Start III Sort 51305

IDF Treaty Series The State of Non-Proliferation # 51305
IDF Treaty Series State of Non-Proliferation

DESBIC AGENDA START- III +
Treaty Between the United States of America, the Nuclear Powers, and the Russian Federation On
Strategic Offensive Reductions
DESBIC Agency Bureau of Arms Control
May 13, 2005 Israeli Intelligence Report # 51305 (AMENDED)
TABLE OF CONTENTS THE SORT COMPACT

Documents Submitted to Congress
1. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic
Offensive Reductions
2. Letter of Transmittal
3. Letter of Submittal
4. Article-by-Article Analysis of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions
STATEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL ATTRIBUTION

Documents Pertaining To U N and NATO Strategic Offensive Reductions
Considered Subject To an 33% Aspect to Ratio 5 year Reduction Rate Scale of De-limitations
U N, NATO and The Nuclear Powers are to Furnish an Contingency Statement Based Upon:
Verifiable Means, conclusion and compliancy, respective to the START II, III Convention set forth
for 31 December 2,007, whereby a full Accounting of accumulative devices and WMD s of any said
deliverable deployablity may be formally addressed, advised, and called attention to hereinafter. All
sales oriented joint strike, or naval flotilla construction of armament is subject to U N Membership
approval. All Aircraft carriers and battle ship and escort cruisers destroyers and their manufacturers
emphasis are to be recalled, and existing fleets are expected to become retrofitted as not to hasten the
arrival of an out of control combatative competitive state of un necessary militancys for a device.
The said International Statements of Attribution are an integral part of the Treaty terms thereof.
The said descriptive accountings of the Nuclear Powers are to be counted and be seen every five
years, by, for and by the United States, Russia, Israel, and the United Nations Generals Secretarys
quarter upon demand or by formal request within 66 hours of a formal demand. The Four Leadership
positions of rank and file have say over what may remain to be seen as tolerable ordnance or whats to
dispose of or silently erase from strategic stockpiles herein under to this entry.
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------------DONE the Twelth of May, 2,005_in H B. Calif. 92649 U S A----------------
Moscow Treaty Supporting Documents
5. Joint Statement by U.S. President George W. Bush and President of the Russian Federation Vladimir V.
Putin on Upcoming Consultations on Strategic Issues (Genoa Statement), July 22, 2001
6. Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on a New Relationship
Between the United States and Russia, November 13, 2001
7. Press Conference by President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, The East Room, November
13, 2001
8. Speech by RF President V.V. Putin in Response to Questions by Journalists at the Joint Press
Conference with U.S. President George Bush, November 13, 2001
9. Speech of Russian Federation President V. V. Putin to Representatives of the American Public and
U.S. Politicians, November 13, 2001, Russian Embassy in Washington
10. Text of Diplomatic Notes Sent to Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine on U.S. Withdrawal from
the ABM Treaty, December 13, 2001
11. A Statement Made by Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 13, 2001, Regarding the
Decision of the Administration of the United States of America to Withdraw from the Antiballistic Missile
Treaty of 1972
12. Response to Russian Statement on U.S. ABM Treaty Withdrawal, December 13, 2001
13. Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship, May 24, 2002
14. Fact Sheet on the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, June 5, 2002
15. Statement by the Russian MFA on the Legal Status of the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and
the United States of America on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II),
June 14, 2002
(SORT) STATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS TREATY
TEXT OF TREATY
The United States of America and the Russian Federation, and All Insignias to an Marquis
Including the United Nations Organization and Memberships of NATO Unified Alliances
hereinafter shall be referred to as the Parties,
Embarking upon the path of new relations for a new century and committed to the goal of
strengthening their relationship through cooperation and friendship,
Believing that new global challenges and threats require a continuous and balanced expansion
to create uniform provisions to settle any international disputes to further the collective
efforts of governments toward these ends for strategic relations between the Parties,

Desiring to establish a genuine partnership based on the principles of capital resources,

alternative fuel utilities, mutual security, cooperation, trust, openness, expect and
predictability,
Commit to implementing significant reductions in weapons of mass destruction (WMD s) and

strategic offensive arms thereto,
Proceeding from the premise of a Faith wherefore; and also the Joint Statements by the
President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation on
Strategic Issues of July 22, 2001 in Genoa and on a New Relationship between the United
States and Russia of November 13, 2001 in Washington,
Mindful of their obligations under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialists Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treatys START I
Respective to the entry into force under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and
Convinced that the purpose of the START Treaty Series will help to establish more favorable
conditions for actively promoting security, cooperation, and enhancing international stability,
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS;
Article I
Each Party shall reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads, as stated by vested authorities of
the President of the United States of America on November 13, 2001, and as stated by the
President of the Russian Federation on November 13, 2001 and December 13, 2001
respectively, so that by December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of highest yielding
frequency devices, ICBM missiles respective of heaviest throw weight, of that order, and
warheads and launchers, multiple independently target able re-entry vehicles, or (MIRVs),
missiles and their launchers; to that of which such WMD s, Missiles, warheads, and variant
launchers shall not exceed 1700-2200 for all aforementioned categories such as the U S and
Russia and her former Unionist Republics.
Each Party to an Ensign do solemnly swear to protect, preserve, defend and bear true Faith,
consistent with the purpose of a formal Declaration for a stronger flag and a higher mass and
an United Nations for utopian order thereto herein wherefore.
Having considered the views expressed the same total aggregate numerical integers will
apply to all the Nuclear Powers collectively, to that of which shall not exceed 33% of the
combinative categorically identified status quo standards. In order to make fuller contribution

to their common military grade resonance as set forth above with all due regard for
reciprocity; all Partys to a State in accordance with this Chapters design apertures are
considered obligated to conform to the standard maximum 33 % combinative total levels of
compliancy hereof.
Should any relevant questions be put to the witnesses and violate the conditions the general
principles of Law recognized by civilized nations, the Partys to a citation, shall contribute
toward the expenses of the Depositary Trust Foundation an penalty assessment made payable
to a United Nations Organization underwritten by all who come to serve.
Within the aggregate numbers provided for and time to time make payable to the Ministry of
Defence, the State of Israel of a Faith there bouts whereby a Ministry of Defense and a
Politburo, and a U S Joint Chiefs Chair has a say even in the event of conducting military
activities for the purpose of promoting disarmament and biologically sensitive research and
development which should result in strengthening peace and security throughout the world
whereas.
Article II
The Parties agree that the START Treaty Series remains in force in accordance with its
generally accepted terms.
Article III The Statute for the Army Corps of Engineers On Site Agencys US UN
It is strongly urged to model the Organizations Bureau similarly nearways to the:
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY Except

for the said cause of safe preconditions rancor set forth to allow proliferation of nuclear
explosive charges and resonances; when safe support becomes a thief in the night there as
wherein will try forasmuch as follows:
1. For purposes of implementing this Treaty, the Parties shall institute the DESBIC
International Bureau of Nuclear Non-proliferation. The International Organization shall be
composed of 16 or so global, mile square said heavier duty Industrial utility
complexes.
2.Each complex shall be manned by 500 employees in the various services that necessitate
the application for transportation, processing, reprocessing, storage containment, temporary
storage, and stationary housing units as 24- 7- 365 round the clock efficiency.

3. Pursuant to the foregoing grant of rights the U S Army Corps of engineers shall Head the
mission. To assure viability, if and when a Partys to a State have not provided an syndicated
engineering station then the application or an interpretation of financial indemnification is
initialized by U S supported financing at the interim. Each Party to an Ensign agreed to
repatriate the Party to which specific loan indemnification is administered and shall be
considered bonded by an liability obligation loan and consultancy contract to be repaid at 50
% or less interest rates to that of which is considered standard and current market value of
exchange rates. In the event of a dispute over remuneration of funding the Group 4 shall have
a final say over the matter.
4. In carrying out the foregoing responsibilities mile square park industrial enclaves should
be expected to support various scientific and engineering services and reasonably large scale
loading and unloading; treatment with say perhaps upwards of up to 30 or more docking
stations, decontamination stations; exspent fuel rod cold storage recesses; thereabouts the full
scope of On Site Inspection supplies and amenities to facilitate the various services of
exchange and scientific occupancy as shall be maintained and given priority defense status
quo in a time of peace, and shall qualify to all Nations, States, or independent leftist novelty
implacable opposition or defectors, as the common standard of denominate theory agenda
hereinafter.
5. The U S On Site Inspection Agency is to be revitalized to an army of many thousand as

would be the exchange accommodations necessary to undertake a ridged and unyielding
approach to the nuclear military grade explosives whereabouts and to make available to the
Corp of Engineers those said accompaniments.
6. Having considered the views expressed on various subjects pertaining to a fast time shot to
the Martian subsoil landings for answers toward a budgetary assimilation or allocation to
upward of 12 billion dollars biannually thereabouts hereon, of the 16 locations worldwide the
International Atomic Energy Agency shall be instructed of a new peaceful policy projection
toward the incineration of oxygen molecules for a purpose of employability under the guns of
numerous sentry exchanges for hires thereon. Starting salarys, depending on experience vary
and are to be taken up with the United Nations ombudsman for human resources and shall
more than likely be based on the aspect to ratio rate of exchange respective to the domicile of
the IAEA employee status quotient to that of the expectancy rate, which shall be recognized
and defined asUnited Nations dollars therefore.
7. US Army minimum danger pay included will be around 4,000$ a month, the dutys vary in
scope and nature and are considered very dangerous in some areas of the world as to reassign
and sub contract the IAEA for the US Army Chief of Staff Department of Corps of

Engineers. Mission priorities are to provide hospitable accommodations for numerous

Russian counterparts who shall be permitted ever so closely now to share the same multi
protractile assignments as such is recommended of the Israeli Garrisons in industrial
counterbalance closeness in-factus to observe and in so doing share accompaniments, postal
resources, general store provisions, sundries, restrooms, mess halls, recreational accessories
and visa versa as provided for in this Chapter in order to make fuller contribution to their
common objective therefore.
8.To promote constructive measures of development and to encourage demilitarization

amongst such States and Republics as they are called our Group 4 selective special services
such as the KGB, the CIA, and other Israeli special Green Beret attachments, and the
Specialized Function for a United Nations Secret Services accountings, shall:
(a) proceed without delay to locate and identify weapons manufacturing plants worldwide
such as in India Pakistan, France Sweden Germany, Israel too now, China, Japan, U S A,
especially, South Africa, and all other Republics to an Emblem engraver for currency Ill
believed, to other report to they of The space based research consulting Sector that are as
indiscreet as have decided the cut off date for weapons systems manufacturing concepts and
contracting accessories to believe 31 December 2,007 as so such an evocation after or around
the act or fact of a U N condition of obligations assumed acts and/or descends upon costly
and disturbingly noteworthy attributable penalty assessment fines herein their.
(b) no military weapons contracting Party without written and approved consent from the
Commissioner of the majority Delegation General Assembly popular vote,(51%) bouts, shall
be issued licensing rights, titles, nor interest in every and all said weapons systems with
exception to bio-molecular aspect to ratio of said people presences with star based modular
conceptions of Gods Love, as discussed pursuant of the Protocols ,7, 8 , IC Black X file of
the DESBIC AGENDA and also in accordances to the S.Q. Security Docket Pre ambulance
to the DESBIC AGENDA, IDF Treaty series which along with INF, NPT and NPT 2-3,
START I, in concise, START II, III and other annexes, Protocols and Texts introduced
during the Coming of the Lord of Israel is hereinafter to be considered an integral part of this
vocational exercise in star elder presences I do declare for certainties, in order to form a more
desirable and dependable respective frame advisory activator there as.
9.The principle objective of the Organizations weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation

mission is that of collecting, disposing and storage containment, and sentry detail of
descriptive afore specified, as when in the courses of human characterization it becomes
obvious to see the note to need and diffuse surplus stock piles and sales, acquisitioning of
Chinese rockets, launchers, boosters MIRV s, ICBM s, nuclear bombs, biological and higher
grade chemical reactivation properties of military grade resonancys, nuclear fuel rods, and

supervisory accounting for major nuclear energy utilities disassembly standards protocols and
applications, suspend aquisitionment as inevitably will concern: naval vessels of every
standard aggregate displacement, whose last shipyard contracts are slated for closures on 31
December 2,007; upon unanimous consent as agreed upon by the Group 4 and the majority
vote and decision of a U N full Assembly to that of an exclusionary precedence, noting all
too well what disarmament projection brings to the tables there as; side winding to, that it
become strongly urged by the U N General Assembly memberships who best personify a
May Day simplex in granting of rights, titles and deeds, with all due regard for interest in
handing out the awarding contractorship for international Maritime Primary care coordination
to the U S Navys and special stipulatory amendments to qualify transitioning exchange of on
board 24- 7- 365 Multinational factions including especially Israeli, Russian ready reserve
Officers thereby.
10. To make Provision in accordance with this Statute, Star Fleet has long been charged with
the obligations assumed under an Israeli Galaxy Class saucer modular request that we act as
if the organization U N belongs to eng@it.pmo.gov.il and the scattered industrial simplexes
shall be located in the arrangements made by chief scientists at Army Headquarters bearing
in mind the ideals of trust and subcontracted on the dollar, exchange payroll aspect to ratio;
also bearing in mind that naval flotilla battle or such terminology of group with aircraft
carriers are scheduled for multinational membership moth ball phase off to better
comprehend the biological specimen samples of aerodynamically aligned perspectives at
a ,000 nuclear energy utility cut off date reminder as expressly reserved for the year 2,022, A
D. Having considered the reports, issued by the Secretary Generals; licensing fees will be
increased to 5 million dollars per unit by 2,012; and $666,666 dollars commencing 31
December, 2,007, unless show cause by, for and by again with a best interest of safety
oriented U N Membership Assembly Delegation appearance as required by Law. To further
the purpose of this Treaty and in order to facilitate the practice of International Government
security and equality, it shall be the finding of this exchange of instruments that the quorum
call and calendar for General Assembly Ad judgments and Ad policy in separation be
counted and be heard, recognized, and seen an minimal of 4-four times a calendar month, as
to vote and decide on matters of relative new age scientific as global security so to purpose a
denuclearization profile for the cause of common approach and attainment of these ends,
therefore it is qualified as a necessary side of a say, to invest in their approach hereinafter
thereupon.
11. For the purpose of reducing and averting the risk of outbreak of wars the Israelis are to
assist the Russians and the U S in chastising or neutralizing U N Employees who are
entruantly absolved in their mercenary derelective opted nay saying, to find cause for
replacement or repair of note to need, or need to note filing fees for the licensing as cause of

liability risks assumed, to engage in nuclear non proliferation within the bounds but not too
far away from dissident or soon to become dishonest accounts made to U S backed Russia,
aspect to ratio payroll to be jointly discussed with formers defense and knowledgeable
coordinators along with the distinctive and pleasant current administrative branches as
proces verbal in an effective and sound alliance as to be certain to import exchange duty
sailors for ease some slack tour of duly authorized naval attention gathering herein store to
these ends .
12. In another way we come to understand as to offside the naval shipyard reminders of a
competitive state of exportation in as much as to foster the exchange of scientific buy backs
and buy outs with that money to make provision in accordance with this chapter to assign a
scheduled plan of nuclear energy utility decommissionment, and request of the Russian
defense counsel sub contracting missionarys as obligate the Swiss and Western money
lenders with reasonably sound and generously robust financial overtures before another
judgment ruling come handed to the U N licensing assessment offices, take notice of rate
increases is why I invented my Uzi other than to shoot a starving lion thereto; resurrect hold
meetings at least twice a week of a Multilateral Implementation Commission.
Article IV
1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures
of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of
ratification.
2. This Treaty shall remain in force until December 31, 2012 and will be extended by
agreement of the Parties or earlier by subsequent agreement.
3. Each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, is bound by life assurances as to not
negate nor withdraw from this Treaty. All Ensigns independent or clandestine as it may cause
to flee are superficially bound by words, thoughts, and deeds indeed to the other Party.
Article V
This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Done at Moscow on May 24, 2002, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages,
both texts being equally authentic. Amended May 13, 2,005
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, U N AND STATE OF ISRAEL

George W. Bush OF FAITH WHEREFORE IN STAR BASE INTERNAL COMMAND
FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, NATO ALLIANCES AND ALL ENSIGNS

Vladimir V. Putin OF FAITH WHEREFORE IN STAR BASE INTERNAL

COMMAND
*************************************************
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
The White House

June 20, 2002
To the Senate of the United States:
I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive
Reductions, signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002 (the Moscow Treaty).
The Moscow Treaty represents an important element of the new strategic relationship
between the United States and Russia. It will take our two nations along a stable, predictable
path to substantial reductions in our deployed strategic nuclear warhead arsenals by
December 31, 2012. When these reductions are completed, each country will be at the lowest
level of deployed strategic nuclear warheads in decades. This will benefit the peoples of both
the United States and Russia and contribute to a more secure world.
The Moscow Treaty codifies my determination to break through the long impasse in further
nuclear weapons reductions caused by the inability to finalize agreements through traditional
arms control efforts. In the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union, both countries
strategic nuclear arsenals remained far larger than needed, even as the United States and
Russia moved toward a more cooperative relationship. On May 1, 2001, I called for a new
framework for our strategic relationship with Russia, including further cuts in nuclear
weapons to reflect the reality that the Cold War is over. On November 13, 2001, I announced
the United States plan for such cuts--to reduce our operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads to a level of between 1700 and 2200 over the next decade. I announced these
planned reductions following a careful study within the Department of Defense. That study,
the Nuclear Posture Review, concluded that these force levels were sufficient to maintain the
security of the United States. In reaching this decision, I recognized that it would be
preferable for the United States to make such reductions on a reciprocal basis with Russia,
but that the United States would be prepared to proceed unilaterally.
My Russian counterpart, President Putin, responded immediately and made clear that he
shared these goals. President Putin and I agreed that our nations respective reductions should
be recorded in a legally binding document that would outlast both of our presidencies and
provide predictability over the longer term. The result is a Treaty that was agreed without
protracted negotiations. This Treaty fully meets the goals I set out for these reductions.
It is important for there to be sufficient openness so that the United States and Russia can

each be confident that the other is fulfilling its reductions commitment. The Parties will use
the comprehensive verification regime of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (the START Treaty) to provide the foundation for confidence,
transparency, and predictability in further strategic offensive reductions. In our Joint
Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship between the United States and Russia,
President Putin and I also decided to establish a Consultative Group for Strategic Security to
be chaired by Foreign and Defense Ministers. This body will be the principal mechanism
through which the United States and Russia strengthen mutual confidence, expand
transparency, share information and plans, and discuss strategic issues of mutual interest.
The Moscow Treaty is emblematic of our new, cooperative relationship with Russia, but it is
neither the primary basis for this relationship nor its main component. The United States and
Russia are partners in dealing with the threat of terrorism and resolving regional conflicts.
There is growing economic interaction between the business communities of our two
countries and ever-increasing people-to-people and cultural contacts and exchanges. The U.S.
military has put Cold War practices behind it, and now plans, sizes, and sustains its forces in
recognition that Russia is not an enemy, Russia is a friend. Military-to-military and
intelligence exchanges are well established and growing.
The Moscow Treaty reflects this new relationship with Russia. Under it, each Party retains
the flexibility to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive
arms, and how reductions are made. This flexibility allows each Party to determine how best
to respond to future security challenges.
There is no longer the need to narrowly regulate every step we each take, as did Cold War
treaties founded on mutual suspicion and an adversarial relationship.
In sum, the Moscow Treaty is clearly in the best interests of the United States and represents
an important contribution to U.S. national security and strategic stability. I therefore urge the
Senate to give prompt and favorable consideration to the Treaty, and to advise and consent to
its ratification.
George W. Bush.
*************************************************
LETTER OF SUBMITTAL
The Secretary of State,

Washington.
The President,
The White House.
Mr. President: I have the honor to submit to you the Treaty Between the United States of
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America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (the Moscow Treaty),
signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002.
INTRODUCTION
The Moscow Treaty marks a new era in the relationship between the United States and
Russia. This short, legally binding document codifies in a flexible manner both countries
commitment to make deep strategic offensive reductions. It facilitates the transition from
strategic rivalry to a genuine strategic partnership based on the principles of mutual security,
trust, openness, cooperation and predictability. The Moscow Treaty is one important element
of a new strategic framework, which involves a broad array of cooperative efforts in political,
economic and security areas.
BACKGROUND
The Moscow Treaty codifies the deep reductions that you announced during the November
2001 Washington/Crawford Summit and President Putin announced at that time and a month
later. It reflects the shared desire to conclude a legally binding document that would outlast
both of your presidencies and to provide openness and predictability over the longer term in
this important area of the U.S.-Russian relationship. The transition to a relationship based on
mutual trust and cooperation enabled us to conclude an agreement in months, not years. At
the same time, the Treaty affords flexibility to each Party to meet unforeseen future
contingencies, while avoiding unnecessary restrictions on either Partys forces or activities.
REDUCTION REQUIREMENTS
The United States and Russia both intend to carry out strategic offensive reductions to the
lowest possible levels consistent with their national security requirements and alliance
obligations, and reflecting the new nature of their strategic relations. The Treaty requires the
United States and Russia to reduce and limit their strategic nuclear warheads to 1700-2200
each by December 31, 2012, a reduction of nearly two-thirds below current levels. The
United States intends to implement the Treaty by reducing its operationally deployed
strategic nuclear warheads to 1700-2200 through removal of warheads from missiles in their
launchers and from heavy bomber bases, and by removing some missiles, launchers, and
bombers from operational service.
For purposes of this Treaty, the United States considers operationally deployed strategic
nuclear warheads to be reentry vehicles on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in their
launchers, reentry vehicles on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in their
launchers onboard submarines, and nuclear armaments loaded on heavy bombers or stored in
weapons storage areas of heavy bomber bases. In addition, a small number of spare strategic
nuclear warheads (including spare ICBM warheads) are located at heavy bomber bases. The
United States does not consider these spares to be operationally deployed strategic nuclear
warheads. In the context of this Treaty, it is clear that only nuclear reentry vehicles, as well
as nuclear armaments, are subject to the 1700-2200 limit.

RELATIONSHIP TO START
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) continues in force unchanged by this Treaty.
In accordance with its own terms, START will remain in force until December 5, 2009,
unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement or extended.
STARTs comprehensive verification regime will provide the foundation for confidence,
transparency and predictability in further strategic offensive reductions. As noted in the May
24 Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship, other supplementary measures,
including transparency measures, may be agreed in the future.
BILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION COMMISSION
The Treaty establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC), a diplomatic

consultative forum that will meet at least twice a year to discuss issues related to
implementation of the Treaty. The BIC will be separate and distinct from the Consultative
Group for Strategic Security, established by the Joint Declaration of May 24, which will be
chaired by Foreign and Defense Ministers with the participation of other senior officials.
ENTRY INTO FORCE; DURATION; RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL
The Treaty will enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification. It is
to remain in force until December 31, 2012, and may be extended by agreement of the Parties
or superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement.
The Treaty also provides that each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may withdraw
from the Treaty upon three months written notice to the other Party.
STATUS OF START II TREATY
The START II Treaty, which was signed in 1993, and to which the Senate gave its advice and
consent in 1996, never entered into force because Russia placed unacceptable conditions on
its own ratification of START II. Russias explicit linkage of START II to preservation of the
ABM Treaty and entry into force of several agreements, signed in 1997, which related to
ABM Treaty succession and ABM/TMD demarcation, made it impossible for START II to
enter into force. With signature of the Moscow Treaty, the United States and Russia have
now taken a decisive step beyond START II.
CONCLUSION
Accompanying this report is an article-by-article analysis of the Treaty. By deeply reducing

operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads while preserving each Partys flexibility to
meet unforeseen future contingencies, the Moscow Treaty will enhance the national security
of the United States. I strongly recommend its transmission to the Senate for advice and
consent to ratification at the earliest possible date.

Respectfully submitted,
Colin L. Powell.
Enclosures: As stated1.
___________________
1 Enclosures include the Moscow Treaty and the Article-by-Article Analysis
Israeli Intelligence Report : State of the State Department U S/U N
ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS
The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic
Offensive Reductions, signed at Moscow on May 24, 2002 (the Moscow Treaty) consists of a
Preamble and five Articles.
TITLE AND PREAMBLE
The title of the Moscow Treaty is Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions. This title was deliberately chosen to
reflect the fact that this Treaty focuses on reductions in strategic nuclear warheads, rather
than on strategic offensive arms, which traditionally have been considered to be delivery
vehicles and launchers. For linguistic reasons, the title of the Russian language version of the
Treaty is ... on Reductions in Strategic Offensive Potential. The English language text of
the Treaty was agreed first, but the phrase strategic offensive reductions could not be
literally translated into Russian. The substantive meanings of the titles are said to be the
same.
The Preamble to the Moscow Treaty sets forth the intentions of the Parties in broad terms.
The first preambular paragraph designates the United States and Russia as the Parties to
obviate the use of their full names throughout the Treaty. The second, third and fourth
preambular paragraphs set forth the Parties shared commitment to conducting their relations
in the new century on a fundamentally different and more cooperative basis than had
characterized their relations in the past. The reference to mutual security in the fourth
paragraph refers to the non-threatening nature of the Parties' new strategic relationship; it
does not imply a specific relationship between the Parties forces. The fifth paragraph
reaffirms the Parties general, longstanding commitment to implementing significant
reductions in strategic offensive arms. This paragraph introduces references to specific prior
commitments and obligations by the Parties in the sixth, seventh and eighth paragraphs that
immediately follow, including those in the Treaty Between the United States of America and

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991 (the START Treaty) and the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968 (the NPT). The sixth paragraph recognizes Joint Statements
made by Presidents Bush and Putin in Genoa on July 22, 2001 and in Washington, DC on
November 13, 2001 that detail the new basis for relations between the United States and
Russia. This preambular language does not imply any restrictions or obligations relating to
defensive programs. The seventh and eighth paragraphs make reference to two existing
agreements of the Parties with regard to nuclear weapons, the START Treaty and Article VI
of the NPT. The final paragraph sets forth the Parties conviction that this Treaty will
establish more favorable conditions for actively promoting security and cooperation and
enhancing international security.
ARTICLE I
Article I contains the central obligation of the Moscow Treaty. The first sentence of this
paragraph obligates the Parties to reduce and limit their strategic nuclear warheads, as stated
by the President of the United States of America on November 13, 2001 and as stated by the
President of the Russian Federation on November 13 and December 13, 2001 respectively, so
that by December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of such warheads does not exceed 1700-
2200 for each Party. The Moscow Treaty's limits relate solely to the number of each Partys
strategic nuclear warheads. The Moscow Treaty does not limit the number of U.S. or Russian
inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) or their associated launchers, or heavy bombers. Article I, by referencing the
statements of both Presidents, makes clear that the Parties need not implement their
reductions in an identical manner.
The United States will implement Article I as stated by President Bush on November 13,
2001: ... the United States will reduce our operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads
to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next decade, a level fully consistent with
American security.2 U.S. negotiators noted to their Russian counterparts that, in carrying out
the reductions provided for in this Treaty, in using the term operationally deployed strategic
nuclear warheads the United States means reentry vehicles on ICBMs in their launchers,
reentry vehicles on SLBMs in their launchers onboard submarines, and nuclear armaments
loaded on heavy bombers or stored in weapons storage areas of heavy bomber bases. The
United States also made clear that a small number of spare strategic nuclear warheads
(including spare ICBM warheads) would be located at heavy bomber bases and that the
United States would not consider these warheads to be operationally deployed strategic
nuclear warheads. The United States intends to reduce its operationally deployed strategic
nuclear warheads in a manner consistent with these statements. In the context of this Treaty,
it is clear that only nuclear reentry vehicles, as well as nuclear armaments, are subject to
the 1700-2200 limit.
The method by which U.S. warhead numbers will be determined under the Moscow Treaty
differs from the START Treaty methodology. The START Treaty contains counting rules
that attribute specific numbers of warheads to each type of ICBM, SLBM or heavy bomber
regardless of the actual number of warheads on the missile or bomber. These numbers may be
different from both the actual capacity of the specific system and the number actually carried
by the system.
Under the U.S. approach, certain strategic nuclear warheads, such as those nominally
associated with submarines in overhaul or submarines modified for other purposes, those
downloaded from ICBMs and SLBMs, and those nominally associated with deactivated
Peacekeeper ICBMs, will continue to be subject to the START Treaty unless such ICBMs or
SLBMs and their associated launchers are eliminated or converted in accordance with
START Treaty procedures. At the same time, however, under the Moscow Treaty, once such
warheads are no longer in operationally-deployed status, they will be included as part of the
United States reductions. Thus, among other things, missiles from which some warheads
have been removed will be considered for purposes of the START Treaty as carrying more
warheads than they in fact carry. By contrast, under the Moscow Treaty, the United States
will limit its strategic nuclear warheads based on the actual number of warheads on missiles
in their launchers and at bomber bases (other than spare warheads).
President Putin, for his part, stated at the Russian Embassy in Washington, DC on November
13, 2001:
... Russia is stating its readiness to proceed with significant reductions of strategic offensive
arms. That is why today we are proposing a radical program of further reductions of SOA --
at the least, by a factor of three -- to the minimum level necessary to maintain strategic
equilibrium in the world.3
and in a statement on December 13, 2001:
... a particularly important task in these conditions is to legally formalize the agreements that
have been reached on further drastic, irreversible, and verifiable reductions in strategic
offensive arms, which we believe should be at the level of 1,500-2,200 nuclear warheads for
each side.4
President Putin did not state explicitly how Russia intends to implement its reductions.
During the negotiations the Russians suggested that they anticipated reducing warheads by
eliminating or converting missiles, launchers and heavy bombers. As noted above, Russia,
like the United States, may reduce its strategic nuclear warheads by any method it chooses.
Russia did not state conclusively during the negotiations how it intends to carry out its
reductions.
The Moscow Treaty does not provide for sublimits or interim reduction levels or require a
Party to reach the final reduction level prior to December 31, 2012. Therefore, prior to
December 31, 2012, each Party is free to maintain whatever level of strategic nuclear
warheads it deems appropriate, consistent with its obligations under the START Treaty and
its obligation to meet the specified limit by the specified date.

The second sentence of Article I states that each Party shall determine for itself the
composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate
limit for the number of such warheads. As noted earlier, the Moscow Treaty does not limit
the total number of strategic offensive arms, or contain either numerical sublimits or bans on
categories of forces. Under the Moscow Treaty, each Party will thus have flexibility in
structuring its forces to reach these new low levels for strategic nuclear warheads. The Treaty
does not restrict a Partys decisions regarding how it will implement the required reductions.
___________________
2 Press Conference by President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, The East
Room, on November 13, 2001.
3 Speech of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin to Representatives of the
American Public and U.S. Politicians, November 13, 2001, Russian Embassy in Washington.
[Official U.S. translation]
4 Statement by Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 13, 2001, Regarding the
Decision of the U.S. Administration to Withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty. [Official U.S.
translation]
ARTICLE II
In Article II, the Parties recognize that the START Treaty remains in force in accordance
with its terms. The purpose of this Article is to make clear that the Moscow Treaty and the
START Treaty are separate. The START Treatys provisions do not extend to the Moscow
Treaty, and the Moscow Treaty does not terminate, extend or in any other way affect the
status of the START Treaty. The START Treaty will remain in force until December 5, 2009,
unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement or extended.
ARTICLE III
Article III establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC), a diplomatic

consultative forum which shall meet at least twice a year, to discuss issues related to
implementation of the Moscow Treaty.
ARTICLE IV
Article IV consists of three paragraphs covering ratification, entry into force, duration and
withdrawal.
Paragraph 1 of Article IV provides that the Moscow Treaty shall be subject to ratification in
accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party and shall enter into force on the
date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.
Paragraph 2 of Article IV provides that the Moscow Treaty shall remain in force until
December 31, 2012 and may be extended by agreement of the Parties or superseded earlier by
a subsequent agreement. Extension of the Treaty is not automatic but must be done by

agreement of the Parties. Since such an extension is authorized by the Treaty, it would
constitute an agreement pursuant to the Treaty and would accordingly not be subject to
Senate advice and consent.
Paragraph 3 of Article IV provides that each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, may
withdraw from the Treaty upon three months written notice to the other Party. Unlike some
other arms control agreements, this withdrawal clause is not tied to a Partys determination
that extraordinary circumstances jeopardizing its supreme national interests exist. Rather, the
Moscow Treaty includes a more general formulation that allows greater flexibility for each
Party to respond to unforeseen circumstances.
Unlike several earlier arms control agreements, including the START Treaty, there are no
specific provisions for either amending the Moscow Treaty or for making viability and
effectiveness changes to the Treaty. Such provisions were not seen as necessary given the
structure and content of this Treaty.
For international agreements submitted to the Senate that do not have specific amendment
procedures, U.S. practice has been to submit amendments to the Senate for its advice and
consent unless the Senate agrees that submission is not required.
ARTICLE V
Article V sets forth standard provisions for registration of the Treaty pursuant to Article 102
of the Charter of the United Nations.
*************************************************
July 22, 2001
Joint Statement by U.S. President George W. Bush and President of the

Russian Federation Vladimir V. Putin on Upcoming Consultations on Strategic
Issues 5
We agreed that major changes in the world require concrete discussions of both offensive and
defensive systems. We already have some strong and tangible points of agreement. We will
shortly begin intensive consultations on the interrelated subjects of offensive and defensive
systems.
___________________
5 This joint statement was made on the margins of the G-7/8 Summit in Genoa, Italy.
*************************************************
November 13, 2001

Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on a

New Relationship Between the United States and Russia
Our countries are embarked on a new relationship for the 21st century, founded on a
commitment to the values of democracy, the free market, and the rule of law. The United
States and Russia have overcome the legacy of the Cold War. Neither country regards the
other as an enemy or threat. Aware of our responsibility to contribute to international
security, we are determined to work together, and with other nations and international
organizations, including the United Nations, to promote security, economic well-being, and a
peaceful, prosperous, free world.
We affirm our determination to meet the threats to peace in the 21st century. Among these
threats are terrorism, the new horror of which was vividly demonstrated by the evil crimes of
September 11, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, militant nationalism, ethnic and
religious intolerance, and regional instability. These threats endanger the security of both
countries and the world at large. Dealing with these challenges calls for the creation of a new
strategic framework to ensure the mutual security of the United States and Russia, and the
world community.
We have agreed that the current levels of our nuclear forces do not reflect the strategic
realities of today. Therefore, we have confirmed our respective commitments to implement
substantial reductions in strategic offensive weapons. On strategic defenses and the ABM
Treaty, we have agreed, in light of the changing global security environment, to continue
consultations within the broad framework of the new strategic relationship. On
nonproliferation matters, we reaffirm our mutual commitment to the Biological and Chemical
Weapons Conventions, and endorse efforts to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Both sides agree that urgent attention must continue to be given to improving the physical
protection and accounting of nuclear materials of all possessor states, and preventing illicit
nuclear trafficking.
We support the building of a European-Atlantic community whole, free, and at peace,

excluding no one, and respecting the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all
nations. To this end, the United States and Russia will work, together with NATO and other
NATO members, to improve, strengthen, and enhance the relationship between NATO and
Russia, with a view to developing new, effective mechanisms for consultation, cooperation,
joint decision, and coordinated/joint action. We believe that these mechanisms should reflect
the fact that the members of NATO and Russia are increasingly allied against terrorism,
regional instability and other contemporary threats, and that the NATO-Russia relationship
should therefore evolve accordingly. We will also work to strengthen our cooperation in
OSCE as a broadly representative, inclusive organization for conducting consultations, taking
decisions, and working together in the region.
We recognize a market economy, the freedom of economic choice and an open democratic
society as the most effective means to provide for the welfare of our citizens. The United
States and Russia will cooperate, including through the support of direct contacts between the

business communities of our countries, to advance U.S.-Russian economic, trade, and

investment relations. The achievement of these goals requires the removal of legislative and
administrative barriers, a transparent, predictable investment climate, the rule of law, and
market-based economic reforms. To this end, it is important to reduce bureaucratic
constraints on the economy and to combat economic crime and corruption.
Reaffirming our commitment to advance common values, the United States and Russia will
continue to work together to protect and advance human rights, tolerance, religious freedom,
free speech and independent media, economic opportunity, and the rule of law. In keeping
with these commitments, we welcome the initiative of Russian and American media
executives, journalists, and independent organizations to convene a Russian-American Media
Entrepreneurship Dialogue. We will promote intense people-to-people exchanges as an
important factor for enhancing mutual understanding between the American and Russian
peoples. We pledge ourselves to the principles and values that represent the best traditions of
both our nations, and to cooperation in order to realize them now and in the future.
*************************************************
November 13, 2001
Press Conference by President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin

6
The East Room
Its a great honor for me to welcome President Vladimir Putin to the White House, and to
welcome his wife as well. This is a new day in the long history of Russian-American
relations, a day of progress and a day of hope.
The United States and Russia are in the midst of a transformation of a relationship that will
yield peace and progress. Were transforming our relationship from one of hostility and
suspicion to one based on cooperation and trust, that will enhance opportunities for peace and
progress for our citizens and for people all around the world.
The challenge of terrorism makes our close cooperation on all issues even more urgent.
Russia and America share the same threat and the same resolve. We will fight and defeat
terrorist networks wherever they exist. Our highest priority is to keep terrorists from
acquiring weapons of mass destruction.
Today, we agreed that Russian and American experts will work together to share information
and expertise to counter the threat from bioterrorism. We agreed that it is urgent that we
improve the physical protection and accounting of nuclear materials and prevent illicit
nuclear trafficking.
And we will strengthen our efforts to cut off every possible source of biological, chemical
and nuclear weapons, materials and expertise. Today, we also agreed to work more closely to
combat organized crime and drug-trafficking, a leading source of terrorist financing.

Both nations are committed to the reconstruction of Afghanistan, once hostilities there have
ceased and the Taliban are no longer in control. We support the UNs efforts to fashion a post-
Taliban government that is broadly based and multi-ethnic. The new government must export
neither terror nor drugs, and it must respect fundamental human rights.
And Russia and the United States -- as Russia and the United States work more closely to
meet new 21st century threats, were also working hard to put the threats of the 20th century
behind us once and for all. And we can report great progress.
The current levels of our nuclear forces do not reflect todays strategic realities. I have
informed President Putin that the United States will reduce our operationally deployed
strategic nuclear warheads to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 over the next decade, a level
fully consistent with American security.
Russia and the United States have also had vast discussions about our defensive capabilities,
the ability to defend ourselves as we head into the 21st century. We have different points of
view about the ABM Treaty, and we will continue dialogue and discussions about the ABM
Treaty, so that we may be able to develop a new strategic framework that enables both of us
to meet the true threats of the 21st century as partners and friends, not as adversaries.
The spirit of partnership that now runs through our relationship is allowing the United States
and Russia to form common approaches to important regional issues. In the Middle East, we
agree that all parties must take practical actions to ease tensions so that peace talks can
resume. We urge the parties to move without delay to implement the Tenet work plan and the
Mitchell Report recommendations.
In Europe, we share a vision of a European Atlantic community whole, free and at peace; one
that includes all of Europes democracies, and where the independence and sovereignty of all
nations are respected. Russia should be a part of this Europe.
We will work together with NATO and NATO members to build new avenues of cooperation
and consultation between Russia and NATO. NATO members and Russia are increasingly
allied against terrorism, regional instability, and other threats of our age. And NATO must
reflect this alliance.
Were encouraged by President Putins commitment to a political dialogue in Chechnya.

Russia has also made important strides on immigration and the protection of religious and
ethnic minorities, including Russias Jewish community. On this issue, Russia is in a
fundamentally different place than it was during the Soviet era. President Putin told me that
these gains for freedom will be protected and expanded.
Our Foreign Ministers have sealed this understanding in an exchange of letters. Because of
this progress, my administration will work with Congress to end the application of Jackson-
Vanik Amendment to Russia.

Russia has set out to strengthen free market institutions and the rule of law. On this basis, our
economic relationship is developing quickly, and we will look for further ways to expand it.
A strong, independent media is a vital part of a new Russia. Weve agreed to launch a
dialogue on media entrepreneurship, so that American and Russian media representatives can
meet and make practical recommendations to both our governments, in order to advance our
goal of free media, and free exchange of ideas.
Russia and the United States will continue to face complex and difficult issues. Yet, weve
made great progress in a very short period of time. Today, because we are working together,
both our countries and the world are more secure and safe.
I want to thank President Putin for the spirit of our meetings. Together, were making history,
as we make progress. Laura and I are looking forward to welcoming the Putins to our ranch
in Crawford, Texas. I cant wait to show you my state, and where I live. In the meantime, I
hope you have a fine stay here in Washington, D.C. And its my honor to welcome you to the
White House, sir, and welcome you to the podium.
___________________
6 For clarity, only the transcript of President Bush's statement is included here. The official
U.S. translation of President Putin's statement is provided on page 18. A question and answer
session has been omitted.
*************************************************
November 13, 2001
Speech by RF President V.V. Putin in Response to Questions by Journalists at

the Joint Press Conference with U.S. President George Bush 7
Ladies and Gentlemen!
I dont know if I will have another opportunity to appear before such an impressive gathering
of the press. Therefore, I would like to start by thanking the President of the United States not
only for his kind invitation to visit the United States and Washington, but also for the
informal way in which our negotiations have begun today.
Both I and my colleagues are gratified to be at the White House. This is a historic place. And
President Bush most graciously gave me a tour not only of the formal reception areas but also
the quarters where he lives. He showed and told me everything. We stopped in front of
almost picture [sic]. This not only interested me but also changed the quality of our
relationship for the better, as it were.
I would like to express my condolences to the U.S. President and all the American people in

connection with the disaster in New York as a result of the airplane crash [sic]. You know,
there is a Russian proverb that says Misfortunes never come alone, but strike one after the
other. We commiserate with you in this tragedy and are certain that the inhabitants of New
York and all the American people will face these adversities with fortitude.
Now let me tell you directly about the progress of our work. The Washington phase of the
talks is coming to an end, and I must note that our conversations already have been very
substantive, interesting, and useful, but they will be continued at Crawford as well. However,
we view the preliminary results as being very positive. This is my fourth meeting with
President Bush in the last several months. I believe that this graphically demonstrates the
current dynamic nature of Russian-U.S. relations. We have come to understand each other
better, moving step by step to bring our positions closer together on key issues of bilateral
and international relations. Today we are already prepared to seek solutions in all areas of our
joint activities. We are willing to dismantle, once and for all, the legacy of the Cold War and
begin fashioning a strategic partnership for the long term.
Naturally, we discussed in detail the fight against international terrorism. The tragic events of
September 11 vividly demonstrated the need to join forces to counter this global threat
decisively. And we do indeed regard it as a global threat. Terrorists and those who abet them
must know that just retribution is inescapable and will overtake them wherever they try to
hide.
The question of the post-crisis political structure of Afghanistan was also addressed. Right
now the most important thing is that peace and a decent life be restored in the country, and
that there be no threat to other countries, or to international stability, emanating from
Afghanistan. Of course, we do not intend to impose our own plans on the Afghan people.
They must decide their fates for themselves, with the active participation of the UN.
We also discussed in detail the course of our dialogue on the interrelated issues of strategic
offensive and defensive arms. We have succeeded in making some progress in this area,
particularly with respect to the prospects for working out a reliable and verifiable agreement
on further major reductions in the nuclear potential of Russia and the United States. In this
connection, I must say that we deeply appreciate the decision by the U.S. President on
reducing strategic offensive arms to a designated threshold and we, for our part, will
endeavor to respond in an appropriate manner. On missile defense issues Russias position
remains unchanged, and we agreed that we will continue the dialogue and consultations on
this matter. I believe that it is too early to provide a final summary of the results of the
discussion of this problem as well. We will have an opportunity to continue our work at
President Bushs ranch in Crawford.
We also exchanged opinions on critical international problems. We discussed the situation in

the Balkans and the situation surrounding Iraq. In the Joint Statement adopted, we reaffirmed
that Russia and the U.S. are determined to facilitate resolution of the crisis in the Middle East
and, above all, early resumption of negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians.

There was also a serious discussion of the development of relations between Russia and
NATO. This includes taking into account the changed international situation. I believe that it
is possible to establish qualitatively new mechanisms for cooperation, specifically, joint
decision-making and coordinated actions in the area of security and strengthening stability.
There was detailed discussion of a number of fundamental issues related to economic

interaction. As you know, the Russian-U.S. dialogue in this area has recently become more
intensive and substantive. The implementation of such major investment projects as Sakhalin
I and the Caspian Pipeline Consortiums oil pipeline is gaining momentum. We are
successfully moving ahead with cooperation in the aerospace field, the mining and chemical
industries, automobile manufacturing, and other areas. Direct contacts among our countries
entrepreneurs are expanding, specifically, within the framework of the Russian-American
Business Dialogue. We are pleased to note that definite progress has been made in resolving
issues related to Russias accession to the WTO and granting Russia market economy status.
And we sensed a clear understanding that the question of graduating Russia from the Jackson-
Vanik Amendment must finally be resolved-not de facto, but de jure. In this context, our
Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State, Messrs. Ivanov and Powell, exchanged
letters confirming the commitment of Russia and the United States to common values in the
area of human rights and religious freedoms.
Of course, the potential for bilateral economic cooperation is still far from being fully
realized. Here, as in other areas, a great deal of joint work lies ahead of us. But we strongly
believe that success is already, to a large extent, predetermined. It is predetermined by our
common willingness to cooperate actively and constructively. I am absolutely certain that this
cooperation, which is reflected in todays visit, will benefit both countries.
___________________
7 Official U.S. translation of the Kremlin's transcript of the Press Conference by President
Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin, The East Room, November 13, 2001. For
clarity, only the transcript of President Putin's statement is included here. The transcript of
President Bush's statement is provided on page 16. A question and answer session has been
omitted.
*************************************************
November 13, 2001
Speech of Russian Federation President V. V. Putin to Representatives of the

American Public and U.S. Politicians, November 13, 2001, Russian Embassy in
Washington8
It is of fundamental importance that our countries collaboration in combatting terrorism not

remain merely an episode in the history of Russian-U.S. relations, but become the start of
long-term partnership and cooperation. Today we must once more look back at the history of
our relations. History, said our great thinker, the Russian historian Vladimir Klyuchevskiy,
is not a teacher, but a supervisor. She does not teach anything, but only punishes us for not
knowing our lessons.
After the Second World War, the ties between our countries developed differently.
Nonetheless, we achieved the main aim in the end: our countries have ceased to be afraid of
each other. This opened the possibility of freeing ourselves also from what, for decades,
aroused horror in the whole worlds peoples: the arsenals of nuclear and other forms of
weapons of mass destruction. Their current quantitative level is not at all in keeping with the
current world situation or the nature of todays threats.
I did not doubt that on this issue we should encounter the understanding of the United States;
and President Bushs statement today confirms this. That is why Russia is stating its readiness
to proceed with significant reductions of strategic arms. That is why today we are proposing a
radical program of further reductions of SOAs--at the least, by a factor of three--to the
minimum level necessary to maintain strategic equilibrium in the world. We no longer need
to frighten each other in order to arrive at agreements. Security is established, not by weapons
and mountains of metal, but by the political will of states and of the leaders of these states.
Yes, today the world is still far from having international relations built exclusively upon
trust. Unfortunately. That is why it is so important today to rely upon the existing foundation
of treaties and agreements in the field of disarmament and arms control.
___________________
8 Official U.S. translation of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs transcript
of President Putin's November 13, 2001, speech at the Russian Embassy in Washington. For
clarity, only the text relevant to the Moscow Treaty is included.
*************************************************
December 13, 2001
Text of Diplomatic Notes Sent to Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine on U.S.
Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty
The following is the text of diplomatic notes sent to Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
Ukraine on December 13, 2001:
The Embassy of the United States of America has the honor to refer to the Treaty between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) on the
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems signed at Moscow May 26,1972.
Article XV, paragraph 2, gives each Party the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides
that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its

supreme interests.
The United States recognizes that the Treaty was entered into with the USSR, which ceased
to exist in 1991. Since then, we have entered into a new strategic relationship with Russia that
is cooperative rather than adversarial, and are building strong relationships with most states
of the former USSR.
Since the Treaty entered into force in 1972, a number of state and non-state entities have
acquired or are actively seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. It is clear, and has
recently been demonstrated, that some of these entities are prepared to employ these weapons
against the United States. Moreover, a number of states are developing ballistic missiles,
including long-range ballistic missiles, as a means of delivering weapons of mass destruction.
These events pose a direct threat to the territory and security of the United States and
jeopardize its supreme interests. As a result, the United States has concluded that it must
develop, test, and deploy anti-ballistic missile systems for the defense of its national territory,
of its forces outside the United States, and of its friends and allies.
Pursuant to Article XV, paragraph 2, the United States has decided that extraordinary events
related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Therefore,
in the exercise of the right to withdraw from the Treaty provided in Article XV, paragraph 2,
the United States hereby gives notice of its withdrawal from the Treaty. In accordance with
the terms of the Treaty, withdrawal will be effective six months from the date of this notice.
*************************************************
December 13, 2001
A Statement Made by Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 13, 2001,

Regarding the Decision of the Administration of the United States of America
to Withdraw from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 19729
The U.S. Administration today announced that it will withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty
in six months time.
The Treaty does indeed allow each of the parties to withdraw from it under exceptional
circumstances. The leadership of the United States has spoken about it repeatedly and this
step has not come as a surprise to us. But we believe this decision to be mistaken.
As is known, Russia, like the United States and unlike other nuclear powers, has long
possessed an effective system to overcome anti-missile defense. So, I can say with full
confidence that the decision made by the President of the United States does not pose a threat
to the national security of the Russian Federation.
At the same time our country elected not to accept the insistent proposals on the part of the U.

S. to jointly withdraw from the ABM Treaty and did everything it could to preserve the
Treaty. I still think that this is a correct and valid position. Russia was guided above all by the
aim of preserving and strengthening the international legal foundation in the field of
disarmament and non-proliferation of mass destruction weapons.
The ABM Treaty is one of the supporting elements of the legal system in this field. That
system was created through joint efforts during past decades.
It is our conviction that the development of the situation in the present world dictates a
certain logic of actions.
Now that the world has been confronted with new threats one cannot allow a legal vacuum to
be formed in the sphere of strategic stability. One should not undermine the regimes of non-
proliferation of mass destruction weapons.
I believe that the present level of bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the U.
S. should not only be preserved but should be used for working out a new framework of
strategic relations as soon as possible.
Along with the problem of anti-missile defense a particularly important task under these
conditions is putting a legal seal on the achieved agreements on further radical, irreversible
and verifiable cuts of strategic offensive weapons, in our opinion to the level of 1,500-2,200
nuclear warheads for each side.
In conclusion I would like to note that Russia will continue to adhere firmly to its course in
world affairs aimed at strengthening strategic stability and international security.
___________________
9 From the English transcript by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation,
Daily News Bulletin, December 14, 2001.
*************************************************
December 13, 2001
Response to Russian Statement on U.S. ABM Treaty Withdrawal
The United States welcomes President Putins statement. We agree with President Putin that
the decision taken by the President of the United States presents no threat to the national
security of the Russian Federation.
We have worked intensively with Russia to create a new strategic framework for our
relationship based on mutual interests and cooperation across a broad range of political,
economic, and security issues. Together, the United States and Russia have made substantial
progress in our efforts and look forward to even greater progress in the future.
The United States in particular welcomes Russias commitment to deep reductions in its level
of offensive strategic nuclear forces. Combined with the reductions of U.S. strategic nuclear
forces announced by President Bush in November, this action will result in the lowest level of
strategic nuclear weapons deployed by our two countries in decades. We will work with
Russia to formalize this arrangement on offensive forces, including appropriate verification
and transparency measures.
Russias announcement of nuclear reductions and its commitment to continue to conduct

close consultations with the United States reflect our shared desire to continue the essential
work of building a new relationship for a new century.
*************************************************
May 24, 2002
Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship
The United States of America and the Russian Federation,
Recalling the accomplishments at the Ljubljana, Genoa, Shanghai, and Washington/Crawford

Summits and the new spirit of cooperation already achieved;
Building on the November 13, 2001 Joint Statement on a New Relationship Between the
United States and Russia, having embarked upon the path of new relations for the twenty-first
century, and committed to developing a relationship based on friendship, cooperation,
common values, trust, openness, and predictability;
Reaffirming our belief that new global challenges and threats require a qualitatively new
foundation for our relationship;
Determined to work together, with other nations and with international organizations, to
respond to these new challenges and threats, and thus contribute to a peaceful, prosperous,
and free world and to strengthening strategic security;
Declare as follows:
A Foundation for Cooperation
We are achieving a new strategic relationship. The era in which the United States and Russia
saw each other as an enemy or strategic threat has ended. We are partners and we will
cooperate to advance stability, security, and economic integration, and to jointly counter
global challenges and to help resolve regional conflicts.
To advance these objectives the United States and Russia will continue an intensive dialogue

on pressing international and regional problems, both on a bilateral basis and in international
fora, including in the UN Security Council, the G-8, and the OSCE. Where we have
differences, we will work to resolve them in a spirit of mutual respect.
We will respect the essential values of democracy, human rights, free speech and free media,
tolerance, the rule of law, and economic opportunity.
We recognize that the security, prosperity, and future hopes of our peoples rest on a benign
security environment, the advancement of political and economic freedoms, and international
cooperation.
The further development of U.S.-Russian relations and the strengthening of mutual

understanding and trust will also rest on a growing network of ties between our societies and
peoples. We will support growing economic interaction between the business communities of
our two countries and people-to-people and cultural contacts and exchanges.
Political Cooperation
The United States and Russia are already acting as partners and friends in meeting the new
challenges of the 21st century; affirming our Joint Statement of October 21, 2001, our
countries are already allied in the global struggle against international terrorism.
The United States and Russia will continue to cooperate to support the Afghan peoples
efforts to transform Afghanistan into a stable, viable nation at peace with itself and its
neighbors. Our cooperation, bilaterally and through the United Nations, the Six-Plus-Two'
diplomatic process, and in other multilateral fora, has proved important to our success so far
in ridding Afghanistan of the Taliban and al-Qaida.
In Central Asia and the South Caucasus, we recognize our common interest in promoting the
stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all the nations of this region. The United
States and Russia reject the failed model of "Great Power" rivalry that can only increase the
potential for conflict in those regions. We will support economic and political development
and respect for human rights while we broaden our humanitarian cooperation and cooperation
on counterterrorism and counternarcotics.
The United States and Russia will cooperate to resolve regional conflicts, including those in
Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Transnistrian issue in Moldova. We strongly
encourage the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia to exhibit flexibility and a constructive
approach to resolving the conflict concerning Nagorno-Karabakh. As two of the Co-
Chairmen of the OSCEs Minsk Group, the United States and Russia stand ready to assist in
these efforts.
On November 13, 2001, we pledged to work together to develop a new relationship between
NATO and Russia that reflects the new strategic reality in the Euro-Atlantic region. We
stressed that the members of NATO and Russia are increasingly allied against terrorism,

regional instability, and other contemporary threats. We therefore welcome the inauguration
at the May 28, 2002 NATO-Russia summit in Rome of a new NATO-Russia Council, whose
members, acting in their national capacities and in a manner consistent with their respective
collective commitments and obligations, will identify common approaches, take joint
decisions, and bear equal responsibility, individually and jointly, for their implementation. In
this context, they will observe in good faith their obligations under international law,
including the UN Charter, provisions and principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act and
the OSCE Charter for European Security. In the framework of the NATO-Russia Council,
NATO member states and Russia will work as equal partners in areas of common interest.
They aim to stand together against common threats and risks to their security.
As co-sponsors of the Middle East peace process, the United States and Russia will continue
to exert joint and parallel efforts, including in the framework of the Quartet, to overcome
the current crisis in the Middle East, to restart negotiations, and to encourage a negotiated
settlement. In the Balkans, we will promote democracy, ethnic tolerance, self-sustaining
peace, and long-term stability, based on respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the states in the region and United Nations Security Council resolutions. The United States
and Russia will continue their constructive dialogue on Iraq and welcome the continuation of
special bilateral discussions that opened the way for UN Security Council adoption of the
Goods Review List.
Recalling our Joint Statement of November 13, 2001 on counternarcotics cooperation, we

note that illegal drug trafficking poses a threat to our peoples and to international security,
and represents a substantial source of financial support for international terrorism. We are
committed to intensifying cooperation against this threat, which will bolster both the security
and health of the citizens of our countries.
The United States and Russia remain committed to intensifying cooperation in the fight
against transnational organized crime. In this regard, we welcome the entry into force of the
Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters on January 31, 2002.
Economic Cooperation
The United States and Russia believe that successful national development in the 21st century
demands respect for the discipline and practices of the free market. As we stated on
November 13, 2001, an open market economy, the freedom of economic choice, and an open
democratic society are the most effective means to provide for the welfare of the citizens of
our countries.
The United States and Russia will endeavor to make use of the potential of world trade to
expand the economic ties between the two countries, and to further integrate Russia into the
world economy as a leading participant, with full rights and responsibilities, consistent with
the rule of law, in the world economic system. In this connection, the sides give high priority
to Russias accession to the World Trade Organization on standard terms.

Success in our bilateral economic and trade relations demands that we move beyond the
limitations of the past. We stress the importance and desirability of graduating Russia from
the emigration provisions of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, also known as the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment. We note that the Department of Commerce, based on its ongoing thorough and
deliberative inquiry, expects to make its final decision no later than June 14, 2002 on whether
Russia should be treated as a market economy under the provisions of U.S. trade law. The
sides will take further practical steps to eliminate obstacles and barriers, including as
appropriate in the legislative area, to strengthen economic cooperation.
We have established a new dynamic in our economic relations and between our business
communities, aimed at advancing trade and investment opportunities while resolving
disputes, where they occur, constructively and transparently.
The United States and Russia acknowledge the great potential for expanding bilateral trade
and investment, which would bring significant benefits to both of our economies. Welcoming
the recommendations of the Russian-American Business Dialogue, we are committed to
working with the private sectors of our countries to realize the full potential of our economic
interaction. We also welcome the opportunity to intensify cooperation in energy exploration
and development, especially in oil and gas, including in the Caspian region.
Strengthening People-to-People Contacts
The greatest strength of our societies is the creative energy of our citizens. We welcome the
dramatic expansion of contacts between Americans and Russians in the past ten years in
many areas, including joint efforts to resolve common problems in education, health, the
sciences, and environment, as well as through tourism, sister-city relationships, and other
people-to-people contacts. We pledge to continue supporting these efforts, which help
broaden and deepen good relations between our two countries.
Battling the scourge of HIV/AIDS and other deadly diseases, ending family violence,
protecting the environment, and defending the rights of women are areas where U.S. and
Russian institutions, and especially non-governmental organizations, can successfully expand
their cooperation.
Israeli Intelligence Report (State Department Release)
Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Non-Proliferation and

International Terrorism
The United States and Russia will intensify joint efforts to confront the new global challenges
of the twenty-first century, including combating the closely linked threats of international
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
We believe that international terrorism represents a particular danger to international stability
as shown once more by the tragic events of September 11, 2001. It is imperative that all

nations of the world cooperate to combat this threat decisively. Toward this end, the United
States and Russia reaffirm our commitment to work together bilaterally and multilaterally.
The United States and Russia recognize the profound importance of preventing the spread of
weapons of mass destruction and missiles. The specter that such weapons could fall into the
hands of terrorists and those who support them illustrates the priority all nations must give to
combating proliferation.
To that end, we will work closely together, including through cooperative programs, to
ensure the security of weapons of mass destruction and missile technologies, information,
expertise, and material. We will also continue cooperative threat reduction programs and
expand efforts to reduce weapons-usable fissile material. In that regard, we will establish
joint experts groups to investigate means of increasing the amount of weapons-usable fissile
material to be eliminated, and to recommend collaborative research and development efforts
on advanced, proliferation-resistant nuclear reactor and fuel cycle technologies. We also
intend to intensify our cooperation concerning destruction of chemical weapons.
The United States and Russia will also seek broad international support for a strategy of
proactive non-proliferation, including by implementing and bolstering the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the conventions on the prohibition of chemical and
biological weapons. The United States and Russia call on all countries to strengthen and
strictly enforce export controls, interdict illegal transfers, prosecute violators, and tighten
border controls to prevent and protect against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Missile Defense, Further Strategic Offensive Reductions, New Consultative Mechanism

on Strategic Security
The United States and Russia proceed from the Joint Statements by the President of the
United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation on Strategic Issues of
July 22, 2001 in Genoa and on a New Relationship Between the United States and Russia of
November 13, 2001 in Washington.
The United States and Russia are taking steps to reflect, in the military field, the changed
nature of the strategic relationship between them.
The United States and Russia acknowledge that todays security environment is
fundamentally different than during the Cold War.
In this connection, the United States and Russia have agreed to implement a number of steps
aimed at strengthening confidence and increasing transparency in the area of missile defense,
including the exchange of information on missile defense programs and tests in this area,
reciprocal visits to observe missile defense tests, and observation aimed at familiarization
with missile defense systems. They also intend to take the steps necessary to bring a joint
center for the exchange of data from early warning systems into operation.

The United States and Russia have also agreed to study possible areas for missile defense
cooperation, including the expansion of joint exercises related to missile defense, and the
exploration of potential programs for the joint research and development of missile defense
technologies, bearing in mind the importance of the mutual protection of classified
information and the safeguarding of intellectual property rights.
The United States and Russia will, within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council,
explore opportunities for intensified practical cooperation on missile defense for Europe.
The United States and Russia declare their intention to carry out strategic offensive
reductions to the lowest possible levels consistent with their national security requirements
and alliance obligations, and reflecting the new nature of their strategic relations.
A major step in this direction is the conclusion of the Treaty Between the United States of
America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions.
In this connection, both sides proceed on the basis that the Treaty Between the United States
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, remains in force in accordance with its terms and
that its provisions will provide the foundation for providing confidence, transparency, and
predictability in further strategic offensive reductions, along with other supplementary
measures, including transparency measures, to be agreed.
The United States and Russia agree that a new strategic relationship between the two
countries, based on the principles of mutual security, trust, openness, cooperation, and
predictability requires substantive consultation across a broad range of international security
issues. To that end we have decided to:
establish a Consultative Group for Strategic Security to be chaired by Foreign

Ministers and Defense Ministers with the participation of other senior officials.
This group will be the principal mechanism through which the sides strengthen
mutual confidence, expand transparency, share information and plans, and
discuss strategic issues of mutual interest; and
seek ways to expand and regularize contacts between our two countries
Defense Ministries and Foreign Ministries, and our intelligence agencies.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Moscow
May 24, 2002.
*************************************************

June 5, 2002
Fact Sheet on the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions
On May 24, President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin signed the Moscow
Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions. Under this Treaty, the United States and Russia
will reduce their strategic nuclear warheads to a level of 1700-2200 by December 31, 2012, a
level nearly two-thirds below current levels.
This new, legally-binding Treaty codifies the deep reductions announced by President Bush
during the November 2001 Washington/Crawford Summit and by President Putin at that
summit and one month later. The two Presidents agreed on the need for a legally binding
document that would outlast both of their presidencies, to provide openness and predictability
over the longer term in the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship. At the same time, reflecting
the mutual trust in this relationship, the Treaty affords flexibility to each Party to meet
unforeseen future contingencies.
The Treaty is part of the new strategic framework that the United States and Russia have
established. The Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship, also issued in Moscow
on May 24, records mutual commitments to a broad array of cooperative efforts in political,
economic, and security areas. It marks a new era in our bilateral relationship.
Treaty Provisions
The Treaty requires each country to reduce and limit its strategic nuclear warheads to 1700-
2200 by December 31, 2012. Each side may determine for itself the composition and
structure of its strategic forces consistent with this limit.
Both the United States and Russia intend to reduce their strategic offensive forces to the
lowest possible levels, consistent with their national security requirements and alliance
obligations, and reflecting the new nature of their strategic relations. The U.S. intends to
reduce its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1700-2200, as President Bush
announced on November 13, 2001. The United States considers operationally deployed
strategic nuclear warheads to be reentry vehicles on ICBMs in their launchers, reentry
vehicles on SLBMs in their launchers onboard submarines, and nuclear armaments located at
heavy bomber bases. In addition, there will be some spares stored at heavy bomber bases.
A Bilateral Implementation Commission will meet at least twice a year to discuss issues
related to implementation of the Treaty.
Ratification Process
The Treaty will be transmitted to the United States Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification; in Russia, the two Chambers of the Federal Assembly must approve a bill on its
ratification. Assuming positive action by the legislatures of both countries, the United States

and Russia will exchange instruments of ratification and the Treaty will enter into force. It
will remain in force until December 31, 2012, and may be extended or replaced with a
subsequent agreement.
Relationship to START
The five-Party Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) of 1991 continues in force
unchanged. (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine and the United States are Parties to
START.) START's comprehensive verification regime will provide the foundation for
providing confidence, transparency and predictability in further strategic reductions. As noted
in the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship also issued in Moscow on May 24,
supplementary measures, including transparency measures, may be agreed in the future. The
United States and Russia will establish a Consultative Group for Strategic Security to be
chaired by Foreign and Defense Ministers. This group will be the principal mechanism
through which the sides strengthen mutual confidence, expand transparency, share
information and plans, and discuss strategic issues of mutual interest.
The 1993 START II Treaty never entered into force because of the long delay in Russian
ratification and the fact that Russia conditioned its ratification of START II on preservation
of the ABM Treaty. The new Moscow Treaty moves us beyond START II, both in reductions
to even lower levels of operationally deployed warheads and in our relationship with Russia.
U.S. Reduction Plans
As outlined in the Department of Defenses Nuclear Posture Review submitted to Congress in

January of this year, the United States plans to deactivate all 50 of its ten-warhead
Peacekeeper ICBMs and remove four Trident submarines from strategic service. Additional
steps to reduce the number of U.S. operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to the
1700-2200 level, including missile downloading and lowering the number of operationally
deployed weapons at heavy bomber bases, will be decided subsequently.
Some of the warheads removed from deployed status will be used as spares, some will be
stored, and some will be destroyed. The U.S. will continue to deploy land-, sea- and air-based
strategic forces as part of one element of the New Triad described in the Nuclear Posture
Review Report to Congress.
*************************************************
June 14, 2002
Statement by the Russian MFA on the Legal Status of the Treaty Between the
Russian Federation and the United States of America on Further Reduction
and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II)10

In May 2000, the Russian Federation ratified the START II Treaty and the New York
agreements of September 26, 1997, regarding the ABM Treaty. In this connection, there was
a mutual understanding with the U.S. side that the U.S. would act in a similar fashion. This
would have made it possible to implement the aforementioned, very important agreements on
the strategic offensive and defensive arms of both Parties.
However, the U.S. declined to ratify the START II Treaty and the New York agreements.
Moreover, on June 13, 2002, the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty and, as a
result, this instrument of international law, which for three decades had served as the
cornerstone of strategic stability, is no longer in effect.
Taking into account the above mentioned actions of the U.S. and based on the provisions of
the Federal Law on Ratification of the START II Treaty, the Russian Federation notes the
absence of any of the prerequisites for entry into force of the START II Treaty and no longer
considers itself bound by the obligation, provided for under international law, to refrain from
actions that could deprive this Treaty of its object and purpose.
___________________
10
Official U.S. translation of a Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement of June 14, 2002.

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IDF Treaty Series The State of Non-Proliferation # 51305

IDF Treaty Series State of Non-Proliferation

DESBIC Agency Bureau of Arms Control

May 13, 2005 Israeli Intelligence Report # 51305 (AMENDED)

TABLE OF CONTENTS THE SORT COMPACT

STATEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL ATTRIBUTION

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------------DONE the Twelth of May, 2,005_in H B. Calif. 92649 U S A----------------

Moscow Treaty Supporting Documents

(SORT) STATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS TREATY

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Desiring to establish a genuine partnership based on the principles of capital resources,

Commit to implementing significant reductions in weapons of mass destruction (WMD s) and

HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS;

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It is strongly urged to model the Organizations Bureau similarly nearways to the:

STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY Except

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5. The U S On Site Inspection Agency is to be revitalized to an army of many thousand as

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Engineers. Mission priorities are to provide hospitable accommodations for numerous

8.To promote constructive measures of development and to encourage demilitarization

9.The principle objective of the Organizations weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation

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FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, U N AND STATE OF ISRAEL

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, NATO ALLIANCES AND ALL ENSIGNS

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The White House

To the Senate of the United States:

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The Secretary of State,

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BILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION COMMISSION

The Treaty establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC), a diplomatic

ENTRY INTO FORCE; DURATION; RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL

STATUS OF START II TREATY

Accompanying this report is an article-by-article analysis of the Treaty. By deeply reducing

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Israeli Intelligence Report : State of the State Department U S/U N

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE ANALYSIS OF THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED

TITLE AND PREAMBLE

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and in a statement on December 13, 2001:

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Article III establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission (BIC), a diplomatic

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July 22, 2001

Joint Statement by U.S. President George W. Bush and President of the

November 13, 2001

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Joint Statement by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on a

We support the building of a European-Atlantic community whole, free, and at peace,

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business communities of our countries, to advance U.S.-Russian economic, trade, and

November 13, 2001

Press Conference by President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin

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Were encouraged by President Putins commitment to a political dialogue in Chechnya.

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November 13, 2001

Speech by RF President V.V. Putin in Response to Questions by Journalists at

Ladies and Gentlemen!