Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994

DIOSDADO JOSE ALLADO and ROBERTO L. MENDOZA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge, Br. 62, Regional Trial Court, Makati, Metro Manila, and PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-
CRIME COMMISSION, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

On balance at the fulcrum once again are the intrinsic right of the State to prosecute perceived transgressors of the law, which can
be regulated, and the innate value of human liberty, which can hardly be weighed.

Some twelve years ago we were confronted with a similar problem when former Senator Jovito R. Salonga invoked before this Court
his "right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant
the filing of an information for subversion against him." 1 We resolved the issue then and sustained him. He is now back before us,
this time as counsel pleading the cause of petitioners herein who, he claims, are in a situation far worse than his predicament twelve
(12) years ago. He postulates that no probable cause likewise exists in this case, and what is worse is that no bail is recommended.

This petition gives us an opportunity to revisit the concept and implication of probable cause, the existence of which is necessary for
the prosecutor to have an accused held for trial and for a trial judge to issue a warrant for his arrest. It is mandatory therefore that
there be probable cause before an information is filed and a warrant of arrest issued. Unfortunately, however, at times a criminal
case is filed, a warrant of arrest issued and a person consequently incarcerated on unsubstantiated allegations that only feign
probable cause.

Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, alumni of the College of Law, University of the Philippines, are partners
of the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado. In the practice of their profession, and on the basis of an alleged extrajudicial
confession of a security guard, they have been accused of the heinous crime of kidnapping with murder by the Presidential Anti-
Crime Commission (PACC) and ordered arrested without bail by respondent judge.

The focal source of the information against petitioners is the sworn statement dated 16 September 1993 of Security Guard
Escolastico Umbal, a discharge of the Philippine Constabulary, implicating them as the brains behind the alleged kidnapping and
slaying of one Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a German national. 2 In that extrajudicial confession, Umbal claimed that he and his
companions were met by petitioners at Silahis Hotel and in exchange for P2.5M the former undertook to apprehend Van Twest who
allegedly had an international warrant of arrest against him. Thus, on 16 June 1992, after placing him under surveillance for nearly a
month, Umbal, Ex-policeman Rolando Gamatero, AFPCIG Agent Roberto Santiago and SPO2 Sergio Antonino abducted Van
Twest. They blocked his blue Nissan Pathfinder under the Alabang overpass and forced him into their car. They brought him to a
"safe house" just behind the New Bilibid Prisons. Umbal was tasked to watch over their quarry. After four (4) days, Gamatero,
Santiago and Antonino returned to the "safe house" together with petitioners and SPO2 Roger Bato, known to Umbal also as
"Batok." SPO2 Bato faked the interrogation of Van Twest, pretending it was official, and then made him sign certain documents. The
following day, Gamatero shot Van Twest in the chest with a baby armalite, after which Antonino stabbed him repeatedly, cut off his
private part, and later burned his cadaver into fine ashes using gasoline and rubber tires. Umbal could not recall the exact date
when the incident happened, but he was certain it was about a year ago.

A day after Umbal executed his extrajudicial confession, the operatives of the PACC, armed with a search warrant issued by Judge
Roberto A. Barrios of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 11, 3 separately raided the two (2) dwellings of Santiago, one located at
No. 7 Sangley Street, and the other, along Amalingan Street, both in Green Heights Subdivision, Paraaque. The raiders recovered
a blue Nissan Pathfinder and assorted firearms and ammunition and placed Santiago and his trusted aide, Efren Madolid, under
arrest. Also arrested later that day were Antonio and Bato who were found to have in their possession several firearms and
ammunition and Van Twest's Cartier sunglasses.

After evaluating the pieces of evidence gathered by PACC operatives, Sr., Supt. Panfilo Lacson, Chief of PACC Task Force
Habagat, referred the case to the Department of Justice for the institution of criminal proceedings against AFPCIG Agent Roberto
Santiago, SPO1 Sergio Antonino, SPO2 Roger Bato, Ex-policeman Rolando Gamatero, Efren Madolid, and petitioners herein, Atty.
Diosdado Jose Allado and Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza, for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, carnapping, kidnapping for
ransom with murder, and usurpation of authority. 4 In his letter to the State Prosecutor dated 17 September 1993, Sr. Supt. Lacson
charged that
 Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza and Atty. Allado of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado Law Offices . . . planned and
conspired with other suspects to abduct and kill the German national Alexander Van Twest in order to eliminate
him after forcing the victim to sign several documents transferring ownership of several properties amounting to
several million pesos and caused the withdrawal of P5M deposit from the victim's bank account.

Thereafter, Senior State Prosecutor Ferdinand prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis issued a subpoena to petitioners informing them
that a complaint
was filed against them by PACC TF-Habagat, directing them to appear on
30 September 1993 at the Multi-Purpose Hall of the Department of Justice and to submit their counter-affidavits. Attached to the
subpoena were copies of the affidavits executed by Umbal and members of the team who raided the two (2) dwellings of Santiago. 5

Not satisfied merely with the affidavits attached to the subpoena, petitioner Mendoza moved for the production of other documents
for examination and copying to enable him to fully prepare for his defense and to submit an intelligible counter-
affidavit. 6 Specifically, petitioner Mendoza was interested in (a) the "several documents transferring ownership of several properties
amounting to several million pesos and the withdrawal of P5M deposits from the victim's bank account," as stated in the complaint;
(b) the complete records of the PACC's investigation, including investigations on other suspects and their disposition, PACC's Order
of Battle for 1992 and early 1993; and, (c) such other written statements issued in the above-entitled case, and all other documents
intended to be used in this case. 7 Petitioners likewise sought the inhibition of the members of the panel of prosecutors, which was
created to conduct the preliminary investigation, on the ground that they were members of the legal staff assigned to PACC and
thus could not act with impartiality.

In its Order of 11 October 1993, 8 the new panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Bernelito R. Fernandez as
Chairman, with Rogelio F. Vista and Purita M. Deynata as Members, confirmed that the motion for inhibition of the members of the
old panel as well as the appeal to the Secretary of Justice was resolved on 8 October 1993 resulting in the creation of a new panel.
Thereafter, the new panel granted the prayer of petitioner Mendoza for the production of additional documents used or intended to
be used against him. Meanwhile, Task Force Habagat, in compliance with the order, submitted only copies of the request for
verification of the firearms seized from the accused, the result of the request for verification, and a Philippine Times Journal article
on the case with a marginal note of President Fidel V. Ramos addressed to the Chief of the Philippine National Police directing the
submission of a report and summary of actions taken thereon.

Not having been provided with the requested documents, petitioners nevertheless submitted their respective counter-affidavits
denying the accusations against them. 9

After a preliminary hearing where clarificatory questions were additionally propounded, the case was deemed submitted for
resolution. But before the new panel could resolve the case, SPO2 Bato filed a manifestation stating that he was reconsidering the
earlier waiver of his right to file counter- affidavit, 10 and "in the greater interest of truth, justice and fair play" moved for the
admissions of his counter-affidavit 11 confessing participation in the abduction and slaying of Van Twest and implicating petitioners
Allado and Mendoza. Sometime in January 1994, however, before petitioners could refute Bato's counter-affidavit, he moved to
suppress it on the ground that it was extracted through intimidation and duress.

On 3 February 1994, with the new penal failing to act on the twin motions of SPO2 Bato, petitioners heard over the radio that the
panel had issued a resolution finding a prima facie case against them and that an information had already been filed in court. Upon
verification with the Department of Justice, however, petitioners were informed that the resolution was not yet ready for release, but
later that afternoon they were able to secure a copy of the information for kidnapping with murder against them 12 and the 15-page
undated resolution under the letterhead of PACC, signed by the panel of prosecutors, with the Head of the PACC Task Force
recommending approval thereof. 13 That same day, the information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati and raffled off
to Branch 62 presided by respondent Judge Roberto C. Diokno.

On 4 February 1994, respondent judge, in response to petitioners' request, gave them until 8 February 1994 to submit their
opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest against all the accused. 14 On 7 February 1994, petitioners complied with the order
of respondent judge. 15 The following day,
8 February 1994, petitioner Allado filed an appeal with the Secretary of Justice seeking review and reversal of the undated
resolution of the panel
of prosecutors, 16 which appeal was adopted by petitioner Mendoza. 17 On
11 February 1994, petitioner Allado moved to defer the proceedings before the trial court pending resolution of his appeal before the
Secretary of Justice. 18 However, on even date, respondent judge issued the assailed warrant of arrest against petitioners. 19 Hence,
on 15 February 1994, petitioners filed with us the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining
order.

On 16 February 1994, we required respondents to comment on the petition and set the case for hearing on 28 February 1994. After
the hearing, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and respondent judge
from conducting further proceedings on the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us. Meanwhile, on 27 February 1994,
petitioners voluntarily surrendered at the Headquarters of the Capital Command (CAPCOM), Philippine National Police (PNP),
Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Metro Manila, and on 29 February 1994, they were released on the basis of our temporary restraining
order.
Petitioners, in their 335-page petition, inclusive of annexes, principally contend that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion and in excess of jurisdiction in "whimsically holding that there is probable cause against petitioners without determining
the admissibility of the evidence against petitioners and without even stating the basis of his findings," 20 and in "relying on the
Resolution of the Panel and their certification that probable cause exists when the certification is flawed." 21 Petitioners maintain that
the records of the preliminary investigation which respondent judge solely relied upon failed to establish probable cause against
them to justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Petitioners likewise assail the prosecutors' "clear sign of bias and impartiality
(sic)." 22

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the determination of probable cause is a function of the judge who
is merely required to personally appreciate certain facts to convince him that the accused probably committed the crime charged.

Section 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, lays down the requirements for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, i.e., a warrant of
arrest shall issue only upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.

As early as 1915, in Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, 23 this Court speaking through Associate Justice Sherman Moreland defined
probable cause as "the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the
facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted." This
definition is still relevant today as we continue to cite it in recent cases. 24 Hence, probable cause for an arrest or for the issuance of
a warrant of arrest has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. 25 And as a protection against false prosecution
and arrest, it is the knowledge of facts, actual or apparent, strong enough to justify a reasonable man in the belief that he was lawful
grounds for arresting the accused. 26

Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan 27 sets a standard for determining the existence of probable cause. While it appears in that case that we
have granted the prosecutor and the trial judge seemingly unlimited latitude in determining the existence of absence of probable
cause by affirming the long-standing procedure that they can base their findings merely on their personal opinion and reasonable
belief, yet, this permissiveness should not be interpreted as giving them arbitrary powers and letting them loose in the determination
of the existence of probable cause, a delicate legal question which can result in the harassment and deprivation of liberty of the
person sought to be charged or arrested. There we said

Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded, such a state of
facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or
entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause"
nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of
probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is
enough that it is it believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely,
there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.

Whether an act was done causing undue injury to the government and whether the same was done with
manifest partiality or evident bad faith can only be made out by proper and sufficient testimony. Necessarily, a
conclusion can be arrived at when the case has already proceeded on sufficient proof. 28

Accordingly, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted there is
sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. In the Order of
respondent judge dated 11 February 1994, it is expressly stated that "[t]his court after careful evaluation of the evidence on record,
believes and rules that probable cause exists; and therefore, a warrant of arrest should be issued." However, we are unable to see
how respondent judge arrived at such ruling. We have painstakingly examined the records and we cannot find any support for his
conclusion. On the contrary, we discern a number of reasons why we consider the evidence submitted to be insufficient for a finding
of probable cause against petitioners.

The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission relies heavily on the sworn statement of Security Guard Umbal who supposedly confessed
his participation in the alleged kidnapping and murder of Van Twest. For one, there is serious doubt on Van Twest's reported death
since the corpus delicti has not been established, nor have his remains been recovered. Umbal claims that Van Twest was
completely burned into ashes with the use of gasoline and rubber tires from around ten o'clock in the evening to six o'clock the next
morning. 29 This is highly improbable, if not ridiculous. A human body cannot be pulverized into ashes by simply burning it with the
use of gasoline and rubber tires in an open field. Even crematoria use entirely closed incinerators where the corpse is subjected to
intense heat. 30Thereafter, the remains undergo a process where the bones are completely ground to dust.

In the case of Van Twest, there is not even any insinuation that earnest efforts were exerted to recover traces of his remains from
the scene of the alleged cremation. 31 Could it be that the government investigators did to the place of cremation but could not find
any? Or could it be that they did not go at all because they knew that there would not be any as no burning ever took place? To
allege then that the body of Van Twest was completely burned to ashes in an open field with the use merely of tires and gasoline is
a tale too tall to gulp.
Strangely, if not awkwardly, after Van Twest's reported abduction on
16 June 1992 which culminated in his decimation by cremation, his counsel continued to represent him before judicial and quasi-
judicial proceedings. Thus on 31 July 1992, his counsel filed in his behalf a petition for review before this Court, docketed as G.R.
Nos. 106253, and on 18 March 1993, a memorandum before the Securities and Exchange Commission in SEC Case No. 3896. On
26 November 1993, during the preliminary investigation conducted by the panel of prosecutors, counsel again manifested that "even
then and even as of this time, I stated in my counter-affidavit that until the matter of death is to be established in the proper
proceedings, I shall continue to pursue my duties and responsibilities as counsel for Mr. Van Twest." 32 Hence, even Asst. Solicitor
General Estoesta believes that counsel of Van Twest doubted the latter's
death. 33 Obviously, counsel himself does not believe that his client is in fact already dead otherwise his obligation to his client would
have ceased except to comply with his duty "to inform the court promptly of such death . . . and to give the name and residence of
his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative," 34 which he did not.

Under the circumstances, we cannot discount petitioners' theory that the supposed death of Van Twest who is reportedly an
international fugitive from justice, a fact substantiated by petitioners and never refuted by PACC, is a likely story to stop the
international manhunt for his arrest. In this regard, we are reminded of the leading case of U.S. v. Samarin 35 decided ninety-two
years ago where this Court ruled that when the supposed victim is wholly unknown, his body not found, and there is but one witness
who testifies to the killing, the corpus delicti is not sufficiently proved.

Then, the extrajudicial statement of Umbal suffers from material inconsistencies. In his sworn statement, he said that he together
with his cohorts was met by petitioners in Silahis Hotel where they hatched the plan to abduct Van Twest. 36 However, during the
preliminary investigation, he stated that he was not part of the actual meeting as he only waited outside in the car for his
companions who supposedly discussed the plan inside Silahis Hotel. 37

Umbal also said that petitioners arrived with Bato and conducted a mock interrogation of Van Twest who thereafter signed various
documents upon being compelled to do so. 38 During the clarificatory questioning, however, Umbal changed his story and said that
he was asked to go outside of the "safe house" at the time Van Twest was interrogated and thus did not see if Van Twest indeed
signed certain documents. Why Umbal had to be sent out of the "safe house,"
no explanation was offered. Did these documents really exist? Or could the
non-existence of these documents be the reason why PACC was not able to comply with the order of the prosecutors to produce
them during the preliminary investigation? And then, what happened to the P2.5M that was supposedly offered by petitioners in
exchange for the abduction of Van Twest? These and more remain unanswered.

Most perplexing however is that while the whole investigation was supposedly triggered off by Umbal's confession of 16 September
1993, the application of the PACC operatives for a search warrant to be served in the
two (2) dwellings of Santiago was filed and granted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila on 15 September 1993, a day before
Umbal executed his sworn statement. In support of the application, the PACC agents claimed that Umbal had been in their custody
since 10 September 1993. Significantly, although he was said to be already under their custody, Umbal claims he was never
interrogated until 16 September 1993 and only at the security barracks of Valle Verde V, Pasig, where he was a security guard. 39

The alleged counter-affidavit of SPO2 Bato, which the panel of prosecutors also considered in filing the charges against petitioners,
can hardly be credited as its probative value has tremendously waned. The records show that the alleged counter-affidavit, which is
self-incriminating, was filed after the panel had considered the case submitted for resolution. And before petitioners could refute this
counter-affidavit, Bato moved to suppress the same on the ground that it was extracted through duress and intimidation.

For sure, the credibility of Umbal is badly battered. Certainly, his bare allegations, even if the State invokes its inherent right to
prosecute, are insufficient to justify sending two lawyers to jail, or anybody for that matter. More importantly, the PACC operatives
who applied for a warrant to search the dwellings of Santiago never implicated petitioners. In fact they claimed that according to
Umbal, it was Santiago, and not petitioners, who masterminded the whole affair. 40 While there may be bits of evidence against
petitioners'
co-accused, i.e., referring to those seized from the dwellings of Santiago, these do not in the least prove petitioners' complicity in the
crime charged. Based on the evidence thus far submitted there is nothing indeed, much less is there probable cause, to incriminate
petitioners. For them to stand trial and be deprived in the meantime of their liberty, however brief, the law appropriately exacts much
more to sustain a warrant for their arrest facts and circumstances strong enough in themselves to support the belief that they are
guilty of a crime that in fact happened. Quite obviously, this has not been met.

Verily, respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant for the arrest of petitioners it appearing that he
did not personally examine the evidence nor did he call for the complainant and his witnesses in the face of their incredible
accounts. Instead, he merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed. For, otherwise, he would
have found out that the evidence thus far presented was utterly insufficient to warrant the arrest of petitioners. In this regard, we
restate the procedure we outlined in various cases we have already decided.

In Soliven v. Makasiar, 41 we said that the judge (a) shall personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by
the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or, (b) if on the basis thereof
he finds no probable cause, may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in arriving at a conclusion on the existence of probable cause.
In People v. Inting, 42 we emphasized the important features of the constitutional mandate: (a) The determination of probable cause
is a function of the judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this
determination; (b) The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assists him in making the
determination of probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the prosecutor's
certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes (if any), and all other
supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the judge in his determination of probable
cause; and, (c) Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for
trial or released. Even if the two inquiries be conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion
about their objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation
proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and therefore,
whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is a function of the prosecutor.

In Lim v. Felix, 43 where we reiterated Soliven v. Makasiar and People v. Inting, we said

[T]he Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can
perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a
report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All these should be before the Judge.

The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the circumstances of
each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be.
The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by
the Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the
judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should
call for the complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the
circumstances of the case so require.

Clearly, probable cause may not be established simply by showing that a trial judge subjectively believes that he has good grounds
for his action. Good faith is not enough. If subjective good faith alone were the test, the constitutional protection would be demeaned
and the people would be "secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects" only in the fallible discretion of the judge. 44 On the
contrary, the probable cause test is an objective one, for in order that there be probable cause the facts and circumstances must be
such as would warrant a belief by a reasonably discreet and prudent man that the accused is guilty of the crime which has just been
committed. 45 This, as we said, is the standard. Hence, if upon the filing of the information in court the trial judge, after reviewing the
information and the documents attached thereto, finds that no probable cause exists must either call for the complainant and the
witnesses themselves or simply dismiss the case. There is no reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose him to an open
and public accusation of the crime when no probable cause exists.

But then, it appears in the instant case that the prosecutors have similarly misappropriated, if not abused, their discretion. If they
really believed that petitioners were probably guilty, they should have armed themselves with facts and circumstances in support of
that belief; for mere belief is not enough. They should have presented sufficient and credible evidence to demonstrate the existence
of probable cause. For the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the
servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness
and vigor indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one" 46

In the case at bench, the undue haste in the filing of the information and the inordinate interest of the government cannot be
ignored. From the gathering of evidence until the termination of the preliminary investigation, it appears that the state prosecutors
were overly eager to file the case and secure a warrant for the arrest of the accused without bail and their consequent detention.
Umbal's sworn statement is laden with inconsistencies and improbabilities. Bato's counter-affidavit was considered without giving
petitioners the opportunity to refute the same. The PACC which gathered the evidence appears to have had a hand in the
determination of probable cause in the preliminary inquiry as the undated resolution of the panel not only bears the letterhead of
PACC but was also recommended for approval by the head of the PACC Task Force. Then petitioners were given the runaround in
securing a copy of the resolution and the information against them.

Indeed, the task of ridding society of criminals and misfits and sending them to jail in the hope that they will in the future reform and
be productive members of the community rests both on the judiciousness of judges and the prudence of prosecutors. And, whether
it is a preliminary investigation by the prosecutor, which ascertains if the respondent should be held for trial, or a preliminary inquiry
by the trial judge which determines if an arrest warrant should issue, the bottomline is that there is a standard in the determination of
the existence of probable cause, i.e., there should be facts and circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a prudent
and cautious man to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime with which he is charged. Judges and prosecutors are not off on
a frolic of their own, but rather engaged in a delicate legal duty defined by law and jurisprudence.

In this instance, Salonga v. Pao 47 finds application

 The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and
anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trial (Trocio v. Manta, 118
SCRA 241, citing Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant,
and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due process (People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA
277). However, in order to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is
conducted in the sense of making sure that the transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary
investigation serves not only for the purposes of the State. More importantly, it is a part of the guarantees of
freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who live in the country. It is therefore imperative upon the fiscal
or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going thru a trial once it is ascertained
that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient
belief as to the guilt of the accused (emphasis supplied).

The facts of this case are fatefully distressing as they showcase the seeming immensity of government power which when
unchecked becomes tyrannical and oppressive. Hence the Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights, defines the limits beyond
which lie unsanctioned state actions. But on occasion, for one reason or another, the State transcends this parameter. In
consequence, individual liberty unnecessarily suffers. The case before us, if uncurbed, can be illustrative of a dismal trend.
Needless injury of the sort inflicted by government agents is not reflective of responsible government. Judges and law enforcers are
not, by reason of their high and prestigious office, relieved of the common obligation to avoid deliberately inflicting unnecessary
injury.

The sovereign power has the inherent right to protect itself and its people from vicious acts which endanger the proper
administration of justice; hence, the State has every right to prosecute and punish violators of the law. This is essential for its self-
preservation, nay, its very existence. But this does not confer a license for pointless assaults on its citizens. The right of the State to
prosecute is not a carte blanche for government agents to defy and disregard the rights of its citizens under the Constitution.
Confinement, regardless of duration, is too high a price to pay for reckless and impulsive prosecution. Hence, even if we apply in
this case the "multifactor balancing test" which requires the officer to weigh the manner and intensity of the interference on the right
of the people, the gravity of the crime committed and the circumstances attending the incident, still we cannot see probable cause to
order the detention of petitioners. 48

The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect the people against arbitrary and discriminatory use of political power. This bundle of
rights guarantees the preservation of our natural rights which include personal liberty and security against invasion by the
government or any of its branches or instrumentalities. Certainly, in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence over
the right of the State to prosecute, and when weighed against each other, the scales of justice tilt towards the former. Thus, relief
may be availed of to stop the purported enforcement of criminal law where it is necessary to provide for an orderly administration of
justice, to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate protection to
constitutional rights. 49

Perhaps, this case would not have reached this Court if petitioners were ordinary people submissive to the dictates of government.
They would have been illegally arrested and detained without bail. Then we would not have the opportunity to rectify the injustice.
Fortunately, the victims of injustice are lawyers who are vigilant of their rights, who fight for their liberty and freedom not otherwise
available to those who cower in fear and subjection.

Let this then be a constant reminder to judges, prosecutors and other government agents tasked with the enforcement of the law
that in the performance of their duties they must act with circumspection, lest their thoughtless ways, methods and practices cause a
disservice to their office and maim their countrymen they are sworn to serve and protect. We thus caution government agents,
particularly the law enforcers, to be more prudent in the prosecution of cases and not to be oblivious of human rights protected by
the fundamental law. While we greatly applaud their determined efforts to weed society of felons, let not their impetuous eagerness
violate constitutional precepts which circumscribe the structure of a civilized community.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order we issued on 28 February
1994 in favor of petitioners, Atty. Diosdado Jose Allado and Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza, is made permanent. The warrant of arrest
issued against them is SET ASIDE and respondent Judge Roberto C. Diokno is ENJOINED from proceeding any further against
herein petitioners in Crim. Case No. 94-1757 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati.

SO ORDERED
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholaran** accused, along with her brother, of swindling government funds?

MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa pinararatangan
ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?

The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions 1 of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth Division,
denying petitioners motion to quash the information and her motion for reconsideration.

The Antecedents

Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state university is
known as a government scholar. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent
of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.

In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP Diliman. 2 On
September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of
the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3

One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. 4 President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the
information, was the Office of the President.

The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.5 The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine
Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university,
consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman. 6

On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D.
Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan. 7 The Information reads:

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH EUNICE D.
SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended committed as follows:

That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public
officer, being then the Student Regent of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in the performance
of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to
gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud the government by falsely and fraudulently representing to former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the University of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed as "President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall," and for which purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the
amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the
latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank
Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check
was subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their personal
 use and benefit, and despite repeated demands made upon the accused for them to return aforesaid amount, the said
accused failed and refused to do so to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense
charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.

Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9 It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by
Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under
Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.

She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was duped. Even assuming that she received
the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from the coffers of the government. 10

Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was not a public
officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She
addsed that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.

She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with the Board of
Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties to receive funds, or
that the crime was committed in connection with her official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.11

The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed petitioners interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase "in relation to office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges
against petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered that the source of the money is a matter of defense. It should be
threshed out during a full-blown trial.13

According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, iwas a public officer. As a member of the BOR, she hads the
general powers of administration and exerciseds the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechems definition of a public office,
petitioners stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is not an essential part of
public office. Parenthetically, compensation has been interpreted to include allowances. By this definition, petitioner was
compensated.14

Sandiganbayan Disposition

In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for lack of merit.15 It ratiocinated:

The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case.

It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution, Section 4(b) of
R.A. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by public officials and
employees in relation to their office. From this provision, there is no single doubt that this Court has jurisdiction over the
offense of estafa committed by a public official in relation to his office.

Accused-movants claim that being merely a member in representation of the student body, she was never a public officer
since she never received any compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no moment, in view of the
express provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(A) x x x

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
"27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:

xxxx
 (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. (Italics supplied)

It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses
involving the officials enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades, because the primordial
consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and functions.

Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?

A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents, to which
accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and corporate powers in the
university, such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law such sums as may be provided by law for
the support of the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own government and to enact for the government of the
university such general ordinances and regulations, not contrary to law, as are consistent with the purposes of the
university; and 3) To appoint, on recommendation of the President of the University, professors, instructors, lecturers and
other employees of the University; to fix their compensation, hours of service, and such other duties and conditions as it
may deem proper; to grant to them in its discretion leave of absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any
other provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for cause after an investigation and hearing
shall have been had.

It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board of directors, or board of trustees
in the case of non-stock corporations. The board of directors or trustees, therefore, is the governing body of the
corporation.

It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines is performing functions similar to
those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that being a member of such
board, accused-movant undoubtedly falls within the category of public officials upon whom this Court is vested with
original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a position classified as Salary Grade 27 or
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

Finally, this court finds that accused-movants contention that the same of P15 Million was received from former President
Estrada and not from the coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that should be properly ventilated during the
trial on the merits of this case.16

On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.17 The motion was denied with finality in a Resolution dated
February 4, 2004.18

Issue

Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND DISMISING THE
CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION." 19

In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; (b)
petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed in
relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from the government.

Our Ruling

The petition cannot be granted.

Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to

quash is not correctible by certiorari.

We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Well-established is the rule that when a motion
to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to
reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash. 20Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a
motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed.21 The evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a
single action.22

In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the Court clearly explained and illustrated the rule and the exceptions, thus:
 As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal until final
judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an
answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The same rule
applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies
from a judgment of acquittal.

This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash, acts
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it
would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss
or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment. In such
cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following are a few examples of the exceptions
to the general rule.

In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of Manila and directed the
respondent court to dismiss the case.

In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over the offense,
this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from further proceeding in the case.

In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, this Court
granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case except to
dismiss the same.

In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this Court
granted the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case.

In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute of Frauds, this
Court granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.

In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the motion to quash based on double
jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further action in the criminal case except to
dismiss the same.

In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on prescription was set aside
on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this Court.24

We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.

The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is

set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

We first address petitioners contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law yet quotes Section 4 of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan. 25 She repeats the reference in the instant petition
for certiorari26 and in her memorandum of authorities.27

We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical error. It bears stressing that petitioner repeated this
claim twice despite corrections made by the Sandiganbayan.28

Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The
Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was
promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that
public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain
at all times accountable to the people.29

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.30
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No.
7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5,
1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic
Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused
are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
"27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:

" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
city department heads;

"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank
of senior superintended or higher;

" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman
and special prosecutor;

" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations.

" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27'" and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;

" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

" (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27'" and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986.

" In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade "27'" or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof shall be vested in the proper regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial
court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended.

" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or order of regional
trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
 " The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed
under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not
be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has
promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to
appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the
People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

" In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

" Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil
action for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the
same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing such civil action separately from the
criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately
but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be,
for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed
abandoned."

Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain acts of public
officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. 31 Pursuant to Section 10 of
R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with the Sandiganbayan. 32

R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of
R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on private
individuals. We quote:

Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close personal
relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal relation by
directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person
having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government, in which such public official has
to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The
word "close personal relation" shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and professional
employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public officer.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses
defined in Section 3 hereof.

In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019,
as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for their penalties.

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over

the offense of estafa.

Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
We note that in hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the
succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.

The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an
absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is
ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang
pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at katawa-tawa.

Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect
contemplated by the legislature.34 The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law and every part of
the act is to be taken into view.35 In other words, petitioners interpretation lies in direct opposition to the rule that a statute must be
interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself.36 Optima statuti interpretatrix est
ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang
pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.

Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:

B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office. We see no
plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is
one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public
officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to
their office.

In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an indictment
for estafa versus a director of the National Parks Development Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held then:

The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an Executive Committee on January 14, 1963, for
the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It was later
designated as the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9,
1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively (E.O.
No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development, Department of Natural Resources, on
December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the
NPDC has remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).

Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular government agency under the Office of
the President and allotments for its maintenance and operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas,
Item Nos. 2, 3).

The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater firmness in Bondoc v. Sandiganbayan.38Pertinent parts of
the Courts ruling in Bondoc read:

Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondocs cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the simple reason that the
latter would not have jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold
a joint trial of Bondocs cases and those of the government employees separately charged for the same crimes, has not
altered the nature of the offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification punishable by penalties higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, committed by government employees in conspiracy with
private persons, including Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They
simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular courts, apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so
transferred, a joint trial would nonetheless not be possible.

Petitioner UP student regent

is a public officer.

Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or remuneration as a UP student regent.
This is not the first or likely the last time that We will be called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the
Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a public officer. 39 The 1987 Constitution does not define who
are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence.

In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:

A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by
law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and
Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when
it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec.
64). There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting
constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any
vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).

In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office:
 "A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by
law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public
officer."42

Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student. This is
likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan
also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,43 We held that while the first part of
Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials
whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of
the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.44

Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner
falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a
non-stock corporation.45 By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office.46 At most, it is merely incidental to the
public office.47

Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.48

The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate
governmental function by providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving professional
and technical training.49 Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation
created for profit.50

The offense charged was committed

in relation to public office, according
to the Information.

Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over
the offense because it was not committed in relation to her office.

According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was no Board
Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the
governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity and not in relation to public office.

It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information. 51 More than that, jurisdiction is not affected by the
pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash. 52 Otherwise,
jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent. 53

In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P., "while in the
performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent
to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud the government x x x." (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information based on
this ground.

Source of funds is a defense that should

be raised during trial on the merits.

It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estradas private funds and not from the government coffers. Petitioner
insists the charge has no leg to stand on.

We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the President and not its then occupant, President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is averred that "petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses
and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of
Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)."
Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that should be
ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant case.54

A lawyer owes candor, fairness

and honesty to the Court.

As a parting note, petitioners counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as a
quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his motion to quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his memorandum,
unveils the misquotation. We urge petitioners counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically
Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that "a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent."

The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,55 where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro D.D.
Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name different from
that with which he was authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition may warrant suspension or
disbarment.56

We admonish petitioners counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A lawyers conduct before the court should be
characterized by candor and fairness.57 The administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act with complete candor
and honesty before the courts.58

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.