent. Such act is right to due process is not violated where he
a clear indication that they intended to convey was able to move for reconsideration of the
the subject property to herein respondent and order or decision in question. 19 In this case,
the deed of sale was not merely simulated or petitioners had the opportunity to fully
fictitious. expound on their defenses through a motion
for reconsideration. Petitioners did file such
motion but they wasted such opportunity by
failing to present therein whatever errors they SECOND DIVISION
believed the CA had committed in its Decision.
Definitely, therefore, the denial of petitioners' [G.R. No. 116668. July 28, 1997.]
motion for reconsideration, praying that they ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner, vs.
be allowed to file appellees' brief, did not CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and
infringe petitioners' right to due process as HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ, respondent.
any issue that petitioners wanted to raise
could and should have been contained in said Simplicio M. Sevilleja for petitioner.
motion for reconsideration. CaDSHE
Ray L. Basbas & Fe Fernandez-Bautista for
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is respondents.
DENIED and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated April 20, 1999 and its SYNOPSIS
Resolution dated December 17, 1999 are Miguel Palang married on July 16, 1949. It
hereby AFFIRMED. was his first marriage. Their only child,
SO ORDERED. Herminia, was born on May 12, 1950.
Callejo, Sr., Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., On July 15, 1973, Miguel, then 63 years old,
concur. contracted his second marriage with Erlinda
Agapay, 19, herein petitioner. Two months
Puno, J., is on official leave. earlier, Miguel and Erlinda purchased a piece
of riceland. Transfer Certificate of Title No.
101736 was issued in their names.
4. ID.; ID.; HEIRSHIP AND FILIATION; On July 15, 1973, the then sixty-three-year-
CANNOT BE ADJUDICATED IN AN ORDINARY old Miguel contracted his second marriage
CIVIL ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF with nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay, herein
OWNERSHIP; CASE AT BAR. The issue petitioner. 2 Two months earlier, on May 17,
concerning Kristopher Palang's status and 1973, Miguel and Erlinda, as evidenced by the
claim as an illegitimate son and heir to Deed of Sale, jointly purchased a parcel of
Miguel's estate is here resolved in favor of agricultural land located at San Felipe,
respondent court's correct assessment that Binalonan, Pangasinan with an area of 10,080
the trial court erred in making square meters. Consequently, Transfer
pronouncements regarding Kristopher's Certificate of Title No. 101736 covering said
heirship and filiation "inasmuch as questions rice land was issued in their names.
as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof
of filiation of illegitimate children and the A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was
determination of the estate of the latter and likewise purchased on September 23, 1975,
claims thereto should be ventilated in the allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. TCT
proper probate court or in a special No. 143120 covering said property was later
proceeding instituted for the purpose and issued in her name.
cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary On October 30, 1975, Miguel and Cornelia
civil action which is for recovery of ownership Palang executed a Deed of Donation as a form
and possession." Kristopher, not having been of compromise agreement to settle and end a
impleaded, was not a party to the case at bar. case filed by the latter. 3 The parties therein
His mother, Erlinda, cannot be called his agreed to donate their conjugal property
guardian ad litem for he was not involved in consisting of six parcels of land to their only
the case at bar. child, Herminia Palang. 4
DECISION Miguel and Erlinda's cohabitation produced a
ROMERO, J p: son, Kristopher A. Palang, born on December
6, 1977. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were
Before us is a petition for review of the convicted of concubinage upon Carlina's
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV complaint. 5 Two years later, on February 15,
No. 24199 entitled "Erlinda Agapay v. Carlina 1981, Miguel died.
(Cornelia) Palang and Herminia P. Dela Cruz"
dated June 22, 1994 involving the ownership On July 11, 1981, Carlina Palang and her
of two parcels of land acquired during the daughter Herminia Palang de la Cruz, herein
cohabitation of petitioner and private private respondents, instituted the case at
respondent's legitimate spouse. bar, an action for recovery of ownership and
possession with damages against petitioner
Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on before the Regional Trial Court in Urdaneta,
July 16, 1949 when he took private Pangasinan (Civil Case No. U-4265). Private
respondent Carlina (or Cornelia) Vallesterol as respondents sought to get back the riceland
a wife at the Pozorrubio Roman Catholic and the house and lot both located at
Church in Pangasinan. A few months after the Binalonan, Pangasinan allegedly purchased by
wedding, in October 1949, he left to work in Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner.
Hawaii. Miguel and Carlina's only child,
Herminia Palang, was born on May 12, 1950. Petitioner, as defendant below, contented that
while the riceland covered by TCT No. 101736
Miguel returned in 1954 for a year. His next is registered in their names (Miguel and
visit to the Philippines was in 1964 and Erlinda), she had already given her half of the
during the entire duration of his year-long property to their son Kristopher Palang. She
sojourn he stayed in Zambales with his added that the house and lot covered by TCT
brother, not in Pangasinan with his wife and No. 143120 is her sole property, having
child. The trial court found evidence that as bought the same with her own money. Erlinda
early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to added that Carlina is precluded from claiming
divorced Carlina in Hawaii. 1 When he aforesaid properties since the latter had
returned for good in 1972, he refused to live already donated their conjugal estate to
Herminia.
After trial on the merits, the lower court 1. Declaring plaintiffs-appellants the
rendered its decision on June 30, 1989 owner of the properties in question;
dismissing the complaint after declaring that
there was little evidence to prove that the 2. Ordering defendant-appellee to vacate
subject properties pertained to the conjugal and deliver the properties in question to
property of Carlina and Miguel Palang. The herein plaintiffs-appellants;
lower court went on to provide for the 3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of
intestate shares of the parties, particularly of Pangasinan to cancel Transfer Certificate of
Kristopher Palang, Miguel's illegitimate son. Title Nos. 143120 and 101736 and to issue in
The dispositive portion of the decision reads: lieu thereof another certificate of title in the
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, name of the plaintiffs-appellants.
judgment is hereby rendered No pronouncement as to costs." 7
1) Dismissing the complaint, with cost Hence, this petition.
against plaintiffs;
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals
2) Confirming the ownership of defendant erred in not sustaining the validity of two
Erlinda Agapay of the residential lot located at deeds of absolute sale covering the riceland
Poblacion, Binalonan, Pangasinan, as and the house and lot, the first in favor of
evidenced by TCT No. 143120, Lot 290-B Miguel Palang and Erlinda Agapay and the
including the old house standing therein; second, in favor of Erlinda Agapay alone.
3) Confirming the ownership of one half Second, petitioner contends that respondent
(1/2) portion of that piece of agricultural land appellate court erred in not declaring
situated at Balisa, San Felipe, Binalonan, Kristopher A. Palang as Miguel Palang's
Pangasinan, consisting of 10,080 square illegitimate son and thus entitled to inherit
meters and as evidenced by TCT No. 101736, from Miguel's estate. Third, respondent court
Lot 1123-A to Erlinda Agapay; erred, according to petitioner, "in not finding
that there is a sufficient pleading and evidence
4) Adjudicating to Kristopher Palang as that Kristoffer A. Palang or Christopher A.
his inheritance from his deceased father, Palang should be considered as party
Miguel Palang, the one-half (1/2) of the defendant in Civil Case No. U-4625 before the
Agricultural land situated at Balisa, San trial court and in CA-G.R. No. 24199. 8
Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan, under TCT No.
101736 in the name of Miguel Palang, After studying the merits of the instant case,
provided that the former (Kristopher) executes, as well as the pertinent provision of law and
within 15 days after this decision becomes jurisprudence, the Court denies the petition
final and executory, a quit-claim forever and affirms the questioned decision of the
renouncing any claims to annul/reduce the Court of Appeals.
donation to Herminia Palang de la Cruz of all The first and principal issue is the ownership
conjugal properties of her parents, Miguel of the two pieces of property subject of this
Palang and Carlina Vallesterol Palang, dated action. Petitioner assails the validity of the
October 30, 1975, otherwise, the state of deeds of conveyance over the same parcels of
deceased Miguel Palang will have to be settled land. There is no dispute that the transfer of
in another separate action; ownership from the original owners of the
5) No pronouncement as to damages and riceland and the house and lot, Corazon
attorney's fees. Ilomin and the spouses Cespedes,
respectively, were valid.
SO ORDERED." 6
The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was
On appeal, respondent court reversed the trial made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The
court's decision. The Court of Appeals provision of law applicable here is Article 148
rendered its decision on July 22, 1994 within of the Family Code providing for cases of
the following dispositive portion: cohabitation when a man or woman who are
not capacitated to marry each other live
"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the exclusively with each other as husband and
appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
another one entered: void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda
contracted marriage on July 15, 1973, said Miguel over the same. Consequently, the
union was patently void because the earlier riceland should, as correctly held by the Court
marriage of Miguel and Carlina was still of Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership
subsisting and unaffected by the latter's de property of the deceased Miguel and private
facto separation. respondent Carlina Palang.
Under Article 148, only the properties Furthermore, it is immaterial that Miguel and
acquired by both of the parties through their Carlina previously agreed to donate their
actual joint contribution of money, property or conjugal property in favor of their daughter
industry shall be owned by them in common Herminia in 1975. The trial court erred in
in proportion to their respective contributions. holding that the decision adopting their
It must be stressed that actual contribution is compromise agreement "in effect partakes the
required by this provision, in contrast to nature of judicial confirmation of the
Article 147 which states that efforts in the separation of property between spouses and
care and maintenance of the family and the termination of the conjugal partnership."
household, are regarded as contributions to 12 Separation of property between spouse
the acquisition of common property by one during the marriage shall not take place
who has no salary or income or work or except by judicial order or without judicial
industry. If the actual contribution of the conferment when there is an express
party is not proved, there will be no co- stipulation in the marriage settlements. 13
ownership and no presumption of equal The judgment which resulted from the parties'
shares. 9 cda compromise was not specifically and expressly
for separation of property and should not be
In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by so inferred.
her testimony that she is engaged in the
business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda
store 10 but failed to persuade to us that she allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on
actually contributed money to buy the subject September 23, 1975 when she was only 22
riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the years old. The testimony of the notary public
date of the conveyance, May 17, 1973, who prepared the deed of conveyance for the
petitioner was only around twenty years of age property reveals the falsehood of this claim.
and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel
a pensioner of the U.S. Government. Palang provided the money for the purchase
Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic price and directed that Erlinda's name alone
to conclude that in 1973 she contributed be placed as the vendee. 14
P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price
of subject property, 11 there being no proof of The transaction was properly a donation made
the same. by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was
clearly void and inexistent by express
Petitioner now claims that the riceland was provision of law because it was made between
bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at
actually cohabited. In the nature of an the time of the donation, under Article 739 of
afterthought, said added assertion was the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the
intended to exclude their case from operation Family Code expressly provides that the
of Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of the prohibition against donation between spouses
precise date when they commenced their now applies to donations between persons
adulterous cohabitation not having been living together as husband and wife without a
adduced, we cannot state definitively that the valid marriage, 15 for otherwise, the condition
riceland was purchased even before they of those who incurred guilt would turn out to
started living together. In any case, even be better than those in legal union. 16
assuming that the subject property was
bought before cohabitation, the rules of co- The second issue concerning Kristopher
ownership would still apply and proof of Palang's status and claim as an illegitimate
actual contribution would still be essential. son and heir to Miguel's estate is here resolved
in favor of respondent court's correct
Since petitioner failed to prove that she assessment that the trial court erred in
contributed money to the purchase price of making pronouncements regarding
the riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, we Kristopher's heirship and filiation "inasmuch
find no basis to justify her co-ownership with as questions as to who are the heirs of the
decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate SECOND DIVISION
children and the determination of the estate of
the latter and claims thereto should be [G.R. No. 202370. September 23, 2013.]
ventilated in the proper probate court or in a JUAN SEVILLA SALAS, JR., petitioner, vs.
special proceeding instituted for the purpose EDEN VILLENA AGUILA, respondent.
and cannot be adjudicated in the instant
ordinary civil action which is for recovery of DECISION
ownership and possession." 17
CARPIO, J p:
As regards the third issue, petitioner contends
that Kristopher Palang should be considered The Case
as party-defendant in the case at bar following
This petition for review on certiorari 1 assails
the trial court's decision which expressly the 16 March 2012 Decision 2 and the 28
found that Kristopher had not been impleaded June 2012 Resolution 3 of the Court of
as party defendant but theorized that he had Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 95322. The
submitted to the court's jurisdiction through
CA affirmed the 26 September 2008 Order 4 of
his mother/guardian ad litem. 18 The trial the Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu,
court erred gravely. Kristopher, not having Batangas, Branch 14 (RTC), in Civil Case No.
been impleaded, was therefore, not a party to 787. TADcCS
the case at bar. His mother, Erlinda, cannot
be called his guardian ad litem for he was not The Facts
involved in the case at bar. Petitioner adds
that there is no need for Kristopher to file On 7 September 1985, petitioner Juan Sevilla
another action to prove that he is the Salas, Jr. (Salas) and respondent Eden Villena
illegitimate son of Miguel, in order to avoid Aguila (Aguila) were married. On 7 June 1986,
multiplicity of suits. 19 Petitioner's grave error Aguila gave birth to their daughter, Joan
has been discussed in the preceding Jiselle. Five months later, Salas left their
paragraph where the need for probate conjugal dwelling. Since then, he no longer
proceedings to resolve the settlement of communicated with Aguila or their daughter.
Miguel's estate and Kristopher's successional
On 7 October 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for
rights has been pointed out.
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage (petition)
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby citing psychological incapacity under Article
DENIED. The questioned decision of the Court 36 of the Family Code. The petition states that
of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against they "have no conjugal properties whatsoever."
petitioner. 5 In the Return of Summons dated 13 October
2003, the sheriff narrated that Salas
SO ORDERED. instructed his mother Luisa Salas to receive
the copy of summons and the petition. 6
Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ ., concur.
On 7 May 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision
Torres, Jr., J ., is on leave. 7 declaring the nullity of the marriage of Salas
and Aguila (RTC Decision). The RTC Decision
further provides for the "dissolution of their
conjugal partnership of gains, if any." 8
IASTDE
On 21 September 2007, the hearing for (3) A parcel of land registered in the name
Aguila's manifestation ensued, with Aguila, of Juan S. Salas married to Rubina Cortez
her counsel and the state prosecutor present. Salas located in Tondo and covered by TCT
During the hearing, Aguila testified that on 17 No. 243373-Ind. marked as Exhibit "D" and its
April 2007 someone informed her of the improvements.
existence of the Discovered Properties.
Thereafter, she verified the information and Thereafter, the Court shall confirm the
secured copies of TCTs of the Discovered partition so agreed upon by the parties, and
Properties. When asked to clarify, Aguila such partition, together with the Order of the
testified that Rubina C. Salas (Rubina) is Court confirming the same, shall be recorded
Salas' common-law wife. 11 in the Registry of Deeds of the place in which
the property is situated.
On 8 February 2008, Salas filed an Opposition
to the Manifestation 12 alleging that there is SO ORDERED. 13
no conjugal property to be partitioned based The RTC held that pursuant to the Rules, 14
on Aguila's petition. According to Salas, even upon entry of judgment granting the
Aguila's statement was a judicial admission annulment of marriage, the court can proceed
and was not made through palpable mistake. with the liquidation, partition and distribution
Salas claimed that Aguila waived her right to of the conjugal partnership of gains if it has
the Discovered Properties. Salas likewise not been judicially adjudicated upon, as in
enumerated properties he allegedly waived in this case. The RTC found that the Discovered
favor of Aguila, to wit: (1) parcels of land with Properties are among the conjugal properties
improvements located in Sugar Landing to be partitioned and distributed between
Subdivision, Alangilan, Batangas City; No. Salas and Aguila. However, the RTC held that
176 Brias Street, Nasugbu, Batangas; P. Salas failed to prove the existence of the
Samaniego Street, Silangan, Nasugbu, Waived Properties. ETHaDC
Batangas; and Batangas City, financed by
Filinvest; (2) cash amounting to P200,000.00; On 11 November 2008, Rubina filed a
and (3) motor vehicles, specifically Honda City Complaint-in-Intervention, claiming that: (1)
and Toyota Tamaraw FX (collectively, "Waived she is Rubina Cortez, a widow and unmarried
Properties"). Thus, Salas contended that the to Salas; (2) the Discovered Properties are her
conjugal properties were deemed partitioned. paraphernal properties; (3) Salas did not
cHaDIA contribute money to purchase the Discovered
Properties as he had no permanent job in
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court Japan; (4) the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
In its 26 September 2008 Order, the RTC over her as she was not a party in the case;
ruled in favor of Aguila. The dispositive and (5) she authorized her brother to
portion of the Order reads: purchase the Discovered Properties but
because he was not well-versed with legal
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises being documentation, he registered the properties in
considered, the petitioner and the respondent the name of "Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina
are hereby directed to partition between C. Salas."
themselves by proper instruments of
conveyance, the following properties, without In its 16 December 2009 Order, the RTC
prejudice to the legitime of their legitimate denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
child, Joan Jisselle Aguila Salas: Salas. The RTC found that Salas failed to
prove his allegation that Aguila transferred the
Waived Properties to third persons. The RTC ownership. 19 Thus, the settlement of the
emphasized that it cannot go beyond the issue of ownership is the first stage in this
TCTs, which state that Salas is the registered action. 20
owner of the Discovered Properties. The RTC
further held that Salas and Rubina were at Basic is the rule that the party making an
fault for failing to correct the TCTs, if they allegation in a civil case has the burden of
were not married as they claimed. proving it by a preponderance of evidence. 21
Salas alleged that contrary to Aguila's petition
Hence, Salas filed an appeal with the CA. stating that they had no conjugal property,
IaDSEA they actually acquired the Waived Properties
during their marriage. However, the RTC
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals found, and the CA affirmed, that Salas failed
On 16 March 2012, the CA affirmed the order to prove the existence and acquisition of the
of the RTC. 15 The CA ruled that Aguila's Waived Properties during their marriage:
statement in her petition is not a judicial CSTEHI
admission. The CA pointed out that the A perusal of the record shows that the
petition was filed on 7 October 2003, but documents submitted by [Salas] as the
Aguila found the Discovered Properties only properties allegedly registered in the name of
on 17 April 2007 or before the promulgation of [Aguila] are merely photocopies and not
the RTC decision. Thus, the CA concluded certified true copies, hence, this Court cannot
that Aguila was palpably mistaken in her admit the same as part of the records of this
petition and it would be unfair to punish her case. These are the following:
over a matter that she had no knowledge of at
the time she made the admission. The CA also (1) TCT No. T-65876 a parcel of land
ruled that Salas was not deprived of the located at Poblacion, Nasugbu, Batangas,
opportunity to refute Aguila's allegations in registered in the name of Eden A. Salas,
her manifestation, even though he was not married to Juan Salas Jr. which is cancelled
present in its hearing. The CA likewise held by TCT No. T-105443 in the name of Joan
that Rubina cannot collaterally attack a Jiselle A. Salas, single;
certificate of title.
(2) TCT No. T-68066 a parcel of land
In a Resolution dated 28 June 2012, 16 the situated in the Barrio of Landing, Nasugbu,
CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration 17 Batangas, registered in the name of Eden A.
filed by Salas. Hence, this petition. Salas, married to Juan S. Salas Jr.
Hence, Barrido brought the case to the Court Here, the subject property's assessed value
via a Petition for Review. She assigned the was merely P8,080.00, an amount which
following errors in the CA Decision: certainly does not exceed the required limit of
P20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro This particular kind of co-ownership applies
Manila to fall within the jurisdiction of the when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
MTCC. Therefore, the lower court correctly impediment to marry each other, exclusively
took cognizance of the instant case. live together as husband and wife under a
void marriage or without the benefit of
The records reveal that Nonato and Barrido's marriage. 12 It is clear, therefore, that for
marriage had been declared void for Article 147 to operate, the man and the
psychological incapacity under Article 36 10 of woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each
the Family Code. During their marriage, other; (2) live exclusively with each other as
however, the conjugal partnership regime husband and wife; and (3) their union is
governed their property relations. Although without the benefit of marriage or their
Article 129 11 provides for the procedure in marriage is void. Here, all these elements are
case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership present. 13 The term "capacitated" in the first
regime, Article 147 specifically covers he paragraph of the provision pertains to the
effects of void marriages on the spouses' legal capacity of a party to contract marriage.
property relations. Article 147 reads: 14 Any impediment to marry has not been
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who shown to have existed on the part of either
are capacitated to marry each other, live Nonato or Barrido. They lived exclusively with
exclusively with each other as husband and each other as husband and wife. However,
wife without the benefit of marriage or under a their marriage was found to be void under
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
be owned by them in equal shares and the psychological incapacity. 15
property acquired by both of them through Under this property regime, property acquired
their work or industry shall be governed by by both spouses through their work and
the rules on co-ownership. aSITDC industry shall be governed by the rules on
In the absence of proof to the contrary, equal co-ownership. Any property acquired
properties acquired while they lived together during the union is prima facie presumed to
shall be presumed to have been obtained by have been obtained through their joint efforts.
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall A party who did not participate in the
be owned by them in equal shares. For acquisition of the property shall be considered
purposes of this Article, a party who did not as having contributed to the same jointly if
participate in the acquisition by the other said party's efforts consisted in the care and
party of any property shall be deemed to have maintenance of the family household. 16
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if Efforts in the care and maintenance of the
the former's efforts consisted in the care and family and household are regarded as
maintenance of the family and of the contributions to the acquisition of common
household. property by one who has no salary or income
or work or industry. 17 aCcEHS
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts
inter vivos of his or her share in the property In the analogous case of Valdez, 18 it was
acquired during cohabitation and owned in likewise averred that the trial court failed to
common, without the consent of the other, apply the correct law that should govern the
until after the termination of their disposition of a family dwelling in a situation
cohabitation. where a marriage is declared void ab initio
because of psychological incapacity on the
When only one of the parties to a void part of either or both parties in the contract of
marriage is in good faith, the share of the marriage. The Court held that the court a quo
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be did not commit a reversible error in utilizing
forfeited in favor of their common children. In Article 147 of the Family Code and in ruling
case of default of or waiver by any or all of the that the former spouses own the family home
common children or their descendants, each and all their common property in equal
vacant share shall belong to the respective shares, as well as in concluding that, in the
surviving descendants. In the absence of liquidation and partition of the property that
descendants, such share shall belong to the they owned in common, the provisions on co-
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture ownership under the Civil Code should aptly
shall take place upon termination of the prevail. 19 The rules which are set up to
cohabitation. aDHCcE govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of THIRD DIVISION
gains, the property regimes recognized for
valid and voidable marriages, are irrelevant to [G.R. No. 143439. October 14, 2005.]
the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists MAXIMO ALVAREZ, petitioner, vs. SUSAN
between common-law spouses or spouses of RAMIREZ, respondent.
void marriages. 20
DECISION
Here, the former spouses both agree that they
acquired the subject property during the SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:
subsistence of their marriage. Thus, it shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint Before us is a petition for review on certiorari
efforts, work or industry, and shall be jointly 1 assailing the Decision 2 of the Court of
owned by them in equal shares. Barrido, Appeals dated May 31, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP
however, claims that the ownership over the No. 56154, entitled "SUSAN RAMIREZ,
property in question is already vested on their petitioner, versus, HON. BENJAMIN M.
children, by virtue of a Deed of Sale. But aside AQUINO, JR., as JUDGE RTC, MALABON,
from the title to the property still being MM, BR. 72, and MAXIMO ALVAREZ,
registered in the names of the former spouses, respondents." STaIHc
said document of sale does not bear a Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the
notarization of a notary public. It must be
complaining witness in Criminal Case No.
noted that without the notarial seal, a 19933-MN for arson 3 pending before the
document remains to be private and cannot be Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon
converted into a public document, 21 making City. The accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein
it inadmissible in evidence unless properly
petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza G.
authenticated. 22 Unfortunately, Barrido Alvarez, sister of respondent.
failed to prove its due execution and
authenticity. In fact, she merely annexed said On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor
Deed of Sale to her position paper. Therefore, called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand
the subject property remains to be owned in as the first witness against petitioner, her
common by Nonato and Barrido, which should husband. Petitioner and his counsel raised no
be divided in accordance with the rules on co- objection.
ownership. TSHIDa
Esperanza testified as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court "ATTY. ALCANTARA:
of Appeals, dated November 16, 2006, as well
We are calling Mrs. Esperanza Alvarez,
as its Resolution dated January 24, 2007 in
the wife of the accused, Your Honor.
CA-G.R. SP No. 00235, are hereby AFFIRMED.
COURT:
SO ORDERED.
Swear in the witness.
Villarama, Jr., Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe ** and
Jardeleza, JJ., concur. xxx xxx xxx
Q: For the record, Mrs. Witness, can you "Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of
state the name of that person, if you know? marriage. During their marriage, neither
the husband nor the wife may testify for or
A: He is my husband, sir, Maximo Alvarez. against the other without the consent of the
Q: If that Maximo Alvarez you were able to affected spouse, except in a civil case by one
see, can you identify him? against the other, or in a criminal case for a
crime committed by one against the other or
A: Yes, sir. the latter's direct descendants or ascendants."
Q: If you can see him inside the Court The reasons given for the rule are:
room, can you please point him?
1. There is identity of interests between
A: Witness pointing to a person and when husband and wife;
asked to stand and asked his name, he gave
2. If one were to testify for or against the
his name as Maximo Alvarez." 4
other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
In the course of Esperanza's direct testimony
against petitioner, the latter showed 3. The policy of the law is to guard the
"uncontrolled emotions," prompting the trial security and confidences of private life, even at
the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and
judge to suspend the proceedings. cADTSH
to prevent domestic disunion and
On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through unhappiness; and
counsel, filed a motion 5 to disqualify
Esperanza from testifying against him 4. Where there is want of domestic
tranquility there is danger of punishing one
pursuant to Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court on marital disqualification. spouse through the hostile testimony of the
other. 11
Respondent filed an opposition 6 to the
motion. Pending resolution of the motion, the But like all other general rules, the marital
disqualification rule has its own exceptions,
trial court directed the prosecution to proceed
both in civil actions between the spouses and
with the presentation of the other witnesses.
in criminal cases for offenses committed by
one against the other. Like the rule itself, the
exceptions are backed by sound reasons strained that there is no more harmony, peace
which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those or tranquility to be preserved. The Supreme
in support of the general rule. For instance, Court has held that in such a case, identity is
where the marital and domestic relations are non-existent. In such a situation, the security
so strained that there is no more harmony to and confidences of private life which the law
be preserved nor peace and tranquility which aims to protect are nothing but ideals which
may be disturbed, the reason based upon through their absence, merely leave a void in
such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a the unhappy home. (People v. Castaeda, 271
case, identity of interests disappears and the SCRA 504). Thus, there is no longer any
consequent danger of perjury based on that reason to apply the Marital Disqualification
identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a Rule."
situation, the security and confidences of
private life, which the law aims at protecting, It should be stressed that as shown by the
will be nothing but ideals, which through their records, prior to the commission of the
absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy offense, the relationship between petitioner
home. 12 and his wife was already strained. In fact, they
were separated de facto almost six months
In Ordoo vs. Daquigan, 13 this Court held: before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and
facts presented reveal that the preservation of
"We think that the correct rule, which may be the marriage between petitioner and
adopted in this jurisdiction, is that laid down Esperanza is no longer an interest the State
in Cargil vs. State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, aims to protect.
25 Okl. 314, wherein the court said:
At this point, it bears emphasis that the State,
'The rule that the injury must amount to a being interested in laying the truth before the
physical wrong upon the person is too narrow; courts so that the guilty may be punished and
and the rule that any offense remotely or the innocent exonerated, must have the right
indirectly affecting domestic harmony comes to offer the direct testimony of Esperanza,
within the exception is too broad. The better even against the objection of the accused,
rule is that, when an offense directly attacks, because (as stated by this Court in Francisco
or directly and vitally impairs, the conjugal 14 ), "it was the latter himself who gave rise to
relation, it comes within the exception to the its necessity." ADcSHC
statute that one shall not be a witness against
the other except in a criminal prosecution for WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
a crime committee (by) one against the other.'" Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial court, RTC,
Branch 72, Malabon City, is ordered to allow
Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to Esperanza Alvarez to testify against petitioner,
petitioner, directly impairs the conjugal her husband, in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN.
relation between him and his wife Esperanza. Costs against petitioner.
His act, as embodied in the Information for
arson filed against him, eradicates all the SO ORDERED.
major aspects of marital life such as trust,
confidence, respect and love by which virtues Panganiban, Corona, Carpio-Morales and
the conjugal relationship survives and Garcia, JJ., concur.
flourishes. cCTESa
The Court finds no cogent reason why the WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for
ruling in Magbaleta as well as in all of the Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
aforementioned cases should not equally ASEIDH
apply to suits involving husband and wife. Costs against petitioner.
Petitioner makes much of the fact that the SO ORDERED.
present case involves a husband and his wife
while Magbaleta is a case between brothers. Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Callejo,
However, the Court finds no specific, unique, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
or special circumstance that would make the
ruling in Magbaleta as well as in the
abovementioned cases inapplicable to suits
involving a husband and his wife, as in the
present case. In the first place, Article 151 of
the Family Code and Article 222 of the Civil
Code are clear that the provisions therein
apply to suits involving "members of the same
family" as contemplated under Article 150 of
the Family Code, to wit:
SO ORDERED. 3
The RTC and the CA differed in their views on It is true that the existence of the subject
whether the public auction should include the house was not specifically alleged in the
subject house. The RTC excluded the subject complaint for partition. Such omission
house because respondent never alleged its notwithstanding, the subject house is deemed
existence in his complaint for partition or part of the judgment of partition for two
established his co-ownership thereof. 17 On compelling reasons. CHATcE
the other hand, citing Articles 440, 18 445 19
and 446 20 of the Civil Code, the CA held that First, as correctly held by the CA, under the
as the deceased owned the subject land, he provisions of the Civil Code, the subject house
also owned the subject house which is a mere is deemed part of the subject land. The Court
accessory to the land. Both properties form quotes with approval the ruling of the CA, to
part of the estate of the deceased and are held wit:
in co-ownership by his heirs, the parties The RTC, in the assailed Order dated August
herein. Hence, the CA concludes that any 30, 2005 ratiocinated that since the house
decision in the action for partition of said constructed on the subject lot was not alleged
estate should cover not just the subject land in the complaint and its ownership was not
but also the subject house. 21 The CA further passed upon during the trial on the merits,
pointed out that petitioners themselves the court cannot include the house in its
implicitly recognized the inclusion of the adjudication of the subject lot. The court
subject house in the partition of the subject further stated that it cannot give a relief to
land when they proposed in their letter of [sic] which is not alleged and prayed for in the
August 5, 2004, the following swapping- complaint.
arrangement: AcSEHT
We are not persuaded.
Sir:
To follow the foregoing reasoning of the RTC
Thank you very much for accommodating us will in effect render meaningless the pertinent
even if we are only poor and simple people. We rule on accession. In general, the right to
are very much pleased with the decision of accession is automatic (ipso jure), requiring no
Presiding Judge Manuel B. Fernandez, Jr., prior act on the part of the owner or the
RTC Br. 254, Las Pias, on the sharing of one- principal. So that even if the improvements
third (1/3) each of a land covered by Transfer including the house were not alleged in the
Certificate of Title No. 383714 (84191) in Las complaint for partition, they are deemed
Pias City. included in the lot on which they stand,
However, to preserve the sanctity of our house following the principle of accession.
which is our residence for more than twenty Consequently, the lot subject of judicial
(20) years, we wish to request that the 1/3 partition in this case includes the house
share of John Nabor C. Arriola be paid by the which is permanently attached thereto,
defendants depending on the choice of the otherwise, it would be absurd to divide the
plaintiff between item (1) or item (2), detailed principal, i.e., the lot, without dividing the
as follows: house which is permanently attached thereto.
23 (Emphasis supplied)
(1) Swap with a 500-square meters [sic] lot
located at Baras Rizal . . . . Second, respondent has repeatedly claimed
that the subject house was built by the
(2) Cash of P205,700.00 . . . . deceased. 24 Petitioners never controverted
such claim. There is then no dispute that the
xxx xxx xxx 22 subject house is part of the estate of the
We agree that the subject house is covered by deceased; as such, it is owned in common by
the judgment of partition for reasons the latter's heirs, the parties herein, 25 any
postulated by the CA. We qualify, however, one of whom, under Article 494 26 of the Civil
that this ruling does not necessarily Code, may, at any time, demand the partition
countenance the immediate and actual of the subject house. 27 Therefore,
respondent's recourse to the partition of the
subject house cannot be hindered, least of all family home not just to the dwelling structure
by the mere technical omission of said in which the family resides but also to the lot
common property from the complaint for on which it stands. Thus, applying these
partition. CaTcSA concepts, the subject house as well as the
specific portion of the subject land on which it
That said notwithstanding, we must stands are deemed constituted as a family
emphasize that, while we treat the subject home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma
house as part of the co-ownership of the from the moment they began occupying the
parties, we stop short of authorizing its actual same as a family residence 20 years back. 31
partition by public auction at this time. It
bears emphasis that an action for partition It being settled that the subject house (and
involves two phases: first, the declaration of the subject lot on which it stands) is the
the existence of a state of co-ownership; and family home of the deceased and his heirs, the
second, the actual termination of that state of same is shielded from immediate partition
co-ownership through the segregation of the under Article 159 of The Family Code, viz.:
common property. 28 What is settled thus far
is only the fact that the subject house is under Article 159. The family home shall continue
the co-ownership of the parties, and therefore despite the death of one or both spouses or of
susceptible of partition among them. the unmarried head of the family for a period
of ten years or for as long as there is a minor
Whether the subject house should be sold at beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the
public auction as ordered by the RTC is an same unless the court finds compelling
entirely different matter, depending on the reasons therefor. This rule shall apply
exact nature of the subject house. regardless of whoever owns the property or
constituted the family home. (Emphasis
Respondent claims that the subject house was supplied.)
built by decedent Fidel on his exclusive
property. 29 Petitioners add that said house The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the
has been their residence for 20 years. 30 disintegration of the family unit following the
Taken together, these averments on record death of its head. To this end, it preserves the
establish that the subject house is a family family home as the physical symbol of family
home within the contemplation of the love, security and unity by imposing the
provisions of The Family Code, particularly: following restrictions on its partition: first,
that the heirs cannot extra-judicially partition
Article 152. The family home, constituted it for a period of 10 years from the death of
jointly by the husband and the wife or by an one or both spouses or of the unmarried head
unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling of the family, or for a longer period, if there is
house where they and their family reside, and still a minor beneficiary residing therein; and
the land on which it is situated. second, that the heirs cannot judicially
Article 153. The family home is deemed partition it during the aforesaid periods unless
constituted on a house and lot from the time it the court finds compelling reasons therefor.
is occupied as a family residence. From the No compelling reason has been alleged by the
time of its constitution and so long as any of parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling
its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the reason to order the partition of the family
family home continues to be such and is home, either by physical segregation or
exempt from execution, forced sale or assignment to any of the heirs or through
attachment except as hereinafter provided and auction sale as suggested by the parties.
to the extent of the value allowed by law. ASEcHI
(Emphasis supplied.) CaAIES More importantly, Article 159 imposes the
One significant innovation introduced by The proscription against the immediate partition of
Family Code is the automatic constitution of the family home regardless of its ownership.
the family home from the time of its This signifies that even if the family home has
occupation as a family residence, without passed by succession to the co-ownership of
need anymore for the judicial or extrajudicial the heirs, or has been willed to any one of
processes provided under the defunct Articles them, this fact alone cannot transform the
224 to 251 of the Civil Code and Rule 106 of family home into an ordinary property, much
the Rules of Court. Furthermore, Articles 152 less dispel the protection cast upon it by the
and 153 specifically extend the scope of the law. The rights of the individual co-owner or
owner of the family home cannot subjugate within the period provided for in Article 159 of
the rights granted under Article 159 to the the Family Code. SCDaET
beneficiaries of the family home.
No costs.
Set against the foregoing rules, the family
home consisting of the subject house and SO ORDERED.
lot on which it stands cannot be partitioned Ynares-Santiago, Corona, * Nachura and
at this time, even if it has passed to the co- Reyes, JJ., concur.
ownership of his heirs, the parties herein.
Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003. 32
Thus, for 10 years from said date or until
March 10, 2013, or for a longer period, if there
is still a minor beneficiary residing therein,
the family home he constituted cannot be
partitioned, much less when no compelling
reason exists for the court to otherwise set
aside the restriction and order the partition of
the property.
Forum-shopping exists where the elements of Second Issue: Nullification of TCT No. T-
litis pendentia are present, namely: (a) identity 221755 (M)
of parties or at least such as representing the Anent the second issue, this Court finds that
same interests in both actions; (b) identity of the CA did not err in dismissing the
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief petitioners' complaint for nullification of TCT
being founded on the same facts; and (c) the No. T-221755 (M).
identity in the two cases should be such that
the judgment that may be rendered in one The subject property is a family
would, regardless of which party is successful,
amounts to res judicata in the other. home.
EHaCTA The petitioners maintain that the subject
property is a family home and, accordingly,
the sale thereof on execution was a nullity. In 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation
Ramos v. Pangilinan, 20 this Court laid down of law. All existing family residences as of
the rules relative to exemption of family homes August 3, 1988 are considered family homes
from execution: ASHaDT and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the Family
For the family home to be exempt from Code. 23 (emphasis supplied and citation
execution, distinction must be made as to omitted)
what law applies based on when it was
constituted and what requirements must be The foregoing rules on constitution of family
complied with by the judgment debtor or his homes, for purposes of exemption from
successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two execution, could be summarized as follows:
sets of rules are applicable.
First, family residences constructed before the
If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August
effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home
3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially in
either judicially or extra-judicially as provided accordance with the provisions of the Civil
under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Code in order to be exempt from execution;
Civil Code. Judicial constitution of the family
home requires the filing of a verified petition Second, family residences constructed after
before the courts and the registration of the the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
court's order with the Registry of Deeds of the 1988 are automatically deemed to be family
area where the property is located. Meanwhile, homes and thus exempt from execution from
extrajudicial constitution is governed by the time it was constituted and lasts as long
Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
involves the execution of a public instrument therein; TSIDEa
which must also be registered with the Third, family residences which were not
Registry of Property. Failure to comply with judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a
either one of these two modes of constitution family home prior to the effectivity of the
will bar a judgment debtor from availing of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are
privilege. considered as family homes by operation of
On the other hand, for family homes law and are prospectively entitled to the
constructed after the effectivity of the Family benefits accorded to a family home under the
Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to Family Code.
constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the Here, the subject property became a family
exemption is effective from the time it was residence sometime in January 1987. There
constituted and lasts as long as any of its was no showing, however, that the same was
beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a
therein. Moreover, the family home should family home in accordance with the provisions
belong to the absolute community or conjugal of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code
partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject
its constitution must have been with consent property became a family home by operation
of the other, and its value must not exceed of law and was thus prospectively exempt
certain amounts depending upon the area from execution. The petitioners were thus
where it is located. Further, the debts correct in asserting that the subject property
incurred for which the exemption does not was a family home.
apply as provided under Art. 155 for which
the family home is made answerable must The family home's exemption from
have been incurred after August 3, 1988. 21
(citations omitted) execution must be set up and
In the earlier case of Kelley, Jr. v. Planters proved to the Sheriff before the sale
Products, Inc., 22 we stressed that: aEDCSI of the property at public auction.
Under the Family Code, there is no need to Despite the fact that the subject property is a
constitute the family home judicially or
family home and, thus, should have been
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed exempt from execution, we nevertheless rule
after the effectivity of the Family Code (August that the CA did not err in dismissing the
petitioners' complaint for nullification of TCT time before the sale, or before the sale has
No. T-221755 (M). We agree with the CA that commenced, but as to the last there is
the petitioners should have asserted the contrary authority."
subject property being a family home and its
being exempted from execution at the time it In the light of the facts above summarized, it
was levied or within a reasonable time is self-evident that appellants did not assert
thereafter. As the CA aptly pointed out: Cdpr their claim of exemption within a reasonable
time. Certainly, reasonable time, for purposes
In the light of the facts above summarized, it of the law on exemption, does not mean a time
is evident that appellants did not assert their after the expiration of the one-year period
claim of exemption within a reasonable time. provided for in Section 30 of Rule 39 of the
Certainly, reasonable time, for purposes of the Rules of Court for judgment debtors to redeem
law on exemption, does not mean a time after the property sold on execution, otherwise it
the expiration of the one-year period provided would render nugatory final bills of sale on
for in Section 30 of Rule 39 of the Rules of execution and defeat the very purpose of
Court for judgment debtors to redeem the execution to put an end to litigation. We
property sold on execution, otherwise it would said before, and We repeat it now, that
render nugatory final bills of sale on execution litigation must end and terminate sometime
and defeat the very purpose of execution to and somewhere, and it is essential to an
put an end to litigation. . . . . 24 effective administration of justice that, once a
judgment has become final, the winning party
The foregoing disposition is in accord with the be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of
Court's November 25, 2005 Decision in the fruits of the verdict. We now rule that
Honrado v. Court of Appeals, 25 where it was claims for exemption from execution of
categorically stated that at no other time can properties under Section 12 of Rule 39 of the
the status of a residential house as a family Rules of Court must be presented before its
home can be set up and proved and its sale on execution by the sheriff. 26 (citations
exemption from execution be claimed but omitted)
before the sale thereof at public auction:
Reiterating the foregoing in Spouses Versola v.
While it is true that the family home is Court of Appeals, 27 this Court stated that:
constituted on a house and lot from the time it TcEAIH
is occupied as a family residence and is
exempt from execution or forced sale under Under the cited provision, a family home is
Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for deemed constituted on a house and lot from
exemption should be set up and proved to the the time it is occupied as a family residence;
Sheriff before the sale of the property at public there is no need to constitute the same
auction. Failure to do so would estop the party judicially or extrajudicially.
from later claiming the exemption. As this
Court ruled in Gomez v. Gealone: AIcECS The settled rule is that the right to exemption
or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family
Although the Rules of Court does not Code is a personal privilege granted to the
prescribe the period within which to claim the judgment debtor and as such, it must be
exemption, the rule is, nevertheless, well- claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor
settled that the right of exemption is a himself before the sale of the property at
personal privilege granted to the judgment public auction. It is not sufficient that the
debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by person claiming exemption merely alleges that
the sheriff, but by the debtor himself at the such property is a family home. This claim for
time of the levy or within a reasonable period exemption must be set up and proved to the
thereafter; Sheriff. . . . . 28 (emphasis supplied and
citations omitted)
"In the absence of express provision it has
variously held that claim (for exemption) must Having failed to set up and prove to the sheriff
be made at the time of the levy if the debtor is the supposed exemption of the subject
present, that it must be made within a property before the sale thereof at public
reasonable time, or promptly, or before the auction, the petitioners now are barred from
creditor has taken any step involving further raising the same. Failure to do so estop them
costs, or before advertisement of sale, or at from later claiming the said exemption.
any time before sale, or within a reasonable
Indeed, the family home is a sacred symbol of considerations demand that Claudio's title to
family love and is the repository of cherished the property be respected. Equity dictates that
memories that last during one's lifetime. 29 It the petitioners are made to suffer the
is likewise without dispute that the family consequences of their unexplained negligence.
home, from the time of its constitution and so
long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides WHEREFORE, in consideration of the
therein, is generally exempt from execution, foregoing disquisitions, the petition is
forced sale or attachment. 30 DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 6,
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
The family home is a real right, which is No. 79391, which affirmed the Decision of the
gratuitous, inalienable and free from Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
attachment. It cannot be seized by creditors Branch 22, in Civil Case No. 1058-M-99 and
except in certain special cases. 31 However, dismissed the complaint for declaration of
this right can be waived or be barred by laches nullity of TCT No. 221755 (M) and other
by the failure to set up and prove the status of documents, and the October 23, 2008
the property as a family home at the time of Resolution denying reconsideration, are
the levy or a reasonable time thereafter. AFFIRMED.
CcTIAH
SO ORDERED. DacASC
In this case, it is undisputed that the
petitioners allowed a considerable time to Carpio, Perez, Sereno and Perlas-Bernabe, *
lapse before claiming that the subject property JJ., concur.
is a family home and its exemption from
execution and forced sale under the Family
Code. The petitioners allowed the subject
property to be levied upon and the public sale
to proceed. One (1) year lapsed from the time
the subject property was sold until a Final
Deed of Sale was issued to Claudio and, later,
Araceli's Torrens title was cancelled and a new
one issued under Claudio's name, still, the
petitioner remained silent. In fact, it was only
after the respondents filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer, or approximately four (4)
years from the time of the auction sale, that
the petitioners claimed that the subject
property is a family home, thus, exempt from
execution.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari In their Complaint with Application for
filed by petitioner under Rule 45 of the 1997 Temporary Restraining Order, 7 respondents
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, praying sought to enjoin the impending foreclosure
for the reversal of the Decision 1 dated sale alleging that the same was hasty,
October 29, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) premature, unreasonable and unwarranted,
in CA-G.R. SP No. 77703, which denied its and also claiming defects in the execution of
petition for certiorari assailing the trial court's the REM. Respondents imputed bad faith on
orders granting respondents' application for a the part of petitioner who did not officially
writ of preliminary injunction. aHIDAE inform them of the denial or disapproval of
their proposal to settle the loan obligation by
The factual antecedents: "dacion via assignment of a commercial
Respondent-spouses Oscar and Evangeline property." Respondents maintained that aside
from the REM being illegally notarized,
Martinez obtained loans from petitioner
Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. in the aggregate incomplete and unenforceable, the obligation
amount of Four Million Forty-Eight Thousand subject thereof had been extinguished by the
Eight Hundred Pesos (P4,048,800.00). As dacion proposal considering that the value of
the property offered was more than sufficient
security for the said amount, a Real Estate
Mortgage (REM) was executed over a to pay for the mortgage debt. It was further
condominium unit in San Miguel Court, Valle averred that the subject property is being used
Verde 5, Pasig City, Metro Manila where the and occupied by respondent-spouses as a
family home.
spouses are residing. Respondent Oscar
Martinez signed the REM both as principal In his Order dated February 17, 2003, Judge
debtor and as President of the registered Mariano M. Singzon, Jr. granted the
owner and third-party mortgagor, respondent application for a writ of preliminary
OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. The REM was injunction. 8 Petitioner filed a motion for
annotated on Condominium Certificate of Title reconsideration which was denied under the
No. PT-21363 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig Order dated April 21, 2003. 9
City. 2
Petitioner questioned the issuance of
Respondent-spouses defaulted in the payment preliminary injunction before the CA arguing
of their outstanding loan obligation, which as that the respondents are not entitled to
of October 31, 2002 stood at P4,918,160.03. 3 injunctive relief after having admitted that
In a letter dated May 15, 2002, they offered to they were unable to settle their loan
settle their indebtedness "with the assignment obligations. By Decision dated October 29,
to the Bank of a commercial lot of 2004, the appellate court sustained the
corresponding value" and also requested for assailed orders, holding that:
recomputation at a lower interest rate and
condonation of penalties. 4 While petitioner's . . . respondent spouses have sufficiently
officers held a meeting with respondent Oscar shown that they have a right over the
Martinez, the latter however failed to submit condominium unit which is subject of the
the required documents such as certificates of mortgage. This proprietary right over the
title and tax declarations so that the bank can condominium is what they are trying to
evaluate his proposal to pay the mortgage debt protect when they applied for preliminary
via dacion en pago. 5 Consequently, petitioner injunction. As respondent spouses have
initiated the extrajudicial foreclosure of the alleged in their complaint, the issuance of
real estate mortgage by filing an ex parte notice of foreclosure sale is at most premature
as there are still several factual issues that proprietary right over the mortgaged property
need to be resolved before a foreclosure can be subject of foreclosure is utterly baseless, for
effected. Such already constitute the the following reasons: first, while the
ostensible right which respondent spouses condominium unit is supposedly a family
possess in order for the foreclosure sale to be home, it is admittedly owned by respondent
temporarily enjoined. 10 cSDIHT corporation and not by the conjugal
partnership or absolute community of
Hence, this petition raising the following respondent-spouses; and second, even
grounds: assuming that OJ-Mark Trading, Inc. is a
I family corporation, respondents' stance
contravenes the established rule that
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS properties registered in the name of the
COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR corporation are owned by it as an entity
IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID separate and distinct from its members or
NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF stockholders. 12
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED As to the alleged proposal of respondent Oscar
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION Martinez to assign commercial lots by dacion
en pago to settle their loan obligations,
II petitioner pointed out that the properties
offered for dacion are not owned, and much
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS less to be owned by him, but purportedly
COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR owned by another corporation (developer), the
IN HOLDING THAT INDIVIDUAL president of which supposedly owes him a
RESPONDENTS SPS. MARTINEZ HAVE sum of money. Respondent Oscar Martinez
PROPRIETARY RIGHT OVER THE likewise admitted during the hearings before
MORTGAGED CONDOMINIUM UNIT the trial court his unpaid loan with petitioner.
Moreover, with the filing of a petition for
III
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS mortgage by petitioner, it serves more than a
COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR formal rejection of respondents' dacion en
IN HOLDING THAT SUCH PURPORTED pago offer. 13
PROPRIETARY RIGHT OF RESPONDENTS
SPS. MARTINEZ DESERVES THE On their part, the respondents contended that
PROTECTIVE MANTLE OF A WRIT OF the petition raises factual issues not proper in
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION DESPITE THEIR an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. They
asserted that the trial court correctly found
CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL ADMISSION OF
THE OUTSTANDING LOANS AND THEIR sufficient legal basis to grant the writ of
DELINQUENCY preliminary injunction after conducting a
summary hearing in which both parties
IV actively participated and submitted oral and
documentary evidence. Such evidence
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS adduced by respondents, as well as the
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE ARE STILL Affidavit dated January 24, 2003 of Atty.
SEVERAL FACTUAL ISSUES TO BE Oscar Martinez (adopted in the February 7,
RESOLVED IN A FULL-BLOWN TRIAL 2003 hearing) fully supported their application
BEFORE PETITIONER EPCIB COULD and hence the trial court did not act
EXERCISE ITS STATUTORY AND EQUITABLE precipitately or arbitrarily in granting
RIGHT TO FORECLOSE 11 injunctive relief. 14 ECTSDa
The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not Respondents argued that they appear to be
the respondents have shown a clear legal right entitled to the relief demanded by their
to enjoin the foreclosure and public auction of Complaint "because petitioner was in bad
the third-party mortgagor's property while the faith when it proceeded to foreclose while
case for annulment of REM on said property is there was still a pending written proposal to
being tried. SDHCac pay." They stand to lose a prime property, and
thus made a serious and sincere offer by way
Petitioner argued that the appellate court's
of dacion en pago. To show good faith and as
conclusion that respondents possess
required by petitioner to continue the
negotiations for dacion, respondent Atty. injunction may be granted when it is
Oscar Martinez even paid P100,000.00 in established:
October 2002, which petitioner accepted. But
petitioner maliciously, fraudulently and (a) That the applicant is entitled to the
hastily proceeded to foreclose the renovated relief demanded, and the whole or part of such
mortgaged property, apparently motivated by relief consists in restraining the commission
its discovery after re-appraisal that the floor or continuance of the act or acts complained
area of the townhouse and number of its of, or in requiring the performance of an act or
rooms had doubled (from 180.750 sq. m. with acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
three [3] bedrooms, it is now 350 sq. m. with (b) That the commission, continuance or
six [6] bedrooms). Respondents contended non-performance of the act or acts complained
that as creditor, it was petitioner's duty not to of during the litigation would probably work
sit on respondents' dacion offer and should injustice to the applicant; or
have informed them in writing that said offer
is rejected. By hanging on the dacion talks, (c) That a party, court, agency or a person
petitioner thus prevented the respondents' is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or
repayment of the loan, in malicious haste to is procuring or suffering to be done, some act
acquire the condominium unit as asset. 15 or acts probably in violation of the rights of
the applicant respecting the subject of the
Respondents further claimed that the action or proceeding, and tending to render
extrajudicial foreclosure will cause grave the judgment ineffectual.
injustice and irreparable injury to respondent-
spouses and their four (4) young children As such, a writ of preliminary injunction may
because their family home, in which they were be issued only upon clear showing of an
residing since 1997, at least insofar as the actual existing right to be protected during the
unencumbered area in excess of 180.750 sq. pendency of the principal action. The twin
m., is exempt from forced sale or execution requirements of a valid injunction are the
under Article 155 of the Family Code. existence of a right and its actual or
Petitioner, on the other hand, will not suffer threatened violations. Thus, to be entitled to
any loss if the foreclosure will not proceed. 16 an injunctive writ, the right to be protected
and the violation against that right must be
With respect to the commercial lots offered in shown. 18 A writ of preliminary injunction
dacion, respondents fault the petitioner in may be issued only upon clear showing of an
deliberately ignoring the fact that the Blue actual existing right to be protected during the
Mountains Subdivision located at Antipolo pendency of the principal action. 19
City was already approved by the Land
Registration Authority; although the The issuance of a preliminary injunction rests
subdivided lots have already been applied, the entirely within the discretion of the court
individual titles had not yet been issued. It taking cognizance of the case and is generally
was therefore impossible for respondents to not interfered with except in cases of manifest
deliver these titles to petitioner by October 21, abuse. 20 For the issuance of the writ of
2002 considering the normal time it takes to preliminary injunction to be proper, it must be
secure land titles. Respondents deplored the shown that the invasion of the right sought to
sudden filing of the petition for extrajudicial be protected is material and substantial, that
foreclosure, which was unfair as the the right of complainant is clear and
negotiations had already reached the stage unmistakable and that there is an urgent and
when petitioner scheduled an ocular paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
inspection for the appraisal of the lots. serious damage. In the absence of a clear legal
However, for unknown reasons, petitioner did right, the issuance of a writ of injunction
not push through with the inspection. 17 constitutes grave abuse of discretion. 21
HaIATC AaCcST
In Almeida v. Court of Appeals, the Court We are in full accord with the CA when it
stressed how important it is for the applicant struck down, for having been issued with
for an injunctive writ to establish his right grave abuse of discretion, the RTC's Order of
thereto by competent evidence: September 25, 2002, granting petitioner's
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
Thus, the petitioner, as plaintiff, was during the pendency of the main case, Civil
burdened to adduce testimonial and/or Case No. 02-1029. The reason therefor is that
documentary evidence to establish her right to the right sought to be protected by the
the injunctive writs. It must be stressed that petitioner in this case through the writ of
injunction is not designed to protect preliminary injunction is merely contingent
contingent or future rights, and, as such, the and not in esse. It bears stressing that the
possibility of irreparable damage without proof existing written contract between petitioner
of actual existing right is no ground for an and respondent was admittedly one of loan
injunction. A clear and positive right restructuring; there is no mention whatsoever
especially calling for judicial protection must or even a slightest reference in that written
be established. Injunction is not a remedy to contract to a supposed agreement of dacion en
protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or pago. In fine, it is still necessary for petitioner
future rights; it will not issue to protect a right to establish in the main case its rights on the
not in esse and which may never arise, or to alleged dacion en pago before those rights
restrain an action which did not give rise to a become in esse or actual and existing. Only
cause of action. There must be an existence of then can the injunctive writ be properly
an actual right. Hence, where the plaintiff's issued. It cannot be the other way around.
right or title is doubtful or disputed, Otherwise, it will be like putting the cart
injunction is not proper. before the horse. 24 [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]
An injunctive remedy may only be resorted to In the case at bar, respondents failed to show
when there is a pressing necessity to avoid that they have a right to be protected and that
injurious consequences which cannot be the acts against which the writ is to be
remedied under any standard compensation. directed are violative of the said right. On the
The possibility of irreparable damage without face of their clear admission that they were
proof of an actual existing right would not unable to settle their obligations which were
justify injunctive relief in his favor. secured by the mortgage, petitioner has a
xxx xxx xxx clear right to foreclose the mortgage. 25
Foreclosure is but a necessary consequence of
. . . . In the absence of a clear legal right, the non-payment of a mortgage indebtedness. 26
issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes In a real estate mortgage when the principal
grave abuse of discretion. As the Court had obligation is not paid when due, the
the occasion to state in Olalia v. Hizon, 196 mortgagee has the right to foreclose the
SCRA 665 (1991): IEHScT mortgage and to have the property seized and
sold with the view of applying the proceeds to
It has been consistently held that there is no the payment of the obligation. 27 CSDcTH
power the exercise of which is more delicate,
which requires greater caution, deliberation This Court has denied the application for a
and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a Writ of Preliminary Injunction that would
doubtful case, than the issuance of an enjoin an extrajudicial foreclosure of a
injunction. It is the strong arm of equity that mortgage, and declared that foreclosure is
should never be extended unless to cases of proper when the debtors are in default of the
great injury, where courts of law cannot afford payment of their obligation. Where the parties
an adequate or commensurate remedy in stipulated in their credit agreements,
damages. mortgage contracts and promissory notes that
the mortgagee is authorized to foreclose the
mortgaged properties in case of default by the On the first issue, the Court of Appeals did
mortgagors, the mortgagee has a clear right to not err in ruling that Tecnogas has no clear
foreclosure in case of default, making the legal right to an injunctive relief because its
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction proposal to pay by way of dacion en pago did
improper. 28 In these cases, unsubstantiated not extinguish its obligation. Undeniably,
allegations of denial of due process and Tecnogas' proposal to pay by way of dacion en
prematurity of a loan are not sufficient to pago was not accepted by PNB. Thus, the
defeat the mortgagee's unmistakable right to unaccepted proposal neither novates the
an extrajudicial foreclosure. 29 parties' mortgage contract nor suspends its
execution as there was no meeting of the
We cannot agree with respondents' position minds between the parties on whether the
that petitioner's act of initiating extrajudicial loan will be extinguished by way of dacion en
foreclosure proceeding while they negotiated pago. Necessarily, upon Tecnogas' default in
for a dacion en pago was illegal and done in its obligations, the foreclosure of the REM
bad faith. As respondent-spouses themselves becomes a matter of right on the part of PNB,
admitted, they failed to comply with the for such is the purpose of requiring security
documentary requirements imposed by the for the loans. [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]
petitioner for proper evaluation of their
proposal. In any event, petitioner had found Respondent-spouses' alleged "proprietary
the subdivision lots offered for dacion as right" in the mortgaged condominium unit
unacceptable, not only because the lots were appears to be based merely on respondents'
not owned by respondents as in fact, the averment that respondent OJ-Mark Trading,
lots were not yet titled but also for the Inc. is a family corporation. However, there is
reason that respondent Oscar Martinez's neither allegation nor evidence to show prima
claimed right therein was doubtful or facie that such purported right, whether as
inchoate, and hence not in esse. majority stockholder or creditor, was superior
to that of petitioner as creditor-mortgagee. The
Requests by debtors-mortgagors for rule requires that in order for a preliminary
extensions to pay and proposals for injunction to issue, the application should
restructuring of the loans, without acceptance clearly allege facts and circumstances showing
by the creditor-mortgagee, remain as that. the existence of the requisites. It must be
Without more, those proposals neither emphasized that an application for injunctive
novated the parties' mortgage contract nor relief is construed strictly against the pleader.
suspended its execution. 30 In the same vein, 32
negotiations for settlement of the mortgage
debt by dacion en pago do not extinguish the We note that the claim of exemption under
same nor forestall the creditor-mortgagee's Art. 153 of the Family Code, thereby raising
exercise of its right to foreclose as provided in issue on the mortgaged condominium unit
the mortgage contract. being a family home and not corporate
property, is entirely inconsistent with the clear
As we held in Tecnogas Philippines contractual agreement of the REM. 33
Manufacturing Corporation v. Philippine Assuming arguendo that the mortgaged
National Bank 31 EaICAD condominium unit constitutes respondents'
Dacion en pago is a special mode of payment family home, the same will not exempt it from
whereby the debtor offers another thing to the foreclosure as Article 155 (3) of the same Code
creditor who accepts it as equivalent of allows the execution or forced sale of a family
payment of an outstanding obligation. The home "for debts secured by mortgages on the
undertaking is really one of sale, that is, the premises before or after such constitution."
creditor is really buying the thing or property Respondents thus failed to show an ostensible
of the debtor, payment for which is to be right that needs protection of the injunctive
charged against the debtor's debt. As such, writ. Clearly, the appellate court seriously
the essential elements of a contract of sale, erred in sustaining the trial court's orders
namely, consent, object certain, and cause or granting respondents' application for
consideration must be present. It is only when preliminary injunction. cSTHaE
the thing offered as an equivalent is accepted Anent the grave and irreparable injury which
by the creditor that novation takes place, respondents alleged they will suffer if no
thereby, totally extinguishing the debt. preliminary injunction is issued, this Court
has previously declared that all is not lost for
defaulting mortgagors whose properties were THIRD DIVISION
foreclosed by creditors-mortgagees, viz.:
[G.R. No. 185920. July 20, 2010.]
In any case, petitioners will not be deprived
outrightly of their property. Pursuant to JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS, ALMA RAMOS
Section 47 of the General Banking Law of WORAK, MANUEL T. RAMOS, JOSEFINA R.
2000, mortgagors who have judicially or ROTHMAN, SONIA R. POST, ELVIRA P.
extrajudicially sold their real property for the MUNAR, and OFELIA R. LIM, petitioners,
full or partial payment of their obligation have vs. DANILO PANGILINAN, RODOLFO
the right to redeem the property within one SUMANG, LUCRECIO BAUTISTA and
year after the sale. They can redeem their real ROLANDO ANTENOR, respondents.
estate by paying the amount due, with interest DECISION
rate specified, under the mortgage deed; as
well as all the costs and expenses incurred by CARPIO MORALES, J p:
the bank.
Respondents filed in 2003 a complaint 1 for
Moreover, in extrajudicial foreclosures, illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric,
petitioners have the right to receive any Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos
surplus in the selling price. This right was (Ramos), the patriarch of herein petitioners.
recognized in Sulit v. CA, in which the Court By Decision 2 of April 15, 2005, the Labor
held that "if the mortgagee is retaining more of Arbiter ruled in favor of respondents and
the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to, ordered Ramos and the company to pay the
this fact alone will not affect the validity of the aggregate amount of P1,661,490.30
sale but simply gives the mortgagor a cause of representing their backwages, separation pay,
action to recover such surplus. 34 13th month pay & service incentive leave pay.
HTaIAC
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated October 29, 2004 of the Court The Decision having become final and
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77703 is hereby executory and no settlement having been
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents' forged by the parties, the Labor Arbiter issued
application for a writ of preliminary injunction on September 8, 2005 a writ of execution 3
is DENIED. which the Deputy Sheriff of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by
No costs. HSaEAD levying a property in Ramos' name covered by
SO ORDERED. TCT No. 38978, situated in Pandacan, Manila
(Pandacan property).
Carpio Morales, Brion, Bersamin and Abad, *
JJ., concur. Alleging that the Pandacan property was the
family home, hence, exempt from execution to
satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the
company moved to quash the writ of
execution. 4 Respondents, however, averred
that the Pandacan property is not the Ramos
family home, as it has another in Antipolo,
and the Pandacan property in fact served as
the company's business address as borne by
the company's letterhead. Respondents added
that, assuming that the Pandacan property
was indeed the family home, only the value
equivalent to P300,000 was exempt from
execution.
Before the appellate court, petitioners alleged No doubt, a family home is generally exempt
that the NLRC erred in ruling that the market from execution provided it was duly
value of the property was P2,177,000 as constituted as such. There must be proof that
assessed by the City Assessor of Manila and the alleged family home was constituted
appearing in the documents submitted before jointly by the husband and wife or by an
the Labor Arbiter, claiming that at the time unmarried head of a family. It must be the
the Pandacan property was constituted as the house where they and their family actually
family home in 1944, its value was way below reside and the lot on which it is situated. The
P300,000; and that Art. 153 of the Family family home must be part of the properties of
Code was applicable, hence, they no longer the absolute community or the conjugal
had to resort to judicial or extrajudicial partnership, or of the exclusive properties of
constitution. either spouse with the latter's consent, or on
the property of the unmarried head of the
In the assailed Decision 7 of September 24, family. The actual value of the family home
2008, the appellate court, in denying shall not exceed, at the time of its
petitioners' appeal, held that the Pandacan constitution, the amount of P300,000 in
property was not exempted from execution, for urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas.
while "Article 153 8 of the Family Code
provides that the family home is deemed Under the Family Code, there is no need to
constituted on a house and lot from the time it constitute the family home judicially or
is occupied as a family residence, [it] did not extrajudicially. All family homes constructed
after the effectivity of the Family Code (August exceed certain amounts depending upon the
3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation area where it is located. Further, the debts
of law. All existing family residences as of incurred for which the exemption does not
August 3, 1988 are considered family homes apply as provided under Art. 155 14 for which
and are prospectively entitled to the benefits the family home is made answerable must
accorded to a family home under the Family have been incurred after August 3, 1988.
Code. IDCHTE
The exemption is effective from the time of the And in both cases, whether under the Civil
constitution of the family home as such and Code or the Family Code, it is not sufficient
lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries that the person claiming exemption merely
actually resides therein. Moreover, the debts alleges that such property is a family home.
for which the family home is made answerable This claim for exemption must be set up and
must have been incurred after August 3, proved. 15
1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred
prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged family In the present case, since petitioners claim
home must be shown to have been constituted that the family home was constituted prior to
either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they
the Civil Code. (emphasis supplied) cDAISC must comply with the procedure mandated by
the Civil Code. There being absolutely no proof
For the family home to be exempt from that the Pandacan property was judicially or
execution, distinction must be made as to extrajudicially constituted as the Ramos'
what law applies based on when it was family home, the law's protective mantle
constituted and what requirements must be cannot be availed of by petitioners.
complied with by the judgment debtor or his Parenthetically, the records show that the
successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sheriff exhausted all means to execute the
sets of rules are applicable. judgment but failed because Ramos' bank
accounts 16 were already closed while other
If the family home was constructed before the properties in his or the company's name had
effectivity of the Family Code or before August already been transferred, 17 and the only
3, 1988, then it must have been constituted property left was the Pandacan property.
either judicially or extra-judicially as provided
under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Civil Code. 11 Judicial constitution of the
family home requires the filing of a verified SO ORDERED.
petition before the courts and the registration Brion, Bersamin, Abad * and Villarama, Jr.,
of the court's order with the Registry of Deeds JJ., concur.
of the area where the property is located.
Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is
governed by Articles 240 to 242 12 of the Civil
Code and involves the execution of a public
instrument which must also be registered with
the Registry of Property. Failure to comply
with either one of these two modes of
constitution will bar a judgment debtor from
availing of the privilege.
I'M CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS c. Any two of the following documents
AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF AGE TURNING 20 showing clearly the paternity between the
THIS COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005. 5 I father and the child:
RESIDE AT PULANG-LUPA STREET BRGY. 1. Employment records
DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE
2. SSS/GSIS records For failure to file a responsive pleading or
answer despite service of summons,
3. Insurance respondent was declared in default.
4. Certification of membership in any Jenie thereupon presented evidence ex-parte.
organization She testified on the circumstances of her
5. Statement of Assets and Liability common-law relationship with Dominique and
affirmed her declarations in her AUSF that
6. Income Tax Return (ITR) during his lifetime, he had acknowledged his
yet unborn child. 11 She offered Dominique's
In summary, the child cannot use the handwritten Autobiography (Exhibit "A") as
surname of his father because he was born her documentary evidence-in-chief. 12
out of wedlock and the father unfortunately Dominique's lone brother, Joseph Butch S.T.
died prior to his birth and has no more Aquino, also testified, corroborating Jenie's
capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the declarations. 13 IEHSDA
child (either through the back of Municipal
Form No. 102 Affidavit of By Decision 14 of April 25, 2007, the trial
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity or court dismissed the complaint "for lack of
the Authority to Use the Surname of the cause of action" as the Autobiography was
Father). (Underscoring supplied) unsigned, citing paragraph 2.2, Rule 2
(Definition of Terms) of Administrative Order
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004 (the Rules and
9 for injunction/registration of name against Regulations Governing the Implementation of
respondent before the Regional Trial Court of R.A. 9255) which defines "private handwritten
Antipolo City, docketed as SCA Case No. 06- document" through which a father may
539, which was raffled to Branch 73 thereof. acknowledge an illegitimate child as follows:
The complaint alleged that, inter alia, the
denial of registration of the child's name is a 2.2 Private handwritten instrument an
violation of his right to use the surname of his instrument executed in the handwriting of the
deceased father under Article 176 of the father and duly signed by him where he
Family Code, as amended by Republic Act expressly recognizes paternity to the child.
(R.A.) No. 9255, 10 which provides: (Underscoring supplied)
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the The trial court held that even if Dominique
surname and shall be under the parental was the author of the handwritten
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled Autobiography, the same does not contain any
to support in conformity with this Code. express recognition of paternity.
However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has Hence, this direct resort to the Court via
been expressly recognized by the father Petition for Review on Certiorari raising this
through the record of birth appearing in the purely legal issue of:
civil register, or when an admission in a WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED
public document or private handwritten HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE
instrument is made by the father. Provided, DECEASED FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN
the father has the right to institute an action DELA CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A
before the regular courts to prove non-filiation RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A "PRIVATE
during his lifetime. The legitime of each HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT" WITHIN THE
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176 OF THE
the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis FAMILY CODE, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 9255,
and underscoring supplied) WHICH ENTITLES THE SAID MINOR TO USE
They maintained that the Autobiography HIS FATHER'S SURNAME. 15 (Underscoring
executed by Dominique constitutes an supplied)
admission of paternity in a "private Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the
handwritten instrument" within the Family Code, as amended, does not expressly
contemplation of the above-quoted provision require that the private handwritten
of law. instrument containing the putative father's
admission of paternity must be signed by him.
They add that the deceased's handwritten
Autobiography, though unsigned by him, is (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a
sufficient, for the requirement in the above- public document or a private handwritten
quoted paragraph 2.2 of the Administrative instrument and signed by the parent
Order that the admission/recognition must be concerned.
"duly signed" by the father is void as it
"unduly expanded" the earlier-quoted xxx xxx xxx
provision of Article 176 of the Family Code. 16 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioners further contend that the trial court That a father who acknowledges paternity of a
erred in not finding that Dominique's child through a written instrument must affix
handwritten Autobiography contains a "clear his signature thereon is clearly implied in
and unmistakable" recognition of the child's Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2,
paternity. 17 Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely
articulated such requirement; it did not
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor "unduly expand" the import of Article 176 as
General (OSG) submits that respondent's claimed by petitioners.
position, as affirmed by the trial court, is in
consonance with the law and thus prays for In the present case, however, special
the dismissal of the petition. It further circumstances exist to hold that Dominique's
submits that Dominique's Autobiography Autobiography, though unsigned by him,
"merely acknowledged Jenie's pregnancy but substantially satisfies the requirement of the
not [his] paternity of the child she was law.
carrying in her womb". 18 First, Dominique died about two months prior
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by to the child's birth. Second, the relevant
R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably
the surname of his/her father if the latter had handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the
expressly recognized him/her as his offspring facts culled from the testimonial evidence
through the record of birth appearing in the Jenie proffered. 20 Third, Jenie's testimony is
civil register, or through an admission made corroborated by the Affidavit of
in a public or private handwritten instrument. Acknowledgment of Dominique's father
The recognition made in any of these Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother
documents is, in itself, a consummated act of Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights
acknowledgment of the child's paternity; could be affected by the registration of the
hence, no separate action for judicial approval questioned recognition of the child. These
is necessary. 19 circumstances indicating Dominique's
paternity of the child give life to his
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, statements in his Autobiography that "JENIE
does not, indeed, explicitly state that the DELA CRUZ" is "MY WIFE" as "WE FELL IN
private handwritten instrument LOVE WITH EACH OTHER" and "NOW SHE IS
acknowledging the child's paternity must be PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE
signed by the putative father. This provision TOGETHER".
must, however, be read in conjunction with
related provisions of the Family Code which In Herrera v. Alba, 21 the Court summarized
require that recognition by the father must the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on
bear his signature, thus: establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant
part:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may
establish their illegitimate filiation in the same Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
way and on the same evidence as legitimate Establishing Filiation
children. caHASI
The relevant provisions of the Family Code
xxx xxx xxx provide as follows:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate ART. 175. Illegitimate children may
children is established by any of the following: establish their illegitimate filiation in the same
(1) The record of birth appearing in the way and on the same evidence as legitimate
civil register or a final judgment; or children.
There being no law which compels the Court It is, therefore, undeniable established by
to act one way or the other on this matter, the the evidence in this case that the appellant
Court invokes the provision of Art. 8, PD 603 [Ma. Theresa] was married to Mario Gopiao,
as amended, otherwise known as the Child and that she had never entered into a lawful
and Youth Welfare Code, to wit: marriage with the appellee [Gerardo] since the
so-called "marriage" with the latter was void
"In all questions regarding the care, custody, ab initio. It was [Gerardo] himself who had
education and property of the child, his established these facts. In other words, [Ma.
welfare shall be the paramount consideration." Theresa] was legitimately married to Mario
WHEREFORE, the respondent's Motion for Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo was born
Reconsideration has to be, as it is hereby on December 8, 1990. Therefore, the child
DENIED. 12 Jose Gerardo under the law is the
legitimate child of the legal and subsisting
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario
Appeals, assigning as error the ruling of the Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the
trial court granting visitation rights to illegitimate child of the void and non-existent
Gerardo. She likewise opposed the continued 'marriage' between [Ma. Theresa] and
use of Gerardo's surname (Concepcion) [Gerardo], but is said by the law to be the
despite the fact that Jose Gerardo had already child of the legitimate and existing marriage
been declared illegitimate and should between [Ma. Theresa] and Mario Gopiao (Art.
therefore use her surname (Almonte). The 164, Family Code). Consequently, [she] is right
appellate court denied the petition and in firmly saying that [Gerardo] can claim
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. neither custody nor visitorial rights over the
13 child Jose Gerardo. Further, [Gerardo] cannot
impose his name upon the child. Not only is it
On the issue raised by Ma. Theresa that there without legal basis (even supposing the child
was nothing in the law that granted a putative to be his illegitimate child [Art. 146, The
father visitation rights over his illegitimate Family Code]); it would tend to destroy the
child, the appellate court affirmed the "best existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and
interest of the child" policy invoked by the Gopiao, would prevent any possible
court a quo. It ruled that "[a]t bottom, it (was) rapprochement between the married couple,
the child's welfare and not the convenience of and would mean a judicial seal upon an
the parents which (was) the primary illegitimate relationship. 16
consideration in granting visitation rights a
few hours once a week." 14 The appellate court brushed aside the
common admission of Gerardo and Ma.
The appellate court likewise held that an Theresa that Jose Gerardo was their son. It
illegitimate child cannot use the mother's gave little weight to Jose Gerardo's birth
surname motu proprio. The child, represented certificate showing that he was born a little
by the mother, should file a separate less than a year after Gerardo and Ma.
proceeding for a change of name under Rule Theresa were married:
103 of the Rules of Court to effect the
correction in the civil registry. 15 We are not unaware of the movant's argument
that various evidence exist that appellee and
Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for the the appellant have judicially admitted that the
reconsideration of the adverse decision of the minor is their natural child. But, in the same
vein, We cannot overlook the fact that Article proper case, 25 his heirs, who can contest the
167 of the Family Code mandates: legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to
his wife. 26 Impugning the legitimacy of a
"The child shall be considered legitimate child is a strictly personal right of the
although the mother may have declared husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. 27
against its legitimacy or may have been Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma.
sentenced as an adulteress." (underscoring Theresa was void from the very beginning, he
ours) never became her husband and thus never
Thus, implicit from the above provision is the acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of
fact that a minor cannot be deprived of her child. DHAcET
his/her legitimate status on the bare The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from
declaration of the mother and/or even much the sexual union in marriage, particularly
less, the supposed father. In fine, the law and during the period of conception. 28 To
only the law determines who are the legitimate overthrow this presumption on the basis of
or illegitimate children for one's legitimacy or Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must
illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there
even the birth certificate of the minor can was no access that could have enabled the
change his status for the information husband to father the child. 29 Sexual
contained therein are merely supplied by the intercourse is to be presumed where personal
mother and/or the supposed father. It should access is not disproved, unless such
be what the law says and not what a parent presumption is rebutted by evidence to the
says it is. 17 (Emphasis supplied) contrary. 30
Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may
reconsideration of the above decision but the be refuted only by the evidence of physical
same was denied. 18 Hence, this appeal. impossibility of coitus between husband and
The status and filiation of a child cannot be wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days
compromised. 19 Article 164 of the Family which immediately preceded the birth of the
Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born child. 31
during the marriage of his parents is To rebut the presumption, the separation
legitimate. 20 between the spouses must be such as to make
As a guaranty in favor of the child 21 and to marital intimacy impossible. 32 This may take
protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of place, for instance, when they reside in
the Family Code provides: different countries or provinces and they were
never together during the period of
Article 167. The child shall be considered conception. 33 Or, the husband was in prison
legitimate although the mother may have during the period of conception, unless it
declared against its legitimacy or may have appears that sexual union took place through
been sentenced as an adulteress. the violation of prison regulations. 34
The law requires that every reasonable Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma.
presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. Theresa were living together in Fairview,
22 We explained the rationale of this rule in Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola
the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Heights which is also in Quezon City. Fairview
Appeals 23 : and Loyola Heights are only a scant four
kilometers apart.
The presumption of legitimacy does not only
flow out of a declaration in the statute but is Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario
based on the broad principles of natural reside in the same city but also that no
justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. evidence at all was presented to disprove
It is grounded on the policy to protect the personal access between them. Considering
innocent offspring from the odium of these circumstances, the separation between
illegitimacy. Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario,
was certainly not such as to make it
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b) 24 of the physically impossible for them to engage in
Family Code. He cannot. He has no standing the marital act.
in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo.
Only Ma. Theresa's husband Mario or, in a
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Finally, for reasons of public decency and
Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption morality, a married woman cannot say that
should be presented by him who asserts the she had no intercourse with her husband and
contrary. There is no such evidence here. that her offspring is illegitimate. 39 The
Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of proscription is in consonance with the
Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage presumption in favor of family solidarity. It
between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands. also promotes the intention of the law to lean
toward the legitimacy of children. 40
Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresa's statement in
her answer 35 to the petition for annulment of Gerardo's insistence that the filiation of Jose
marriage 36 that she never lived with Mario. Gerardo was never an issue both in the trial
He claims this was an admission that there court and in the appellate court does not hold
was never any sexual relation between her water. The fact that both Ma. Theresa and
and Mario, an admission that was binding on Gerardo admitted and agreed that Jose
her. Gerardo was born to them was immaterial.
That was, in effect, an agreement that the
Gerardo's argument is without merit. child was illegitimate. If the Court were to
First, the import of Ma. Theresa's statement is validate that stipulation, then it would be
that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son tantamount to allowing the mother to make a
with Mario but her illegitimate son with declaration against the legitimacy of her child
Gerardo. This declaration an avowal by the and consenting to the denial of filiation of the
mother that her child is illegitimate is the child by persons other than her husband.
very declaration that is proscribed by Article These are the very acts from which the law
167 of the Family Code. seeks to shield the child.
The language of the law is unmistakable. An Public policy demands that there be no
assertion by the mother against the legitimacy compromise on the status and filiation of a
of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child. 41 Otherwise, the child will be at the
child born or conceived within a valid mercy of those who may be so minded to
marriage. exploit his defenselessness.
Second, even assuming the truth of her The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardo's
statement, it does not mean that there was birth certificate is misplaced. It has no
never an instance where Ma. Theresa could evidentiary value in this case because it was
have been together with Mario or that there not offered in evidence before the trial court.
occurred absolutely no intercourse between The rule is that the court shall not consider
them. All she said was that she never lived any evidence which has not been formally
with Mario. She never claimed that nothing offered. 42
ever happened between them. Moreover, the law itself establishes the status
Telling is the fact that both of them were living of a child from the moment of his birth. 43
in Quezon City during the time material to Although a record of birth or birth certificate
Jose Gerardo's conception and birth. Far from may be used as primary evidence of the
foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy, filiation of a child, 44 as the status of a child
their proximity to each other only serves to is determined by the law itself, proof of
reinforce such possibility. Thus, the filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy
impossibility of physical access was never of the child is being questioned, or when the
established beyond reasonable doubt. cda status of a child born after 300 days following
the termination of marriage is sought to be
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresa's established. 45
statement is to allow her to arrogate unto
herself a right exclusively lodged in the Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a
husband, or in a proper case, his heirs. 37 A legitimate child was not under attack as it
mother has no right to disavow a child could not be contested collaterally and, even
because maternity is never uncertain. 38 then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary
Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of
question Jose Gerardo's legitimacy. proof of legitimacy in this case was improper
and uncalled for. ISDCHA
In addition, a record of birth is merely prima Having only his best interests in mind, we
facie evidence of the facts contained therein. uphold the presumption of his legitimacy.
46 As prima facie evidence, the statements in
the record of birth may be rebutted by more As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have
preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive the right to bear the surnames of his father
evidence with respect to the truthfulness of Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity
the statements made therein by the interested with the provisions of the Civil Code on
parties. 47 Between the certificate of birth surnames. 50 A person's surname or family
which is prima facie evidence of Jose name identifies the family to which he belongs
Gerardo's illegitimacy and the quasi- and is passed on from parent to child. 51
conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname
by proof beyond reasonable doubt) of his on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law,
legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only not related to him in any way.
does it bear more weight, it is also more The matter of changing Jose Gerardo's name
conducive to the best interests of the child and effecting the corrections of the entries in
and in consonance with the purpose of the the civil register regarding his paternity and
law. filiation should be threshed out in a separate
It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. proceeding.
Theresa would doggedly press for Jose In case of annulment or declaration of
Gerardo's illegitimacy while claiming that they absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the
both had the child's interests at heart. The Family Code grants visitation rights to a
law, reason and common sense dictate that a parent who is deprived of custody of his
legitimate status is more favorable to the children. Such visitation rights flow from the
child. In the eyes of the law, the legitimate natural right of both parent and child to each
child enjoys a preferred and superior status. other's company. There being no such parent-
He is entitled to bear the surnames of both his child relationship between them, Gerardo has
father and mother, full support and full no legally demandable right to visit Jose
inheritance. 48 On the other hand, an Gerardo.
illegitimate child is bound to use the surname
and be under the parental authority only of Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the
his mother. He can claim support only from a child. Article 8 of PD 603, otherwise known as
more limited group and his legitime is only the Child and Youth Welfare Code, is clear
half of that of his legitimate counterpart. 49 and unequivocal:
Moreover (without unwittingly exacerbating
the discrimination against him), in the eyes of Article 8. Child's Welfare Paramount. In
society, a 'bastard' is usually regarded as all questions regarding the care, custody,
bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor. education and property of the child, his
Needless to state, the legitimacy presumptively welfare shall be the paramount consideration.
vested by law upon Jose Gerardo favors his
Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention
interest. on the Rights of a Child of which the
It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used Philippines is a signatory is similarly
as a pawn in the bitter squabble between the emphatic:
very persons who were passionately declaring
Article 3
their concern for him. The paradox was that
he was made to suffer supposedly for his own 1. In all actions concerning children,
sake. This madness should end. whether undertaken by public or private social
welfare institutions, courts of law,
This case has been pending for a very long
administrative authorities or legislative bodies,
time already. What is specially tragic is that
the best interests of the child shall be a
an innocent child is involved. Jose Gerardo primary consideration.
was barely a year old when these proceedings
began. He is now almost fifteen and all this The State as parens patriae affords special
time he has been a victim of incessant protection to children from abuse, exploitation
bickering. The law now comes to his aid to and other conditions prejudicial to their
write finis to the controversy which has development. It is mandated to provide
unfairly hounded him since his infancy. protection to those of tender years. 52
DcCEHI Through its laws, the State safeguards them
from every one, even their own parents, to the SECOND DIVISION
end that their eventual development as
responsible citizens and members of society [G.R. No. 182367. December 15, 2010.]
shall not be impeded, distracted or impaired CHERRYL B. DOLINA, petitioner, vs.
by family acrimony. This is especially GLENN D. VALLECERA, respondent.
significant where, as in this case, the issue
concerns their filiation as it strikes at their DECISION
very identity and lineage. ADEaHT
ABAD, J p:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The September 14, 1995 and January 10, This case is about a mother's claim for
1996 resolutions of the Court of Appeals in temporary support of an unacknowledged
CA-G.R. CV No. 40651 are hereby AFFIRMED. child, which she sought in an action for the
issuance of a temporary protection order that
Costs against petitioner. she brought against the supposed father.
aEcSIH
SO ORDERED.
The Facts and the Case
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Garcia,
JJ., concur. In February 2008 petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina
filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of
Carpio-Morales, J., took no part. a temporary protection order against
respondent Glenn D. Vallecera before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City in
P.O. 2008-02-07 1 for alleged woman and
child abuse under Republic Act (R.A.) 9262. 2
In filling out the blanks in the pro-forma
complaint, Dolina added a handwritten prayer
for financial support 3 from Vallecera for their
supposed child. She based her prayer on the
latter's Certificate of Live Birth which listed
Vallecera as the child's father. The petition
also asked the RTC to order Philippine
Airlines, Vallecera's employer, to withhold
from his pay such amount of support as the
RTC may deem appropriate.
Clarissa accepted petitioner's offer and worked Let us rejoice a common responsibility you
as a casual employee in the mayor's office and I shall take care of it and let him/her see
starting on September 1, 1986. From the light of this beautiful world. CAcIES
November 10 to 15 in 1986, with companions We know what to do to protect our honor and
Aster de Quiros, Pat del Valle, Jaime and integrity.
Jocelyn Vargas, she accompanied petitioner to
Legaspi City to attend a seminar on town Just relax and be happy, if true.
planning. They stayed at the Mayon Hotel.
acHETI With all my love,