Babst V National Intelligence Board

6/10/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 132
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Babst vs. National Intelligence Board
*
No. L62992. September 28, 1984.
ARLENE BABST, ODETTE ALCANTARA CERES P.

DOYO, JOANN Q. MAGLIPON, DOMINI
TORREVILLASSUAREZ, LORNA KALAWTIROL,
CIELO BUENAVENTURA, SYLVIA MAYUGA, SHEILA
S. CORONEL, ET AL., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE BOARD, SPECIAL COMMITTEE NO. 2,
BRIG. GEN. WILFREDO ESTRADA (ret.), COL. RENATO
ECARMA, NBI ASST. DIRECTOR PONCIANO
FERNANDO, COL. BALBINO DIEGO, COL. GALILEO
KINTANAR, COL. EUSTAQUIO PERALTA, ET AL.,
respondents.
_______________
* EN BANC.
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VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 317

Moot and Academic; Military Law; Criminal Procedure;

Where assailed proceedings have ended, the petition to enjoin and
declare it illegal becomes moot and academic.The assailed
proceedings have come to an end. The acts sought to be prohibited
(i.e., the issuance of letters of invitation and subsequent
interrogations) have therefore been abated, thereby rendering the
petition moot and academic as regards the aforesaid matters.
Same; Same; Same; A letter of invitation to appear before a
group of ranking military officers inside a military camp can
easily be mistaken as a command.Be that as it may, it is not idle
to note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and
answer some questions, which the person invited may heed or
refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally
objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however, such an
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000015c8e6482588d33aaaf003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/46
invitation can easily assume a different appearance. Thus, where

the invitation comes from a powerful group composed
predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time when
the country has just emerged from martial rule and when the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not
entirely been lifted, and the designated interrogation site is a
military camp, the same can easily be taken, not as a strictly
voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as an
authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril,
especially where, as in the instant case, the invitation carries the
ominous warning that failure to appear . . . shall be considered as
a waiver . . . and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in
accordance with law. Fortunately, the NIB director general and
chairman saw the wisdom of terminating the proceedings and the
unwelcome interrogation.
Prohibition; Criminal Procedure; Writ of prohibition cannot
issue against a board which did not file the libel case in question.
Firstly, the writ of prohibition is directed against a tribunal,
board or person acting without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion visavis certain proceedings pending
before it. The libel cases adverted to are not pending before
respondent NIB or any other respondent.
Same; Same; Issue of validity of libel charge should be raised
in the court where it was filed. Same rule applies as to
admissibility of evidence.Secondly, the issue of validity of the
libel charges by reason of their alleged collision with freedom of
expression, is a matter that should be raised in the proper forum,
i.e., before the court where the libel cases are pending or where
they may be filed. The
318
same rule applies to the issue of admissibility as evidence of

matters that have been elicited in the course of an inquiry or
interrogation conducted by respondent NIB, which petitioners
claim to have been illegally obtained.
Same; Same; Right to file a libel case is a personal matter.
Prohibition to file it or prosecute it cannot issue against
respondent National Intelligence Board.Finally, the right to
seek redress when libeled is a personal and individual privilege of
the aggrieved party, and no one among the respondent officials
has the authority to restrain any of his subordinates who has
been libeled from vindicating his right by instituting a libel suit.

Brig. Gen. Tadiar has filed the libel case against petitioners
Suarez and Doyo in his personal capacity. Moreover, he is not
even a member of respondent NIB. And the NIB does not appear
to have anything to do with Gen. Tadiars private right to
complain of libel.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
Constitutional Law; Press freedom is a preferred right. It must

be exercised properly, however.There is no ambiguity in the
above authoritative doctrines. Press freedom is a preferred right.
It is entitled to the fullest protection that the law affords. A
person who deems himself aggrieved by defamatory statements is
of course entitled to seek redress in the courts. Nonetheless, in
the felicitous language of the New York Times decisions, libel can
claim no talismatic immunity from constitutional limitations.
While there is an undeniable public interest in assuring that a
mans reputation be safeguarded from calumny and unjust
accusation, on matters of public concern, he cannot be shielded
from the scrutiny of the press and the expression thereafter of
whatever failings it might uncover on matters of public concern.
Care is to be taken, however, that in its publication there is
avoidance of affirming what is not true or disregarding in a
manner deemed reckless to take the necessary steps of
ascertaining its truth or falsity. That is as it should be. Justice
Holmes, in his classic dissent in Abrams, after stressing that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by a free trade of ideas,
and that there should be the competition in the open market, was
insistent that truth is the only ground upon which mans wishes
can be safely carried out. Professor Emerson, at present the
foremost scholar in the field, emphasized the value of freedom of
expression as an essential process for advancing knowledge and
discovering truth.
319
VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 319
Same; The times are difficult, even perilous. It is of essence,

therefore, that public officials and journalist have initial trust for
each other.There is no more exacting duty on the part of the
judiciary, therefore, than to heed the clear and unmistakable
mandate of the Constitution in passing upon the conflicting
claims of the parties in libel cases. To repeat, the law cannot
ignore a mans inherent right to have his reputation remain free
from unjustified and unwarranted imputations of wrongdoing.

Nonetheless, because of the primacy enjoyed by the free speech
and free press guarantees of the Constitution, even on the
assumption that there has been injury to mans reputation, the
damages to be assessed, if at all warranted, should not be lacking
in the quality of realism. The same sense of realism should
likewise be displayed by the plaintiff in a libel suit in estimating
the amount due him for the injury inflicted on his good name. The
times are difficult, even perilous. It is of the essence, therefore,
that there be on the part of public officials and journalists alike
an attitude of trust and confidence in the good faith that
motivates them in the discharge of their responsibilities. Such an
attitude may lessen the atmosphere of confrontation and dissipate
the fear that press freedom has become a casualty under the
circumstances. It is for the judiciary to be ever on the alert that
such be not the case.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
Judgments; Moot and Academic; The petitioners are entitled

to a definitive ruling even if, as the majority says, the respondent
boards proceedings of inviting petitioners for questioning, have
already terminated. This will serve as useful guide for the conduct
of public officers and tribunals.Petitioners on the other hand,
invoke the imperatives of public interest in their petition and
plead for a definite ruling thereon from the Court so that the
violations of their constitutional rights of free press and speech
and privacy may not be repeated. Petitioners are entitled to such
a definite ruling. In the words of the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro in Aquino, Jr. vs. Enrile, the fact that a final
determination of a question involved in an action is needed will be
useful as a guide for the conduct of public officers or tribunals is a
sufficient reason for retaining an action which would or should
otherwise be dismissed. Likewise appeals may be retained if the
questions involved are likely to arise frequently in the future
unless they are settled by a court of last resort.
Same; Prohibition; Criminal Procedure; The ground cited by
the majority that Gen. Tadiar filed the libel case in his personal
capacity
320
is not borne out by the records.The third abovecited ground that

respondent Gen. Tadiar has filed the libel case in his personal
capacity is not borne out by the record. The information filed
recites that the libel was committed against the character,
honesty, integrity, virtue and reputation of Brigadier General
Artemio A. Tadiar, Jr., Commanding General of the 3rd
Philippine Marine Brigades, Armed Forces of the Philippines,
both as a man and as an officer in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and that the articles false, defamatory and libelous
statements (which) impute to the officers and men of the 4th
Marine Battalion, a unit of the Third Philippine Marine Brigade
under the command of Brig. Gen. Artemio A. Tadiar, Jr., the
commission of the crimes of murder, homicide, arbitrary
detention, illegal arrests and searches, maltreatment and other
acts of oppression, terrorism, abuse of authority and acts of
misconduct unbecoming of military officers and members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, although it claimed P10million
damages on Brig. Gen. Tadiars behalf.
ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
Judgments; I agree with Justice Teehankee that the Court

should rule squarely on the matter.The ponencia of Justice
Plana declares the petition moot and academic in respect of the
interrogations because they have been abated. He adds a short
and mild note of concern. I agree with Justice Teehankee that the
Court should rule squarely on the matter.
Same; Constitutional Law; Military Law; Criminal Procedure;
Invitations made by military officers to petitioners for interview
are odious and had chilling effects because they are cloaked by a
mantle of pseudolegality.The Constitution states that No law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.
(Art. IV, Sec. 9.) In the instant case the persons who compose
Special Committee No. 2 of the National Intelligence Board have
abridged the freedom to speak and the freedom to publish by
intimidation and veiled threats addressed to some members of the
press who by their writings have been critical of the government.
Their actions are the more odious and had chilling effects because
they were cloaked by a mantle of pseudo legality.
Same; Same; Same; The letters at bar while using the word
requested are in fact thinly veiled commands:The letter uses
the word requested but in context the request was a thinly
veiled command to appear before the Special Committee for
failure to do so is to
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VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 321
be considered as a waiver (of what?) and the committee will have

to proceed in accordance with law (again what law?).
Prohibition; Criminal Procedure; Writ of prohibition may be
issued to prevent oppressive enforcement of criminal law.It is
now wellsettled that prohibition can be issued in the sound
discretion of the court in order to prevent oppressive enforcement
of the criminal law. (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez, 43
Phil. 304 [1922].) Upon the other hand, the reasons advanced by
Justice Plana why prohibition should not be issued are based on
technical and ignore equitable grounds. He forgets that
prohibition is a prerogative and an equitable writ.
Same; Same; The interrogations at bar are proper objects of
prohibition and injunction.In the light of the foregoing, I place
on record my condemnation of the interrogations. They were
violative of the freedoms of speech, press and privacy. They were
the proper objects of prohibition or injunction. Similarly, any libel
suit, whether civil or criminal, on matters inquired into in the
interrogation can also be prohibited.
PETITION for prohibition with preliminary injunction to

review the decision of the National Intelligence Board.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
RESOLUTION
PLANA, J.:
This was originally a petition for prohibition with

preliminary injunction which was superseded by the
amended and supplemental petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction filed by petitioners on March 3,
1983, seeking to prohibit the respondents (a) from issuing
subpoenas or letters of invitation to petitioners and
interrogating them, and (b) from filing libel suits on
matters that have been the subject of inquiry by
respondent National Intelligence Board (NIB).
Petitioners are columnists, feature article writers and
reporters of various local publications. At different dates
since July, 1980, some of them have allegedly been
summoned by military authorities who have subjected
them to sustained in
322

terrogation on various aspects of their works, feelings,

sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private
lives. Typical of the letters received by the petitioners from
respondent NIB is that addressed to petitioner Arlene
Babst, dated December 20, 1982, which reads:
Madam:
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, you are hereby

requested to appear before this Special Committee at Philippine
Army Officers Clubhouse, Fort Bonifacio, Metro Manila (sketch
attached), 9:00 A.M., December 22, 1982, to shed light on
confidential matters being looked into by this Committee.
Your failure to appear on the specified date and place shall be
considered as a waiver on your part and this Committee will be
constrained to proceed in accordance with law.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO C. ESTRADA

Brig. General, AFP (Ret.)
Chairman
Aside from the interrogations, a criminal complaint for

libel was filed by Brig. Gen. Artemio Tadiar, Jr. on
February 9, 1983 with the Office of the City Fiscal, Manila,
against petitioners Domini TorrevillasSuarez, editor of the
Panorama, and Ma. Ceres Doyo based on an article written
by Doyo and published in the March 28, 1982 issue of the
Panorama, on which the author had been interrogated by
respondents. The complaint included an staggering P10
million claim for damages. (An information for libel has
since been filed with the Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Region against Suarez and Doyo.)
Petitioners maintain that the respondents have no
jurisdiction over the proceedings which are violative of the
constitutional guarantee on free expression since they have
the effect of imposing restrictive guidelines and norms on
mass media; that they are a punitive ordeal or subsequent
punishment of petitioners for lawful publications; that they
amount to a system of censorship, curtailing the free flow
of informa
323
VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 323

tion and opinion, indispensable to the right of the people

to know matters of public concern guaranteed in Section 6
of Article IV of the Constitution; and that they constitute
intrusions into spheres of individual liberty. Regarding the
libel charge against Suarez and Doyo, petitioners denounce
the filing as instituted with intent to intimidate and based
on illegally obtained evidence, referring to the matters
inquired into by respondents in previously conducted,
allegedly illegal interrogations.
In their comment, respondents counter that no issue of
jurisdiction exists since they do not pretend to exercise
jurisdiction over the petitioners; that what respondents
have sent to petitioners were neither subpoenas nor
summonses, but mere invitations to dialogues which were
completely voluntary, without any compulsion employed on
petitioners; that the dialogues themselves were designed
simply to elicit information and exchange ideas; and that
the expression of personal preferences and opinions by
members of the respondent Board is not equivalent to the
imposition of norms and guidelines to be followed by
petitioners. Relative to the libel case, respondents contend
that petitioners have no cause of action against respondent
Board since respondent General Tadiar is not a member of
respondent Board and has filed the libel case in his
personal capacity; and the libel case is not pending before
any of the respondents. Furthermore, respondents aver
that this case has been rendered moot and academic
because the proceedings before NIB Special Committee No.
2 (which conducted the interrogations) have already been
ordered terminated by General Fabian C. Ver in his
capacity as Director General and Chairman of the NIB, and
said proceedings have in fact been terminated.
The petition is premised upon the alleged illegality and
unconstitutionally of the issuance by respondent NIB to
petitioners of letters of invitation, their subsequent
interrogation, and the filing of the aforementioned libel
suit.
Under the circumstances of the case, the petition cannot
be granted.
The assailed proceedings have come to an end. The acts
sought to be prohibited (i.e., the issuance of letters of
invita
324

tion and subsequent interrogations) have therefore been

abated, thereby rendering the petition moot and academic
as regards the aforesaid matters.
Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that ordinarily,
an invitation to attend a hearing and answer some
questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at
his pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable.
Under certain circumstances, however, such an invitation
can easily assume a different appearance. Thus, where the
invitation comes from a powerful group composed
predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time
when the country has just emerged from martial rule and
when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus has not entirely been lifted, and the designated
interrogation site is a military camp, the same can easily
be taken, not as a strictly voluntary invitation which it
purports to be, but as an authoritative command which one
can only defy at his peril, especially where, as in the
instant case, the invitation carries the ominous warning
that failure to appear . . . shall be considered as a waiver .
. . and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in
accordance with law. Fortunately, the NIB director
general and chairman saw the wisdom of terminating the
proceedings and the unwelcome interrogation.
Similarly, prohibition will not issue in respect of the
libel charges now pending in court against two of the
petitioners and similar suits that might be filed.
Firstly, the writ of prohibition is directed against a
tribunal, board or person acting without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion visavis
certain proceedings pending before it. The libel cases
adverted to are not pending before respondent NIB or any
other respondent.
Secondly, the issue of validity of the libel, charges by
reason of their alleged collision with freedom of expression,
is a matter that should be raised in the proper forum, i.e.,
before the court where the libel cases are pending or where
they may be filed. The same rule applies to the issue of
admissibility as evidence of matters that have been elicited
in the course of an inquiry or interrogation conducted by
respondent NIB, which petitioners claim to have been
illegally obtained.
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VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 325

Finally, the right to seek redress when libeled is a personal

and individual privilege of the aggrieved party, and no one
among the respondent officials has the authority to
restrain any of his subordinates who has been libeled from
vindicating his right by instituting a libel suit. Brig. Gen.
Tadiar has filed the libel case against petitioners Suarez
and Doyo in his personal capacity. Moreover, he is not even
a member of respondent NIB. And the NIB does not appear
to have anything to do with Gen. Tadiars private right to
complain of libel.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
MelencioHerrera, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De

la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., concurs and submits a separate
opinion.
Teehankee, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
Makasiar, and Aquino, JJ., in the result.
Concepcion, Jr., J., on leave.
Guerrero, J., on official leave.
Abad Santos, J., see dissenting opinion.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring with a separate opinion:
The opinion of the Court penned by Justice Plana, written

in his usual lucid style, is entitled to commendation. It is
characterized by fealty to what has long been accepted as
the task incumbent on the judiciary, namely, to resolve
disputes. There is no departure from the practice very
much in evidence in the United Kingdom and many
Commonwealth countries. As pointed out by him: The
petition is premised upon the alleged illegality and
unconstitutionality of the issuance by respondent NIB to
petitioners of letters of invitation, their subsequent
interrogation,
1
and the filing of the aforementioned libel
suit. Why it cannot be granted is made clear in these
words: The assailed proceedings have come to an end. The
acts sought to be prohibited (i.e., the issuance of letters of
in
_______________
1 Decision of the Court, 3.
326

vitation and subsequent interrogations) have therefore

been abated, thereby rendering the petition 2
moot and
academic as regards the aforesaid matters. As he further
stated in the latter portion of the opinion: Fortunately, the
NIB director general and chairman saw the wisdom of
terminating 3the proceedings and the unwelcome
interrogation.
After pointing out the moot and academic character of
the petition, Justice Plana, noted that ordinarily an
invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions,
which the person invited may heed or refuse at his
pleasure is not per se illegal or unconstitutional and hence
free from objection. Then he made the apt observation that
under the circumstances at present obtaining, it can be
viewed as an authoritative command which one can only
defy at his peril, especially where, as in the instant case,
the invitation carries the ominous warning that failure to
appear * * * shall be considered as a waiver * * * and this
Committee4 will be constrained to proceed in accordance
with law. To this extent, there is conformity to what also
has been traditional in this jurisdiction. This Court,
whenever an occasion calls for it, has given expression to
views indicative of its appraisal of how to avoid the at
times thin line separating what is juridically impeccable
from that which may give rise to wellfounded doubts as to
its legality or at the very least cast a reflection on the ways
of the law. What this Court or a member thereof says then
may be of persuasive character.
Why prohibition will not issue with respect to the libel
charges pending in court against petitioners and suits of a
similar character that could be filed, Justice Plana
explained in this manner: Firstly, the writ of prohibition is
directed against a tribunal, board or person acting without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
visavis certain proceedings pending before it. The libel
cases adverted to are not pending before respondent NIB or
any other respondent. Secondly, the issue of validity of the
libel charges by reason of their alleged collision with
freedom of expression, is a matter that should be raised in
the proper forum, i.e., before
_______________
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid, 4.
4 Ibid.
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VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 327

the court where the libel cases are pending or where they
may be filed. Finally, the right to seek redress when libeled
is a personal and individual privilege of the aggrieved
party, and no one among the respondent officials has the
authority to restrain any of his subordinates who has been
libeled
5
from vindicating his right by instituting a libel
suit.
In terms of the tried and tested concepts of strict law, it
thus becomes obvious why concurrence is unavoidable. This
Tribunal, however, is likewise a court of equity. It is
reliance on that aspect that distinguishes the separate
opinions of Justices Teehankee and Abad Santos. True to
the tradition that cases on freedom of expression furnish
the opportunity for moving utterances, they stress in
language both lofty and persuasive, the exacting
responsibility of the judiciary in preserving unimpaired
press freedom. They have done me the honor of citing or
referring to excerpts from my opinions as well as my other
writings. I am, of course, appreciative. Moreover, there has
been no change of heart on my part. I stand by them. I am
unable, however, to go as far as they would wish this Court
to go. It is my considered opinion that it suffices that I6
follow what, as ponente, I did in De la Camara v. Enage,
namely to furnish guidelines for the lower courts, based on
authoritative doctrines. Thus: While under the
circumstances a ruling on the merits of the petition for
certiorari is not warranted, still, as set forth at the opening
of this opinion, the fact that this case is moot and academic
should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in
language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity
on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal
command of 7the Constitution that excessive bail shall not
be required.
_______________
5 Ibid. As to the second reason, this sentence is included: The same

rule applies to the issue of admissibility as evidence of matters that have
been elicited in the course of an inquiry or interrogation conducted by
respondent NIB, which petitioners claim to have been illegally obtained.
The opinion of the Court set forth the above grounds in three separate
paragraphs.
6 41 SCRA 1 (1971).
7 Ibid, 6. This excerpt has been cited with approval by Justice
Teehankee in his dissent, p. 5.
328

1. Fortunately, there is a case that serves such8 a

purpose. I refer to Lopez v. Court of Appeals. It
deals with a civil action for libel, but the principles
therein enunciated apply as well to criminal
prosecutions. As was set forth early in the opinion
of the Court: It is on the freedom of the press that
petitioners would stake their case to demonstrate
that no action for libel would lie arising from the
publication of the picture of respondent Cruz
identified as responsible for the hoax of the year,
when such was not the case at all. It is easily
understandable why. No liability would be incurred
if it could be demonstrated that it comes within the
wellnigh allembracing scope of freedom of the
press. Included therein is the widest latitude of
choice as to what items should see the light of day
so long as they are relevant to a matter of public
interest, the insistence on the requirement as to its
truth yielding at times to unavoidable inaccuracies
attendant on newspapers and other publications
being subject to the tyranny of deadlines. If no such
showing could be plausibly made, however, it is
difficult to resist the conclusion that there
9
was in
fact the commission of such quasidelict.
2. Further on the question of the decisive character of
press freedom in the adjudication of libel suits, the
Lopez opinion had this to say: There is an
impressive recognition in our decisions of the
curtailment to which press freedom would be
subjected if an action for libel were not rigorously
scrutinized to remove doubts as to its being utilized
to penalize the exercise of that constitutional right.
Thus, in the first leading case, United States v.
Bustos, Justice Malcolm could correctly stress: The
interest of society and the maintenance of good
government demand a full discussion of public
affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct
of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech.

The sharp incision of its probe relieves the absences
of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a
hostile and an unjust accusation: the wound can be
assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A
public officer must not to be too thinskinned with
reference to comment upon his official acts. Only
thus can the intelligence
_______________
8 34 SCRA 116 (1970).

9 Ibid, 119120.
329
VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 329

and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course,

criticism does not authorize defamation.
Nevertheless, as an individual is less than the
State, so must expected criticism be born for the
common good. On this aspect of the question which,
as answered by him, would require that a criminal
suit for libel should not be utilized as a means for
stifling press freedom, he categorically declared:
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly
administration of government have demanded
protection for public opinion. The inevitable and
incontestable result has been the development
10
and
adoption of the doctrine of privilege.
3. So it is in the United States except for the fact that
it was not until 1964, 36 years after Bustos, that its
Supreme Court had occasion to rule likewise. To
quote anew from the Lopez opinion: In the leading
case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the nature
of the question presented was set forth by Justice
Brennan for the Court in the opening paragraph of
his opinion: We are required in this case to
determine for the first time the extent to which the
constitutional protections for speech and press limit
a States power to award damages in a libel action
brought by a public official against critics of his
official conduct. This is the Courts approach to
such an issue: In deciding the question now, we are
compelled by neither precedent nor policy to give
any more weight to the epithet libel than we have
to other mere labels of state law. * * * Like

insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts,
breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal
business, and the various other formulas for the
repression of expression that have been challenged
in this Court, libel can claim no talismanic
immunity from constitutional limitations. It must
be measured by standards that satisfy the First
Amendment. Continuing the same trend, the
opinion stressed further: Thus we consider this
case against the background of a profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide
open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks
on government and public officials. * * * The
present advertisement, as an expression of
_______________
10 Ibid, 123124.
330

grievance and protest on one of the major public

issues of our time, would seem11clearly to qualify for
the constitutional protection.
4. The test to be followed, according to the language of
the New York Times decision, as reinforced by
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, was set forth thus in
the Lopez opinion: For liability to arise then
without offending press freedom, there is this test
to meet: The constitutional guarantees require, we
think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with actual
malicethat is, with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not. The United States Supreme Court went
further in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, where
such immunity was held as covering statements
concerning public figures regardless of whether or
not they are government officials. Why there should
be such an extension is understandable in the light
of the broad scope enjoyed by press freedom which

certainly allows a full and free discussion of public
issues. What can be more logical and appropriate,
then, than such an expansion of the principle. As
noted by a commentator: Since discussion of public
issues cannot be meaningful without reference to
the men involved on both sides of such issues, and
since such men will not necessarily be public
officials, one cannot but agree that the Court was
right in Curtis
12
to extend the Times rule to all public
figures.
________________
11 bid, 125126. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan is reported in 376 US

254.
12 Ibid, 126127. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts is reported in 388 US
130. It was decided in 1967. The rule thus announced was followed in the
subsequent cases of: St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 US 727 (1968);
Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Asso. v. Brusler, 398 US 6 (1970); Ocala
StarBanner Co. v. Damron, 401 US 295 (1971); Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 US 29 (1971); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. The
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 US 376 (1973); The
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, Jr., 418 US 241 (1974); Old
Dominion Branch No. 496, National Association of Letter Carriers v.
Austin, 418 US 264 (1974); Cantrell v. Forest City
331
VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 331

5. Accordingly, the Lopez opinion could rightfully

stress: The significance of the foregoing line of
decisions impressive for their consistency is quite
obvious. No inroads on press freedom should be
allowed in the guise of punitive action visited on
what otherwise could be characterized as libel
whether in the form of printed words or a
defamatory imputation resulting from the
publication of respondents picture with the
offensive caption as in the case here complained of.
This is not to deny that the party responsible
invites the institution either of a criminal
prosecution or a civil suit. It must be admitted that
what was done did invite such a dire consequence,
considering the value the law justly places on a
mans reputation. This is merely to underscore the
primacy that freedom of the press enjoys. It ranks

rather high in the hierarchy of legal values. If the
cases mean anything at all then, to emphasize what
has so clearly emerged, they call for the utmost care
on the part of the judiciary to assure that in
safeguarding the interest of the party allegedly
offended, a realistic account of the obligation of a
news media to disseminate information of a public
character and to comment thereon as well as the
conditions attendant13
on the business of publishing
cannot be ignored.
6. There is no ambiguity in the above authoritative
14
doctrines. Press freedom is a preferred right. It is
entitled to the fullest protection that the law
affords. A person who deems himself aggrieved by
defamatory statements is of course entitled to seek
redress in the courts Nonetheless, in the felicitous
language of the New York Times decisions, libel
can claim no talismatic immunity from
constitutional limitations. While there is an
undeniable public interest in assuring that a mans
reputation be safeguarded from calumny and unjust
accusation, on matters of public concern, he cannot
be shielded from the scrutiny of the press and the
expression thereafter of whatever failings it might
uncover on matters of public concern. Care is to be
taken, however, that in its
_______________
Publishing Co., 419 US 245 (1974); and Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 US
448 (1976).
13 Ibid, 127.
14 Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553, 570 (1983).
332

publication there is avoidance of affirming what is

not true or disregarding in a manner deemed
reckless to take the necessary steps of ascertaining
its truth or falsity. That is as it should be. Justice
Holmes, in his classic dissent in Abrams, after
stressing that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by a free trade of ideas, and that there
should be the competition in the open market, was
insistent that truth is the only ground upon

15
which
mans wishes can be safely carried out. Professor
Emerson, at present the foremost scholar in the
field, emphasized the value of freedom of expression
as an essential process 16
for advancing knowledge
and discovering truth.
7. There is no more exacting duty on the part of the
judiciary, therefore, than to heed the clear and
unmistakable mandate of the Constitution in
passing upon the conflicting claims of the parties in
libel cases. To repeat, the law cannot ignore a mans
inherent right to have his reputation remain free
from unjustified and unwarranted imputations of
wrongdoing. Nonetheless, because of the primacy
enjoyed by the free speech and free press
guarantees of the Constitution, even on the
assumption that there has been injury to mans
reputation, the damages to be assessed, if at all
warranted, should not be lacking in the quality of
realism. The same sense of realism should likewise
be displayed by the plaintiff in a libel suit in
estimating the amount due him for the injury
inflicted on his good name. The times are difficult,
even perilous. It is of the essence, therefore, that
there be on the part of public officials and
journalists alike an attitude of trust and confidence
in the good faith that motivates them in the
discharge of their responsibilities. Such an attitude
may lessen the atmosphere of confrontation and
dissipate the fear that press freedom has become a
casualty under the circumstances. It is for the
judiciary to be ever on the alert that such be not the
case.
_______________
15 Abrams v. US, 250 US 616, 630 (1919). The separate opinion of

Justice Abad Santos quotes from such dissent extensively.
16 Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 6 (1969).
333
VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 333

SEPARATE OPINION
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent on the grounds, as hereinafter

stated, that rather than dismiss as moot and petition at bar
due to termination of respondent committees interrogation
proceedings, the Court should rule squarely or at least lay
down the authoritative and controlling doctrines on the
vital issues of profound public importance and interest that
involve the upholding of the preferred freedoms of speech
and press that are so vital for the survival of our
democratic heritage and the proscribing of the questioned
acts of harassing and intimidating journalists who expose
and report on complaints of military abuses.
Petitioners, all in mass media as editors, columnists,
reporters or feature article writers, filed on January 25,
1983 the verified petition for prohibition against
respondent National Intelligence Board, Special Committee
No. 2, and its Chairman and members, all composed of
ranking military officers, save respondent NBI Assistant
Director Ponciano Fernando. They complain that some of
them have received summonses, subpoenas or directives
from military authorities who have subjected them to
sustained interrogation, touching the most delicate aspects
of their work, feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and
even aspects of their private lives. From August to
December of 1982, several such subpoenas were received by
some of the petitioners, most of which came in the wake of
the mass arrest, indictment and prosecution of the editor
and staff of the publication We Forum, which could be
read as a threat that petitioners might also be subjected to
similar treatment, and that those who have been
subjected to the aforesaid sustained interrogation found it
an ordeal creating a chilling effect on their work.
Invoking the preferred freedom of the press which
constitutionally protects them from prior restraint or
censorship or subsequent punishment or liability unless
there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that
may be rightfully prevented by law, and disregarding
emphatic admonitions by
334

their interrogators to keep silent concerning the

interrogation and the risk of possible personal reprisal,
they have petitioned of this Court for the writ of

prohibition with injunction. Petitioners ask the Court to
put a stop to such summonses, directives and
interrogations by respondents and to declare them
unconstitutional and unlawful. Petitioners further ask
the Court to likewise put a stop to further harassment in
the form of scurrilous libel suits to be filed by military
commanders against the editor, some staff members and
contributors of Philippine Panorama (Sunday magazine of
Bulletin Today), as per official announcement
1
of Camp
Aguinaldo reported on January 30, 1983. By Amended and
Supplemental Petition of March 3, 1983, petitioners
pinpoint the criminal libel complaint with a staggering
P10million claim for damages (as against the modest
P250.00 fee received by the writer) filed on February 9,
1983 with the City Fiscal of Manila by Brig. Gen. Artemio
A. Tadiar, Jr. (as Commanding General of the Third
Philippine Marine Brigade, AFP) against petitioners
Domini Torrevillas Suarez and Ma. Ceres P. Doyo, editor
and writer, respectively, for the alleged libelous article
Forty Years After the Fall, Bataan is Again Under Seige,
which was published a year before in2 the Philippine
Panorama issue of March 28, 1982. (The criminal
information for libel, Crim. Case No. 8316213 was filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila on March 24, 1983
and sought P10million by way of actual, moral, exemplary
and other damages for the complainant Brig. Gen. Tadiar
for having been expos[ed] . . . to3 public hatred, contempt,
discredit, dishonor and ridicule.)
At the hearing on February 1, 1983, the Solicitor
General on behalf of respondents submitted the
memorandum dated January 19, 1983 of respondent
General Fabian C. Ver as Director General and Chairman
of the National Intelligence Board terminating the
proceedings of respondent Committee No. 2 and stating
that after reviewing the report of said Com
_______________
1 Par. 20.3, Amended and Supplemental Petition.

2 Par. 29.5, idem.
3 Solicitor Generals Manifestation filed on April 9, 1983 submitting
copy of the Information as filed in Court.
335
VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 335

mittee on the series of dialogues [you] have conducted

with selected members of the media, the Board expressed
satisfaction in the results of the dialogues and noted better
mutual understanding of the respective roles of media and
government.
The Courts majority resolution dismisses the petition as
having become moot and academic with the termination of
respondent Committees proceedings and interrogations.
Petitioners on the other hand, invoke the imperatives of
public interest in their petition and plead for a definite
ruling thereon from the Court so that the violations of their
constitutional rights of free press and speech and privacy
may not be repeated.
Petitioners are entitled to such a definite ruling. In the
words of the late
4
Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro in Aquino,
Jr. v. Enrile, the fact that a final determination of a
question involved in an action is needed will be useful as a
guide for the conduct of public officers or tribunals is a
sufficient reason for retaining an action which would or
should otherwise be dismissed. Likewise appeals may be
retained if the questions involved are likely to arise
frequently in the future unless they are settled by a court
of last resort.
This was also my submittal in my dissents5
in the recent
habeas corpus
6
cases of Renato Caete and Aristedes
Sarmiento. In these cases, the military authorities had
refused to release the detainees despite their acquittal by
the trial courts on the ground that only the President of
the Philippines can order (their) release since (they are)
being detained pursuant to a PCO. The charges against
them were found to be bereft of basis and evidence. In
Caetes case, the trial court granted his motion to dismiss
the case of illegal possession of subversive documents for
insufficiency of the prosecutions evidence. In Sarmientos
case, the trial court dismissed the subversion charges for
utter worthlessness of evidence, so much so that Mr.
Justice Felix V. Makasiar suggested that (T)he military
_______________
4 59 SCRA 183 (1974).

5 G.R. No. 63776, prom. August 16, 1984.
6 G.R. No. 62119, prom. August 27, 1984.
336

establishment should inquire into whether the President

was deceived into issuing the PCO and who initiated the
arrest of the couple without supporting evidence. The
detainees were released by the military only when the
PCOs were lifted after the lapse of several months since
their acquittal and the Courts majority ordered the
dismissal of the cases as having become moot. I maintained
in line with a host of precedents that the basic issue of
whether a judgment of acquittal prevails over the PCO
should be squarely resolved rather than emasculated with
the dismissal of the cases in order to avoid countless other
Caetes and Sarmientos. 7
In De la Camara vs. Enage (where petitioneraccused
had escaped from jail, apparently in desperation due to the
excessive and exorbitant bail fixed by respondent judge of
almost P2.5million rejected by the now Chief Justice
therein as a sanctimonious avowal of respect for a
mandate of the Constitution . . . on a purely verbal level,
when the Department of Justice had recommended P40,000
bail for the two offenses), the Court held that the fact that
this case is moot and academic should not preclude this
Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and
unmistakable . . . for the guidance of lower court judges,
the controlling and authoritative doctrines that should be
observed in according full respect to constitutional rights.
While we dismissed the case as moot with petitioners
escape, the Court nevertheless squarely ruled that the
constitutional right to bail should not be rendered nugatory
with the imposition of excessive bail and declared the
challenged order as having reduced the right to bail to a
barren form of words. . . absolutely bereft of support in
law.
I hold then with Mr. Justice Vicente Abad Santos, and
as intimated by the majority resolution when it noted that
fortunately, the NIB director general and chairman saw
the wisdom of terminating 8
the proceedings and the
unwelcome interrogations, that the invitations and
interrogations were violative of the freedoms of speech,
press and privacy and proper objects of the petition at bar
for prohibition with injunction. The Court should so rule,
setting forth as in De la Camara
_______________
7 41 SCRA 1, 6 and 10, per Fernando, J. (1971).

8 At page 4, main resolution.
337
VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 337

for the guidance of lower court judges the controlling and

authoritative doctrines that safeguard the preferred
freedoms of press and speech and making of record the
Solicitor Generals assurance and commitment at the
hearing that no further interrogations of journalists would
take place and that there will be no other committees that
will be created for the same purpose.
The Chief Justice (then Associate
9
Justice) had in the
1969 case of Gonzales vs. Comelec collated precedents and
jurisprudence and restated such controlling principles, as
follows:
x x x There is to be then no previous restraint on the

communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel
suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt
proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of
substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.
The vital need in a constitutional democracy for freedom of
expression is undeniable whether as a means of assuring
individual selffulfillment, of attaining the truth, of securing
participation by the people in social including political decision
making, and of maintaining the balance between stability and
change. The trend as reflected in Philippine and American
decisions is to recognize the broadest scope and assure the widest
latitude to this constitutional guaranty. It represents a profound
commitment to the principle that debate of public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wideopen. It is not going too far,
according to another American decision, to view the function of
free speech as inviting dispute. It may indeed best serve its high
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to
anger.
Freedom of speech and the press thus means something more
than the right to approve existing political beliefs or economic
arrangements, to lend support to official measures, to take refuge
in the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public
consequence. So atrophied, the right becomes meaningless. The
right belongs as well, if not more, for those who question, who do
not conform, who differ. To paraphrase Justice Holmes, it is
freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for the thought
that agrees with us.
________________
9 27 SCRA 835, 856858.
338

The special appeal made by revered Law Professor Gerardo

Florendo at last years hearing of February 1st is herein
likewise reproduced for the record:
x x x With your indulgence, most Honorable Supreme Court

Justices, I am appearing here for the first time in view of the
importance of the question here to be ventilated before the great
and august Body, of the Supreme Court, for unless the petition is
upheld by the Supreme Court, neither the freedom of the
Supreme Court Justices nor of the defendantattorneys can be
protected, much less my freedom as a civilian and mere citizen of
this great Republic of the Philippines. So, as Im here, Your
Honor, to add to my weak voice, at the advanced age of 87 years,
so that before I pass out of this world into the great beyond, no
one can say a voice no matter how big (sic). For indeed, reading
the petition, the questions asked by the military are in themselves
punishment far beyond the ken of prison walls. But harassing the
individual concerned out of the rooms, in the privacy of their
habitations, we wish the whole country could stand to say that
what you, the Military, which is sworn to protect the freedom and
liberty of the citizens of this country, could really exercise that to
the benefit of each and every citizen, because when a citizens
freedom is jeopardized, endangered, that also affects you
personally and your children, and your grandchildren. So that,
Your Honor, I wish now to intervene here and say, Military,
please change your proceedings, your actuations and exercise your
duties as you are sworn to defend the freedom and liberty of your
10
country and of the citizens of the land. Thank you.
As to the prohibition suit against the criminal libel suit

initiated by respondent Brig. Gen. Tadiar with a claim of
P10million damages, the majority resolution dismisses the
petition on the grounds that (1) the libel case is not
pending before respondent NIB; (2) the lack of cause of
action or nonexistence of a criminal offense should be
raised in the proper forum, i.e. the court where the libel
case is pending; and (3) respondent Brig. Gen. Tadiar has
filed the libel case in his personal capacity in the exercise
of a personal and individual privilege of the aggrieved
party.
The Resolution has thus adopted the conventional
approach of requiring that the invalidity of the libel case be
raised in the
_______________
10 Transcript of hearing, pp. 3334.
339
VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 339

Regional Trial Court (which has not been impleaded, as the

information had not yet been filed at the time of the filing
of the Amended and Supplemental Petition) and first
passed upon by said court.
But this Court has set aside procedural niceties in the
past and cut the gordian knot and directly gave its final
determination particularly when necessary as a guide for
the conduct of public officers and tribunals and to forestall
needless congestion of the courts dockets with the
likelihood of numerous future similar cases being filed.
And this direct approach is required now. The Chief
Justice himself in a lecture at the National Press Club last
July, observed that about thirteen years ago (before
martial law) fiscals automatically dismissed libel
complaints against newsmen by merely invoking the
preferred freedom of the press but that nowadays the
prosecutors tend to file such libel cases against newsmen.
It may be added that the prosecutors have cooperated in
aggravating the pressure and intimidation by the new
gimmick of including in the criminal information the
complainants claim for astronomical damages in tens and
hundreds of millions of pesos, which the newsman could
not possibly even begin to aspire to earn, even if he lived a
hundred lifetimes. It is of common knowledge and practice
that such claims for damages were never before set out in
specific amounts in the information nor have the courts
been known to have ever granted before awards for
damages in such punitive and fantastic amounts, the
usual practice being more
11
likely to reduce damages for libel
than to increase them.
_______________
11 Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 116, 129 (1970). Under the
Supreme Courts Resolution of Sept. 13, 1984 in Adm. Matter No. 836
3890 providing for increased court filing fees effective OCTOBER 1, 1984,
this gimmick of libel complainants of using the fiscals office to include in
the criminal information their claim for astronomical damages in multiple
millions of pesos without paying any filing fees has been discouraged. The
said Resolution provides that (W)hen the offended party seeks to enforce
civil liability against the accused by way of actual, moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as
provided in the Rules of Court and approved by the Court shall first be
paid to
340

Lawyercolumnist Apolonio Batalla comments that (M)ost

of the stories appearing in the periodicals are about
government and many of them tend to offend government
officials. If a newsman is fearful of being indicted for libel,
he writes less freely and doctors the facts to make them
inoffensive to certain government officials even if he thinks
that it is not correct to do so. But he is afraid of risking
exposure to a criminal case. He adds that (I)f fiscals
become fearful of dismissing complaints on valid grounds,
the fear might spread to include not only newsmen but the
lower courts as well. There cannot be that desirable
amount of freedom guaranteed by the Constitution if
reliance is placed only on what the Supreme Court will rule
in particular cases, and cautions that (P)ress freedom is
the concern of judges, fiscals, other government officials,
writers, and the rest of society, including the possible
complainants in libel suits. In the absence of the will on the
part of such people to preserve press freedom, the Supreme
Court will be of little utility. He cites the case of Isidoro
Chammag, a Bulletin correspondent in the north: After he
wrote a story about Abra folk fleeing their homes on
account of a military raid on suspected insurgents, he was 12
sued for libel. He did not have the resources to post bail.
His colleagues started a fund campaign to raise bail for
him.
In a recent editorial, the TimesJournal decries that
libel suits are being used to harass journalists. It recalls
that (During the severest period of martial law the
Philippine press was kept under tight watch. Not a few
editors and reporters have experienced the quiet terror of
an irate phone call from some ranking public official or a
lessthanfriendly summons from the military. And Filipino
journalists are not so dense as to misread such feedback as
anything less than the in
_______________
the Clerk of Court of the court where the criminal action is filed. x x x
Beginning OCTOBER 1, 1984, a claimant for such damages of P10million
through the fiscals office, like respondent Gen. Tadiar, will first have to
pay, before his claim is accepted for filing, a total filing fee of P39,400.00
(P3,400.00 for the 1st million computed at a filing fee of P4.00 per
P1,000.00 in excess of P150,000.00 and P36,000.00 for the next P9
million).
12 A. Batalla Bulletin Today issue of July 29, 1984.
341
VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 341

timidation it was meant to cause, and points out that

(W)hile the formal lifting of martial law has eased
somewhat the daily pressure on media to rigidly tow the
official line, memories of those lessthanshining moments
of Philippine journalism are still vivid in the collective
mind of media. Many editors and reporters, especially
those of the mainstream press, still find themselves
automatically censoring themselves, sacrificing full
disclosure at the altar of compromise. The editorial
concludes (T)hat nuisance suits continue to be used in
their place should be cause for serious worry not only
among journalists but also for the public and policymakers.
The lessons of the recent past only show that corruption
and abuse
13
of authority thrives best when the press is
timid.
The late Justice Hugo Black of the U.S. Supreme Court
in the Pentagon Vietnam Papers cases (which turned down
the U.S. Governments plea for injunction against the
publication of the papers in the name of national security)
had stressed that (T)he press was to serve the governed,
not the governors. The Governments power to censor the
press was abolished so that the press would remain forever
free to censure the Government. The press was protected so
that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the
people. Only a free and unrestrained press
14
can effectively
expose deception in government. x x x.
As already indicated, the Court should now set forth
once again the controlling and authoritative doctrines that
the Court, even ahead of the U.S. Supreme Court, had first 15
enunciated in the 1918 landmark case of U.S. vs. Bustos
on the protected right of fair comment on the official acts of
public officers thus: The interest of society and the
maintenance of good government demand a full discussion
of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the
conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech.

The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of
officialdom. Men in public life
_______________
13 TimesJournal issue of Sept. 14, 1984.

14 New York Times vs. U.S. vs. U.S. vs. Washington Post, 403 U.S. 713
(1971).
15 37 Phil. 731.
342

may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation: the

wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience.
A public officer must not to be too thinskinned with
reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can
the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of
course, criticism does not authorize defamation.
Nevertheless, as an individual is less than the State, so
must expected criticism be born for the common good.
Given this approach, the first ground above cited of the
majority resolution for not ruling now on the Tadiar libel
suit may be easily remedied with the Courts considering as
formally impleaded as party respondents the Regional
Trial Court where the case is pending as well as the People
(who is after all represented by the Solicitor General)
which is the party plaintiff in all criminal cases.
The third abovecited ground that respondent Gen.
Tadiar has filed the libel case in his personal capacity is
not borne out by the record. The information filed recites
that the libel was committed against the character,
honesty, integrity, virtue and reputation of Brigadier
General Artemio A. Tadiar, Jr., Commanding General of
the 3rd Philippine Marine Brigades, Armed Forces of the
Philippines, both as a man and as an officer in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and that the articles false,
defamatory and libelous statements (which) impute to the
officers and men of the 4th Marine Battalion, a unit of the
Third Philippine Marine Brigade under the command of
Brig. Gen. Artemio A. Tadiar, Jr., the commission of the
crimes of murder, homicide, arbitrary detention, illegal
arrests and searches, maltreatment and other acts of
oppression, terrorism, abuse of authority and acts of
misconduct unbecoming of military officers and members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, although it claimed

P10million damages on Brig. Gen. Tadiars behalf.
There is no question then that respondent Gen. Tadiar
felt libelled because the articles narration of misdeeds
reportedly committed by officers and men under his
command in Bataan (false and defamatory statements,
according to his complaint) reflected upon him as the
commanding general. Petitioners complain then that if
respondents AFP Chief of Staff and NIB
343
VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 343

had expressed satisfaction in the results of the dialogues

and noted better mutual understanding of the respective
roles of media and government, respondent Tadiar could
not take a stance opposite that of his superiors and that
conflict of interests arise and national policy
considerations would thereby be ignored by General
Tadiars action. The assurance of the Solicitor General that
petitioners would not be subjected to further interrogations
would be meaningless. If that were allowed, it would
appear that the Armed Forces of the Philippines, thru its
Chief of Staff, terminated the interrogations of
newspaperwomen with its left hand only to hit them with
libel suits with its right hand.
16
What one cannot do directly,
he cannot do indirectly. Petitioner Doyos offending
article is attached to the record and appears to bear out
their contention that a principal element of libel is here
absent: that of identification or identifiability. Thus,
petitioners submit that (A)n examination of the allegedly
libelous article would disclose that respondent General
Tadiar is not mentioned at all even inferentially, indirectly,
parenthetically, tangentially, or peripherally in the
allegedly libelous article; nor is
17
it even suggested that he
was in command of the troops.
The Court has long adopted the criterion set forth in the18
U.S. benchmark case of New York Times Co. vs. Sullivan
that libel can claim no talismanic immunity from
constitutional limitations that protect the preferred
freedoms of speech and press. Sullivan laid down the test
of actual malice, viz. (T)he constitutional guaranty of
freedom of speech and press prohibits a public official from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was
made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false

or not. Particularly applicable to respondent Tadiars
complaint is the declaration that there is no legal alchemy
by which a State may create a cause of action for libel by
transmuting criticism of government, however impersonal
it may seem on its face, into personal criticism and
_______________
16 Amended and Supplemental Petition, par. 29.1.

17 Idem, par. 29.3.
18 376 U.S. 254 (1964); see Lopez vs. CA, fr. 11.
344

hence, potential libel, of the officials of whom the

government is composed. . . We hold that such a
proposition may not constitutionally be utilized to establish
that an otherwise impersonal attack on governmental
operations was a libel of an official responsible for those
operations.
Ultimately, the core issue is whether or not the article
on Bataan is constitutionally protected as fair comment on
matters of public interest involving military conduct and
operations and therefore not actionable as libel, criminally
or civilly. As former Chief Justice
19
Ricardo Paras pointed
out in Quisumbing vs. Lopez, so long as there is no
personal ill will, selfseeking motive or actual malice or
abuse of press freedom, the newspapers should be given
such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to
courageously and effectively perform their important role
in our democracy. The ground rules and limits of the
Constitution are there and should be applied and respected
by all concerned in all cases, and not on a case by case basis
if the fundamental rights of free speech and press are to be
upheld and enhanced and the courts not rendered of little
utility.
The ringing words of the late Justice Jose Abad Santos,
hero and martyr of the Japanese invasion of the
Philippines in World
20
War II, in his dissenting opinion in
People vs. Rubio against the majority decision that to his
mind set at naught constitutional principles against the
issuance of general search warrants give us, mutatis
mutandis, a fitting admonition:
The internal revenue agents concerned in this case have shown

commendable zeal in their efforts to protect the revenues of the
Government; but this same zeal, if allowed to override
constitutional limitations would become obnoxious to
fundamental principles of liberty. And if we are to be saved from
the sad experiences of some countries which have constitutions
only in name, we must insist that governmental authority be
exercised within constitutional limits; for, after all, what matters
is not so much what the people write in their constitutions as the
spirit in which they observe their provisions.
_______________
19 96 Phil. 510 (1955).

20 57 Phil. 384 (1932).
345
VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 345

ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly

logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and
want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express
your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow
opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech
impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the circle, or
that you do not care wholeheartedly for the result, or that you
doubt either your power or your premises. But when men have
realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come
to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached
by free trade in ideas,that the best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market;
and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out. That, at any rate, is the theory of our
Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.
Every year, if not every day, we have to wager our salvation upon
some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that
experiment is part of our system I think that we should be
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of
opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death,
unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with
the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate
check is required to save the country. (Justice Holmes in Abrams
vs. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630; 63 U.S. S.C. Lawyers Ed.
1173, 1180 [1919].)
The above quotation has relevance to this case which is a

petition for prohibition.
When the petition was filed on January 25, 1983, the
petitioners were in the mass print media. Some were
editors (e.g. Domini TorrevillasSuarez of PANORAMA
magazine), some were columnists (e.g. Arlene Babst of
BULLETIN TODAY), some were feature writers (e.g. Jo
Ann Q. Maglipon), and some were reporters (e.g. Maritess
DanguilanVitug). As this is written some of the petitioners
have ceased to write regularly such as Ms. Babst and Letty
JimenezMagsanoc.
The respondents are the members of Special Committee
No. 2 of the National Intelligence Board composed of
retired Brigadier General Wilfredo C. Estrada, Brigadier
General Renato Ecarma, National Bureau of Investigation
Assistant Director Ponciano Fernando, Colonel Balbino
Diego, Colonel
346

Galileo Kintanar, Colonel Eustaquio Peralta, Colonel

Constantino Tigas, and Major Eleonor Bernardino.
Special Committee No. 2 of the National Intelligence
Board summoned and interrogated on various dates the
following petitioners:
1. Domini TorrevillasSuarez
2. Lorna KalawTirol
3. Ma. Ceres P. Doyo
4. JoAnn Q. Maglipon
5. Arlene Babst
6. Ninez CachoOlivares
Some of the other petitioners were summoned but had not

yet been interrogated when the petition was filed.
Typical of the summonses was the confidential letter
sent to petitioner Babst which reads as follows:
Republic of the Philippines

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BOARD
Special Committee No. 2
December 20, 1982

Ms. Arlene BABST
Recoletos St., cor Muralla St.
Intramuros, Metro Manila
Madam:
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, you
are hereby requested to appear before this Special
Committee at Philippine Army Officers Clubhouse,
Fort Bonifacio, Metro Manila, (sketch attached), 9:00
A.M., December 22, 1982, to shed light on confidential
matters being looked into by this Committee.
Your failure to appear on the specified date and
place shall be considered as a waiver on your part and
this Committee will be constrained to proceed in
accordance with law.
Very truly yours,
(SGD) WILFREDO C. ESTRADA
Brig. General, AFP (Ret.)
Chairman
347
VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 347

(Annex A, Petition.)
In an affidavit which Ms. Babst executed on January 15,

1983, she said:
1. I presently work for the Bulletin Publishing

Corporation as Editorial Page columnist of the
Bulletin Today;
2. In connection with my columns in said publication,
I was served on December 20, 1982 a written
invitation marked Confidential from Brig. Gen.
Wilfredo C. Estrada to appear before the National
Intelligence Board, Special Committee #2, on
December 22, 1982, for the stated purpose: to shed
light on confidential matters with the warning that
my failure to appear shall be considered as a
waiver on your part and the Committee will be
constrained to proceed in accordance with law;
3. On December 22, 1982, I appeared before the
Special Committee #2 of the National Intelligence
Board composed of all military personnel who were,
namely: Brig. Gen. Wilfredo Estrada, AFP (RET.);
Col. Balbino Diego, legal officer of the Presidential
Security Command (PSC); Col. Juanito Fernando of

the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Col.
Galileo Kintanar of the 15th MIG, ISAFP; Col.
Peralta of the CIS; Col. Ecarma, Col. Constantino
Tigas of the Ministry of Information; Maj. Eleonor
Bernardino, and a number of other persons,
including staff and personnel;
4. The interrogation or interview termed by the Panel
as a dialogue lasted from 9:40 A.M. till about 1:15
P.M. or for a duration of more than three (3) hours;
5. Throughout the proceedings the perceptible
objective of the Panel was to intimidate and instill
fear in me (as well as all writers of the press) to the
point that we will suppress the truth and not freely
write or express my views on matters of public
concern;
6. The proceedings that transpired are stated in a five
page Information Sheet which I personally
executed and is hereby attached and incorporated
as an integral part of this affidavit and bears my
authenticating signature on each and every page
thereof;
7. I am executing this affidavit for all legal purposes it
may serve. (Annex C, Petition.)
On the interrogation, she wrote as follows:
INFORMATION ON THE INTERROGATION:
348

1) The invitation was received on Monday evening at the

Bulletin Today, Dec. 20, 1982. I later learned that two
military men had gone to my parents old house in Quezon
City, looking for me, and causing much distress in my
bewildered household. Copy of invitation with Atty. Joker
P. Arroyo, who subsequently accompanied me to the
interrogation.
The invitation was for: WEDNESDAY, DEC. 22, 1982, at 9
a.m., Fort Bonifacio
2) The investigation panel was composed of the following:
a. Brig. Gen. Wilfredo C. Estrada, AFP (Ret.) Chairman of

the National Intelligence Board, Special Committee
b. Col. Balbino Diego, Chief, Intelligence and Legal Office,

Presidential Security Com.
c. Col. Fernando, National Bureau of Investigation
d. Col. Galileo Kintanar, 15th MIG, ISAFP, Bago Bantay
e. Col. Peralta, CIS
f. Col. Ecarma
g. Col. Tigas, Ministry of Information
h. Major Babette Bernardino
3) The investigation lasted from 9:40 a.m. till about 1:15

p.m., with a 10 minute coffee break at around 11:20: From
9 to 9:40, we talked informally. Col. Fernando read me
Sec. 9 of Article 4 of the Bill of Rights, the section saying
that no law shall be passed to abridge freedom of speech,
of the press, or of peaceful assembly BUT, Col. Fernando
told me emphatically, this section was subordinate to that
one (which he also showed me) saying that police power
could overrule the first section when matters of national
security so decree.
QUESTIONS ASKED BY THE INTERROGATORS:
1. May we call you Arlene?

2. What is your marital status?
3. Would you care to tell us more about yourself? (I said no.)
4. Tell us about your trips abroad, who financed them, for
what purpose, when, which countries have you visited or
not visited,
349
VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 349

were these for journalistic purposes, who did you travel

with?
5. What are the things you consider important to you? (I
said, Zen, writing, friendships.)
6. Tell us about your educational background.
7. When did you start with the Bulletin and how did you get
your post?
8. Tell us about your previous media positions.
9. They asked specifically about columns on:
Edgar Jopson, Wed., Sept. 29, 1982

What exactly is press freedom?, Fri., Sept. 17, 1982
Fear eats away at the soul, Jan. 10, 1982

and several others in passing
They questioned mostly my attitude, style tone, point of view
in regard to these columns.
10. Dont you think that you should consider the effect of your
columns on the mind and passions of your readers? Col.
Diego asked: Why do you write to agitate the mind and
arouse the passions?
Col. Kintanar was the one most concerned with the effect
of your writings on the minds and passions of your
readers.
11. After my lawyer, Mr. Arroyo, pointed out that out of some
450 columns, only a few seemed to be questioned by the
board, Gen. Estrada said that even so, a plane cannot fly
unless it is 100% in flying condition. I couldnt make out
what he meant by that.
12. What subjects do you write about? (I listed a dozen various
topics from feminism to art to philosophy to film to
religion, etc.). Why do you choose them?
13. Who reads your columns at the Bulletin before they are
published or not published?
14. What kind of mail/feedback do you get?
15. Do you mind if we ask about your brothers case? (This in
connection with my columns criticizing anomalies in
government and business.)
16. Were you really a nun? When? Where? Why? Why did you
leave?
17. Tell us about your Zen, what is it, how do you practice it,
where, etc.
18. Why did you leave the Catholic religion?
350

19. Why do you women writers make Fr. Agatep look

like a hero? (I told them Ive never even written
about him.)
20. What were you doing in February, 1970, because we
have on our files (and they showed me their thick
dossier) a report that you disappeared for a month
then and probably joined the underground.
21. Did We Forum ask you to write for them?
22. Are speaking engagements part of your duties as a

journalist? Do you consider them hazardous? (I
replied that these were a hazard of the trade, part
of being a public figure.)
23. Would you care to write about the military? Would
you like to visit Samar, Leyte, the PMA?
24. Did you know that Edgar Jopson was a radical?
Why did he become a radical? (You tell me, I told
them.)
25. Are you ever censored or edited?
26. Are you familiar with the problem of brainwashing?
27. Dont you think that you are being unwittingly used
by those who try to subvert the government?
28. Would you are to join the Office of Media Affairs?
29. Do you have children?
30. On that column Diary of a political detainee, did
you check whether the detainees were really
fasting?
31. Are you hiding behind your literary devices? Are
you evading my question? (this by Maj. Bernardino)
32. Dont you think your writings make heroes of the
very people the military have such a hard time
with?
33. Dont you feel that many groups would like to
influence you? (I said, Of course and listed hotel PR
groups, the military, etc.)
34. Who are the writers who have influenced you?
35. What is the name of your novel? What does it
mean? How is it selling? Who published it?
36. Did you know that Fr. Agatep was a womanizer?
(Who among Filipino men isnt, I replied, words to
that effect.)
37. Tell us more about Buddhism and Zen and
meditation. Is it true you face the wall two hours a
day, sitting absolutely still?
38. When did you start writing? Why? How?
39. Your cousin Carmen Sabater said you disappeared
in 1970. Why?
351
VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 351

40. We have a report that you applied for a job at

ISAFP in 1973. (They showed me an application
form I was supposed to have filled out and signed; I
did not recognize it at all.) What is ISAFP, I asked
them, I dont even know what that isthey
explained it was the Intelligence Service of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. Why in Gods
name would I want to work for them, I said.
41. What is your definition of national security?
42. What is your definition of press freedom?
43. What are the guidelines for responsible journalism?
Do you realize that some of your writings are only a
hairline away from subversive writing?
44. What is subversive writing? (You tell me, I said
again.)
45. Did you mind coming here today? (yes, very much)
Thank you for coming. (I didnt thank them so Mr.
Arroyo had to mind my manners for me.)
46. Would you like to come to Baguio or Samar or
Leyte, they repeated, and offered me a job again
with the OMA. Have you ever written anything
favorable about the military? I pointed out the
column The Human Side of the Military, written
Jan. 30, 1981. The interrogation was recorded by
stenographers seated at the sides and, I suspect, by
hidden recorders, why not indeed? Am I being too
cynical? Sorry.
Col. Kintanar repeated about half a dozen times
that I should be concerned about the effect my
writing has on my readers and that I was on the
borderline between legitimate journalism and
writing things that arouse the people. Arouse them
to what, I asked? To think, I hope, I said.
My response to the invitation and the interrogation:
I am helpless about being insulted but I do not have
to smile at the insults. I was indignant that I was
invited (with a threat) at all. By what legal
authority was I brought there? If they really
wanted a dialogue, they should have invited us as a
group to lunch and served decent white wine. (I told
them this.) They ruined my Christmas shopping
which was a far more interesting activity for that
morning, I firmly believe. They wished me a happy
birthday and I told them I would indeed remember
this charming gift the military of my country gave
me practically on the eve of my birthday and
Christmas, 1982. (Annex C1, Petition.)
The original petition asks that the interrogations be

declared unconstitutional and unlawful and that the
352

respondents be prohibited permanently from engaging in

such practices and similar acts.
An amended and supplemental petition was filed on
March 3, 1984, naming Generals Fabian Ver and Artemio
Tadiar, Jr. as additional respondents. Another prayer was
addedthat the respondents be prohibited from filing libel
suits on matters that have been inquired into by the
National Intelligence Board.
The additional prayer was made because the petitioners
were apprehensive that aside from the interrogations they
would be subjected to other forms of harassment. The
BULLETIN TODAY carried the following item in its issue
of January 30, 1983:
OFFICERS TO FILE LIBEL CHARGES
Camp Aguinaldo announced yesterday that charges of scurrilous

libel will be filed by military officers against the editor and some
staff members and contributors of Philippine Panorama, the
Sunday magazine of Bulletin Today.
AFP spokesman Col. Reynaldo Wycoco said the charge
stemmed from what the complainants considered as malicious
writings of some staff members and contributors of Panorama on
sensitive issues, that maligned them personally or cast aspersions
on their integrity and dignity as military commanders.
Among the complainants are Brig. Gen. Victorino Asada of the
First Constabulary regional command, Brig. Gen. Bienvenido
Felix of Third PC regional command, Brig. Gen. Salvador Mison
of the eastern command, Brig. Gen. Pedrito de Guzman, while
commander of the Eleventh PC regional command in Davao, and
other officers.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, and other government
prosecutors in charge of national security cases have been
consulted on the legal actions to be taken against writers of other
newspapers and magazines who have allegedly committed the
same offense.
The spokesman said those to be charged are Domini
TorrevillasSuarez, Panorama editor, Jo Ann Maglipon, writer
contributor; Lorna KalawTirol, staff writer, Maria Ceres Doyo,
writercontributor, and Sheilah Coronel, staffwriter.
General De Guzman said Maglipons article entitled Where the

Men with Guns Tread, Nothing is Left But Charred Remains and
the
353
VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 353

Skeleton of a Village which appeared July 4, 1982, in Philippine

Panorama, gravely discredited the soldiers in his command, with
obvious malicious intent.
The article allegedly contained numerous imputations that
government troopers intimidated, tortured, and massacred
innocent civilians belonging to the Atas minority, whom they are
sworn to protect, and that they rampaged through their villages
in Davao del Norte, during 19781981.
Tirol wrote an article entitled In this Catholic Country, Is it
Being Subversive to Live Out Christs Gospel? published last
Nov. 21. The article blamed the military for acts of atrocities on
the Church in the Samar provinces, the complainants said.
In Northern Samar, the people had been terrorized by two
months of military operations, and that the head of one dead man
was displayed in the poblacion, 35 ears attached to it, dead people
were brought to the centers tied to a pole and then dumped into a
pit, the article was quoted as saying.
Mrs. Tirol, in complete contempt of the military authorities led
by General Mison, said that the military dumps into the waste
basket the letter complaints about military abuses, the
complainants said.
Maria Ceres P. Doyo wrote an article entitled 40 Years After
the Fall, Bataan is Again Under Siege, which appeared in the
March 28 issue. General Felix said this article is libelous because
it casts aspersion on the marines and the PC and discredits his
capability and integrity as a military commander.
He quoted the following from the article:
In September 1981, military operations in Bataan were stepped up. For

many this was the start of a nightmarish experience. Raid, tortures,
arrests, killings. The PC and the marines were trying to flush out so
called subversive elements.
General Azada, commanding general of Recom I charged that

Doyos article on Fr. Zacarias Agatep glamorized an acknowledged
enemy of the government and put the military authorities in a
bad light by casting aspersions and apprehensions on the
circumstances surrounding the encounter between the PC and
NPA where Agatep was killed.
Coronel, author of the article Who Killed Bobby de la Paz? in

the Panorama last Dec. 12, questioned the Eascom
pronouncement that the New Peoples Army (NPA) was
responsible for the murder of de la Paz.
354

The article said the Eascom never conducted any thorough

investigation of the case and that there were circumstantial
evidence that point to the militarys involvement in the slaying.
General Mison charged that Coronel simply quoted from a
leftish group publication, without verifying from the local military
and police authorities on the progress of the actual investigation.
(Annex F, Amended Petition.)
In fact respondent Tadiar executed a complaint affidavit

dated February 9, 1983, which he filed with the City Fiscal
of Manila. He accused petitioners Domini Torrevillas
Suarez and Ma. Ceres Doyo of libel because of the
publication in PANORAMA of an article entitled 40
YEARS AFTER THE FALL, BATAAN IS AGAIN UNDER
SIEGE. He claimed damages (other than exemplary
damages) in the amount of ten million (P10,000,000.00)
pesos which Justice Plana has described as staggering.
(Annex G1, Amended Petition.)
It should be stated also that petitioner Letty Jimenez
Magsanoc once wrote a highly critical article published in
PANORAMA for which she was threatened with libel suits
by several highly placed government officials. Mrs.
JimenezMagsanoc is not with PANORAMA anymore.
Recently a committee of the print media issued a
STATEMENT OF CONCERN
We view with concern recent developments which threaten the

freedom of journalists to report and comment on issues of public
importance.
We are alarmed by the increasing number of libel suits filed
against journalists by public officials and the military. This form
of harassment through legal action threatens the citizens
constitutional right to be informed.
This month alone, two libel suits were filed against the
Bulletin Publishing Corp., Panorama editor Domini Torrevillas
Suarez, contributor Mauro Avena, and lawyer Lupino Lazaro for
the publication of Lazaros views on the Aquino assassination and
the conduct of the Agrava Board Investigation.
Since the May 14 elections, Mr. & Mrs. received two notices of
libel in connection with articles on alleged election anomalies in
Cebu and Leyte.
355
VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 355

In 1982, the editorpublisher of We Forum was charged with libel

for running a series of articles that questioned the authenticity of
President Marcos war decorations.
In 1983, five women journalists were threatened with libel
suits for exposes on military abuses in Panorama magazine. One
case, against freelance writer Ceres Doyo and editor Torrevillas
Suarez, has actually been filed.
In the same year, Bulletin correspondent Isidro Chammag was
charged with libel for his report on military abuses in Abra.
The provincial press and the foreign press in the Philippines
are no less vulnerable to legalized harassments. They have had
their share of libel suits, many of which are still pending in the
courts.
Suing for libel has traditionally been the defense of aggrieved
citizens. Today, however, libel suits have become a convenient
instrument of the state to cow and intimidate journalists through
court action. A sad consequence of this is the blacklisting of
journalists by publications wary of libel suits.
We view with alarm the ominous implication of President
Marcos statement in his July 23rd StateoftheNation address
which now classifies libel with violence and subversion: Violence,
subversion and libel are not acceptable weapons of dissent in a
democratic society. Side by side with this is the grave threat
posed by P.D. 1834 which makes unlawful use of publications
punishable by death or life imprisonment.
We strongly protest these continuing assaults on press
freedom. We appeal to the authorities concerned to help restore
the peoples right to a free press. We affirm our commitment to
fair and responsible journalism and our solidarity with our
harassed colleagues.
In the comment submitted for the respondents on the

original petition it is argued that the petition is totally
devoid of merit. It contains a prayer for dismissal.
When the case was heard on February 1, 1983, on the
issuance of a preliminary injunction, the Solicitor General
submitted a copy of the memorandum of General Fabian C.
Ver, Director General and Chairman of the National
Intelligence Board, addressed to respondent Estrada, dated

January 19, 1983, which reads as follows:
The Board reviewed the Report of Special Committee No. 2

regarding the series of dialogues you have conducted with selected
356

members of the media. It expressed satisfaction in the results of

the dialogue and noted better mutual understanding of the
respective roles of media and government. In view thereof, such
proceedings of Committee No. 2 are hereby ordered terminated.
(Rollo, p. 64.)
In the light of the memorandum, the Solicitor General said

that there was no need for further proceedings on the
matter. Mr. Joker Arroyo, one of the counsels for the
petitioners, admitted that the plea for preliminary
injunction was no longer viable. He nonetheless contended
that the matter is such importance that the petitioners
hope for a definite ruling on the principal question raised.
The ponencia of Justice Plana declares the petition moot
and academic in respect of the interrogations because they
have been abated. He adds a short and mild note of
concern. I agree with Justice Teehankee that the Court
should rule squarely on the matter.
The Constitution states that No law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. (Art. IV,
Sec. 9.) In the instant case the persons who compose
Special Committee No. 2 of the National Intelligence Board
have abridged the freedom to speak and the freedom to
publish by intimidation and veiled threats addressed to
some members of the press who by their writings have been
critical of the government. Their actions are the more
odious and had chilling effects because they were cloaked
by a mantle of pseudo legality.
The letter of respondent Estrada to Ms. Babst uses the
word law twicea law which vests authority in him and
which also authorizes his committee to proceed if Ms. Babst
should fail to appear. I have asked and searched but I have
yet to discover the law respondent Estrada had in mind.
The letter uses the word requested but in context the
request was a thinly veiled command to appear before the
Special Committee for failure to do so is to be considered as
a waiver (of what?) and the committee will have to proceed
in accordance with law (again what law?).
The interrogations were not only offensive to the

guarantees of free speech and free press, they also violated
the right to privacythe right to withhold information
which are nobodys
357
VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 357

business. Note, for example, that Ms. Babst was asked if

she was really a nun, if she practised Zen, why she left the
Catholic religion, etc.
In the case of Ms. Babst it could be asked why she
honored the request and discussed even impertinent and
personally intrusive questions when she had the legal
services of Atty. Joker Arroyo. It should be recalled that
the interrogation took place on December 22, 1982, and on
that date the WE FORUM case was just a few days old and
it should be noted that not only were the staffers of that
publication arrested on Presidential Commitment Orders
but the equipment and other properties of the paper were
also sequestered. Fear indeed can have a paralyzing effect.
For freedom to speak and to publish to be meaningful,
Not much reflection is needed to show that these freedoms
would be nullified if a person were allowed to express his
views only on the pain of being held accountable. That
would be to stifle the expression of opinions which are
repugnant or contrary to the current political, economic, or
moral views. The right to dissent becomes nonexistent.
To expose the party availing himself of freedom of speech
or of the press to run the risk of punishment is to make a
mockery of our commitment to the free mind. (Fernando,
The Bill of Rights, p. 131 [1972].)
I also want to put on record what Professor Archibald
Cox of Harvard Law School (formerly Solicitor General of
the United States and as Watergate Special Prosecutor one
of the victims of the Saturday night massacre) said when
he pleaded for forbearance to those who were disrupting a
teachin on Vietnam in March of 1971:
My name is Archibald Cox. I beseech you to let me say a few

words in the name of the President and Fellows of this University
on behalf of freedom of speech. For if this meeting is disrupted
hateful as some of us may find itthen liberty will have died a
little and those guilty of the disruption will have done inestimable
damage to the causes of humanity and peace.
Men and women whose views aroused strong emotionsloved

by some and hated by othershave always been allowed to speak
at HarvardFidel Castro, the late Malcolm X, George Wallace,
William Kuntsler, and others. Last year, in this very building,
358

speeches were made for physical obstruction of University

activities. Harvard gave a platform to all these speakers, even
those calling for her destruction. No one in the community tried to
silence them, despite intense opposition.
The reason is plain, and it applies here tonight. Freedom of
speech is indivisible. You cannot deny it to one man and save it
for others. Over and over again the test of our dedication to
liberty is our willingness to allow the expression of ideas we hate.
(33 Harvard Law School Bulletin, No. 1.)
It is now wellsettled that prohibition can be issued in the

sound discretion of the court in order to prevent oppressive
enforcement of the criminal law. (Dimayuga and Fajardo
vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304 [1922].) Upon the other hand,
the reasons advanced by Justice Plana why prohibition
should not be issued are based on technical and ignore
equitable grounds. He forgets that prohibition is a
prerogative and an equitable writ.
In the light of the foregoing, I place on record my
condemnation of the interrogations. They were violative of
the freedoms of speech, press and privacy. They were the
proper objects of prohibition or injunction. Similarly, any
libel suit, whether civil or criminal, on matters inquired
into in the interrogation can also be prohibited.
I close with this statement. The Armed Forces of the
Philippines is an honorable and distinguished institution.
Mt. Samat, Corregidor and the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani
are monuments to the uncommon valor of its gallant, brave
and patriotic members. Let not the shining image of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines be tarnished by some of its
members who by their excessive zeal subordinate the rights
they are sworn to protect to the imagined demands of
national security, to borrow a phrase from Senator
Emmanuel Pelaez.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.The liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully

any matter of public interest without censorship or
punishment is the essence of the constitutional freedom of
speech and of the press. (Gonzales vs. Commission on

Elections, 27 SCRA 835.)
359
VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 359

Jain vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
The State has the power to regulate the rights to free

speech and assembly. (Gallego vs. People, 8 SCRA 813.)
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6/10/2017 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 132

316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ARLENE BABST, ODETTE ALCANTARA CERES P.

VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 317

Moot and Academic; Military Law; Criminal Procedure;

invitation can easily assume a different appearance. Thus, where

318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Babst vs. National Intelligence Board

same rule applies to the issue of admissibility as evidence of

been libeled from vindicating his right by instituting a libel suit.

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

Constitutional Law; Press freedom is a preferred right. It must

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Babst vs. National Intelligence Board

Same; The times are difficult, even perilous. It is of essence,

from unjustified and unwarranted imputations of wrongdoing.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

Judgments; Moot and Academic; The petitioners are entitled

320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Babst vs. National Intelligence Board

is not borne out by the records.The third abovecited ground that

ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:

Judgments; I agree with Justice Teehankee that the Court

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Babst vs. National Intelligence Board

be considered as a waiver (of what?) and the committee will have

PETITION for prohibition with preliminary injunction to

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

This was originally a petition for prohibition with

322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

terrogation on various aspects of their works, feelings,

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, you are hereby

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) WILFREDO C. ESTRADA

Aside from the interrogations, a criminal complaint for

VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 323

tion and opinion, indispensable to the right of the people

324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

tion and subsequent interrogations) have therefore been

VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 325

Finally, the right to seek redress when libeled is a personal

MelencioHerrera, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring with a separate opinion:

The opinion of the Court penned by Justice Plana, written

1 Decision of the Court, 3.

326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

vitation and subsequent interrogations) have therefore

VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 327

5 Ibid. As to the second reason, this sentence is included: The same

328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

1. Fortunately, there is a case that serves such8 a

of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech.

8 34 SCRA 116 (1970).

VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 329

and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course,

to other mere labels of state law. * * * Like

330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

grievance and protest on one of the major public

of the broad scope enjoyed by press freedom which

11 bid, 125126. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan is reported in 376 US

VOL. 132, SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 331

5. Accordingly, the Lopez opinion could rightfully

primacy that freedom of the press enjoys. It ranks