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to what extent was the Allies success the result of their superior tactics and strategies?
As the War to End All Wars approached, the nature of warfare had significantly changed
compared to the wars of the 19th century. As warfare changed, so did tactics and strategies. The
Allies and Central Powers both had to adapt to these changes. As will be shown in this essay,
the side that was winning, was usually also adapting new tactics and strategies quicker.
However, this is not to say that the ultimate Allies success was because of superior tactics and
strategies. On the contrary, they were only to a fairly limited extent the reason for Allies s
success because the Allies generals did not display significantly better tactics than Central
Powers generals; the Allies failed to deploy significantly better technology and use it to their
advantage; and because the Allies were not able to show superior strategies on how to fight the
war as a whole.
During the First World War, the Allies generals werent able to devise significantly superior
tactics than Central Powers generals, which why they contributed to Allies success only to a
limited extent. For example, Sir Douglas Haig was known as the butcher because he threw
massive armies against German lines, often without success. He did so in the Battle of the
Somme, where Britain suffered 60,000 casualties on the first day. The elderly Haig was blamed
to use antiquated strategies and not fully considering the ease with which machine guns could
slaughter his troops. Though, it must be noted that historian John Terraine has defended Haig,
saying that Haig did not have another option due to the rigid nature of trench warfare.
However, German generals were able to quite successfully deploy storm troops and break
through defensive lines; this displays superior tactics on the Central Powers side. Though this
example is extreme, it shows how the Allies did not win the First World War because they had
better military staff deploying superior tactics and strategies. Though to a lesser extent, Winston
Churchill, John J. Pershing and Aleksandr Samsonov, were three other generals who famously
failed to successfully deploy superior tactics to the Central Powers. This is not to say that all
German generals were deploying superior tactics and strategies, but Allies generals were not
Though to a limited extent, the Allies occasionally used technology much better than the
Central Powers and were therefore able to transform technological superiority into tactical and
strategic superiority. Especially during the last counter-offensive from March, 1918 onwards,
the Allies displayed superior technology. The use of tanks, for example, generated a significant
advantage and helped the Allies. This is because the allies more successfully used tanks in
conjunction with infantry, artillery and aircrafts. The German A7V was larger, slower and
tended to break down more frequently. The Allies, however, used small Renault FTs to their
advantage. For example, the advantage showed during the Battle of Amiens in August, 1918,
when tanks helped the Allies break through German defensive lines. For much of the war, the
Allies were lagging behind Central Powers in terms of technology that was a key part of
strategy. One key examples is the Germans use of U-boats, that almost starved Britain to
surrender by 1917. However, by use of hydrophones and mines, the Allies did eventually catch
up with German technology and rendered the U-boat fleet almost useless. This was also helped
by successful Allied strategy at the Zeebrugge Raid of April, 1918, that blocked the U-boat
fleets most important port. Though the allies were able to neutralize the U-boat threat, which
definitely helped them win the war, they were not able to gain a superiority in tactics and
strategy themselves. Neither side developed a wonder weapon that decisively won the war,
but with the use of tanks and similar technologies, the Allies were able to show superior tactics
in battles.
On a national and international level, the Allies were able to deploy a significantly superior
strategy only to a limited extent towards the end of the war. As the war began, the French
strategy was to directly invade Germany through Alsace Lorraine. Meanwhile, the French were
not seen considering Germanys Schlieffen Plan thoroughly. Without delving too deeply into
counterfactual reasoning, it is possible that were it not for Belgian resistance and British
interference through, for example, the British Expeditionary Forces at Liege, the Schlieffen Plan
might well have been successful. Though the Central Powers failed, the Allies were in the
beginning not deploying any more coordinated overall strategy to fight the war. This can also
be seen with the failures of ANZAC forces in Gallipoli and the death of approximately 600,000
Italian forces in a disastrous Battle of Caporetto. Only in 1918, did other Allied forces help Italy
drive out Austrian forces and did British forces with the help of ANZAC and Indian forces
succeed at the Battle of Megiddo. Most importantly, however, was it with the entrance of the
United States that the campaign at the Western Front was successful. Though, even at the
Western Front, success is not solely due to superior strategy. Nonetheless, towards the end of
the war, the Allies can be seen deploying superior strategy, even though it was not the decisive
strategy. Allied generals failed to deploy significantly superior tactics in key battles such as the
Battle of Tannenberg or the Battle of the Somme. Allied forces were able to utilize significantly
better technology that put them in an advantage in regards to tactics and strategy, but it was not
decisive in the outcome of the war. Lastly, Allied strategy was only superior towards the end of
the war, when they cooperating on multiple fronts including the Western Front, the Middle
East, and Italy. Other factors, such as numerical advantage or higher national morale, must
have secured Allied success, while superior tactics and strategies only helped do so.