GG 137 Case Title: Soriano v Laguardia

G.R. Number & Date: 164785, 165636 | April 29, 2009

Nature of the Case: In these two petitions for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Eliseo
F. Soriano seeks to nullify and set aside an order and a decision of the Movie and Television Review
and Classi cation Board (MTRCB) in connection with certain utterances he made in his television show,
Ang Dating Daan.

Petitioners: Eliseo F. Soriano, host of the program Ang Dating Daan

Respondents: Members of INC, ,Michael Sandoval & Chairperson of MTRCB

Facts:
On August 10, 2004: Petitioner, the host of the program Ang Dating Daan aired on UNTV 37,
made the following remarks:
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;

Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang
gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O,
masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra
ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.

Two days later, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were
lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and 7 other private respondents, all members of the INC.
Respondent Michael Sandoval who felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a
minister of INC and a regular host of the TV Program Ang Tamang Daan.
MTRCB then sent petitioner a notice of the hearing in relation to the alleged use of some cuss
words in the Aug 10, 2008 episode of Ang Dating Daan.
MTRCB then ordered the preventive suspension of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days in
accordance with Section 3(d) of P.D. 1986 creating MTRCB in relation to Sec 3, Chapter XIII of
the 2004 IRR of PD 1986 and Sec 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure.
Petitioner sought for reconsideration of the preventive suspension order, praying that
Chairperson Consoliza P. Laguardia & 2 other members of the adjudication board recuse
themselves from hearing the case.
The MTRCB then issued a decision disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is hereby rendered, finding respondent Soriano liable for
his utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3) months suspension from his program, "Ang
Dating Daan".

Co-respondents Joselito Mallari, Luzviminda Cruz and UNTV Channel 37 and its owner, PBC, are hereby
exonerated for lack of evidence.

SO ORDERED.

Hence this petition.

Petitioners Arguments: Petitioner asserts that his utterance in question is a protected form of
speech.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sorianos statements during the televised Ang Dating Daan are obscene?
FALLO: WHEREFORE, the decision of the MTRCB in Adm. Case No. 01-04 dated September 27,
2004 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION of limiting the suspension to the program Ang
Dating Daan. As thus modi ed, the fallo of the MTRCB shall read as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, a Decision is hereby rendered, imposing a penalty of
THREE (3) MONTHS SUSPENSION on the television program, Ang Dating Daan, subject of the
instant petition.

Co-respondents Joselito Mallari, Luzviminda Cruz, and UNTV Channel 37 and its owner, PBC, are
hereby exonerated for lack of evidence.

Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

HELD: YES.

1. The freedom of expression, as with the other freedoms encased in the Bill of Rights, is however, not
absolute. It may be regulated to some extent to serve important public interests, some forms of
speech not being protected. As has been held, the limits of the freedom of expression are reached
when the expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.

2. The Court rules otherwise. It has been established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low-
value expression refers to libelous statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading
advertisement, insulting or " fighting words", i.e., those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering national security.

3. The Court finds that petitioner's statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the
average child. Hence, it is, in that context, unprotected speech. In Fernando v. Court of Appeals, the
Court expressed difficulty in formulating a definition of obscenity that would apply to all cases, but
nonetheless stated the ensuing observations on the matter:

There is no perfect definition of "obscenity" but the latest word is that of Miller v. California which
established basic guidelines, to wit: (a) whether to the average person, applying contemporary
standards would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. But, it would be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude
that the trier of facts has the unbridled discretion in determining what is "patently offensive". . . .

What remains clear is that obscenity is an issue proper for judicial determination and should
be treated on a case to case basis and on the judge's sound discretion.

4. The problem with the challenged statements is that they were uttered in a TV program that is rated
G (for general viewership) and in a time slot that would likely reach even the eyes and ears of
children. While adults may have understood that the terms thus used were not to be taken literally,
children could hardly be expected to have the same discernment. Without parental guidance, the
unbridled use of such language as that of petitioner in a TV broadcast could corrupt impressionable
young minds. Said statements were made in a medium easily available and accessible to children.
With respect to the young minds, said utterances are to be treated as unprotected speech.

5. In this sense, we find petitioners utterances obscene and not entitled to the protection under the
umbrella of freedom of speech.
 6. With the view we take of the case, the suspension MTRCB imposed under the premises was, in one
perspective, permissible restriction. We make this disposition against the backdrop of the following
interplaying factors: First, the indecent speech was made via television, a pervasive medium that, to
borrow from Gonzales v. Kalaw Katigbak, easily "reaches every home where there is a set [and
where] [c]hildren will likely be among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown"; second, the
broadcast was aired at the time of the day when there was a reasonable risk that children might be
in the audience; and third, petitioner uttered his speech on a "G" or "for general patronage" rated
program. Under Sec. 2 (A) of Chapter IV of the IRR of the MTRCB, a show for general patronage is
"[s]uitable for all ages", meaning that the "material for television . . . in the judgment of the BOARD,
does not contain anything unsuitable for children and minors, and may be viewed without adult
guidance or supervision". The words petitioner used were, by any civilized norm, clearly not suitable
for children. Where a language is categorized as indecent, as in petitioner's utterances on a general-
patronage rated TV program, it may be readily proscribed as unprotected speech.

7. As the Court has been impelled to recognize exceptions to the rule against censorship in the past,
this particular case constitutes yet another exception, another instance of unprotected speech,
created by the necessity of protecting the welfare of our children. As unprotected speech,
petitioners utterances can be subjected to restraint or regulation.

8. Petitioner's offensive and obscene language uttered in a television broadcast, without doubt,
was easily accessible to the children. His statements could have exposed children to a
language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the welfare of children and the
State's mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae, constitute a substantial and
compelling government interest in regulating petitioner's utterances in TV broadcast as
provided in PD 1986.

Notes:

The Court in Chavez v Gonzales elucidated on the distinction between regulation or restriction of protected speech that
is content-based and that which is content-neutral. A content-based restraint is aimed at the contents or idea of the
expression, whereas a content-neutral restraint intends to regulate the time, place, and manner of the expression under
well-defined standards tailored to serve a compelling state interest, without restraint on the message of the expression.
Courts subject content-based restraint to strict scrutiny.

Prior restraint means official government restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination.
General Rule: Prior Restraint is not allowed.
Exception: Movies, television and radio broadcast censorship in view of its access to numerous people, including the young
who must be insulated from the prejudicial effects of unprotected speech.

TESTS: Modes of weighing competing values or with life effect, determining which of the clashing interests should be
advanced.
1. Clear and Present Danger Test Under this doctrine, freedom of expression is susceptible of restriction when and
only when necessary to prevent grave and immediate danger to the interests which the government may lawfully
protect.
2. Balancing of Interest Test Duty of the courts to determine which of the two conflicting interests demands the
greater protection under the particular circumstances presented. To weight circumstances and to appraise the
substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of rights.