G.R. No. L-58445 April 27, 1989 2.

Whether the presumption of compensability is absolutely

inapplicable under the present compensation laws when a disease is
not listed as occupational disease. (p. 17, Rollo)
ZAIDA G. RARO, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE The key argument of the petitioner is based on the fact that medical science cannot, as
INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences), respondents. yet, positively identify the causes of various types of cancer. It is a disease that strikes
people in general. The nature of a person's employment appears to have no relevance.
Cancer can strike a lowly paid laborer or a highly paid executive or one who works on
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
land, in water, or in the bowels of the earth. It makes the difference whether the victim is
employed or unemployed, a white collar employee or a blue collar worker, a housekeeper,
Jurisprudence on the compensability of cancer ailments has of late become a source of an urban dweller or a resident of a rural area.
confusion among the claimants and the government agencies enforcing the employees'
compensation law. The strongly lingering influence of the principles of 94 presumption of
It is not also correct to say that all cancers are not compensable. The list of occupational
compensability" and "aggravation" found in the defunct Workmen's Compensation Act but
diseases prepared by the Commission includes some cancers as compensable, namely
expressly discarded under the present compensation scheme has led to conflict and

inconsistency in employees' compensation decisions.

Occupational Diseases Nature of Employment

The problem is attributable to the inherent difficulty in applying the new principle of "proof
of increased risk." There are two approaches to a solution in cases where it cannot be
proved that the risk of contracting an illness not listed as an occupational disease was xxx xxx xxx xxx
increased by the claimant's working conditions. The one espoused by the petitioner insists
that if a claimant cannot prove the necessary work connection because the causes of the
16. Cancer of stomach and other Woodworkers, wood products
disease are still unknown, it must be presumed that working conditions increased the risk
lymphatic and blood forming vessels; industry carpenters, nasal cavity
of contracting the ailment. On the other hand, the respondents state that if there is no
and sinuses and employees in pulp and paper mills and plywood
proof of the required work connection, the disease is not compensable because the law
mills.
says so.

The petitioner states that she was in perfect health when employed as a clerk by the
Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences at its Daet, Camarines Norte regional office on March
17, 1975. About four years later, she began suffering from severe and recurrent
headaches coupled with blurring of vision. Forced to take sick leaves every now and then,
she sought medical treatment in Manila. She was then a Mining Recorder in the Bureau.
The petitioner was diagnosed at the Makati Medical Center to be suffering from brain
tumor. By that time, her memory, sense of time, vision, and reasoning power had been
lost.
A claim for disability benefits filed by her husband with the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) was denied. A motion for reconsideration was similarly denied. An appeal
to the Employees' Compensation Commission resulted in the Commission's affirming the
GSIS decision.
17. Cancer of the lungs, liver Vinyl chloride workers, and brain plastic
workers.
(Annex A, Amended Rules on Employees Compensation)
The petitioner questions the above listing. We see no arbitrariness in the Commission's
allowing vinyl chloride workers or plastic workers to be compensated for brain cancer.
There are certain cancers which are reasonably considered as strongly induced by
specific causes. Heavy doses of radiation as in Chernobyl, USSR, cigarette smoke over a
long period for lung cancer, certain chemicals for specific cancers, and asbestos dust,
among others, are generally accepted as increasing the risks of contracting specific
cancers. What the law requires for others is proof.
The first thing that stands in the way of the petition is the law itself.

The following issues are raised in this petition:
1. Whether brain tumor which causes are unknown but contracted
during employment is compensable under the present compensation
laws.
Presidential Decree No. 422, as amended, the Labor Code of the Philippines defines
"sickness" as follows:
ART. 167. Definition of Terms. As used in this Title unless the
context indicates otherwise:

xxx xxx xxx

 (1) Sickness means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational
disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by
employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of
contracting the same is by working conditions. For this purpose, the
Co on is empowered to determine and approve occupational and
work- related illnesses that may be considered compensable sable
based on hazards of employment. (PD 1368, May 1, 1978).
Section 1 (b), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation clearly defines
who are entitled. It provides:
SECTION 1.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational
disease under Annex A of these rules with the conditions set therein
satisfied;otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting
the disease is increase by the working conditions. (Emphasis
supplied)
The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing the illness was
caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions. To say that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has the
obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The
existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot be presumed .
In Navalta v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. 46684, April 27, 1988) this
Court recognized the fact that cancer is a disease of still unknown origin which strikes;
people in all walks of life, employed or unemployed. Unless it be shown that a particular
form of cancer is caused by specific working conditions (e. g. chemical fumes, nuclear
radiation, asbestos dust, etc.) we cannot conclude that it was the employment which
increased the risk of contracting the disease .
To understand why the "Presumption of compensability" together with the host of
decisions interpreting the "arising out of and in the course of employment" provision of the
defunct law has been stricken from the present law, one has to go into the distinctions
between the old workmen's compensation law and the present scheme.
On January 1, 1975, the Workmen's Compensation Act was replaced by a novel scheme
under the new Labor Code. The new law discarded, among others, the concepts of
"presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" and substituted a system based on
social security principles. The present system is also administered by social insurance
agencies the Government Service Insurance System and Social Security System
under the Employees' Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible
equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the
employee's right to receive reparation for work- connected death or disability. (Sulit v.
Employees' Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483 [1980]; Armena v. Employees'
Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851 [1983]; Erese v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, 138 SCRA 192 [1985]; De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation Commission,
142 SCRA 92 [1986]; Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., GR No.
65680, May 11, 1988).
Instead of an adversarial contest by the worker or his family against the employer, we now
have a social insurance scheme where regular premiums are paid by employers to a trust
fund and claims are paid from the trust fund to those who can prove entitlement.
In Sarmiento v. Employees' Compensation Commission (supra), we affirmed the validity of
the new law by explaining the present system as follows:
We cannot give serious consideration to the petitioner's attack against
the constitutionality of the new law on employee's compensation. It
must be noted that the petitioner filed his claim under the provisions of
this same law. It was only when his claim was rejected that he now
questions the constitutionality of this law on appeal by certiorari.
The Court has recognized the validity of the present law and has
granted and rejected claims according to its provisions. We find in it
no infringement of the worker's constitutional rights.
xxx xxx xxx
The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the
contributions of employers based on the salaries of their employees.
The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation.
No employer opposes his claim There is no notice of injury nor
requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim with
a new neutral Employees' Compensation Commission which then
determines on the basis of the employee's supporting papers and
medical evidence whether or not compensation may be paid. The
payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration is low.
The amount of death benefits has also been doubled.
On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular
monthly premiums to the scheme. It does not look for insurance
companies to meet sudden demands for compensation payments or
set up its own fund to meet these contingencies. It does not have to
defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims.
The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of
workmen's compensation. The Commission administers and settles
claims from a fired under its exclusive control. The employer does not
intervene in the compensation process and it has no control, as in the
past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of
Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered
claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid
benefits.
 Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for
compensation, the rules on presumption of compensability and
controversion cease to have importance. The lopsided situation of an
employer versus one employee, which called for equalization through
the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent.
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner's challenge is really against the desirability of the new
law. There is no serious attempt to assail it on constitutional grounds.
The wisdom of the present scheme of workmen's compensation is a
matter that should be addressed to the President and Congress, not
to this Court. Whether or not the former workmen's compensation
program with its presumptions, controversions, adversarial
procedures, and levels of payment is preferable to the present
scheme must be decided by the political departments. The present
law was enacted in the belief that it better complies with the mandate
on social justice and is more advantageous to the greater number of
working men and women. Until Congress and the President decide to
improve or amend the law, our duty is to apply it. (at pp. 4, 5, and 6)
ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to winch the tens of millions
of workers and their families look for compensation whenever covered accidents, salary
and deaths occur. As earlier stated, if increased contributions or premiums must be paid in
order to give benefits to those who are now excluded, it is Congress which should amend
the law after proper actuarial studies. This Court cannot engage in judicial legislation on
such a complex subject with such far reaching implications.
We trust that the public respondents and the Social Security System are continually
evaluating the actuarial soundness of the trust funds they administer. In this way, more
types of cancers and other excluded diseases may be included in the list of covered
occupational diseases. Or legislation may be recommended to Congress either increasing
the contribution rates of employers, increasing benefit payments, or making it easier to
prove entitlement. We regret that these are beyond the powers of this Court to
accomplish.
For the guidance of the administrative agencies and practising lawyers concerned, this
decision expressly supersedes the decisions in Panotes v. Employees' Compensation
Commission [128 SCRA 473 (1984)]; Mercado v. Employees' Compensation
Commission [127 SCRA 664 (1984)]; Ovenson v. Employees' Compensation
Commission [156 SCRA 21 (1987)]; Nemaria v. Employees' Compensation
Commission [155 SCRA 166 (1987)] and other cases with conclusions different from those
stated above.

The non-adversarial nature of employees' compensation proceedings is crucial to an

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED The questioned decision of the public
understanding of the present scheme. There is a widespread misconception that the poor
respondents is AFFIRMED.
employee is still arrayed against the might and power of his rich corporate employer.
Hence, he must be given all kinds of favorable presumptions. This is fallacious. It is now
the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are SO ORDERED.
not entitled under the law. The employer joins its employees in trying to have their claims
approved. The employer is spared the problem of proving a negative proposition that the
disease was not caused by employment. It is a government institution which protects the
stability and integrity of the State Insurance Fund against the payment of non-
compensable claims. The employee, this time assisted by his employer, is required to
prove a positive proposition, that the risk of contracting the is increased by working
conditions.

The social insurance aspect of the present law is the other important feature which
distinguishes it from the old and familiar system.

Employees' compensation is based on social security principles. All covered employers

throughout the country are required by law to contribute fixed and regular premiums or
contributions to a trust fund for their employees. Benefits are paid from this trust fund. At
the time the amount of contributions was being fixed, actuarial studies were undertaken.
The actuarially determined number of workers who would probably file claims within any
given year is important in insuring the stability of the said fund and making certain that the
system can pay benefits when due to all who are entitled and in the increased amounts
fixed by law.

We have no actuarial expertise in this Court. If diseases not intended by the law to be
compensated are inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance
Fund is endangered. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law
G.R. No. L-35741 December 20, 1932
VICTORIA TALLER VIUDA DE NAVA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
YNCHAUSTI STEAMSHIP CO., defendant-appellee.
Acting Provincial Fiscal Debuque for appellant.
A. de Aboitiz Pinaga for appellee.
De Witt, Perkins & Brady as amicus curiae.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo by Victoria Taller Vda. de
Nava, for the purpose of recovering the sum of P1,00.92 from the Ynchausti Steamship
Co., it being alleged that said amount is due to the plaintiff under the Workmen's
Compensation Act, No. 3428 of the Philippine Legislature, by reason of the death of her
husband in the course of his duty, while serving as helmsman (timonel) on the interisland
steamer Vizcaya, under the circumstances stated in the complaint. Upon hearing the
cause the trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint, and the plaintiff appealed.
The case was submitted upon an agreed statement of facts from which it appears that the
Ynchausti Steamship Co. is engaged in the business of operating vessels in the coastwise
and interisland trade, and on April 2, 1930, the steamer Vizcaya, one of its vessels, was
being maneuvered in the mouth of the Iloilo River, at Iloilo. At this time Valentin Nava held
the position of helmsman (timonel) on said boat, receiving a monthly compensation of
P35. In connection with moving the boat Nava, in charge of other members of the crew,
was engaged in hauling in the ship's cable and in coiling the cable on the deck of the boat
preparatory to passing it down a hatchway and bestowing it in its proper place in the
vessel. While thus engaged Nava found the space which they required for coiling the
cable partly occupied by a folding bed belonging to one of the third-class passengers.
Nava asked whose bed it was, and Dalmacio Villanueva, one of the passengers,
answered that he was the owner of the bed. Thereupon Nava said that he (Nava) would
push it to another place because it interfered with the work. Suiting the action to the word,
he pushed the bed with his foot towards the other side of the ship. This act aroused the
anger of the owner of the bed, and hot words were exchanged, in the course of which
Villanueva, using one of the wooden bars of the bed, gave Nava a jab in the pit of the
stomach. Under the impact of this blow Nava leaned back, and at this moment Vicente
Villanueva, a brother of Dalmacio Villanueva, ran up to Nava and stabbed him with a fan
knife just above the left nipple. The blade penetrated Nava's heart and he died almost
instantly. For the crime of homicide thus committed Vicente Villanueva was later
sentenced to imprisonment for fourteen years, eight months and one day, reclusion
temporal, with accessories, and was required to indemnify the family of the deceased in
the amount of P1,000, with costs. The deceased left a wife and seven children, and this
action for compensation was instituted by the widow, under Act No. 3428 of the Philippine
Legislature, as amended.
The answer of the defendant raises several questions all of which were decided in favor of
the plaintiff by the trial court with the exception of the most vital one which will chiefly
engage our attention in the course of this opinion. But as the defendant relies in its brief
upon the various points decided against it in the appealed decision, it is advisable to
notice these points as preliminary to the discussion of what we consider to be the main
question.
Among other things, it is insisted that the death of Valentin Nava was not an accident
within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, No. 3428. Under section 2 of Act
No. 3428, as it stood when this incident occurred, compensation is demandable for "a
personal injury from any accident due to and in the pursuance of the employment". By the
word "accident" as here used it is intended to indicate that the act causing the injury shall
be casual, in the sense of being unforeseen, and one for which the injured party is not
legally responsible. Now, in the case before us, the death of Valentin Nava, was not, at
least as regards the perpetrator of the deed, any accident whatever. The death was
caused by the criminal and intentional act of Vicente Villanueva. But an act may be an
accident as regards one person or from one point of view and not an accident as regards
another person and from another point of view. This homicide was not attributable to the
act of deceased himself and was not capable of being foreseen as a likely consequence of
the discharge of his duties. The trial court therefore correctly held that the death of Nava
was due an accident within the meaning of section 2 of Act No. 3428.
Again, it is insisted that Nava was not an "industrial employee", within the meaning of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, inasmuch as he was employed as a helmsman (timonel)
and his duties were not of an industrial nature. This contention takes too narrow a view of
the meaning of the phrase "industrial employee" as used in the Act cited. As helmsman on
the boat Nava was charged with the performance of duties connected with piloting of the
boat and controlling its movements when in motion. Duties of this character are clearly of
an industrial nature, since they are concerned with effecting the ends and purposes of
industry. The definition of "industrial employment", as given in subsection (d) of section 39,
Act No. 3428, covers all employment or work at a trade, occupation or profession
exercised by an employer for the purpose of gain, subject only to the limitation of yearly
gross income. Nava was therefore an industrial employee and entitled to compensation
under the Act, provided the other circumstances attendant upon the accident which
caused his death were of such nature as to bring him within the purview of the Act.
It is further insisted that Act No. 3428, as amended, does not cover the case of an
employee upon a coastwise vessel. In this connection attention is directed to the fact that,
under section 38, Act No. 3428 extends to the cases of "employees engaged in the
interisland trade"; and it was only by Act No. 3812 (section 12) that the provision was
amended so as to include employees engaged in the "coastwise and interisland trade".
From this it is supposed that the case in question does not fall under section 38 of Act No.
3428. The question is in our opinion without merit. In the first place, the word "interisland",
as originally used in section 38, was apparently used in a broad sense, to include all
shipping in and among the islands, in vessels of Philippine registration, and it is not limited
to shipping from a port of one island to a port of another island. The expression "the
coastwise and" was therefore of clarifying a possible ambiguity and to bring the
phraseology of the Act more into harmony with the technical terms commonly used in the
Customs laws and regulations. Even supposing, therefore, that the Vizcaya was only
engaged in the carrying of trade between different ports of the same island a fact which
does not appear the "accident" with which we are here concerned should be
considered within the purview of the law. It is not apparent that the meaning of the law was
changed in any essential feature by this amendment.
Still, again, it is insisted that the case does not come under Act No. 3428 for the reason
that it does not appear that the defendant had a gross income during the year immediately
preceding the one during which the accident occurred of not less than P40,000. But we
note that in the agreed statement of facts it is stated that during the last twelve months
anterior to the month of April of 1930, the defendant had a gross income of more than
P40,000 as a result of its business. This was evidently intended to cover the requirement
expressed in subsection (d) of section 39 of Act No. 3428, and although the stipulation
does not technically cover the gross earning for the full calendar year anterior to the
calendar year in which the accident occurred, we are of the opinion that the trial judge
committed no error in interpreting the stipulation in that sense.
Finally, it is supposed that the circumstance that the criminal court imposed the civil
obligation on Vicente Villanueva to indemnify the family of the deceased in the amount of
one thousand pesos makes it improper to allow additional compensation in this case. As
the trial court properly held, the suggestion is without merit. In the first place, it does not
appear that the criminal indemnity has been paid and, in the second place, that obligation
is wholly distinct from the obligation imposed by the Workmen's Compensation Act and the
latter is in no sense subsidiary to the former.lawphil.net
This brings us to consider the most important question in the case, namely, whether the
death of Valentin Nava occurred in the course of his employment, or was the result of the
nature of such employment. In this connection we quote section 2 of Act No. 3428, which
runs as follows:
SEC. 2. Grounds for compensation. When any employee receives a personal
injury from any accident due to and in the pursuance of the employment, or
contracts any illness directly caused by such employment or the result of the
nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums
and to the persons hereinafter specified.
This provision was amended by section 1 of Act No. 3812 so as to read as follows:
SEC. 2. Grounds for compensation. When any employee receives a personal
injury from any accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, or
contracts any illness directly caused by such employment, or the result of the
nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums
and to the persons hereinafter specified.
This last provision, having been enacted since the death of Valentin Nava, is not directly
applicable to the case before us, but it may properly be quoted for purposes of comparison
and interpretation. Fixing our attention then more particularly upon section 2 of Act No.
3428, it is quite clear that the death of Valentin Nava was not due to any illness directly
caused by his employment or the result of the nature of such employment. We are of the
opinion, however, that it occurred in the course of his employment and "in pursuance of
the employment", as this expression is used in the provision cited. The attorneys for the
appellee presents a narrow view of Nava's employment and insists that, inasmuch as he
was employed as helmsman, he was acting within the scope of his duties only when his
hand was on the helm of the vessel and he was engaged in actually guiding its motions.
We are of the opinion that his duties should be considered as having greater latitude. It is
true that the term indicative of his employment was that of helmsman, but we think that his
duties should be considered as comprehending acts done by him in helping to guide the
ship. In maneuvering a vessel, in entering and leaving ports, it is necessary for the ship's
officers in charge of the motions of the vessel to avail themselves of cables; and the taking
in of a cable and the coiling of it upon the deck are acts properly incident to controlling the
motion of the vessel. It results that, when Nava found that one of the third-class
passengers had placed his bed on the deck in a position where it was in his way, he acted
within the scope of his duty when he pushed the bed back; and when the fatal assault was
made upon him because of that act, it must be considered that his death resulted from an
act done in the line of his duty.
At this juncture it may be well to give a few words of explanation concerning the verbiage
of section 2 of Act No. 3428 and of the amendment effected in this section by Act No.
3812, and particularly in the substitution, in the latter Act, of the expression "arising out of
and in the course of the employment" for the expression "due and to in the pursuance of
the employment" used in Act No. 3428. Upon this point we note that Act No. 3428 was
adopted by the Philippine Legislature in Spanish, and the original of the section is taken
from the statutes of the Territory of Hawaii (section 3604, Chapter 209 of the Revised
Laws of Hawaii, 1925). Our English version here is the official translation into English of
the Spanish version as adopted by the Philippine Legislature. In the Hawaiian law the
expression used in the part of the statute here under consideration is "arising out of and in
the course of such employment". These words, after passing through the Spanish version,
and upon being turned back into English, appeared as "due to and in the pursuance of the
employment". It follows that the expression found in the amendatory provision (section 1 of
Act No. 3812) is merely a reversion to the English wording of the Hawaiian statute, which
corresponds, we may add, to the wording commonly used in the American statutes. It is
clear therefore that the amendment introduced by the last named Act was merely intended
to bring the English version of our statute into verbal conformity with the Hawaiian and
other American laws. No change whatever in the meaning of the provision was intended to
be effected by said amendment.
The attorneys for the appellee have called our attention to some American decisions,
which, it is insisted, support the conclusion of the trial court that the homicide which
resulted in the death of Valentin Nava was not an accident due to and in the pursuance of
his employment, as this expression runs in section 2 of Act No. 3428. The cases most
emphatically urged upon us in this connection by the appellee are State of Minnesota ex
rel. School Dist. No. 1, in Itasca County vs. District Court (140 Minn., 470; 15 A. L. R.,
579), and Schmoll vs. Weisbrod & Hess Brewing Co. (89 N. J. L., 150; 97 Atl., 732). In the
first of these cases the facts were as follows:
The school district employed a young woman to teach in the Round Lake school, some 35
miles from Deer River in Itasca County and 25 miles from Black Duck in Beltrami County,
these two places being the nearest railway points. The country was densely wooded and
sparsely settled. The school was a one-room school and fifteen pupils attended. The
nearest house was a half mile away, and the boarding house was a mile or a mile and a
quarter. On the morning of September 20, 1916, an unknown man asked for food at the
boarding place of the teacher. On the evening of that day, when her work at the school
was finished, she started for her boarding house, taking a short cut through the woods.
She had some papers which she intended to correct at home in the evening, and a book
to study. As she was on her way, and when just off the school grounds, she was criminally
assaulted by this for the gratification of his passions, and as part of the transaction he shot
her, destroying the sight of her left eye. She filed a claim for compensation against the
school district, under the Compensation Act, which required an employer to pay
compensation "in every case of personal injury or death of his employee, caused by
accident, arising out of and in the course of the employment". The District Court for Itasca
County awarded the compensation prayed for, and the School District brought an action
for certiorari in the Supreme Court of Minnesota, claiming that the injury suffered by the
employee did not arise out of and in the course of the employment. The Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the lower court, and held that the injury for which compensation
had been awarded by the district court did not arise out of the employment.

In the second case it appeared that the deceased was a route foreman in the employ of
the respondent. His duties were to look after the various beer delivery routes and see that
they were properly conducted, and on Saturdays he had a beer delivery where he
delivered beer and collected the moneys therefor. On the 19th day of December, 1914, on
a Saturday night, at about 8 o'clock, the deceased made a delivery of beer at some
dwelling house in Atlantic City leaving his wagon in the street, a little distance away, and
while returning to his wagon he was assaulted and shot by some person unknown. The
deceased mounted his wagon and returned to brewery and accounted to his employer for
the moneys intrusted to and collected by him and then went to a hospital where he, ten
days later, died from the effects of the gunshot wound.

In the first of these cases it is quite evident that there was no causal relation between the
service which the plaintiff as a teacher, had rendered and the assault which was
committed upon her. In the second case the motive of the assault was evidently robbery,
and there was no direct connection between the work done by the victim of the robbery
and the assault. If it had appeared, in the first case, that the teacher had been attacked
while in the act of properly disciplining one of her pupils, and because of that fact, it would,
we think, have been held that the injury had been incurred in the course of her
employment. The second case brings us perhaps into more debatable ground, but the
casual relation between the performance of duty and the assault was not as manifest as in
the case now before us. The following decisions, gleaned from American jurisprudence,
shed further light upon the situation before us:

In In re Wooley vs. Minneapolis Equipment Co. and Globe Indemnity Co. (157 Minn., 428;
196 N. W. 477), where a salesman was shot and killed in a street brawl brought on by
himself and for his own purposes, even though he was engaged in his employee's
business just before the fracas, and intended to resume it afterwards, the court held that
the injury did not arise out of the employment.

In Scholtzhauer vs. C. & L. Lunch Co. (233 N. Y., 12; 134 N. E., 701), it was held that the
injury did not arise out of the employment, where a waitress in a restaurant was shot by a
negro dish-washer because she had declined an invitation to out with him and had stated
that she would not go out with a negro.

In the case now in hand it seems clear to us that the plaintiff is entitled to the
compensation demanded and no question has been made as to the amount thereof.

The judgment appealed from will therefore be reversed, and the plaintiff will recover of the
defendant the sum of P1,000.92, with interest from the date of the filing of the complaint
and with costs. So ordered.

Villa-Real, Hull, Vickers and Imperial, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-47360 November 28, 1940 evidence regarding the motive or intention of a person is admissible, as an
exception to the hearsay rule. (See Wigmore on Evidence, par. 1729, et seq.:
and also notes to its Supplement.) And view of the fact that the declarations of
BOHOL LAND TRANSPORTATION CO., recurrente y apelante,
Dalmao were made under the sanction of an oath, and the defendant itself
vs.
presented Exhibit 9 (testimony of some witness in the criminal case against
FERMINA VIUDA DE MADANGUIT Y OTROS, recurridos y apelados.
Dalmao), which corroborates the widow's testimony, we cannot say that there is
not enough evidence about the motive impelling Dalmao's murderous hand.
Sres. Alvear y Agrava en representacion de la recurrente.
D. Antonio Logarta y D. Cecilio I. Lim en representacion de los recurridos.
At any rate, the declaration of the widow at pages 22 to 25 of the transcript of
the stenographic notes were not objected to as hearsay, and for all purposes
HORRILLENO, J.: are in the record entitled to some value. (Diaz vs. U.S., 223 U.S. 442.).

Este es un recurso de certiorari promotivao por la Bohol Land Transportaion Co. contra Nevertheless, let us suppose, that proof of Dalmao's resentment is insufficient.
Fermina Viuda de Mandaguit, la recurrida, en el que pide se revoque la decision del Then Madanguit's injury does not appear to have arisen out of his employment;
Tribunal de Apelaciones, promulgada el 28 de febrero de 1940, la cual, copiada yet it being undeniable that he was killed 'in the course of his employment' (see
literalmente, dice asi:. Jackson vs. Dairyman's Creamery, 162 S.E., 359; Oklahoma Gas and Electric
Co. vs. Sartonio, 12 Pac. [2nd] 221, his family is entitled to compensation under
the decision of the Supreme Court in Pollisco vs. Basilan Lumber Co., G.R.
Driving the passenger truck No. 77 of the defendant transportation company, 39721, Oct 23, 1993 (Philippine Cases on Workmen's Compensation by Butalid,
Ramon Madanguit left Tagbilaran, Bohol, on his regular trip to barrio Catigbian
p.7)
of another municipality in the afternoon of May 17, 1937. On the road he
overtook and passed another truck of the defendant, and in doing so he fell but
collided with Ciriaco Dalmao (then riding a bicycle in the opposite Referring to the second point, the accident did not arise out of his employment,
direction),practically ditching him. Dalmao immediately turned around and which was that of operating the machine and fixing it when it was out of
pursued Madanguit's truck, which a few minutes later had to park in front of the commission, inasmuch as said accident did not occur while he was engaged in
house of Attorney Celestino Gallares, because some pedestrian signaled to get said work and as a consequence thereof.
aboard. Taking advantage of the stop, Madanguit went to the Lourdes Drug
Store across the street to wash his hands which had become dirty when he
"But that the accident occurred in the course of his employment there
cleaned the truck. In the meantime, Ciriaco Dalmao arrived, went into the drug
can be no doubt, for the reason that, being an employee of the firm
store, and, without much ado, knifed Madanguit to death. Dalmao was
and while riding in the wagon furnished by the company to bring then
prosecuted and having pleaded guilty was sentenced accordingly.
home within the concession after their work, plaintiff was within the
radius of action and under the control of the defendant company."
Subsequently, the heirs of Madanguit filed this action for compensation under (Pollisco vs. Basilan Lumber Co., supra ).
Act No. 3428, as amended, in the Court of First Instance of Bohol, and obtained
judgment for the total sum of P1,507.58, to be paid in the manner directed. The
In Bellosillo vs. City of Manila (G.R. No. 34522, November 9, 1931,
defendant appealed, questioning not the amount of compensation nor the
Butalid, supra, p. 16), a workman employed on a public street temporarily left
manner of payment thereof, but the right of the plaintiff to be compensated, and
his work and crossed the street, he was run over by an automobile and killed.
submitting the proposition: First, that the death did not arise out of Madanguit's
The Supreme Court gave him compensation under Act 3428, holding that the
employment and in the course thereof; and, second that compensation is not
injury was caused by an accident due to, and in pursuance of, his employment.
due because the death occurred on the account of Madanguit's notorious
negligence, or intention to inflict injury upon Dalmao.
It should be noted in this connection that in constructing this specific provision of
the Workmen's compensation law, the tendency is towards liberality in favor
We are of the opinion that under the facts stated at the beginning of this
whenever an employee suffers injury in the course of his employment, a
decision, the death of Madanguit arose out, and in the course of his
reasonable factual presumption, is that the hurt arose out of the employment.
employment. It appears that because while driving the defendant's truck he
offended Dalmao, the latter stabbed and killed him.
The defendant attempted to establish the fact that Madanguit owed Dalmao
about P3.50; that on May 17, just a few minutes before the killing, Dalmao
But the defendant maintains that there is no competent proof regarding
stopped Madanguit and asked for payment, that Madanguit paid no attention to
Dalmao's motive, maintaining that the declaration in open court of the widow of
Dalmao, whereupon the latter became enraged, followed Madanguit and killed
Madanguit, who merely repeated Dalmao's testimony in the criminal case
him. The theory is not plausible for it is unlikely that for a small indebtedness
against him for murder is hearsay and incompetent evidence. But hearsay
Dalmao should take away the life of an individual. it is also incredible that he
 should stop a truck to demand payment. But this alleged debt of Madanguit
lends color to the plaintiff's version, because his rudeness in crowding Dalmao
out of the street was resented by the latter, who, as a creditor of Madanguit,
evidently expected better treatment.
The other defense that the killing was caused by Madanguit's intention to inflict
injuries upon Dalmao, or to his notorious negligence, is concededly premised on
the assumption that the decision in criminal case No. 4180, Exhibit E, is
admissible (appellant's brief, p.34). As we agree with the defendant that said
Exhibit, for the purpose of showing the facts recited therein, is not admissible,
we do not have to go into this defense, specially because we are not convinced
there was notorious negligence or wilfull misconduct on the part of Madanguit.
The net result is that plaintiff are entitled to compensation. And as the defendant
has assigned no error as to the rate or amount of the award, the judgment
appealed from will be affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
La recurrente, como fundamento de su recurso, alega:.
1. The Second Division of said Court of Appeals completely disregarded the fact
that the death of Ramon O. Madanguit was not an accident at all and
erroneously held that, because Ramon O. Madanguit was murdered by Ciriaco
Dalmao in the Lourdes Drug Store, the said death arose in the coarse of his
employment or as a result of said employment it been found by said Second
Division of Court of Appeals that the death of the deceased arose from the
following facts:
. . . "On the road he overtook and passed another truck of the defendant, and in
doing so he fell but collided Ciriaco Dalmao (then riding a bicycle in the opposite
direction), practically ditching him, Dalmao immediately turned around and
pursued Madanguit's truck which a few minutes after had to park in front of the
house of Attorney Celestino Gallares, because some pedestrian signaled to get
aboard. Taking advantage of the stop. Madanguit went to the Lourdes Drug
Store across the street to wash his hands which had become dirty when he
cleaned the truck. In the meantime, Ciriaco Dalmao arrived, went into the drug
store and without much ado, knifed Madanguit to death. Dalmao was
prosecuted, and having pleaded guilty, was sentence accordingly."
2. The Second Division of the Court of Appeals committed an error in holding
the deceased was not notoriously negligent when,
(a) The deceased violated and disregarded the rules and regulations of
petitioner by starting late from; petitioner's garage which fact accounted for
deceased going to the Lourdes Drug Store to wash his hands and comb his
hair; and
(b) The deceased disregarded the right of Ciriaco Dalmao, his assailant, by
almost colliding with, and there was not enough space for his truck to go
through without causing injury or damage to the travelling public.
3. The Second Division of the Court of Appeals also committed an error of law in
implied holding that petitioner is an insurer against all accidental injuries which
might happened to its employees while in the course of their employment and
holding that, because the deceased was murdered on account of his
carelessness and derelictions of duty, the said deceased Ramon O. Madanguit
died in the course of his employment. (See par. 2, p.2, decision, Appendix A.)
4. The Second Division of the Court of Appeals again committed an error of law
by concluding that petitioner is answerable for the death of decease when it
itself finds that "It appears that because while driving the defendant's truck he
(the deceased) offended Dalmao, the latter stabbed and killed him" and . . .
5. Finally, the decision of the Second Division of Court of Appeals is against the
applicable decision of this Honorable Court in that it applied without exception
and limitation, the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law in holding
that 'the tendency is towards liberality in favor of the employee. And perhaps it is
not error to say that whenever an employee suffers injuries in the course of his
employment, a reasonable factual presumption is that the hurt arose out of the
employment' when according to the case Vergara vs. Pampanga Bus Co., G.R.
No. 44149, January 9, 1936; Vol. V, lawyers' Journal, p. 372, this Honorable
Court says:
"We have heretofore given repeated evidence of our desire to see a spirit of
liberality characterize the construction of the Workmen's Compensation Act. We
have endeavored to interpret the Act to promote its purpose. We have even
gone so far as to interpret it fairly in favor of the employee. But we cannot
construct the Act to fit particular cases, and in this particular case neither the
facts nor the law are demonstrative of a meritorious claim on the part of the
employee coming within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act."
No se discuten por la recurrente, ni puede discurtilos en esta instancia, los hechos
declarados probados por el Tribunal de Apelacion en su decision objeto del presente
recurso, a sabeer:
Driving the passenger truck No. 77 of the defendant transportation company,
Ramon Madanguit left Tagbilaran, Bohol, on his regular trip to barrio Catigbian
of another municipality in the afternoon of May 17, 1938. On the road he
overtook and passed another truck of the defendant and in doing so he fell but
collided with Ciriaco Dalmao (the riding a bicycle in the opposite direction),
practically ditching him. Dalmao immediately turned around and pursued
Madanguit's truck, which few minutes later had to work in front of the house of
Attorney Celestino Gallares, because some pedestrian signaled to get aboard.
Taking advantage of the stop, Madanguit went to the Lourdes Drug Store across
the street to wash his hands which had become dirty when he cleaned the truck.
in the meantime , Ciriaco Dalmao arrived, went into the drug store, and without
much ado, knifed Madanguit to death. Dalmao was prosecuted, and having
pleaded guilty, was sentence accordingly.
Subsequently, the heirs of Madanguit filed this action for compensation under Act 3428, as
amended, in the Court of First Instance of Bohol, and obtained judgment for the total sum
of P1,507,58, to be paid in the manner directed. The defendant appealed, questioning not Avancea, Pres., Imperial, Diaz y Laurel, MM., estan conformes.
the amount of compensation nor the manner of payment thereof, but the right of the
plaintiff to be compensated, and submitting the proposition: First, that the death did not
arise out of Madanguit's employment and in the course thereof; and, occurred on account
of Madanguit's notorious negligence, or intention to inflict upon Dalmao.

La unica cuestion, por consiguiente, que se plantea ante Nos es la de si, en vista de tales
hechos, procede o no otorgar a la recurrida los beneficios de la Ley de Compensacion de
Obreros No. 3428, segun ha sido enmendada por la Ley No. 3812. Dicha ley, tal como ha
sido enmendada, dispone en su articulo 2, lo siguiente:

ART. 2. Motivos para una compensacion. Cuando un empleado sufre una

lesion personal por accidente proveniente de, y en el curso de su empleo, o
contrajere una enfermedad causada directamente por el empleo o como
resultado de la naturaleza de dicho empleo, su patrono le pagara una
compensacion en las cantidades y a las personas que se especifican mas
adelante.

En Pollisco vs. Basilan Lumber Co., R.G. No. 39721, este Tribunal, entre otras cosas,
declaro que Pollisco tenia derecho a la compensacion no obstante haber ocurrido el
accidente despues de su trabajo y mientras volvia ya a su casa. El caso de autos es, a
nuestro juicio, mas fuerte y meritorio todavia que el citado de Pollisco. Como se
desprende de los hechos probados segun el Tribunal de Apelacion, Madanguit, el difunto,
era el chofer de uno de los buses de la recurrente, Bohol Land Transportation Co., y
mientras guiaba el coche, este choco contra la bicicleta que montaba Ciriaco Dalmao; que
momentos despues, casi inmediatamente, Madanguit paro su coche frente a la casa del
abogado Celestino Gallares, por haber recibido seas de algunos peatones que querian
coger el camion y, aprovechando esta oportunidad, bajo de el y se dirigio al Lourdes Drug
Store con el objeto de lavarse las manos que se habian ensuciado al limpiar su coche.
Entretanto, Ciriaco Dalmao llego y entro en la botica y, sin mas ni mas, apualo a
Madanguit que murio en el acto.

En otro asunto, Bellosillo vs. City of Manila, R.G. No. 34522, decidido por este Tribunal,
se declaro que un obrero de la Ciudad de Manila, que trabajaba en las calles publicas,
tenia derecho a la compensacion bajo la ley, a pesar de haber dejado temporalmente su
trabajo y cruzado la calle, momento en que fue atropellado por un automovil que le dejo
muerto en el acto. En Corpus Juris, pag. 673, tomo 71, hallamos lo siguente:

. . . where the employee is injured while seeking toilet facilities or going to ro

from a toilet, the injury arises out of the employment and in the course of it . . .

El Tribunal de Apelacines, por tanto, no incurrio en error alguno al decidir este asunto,
confirmando en todas sus partes el fallo del tribunal a quo a favor de Fermina Vda. de
Madanguit, la recurrida.

En su consecuencia, procede, y asi lo declaramos, confirmar en todas sus partes la

decision objeto del recurso, con las costas en ambar instancias a cargo de la recurrente.
Asi se ordena.
G.R. No. L-26341 November 27, 1968
ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO., petitioner,
vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and IRENEA M. PABLO, for herself
and in behalf of her minor children EDWIN, EDGAR and EDNA, all surnamed
PABLO, respondents.
Luisito C. Hofilena for petitioner.
Villavieja and Villanueva for respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission.
Gualberto C. Opong for respondent Irenea M. Pablo and her minor children.
CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal by the Iloilo Dock and Engineering Company (hereinafter referred to as
the IDECO) from the decision dated February 28, 1966 of the Workmen's Compensation
Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) affirming the decision of the
Regional Office VII in Iloilo City, and ordering the IDECO to pay to the widow and children
of Teodoro G. Pablo (Irenea M. Pablo and the minors Edwin, Edgar and Edna, all
surnamed Pablo) the sum of P4,000, to pay to the widow P89 as reimbursement for burial
expenses and P300 as attorney's fees, and to pay to the Commission the amount of P46
as fees pursuant to section 55 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended.
At about 5:02 o'clock in the afternoon of January 29, 1960, Pablo, who was employed as a
mechanic of the IDECO, while walking on his way home, was shot to death in front of, and
about 20 meters away from, the main IDECO gate, on a private road commonly called the
IDECO road. The slayer, Martin Cordero, was not heard to say anything before or after the
killing. The motive for the crime was and still is unknown as Cordero was himself killed
before he could be tried for Pablo's death. At the time of the killing, Pablo's companion
was Rodolfo Galopez, another employee, who, like Pablo, had finished overtime work at
5:00 p.m. and was going home. From the main IDECO gate to the spot where Pablo was
killed, there were four "carinderias" on the left side of the road and two "carinderias" and a
residential house on the right side. The entire length of the road is nowhere stated in the
record.
According to the IDECO, the Commission erred (1) in holding that Pablo's death occurred
in the course of employment and in presuming that it arose out of the employment; (2) in
applying the "proximity rule;" and (3) in holding that Pablo's death was an accident within
the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The principal issue is whether Pablo's death comes within the meaning and intendment of
that "deceptively simple and litigiously prolific",1 phrase The two components of the
coverage formula "arising out of" and "in the course of employment." 2 The two
components of the coverage formula "arising out of" and "in the course of employment"
are said to be separate tests which must be independently satisfied; 3 however, it should
not be forgotten that the basic concept of compensation coverage is unitary, not dual, and
is best expressed in the word, "work-connection," because an uncompromising insistence
on an independent application of each of the two portions of the test can, in certain cases,
exclude clearly work-connected injuries.4 The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or
cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course
of" refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident takes place. 5
As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise "in the course of
employment" when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where
the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in
doing something incidental thereto.6
The general rule in workmen's compensation law known as the "going & coming rule,"
simply stated, is that "in the absence of special circumstances, an employee injured in,
going to, or coming from his place of work is excluded from the benefits of workmen's
compensation acts."7 This rule, however, admits of four well-recognized exceptions, to wit:
(1) where the employee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of his employer;
(2) where the employee is about to enter or about to leave the premises of his employer
by way of the exclusive or customary means of ingress and egress; (3) where the
employee is charged, while on his way to or from his place of employment or at his home,
or during his employment, with some duty or special errand connected with his
employment; and (4) where the employer, as an incident of the employment, provides the
means of transportation to and from the place of employment.8
We address ourselves particularly to an examination and consideration of the second
exception, i.e., injuries sustained off the premises of the employer, but while using a
customary means of ingress and egress.
This exception, known as the "proximity rule," was applied in Philippine Fiber Processing
Co., Inc. vs. Ampil.9 There, the employee, at about 5:15 a.m., while proceeding to his
place of work and running to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch fronting the main
gate of the employer's factory, as a result of which he died the next day. The sole question
was whether or not the accident which caused the employee's death arose out of and in
the course of his employment. This Court ruled in favor of the claimant thus:
The very case of Afable vs. Singer Sewing Machine Co. invoked by the
petitioner intimated that "we do not of course mean to imply that an employee
can never recover for injuries suffered while on his way to or from work. That
depends on the nature of his employment." Considering the facts found by the
Commission, namely, that the deceased Angel Ariar was not under any shift
routine; that his assignment covered the entire working hours of the factory; that
the first working hour starts at 6:00 o'clock in the morning; that it takes at least
thirty minutes before the machine operates at full speed or load; that the spot
where he fell (ditch fronting petitioner's factory or sidewalk of its premises), is
immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident in question must be
deemed to have occurred within the zone of his employment and therefore
arose out of and in the course thereof. In Salilig vs. Insular Lumber Co., G.R.
No. 28951, September 10, 1928, referred to in the Comments on the Workmen's
Compensation Commission Act by Morabe and Inton, 1955 edition,
compensation was allowed for injury received by a laborer from an accident in
going to his place of work, along a path or way owned by his employer and
commonly used by the latter's laborers.
In contrast is Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. vs. Quiroz,10 which concerned
injuries sustained by a centrifugal operator. He had reported for work at 9:30 p.m. (March
7, 1958) and was dismissed at 5:30 the following morning. Soon "after he stepped out of
the company gate, and while standing about 2- meters from it between the shoulder of
the highway and a railroad that came from inside the compound and intersected the
highway, waiting for a ride home, he was bumped by a jeepney, as a result of which he
sustained" injuries. In holding that these injuries were "not produced by an accident
"arising out of and in the course of employment," " this Court reasoned thus:
The compensability of an injury suffered by an employee proceeding to or
coming from his work depends upon whether or not it is "work-connected." As
Chief Justice Kenison of New Hampshire has put it, "the fact that the employee
is travelling to or from work on a public highway does not necessarily exclude
coverage (Brousseau vs. Blackstone Mills, 130 A 2d 543, 545). Conversely, it is
not enough to say that the employee would not have been on the public
highway had it not been for his job, since the same can usually be said of the
general public (Payne & Dolan vs. Industrial Commission, 46 NE 2d 925). The
law, in effect, insures the employee against losses arising from the perils of his
work. In other words, the Workmen's Compensation Act covers occupational
injuries, which, as such, must have a causative connection with something, not
merely in common with the public, but peculiar to the employment. In order to
warrant recovery for off-the-premises injuries, it must be shown that there has
been a very special danger, some particular risk which the employer could have
caused or allowed to exist. Hence,
It is significant that practically all successful off-the-premises cases
have involved normal route of access to the plant, or an icy sidewalk
adjacent to the premises and therefore identified with the premises in
the sense that the employer should have removed the ice. (Emphasis
ours.)
It is true that in Philippine Fiber Processing Co. v. Ampil, G.R. No. L-8130 (June
30, 1956), we held the employer liable for an injury sustained by an employee
who, as he was running to his place of work to avoid the rain, slipped and fell
into a ditch in front of the factory's main gate and near the same. The ditch was,
however, in itself an obvious hazard which, owing to its proximity to the gate, the
employer should have taken measures to remove. Thus, thru his inaction, he
had contributed, in a special way, to the occurrence of the accident.
In the case at bar, no such special circumstance appears to exist. There is
no particular causative connection between the injury sustained by the
employee and either his work or his employer. Although, as stated in the
decision appealed from, the record does not show that the company "had taken
measures to make the waiting place safe for the employees," neither does the
record show either that the accident occurred at the usual waiting place of the
employees, or that said place was particularly unsafe.
Our Workmen's Compensation Act being essentially American in origin and text, it is not
amiss to pay deference to pertinent American jurisprudence. In the precise area of law
here involved, we can draw guidance from an affluence of Federal and State precedents.
From Samuel B. Horovitz' Injury and Death under Workmen's Compensation Laws (1944),
pp. 159 to 165, we glean the following observations:
Suppose, however, that the injury occurs on the way to work or on the way
home from work. Injuries going to or from work have caused many judicial
upheavals.
The question here is limited to whether the injuries are "in the course of" and not
"out of" the employment. How the injury occurred is not in point. Street risks,
whether the employee was walking or driving, and all other similar questions
deal with the risk of injury or "out of" the employment. "In the course of" deals
mainly with the element of time and space, or "time, place and circumstances."
Thus, if the injury occurred fifteen minutes before working hours and within one
hundred feet of the employer's premises, on sidewalks or public roads, the
question of "in the course of" the employment is flatly raised.
Some of our states refuse to extend this definition of "in the course of" to include
these injuries. Most of the states will protect the employee from the moment his
foot or person reaches the employer's premises, whether he arrives early or
late. These states find something sacred about the employment premises and
define "premises" very broadly, not only to include premises owned by the
employer, but also premises leased, hired, supplied or used by him, even
private alleyways merely used by the employer. Adjacent private premises are
protected by many states, and a few protect the employee even on adjacent
public sidewalks and streets. Where a city or any employer owns or controls an
island, all its streets are protected premises.
There is no reason in principle why states should not protect employees for
a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable
distance before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises. The Supreme
Court of the United States has declared that it will not overturn any state
decision that so enlarges the scope of its act. Hence, a deaf worker, trespassing
on railroad tracks adjacent to his employer's brick-making premises (but shown
by his superintendent the specific short crossing over the track), and killed by a
train, was held to be in the course of his employment when hit by an oncoming
train fifteen minutes before his day would have begun. So long as causal
relation to the employment is discernible, no federal question arises.
The narrow rule that a worker is not in the course of his employment until he
crosses the employment threshold is itself subject to many exceptions. Off-
premises injuries to or from work, in both liberal and narrow states, are
compensable (1) if the employee is on the way to or from work in a vehicle
owned or supplied by the employer, whether in a public (e.g., the employer's
street car) or private conveyance; (2) if the employee is subject to call at all
hours or at the moment of injury; (3) if the employee is travelling for the
employer, i.e., travelling workers; (4) if the employer pays for the employee's
time from the moment he leaves his home to his return home; (5) if the
employee is on his way to do further work at home, even though on a fixed
salary; (6) where the employee is required to bring his automobile to his place of
 business for use there. Other exceptions undoubtedly are equally justified,
dependent on their own peculiar circumstances.
Schneider (supra, at p. 117) makes this significant statement:
The proximity rule exception to the general going and coming rule is that an
employee is generally considered to be in the course of his employment while
coming to or going from his work, when, though off the actual premises of his
employer, he is still in close proximity thereto, is proceeding diligently at an
appropriate time, by reasonable means, over the natural, practical, customary,
convenient and recognized way of ingress, or egress either on land under the
control of the employer, or on adjacent property with the express or implied
consent of the employer.
On pp. 98 to 99 of 85 ALR, we find the following disquisition:
The compensation acts have been very generally held not to authorize an award
in case of an injury or death from a peril which is common to all mankind, or to
which the public at large is exposed. 28 R.C. L. 804. And they do not as a
general rule cover injuries received while going to or from work on public
streets, where the employee has not reached, or has left the employer's
premises. The question whether an injury arises out of and in the course of the
employment, however, is one dependent upon the facts of each case, and in
some cases, where an injury occured while the employee was going to or from
work, but was in the street in front of the employer's premises, it has been held
compensable.
Thus, in the reported case (Barnett v. Brtiling Cafeteria Co., ante, 85) the injury
was held to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment, where the
employee slipped on ice on the sidewalk immediately in front of the employer's
place of business, while on her way to report for duty, and just before entering
by the only entrance to her place of employment. The court here recognized the
general rule that, if an employee is injured while going to or from his work to his
house, or to or from some point not visited for the discharge of a duty arising out
of the employment, or while in the use of a public highway, he does not come
within the protection of the Workmen's Compensation Act, but stated that there
is an exception to this rule and that the employment is not limited by the actual
time when the workman reaches the scene of his labor and begins it, or when
he ceases, but includes a reasonable time and opportunity before and after,
while he is at or near his place of employment. The court reasoned that in the
case at bar, although the employee had not entered the employer's place of
business, and the sidewalk was a public highway so much therefore as was in
front of the employer's place of business was a necessary adjunct, used in
connection with the business, and that the sidewalk was to a limited degree and
purpose a part of the employer's premises.
In Industrial Commission v. Barber (1927) 117 Ohio St 373, 159 NE 363, the
injury was held to have arisen in the course of the employment where an
employee, about five minutes before the hour when he was to go on duty, was
struck by an automobile owned and driven by another employee, within a short
distance from the employer's plant, which was located at the dead end of a
street maintained by the employer from its plant to the intersection with another
street, and, although the street was a public one, it led nowhere except to the
employer's plant, and all of its employees were obliged to use it in going to and
from their work. The court stated that where the conditions under the control of
an industrial plant are such that the employee has no option but to pursue a
given course with reference to such conditions and environments, the
pursuance of such course is an implied obligation of the employer in his contract
with such employee, and that when he, for the purpose of entering his
employment, has entered into the sphere or zone controlled by his employer
and is pursuing a course with reference to which he has no option, he is then
not only within the conditions and environments of the plant of his employer, but
is then in the course of his employment; and that, when he receives an injury
attributable to such conditions and environments, there is a direct causal
connection between his employment and his injury, and the injury falls within the
class of industrial injuries for which compensation has been provided by the
Workmen's Compensation Law.
99 C.J.S., at pp. 807-814, has this to say:
It is laid down as a general rule, known as the "going and coming" rule, that, in
the absence of special circumstances, and except in certain unusual
circumstances, and where nothing else appears, harm or injury sustained by an
employee while going to or from his work is not compensable. Such injury, or
accident, is regarded by the weight of authority of many courts as not arising out
of his employment, and as not being, or not occurring, in the course thereof.
However, this rule is not inflexible, is not of inevitable application, and is subject
to qualifications, and to exceptions which depend on the nature, circumstances,
and conditions of the particular employment, the circumstances of the particular
case, and the cause of the injury.
Jaynes vs. Potlach Forests11 expresses with enlightening clarity the rationale for extending
the scope of "course of employment" to certain "off-premises" injuries:
We are urged here to again recognize and apply the distinction between off-
premises injuries which occur on private property and those which occur on
public streets and highways. The extension of the course of employment to off-
premises injuries is not based upon the principle which would justify a distinction
upon the narrow ground of private and public property; it is not sound to say that
while an employee is on public highway he is always there as a member of the
public and in nowise in the exercise of any right conferred by his contract to
employment; nor is it a complete answer to say that while he is on his
employer's premises his presence there is by contract right, otherwise he would
be a trespasser. The question of whether or not one is a covered employee
should not be resolved by the application of the law relating to rights to enter
upon lands, or by law of trespass, licensee, invitee or otherwise.
A substantial and fair ground to justify the extension of the course of
employment beyond the premises of the employer is to extend its scope to the
 necessary risks and hazards associated with the employment. These risks may
or may not be on the premises of the employer and for this reason there is no
justification to distinguish between extended risks on public highways and
private pathways. In fact it is at most a distinction without a difference. Under
the better reasoned cases the technical status as public or private is obviously
of no moment or in any event in and of itself is not conclusive.
Likewise enlightening is the following explanation of the premises rule exceptions:
We have, then a workable explanation of the exception to the premises rule: it is
not nearness, or reasonable distance, or even the identifying or surrounding
areas with the premises; it is simply that, when a court has satisfied itself that
there is a distinct "arising out of" or causal connection between the conditions
under which claimant must approach and leave the premises and the
occurrence of the injury, it may hold that the course of employment extends as
far as those conditions extend. (Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, 1965
ed., vol. 1, pp. 210-211)
We now direct our attention to the cause of the employee's death: assault.
An "assault," although resulting from a deliberate act of the slayer, is considered an
"accident" within the meaning of sec. 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, since the
word "accident" is intended to indicate that "the act causing the injury shall be casual or
unforeseen, an act for which the injured party is not legally responsible." 12
In the cases where the assault was proven to have been work-connected, compensation
was awarded. In Nava, supra, the helmsman of a boat was engaged in hauling the ship's
cable and in coiling the cable partly occupied by a folding bed of one of the passengers.
This passenger, upon being asked, declared his ownership of the bed. Nava expressed
his intention of pushing it out of the way and proceeded to do so. Angered by this, the
passenger exchanged hot words with Nava, and then, with a piece of wood, jabbed Nava
at the pit of the stomach. At this point, the passenger's brother ran up to Nava and
stabbed him to death. The death was adjudged compensable.
In Bohol Land Transportation Co. vs. Vda. de Mandaguit,13 the truck which Mandaguit was
driving collided with a cyclist going in the opposite direction. The latter turned around and
immediately pursued the bus. He overtook it a few minutes later when it stopped to take
on passengers. The driver then disembarked from the bus to wash his hands at a
drugstore nearby. The cyclist followed him there and knifed him to death. We affirmed the
grant of compensation upon the finding that the death arose out of and in the course of
employment.
In Galicia vs. Dy Pac,14 the employee, Pablo Carla, was asked to work in lieu of another
employee who had been suspended from work upon request of his labor union; while
Carla was working, the suspended employee asked him to intercede for him, but Carla
refused; an altercation resulted; shortly thereafter the suspended employee stabbed Carla
to death. The death was held compensable because "the injury sustained by the deceased
was caused by an accident arising out of his employment since the evidence is clear that
the fight which resulted in the killing of the deceased had its origin or cause in the fact that
he was placed in the job previously occupied by the assailant."
In the three cases above-cited, there was evidence as to the motive of the assailant.
In A. P. Santos, Inc. vs. Dabacol,15 the death of an employee-driver who, while driving a
cab, was killed by an unidentified passenger, was held compensable by the Commission.
However, the question of whether the assault arose out of the employment, was not raised
on appeal to this Court.
In Batangas Transportation Company vs. Vda. de Rivera,16 that question was raised.
While the employee-driver was driving a bus, a passenger boarded it and sat directly
behind the driver. After about thirty minutes, during which the passenger and the driver
never so much as exchanged a word, the passenger shot the driver to death and then
fled. There was no competent proof as to the cause of the assault, although there were
intimations that the incident arose from a personal grudge. The majority decision17 ruled
the death compensable. The bases: (1) Once it is proved that the employee died in the
course of the employment, the legal presumption, in the absence of substantial evidence
to the contrary, is that the claim "comes within the provisions of the compensation law"
(sec. 43), in other words, that the incident arose out of the workman's employment. (2)
Doubts as to rights to compensation are resolved in favor of the employee and his
dependents. (3) The Commissioner's declaration on the work-connection might be binding
on the Court. (4) There are employments which increase the risk of assault on the person
of the employee and it is in that sense that an injury or harm sustained by the assaulted
worker arises out of the employment, because the increased risk to assault supplies the
link or connection between the injury and the employment. Among the jobs enumerated as
increasing the risk of assault are (a) jobs having to do with keeping the peace or guarding
property; (b) jobs having to do with keeping or carrying of money which subject to the
employee to the risk of assault because of the increased temptation to robbery; (c) jobs
which expose the employee to direct contact with lawless and irresponsible members of
the community, like that of a bartender; and (d) work as bus driver, taxi driver or street car
conductor.
It has been said that an employment may either increase risk of assault because of its
nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault. The first kind of
employment, the so-called "increased risk" jobs comprehend (1) jobs involving dangerous
duties, such as that of guarding the employer's property, that of carrying or keeping
money, that where the employee is exposed to lawless or irresponsible members of the
public, or that which subjects him to increased or indiscriminate contact with the public,
such as the job of a street car conductor or taxi-driver;18 (2) jobs where the employee is
placed in a dangerous environment;19 and (3) jobs of employees whose work takes them
on the highway. On the other hand, the employment itself may be the subject-matter of a
dispute leading to the assault as where a supervisor is assaulted by workmen he has fired,
or where the argument was over the performance of work or possession of tools or the
like, or where the violence was due to labor disputes.20
In Rivera, supra, the unexplained assault on the employee was considered to
have arisen out of the employment because it occurred in the course of employment. This
Court relied on the presumption of law that in any proceeding for the enforcement of a
claim, the claim is presumed to come within the provisions of the Act. 21 According to this
Court, "this statutory presumption was copied from New York." Concerning the
corresponding New York provision of law, Larson has this to say:
 In a few jurisdictions, notably New York and Massachusetts, a statutory
presumption in favor of coverage has figured in unexplained-accident cases.
The Massachusetts statute provides:
In any claim for compensation, where the employee has been killed,
or is physically or mentally unable to testify, it shall be presumed, in
the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the claim
comes within the provisions of this chapter, that sufficient notice of the
injury has been given, and that the injury or death was not occasioned
by the wilful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or
another.
This provision was largely copied from the New York section on presumptions,
except that the New York act creates the presumption in all cases, not merely
those involving an employee's death or inability to testify.
The sweeping inclusiveness of this language might seem at first glance to mean
that the mere making of a claim is also the making of a prima facie case, as long
as death or injury is shown to have occurred. The New York and Massachusetts
courts have not so interpreted these statutes, however. It seems to be
necessary to establish some kind of preliminary link with the employment before
the presumption can attach. Otherwise, the claimant widow would have merely
to say, "My husband, who was one of your employee, has died, and I therefore
claim death benefits," whereupon the affirmative burden would devolve upon the
employer to prove that there was no connection between the death and the
environment.
It is not yet entirely clear what initial demonstration of employment-connection
will give the presumption a foothold. Apparently, the idea is to rule out cases in
which claimant can show neither that the injury occurred in the course of
employment nor that it arose out of it, as where he contracted a disease but has
no evidence to show where he got it. If there is evidence that the injury occurred
in the course of employment, the presumption will usually supply the "arising-
out-of-employment" factor." Larson's Workmen Compensation Law (1965) vol.
1, pp. 123-124.
We also quote from the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York in Daus vs.
Gunderman & Sons:22
The statute is not intended to relieve completely an employee from the burden
of showing that accidental injuries suffered by him actually were sustained in the
course of his employment. "It is not the law that mere proof of an accident,
without other evidence, creates the presumption under section 21 of the
Workmen's Compensation Law (Consol. Law, c. 67) that the accident arose out
of and in the course of the employment. On the contrary, it has been frequently
held, directly and indirectly, that there must be some evidence from which the
conclusion can be drawn that the injuries did arise out of and in the course of
the employment." Proof of the accident will give rise to the statutory presumption
only where some connection appears between the accident and the
employment.
Likewise of relevance is the following treatise:
The discussion of the coverage formula, "arising out of and in the course of
employment," was opened with the suggestion that, while "course" and "arising"
were put under separate headings for convenience, some interplay between the
two factors should be observed in the various categories discussed.
A few examples may now be reviewed to show that the two tests, in practice,
have not been kept in air-tight compartments, but have to some extent merged
into a single concept of work-connection. One is almost tempted to formulate a
sort of quantum theory of work-connection: that a certain minimum quantum of
work-connection must be shown, and if the "course" quantity is very small, but
the "arising" quantity is large, the quantum will add up to the necessary
minimum, as it will also when the "arising" quantity is very small but the "course"
quantity is relatively large.
But if both the "course" and "arising" quantities are small, the minimum quantum
will not be met.
As an example of the first, a strong "arising" factor but weak "course" factor, one
may cite the cases in which recoveries have been allowed off the employment
premises, outside business hours, when an employee going to or coming from
work is injured by a hazard distinctly traceable to the employment, such as a
traffic jam overflowing from the employment premises, or a rock flying through
the air from a blast on the premises. Here, by normal course of employment
standards, there would be no award, since the employee was not on the
premises while coming or going. Yet the unmistakable character of the causal
relation of the injury to the employment has been sufficient to make up for the
weakness of the "course" factor. Another example of the same kind of
balancing-out is seen in the line of cases dealing with injury to travelling men or
loggers while sleeping in hotels or bunkhouses. It was shown in the analysis of
these cases that, although the "course" factor is on the borderline when the
employee is sound asleep at the time of injury, a strong causal relation of the
injury to the conditions of employment as where a fellow-logger runs amok,
or a straw falls into the bunkhouse-inmate's throat from the mattress above, or
the employee is trapped in a burning hotel will boost the case over the line to
success; while a weak causal connection, as where the salesman merely slips
in a hotel bath, coupled with a weak "course" factor due to the absence of any
direct service performed for the employer at the time, will under present
decisions add up to a quantum of work-connection too small to support an
award. It was also shown that when the "course" element is strengthened by the
fact that the employee is at all times on call, the range of compensable sources
of injury is broader than when the employee, although living on the premises is
not on call.
A somewhat similar balancing-out process is seen in the holding that a
borderline course-of-employment activity like seeking personal comfort or going
to and from work falls short of compensability if the method adopted is unusual,
unreasonable and dangerous, while no such restriction applies to the direct
performance of the work.
As an example of the reverse situation, a strong "course" element and a weak
"arising" element; one may recall the "positional" cases discussed in section 10,
as well as the unexplained-fall and other "neutral-cause" cases. Here the course
of employment test is satisfied beyond the slightest doubt: the employee is in
the midst of performing the active duties of his job. But the causal connection is
very weak, since the source of the injury whether a stray bullet, a wandering
lunatic, and unexplained fall or death, or a mistaken assault by a stranger is
not distinctly associated with employment conditions as such, and is tied to the
employment only by the argument that the injury would not have occurred to this
employee but for the obligation of the employment which placed him in the
position to be hurt. Yet, since the "course" element is so strong, awards are
becoming increasingly common on these facts.
Incidentally, it may be observed that this "quantum" idea forms a useful
yardstick for measuring just how generous a court has become in expanding
compensation coverage; for if a court makes an award when a case, by the
above standards, is weak both on course of employment and on causal
connection, one can conclude that the court is capable of giving the act a broad
construction. Thus, an award was made in Puffin v. General Electric, where the
course element was weak (rest period) and the causal element was weak
(setting fire to own sweater while smoking). Both factors were likewise very
weak in O'Leary v. Brown Pacific-Maxon Inc., where the course of employment
consisted of a recreation period interrupted by a rescue of a stranger, and the
arising factor consisted of drowning in a channel where decedent was prohibited
from going. And, in Martin v. Plaut, the course of employment factor was weak
(a cook dressing in the morning) and the causal factor was also weak (an
unexplained fall); yet an award was made in New York.
But another New York case shows that the simultaneous weakness of course
and arising factors may reach the point where the requisite quantum is not
found. In Shultz v. Nation Associates, compensation was denied to an employee
who while combing her hair preparatory to going to lunch negligently struck her
eye with the comb. Here we see thinness on all fronts: as to course of
employment time factor, we have a lunch period; as to the course of
employment activity factor, we have care of personal appearance; and as to the
causal factor, we have negligence of the employee. Each weakness standing
alone lunch period, care of appearance, negligence would not be fatal;
there are many awards in which one or another of these is present. But when all
are present, while an award is not impossible and could be defended on a point
by point basis, it cannot be relied upon in most jurisdictions by the prudent
lawyer. Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law1965 ed. Vol. 1, pp. 452.97 to
452.100.
In resume:
1. Workmen's compensation is granted if the injuries result from an accident
which arise out of and in the course of employment.
2. Both the "arising" factor and the "course" factor must be present. If one factor
is weak and the other is strong, the injury is compensable, but not where both
factors are weak. Ultimately, the question is whether the accident is work-
connected.
3. In a proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the same is presumed to
come within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. But a
preliminary link must first be shown to exist between the injury and the
employment. Thus if the injury occurred in the course of employment, it is
presumed to have arisen out of the employment.
4. The "course" factor applies to time, place and circumstances. This factor is
present if the injury takes place within the period of employment, at a place
where the employee may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in
doing something incidental thereto.
5. The rule is that an injury sustained while the employee goes to or comes from
his place of work, is not of the employment.
6. The exception to the rule is an injury sustained off the employee's premises,
but while in close proximity thereto and while using a customary means of
ingress and egress. The reason for extending the scope of "course of
employment" to off-premises injuries is that there is a causal connection
between the work and the hazard.
7. An "assault" may be considered an "accident" within the meaning of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. The employment may either increase risk of
assault because of its nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the
assault.
From the milestones, we now proceed to take our bearings in the case at bar, having in
mind always that no cover-all formula can be spelled out with specificity, that the particular
facts and circumstances of each case must be inquired into, and that in any perceptive
inquiry, the question as to where the line should be drawn beyond which the liability of the
employer cannot continue has been held to be usually one of fact.
We shall first dwell on the question of ownership of the private road where Pablo was
killed. In granting compensation, the Commission said that "the road where the deceased
was shot was of private ownership, was called the IDECO road, and led straight to the
main IDECO gate, thus raising the reasonable assumption that it belonged" to the IDECO.
The Commission reasoned out that "even if the ownership of the road were open to
question, there was no doubt that its private character was obviously exploited by the
respondent for the purpose of its own business to such an extent as to make it to all
intents and purposes an extension of its premises," so that the "shooting of the deceased
may be considered to have taken place on the premises, and therefore within the
employment;" and that "while respondent allowed its name to be used in connection with
the private road for the ingress and egress of the employees it did not apparently take the
necessary precaution to make it safe for its employees by employing security guards."
But the IDECO denies ownership of the road. In its memorandum filed with the Regional
Office, IDECO averred that Pablo's death did not originate from his work as to time, place
and circumstances. This, in effect, is a denial of ownership of the road. The decision of the
Regional Office does not state that the road belongs to the IDECO. All that it says is that
Pablo was shot "barely two minutes after he was dismissed from work and while walking
along the IDECO road about twenty (20) meters from the gate." In its "motion for
reconsideration and/or review," the IDECO emphasized that "the place where the incident
happened was a public road, not less than twenty (20) meters away from the main gate of
the compound, and therefore not proximate to or in the immediate vicinity of the place of
work." Again, the ownership of the road was implicitly denied. And in its "motion for
reconsideration and/or appeal to the Commission en banc," the IDECO alleged outright
that the "road where the incident took place, although of private ownership, does not
belong to IDECO. There is absolutely no evidence on record that shows IDECO owns the
road." If the road were owned by the IDECO, there would have been no question that the
assault arose "in the course of employment."23 But if it did indeed own the road, then the
IDECO would have fenced it, and place its main gate at the other end of the road where it
meets the public highway.
But while the IDECO does not own the private road, it cannot be denied that it was using
the same as the principal means of ingress and egress. The private road leads directly to
its main gate.24 Its right to use the road must then perforce proceed from either an
easement of right of way or a lease. Its right, therefore, is either a legal one or a
contractual one. In either case the IDECO should logically and properly be charged with
security control of the road. The IDECO owed its employees a safe passage to its
premises. In compliance with such duty, the IDECO should have seen to it not only that
road was properly paved and did not have holes or ditches, but should also have instituted
measures for the proper policing of the immediate area. The point where Pablo was shot
was barely twenty meters away from the main IDECO gate, certainly nearer than a stone's
throw therefrom. The spot is immediately proximate to the IDECO's premises. Considering
this fact, and the further facts that Pablo had just finished overtime work at the time, and
was killed barely two minutes after dismissal from work, the Ampil case is squarely
applicable here. We may say, as we did in Ampil, that the place where the employee was
injured being "immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident in question must
be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his employment and therefore arose out of
and in the course thereof." Our principal question is whether the injury was sustained in
the course of employment. We find that it was, and so conclude that the assault arose out
of the employment, even though the said assault is unexplained.
American jurisprudence supports this view.
In Bountiful Brick Company vs. Giles,25 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled:
Employment includes both only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable
margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place
where the work is to be done. If the employee to be injured while passing, with
the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way
over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and
relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is
one arising out of and in the course of employment as much as though it had
happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its
performance. In other words, the employment may begin in point of time before
the work is entered upon and in point of space before the place where the work
is to be done is reached. Probably, as a general rule, employment may be said
to begin when the employee reaches the entrance to the employer's premises
where the work is to be done; but it is clear that in some cases the rule extends
to include adjacent premises used by the employee as a means of ingress and
egress with the express or implied consent of the employer.
The above ruling is on all fours with our facts. Two minutes from dismissal and twenty
meters from the main IDECO gate are "a reasonable margin of time and space necessary
to be used in passing to and from" the IDECO's premises. The IDECO employees used
the private road with its consent, express or implied. Twenty meters on that road from the
main gate is in close proximity to the IDECO's premises. It follows that Pablo's death was
in the course of employment.
In Carter vs. Lanzetta,26 it was held that "such statutes envision extension of coverage to
employees from the time they reach the employer's premises until they depart therefrom
and that hours of service include a period when this might be accomplished within a
reasonable interval;" and that "under exceptional circumstances, a continuance of the
course of employment may be extended by allowing the employee a reasonable time not
only to enter or leave the premises but also to surmount certain hazards adjacent thereto."
The private road led directly to the main IDECO gate. From this description, it would
appear that the road is a dead-end street. In Singer vs. Rich Marine Sales,27 it was held
that, where the employee, while returning to work at the end of the lunch period, fell at the
curb of the sidewalk immediately adjacent to the employer's premises and one other
located thereon, and the general public used the street only in connection with those
premises, and the employer actually stored boats on the sidewalk, the sidewalk was within
the precincts of employment. In that case there were even two business establishments
on the dead-end street. Here, it is exclusively the IDECO premises which appear to be at
the end of the private road.
We find in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation28 a meaningful statement of the obligation of the
employer to its employees: "That the employer owes, so to speak, a duty of 'safe passage'
to an employee to the point where he can reach the proper arrival or departure from his
work seems without question."
We next quote extensively from Kelty vs. Travellers Insurance Company:29
The rule has been repeatedly announced in Texas that an injury received by an
employee while using the public streets and highways in going to or returning
from the place of employment is not compensable, the rationale of the rule
being that in most instances such an injury is suffered as a consequence of risk
and hazards to which all members of the travelling public are subject rather than
risk and hazards having to do with and originating in the work or business of the
employer....
Another exception, however, which is applicable is found in the so-called
"access" cases. In these cases a workman who has been injured at a plane
intended by the employer for use as a means of ingress or egress to and from
the actual place of the employee's work has been held to be in the course of his
employment. The courts have said that these access areas are so closely
related to the employer's premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the
employer's premises. We shall discuss the principal authorities dealing with this
exception to the general rule.
The leading cases in Texas dealing with the "access" exception, and one which
we think is controlling of this appeal, is Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v.
Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72, 28 A.L.R. 1402. In that case the
employee was employed by Hartburg Lumber Company, which company
operated and owned a sawmill in Hartburg, Texas, which was a lumber town,
consisting solely of the employer's facilities. A railroad track ran through the
town and a part of the lumber company's facilities was situated on either side of
the right-of-way. A public road ran parallel to the railroad tracks which led to the
various buildings on the property of the lumber company. This crossing was
used by any member of the public desiring to go to any part of the lumber
company facilities. On the day in question the decedent quit work at noon, went
home for lunch and while returning to the lumber company plant for the purpose
of resuming his employment, was struck and killed by a train at the crossing in
question. The insurance company contended (as it does here) that the
decedent's death did not originate in the work or business of his employer and
that at the time of his fatal injuries he was not in or about the furtherance of the
affairs or business of his employer. The Supreme Court, in an extensive opinion,
reviewed the authorities from other states and especially Latter's Case 238
Mass. 326, 130 N. E. 637, 638, and arrived at the conclusion that the injury and
death under such circumstances were compensable under the Texas Act. The
court held that the railroad crossing bore so intimate a relation to the lumber
company's premises that it could hardly be treated otherwise than as a part of
the premises. The Court pointed out that the lumber company had rights in and
to the crossing which was used in connection with the lumber company's
business, whether by employees or by members of the public. In announcing
the "access" doctrine Justice Greenwood said:
Was Behnken engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or
business of his employer when he received the injury causing his
death? He was upon the crossing provided as the means of access to
his work solely because he was an employee. He encountered the
dangers incident to use of the crossing in order that he might perform
the duties imposed by his contract of service. Without subjecting
himself to such dangers he could not do what was required of him in
the conduct of the lumber company's business. He had reached a
place provided and used only as an adjunct to that business, and was
injured from a risk created by the conditions under which the business
was carried on. To hold that he was not acting in furtherance of the
affairs or business of the lumber company would be to give a strict
interpretation to this remedial statute, which should be liberally
construed with a view to accomplish its purpose and to promote
justice.
xxx xxx xxx
In Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Anderson, Tex. Civ. App., 125 S. W. 2d 674,
wr. ref., this court followed the rule announced in Behnken, supra. In that case
the employee was killed while crossing the railroad track near his place of
employment. In discussing the question of the situs of the injury Justice Looney
said:
Its use as a means of ingress to and exit from his place of work not
only conduced his safety and convenience, but contributed to the
promptness and efficiency with which he was enabled to discharge
the duties owing his employer; hence the reason and necessity for his
presence upon the railroad track (that portion of the pathway leading
over the railroad right of way) when injured, in our opinion, had to do
with, originated in and grew out of the work of the employer; and that,
the injury received at the time, place and under the circumstances,
necessarily was in furtherance of the affairs or business of the
employer.
Again, in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Boecker, Tex. Civ. App. 53 S. W. 2d
327, err. ref., this court had occasion to follow the "access" doctrine. In that case
Chief Justice Jones quoted from the Supreme Court of the United States in the
case of Bountiful Brisk Company, et al. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 48 S. Ct. 221, 72
L. Ed. 507, 66 A. L. R. 1402, as follows:
An employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a
reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing
to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee
be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the
employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises,
or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in
practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one
arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though
it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the
place of its performance. In other words, the employment may begin
in point of time before the work is entered upon and in point of space
before the place where the work is to be done is reached.
The ruling enunciated above is applicable in the case at bar. That part of the road where
Pablo was killed is in very close proximity to the employer's premises. It is an "access
area" "so clearly related to the employer's premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the
employer's premises." That portion of the road bears "so intimate a relation" to the
company's premises. It is the chief means of entering the IDECO premises, either for the
public or for its employees. The IDECO uses it extensively in pursuit of its business. It has
rights of passage over the road, either legal, if by virtue of easement, or contractual, if by
reason of lease. Pablo was using the road as a means of access to his work solely
because he was an employee. For this reason, the IDECO was under obligation to keep
the place safe for its employees. Safe, that is, against dangers that the employees might
encounter therein, one of these dangers being assault by third persons. Having failed to
take the proper security measures over the said area which it controls, the IDECO is liable
for the injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in his death.
As therefore stated, the assault on Pablo is unexplained. The murderer was himself killed
before he could be brought to trial. It is true there is authority for the statement that before
the "proximity" rule may be applied it must first be shown that there is a causal connection
between the employment and the hazard which resulted in the injury. 30 The following more Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando and Capistrano,
modern view was expressed in Lewis Wood Preserving Company vs. Jones:31 JJ., concur.

While some earlier cases seem to indicate that the causative danger must be
peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood for the injuries to
arise out of and in the course of the employment (see Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Peek, 36 Ga. App. 557 [137 S.E. 121]; Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v.
Cox, 61 Ga. App. 420, 6 S.E. 2d 189), later cases have been somewhat more
liberal, saying that, "to be compensable, injuries do not have to arise from
something peculiar to the employment." Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v.
Bardon, 79 Ga. App. 260, 262, 54 S.E. 2d 443, 444. "Where the duties of an
employee entail his presence (at a place and a time) the claim for an injury there
occurring is not to be barred because it results from a risk common to all others
... unless it is also common to the general public without regard to such
conditions, and independently of place, employment, or pursuit." New
Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 118 S.E. 786, cited in
Globe Indemnity Co. v. MacKendree, 39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S.E. 46, 47; McKiney
v. Reynolds & Manley Lumber Co., 79 Ga. App. 826, 829, 54 S.E. 2d 471, 473.

But even without the foregoing pronouncement, the employer should still be held liable in
view of our conclusion that that portion of the road where Pablo was killed, because of its
proximity, should be considered part of the IDECO's premises. Hence, the injury was in
the course of employment, and there automatically arises the presumption invoked
in Rivera that the injury by assault arose out of the employment, i. e., there is a causal
relation between the assault and the employment.

We do say here that the circumstances of time, two minutes after dismissal from overtime
work, and space, twenty meters from the employer's main gate, bring Pablo's death within
the scope of the course factor. But it may logically be asked: Suppose it were three
minutes after and thirty meters from, or five minutes after and fifty meters from, would the
"proximity" rule still apply? In answer, we need but quote that portion of the decision
in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation, supra, which answered a question arising from an
ingenious hypothetical question put forth by the defendant therein:

We could, of course, say "this is not the case before us" and utilize the old saw,
"that which is not before us we do not decide." Instead, we prefer to utilize the
considerably older law: "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof" (Matthew
1:34), appending, however, this admonition: no statute is static; it must remain
constantly viable to meet new challenges placed to it. Recovery in a proper case
should not be suppressed because of a conjectural posture which may never
arise and which if it does, will be decided in the light of then existing law.

Since the Workmen's Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed to afford
relief to workmen, it must be liberally construed to attain the purpose for which it was
enacted.32 Liberally construed, sec. 2 of the Act comprehends Pablo's death. The
Commission did not err in granting compensation.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed, at petitioner's cost.

G.R. No. L-46046 April 5, 1985
EMELITA ENAO, petitioner,
vs.
THE EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent.
Vivencio M. Carpio, Jr. for petitioner.
Jose G. De Vera for respondent ECC.
ALAMPAY, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission
(E.C.C.), dated October 26, 1976, affirming the decision of the Government Service
Insurance System, denying petitioner's claim for Compensation of income benefits due to
the injuries sustained by her when on August 1, 1975, while on her way to Dipolog City for
the purpose of purchasing supplies and other training and school aids for her office, she,
together with others, were ambushed by unidentified men believed to be communist
insurgents.
The antecedent facts of this case are not disputed and are well stated in the appealed
decision rendered by the Employees' Compensation Commission, subject of the petition in
this case.
... On August 1, 1975, appellant (Emelita Enao), a Public School
Teacher, together with others, was on her way from her official station
at Sergio Osmena, Sr., Zamboanga del Norte to Dipolog City.
According to the Acting Administrative Officer of her employer,
'Having held classes on July 26, in lieu of August 1, 1975, as per
District Memorandum hereto attached, Miss Enao was on her way
home from station when their group was ambushed and fired upon by
armed men hitting her on her forearm and abdomen necessitating
operation' (Part II, Income Benefits Claim for Payment), and according
to appellant's witnesses, who were members of the ambushed party,
she was on her way to Dipolog City for the purpose of 'securing
supplies and other training and school aids necessary for furthering
(our) services as a school teacher' (Affidavits of Francisco L. Podol
and Juanita Adanza, respectively). When the appellant and her group
were at barrio de Venta Perla, Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte, they
were fired upon by a band of armed men believed to be communist
insurgents. As a result of the ambush, the appellant sustained
gunshot wounds on her left forearm and abdomen which compelled
her confinement at the Zamboanga del Norte Provincial Hospital from
August 1 to 6, 1975, for surgical removal of foreign bodies (shrapnel)
from her left arm and later at the Dipolog Medical Center from
September 10 to 12, 1975 for definitive treatment. She also
developed interstitial pneumonia as a result. (Decision of the
Employees' Compensation Commission, Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 8-9).
On August 5, 1975, petitioner sent a notice of claim of injury to the Secretary of Education
and Culture, through the Division Superintendent of Schools, Zamboanga City. It is said
that this claim was not controverted.
On the same date, a claim for income benefits for disability was filed by the herein
petitioner with the Government Service Insurance System but this claim was denied by the
System in its letter-decision, dated February 27, 1976, on its reasoning that:
It appears that on your way to Dipolog City for the purpose of
purchasing your needs, you were ambushed by unidentified men
believed to be NPAS. Though this happened on August 1, 1975, a
regular working day, this was considered your off day, having held
classes in its stead on July 26, 1975, a Saturday, per District
Memorandum No. 1, s. 1975, dated June 2, 1975. Under such
situation, for purposes of the Employees' Compensation, said
accident happened outside your time and place of work, not to
mention the fact that you were not in the performance of your official
functions when it happened.
In view of the foregoing, your claim is hereby denied. (Annex "A",
Rollo, p. 7)
Not satisfied with the above ruling of the GSIS and upon denial of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration thereof, the latter appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission.
On October 26, 1976, the ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS appealed from and
dismissed the Petitioner's claim, on the grounds that:
... First. the day when the accident occurred, more particularly August
1, 1975, was an off-day. Perusal of the District Memorandum No. 1,
series of 1975 and dated June 2, 1975, win show that August 1, 1975,
is not just an isolated off-day, but one of those dates fixed and set in
lieu of Saturday. Hence, the injury was incurred not during office
hours. Second, appellant incurred injury while en route to Dipolog
City; more aptly put, while outside t-he school premises where she
normally discharges her official functions. The sworn statement of the
Acting Administrative Officer and the appellant's witness all point to
the same circumstance. Third, while appellant's witnesses testified in
an affidavit that appellant left her official station for Dipolog City on the
day in question for the purpose of procurring school supplies and
training aids to enhance her teaching efficiency, we find the version of
the Acting Administrative Officer more credible-that is, the appellant
was on her way home from station-for there is nothing which indicates
that it is false, misleading or fabricated. On the other hand, the
preponderance of legal opinion holds that affidavits, as those of
appellant's witnesses, are only prima facie evidence of weak
probative force and are in themselves self-serving declarations where
the same have been made in anticipation of a future litigation. It has
 been said that 'perhaps the most subtle and prolific of au the fallacies
of testimony arises out of unconscious partisanship.' In the case at
bar, upon the happening of the accident, the companions of the
appellant perhaps still sympathetic to her for what befall her, and
testifying in an affidavit, are apt to side with her. (Annex "B", Rollo, pp.
9-10)
In the petition for review presented to this Court, Petitioner contends that the Respondent
ECC has decided the claim in a way not in accordance with law and applicable decision of
the Supreme Court.
At the time of the incident in question, the pertinent and governing provisions of law are to
be found in Section 1, Rule 11, of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation,
which provides:
SECTION 1. Grounds.(a) For the injury and the resulting disability
or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an
employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions:
(1) The employee must have sustained the injury during his working
hours;
(2) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work
requires him to be; and
(3) The employee must have been performing his official function.
The Petitioner, in proceeding to Dipolog City on August 1, 1975, which is a Friday, from
her station at the Municipality of Sergio Osmena, Sr., Zamboanga del Norte, intended to
procure supplies and other training aids which are needed facilities in connection with her
services as a school teacher at the Wilbon Primary School, cannot be at all disputed. The
companions of the Petitioner at the time of the ambush and who appear to be co-teachers
of the Petitioner, namely: Francisco L. Podol and Juanita Adanza, have attested in their
respective affidavits that they and the Petitioner were at that time on their way to Dipolog
City "for the purpose of securing supplies and other training and school aids necessary for
the furtherance of their services as school teachers." There is no mention at an in the
decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission that this particular assertion has
been at all contradicted or controverted by any evidence whatsoever submitted to the
Commission by the GSIS.
We find no basis at an for the findings made by the Employees' Compensation
Commission in its decision that the statements of Petitioner and her witnesses are merely
self-serving declarations because We can discern no circumstance that would indicate or
support such a conclusion. As a matter of fact, the decision appealed from accepts the
fact that the statements given by Petitioner-Appellant's witnesses constitute prima facie
evidence of the matter sought to be established. Uncontroverted and unrefuted by any
evidence, then such statements of appellant's witnesses would suffice to establish that the
multiple gunshot wounds and injuries sustained by appellant and which caused her
confinement at the Zamboanga del Norte Provincial Hospital from August 1 to 6, 1975 for
removal of shrapnels from her left arm and later at the Dipolog Medical Center from
September 1 to 12, 1975, are definitely work-connected.
The conjecture expressed in the decision of the ECC that appellant obtained the referred
self-serving declaration of her witnesses "in anticipation of a future litigation" is unfair and
untenable. Petitioner could not have even expected that respondent GSIS would resist her
claim. Notice of the same claim for the injuries she sustained is said to have been
presented to the Secretary of Education and Culture, through the Division Superintendent
of Schools, Division of Zamboanga del Norte at Dipolog City, promptly on August 5, 1975,
or four (4) days after the ambush incident and such claim was not controverted by said
public school officials. These submissions of Petitioner-Appellant have not at all been
contradicted by Respondent. No cause has, therefore, been shown why petitioner would
have been to obtain false affidavits from her co-teachers whose sense and probity and
righteousness must be presumed until otherwise disproved.
Furthermore, the fact that Dipolog City is also the residence of the Petitioner does not at
all, by this singular circumstance, render untrue or false the clear evidence submitted in
this case that Petitioner and her co-teachers were proceeding to Dipolog City at the time
to purchase needed supplies and other training and school aids. That Dipolog City
happened to be also the Petitioner's place of residence, in this instance, becomes simply
incidental and/or purely coincidental.
As it can be rightfully ruled that the Claimant-Petitioner was actually then performing her
official functions, it hardly matters then whether such task which Petitioner was then
engaged in or discharging, happened outside the regular working hours and not in the
Petitioner's place of work. It is rather obvious that in proceeding to purchase school
materials in Dipolog City, Petitioner would necessarily have to leave the school premises
and her travel need not be during her usual working hours. What is significant and
controlling is that the injuries she sustained are work-connected, which the Court finds to
be so.
The environmental facts in this case are even more compelling than the earlier case of
Vda. de Torbela vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, L-42627, February 21, 1980,
96 SCRA 260, where, by a significant majority vote of this Court, it was held that a claim
arising from a vehicular accident sustained by a school principal on his way from Bacolod
City where he lived to his school at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where he was the school
principal of, is compensable. It was therein ruled that "where an employee is accidentally
injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place of work, while she is going to and from
her work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of her
employment.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission appealed from
is hereby SET ASIDE, and the Government Service Insurance System is hereby ordered
to grant the Petitioner's claim for loss of income benefits and to process and ascertain the
total amount due herein Petitioner and thereafter to pay the same.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 90204 May 11, 1990 We agree with the decision of the system, hence we dismiss this
appeal. Postpartum septicemia is an acute infectious disease of the
puerperium resulting from the entrance into the blood of bacteria
MANUEL BELARMINO, petitioner,
usually streptococci and their toxins which cause dissolution of the
vs.
blood, degenerative changes in the organs and the symptoms of
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE
intoxication. The cause of this condition in the instant case was the
INSURANCE SYSTEM,respondents.
infected vaginal lacerations resulting from the decedent's delivery of
her child which took place at home. The alleged accident in school
could not have been the cause of septicemia, which in this case is
clearly caused by factors not inherent in employment or in the working
conditions of the deceased. (pp. 14-15,Rollo.)
GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

Hence, this petition for review.

This seven-year-old case involves a claim for benefits for the death of a lady school
teacher which the public respondents disallowed on the ground that the cause of death
was not work-connected.
Before her death on February 19, 1982, petitioner's wife, Oania Belarmino, was a
classroom teacher of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports assigned at the
Buracan Elementary School in Dimasalang, Masbate (p. 13, Rollo). She had been a
classroom teacher since October 18, 1971, or for eleven (11) years. Her husband, the
petitioner, is also a public school teacher.
After a careful consideration of the petition and the annexes thereof, as well as the
comments of the public respondents, we are persuaded that the public respondents'
peremptory denial of the petitioner's claim constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.
Rule III, Section 1 of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation enumerates the
grounds for compensability of injury resulting in disability or death of an employee, as
follows:

On January 14, 1982, at nine o'clock in the morning, while performing her duties as a Sec. 1. Grounds (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or
classroom teacher, Mrs. Belarmino who was in her 8th month of pregnancy, accidentally death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of
slipped and fell on the classroom floor. Moments later, she complained of abdominal pain an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions:
and stomach cramps. For several days, she continued to suffer from recurrent abdominal
pain and a feeling of heaviness in her stomach, but, heedless of the advice of her female
(1) The employee must have been injured at the
co-teachers to take a leave of absence, she continued to report to the school because
place where his work requires him to be;
there was much work to do. On January 25, 1982, eleven (11) days after her accident, she
went into labor and prematurely delivered a baby girl at home (p. 8, Rollo).
(2) The employee must have been performing his
official functions; and
Her abdominal pains persisted even after the delivery, accompanied by high fever and
headache. She was brought to the Alino Hospital in Dimasalang, Masbate on February 11,
1982. Dr. Alfonso Alino found that she was suffering from septicemia post partum due to (3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the
infected lacerations of the vagina. She was discharged from the hospital after five (5) days employee must have been executing an order for
on February 16, 1982, apparently recovered but she died three (3) days later. The cause the employer.
of death was septicemia post partum. She was 33 years old, survived by her husband and
four (4) children, the oldest of whom was 11 years old and the youngest, her newborn
(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be
infant (p. 9, Rollo).
compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational
disease listed under Annex "A" of these Rules with the conditions set
On April 21, 1983, a claim for death benefits was filed by her husband. On February 14, therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
1984, it was denied by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) which held that contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.
'septicemia post partum the cause of death, is not an occupational disease, and neither
was there any showing that aforesaid ailment was contracted by reason of her
(c) Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975
employment. . . . The alleged accident mentioned could not have precipitated the death of
and the resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these
the wife but rather the result of the infection of her lacerated wounds as a result of her
Rules.
delivery at home" (p. 14 Rollo).

The illness, septicemia post partum which resulted in the death of Oania Belarmino, is
On appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission, the latter issued Resolution No.
admittedly not listed as an occupational disease in her particular line of work as a
3913 dated July 8, 1988 holding:
classroom teacher. However, as pointed out in the petition, her death from that ailment is
compensable because an employment accident and the conditions of her employment
contributed to its development. The condition of the classroom floor caused Mrs.
Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as a result. The fall precipitated the onset of
recurrent abdominal pains which culminated in the premature termination of her
pregnancy with tragic consequences to her. Her fall on the classroom floor brought about
her premature delivery which caused the development of post partum septicemia which
resulted in death. Her fall therefore was the proximate or responsible cause that set in
motion an unbroken chain of events, leading to her demise.
There is no merit in the public respondents' argument that the cause of the decedent's
post partum septicemia "was the infected vaginal lacerations resulting from the decedent's
delivery of her child at home" for the incident in school could not have caused septicemia
post partum, . . . the necessary precautions to avoid infection during or after labor were
(not) taken" (p. 29, Rollo).
The argument is unconvincing. It overlooks the fact that septicemia post partum is a
disease of childbirth, and premature childbirth would not have occurred if she did not
accidentally fall in the classroom.

. . . what is termed in American cases the proximate cause, not

It is true that if she had delivered her baby under sterile conditions in a hospital operating
implying however, as might be inferred from the word itself, the
room instead of in the unsterile environment of her humble home, and if she had been
nearest in point of time or relation, but rather, [is] the efficient cause,
attended by specially trained doctors and nurses, she probably would not have suffered
which may be the most remote of an operative chain. It must be that
lacerations of the vagina and she probably would not have contracted the fatal infection.
which sets the others in motion and is to be distinguished from a mere
Furthermore, if she had remained longer than five (5) days in the hospital to complete the
preexisting condition upon which the effective cause operates, and
treatment of the infection, she probably would not have died. But who is to blame for her
must have been adequate to produce the resultant damage without
inability to afford a hospital delivery and the services of trained doctors and nurses? The
the intervention of an independent cause. (Atlantic Gulf vs. Insular
court may take judicial notice of the meager salaries that the Government pays its public
Government, 10 Phil. 166,171.)
school teachers. Forced to live on the margin of poverty, they are unable to afford
expensive hospital care, nor the services of trained doctors and nurses when they or
The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, members of their families are in. Penury compelled the deceased to scrimp by delivering
either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting her baby at home instead of in a hospital.
a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor the final event in the chain
The Government is not entirely blameless for her death for it is not entirely blameless for
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
her poverty. Government has yet to perform its declared policy "to free the people from
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of living, and
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and
improve the quality of life for all (Sec. 7, Art. II, 1973 Constitution and Sec. 9, Art. II, 1987
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
Constitution). Social justice for the lowly and underpaid public school teachers will only be
his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
an empty shibboleth until Government adopts measures to ameliorate their economic
therefrom. (Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181.)
condition and provides them with adequate medical care or the means to afford it.
"Compassion for the poor is an imperative of every humane society" (PLDT v. Bucay and
Thus in Enriquez v. WCC, 93 SCRA 366, 372, this Court ruled: NLRC, 164 SCRA 671, 673). By their denial of the petitioner's claim for benefits arising
from the death of his wife, the public respondents ignored this imperative of Government,
and thereby committed a grave abuse of discretion.
. . . Verily, the right to compensation extends to disability due to
disease supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting
from a compensable injury (82 Am. Jur. 132). Where the primary WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The respondents Employees
injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every Compensation Commission and the Government Service Insurance System are ordered
natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of to pay death benefits to the petitioner and/or the dependents of the late Oania Belarmino,
the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening with legal rate of interest from the filing of the claim until it is fully paid, plus attorney's fees
cause attributable to complainants own negligence or misconduct ( I equivalent to ten (10%) percent of the award, and costs of suit.
Larson Workmen's Compensation Law 3-279 [1972]). Simply stated,
all the medical consequences and sequels that flow from the primary
SO ORDERED.
injury are compensable. (Ibid.)

Mrs. Belarmino's fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of her employment as
a classroom teacher, hence, all the medical consequences flowing from it: her recurrent
abdominal pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her septicemia post partum and
death, are compensable.
 Jessie Fajardo, a co-worker of Jasmin, narrated that on June 21, 1998, Jasmin
BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER G.R. Nos. 182978-79 was found dead by a female cleaner lying on the floor inside her dormitory room with her
AND PROMOTION, INC., mouth foaming and smelling of poison.[3]
Petitioner, Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J.(Chairperson), Based on the police report and the medical report of the examining physician of
- versus - Carpio Morales,* the Al-Birk Hospital, who conducted an autopsy of Jasmins body, the likely cause of her
Chico-Nazario, death was poisoning. Thus:
Nachura, and
Peralta, JJ. According to letter No. 199, dated 27.2.1419H, issued by
SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA Al-Birk Police Station, for examining the corpse of Jasmin Cuaresma,
CUARESMA (for and in behalf of 12.20 P.M. 27.2.1419H, Sunday, at Al-Birk Hospital.
their daughter, Jasmin G. Cuaresma),
WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. 1. The Police Report on the Death
and JAIME ORTIZ (President, 2. The Medical Diagnosis
White Falcon Services, Inc.),
Respondents. Sex: Female Age: 25 years Relg: Christian

x ------------------------------------------------------ x The said person was brought to the Emergency Room of

the hospital; time 12.20 P.M. and she was unconscious,
SPOUSES SIMPLICIO and MILA G.R. Nos. 184298-99 blue, no pulse, no respiration and the first aid esd
CUARESMA (for and in behalf of undertaken but without success.
their daughter, Jasmin G. Cuaresma),
Petitioners, 3. Diagnosis and Opinion: Halt in blood circulation
respiratory system and brain damage due to
- versus - an apparent poisoning which is under investigation.[4]
WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. Promulgated:
and BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER Name: Jasmin Cuaresma
AND PROMOTION, INC., Sex: Female
Respondents. April 7, 2009 Marital Status: Single Nationality: Philipino (sic)
Religion: Christian Profession: Nurse
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x Address: Al-Birk Genrl. Hospital Birth Place: The
Philippines

On 27.2.1419H, Dr. Tariq Abdulminnem and Dr. Ashoki

DECISION Komar, both have examined the dead body of Jasmin
Cuaresma, at 12.20 P.M., Sunday, 22.2.14189H, and the
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: result was:

1. Report of the Police on the death

These consolidated petitions assail the Amended Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals dated May 14, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80619 and CA-G.R. SP No. 81030
finding White Falcon Services, Inc. and Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc.
solidarily liable to indemnify spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma the amount of
US$4,686.73 in actual damages with interest.
On January 6, 1997, Jasmin Cuaresma (Jasmin) was deployed by Becmen
Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc.[2] (Becmen) to serve as assistant nurse in Al-Birk
Hospital in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), for a contract duration of three years, with
a corresponding salary of US$247.00 per month.
Over a year later, she died allegedly of poisoning.
2. Medical Examination: Blue skin and paleness on the
Extrimes (sic), total halt to blood circulation and respiratory
system and brain damage. There were no external
injuries. Likelypoisoning by taking poisonous
substance, yet not determined. There was a bad smell in
the mouth and unknown to us.[5] (Emphasis supplied)
Jasmins body was repatriated to Manila on September 3, 1998. The following
day, the City Health Officer of Cabanatuan City conducted an autopsy and the resulting
medical report indicated that Jasmin died under violent circumstances, and not poisoning
as originally found by the KSA examining physician. The City Health Officer found that
Jasmin had abrasions at her inner lip and gums; lacerated wounds and abrasions on her
left and right ears; lacerated wounds and hematoma (contusions) on her elbows;
abrasions and hematoma on her thigh and legs; intra-muscular hemorrhage at the anterior
chest; rib fracture; puncture wounds; and abrasions on the labia minora of the vaginal
area.[6]
On March 11, 1999, Jasmins remains were exhumed and examined by the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The toxicology report of the NBI, however, tested
negative for non-volatile, metallic poison and insecticides.[7]
Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas), Jasmins parents and her
surviving heirs, received from the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) the
following amounts: P50,000.00 for death benefits; P50,000.00 for loss of life; P20,000.00
for funeral expenses; and P10,000.00 for medical reimbursement.
On November 22, 1999, the Cuaresmas filed a complaint against Becmen and
its principal in the KSA, Rajab & Silsilah Company (Rajab), claiming death and insurance
benefits, as well as moral and exemplary damages for Jasmins death. [8]
In their complaint, the Cuaresmas claim that Jasmins death was work-related,
having occurred at the employers premises;[9] that under Jasmins contract with Becmen,
she is entitled to iqama insurance coverage; that Jasmin is entitled to compensatory
damages in the amount of US$103,740.00, which is the sum total of her monthly salary of
US$247.00 per month under her employment contract, multiplied by 35 years (or the
remaining years of her productive life had death not supervened at age 25, assuming that
she lived and would have retired at age 60).
The Cuaresmas assert that as a result of Jasmins death under mysterious
circumstances, they suffered sleepless nights and mental anguish. The situation, they
claim, was aggravated by findings in the autopsy and exhumation reports which evidently
show that a grave injustice has been committed against them and their daughter, for which
those responsible should likewise be made to pay moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.
In their position paper, Becmen and Rajab insist that Jasmin committed suicide,
citing a prior unsuccessful suicide attempt sometime in March or April 1998 and relying on
the medical report of the examining physician of the Al-Birk Hospital. They likewise deny
liability because the Cuaresmas already recovered death and other benefits totaling
P130,000.00 from the OWWA. They insist that the Cuaresmas are not entitled to iqama
insurance because this refers to the issuance not insurance of iqama, or residency/work
permit required in the KSA. On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, they claim that
the Cuaresmas are not entitled to the same because they have not acted with fraud, nor
have they been in bad faith in handling Jasmins case.
While the case was pending, Becmen filed a manifestation and motion for
substitution alleging that Rajab terminated their agency relationship and had appointed
White Falcon Services, Inc. (White Falcon) as its new recruitment agent in the
Philippines. Thus, White Falcon was impleaded as respondent as well, and it adopted and
reiterated Becmens arguments in the position paper it subsequently filed.
On February 28, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision[10] dismissing the
complaint for lack of merit. Giving weight to the medical report of the Al-Birk Hospital
finding that Jasmin died of poisoning, the Labor Arbiter concluded that Jasmin committed
suicide. In any case, Jasmins death was not service-connected, nor was it shown that it
occurred while she was on duty; besides, her parents have received all corresponding
benefits they were entitled to under the law. In regard to damages, the Labor Arbiter found
no legal basis to warrant a grant thereof.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (Commission) reversed
the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Relying on the findings of the City Health Officer of
Cabanatuan City and the NBI as contained in their autopsy and toxicology report,
respectively, the Commission, via its November 22, 2002 Resolution[11] declared that,
based on substantial evidence adduced, Jasmin was the victim of compensable work-
connected criminal aggression. It disregarded the Al-Birk Hospital attending physicians
report as well as the KSA police report, finding the same to be inconclusive. It declared
that Jasmins death was the result of an accident occurring within the employers premises
that is attributable to her employment, or to the conditions under which she lived, and thus
arose out of and in the course of her employment as nurse. Thus, the Cuaresmas are
entitled to actual damages in the form of Jasmins lost earnings, including future earnings,
in the total amount of US$113,000.00. The Commission, however, dismissed all other
claims in the complaint.
Becmen, Rajab and White Falcon moved for reconsideration, whereupon the
Commission issued its October 9, 2003 Resolution[12] reducing the award of
US$113,000.00 as actual damages to US$80,000.00.[13] The NLRC likewise declared
Becmen and White Falcon as solidarily liable for payment of the award.
Becmen and White Falcon brought separate petitions for certiorari to the Court
of Appeals.[14] On June 28, 2006, the appellate court rendered its Decision,[15] the
dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the subject petitions are DENIED but in the
execution of the decision, it should first be enforced against White
Falcon Services and then against Becmen Services when it is already
impossible, impractical and futile to go against it (White Falcon).
SO ORDERED.[16]
The appellate court affirmed the NLRCs findings that Jasmins death was
compensable, the same having occurred at the dormitory, which was contractually
provided by the employer. Thus her death should be considered to have occurred within
the employers premises, arising out of and in the course of her employment.
Becmen and White Falcon moved for reconsideration. On May 14, 2008, the
appellate court rendered the assailed Amended Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are
GRANTED. Accordingly, the award of US$80,000.00 in actual
damages is hereby reduced to US$4,686.73 plus interest at the legal
rate computed from the time it became due until fully paid. Petitioners
are hereby adjudged jointly and solidarily liable with the employer for
the monetary awards with Becmen Service Exporter and Promotions,
Inc. having a right of reimbursement from White Falcon Services, Inc.
SO ORDERED.[17]
In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals found that although Jasmins
death was compensable, however, there is no evidentiary basis to support an award of
actual damages in the amount of US$80,000.00. Nor may lost earnings be collected,
because the same may be charged only against the perpetrator of the crime or quasi-
delict. Instead, the appellate court held that Jasmins beneficiaries should be entitled only
to the sum equivalent of the remainder of her 36-month employment contract, or her
monthly salary of US$247.00 multiplied by nineteen (19) months, with legal interest.
Becmen filed the instant petition for review on certiorari (G.R. Nos. 182978-
79). The Cuaresmas, on the other hand, moved for a reconsideration of the amended
decision, but it was denied. They are now before us via G.R. Nos. 184298-99.
On October 6, 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 184298-99
with G.R. Nos. 182978-79.
In G.R. Nos. 182978-79, Becmen raises the following issues for our resolution:
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
GAVE MORE CREDENCE AND WEIGHT TO THE AUTOPSY
REPORT CONDUCTED BY THE CABANATUAN CITY HEALTH
OFFICE THAN THE MEDICAL AND POLICE REPORTS ISSUED BY
THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH OF KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA AND
AL-BIRK HOSPITAL.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN
ON THE BASIS OF THE POSITION PAPERS AND ANNEXES
THERETO INCLUDING THE AUTOPSY REPORT, IT CONCLUDED
THAT THE DEATH OF JASMIN CUARESMA WAS CAUSED BY
CRIMINAL AGGRESSION.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
HELD THAT THE DEATH OF JASMIN CUARESMA WAS
COMPENSABLE PURSUANT TO THE RULING OF THE SUPREME
COURT IN TALLER VS. YNCHAUSTI, G.R. NO. 35741, DECEMBER
20, 1932, WHICH IT FOUND TO BE STILL GOOD LAW.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
HELD BECMEN LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF JASMIN CUARESMA
NOTWITHSTANDING ITS ADMISSIONS THAT IQAMA INSURANCE
WAS A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR SINCE IQAMA IS NOT AN
INSURANCE.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT THE DEATH OF JASMIN WAS WORK
RELATED.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
HELD BECMEN LIABLE TO JASMINS BENEFICIARIES FOR THE
REMAINDER OF HER 36-MONTH CONTRACT COMPUTED IN
THIS MANNER: MONTHLY SALARY OF US$246.67 MULTIPLIED
BY 19 MONTHS, THE REMAINDER OF THE TERM OF JASMINS
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT, IS EQUAL TO US$4,686.73.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
HELD BECMEN LIABLE TO PAY INTEREST AT THE LEGAL RATE
FROM THE TIME IT WAS DUE UNTIL FULLY PAID.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
HELD BECMEN AND WHITE FALCON JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY
LIABLE WITH THE EMPLOYER NOTWITHSTANDING THE
ASSUMPTION OF LIABILITY EXECUTED BY WHITE FALCON IN
FAVOR OF BECMEN.
On the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 184298-99, the Cuaresmas raise the following
issues:
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN
APPLYING THE PROVISIONS OF THE CIVIL CODE CONSIDERED
GENERAL LAW DESPITE THE CASE BEING COVERED BY E.O.
247, R.A. 8042 AND LABOR CODE CONSIDERED AS SPECIAL
LAWS.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
APPLYING THE DECEASEDS FUTURE EARNINGS WHICH IS (AN)
INHERENT FACTOR IN THE COMPUTATION OF DEATH
BENEFITS OF OVERSEAS FILIPINO CONTRACT WORKERS.
(THE COURT OF APPEALS) GRAVELY ERRED IN
REDUCING THE DEATH BENEFITS AWARDED BY NLRC
CONSIDERED FINDINGS OF FACT THAT CANNOT BE
DISTURBED THROUGH CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE
RULES OF COURT.
The issue for resolution is whether the Cuaresmas are entitled to monetary
claims, by way of benefits and damages, for the death of their daughter Jasmin.
The terms and conditions of Jasmins 1996 Employment Agreement which she
and her employer Rajab freely entered into constitute the law between them. As a rule,
stipulations in an employment contract not contrary to statutes, public policy, public order
or morals have the force of law between the contracting parties. [18] An examination of said
employment agreement shows that it provides for no other monetary or other
benefits/privileges than the following:
1. 1,300 rials (or US$247.00) monthly salary;
2. Free air tickets to KSA at the start of her contract and to
the Philippines at the end thereof, as well as for her
vacation at the end of each twenty four-month service;
3. Transportation to and from work;
4. Free living accommodations;
5. Free medical treatment, except for optical and dental
operations, plastic surgery charges and lenses, and
medical treatment obtained outside of KSA;
6. Entry visa fees will be shared equally between her and
her employer, but the exit/re-entry visa fees, fees for Iqama
issuance, renewal, replacement, passport renewal,
 sponsorship transfer and other liabilities shall be borne by
her;
7. Thirty days paid vacation leave with round trip tickets to
Manila after twenty four-months of continuous service;
8. Eight days public holidays per year;
9. The indemnity benefit due her at the end of her service
will be calculated as per labor laws of KSA.
Thus, the agreement does not include provisions for insurance, or for accident,
death or other benefits that the Cuaresmas seek to recover, and which the labor tribunals
and appellate court granted variably in the guise of compensatory damages.
However, the absence of provisions for social security and other benefits does
not make Jasmins employment contract infirm. Under KSA law, her foreign employer is
not obliged to provide her these benefits; and neither is Jasmin entitled to minimum wage
unless of course the KSA labor laws have been amended to the opposite effect, or that a
bilateral wage agreement has been entered into.
Our next inquiry is, should Jasmins death be considered as work-connected and
thus compensable? The evidence indicates that it is not. At the time of her death, she was
not on duty, or else evidence to the contrary would have been adduced. Neither was she
within hospital premises at the time. Instead, she was at her dormitory room on personal
time when she died. Neither has it been shown, nor does the evidence suggest, that at the
time she died, Jasmin was performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental to her
employment as nurse, because she was at her dormitory room. It is reasonable to
suppose that all her work is performed at the Al-birk Hospital, and not at her dormitory
room.
We cannot expect that the foreign employer should ensure her safety even
while she is not on duty. It is not fair to require employers to answer even for their
employees personal time away from work, which the latter are free to spend of their own
choosing. Whether they choose to spend their free time in the pursuit of safe or perilous
undertakings, in the company of friends or strangers, lovers or enemies, this is not one
area which their employers should be made accountable for. While we have emphasized
the need to observe official work time strictly,[19] what an employee does on free time is
beyond the employers sphere of inquiry.
While the employers premises may be defined very broadly not only to include
premises owned by it, but also premises it leases, hires, supplies or uses, [20] we are not
prepared to rule that the dormitory wherein Jasmin stayed should constitute employers
premises as would allow a finding that death or injury therein is considered to have been
incurred or sustained in the course of or arose out of her employment. There are certainly
exceptions,[21] but they do not appear to apply here. Moreover, a complete determination
would have to depend on the unique circumstances obtaining and the overall factual
environment of the case, which are here lacking.
But, did Jasmin commit suicide? Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon vehemently
insist that she did; thus, her heirs may not claim benefits or damages based on criminal
aggression. On the other hand, the Cuaresmas do not believe so.
The Court cannot subscribe to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide while
halfway into her employment contract. It is beyond human comprehension that a 25-year
old Filipina, in the prime of her life and working abroad with a chance at making a decent
living with a high-paying job which she could not find in her own country, would simply
commit suicide for no compelling reason.
The Saudi police and autopsy reports which state that Jasmin is a likely/or
apparent victim of poisoning are patently inconclusive. They are thus unreliable as
evidence.
On the contrary, the autopsy report of the Cabanatuan City Health Officer and
the exhumation report of the NBI categorically and unqualifiedly show that Jasmin
sustained external and internal injuries, specifically abrasions at her inner lip and
gums; lacerated wounds and abrasions on her left and right ears; lacerated wounds
and hematoma (contusions) on her elbows; abrasions and hematoma on her thigh
and legs; intra-muscular hemorrhage at the anterior chest; a fractured rib; puncture
wounds; andabrasions on the labia minora of the vaginal area. The NBI toxicology
report came up negative on the presence of poison.
All these show that Jasmin was manhandled and possibly raped prior to her
death.
Even if we were to agree with the Saudi police and autopsy reports that indicate
Jasmin was poisoned to death, we do not believe that it was self-induced. If ever Jasmin
was poisoned, the assailants who beat her up and possibly raped her are certainly
responsible therefor.
We are not exactly ignorant of what goes on with our OFWs. Nor is the rest of
the world blind to the realities of life being suffered by migrant workers in the hands of
some foreign employers. It is inconceivable that our Filipina women would seek
employment abroad and face uncertainty in a foreign land, only to commit suicide for
unexplained reasons. Deciding to leave their family, loved ones, and the comfort and
safety of home, to work in a strange land requires unrivaled strength and courage. Indeed,
many of our women OFWs who are unfortunate to end up with undesirable employers
have been there more times than they care to, beaten up and broken in body yet they
have remained strong in mind, refusing to give up the will to live. Raped, burned with
cigarettes, kicked in the chest with sharp high-heeled shoes, starved for days or even
weeks, stabbed, slaved with incessant work, locked in their rooms, forced to serve their
masters naked, grossly debased, dehumanized and insulted, their spirits fought on and
they lived for the day that they would once again be reunited with their families and loved
ones. Their bodies surrendered, but their will to survive remained strong.
It is surprising, therefore, that Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon should insist on
suicide, without even lifting a finger to help solve the mystery of Jasmins death. Being in
the business of sending OFWs to work abroad, Becmen and White Falcon should know
what happens to some of our OFWs. It is impossible for them to be completely unaware
that cruelties and inhumanities are inflicted on OFWs who are unfortunate to be employed
by vicious employers, or upon those who work in communities or environments where they
are liable to become victims of crime. By now they should know that our women OFWs do
not readily succumb to the temptation of killing themselves even when assaulted, abused,
starved, debased and, worst, raped.
Indeed, what we have seen is Rajab and Becmens revolting scheme of
conveniently avoiding responsibility by clinging to the absurd theory that Jasmin took her
own life.Abandoning their legal, moral and social obligation (as employer and recruiter) to
assist Jasmins family in obtaining justice for her death, they immediately gave up on
Jasmins case, which has remained under investigation as the autopsy and police reports
themselves indicate. Instead of taking the cudgels for Jasmin, who had no relative or
representative in the KSA who would naturally demand and seek an investigation of her
case, Rajab and Becmen chose to take the most convenient route to avoiding and denying
liability, by casting Jasmins fate to oblivion. It appears from the record that to this date, no
follow up of Jasmins case was ever made at all by them, and they seem to have
expediently treated Jasmins death as a closed case. Despite being given the lead via the
autopsy and toxicology reports of the Philippine authorities, they failed and refused to act
and pursue justice for Jasmins sake and to restore honor to her name.
Indeed, their nonchalant and uncaring attitude may be seen from how Jasmins
remains were repatriated. No official representative from Rajab or Becmen was kind
enough to make personal representations with Jasmins parents, if only to extend their
condolences or sympathies; instead, a mere colleague, nurse Jessie Fajardo, was
designated to accompany Jasmins body home.
Of all lifes tragedies, the death of ones own child must be the most painful for a
parent. Not knowing why or how Jasmins life was snuffed out makes the pain doubly
unbearable for Jasmins parents, and further aggravated by Rajab, Becmen, and White
Falcons baseless insistence and accusation that it was a self-inflicted death, a mortal sin
by any religious standard.
Thus we categorically hold, based on the evidence; the actual experiences of
our OFWs; and the resilient and courageous spirit of the Filipina that transcends the vilest
desecration of her physical self, that Jasmin did not commit suicide but a victim of
murderous aggression.
Rajab, Becmen, and White Falcons indifference to Jasmins case has caused
unfathomable pain and suffering upon her parents. They have turned away from their
moral obligation, as employer and recruiter and as entities laden with social and civic
obligations in society, to pursue justice for and in behalf of Jasmin, her parents and those
she left behind. Possessed with the resources to determine the truth and to pursue justice,
they chose to stand idly for the sake of convenience and in order that they may avoid
pecuniary liability, turning a blind eye to the Philippine authorities autopsy and toxicology
reports instead of taking action upon them as leads in pursuing justice for Jasmins
death. They have placed their own financial and corporate interests above their moral and
social obligations, and chose to secure and insulate themselves from the perceived
responsibility of having to answer for and indemnify Jasmins heirs for her death.
Under Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. 8042), or the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,[22] the State shall, at all times, uphold the dignity of its
citizens whether in country or overseas, in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in
particular.[23] The State shall provide adequate and timely social, economic and legal
services to Filipino migrant workers.[24] The rights and interest of distressed[25] overseas
Filipinos, in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in particular, documented or
undocumented, are adequately protected and safeguarded. [26]
Becmen and White Falcon, as licensed local recruitment agencies, miserably
failed to abide by the provisions of R.A. 8042. Recruitment agencies are expected to
extend assistance to their deployed OFWs, especially those in distress. Instead, they
abandoned Jasmins case and allowed it to remain unsolved to further their interests and
avoid anticipated liability which parents or relatives of Jasmin would certainly exact from
them. They willfully refused to protect and tend to the welfare of the deceased Jasmin,
treating her case as just one of those unsolved crimes that is not worth wasting their time
and resources on. The evidence does not even show that Becmen and Rajab lifted a
finger to provide legal representation and seek an investigation of Jasmins case. Worst of
all, they unnecessarily trampled upon the person and dignity of Jasmin by standing pat on
the argument that Jasmin committed suicide, which is a grave accusation given its un-
Christian nature.
We cannot reasonably expect that Jasmins parents should be the ones to
actively pursue a just resolution of her case in the KSA, unless they are provided with the
finances to undertake this herculean task. Sadly, Becmen and Rajab did not lend any
assistance at all in this respect. The most Jasmins parents can do is to coordinate with
Philippine authorities as mandated under R.A. 8042, obtain free legal assistance and
secure the aid of the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Labor and
Employment, the POEA and the OWWA in trying to solve the case or obtain relief, in
accordance with Section 23[27] of R.A. 8042. To our mind, the Cuaresmas did all that was
within their power, short of actually flying to the KSA. Indeed, the Cuaresmas went even
further. To the best of their abilities and capacities, they ventured to investigate Jasmins
case on their own: they caused another autopsy on Jasmins remains as soon as it arrived
to inquire into the true cause of her death. Beyond that, they subjected themselves to the
painful and distressful experience of exhuming Jasmins remains in order to obtain another
autopsy for the sole purpose of determining whether or not their daughter was
poisoned. Their quest for the truth and justice is equally to be expected of all loving
parents. All this time, Rajab and Becmen instead of extending their full cooperation to the
Cuaresma family merely sat on their laurels in seeming unconcern.
In Interorient Maritime Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC,[28] a seaman who was being
repatriated after his employment contract expired, failed to make his Bangkok to Manila
connecting flight as he began to wander the streets of Bangkok aimlessly. He was shot to
death by Thai police four days after, on account of running amuck with a knife in hand and
threatening to harm anybody within sight. The employer, sued for death and other benefits
as well as damages, interposed as defense the provision in the seafarer agreement which
provides that no compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity,
disability or death resulting from a willful act on his own life by the seaman. The Court
rejected the defense on the view, among others, that the recruitment agency should have
observed some precautionary measures and should not have allowed the seaman, who
was later on found to be mentally ill, to travel home alone, and its failure to do so rendered
it liable for the seamans death. We ruled therein that
The foreign employer may not have been obligated by its
contract to provide a companion for a returning employee, but it
cannot deny that it was expressly tasked by its agreement to assure
the safe return of said worker. The uncaring attitude displayed by
petitioners who, knowing fully well that its employee had been
suffering from some mental disorder, nevertheless still allowed
him to travel home alone, is appalling to say the least. Such
attitude harks back to another time when the landed gentry
practically owned the serfs, and disposed of them when the
latter had grown old, sick or otherwise lost their
usefulness.[29] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, more than just recruiting and deploying OFWs to their foreign principals,
recruitment agencies have equally significant responsibilities. In a foreign land where
OFWs are likely to encounter uneven if not discriminatory treatment from the foreign
government, and certainly a delayed access to language interpretation, legal aid, and the
Philippine consulate, the recruitment agencies should be the first to come to the rescue of
our distressed OFWs since they know the employers and the addresses where they are
deployed or stationed. Upon them lies the primary obligation to protect the rights and
ensure the welfare of our OFWs, whether distressed or not. Who else is in a better
position, if not these recruitment agencies, to render immediate aid to their deployed
OFWs abroad?
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. Article 21 of the Code states that any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. And, lastly, Article 24 requires
that in all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a
disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental
weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.
Clearly, Rajab, Becmen and White Falcons acts and omissions are against
public policy because they undermine and subvert the interest and general welfare of our
OFWs abroad, who are entitled to full protection under the law. They set an awful example
of how foreign employers and recruitment agencies should treat and act with respect to
their distressed employees and workers abroad. Their shabby and callous treatment of
Jasmins case; their uncaring attitude; their unjustified failure and refusal to assist in the
determination of the true circumstances surrounding her mysterious death, and instead
finding satisfaction in the unreasonable insistence that she committed suicide just so they
can conveniently avoid pecuniary liability; placing their own corporate interests above of
the welfare of their employees all these are contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy, and constitute taking advantage of the poor employee and her familys ignorance,
helplessness, indigence and lack of power and resources to seek the truth and obtain
justice for the death of a loved one.
Giving in handily to the idea that Jasmin committed suicide, and adamantly
insisting on it just to protect Rajab and Becmens material interest despite evidence to the
contrary is against the moral law and runs contrary to the good custom of not denouncing
ones fellowmen for alleged grave wrongdoings that undermine their good name and
honor.[30]
Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the protective
mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract stipulations to the contrary
notwithstanding. This pronouncement is in keeping with the basic public policy of the State
to afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and
employers. This ruling is likewise rendered imperative by Article 17 of the Civil Code which
states that laws which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs
shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations
or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.[31]
The relations between capital and labor are so impressed with public
interest,[32] and neither shall act oppressively against the other, or impair the interest or
convenience of the public.[33] In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts
shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer. [34]
The grant of moral damages to the employee by reason of misconduct on the
part of the employer is sanctioned by Article 2219 (10)[35] of the Civil Code, which allows
recovery of such damages in actions referred to in Article 21.[36]
Thus, in view of the foregoing, the Court holds that the Cuaresmas are entitled
to moral damages, which Becmen and White Falcon are jointly and solidarily liable to pay,
together with exemplary damages for wanton and oppressive behavior, and by way of
example for the public good.
Private employment agencies are held jointly and severally liable with the
foreign-based employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of
employment.This joint and solidary liability imposed by law against recruitment agencies
and foreign employers is meant to assure the aggrieved worker of immediate and
sufficient payment of what is due him.[37] If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical
being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall
themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the
aforesaid claims and damages.[38]
White Falcons assumption of Becmens liability does not automatically result in
Becmens freedom or release from liability. This has been ruled in ABD Overseas
Manpower Corporation v. NLRC.[39] Instead, both Becmen and White Falcon should be
held liable solidarily, without prejudice to each having the right to be reimbursed under the
provision of the Civil Code that whoever pays for another may demand from the debtor
what he has paid.[40]
WHEREFORE, the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 14,
2008 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80619 and CA-G.R. SP No. 81030 is SET ASIDE. Rajab &
Silsilah Company, White Falcon Services, Inc., Becmen Service Exporter and
Promotion, Inc., and their corporate directors and officers are found jointly and
solidarily liable and ORDERED to indemnify the heirs of Jasmin Cuaresma, spouses
Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma, the following amounts:
1) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as
moral damages;
2) TWO MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2,500,000.00) as
exemplary damages;
3) Attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award;
and,
4) Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 81327 December 4, 1989
CRISPINA VANO, petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, (Bureau of Posts) and
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents.
Severino B. Estonina for petitioner.
The Government Corporate Counsel for GSIS.
PARAS, J.:
The only issue in this case is whether or not the death of petitioner's husband, Filomeno
Vano is compensable under the Employees' Compensation Law.
Filomeno Vano was a letter carrier of the Bureau of Posts in Tagbilaran City. On July 31,
1983, a Sunday, at around 3:30 p.m. Vano was driving his motorcycle with his son as
backrider allegedly on his way to his station in Tagbilaran for his work the following day,
Monday. As they were approaching Hinawanan Badge in Loay, Bohol, the motorcycle
skidded, causing its passengers to be thrown overboard. Vano's head hit the bridge's
railing which rendered him unconscious. He was taken to the Engelwood Hospital where
he was declared dead on arrival due to severe hemorrhage.
Vano's widow, Crispina Vano, filed a death benefit claim under PD 626, as amended, with
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). On April 6, 1984, the GSIS denied the
claim, citing the following reason:
It appears on record that your husband was on his way to his station
when he died in a vehicular accident he figured in a Sunday, July 31,
1983.
Obviously, the accident occurred outside of his time and place of
work; neither was he performing official duties at the time of its
occurrence. Accordingly, the conditions for compensability in
accordance with the law have not been satisfied, to wit:
1. that the employee must have been injured at
the place where his work requires him to be;
2. that the employee must have been performing
his official functions; and
3. if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the
employee must have been executing an order for
his employer. (p. 22, Rollo)
Crispina Vano's requests for reconsideration were denied by the GSIS, consequently, the
case was elevated to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) for appropriate
review under ECC Case No. 2658.
In a Decision dated October 13, 1987, the ECC affirmed the decision denying the claim of
Crispina Vano because:
Under the Employees' Compensation law, injuries resulting from
accidents while an employee is going to and from the place of work is
not compensable. Some exceptions, however, are: when the injury is
sustained at a place proximate to the work-place, when the employee
meets the accident while riding in a company vehicle and when he is
on special errand for his employer. (Section 1, Rule III of the
Amended Rules of Employees' Compensation)
We note that the case at bar does not fall under any of the foregoing
exceptions. In fact, the subject employee's accident happened on a
Sunday, a non-working day. In the light of the foregoing, we cannot
but affirm respondent's denial of the claim. (pp. 13-15, Rollo; p. 2,
Decision, ECC Case No. 2658)
The petitioner then came to this Court on a petition for review on certiorari. She alleges
that since her husband was precisely commuting from his hometown to Tagbilaran City,
where he would report for duty as letter carrier the following day, when he met the
accident, then his consequent death should be compensated.
The respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) reiterates its views and
contends that the present provision of law on employment injury is different from that
provided in the old Workmen's Compensation Act and is "categorical in that the injury
must have been sustained at work while at the workplace or elsewhere while executing an
order from the employer." (Rollo, p. 69)
For its part, the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission stood firm in asserting
that the death of Filomeno Vano is not the result of an employment accident as
contemplated by law hence petitioner is clearly not entitled to her claim for death benefits.
The case of Vda.de Torbela vs. Employees' Compensation Commission (96 SCRA 260,
263, 264) supports petitioner's contention of compensability. In the said case, this Court
held:
It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about
5:45 o'clock in the morning due to injuries sustained by him in a
vehicular accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod
City, where he lived, to Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where the
school of which he was the principal was located and that at the time
 of the accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly
worked on in his residence on the eve of his death.

The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured

at a point reasonably proximate to the place of work, while he is going
to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and
in the course of his employment.

The same ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Alano vs.
Employees' Compensation Commission (158 SCRA, 669, 672):

In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to
her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts
it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place
of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the
school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there
because her employment required her to be there.

We see no reason to deviate from the foregoing rulings. Like the deceased in these two
(2) aforementioned cases, it was established that petitioner's husband the case at bar was
on his way to his place of work when he met the accident. His death, therefore, is
compensable under the law as an employment accident.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and the Government
Service Insurance System is ordered to pay petitioner the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos
(P12,000.00)) as death benefit and the sum of One Thousand Two Hundred Pesos
(P1,200.00) as attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27588 April 28, 1969
LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and ROSARIO VDA. DE
ROSANO respondents.
H. San Luis and L. V. Simbulan for petitioner.
Juan B. Moreno for respondent Rosario Vda. de Rosano.
Villavieja, Villanueva and Ocampo for respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:
Petition filed by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation for review of the decision of the
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner (in R04 WC Case No. 3941), ordering it to pay
claimants Rosario Vda. de Rosano, minors Rebecca, Edgardo and Baltazar, all surnamed
Rosano death compensation benefits, burial expenses and attorney's fees for the death of
Pastor Rosano; as well as of the resolution of the Workmen's Compensation
Commission en bancdenying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
decision.
As found by the Acting Referee of the Department of Labor, supported by the evidence on
record, the facts of the case are as follows:
At about 6 o'clock in the morning of 30 November 1964, stevedore Pastor Rosano went to
Pier 9, Manila, to await the arrival of a barge of herein petitioner corporation, scheduled to
dock at 9 o'clock in the morning. While thus waiting for the vessel Rosano had a heated
verbal argument with one Benjamin Valdez, another stevedore engaged by petitioner
corporation, over the possession of a platform used in the loading and unloading of
cargoes taken into or out of the watercraft. Rosano was able to get it. As the barge did not
arrive as scheduled, Rosano went home for lunch. When he returned at about 1 o'clock in
the afternoon, he found the platform again in the possession of Valdez. Rosano's demand
for delivery to him of said platform precipitated another argument which almost ended in
fist fight. Valdez finally gave up the platform, but not before he had uttered threats against
the life of Rosano. Later, informed that the barge they were waiting for definitely was not
arriving, Rosano, with two companions, boarded a passenger jeep bound for Tondo.
When he got off from the jeep near his house, he was met by Valdez, who whipped out a
knife and stabbed him. Rosano fell to the ground. He was immediately brought to the
hospital where he expired at 2:30 in the afternoon of that same day, 30 November 1964
(Exhibit C).
On 1 March 1965, the widow, Rosario Vda.de Rosano, for herself and on behalf of her 3
minor children filed with the Department of Labor a formal claim for death compensation
benefits against petitioner Luzon Stevedoring Corporation for the death of her husband,
Pastor Rosano. The company answered, denying the allegations of the complaint and
raising the defense of prescription, in that the claim was filed beyond the 3-month period
from the death of Rosano, as provided in the Workmen's Compensation law.
On 15 September 1965, after due hearing, the Acting Referee rendered judgment,
ordering the company to pay to the claimants death compensation benefits in the sum of
P6,000.00; P200.00 as reimbursement for burial expenses; P200.00, as attorney's fees;
and P61.00 as fees payable to the office. The award was based on the finding that
Rosano was an employee of the company and that death arose out of his said
employment. The defense of prescription was rejected, it appearing that the company had
failed to controvert the claimants' right to compensation within the period prescribed in
Section 45 of Act 3428. The company appealed to the Workmen's Compensation
Commission, which affirmed the decision of the Referee. And when its motion for
reconsideration of said decision was denied by the Commission en banc, the company
filed the present petition for review, assigning as all errors committed by the Commission
its finding on the existence of employee-employer relationship between the petitioner and
the deceased and the ruling that the right to demand compensation benefits has not
prescribed.
The contention that there existed no employer-employee relationship between petitioner
and the late Pastor Rosano is premised on the allegation that the latter was a "gang boss"
working with the petitioner on an "on and off" basis; that Rosano worked for petitioner
when so assigned by the union, of which he was a member, that, if at all, the employer-
employee relationship existed only whenever the deceased rendered actual service for the
petitioner. Since on 30 November 1964 Rosano was not able to work (because the barge
did not arrive), then, according to petitioner, he was not an employee when he (Rosano)
met his death.
There is no merit to this contention. In the first place, while petitioner company failed to
submit any evidence that the work rendered by the deceased was purely casual, 1 it has
been established that prior to the stabbing incident the deceased, with other stevedores,
was in the pier prepared to do hauling jobs for the petitioner's business. And there is
unrebutted testimony that the deceased had been doing stevedoring work for said
petitioner for 15 years.2Secondly, even assuming petitioner's allegations to be true, that
the deceased was a union member, and that it was the union that furnished laborers and
stevedors when required by petitioner company, presumably with the latter delivering the
stevedoring charges directly to the union for distribution to the individual laborers, these
facts did not make the union an independent contractor whose intervention relieved the
said company of liability for the death of a laborer specially where no contractor's bond
was required for the union's performance of its undertaking. 3 The union here was no more
than an agent of the company and whose fiction is merely to save the latter from the
necessity of dealing with individual laborers. And in this kind of indirect employment, it has
been repeatedly held, the employer is not relieved of liability under the Workmen's
Compensation law. 4
It is next claimed for the petitioner that even if he were an employee, Rosano's death is
not compensable because it came when he was outside of the company premises and not
at work.
We do not agree with the appellant. From the proved sequence of events that took place
on 30 November 1964 involving the deceased Pastor Rosano, it is evident that the cause
of his fatal stabbing by Benjamin Valdez (who was thereafter accused and convicted) can
be traced to their disagreement over the possession of a platform that was to be used in
their work for petitioner that although the altercation started in the morning the same was
resumed when they returned in the afternoon and carried on when Valdez left, lay in wait
near Rosario's house, and there met and stabbed the latter when he alighted from the
jeep. Neither can it be said that the employer is exempt from liability under the Workmen's
Compensation law because the cause of death arose outside of the company
premises, 5 whereas the quarrel happened at the waterfront at Pier 9.
For an injury to be compensable, it is not necessary that the cause therefor shall take
place within the place of employment. If a workman is acting within the scope of his
employment, his protection "in the course of" the employment usually continues, regard of
the place of injury. 6 Thus, in one case, 7 an employee went to the House of the employer
across the warehouse where he worked to get a drink of water, that there, while trying to
drive away a puppy that he saw eating fish in the employer's kitchen, he was bitten in the
hand, as a result of which he later died of hydrophobia. The death of the employee was
held compensable, on the ground that his trip to the kitchen was occasioned by the
employer's fault in not providing adequate drinking water at the warehouse. In the present
case, it cannot be disputed that it is inherent in the stevedoring work for the petitioner that
the laborers, like the deceased, stay in the pier and wait for the docking of petitioner's
vessels.
Furthermore, jurisprudence is to the effect that injuries sustained by an employee while in
the course of his employment, as the result of an assault upon his person by another
employee, or by a third person, no question of the injured employee's own culpability
being involved, is compensable where, from the evidence presented, a rational mind is
able to trace the injury to a cause set in motion by the nature of the employment, or some
condition, obligation or incident therein, and not by some other agency.8
The rule as stated by the Connecticut Supreme Court is that ... when the
employee is assaulted while he is defending his employer, or his employer's
interests, or when the assault was incidental to some duty of his employment,
the injuries he suffers in consequence of the assault will, as a rule, arise out of
the employment. He will then be serving his employer's ends and not of his own.
(Jacquemin vs. Turner and Sermour Manufacturing Co., Conn., 103 A. 115;
Goldshirch vs. American Character Doll Co., 135 Misc. 817, 238 N. Y. 519.)
Similarly, in Appleford vs. Kimmel, 296 NW, 861, it appeared that a theater employee's job
required him to handle disturbances in the theater; that several patrons were ordered by
him to leave the theater because of disturbances they were causing; and that after the
theater closed the employee started for home and was subjected to injurious assault by
those he had previously ordered to leave; the court held that the evidence sustained the
finding that the employee's injury arose out of, and in the course of, the employment.
In the leading case of Field vs. Charmette Knitted Fabric Co., 245 N.Y. 138, where a
superintendent was injured on the sidewalk by workmen with whom he had quarreled in
the mill, the late Justice Cardozo (then of the New York Supreme Court) declared the
injury compensable, reasoning that the quarrel outside of the mill was merely a
continuation or extension of the quarrel begun within; that continuity of the case had been
so combined with continuity in time and space "that the quarrel from origin to ending must
be taken to be one".
The rationale applies to the case at bar, where the facts, shown by the evidence found by
the referee and affirmed by the Commission, are that Rosano had been assaulted by the
man with whom he had quarreled barely a half hour after leaving the place of work where
the quarrel occurred, in connection with the possession of the platform to be used in
unloading cargo, without any independent agency or cause for the assault being shown.
As pointed out by Larson (Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. I, section 29.21)
since the ultimate test applied by Judge Cardozo was whether "the quarrel from
origin to ending must be taken to be one" it should make no difference how
widely separated the assault was from the employment in time and space if it
remained an inherent part of an employment incident.
Other cases applying the same principle are collated in Schneider, "Workmen's
Compensation", Perm. Ed., Vol. 6, page 131, et seq.
As regards the defense of prescription raised by petitioner, it is true that the formal
demand for compensation for the death of Pastor Rosano on 30 November 1964 was
made by the dependent widow and minor children only on 1 March 1965, or beyond the 3-
month period provided for 'in section 24 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. But we are
not impressed by petitioner's disclaimer that it had no knowledge of the stabbing incident
prior to its notification by the Regional Office of the filing of the claim. It may be pointed out
that the law does not speak of "formal notice" by the employer of the accident; it specifies
only "knowledge of the accident". For petitioner to say that it had no actual knowledge of
the stabbing incident on 30 November 1964 would run counter to the ordinary course of
human behavior. An employer could scarcely have been spared the news of the killing of
one of its laborers by another laborer, especially where the cause therefor started in the
place where the laborers gather and work. When the widow went to the company
premises to demand compensation for the death of her husband a week after his burial,
she was able to talk to an unknown employee inside the compound, who told her that she
could not get anything because the death of her husband did not occur in the company
premises. Far from showing lack of knowledge by the employer, this fact constitutes
sufficient indication that the death of Rosano was already a matter of common knowledge
in petitioner's office that even an allegedly unidentified employee could advance the exact
defense that the employer later set up in the case.lawphi1.nt
The fact remains that the petitioner failed to controvert in due time the right of the
claimants to compensation, as required by section 45 of Act 3428. And the rule is now
well-settled that the requirements (for claimants) of giving of notice of injury and filing of
claim within the prescribed period is non-jurisdictional and does not constitute a bar to
compensation proceedings if the employer, who had knowledge of the accident, failed to
controvert the claimant's right to compensation pursuant to section 45 of the law. 9 For
such failure of the employer to controvert the claimant's constitutes a waiver (or a
forfeiture by law) of its right to question the validity and reasonableness of the claim and
precludes the setting up of all non-jurisdictional defenses, such as non-compensability of
injuries, prescription, and the like. 10
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision of the Workmen's Compensation
Commission and its resolution en banc, the petition for review is hereby dismissed, with
costs against the petitioner.

G.R. No. 84307 April 17, 1989
CIRIACO HINOGUIN petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (Armed Forces of the Philippines), respondents.
Alexander A. Acain for petitioner.
FELICIANO, J.:
This Petition for Review is directed against the Decision of the Employees' Compensation
Commission ("ECC") in ECC Case No. 3275 (Ciriaco Hinoguin v. Government Service
Insurance System [Armed Forces of the Philippines]) which affirmed the decision of the
Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") denying petitioner's claim for
compensation benefit on account of the death of petitioner's son, Sgt. Lemick G. Hinoguin
The deceased, Sgt. Hinoguin started his military service in 1974, when he was called to
military training by the Philippine Army. He later on enlisted in the Philippine Army as a
private first class. At the time of his death on 7 August 1985, he was holding the rank of
Sergeant per Special Order P-4200, HPA dated 15 October 1985, in "A" company 14th
Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division, PA. The Headquarters of the 14th Infantry
Battalion was located at Bical, Muoz, Nueva Ecija. Sgt. Hinoguin was Detachment Non-
Commissioned Officer at Capintalan, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, "A" Company being
stationed at Carranglan, Nueva Ecija.
On 1 August 1985, Sgt. Hinoguin and two (2) members of his Detachment, Cpl. Rogelio
Clavo and Dft. Nicomedes Alibuyog, sought permission from Captain Frankie Z. Besas,
Commanding Officer of "A" Company to go on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Viscaya,
"to settle [an] important matter thereat." 1 Captain Besas orally granted them permission to
go to Aritao and to take their issued firearms with them, considering that Aritao was
regarded as "a critical place " 2 that is, it had peace and order problems due to the
presence of elements of the New People's Army ("NPA!') in or in the vicinity of Aritao.
Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog left Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, about noon on 1
August 1985 and arrived in Aritao, Nueva Viscaya, about 1:30 o'clock P.M. on the same
day. 3 They proceeded to the home of Dft. Alibuyog's parents where they had lunch. About
4:00 o'clock P.M., the three (3) soldiers with a fourth man, a civilian and relative of Dft.
Alibuyog, had some gin and beer, finishing a bottle of gin and two (2) large bottles of beer.
Three hours later, at about 7:00 o'clock P.M., the soldiers left the Alibuyog home to return
to their Company Headquarters. They boarded a tricycle, presumably a motor-driven one,
Sgt. Hinoguin and Cpl. Clavo seating themselves in the tricycle cab while Dft. Alibuyog
occupied the seat behind the driver. Upon reaching the poblacion of Aritao, Dft. Alibuyog
dismounted, walked towards and in front of the tricycle cab, holding his M-16 rifle in his
right hand, not noticing that the rifle's safety lever was on semi automatic (and not on
"safety"). He accidentally touched the trigger, firing a single shot in the process and hitting
Sgt. Hinoguin, then still sitting in the cab, in the left lower abdomen. The Sergeant did not
apparently realize immediately that he had been hit; he took three (3) steps forward, cried
that he had been hit and fell to the ground.
His companions rushed Sgt. Hinoguin to a hospital in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, for
treatment. Their Company Commander, Capt. Besas, hurried to the hospital upon being
notified of the shooting and there talked with the wounded Sergeant. The latter confirmed
to Capt. Besas that he had indeed been accidentally shot by Dft. Alibuyog Sgt. Hinoguin
was later moved to the AFP Medical Center in Quezon City and there he died on 7 August
1985. The Death Certificate lists "septic shock" as immediate cause of death, and
"generalized septicemia of peritonitis" as antecedent cause, following his sustaining a
gunshot wound.
An investigation conducted by H.Q., 14th Infantry Battalion on 11 August 1985 concluded
that the shooting of Sgt. Hinoguin was "purely accidental in nature." 4 On 19 November
1985, a "Line of Duty Board of Officers" was convened by H.Q. 14th Infantry Battalion, "to
determine Line of Duty Status of [the] late Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin 640407 (Inf.) PA, a
member of "A" Co., 14IB, 5 ID, PA who died ... due to Gun Shot Wound as a result of an
accidental fire (sic) committed by Dft. Nicomedes Alibuyog 085-5009 (Inf.) PA ... ." After
receiving and deliberating .g on the Investigation Report dated 11 August 1985 together
with the sworn statements of witnesses Alibuyog, Clavo and Besas, and after some further
questioning of Capt. Besas, the Line of Duty Board reached the following conclusion and
recommendation:
Sgt. Hinoguin was then the designated Detachment Commander of
Capintalan detachment. On or about 011300H August 1985 Dft.
Alibuyog invited Sgt. Hinoguin and Cpl. Clavo to his home to
celebrate at Aritao, Nueva Viscaya. They asked permission to go on
overnight and to allow them to carry their firearms with them because
the place where they were going is critical. They were given such
permission verbally by their Commanding Officer. The death of Sgt.
Hinoguin was purely accidental as the Investigation Report presented
here proved beyond reasonable [doubt] the fact that Dft. Alibuyog had
no grudge either [against] Cpl. Clavo or Sgt. Hinoguin
RECOMMENDATION:
The recommendation written by the Chairman and unanimously voted
for by the members contain the following:
The Board after a thorough deliberation on presented evidences
declares that the Death of Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin 640407 (Inf.) PA is in
Line of Duty.
The Board recommend farther that all benefits due the legal
dependents of the late Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin be given. 5 (Emphasis
supplied)
Sometime in March 1986, petitioner filed his claim for compensation benefits under P.D.
No. 626 (as amended), claiming that the death of his son was work-connected and
therefore compensable. This was denied 6 by the GSIS on the ground that petitioner's son
was not at his work place nor performing his duty as a soldier of the Philippine Army at the
time of his death.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which Motion was, however, denied by the
GSIS. This denial was confirmed by the Workmen's Compensation Commission ("WCC")
in a Decision dated 24 May 1988 which stated that:
[F]rom the recital of the facts therein [we found it] very difficult for us
to perceive where the work-connection of the events that led to
appellant's son's death lies. Under the law, death resulting from injury
is considered compensable if it arises out of and in the course of
employment. Definitely, the death of Hinoguin did not arises out of
employment. Clearly, the facts showed that he was not on his place of
work nor was he performing official functions. On the contrary, he was
on pass and had just came from a merrymaking when accidentally
shot by his companion, 7 (Emphasis supplied)
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the death of Sgt. Lemick
Hinoguin is compensable under the applicable statute and regulations.
Considering that Sgt. Hinoguin died on 7 August 1985, the applicable law is to be found in
Book Four, Title III of the Labor Code, as amended. It may be noted at the outset that
under Article 167 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended and Section 4 (b) (1) of Rule I of the
Amended (Implementing) Rules on Employees' Compensation, the term "employee"
includes a "member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines." Rule XIII entitled "Death", of
the Amended (Implementing) Rules provides in part as follows:
SECTION 1. Conditions to Entitlement. (a) The beneficiaries of a
deceased employee shall be entitled to an income benefit if all of the
following conditions are satisfied:
(1) The employee had been duly reported to the System;
(2) He died as a result of injury or sickness; and
(3) The System has been duly notified of his death, as well as the
injury or sickness which caused his death. His employer shall be
liable for the benefit if such death occurred before the employee is
duly reported for coverage of the System.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 167 (k) of the Labor Code as amended defines a compensable "injury" quite simply
as "any harmful change in the human organism from any accident arising out of and in the
course of the employment." The Amended (Implementing) Rules have, however,
elaborated considerably on the simple and succinct statutory provision. Rule III, Section 1
(a) reads:
SECTION 1. Grounds. (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or
death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an
employment accident satisfying all of the following grounds:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place work requires
him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions;
and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have
been executing an order for the employer.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that because the Amended (Implementing) Rules are intended to apply to
all kinds of employment, such rules must be read and applied with reasonable flexibility
and comprehensiveness. The concept of a "work place" referred to in Ground 1, for
instance, cannot always be literally applied to a soldier on active duty status, as if he were
a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a particular
fixed office. Obviously, a soldier must go where his company is stationed. In the instant
case, Aritao, Nueva Viscaya was not, of course, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. Aritao being
approximately 1-1/2 hours away from the latter by public transportation. But Sgt. Hinoguin,
Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog had permission from their Commanding Officer to proceed to
Aritao, and it appears to us that a place which soldiers have secured lawful permission to
be at cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go
by their commanding officer. We note that the three (3) soldiers were on an overnight pass
which, notably, they did not utilize in full. They were not on vacation leave. Moreover, they
were required or authorized to carry their firearms with which presumably they were to
defend themselves if NPA elements happened to attack them while en route to and from
Aritao or with which to attack and seek to capture such NPA elements as they might
encounter. Indeed, if the three (3) soldiers had in fact encountered NPAs while on their
way to or from Aritao and been fired upon by them and if Sgt. Hinoguin had been killed by
an NPA bullet, we do not believe that respondent GSIS would have had any difficulty in
holding the death a compensable one.
Turning to the question of whether Sgt. Hinoguin was performing official functions at the
time he sustained the gunshot wound, it has already been pointed out above that the Line
of Duty Board of Officers of the 14th Infantry Battalion Headquarters had already
determined that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin had occurred "in line of duty." It may be noted
in this connection that a soldier on active duty status is really on 24 hours a day official
duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is
subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, 7 days a week, except,
of course, when he is on vacation leave status (which Sgt. Hinoguin was not). 'Thus, we
think that the work-connected character of Sgt. Hinoguins injury and death was not
effectively precluded by the simple circumstance that he was on an overnight pass to go to
the home of Dft. Alibuyog, a soldier under his own command. Sgt. Hinoguin did not
effectively cease performing "official functions" because he was granted a pass. While
going to a fellow soldier's home for a few hours for a meal and some drinks was not a
specificmilitary duty, he was nonetheless in the course of performance of official functions.
Indeed, it appears to us that a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he
is shown to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily
by, e.g., going on an approved vacation leave. 8 Even vacation leave may, it should be
remembered, be preterminated by superior orders.

More generally, a soldier in the Armed Forces must accept certain risks, for instance, that
he will be fired upon by forces hostile to the State or the Government. That is not, of
course, the only ask that he is compelled to accept by the very nature of his occupation or
profession as a soldier. Most of the persons around him are necessarily also members of
the Armed Forces who carry firearms, too. In other words, a soldier must also assume the
risk of being accidentally fired upon by his fellow soldiers. This is reasonably regarded as
a hazard or risk inherent in his employment as a soldier.

We hold, therefore, that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin that resulted from his being hit by an
accidental discharge of the M-16 of Dft. Alibuyog, in the circumstances of this case, arose
out of and in the course of his employment as a soldier on active duty status in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and hence compensable.

It may be well to add that what we have written above in respect of performance of official
functions of members of the Armed Forces must be understood in the context of the
specific purpose at hand, that is, the interpretation and application of the compensation
provisions of the Labor Code and applicable related regulations. It is commonplace that
those provisions should, to the extent possible, be given the interpretation most likely to
effectuate the beneficient and humanitarian purposes infusing the Labor Code.

ACCORDINGLY, the Decision of the GSIS taken through its Claim Review Committee
dated 20 November 1986 and the Decision dated 24 May 1988 of the Employees'
Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 3275, are hereby REVERSED and the GSIS
is hereby DIRECTED to award all applicable benefits in respect of the death of Sgt.
Lemick G. Hinoguin, to petitioner. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 128524. April 20, 1999]
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and FELONILA ALEGRE, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
May a moonlighting policemans death be considered compensable? This is the crux
of the controversy now at bar.
The records[1].1 disclose that private respondent Felonila Alegres deceased
husband, SPO2 Florencio A. Alegre, was a police officer assigned to the Philippine
National Police station in the town of Vigan, Ilocos Sur. On that fateful day of December 6,
1994, he was driving his tricycle and ferrying passengers within the vicinity of Imelda
Commercial Complex when SPO4 Alejandro Tenorio, Jr., Team/Desk Officer of the Police
Assistance Center located at said complex, confronted him regarding his tour of
duty. SPO2 Alegre allegedly snubbed SPO4 Tenorio and even directed curse words upon
the latter. A verbal tussle then ensued between the two which led to the fatal shooting of
the deceased police officer.
On account of her husbands death, private respondent seasonably filed a claim for
death benefits with petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 626. In its decision on August 7, 1995, the GSIS, however, denied
the claim on the ground that at the time of SPO2 Alegres death, he was performing a
personal activity which was not work-connected. Subsequent appeal to the Employees
Compensation Commission (ECC) proved futile as said body, in a decision dated May 9,
1996, merely affirmed the ruling of the GSIS.
Private respondent finally obtained a favorable ruling in the Court of Appeals when
on February 28, 1997, the appellate court reversed[2] the ECCs decision and ruled that
SPO2 Alegres death was work-connected and, therefore, compensable. Citing Nitura v.
Employees Compensation Commission[3] and Employees Compensation Commission v.
Court of Appeals,[4] the appellate court explained the conclusion arrived at, thus:
[T]he Supreme Court held that the concept of a workplace cannot always be literally
applied to a person in active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in
an assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office.
It is our considered view that, as applied to a peace officer, his work place is not confined
to the police precinct or station but to any place where his services, as a lawman, to
maintain peace and security, are required.
At the time of his death, Alegre was driving a tricycle at the northeastern part of the Imelda
Commercial Complex where the police assistance center is located. There can be no
dispute therefore that he met his death literally in his place of work.
It is true that the deceased was driving his tricycle, with passengers aboard, when he was
accosted by another police officer. This would lend some semblance of viability to the
argument that he was not in the performance of official duty at the time.
However, the argument, though initially plausible, overlooks the fact that policemen, by the
nature of their functions, are deemed to be on a round-the-clock duty.
Aggrieved, GSIS comes to us on petition for review on certiorari reiterating its
position that SPO2 Alegres death lacks the requisite element of compensability which is,
that the activity being performed at the time of death must be work-connected.
We grant the petition.
As stated at the outset, the sole issue for the Courts resolution is whether the death
of SPO2 Alegre is compensable pursuant to the applicable laws and regulations.
Under the pertinent guidelines of the ECC on compensability, it is provided that for
the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the
result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions:
(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work
requires him to be;
(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and
(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been
executing an order for the employer.[5]
Actually, jurisprudence is rather scant with respect to the above rules application in
the case of police officers. Nevertheless, owing to the similarity of functions, that is, to
keep peace and order, and the risks assumed, the Court has treated police officers similar
to members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines with regard to the compensability of
their deaths. Thus, echoingHinoguin v. Employees Compensation Commission,[6] a case
involving a soldier who was accidentally fired at by a fellow soldier, we held in Employees
Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals,[7] that members of the national police are
by the nature of their functions technically on duty 24 hours a day because policemen are
subject to call at any time and may be asked by their superiors or by any distressed citizen
to assist in maintaining the peace and security of the community.
Upon examination of the Court of Appeals reasoning, we believe that the appellate
court committed reversible error in applying the precepts enunciated in the cited
cases. While we agree that policemen, like soldiers, are at the beck and call of public duty
as peace officers and technically on duty round-the-clock, the same does not justify the
grant of compensation benefits for the death of SPO2 Alegre based on the facts disclosed
by the records. For clarity, a review of the cases relevant to the matter at hand is in order.
In Hinoguin, the deceased Philippine Army soldier, Sgt. Limec Hinoguin, together
with two other members of his detachment, sought and were orally granted permission by
the commanding officer of their company to leave their station in Carranglan, Nueva Ecija
to go on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya. As they were returning to their
headquarters, one of his companions, not knowing that his M-16 rifle was on semi-
automatic mode, accidentally pulled the trigger and shot Sgt. Hinoguin who then died as a
result thereof. Ruling for the grant of death compensation benefits, this Court held:
The concept of a workplace referred to in Ground 1, for instance, cannot always be literally
applied to a soldier on active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in
assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office. Obviously, a soldier must
go where his company is stationed. In the instant case, Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya was not, of
course, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. Aritao being approximately 1-1/2 hours away from the
latter by public transportation. But Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog had
permission from their Commanding Officer to proceed to Aritao, and it appears to us that a
place which soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different,
legally speaking, from a place where they arerequired to go by their commanding
officer. We note that the three (3) soldiers were on an overnight pass which, notably, they
did not utilize in full. They were not on vacation leave. Moreover, they were required or
authorized to carry their firearms with which presumably they were to defend themselves if
NPA elements happened to attack them while en route to and from Aritao or with which to
attack and seek to capture such NPA elements as they might encounter. Indeed, if the
three (3) soldiers had in fact encountered NPAs while on their way to or from Aritao and
been fired upon by them and if Sgt. Hinoguin had been killed by an NPA bullet, we do not
believe that respondent GSIS would have had any difficulty in holding the death a
compensable one.
Then came the case of Nitura, likewise involving a member of the Philippine Army,
Pfc. Regino S. Nitura, who was assigned at Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del
Norte. At the time he met his death, he was instructed by his battalion commander to
check on several personnel of his command post who were then attending a dance party
in Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City.But on his way back to the camp, he passed, crossed
and fell from a hanging wooden bridge which accident caused his death. Reversing the
ECC which earlier denied death benefits to the deceaseds widow, the Court ruled:
A soldier must go where his company is stationed. In the case at bar, Pfc. Nituras station
was at Basagan, Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte. But then his presence at the site of the
accident was with the permission of his superior officer having been directed to go to
Barangay San Jose, Dipolog City. In carrying out said directive, he had to pass by the
hanging bridge which connects the two places. As held in the Hinoguin case (supra.), a
place where soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different,
legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer.
As to the question of whether or not he was performing an official function at the time of
the incident, it has been held that a soldier on active duty status is really on a 24 hours a
day official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a
day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, seven (7)
days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status. Thus, a soldier
should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and
unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by going on approved vacation
leave.
The more recent case which was cited by the appellate court in support of its
decision is Employees Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals. This time, the
claim for death compensation benefits was made in behalf of a deceased police officer,
P/Sgt. Wilfredo Alvaran, who, at the time of his death, was a member of the Mandaluyong
Police Station but assigned to the Pasig Provincial Jail. Findings showed that the
deceased brought his son to the Mandaluyong Police Station for interview because the
latter was involved in a stabbing incident. While in front of the said station, the deceased
was approached by another policeman and shot him to death. Both the GSIS and the ECC
denied the claim by the deceaseds widow on the ground that Sgt. Alvaran was plainly
acting as a father to his son and that he was in a place where he was not required to
be. The Court of Appeals reversed said denial which decision was affirmed by this Court,
declaring that:
But for claritys sake and as a guide for future cases, we hereby hold that members of the
national police, like P/Sgt. Alvaran, are by the nature of their functions technically on duty
24 hours a day. Except when they are on vacation leave, policemen are subject to call at
anytime and may be asked by their superiors or by any distressed citizen to assist in
maintaining the peace and security of the community.
xxxxxxxxx
We hold that by analogy and for purposes of granting compensation under P. D. No. 626,
as amended, policemen should be treated in the same manner as soldiers.
While it is true that, geographically speaking, P/Sgt Alvaran was not actually at his
assigned post at the Pasig Provincial Jail when he was attacked and killed, it could not
also be denied that in bringing his son --- as a suspect in a case --- to the police station for
questioning to shed light on a stabbing incident, he was not merely acting as father but as
a peace officer.
From the foregoing cases, it can be gleaned that the Court did not justify its grant of
death benefits merely on account of the rule that soldiers or policemen, as the case may
be, are virtually working round-the-clock. Note that the Court likewise attempted in each
case to find a reasonable nexus between the absence of the deceased from his assigned
place of work and the incident that led to his death.
In Hinoguin, the connection between his absence from the camp where he was
assigned and the place where he was accidentally shot was the permission duly given to
him and his companions by the camp commander to go on overnight pass. According to
the Court, a place which soldiers have secured lawful permission cannot be very different,
legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer
and, hence, the deceased is to be considered as still in the performance of his official
functions.
The same thing can be said of Nitura where the deceased had to go outside of his
station on permission and directive by his superior officer to check on several personnel of
his command who were then attending a dance party.
As for P/Sgt. Alvaran in the Employees Compensation Commission case, although
he was not given any directive or permission by a superior officer to be at the
Mandaluyong Police Station, his presence there was nonetheless justified by the
peacekeeping nature of the matter he was attending to at the time that he was attacked
and shot to death, that is, bringing his son to the police station to answer for a crime, a
basic duty which any policeman is expected and ought to perform.
 Taking together jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect
to claims for death benefits, namely: (a) that the employee must be at the place where his
work requires him to be; (b) that the employee must have been performing his official
functions; and (c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been
executing an order for the employer, it is not difficult to understand then why SPO2
Alegres widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the matter
SPO2 Alegre was attending to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for
a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in nature proceeding as it did from no
particular directive or permission of his superior officer. In the absence of such prior
authority as in the cases of Hinoguin and Nitura, or peacekeeping nature of the act
attended to by the policeman at the time he died even without the explicit permission or
directive of a superior officer, as in the case of P/Sgt. Alvaran, there is no justification for
holding that SPO2 Alegre met the requisites set forth in the ECC guidelines. That he may
be called upon at any time to render police work as he is considered to be on a round-the-
clock duty and was not on an approved vacation leave will not change the conclusion
arrived at considering that he was not placed in a situation where he was required to
exercise his authority and duty as a policeman. In fact, he was refusing to render one
pointing out that he already complied with the duty detail.[8] At any rate, the 24-hour duty
doctrine, as applied to policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact validation
of their acts to place them within the scope of the guidelines rather than a blanket license
to benefit them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths. In other words, the 24-
hour duty doctrine should not be sweepingly applied to all acts and circumstances causing
the death of a police officer but only to those which, although not on official line of duty,
are nonetheless basically police service in character.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 42003 dated February 28, 1997, is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
Merlitas condition constrained her to retire from service in April 1998. Her medical
GOVERNMENT SERVICE G.R. No. 154385 examiners considered her disability as total and permanent. [9] On account of her
INSURANCE SYSTEM, illness, Merlitafiled a claim with GSIS for compensation benefits which was denied on the
Petitioner, Present: ground that Urolithiasis is not work-related. Merlita sought reconsideration, but it was
similarly denied. On appeal, the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) likewise
QUISUMBING, J., rejected Merlitas claim,[10] the pertinent portions of whose decision read:
Chairperson,
CARPIO, Viewed against the foregoing, we can safely conclude that the
- versus - CARPIO MORALES, development of appellants Urolithiasis was not due to factors present
TINGA, and in her workplace or the nature of her employment as a teacher.
VELASCO, JR., JJ. Familial or hereditary predisposition have been noted in the
MERLITA PENTECOSTES, development of this disease, thus, we believe that the respondent
Substituted by Jaime R. Pentecostes, System correctly ruled against compensability.
Respondent. Promulgated:
August 24, 2007 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent
System appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, and the instant case is
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x dismissed for lack of merit.[11]

Aggrieved, Merlita interposed an appeal in December 1999 before the Court of

DECISION Appeals insisting that the conditions of her work greatly increased the risk of contracting
the ailment.[12] A couple of days later, Merlita died and was substituted by her husband and
TINGA, J.: six (6) children.[13]

In this Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner The Court of Appeals sustained Merlitas position, reversed the decision of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) assails the Decision[2] dated 11 April ECC, and declared her heirs entitled to the compensation benefits under Presidential
2002 of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 65840 and its Decree (P.D.) No. 626, as amended.[14] The appellate court stated:
Resolution[3] dated 17 July 2002 denying its Motion for Reconsideration.
It can be stressed that Merlita Pentecostes, when she commenced
Following are the factual and legal antecedents, as culled from the decision of the Court of her career as a public school elementary teacher, first as a substitute
Appeals. classroom teacher from 1980 to 1984, then as a regular classroom
teacher up to the time she went out of service in 1998 because of her
Respondent Merlita Pentecostes (Merlita) was 32 years old when she joined the serious kidney disease was, at the age of 32 years, young and in
government service in 1980 as a public school elementary teacher assigned to the remote good perfect healthy condition. In the fourteen (14) years of teaching
and mountainous barangay elementary schools of the towns of Basud, Imelda, Labo and she was assigned in the arid, rural, tropical and
Jose Panganiban, all in the province of Camarines Norte. In 1995, Merlita was assigned to mountainous barangays of Basud, Labo, Imelda and
the urban town of Daet, Camarines Norte where she retired from service on 24 April Jose Panganiban, all far-flung towns of Camarines Norte where the
1998 on account of her serious malady. While assigned at the said mountainous petitioner has to regularly walk daily an exhausting, dehydrating, and
towns, Merlita had to walk six (6) kilometers daily to and from the barangay elementary lung-busting six (6) kilometers stretch to and from
school where she taught and her temporary residence in the poblacion.[4] In said the barangay elementary school and place of her temporary
locales, Merlitas only source of drinking water came from a deep well. Merlita frequently residence in thePoblacion of the municipality of said towns. A daily
experienced urinary tract infections.[5] routine for fourteen (14) years which strained her kidneys coupled
with drinking unchlorinated and uncertain impurities-filled water from
From 15 November 1997 to 8 December 1997, Merlita was confined at deep and shallow water wells and the stress of working away from the
the Bicol Medical Center in Naga City due to Chronic Renal Failure secondary to loving arms and bliss of her family who lived
Obstructive UropathySecondary to Urolithiasis.[6] Consequently, Merlitas right kidney was in Daet, Camarines Norte. This dehydrating condition of walking six
removed by way of a nephrectomy in October 1998.[7] (6) kilometers to and from the arduous and hot
mountainous barangays on the aforesaid towns of Camarines Norte
Merlitas left kidney also failed because of Nephrolithiasis (Renal Stones or Urolithiasis). put heavy toll on petitioners kidneys by reducing urine volume and
On account of her condition, she underwent hemodialysis (a procedure where blood with higher secretion and concentration of insoluble sediments-
the excretory products is removed and replaced with fresh blood) two (2) times a week predisposing factors which contributed and increased the risk of
which is an expensive procedure done not to cure the disease but to ease the pain, to petitioners contracting Urolithiasis (a renal disease attributed to the
lessen the retention of fluids, to minimize further complications, and to lengthen the development of calcium, oxalates, uric acid and/or cystine stones, in
chance of survival of Merlita.[8] the calyces, papillae, ureter, urinary bladder and other renal parts).
 This undue strain on petitioners kidneys predisposed petitioner to
develop this malady, Urolithiasis, which as a consequence
suppressed the kidney functions by way of renal failure. This
predisposing factor of chronic dehydration which contributed and
increased the risk of the petitioner to develop Urolithiasis and Renal
Failure has been confirmed by medical experts and authorities in their
respective fields in medicine x x x.[15]
xxxx
Moreover, since the cause or causes of Urolithiasis is or are still
unknown, no proof can be presented because the law does not
require the impossible.[16]
In the instant petition, GSIS reiterates its previous submission that Merlita failed
to discharge the burden of presenting evidence that her ailment was caused by her
work.[17]Moreover, it states that the sad plight and the deterioration of the GSIS State
Insurance Fund should not be aggravated by approving claims of ailments not intended by
law to be covered.[18]
In her Comment[19] dated 20 January 2003, Merlita maintains that the
development of urolithiasis as being secondary to chronic renal failure has no clear
etiologic factor so as to a create a conclusive causal connection leading to the disease.
Since the cause or causes of the disease is or are still unknown, no proof can be
presented because the law does not require the impossible.[20]
In a Resolution[21] dated 19 March 2007, the Court noted the death
of Merlitas husband and substitute respondent, Jaime P. Pentecostes, Sr. He was
substituted by one of his children, Jaime R. Pentecostes, Jr., as party respondent.
The sole issue before the Court is whether Merlita is entitled to compensation
benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended.
After a thorough evaluation of the case and assessment of the arguments of the
parties, the Court finds for Merlita and affirms the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Section 1(b), Rule III implementing P.D. 626, as amended, provides:
For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational
disease listed under Annex A of these Rules with the conditions set
therein satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.
Under the above Rule, for Merlitas sickness and resulting disability to be compensable,
there must be proof that (a) her sickness was the result of an occupational disease listed
under Annex A of the Rules of Employees Compensation, or (b) the risk of contracting the
disease was increased by her working conditions. This means that if the claimants illness
or disease is not included in Annex A, then he is entitled to compensation only if he can
prove that the risk of contracting the illness or disease was increased by his working
conditions.[22] The law does not require that the connection be established with absolute
certainty or that a direct causal relation be shown. It is enough that the theory upon which
the claim is based is probable. Probability, not certainty, is the touchstone.[23]
Pertinently, the Court stated in the case of Employees Compensation Commission v.
Court of Appeals:[24]
Despite the abandonment of the presumption
of compensability established by the old law, the present law has
not ceased to be an employees compensation law or a social
legislation; hence, the liberality of the law in favor of the working man
and woman still prevails, and the official agency charged by law to
implement the constitutional guarantee of social justice should adopt
a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for
compensability, especially in light of the compassionate policy
towards labor which the 1987 Constitution vivifies and
enhances. Elsewise stated, a humanitarian impulse, dictated by no
less than the Constitution itself under the social justice policy, calls for
a liberal and sympathetic approach to legitimate appeals of disabled
public servants; or that all doubts to the right to compensation must
be resolved in favor of the employee or laborer. Verily, the policy is to
extend the applicability of the law on employees compensation to as
many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder.[25]
Concededly, Merlitas illness, urolithiasis, is not among those listed in the table of
occupational diseases embodied in Annex A of the Rules on Employees Compensation.
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals in its finding that Merlita was
able to prove by substantial evidence that her working conditions increased the risk of
contracting the disease. Substantial evidence is the amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify the conclusion. [26]
Urolithiasis is the process of forming stones in the kidney, bladder and/or urethra (urinary
tract).[27] It is the formation of urinary calculi at any level of the urinary tract. Urinary calculi
(stones) are worldwide in its distribution but are more common in some geographic areas
as in parts of United States, South Africa, Pakistan, India and Southeast Asia. Nutritional
and environmental factors seem to play a role in stone formation.[28] The prevalence of
urinary calculi is higher in those who live in mountainous, desert or tropical areas. Higher
temperatures increase perspiration, which may result in concentrated urine. This promotes
increased urinary crystallization. The mineral content of water also may contribute to the
causes of stone disease. Some studies state that excessive water hardness causes a
greater incidence of stone disease.[29]
The 15th Edition of Smiths General Urology states that fluid intake and urine output may
have an effect on urinary stone disease. It also states that individuals living in hot climates
are prone to dehydration, which results in an increased incidence of urinary stones.
Although heat may cause a higher fluid intake, sweat loss results in lowered voided
volumes. Hot climates usually expose people to more ultraviolet light, increasing vitamin
D3 production. Increased calcium and oxalate excretion has been correlated with WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 11 April 2002 of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of
increased exposure time to sunlight.[30] Those who become dehydrated due to strenuous Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 65840, ordering the Government Service Insurance System
physical activity are also particularly at risk of developing stones. [31] to pay the heirs of Merlita Pentecostes compensation benefits as provided under P.D. No.
626, as amended, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
According to the 13th Edition of Harrisons Principles of Internal Medicine, Vol.
2. (International Edition, 1994), urinary stones usually arise because of the breakdown of a
delicate balance. The kidneys must conserve water, but they also must excrete materials
that have a low solubility. These two opposing requirements must be balanced during
adaptation to diet, climate and activity.[32]

The foregoing medical reports establish that the environment (climate and geographical
location), water or fluid intake and activity are important factors in the development or
inhibition of urinary stone disease. The regularity of urination likewise plays an important
role since withholding urine for sometime may disturb the balance. [33] Merlita was assigned
to schools located in mountainous barangays which required her to walk daily a
considerable distance. Considering the climate, the location of her workplace, i.e.
mountainous and far-flung, and the strenuous walk she had to daily endure, she was
prone to dehydration which could have led to the formation of urinary stones. Additionally,
in said place the only available drinking water was the water taken from the deep well
which in all probability was hard water, containing minerals which contribute to the
formation of kidney stones. Merlita could also have missed the important habit of

regular urination. Teachers have a tendency to sit for hours on end, and to put off or
postpone emptying their bladders when it interferes with their teaching hours or
preparation of lesson plans.[34] Thus, while the Court concedes that the nature
of Merlitas work as a teacher does not per se ordinarily cause urolithiasis, the risk of
contracting the same in this case was aggravated by the peculiar conditions and location
of her workplace, which required her to undergo a five-day week schedule of strenuous
and protracted walking.

Finally, it is well to recall the Courts exhortation in Vicente v. Employees Compensation

Commission[35] reiterated in the case of Employees Compensation Commission v. Court of
Appeals[36] wherein the Court ruled that therein private respondents job as an NBI
Engineer, which included field work, increased her risk of contracting uterelothiasis, also a
urinary stone disease, to wit:

The court takes this occasion to stress once more its abiding concern
for the welfare of government workers, especially the humble rank
and file, whose patience, industry, and dedication to duty have often
gone unheralded, but who, in spite of very little recognition, plod on
dutifully to perform their appointed tasks. It is for this reason that the
sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries, and
the law, by its own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in
their favor. It is likewise for this reason that the Court disposes of this
case and ends a workingmans struggle for his just dues.[37]
G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES,
INC., Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul the March 17, 2010
Decision1 of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. SL-
18483-0218-10, entitled Bernardina P. Bartolome v. Social Security System (SSS)
[Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.}, declaring that petitioner is not a beneficiary of the
deceased employee under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise known as the
Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by PD 626.2
The Facts
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by Scanmar
Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As
such, he was enrolled under the government's Employees' Compensation Program
(ECP).3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board the vessel
whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his untimely death the following day. 4
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P.
Bartolome, Johns biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a
claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San
Fernando City, La Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10,
20095 addressed to petitioner, denied the claim, stating:
We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim because you are no
longer considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by
CORNELIO COLCOL based on documents you submitted to us.
The denial was appealed tothe Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), which
affirmed the ruling of the SSS La Union Branch through the assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is hereby dismissed for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against
petitioners entitlement to the death benefits sought after under PD 626 on the ground she
can no longer be considered Johns primary beneficiary. As culled from the records, John
and his sister Elizabeth were adopted by their great grandfather, petitioners grandfather,
Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision7 in Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the
Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated February 4, 1985, which decree of adoption
attained finality.8 Consequently, as argued by the agencies, it is Cornelio who qualifies as
Johns primary beneficiary, not petitioner. Neither, the ECC reasoned, would petitioner
qualify as Johns secondary beneficiary even if it wereproven that Cornelio has already
passed away. As the ECC ratiocinated:
Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that beneficiaries are the
"dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary
beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parentsand subject to the restrictions
imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who
are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent acknowledged natural child
shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children
who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit."
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the legitimate parent of
the covered member, as provided for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules
on Employees Compensation. This Commission believes that the appellant is not
considered a legitimate parent of the deceased, having given up the latter for adoption to
Mr. Cornelio C. Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption divested her of the statusas the
legitimate parent of the deceased.
xxxx
In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent of the adopted
child shall now be upon the adopting parent. Hence, in this case, the legal parent referred
to by P.D. 626, as amended, as the beneficiary, who has the right to file the claim, is the
adoptive father of the deceased and not herein appellant.9 (Emphasis supplied)
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the
ECC.10 Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Honorable ECCs Decision is contrary to evidence on record.
II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the just, due and
lawful claims of the petitioner as a lawful beneficiary of her deceased biological
son.
 III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving due
course/denying petitioners otherwise meritorious motion for reconsideration. 11
In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological parents of the covered,
but legally adopted, employee considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in
appropriate cases, to receive the benefits under the ECP?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The ECCs factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record
To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioners claim for death
benefits is that eventhough she is Johns biological mother, it was allegedly not proven
that his adoptive parent, Cornelio, was no longer alive. As intimated by the ECC:
Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether the legally adoptive
parent, Mr. Colcol, is dead, which would immediately qualify the appellant [petitioner] for
Social Security benefits. Hence, absent such proof of death of the adoptive father, this
Commission will presume him to be alive and well, and as such, is the one entitled to
claim the benefit being the primary beneficiary of the deaceased. Thus, assuming that
appellant is indeed a qualified beneficiary under the Social Security law, in view of her
status as other beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit legally provided by law to the
primary beneficiary, in this case the adoptive father since he is still alive.
We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.
Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great
respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of
said administrative agenciesover matters falling under their jurisdiction.12 However, in the
extant case, the ECC had overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the petitioner
Cornelios death certificate.13
Based on Cornelios death certificate, it appears that Johns adoptive father died on
October 26, 1987,14 or only less than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on
February 4, 1985, which attained finality.15 As such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled
that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law
This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death benefits
claim in view of Johns work-related demise. The pertinent provision, in this regard, is
Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended, which reads:
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the context indicates otherwise:
xxxx
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children,
who are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to
the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate
descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent
acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are
no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit.
(Emphasis supplied)
Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the ECC "[T]o approve
rules and regulations governing the processing of claims and the settlement of disputes
arising therefrom as prescribed by the System," the ECC has issued the Amended Rules
on Employees Compensation, interpreting the above-cited provision as follows:
RULE XV BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and
determined atthe time of employees death.
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:
(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the
time of the employees death until he remarries; and
(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or
acknowledged natural children, who are unmarried not
gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21
years of age provided that he is incapacitated and
incapable of self - support due to physicalor mental defect
which is congenital or acquired during minority; Provided,
further, that a dependent acknowledged natural child shall
be considered as a primary beneficiary only when there are
no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible
for monthly income benefit; provided finally, that if there are
two or more acknowledged natural children, they shall be
counted from the youngest and without substitution, but not
exceeding five.
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:
(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon the
employee for regular support;
(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children
who are unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over 21
years of age, or over 21 years of age providedthat he is
incapacitated and incapable of self - support dueto physical
 or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during
minority. (Emphasis supplied)
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioners claim on the ground that she is no longer
the deceaseds legitimate parent, as required by the implementing rules. As held by the
ECC, the adoption decree severed the relation between John and petitioner, effectively
divesting her of the status of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of being a
secondary beneficiary.
We disagree.
a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation deviates
from the clear language of Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended
Examining the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation in light of the Labor Code,
as amended, it is at once apparent that the ECC indulged in an unauthorized
administrative legislation. In net effect, the ECC read into Art. 167 of the Code an
interpretation not contemplated by the provision. Pertinent in elucidating on this point
isArticle 7 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which reads:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not beexcused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall
be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are
not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.(Emphasis supplied)
As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco
Corporation16 that:
As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for
regulating the mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has been
enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in
harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the
two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law. (Emphasis supplied)
Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article
167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to refer to
"legitimate parents."
It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was resolved by this Court
in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court17 in this wise:
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general
acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In
accordancetherefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should beunderstood to
have a general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia
verba sunt generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction prevents us
from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus. xxx
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive
sense thanit is used and intended is not warranted by any rule ofinterpretation. Besides,
he further states that when the law intends to use the termin a more restrictive sense, it
qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil
Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not
only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context
indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense which as already
discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the afore-quoted
Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is usedand ought to be taken in its general sense and
cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The phrase
"dependent parents" should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or
illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one
should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are parents, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, biological or by adoption,who are in need of support or assistance.
Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not intend
to limit the phrase "dependent parents" to solely legitimate parents. At the risk of being
repetitive, Article 167 provides that "in their absence, the dependent parents and subject
to the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate
descendants who are secondary beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers contemplated
"dependent parents" to mean legitimate parents, then it would have simply said
descendants and not "legitimate descendants." The manner by which the provision in
question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase "dependent parents" was intended
to cover all parents legitimate, illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.
b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation is in
contravention of the equal protection clause
To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an affront to the
Constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws for the rule, as worded,
prevents the parents of an illegitimate child from claiming benefits under Art. 167 (j) of the
Labor Code, as amended by PD 626. To Our mind, such postulation cannot be
countenanced.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner.18 In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the
state to govern impartially, and it may not drawdistinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.19
The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal application of the
laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires isequality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test
of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane tothe purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification."20
In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate against
illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above-cited rule promulgated by the ECC that limits
the claim of benefits to the legitimate parents miserably failed the test of reasonableness
since the classification is not germane to the law being implemented. We see no pressing
government concern or interest that requires protection so as to warrant balancing the
rights of unmarried parents on one hand and the rationale behind the law on the other. On
the contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate, and the policy of PD 626 that
employees and their dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in the event of
work-connected disability or death - will be better served if Article 167 (j) of the Labor
Code is not so narrowly interpreted.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the legitimate
ones, there can be no other course of action to take other than to strikedown as
unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the
Amended Rules on Employees Compensation.
Petitioner qualifies as Johns dependent parent
In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted rule, the ECC
extended illegitimate parents an opportunity to file claims for and receive death benefitsby
equating dependency and legitimacy to the exercise of parental authority. Thus, as
insinuated by the ECC in its assailed Decision, had petitioner not given up John for
adoption, she could have still claimed death benefits under the law.
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate parents"
pertain to those who exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled under the
ECP.Itwas only in the assailed Decision wherein such qualification was made. In addition,
assuming arguendothat the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted
Labor Code provision to the deceaseds legitimate parents, and that the commission
properly equated legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner can still qualify as Johns
secondary beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years old, petitioners
parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail
the ECC missed, aside from Cornelios death, was that when the adoptive parent died less
than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4)
years of age.
Johns minority at the time of his adopters death is a significant factor in the case at bar.
Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor
of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption
is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of
adoption,21 who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed
away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological
parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 855222 (RA 8552),
otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission. If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the
parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the
Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal
rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be
extinguished. (emphasis added)
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of
custody is concerned.1wphi1 The manner herein of terminating the adopters parental
authority, unlike the grounds for rescission,23 justifies the retention of vested rights and
obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of
parental authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the
adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.
To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA 8552 was
enacted after Cornelios death. Truth be told, there is a lacuna in the law as to which
provision shall govern contingencies in all fours with the factual milieu of the instant
petition. Nevertheless, We are guided by the catena of cases and the state policies behind
RA 855224 wherein the paramount consideration is the best interest of the child, which We
invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of the child that
someone will remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter fail
or is rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the adoptee isstill
in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as in this case, death of the
adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to perform the role of a parent other
than the adoptees biological one.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is
severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are
not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, insome instances, are able
to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by
the following rules:
xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the
adopted concur withthe adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half tobe inherited
by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
xxx
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of
legal or intestate succession shall apply.
does not cover compensation for work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the
designation of beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626,
Johns deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a
way, considered petitioner as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence of
circumstances from Cornelios death during Johns minority, the restoration ofpetitioners
parental authority, the documents showing singularity of address, and Johns clear
intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary - effectively made petitioner, to Our mind,
entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent
parent.

Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcols death, which was prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his
parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.
All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal basis. Cornelios
adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the
benefits stemming from Johns death as a dependent parent given Cornelios untimely
demise during Johns minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death
benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein
petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010 Decision of the
succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits Employees' Compensation Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, is
arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estateof the
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC is hereby directed to release the benefits due to a
adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the secondary beneficiary of the deceased covered employee John Colcol to petitioner
policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis--vis the right to Bernardina P. Bartolome.
receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue
of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the
exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offsprings No costs.
adoptive parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of a minor child whose second
chance ata better life under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched from him by
SO ORDERED.
deaths cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted childs quality of life might have been better
off not being adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We
hold that Cornelios death at the time of Johnsminority resulted in the restoration of PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
petitioners parental authority over the adopted child. Associate Justice

On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioners dependence on John
can be established from the documentary evidence submitted to the ECC. As it appears in
the records, petitioner, prior to Johns adoption, was a housekeeper. Her late husband
died in 1984, leaving her to care for their seven (7) children. But since she was unable to
"give a bright future to her growing children" as a housekeeper, she consented to
Cornelios adoption of Johnand Elizabeth in 1985.

Following Cornelios death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner and John repeatedly
reported "Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their residence. In fact, this
veryaddress was used in Johns Death Certificate25 executed in Brazil, and in the Report
of Personal Injury or Loss of Life accomplished by the master of the vessel boarded by
John.26 Likewise, this is Johns known address as per the ECCs assailed
Decision.27Similarly, this same address was used by petitioner in filing her claim before the
SSS La Union branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC. Hence, it can be
assumed that aside from having been restored parental authority over John, petitioner
indeed actually execised the same, and that they lived together under one roof.

Moreover, John, in his SSS application,28 named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for
his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the "Social Security Law." While RA 8282
G.R. No. 196102 November 26, 2014
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner,
vs.
AURELIA Y. CALUMPIANO, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
1 2
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari are 1) the October 30, 2009 Decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 85908 which set aside the June 24, 2004
Decision3 of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. GM-
16174-0209-04 and ordered the payment of disability benefits to the herein respondent
Aurelia Y. Calumpiano; and 2) the CA's February 23, 2011 Resolution4 denying
reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision.
Factual Antecedents
As determined by the CA, the facts are as follows:
x x x Aurelia Y. Calumpiano5 was employed as Court Stenographer at the then Court of
First Instance ofSamar from January 5, 1972 until her retirement on March 30, 2002.
On March 7, 2002, shortly before her retirement, [respondent] filed before the Supreme
Court, an application for disability retirement on account of her ailment[s], Hypertensive
Cardiovascular Disease [and] Acute Angle Closure Glaucoma. To bolster her claim,
[respondent] submitted the medical certificates issued by her attending physicians, Dr.
Alfred I. Lim and Dr. Elmer Montes, both of whom are Op[h]thalmologists [at] Eastern
Samar Provincial Hospital. She submitted them together with the results of her perimetry
test, [a certificate of] which x x x was issued by Dr. Lim. On September 30, 2002, the
Supreme Court approved [respondents] application for disability retirement, under
Republic Act No. 8291 (New GSIS Act of 1997).
[Respondents] disability claim was forwarded to GSIS, 6 but the latter denied her claim for
the reason that hypertension and glaucoma, which were her illnesses, were not work[-
]related. Her motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the GSIS.
Petitioner filed an appeal [with] the ECC, which rendered the assailed Decision, 7 the
dispositive portion of which stated:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED
and the instant appeal dismissed for want of merit.
SO ORDERED.8
In dismissing respondents appeal, the ECC held:
"Glaucoma is characterized by an intraocular pressure sufficiently elevated to produce
intraocular damage. The three major categories of glaucoma are: (1) angle-closure
glaucoma, (2) open-angle glaucoma, and (3) congenital and juvenile glaucoma. Eyes that
develop primary angle glaucoma are anatomically predisposed to the condition. In primary
open-angle glaucoma, [the] angle appears open [and] does notseem to function properly.
The exact nature of obstruction has not yet been elucidated. Congenital glaucoma and
juvenile glaucoma are thought to be hereditary inmost cases, although infectious causes
are possible (rubella).["] (Pathologic Basis of Disease by Cotran, 6th edition, pages 1374-
1375)
"Hypertension is an increase in the blood pressure within the normal of less than 120/80
mm Hg as defined by the Joint National Committee VII. Primary risk factor for developing
hypertension is smoking. Other important risk factors are excess body weight, high salt
intake, nutritional factors, high alcohol consumption, physical inactivity and psychological
factors, including stress." (Principles of Internal Medicine)
To warrant compensability of ailment and its resulting sickness, disability or death under
P.D. 626, as amended, Rule III, Section 1(b) thereof, specifically provides that the ailment
must be listed by the Commission as an occupational disease with the conditions set forth
therein satisfied, otherwise, the conditions imposed under the Increased Risk Theory must
be complied with.
Appellant9 worked as a Court Stenographer III of the Supreme Court for thirty (30) years.
Her duties were no doubt stressful and the same may have caused her to develop her
ailment, hypertension. However, to make the same compensable, it is necessary that
there must be impairment of function of her body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and
brain resulting in her permanent disability. An examination of the appellants records would
show that she was not suffering from end[-]organ damage. This was shown in the x x x
report [of the ECG] that was taken on the appellant on January 21, 2002. Thus, the same
cannot be considered compensable and work-connected.
Likewise, her other ailment, Glaucoma[,] cannot also be considered work-connected.
Medical science has explained that it is characterized by an intraocular pressure
sufficiently elevatedto produce intraocular glaucoma. Here, there was nothing in her duties
that would cause or increase her risk of contracting the said ailment. 10
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In a Petition for Review11 filed with the CA and docketed therein as CAG.R. SP No. 85908,
respondent sought to set aside the aboveECC Decision, arguing that her illness is work-
connected which thus entitles her to disability compensation.
On October 30, 2009, the CA issued the herein assailed Decision containing the following
decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision is SET
ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to the Employees Compensation Commission for
the payment of the disability benefits due the Petitioner.
SO ORDERED.12
The CA held that while respondents hypertension and glaucoma are not listed as
occupational diseases under the implementing rules of the Employee Compensation
Program under Presidential Decree No. 62613 (PD 626), they were nonetheless contracted
and became aggravated during her employment as court stenographer; that under the
"increased risk theory," a "non-occupational disease" is compensable as long as proof of a
causal connection between the work and the ailment is established; 14 that respondents
illnesses are connected to her work, given the nature of and pressure involved in her
functions and duties as a court stenographer; that the certifications issued by the attending
physicians certifying to respondents illnesses should begiven credence; that the ECC
itself conceded that respondents duties were "no doubt stressful and the same may have
caused her to develop her ailment, hypertension;" and that while the presumption of
compensability has been abrogated with the issuance of PD 626, employees
compensation laws nevertheless constitute social legislation which allows for liberality in
interpretation to the benefit of the employee, and the policy has always been to extend the
applicability of said laws to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder.15
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied the same in its February
23, 2011 Resolution. Hence, the instant Petition.
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT
RESPONDENTS DISEASES (HYPERTENSION AND GLAUCOMA) ARE
COMPENSABLE UNDER THE INCREASED RISK THEORY; AND
2. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE
FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE ECC.16
Petitioners Arguments
Praying that the assailed CA pronouncements be set aside and that the June 24, 2004
Decision of the ECC be reinstated, petitioner argues in its Petition and Reply17 that
respondents hypertension and glaucoma are not compensable under the principle of
increased risk; that although essential hypertension is listed as an occupational disease, it
is not compensable per seas the conditions under Section 1, Rule III of the Amended
Rules on Employees Compensation18 should be satisfied; that hypertension is
compensable only "if it causes impairment of function of body organs like kidneys,
heart,eyes and brain, resulting in permanent disability;"19 that since respondent did not
suffer "end-organ damage" to or impairment of her kidneys, heart, eyes and brain which
resulted in permanent disability, her illness is not compensable; that respondents other
illness glaucoma is not compensable;20 and that the findings of the ECC should be
accorded respect and finality, as it has the expertise and knowledge on account of its
specialized jurisdiction overemployee compensation cases. Respondents Arguments
In her Comment,21 respondent seeks the denial of the Petition, arguing relevantly that the
"increased risk theory," which applies to her, has been upheld in several decided
cases;22 that in disability compensation cases, it is not the injury which is compensated for
but rather the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of the employees earning
capacity;23 and that while the ECC has the expertise and knowledge relative to
compensation cases, the CA isnot precluded from making its own assessment of the case
which goes against that of the ECCs. Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
In resolving this case, the case of Government Service Insurance System v. Baul 24 comes
into mind and lays the groundwork for a similar ruling. In said case, the Court held:
Cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are considered as occupational
diseases under Nos. 19 and 29, respectively, of Annex "A" of the Implementing Rules of
P.D. No. 626, as amended. Thus, it is not necessary that there be proof of causal relation
between the work and the illness which resulted in the respondents disability. The open-
ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. In general, a
covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.
However, although cerebro-vascular accident and essential hypertension are listed
occupational diseases, their compensability requires compliance with all the conditions set
forth inthe Rules. In short, both are qualified occupational diseases. For cerebro-vascular
accident, the claimant must prove the following: (1) there must be a history, which should
be proved, of trauma at work (to the head specifically) due to unusual and extraordinary
physical or mental strain or event, or undue exposure to noxious gases in industry; (2)
there must be a direct connection between the trauma or exertion in the course of the
employment and the cerebro-vascular attack; and (3) the trauma or exertion then and
there caused a brain hemorrhage. On the other hand, essential hypertension is
compensable only if it causes impairment of function of body organs like kidneys, heart,
eyes and brain, resultingin permanent disability, provided that, the following documents
substantiate it: (a) chest X-ray report; (b) ECG report; (c) blood chemistry report; (d)
funduscopy report; and (e) C-T scan.
The degree of proof required to validate the concurrence of the above-mentioned
conditions under P.D. No. 626 is merely substantial evidence, that is, such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. What
the law requires is a reasonable work connection and not direct causal relation. It is
enough that the hypothesis on which the workmens claim isbased is probable. As
correctly pointed out by the CA, probability, not the ultimate degree of certainty, is the test
of proof in compensation proceedings. For, in interpreting and carrying out the provisions
of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the primordial and
paramount consideration is the employees welfare. To safeguard the workers rights, any
doubt as to the proper interpretation and application must be resolved in [his] favor.
In the instant case, medical reports and drug prescriptions of respondents attending
physicians sufficiently support her claim for disability benefits. Neither the GSIS nor the
ECC convincingly deny their genuineness and due execution. The reports are made part
of the record and there is no showing that they are false or erroneous, or resorted to [for
the purpose] of deceiving the Court, hence, are entitled to due probative weight. The
failure of respondent to submit to a full medical examination, as required by the rules, to
substantiate her essential hypertension, is of no moment. The law is that laboratory
reports such as X-ray and ECG are not indispensable prerequisites to compensability, the
reason being that the strict rules of evidence need not be observed in claims for
compensation. Medical findings of the attending physician may be received in evidence
and used as proof[s] of the fact in dispute. The doctors certification as to the nature of
claimants disability may begiven credence as he orshe normally would not make
untruthful certification. Indeed, no physician inhis right mind and who is aware of the far[-
]reaching and serious effect that his or her statements would cause on a money claim
against a government agency would vouch indiscriminately without regarding his own
interests and protection.
Significantly, evenmedical authorities have established that the exact etiology of essential
hypertension cannot be accurately traced:
The term essential hypertension has been employed to indicate those cases of
hypertension for which a specific endocrine or renal basis cannot befound, and in which
the neural element may be only a mediator ofother influences. Since even this latter
relationship is not entirely clear, it is more properly listed for the moment in the category of
unknown etiology. The term essential hypertension defines simply by failing to define;
hence, it is of limited use except as an expression of our inability to understand adequately
the forces at work.25
It bears stressing, however, that medical experiments tracing the etiology of essential
hypertension show that there is a relationship between the sickness and the nature and
conditions of work. In this jurisdiction, we have already ruled in a number of cases the
strenuous office of a public school teacher. The case of Makabali v. Employees
Compensation Commission, which we have re-affirmed in the subsequent cases of De
Vera v. Employees Compensation Commission, Antiporda v. Workmens Compensation
Commission, and De la Torre v. Employees Compensation Commission, amply
summarized, thus:
xxxx
The fact that the essential hypertension of respondent worsened and resulted in a CVA at
the time she was already out of service is inconsequential. The main consideration for its
compensability is that her illness was contracted during and by reason ofher employment,
and any non-work related factor that contributed to its aggravation is immaterial.
Indeed, an employees disability may not manifest fully at one precise moment in time but
rather over a period of time. It is possible that an injury which at first was considered to be
temporary may later on become permanent or one who suffers a partial disability becomes
totally and permanently disabled from the same cause. The right to compensation extends
to disability due to disease supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting from
a compensable injury. Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of
employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of
the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to
claimants own negligence or misconduct. Simply stated, all medical consequences that
flow fromthe primary injury are compensable.
P.D. No. 626, as amended, is said to have abandoned the presumption of compensability
and the theory of aggravation prevalent under the Workmens Compensation Act.
Nonetheless, we ruled in Employees Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals,
that:
Despite the abandonment of the presumption of compensability established by the old law,
the present law has not ceased to be an employees compensation law or a social
legislation; hence, the liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman still
prevails, and the official agency charged by law to implement the constitutional guarantee
of social justice should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims
for compensability, especially in light of the compassionate policy towards labor which the
1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances. Elsewise stated, a humanitarian impulse,
dictated by no less than the Constitution itself under the social justice policy, calls for a
liberal and sympathetic approach to legitimate appeals of disabled public servants; or that
all doubts to the right to compensation must be resolved in favor of the employee or
laborer. Verily, the policy is to extend the applicability of the law on employees
compensation to as many employees who can avail of the benefits
thereunder.26 (Emphasis supplied)
Also, in Government Service Insurance System v. De Castro, 27 this Court made the
following pronouncement:
Other than the given facts, another undisputed aspect of the case is the status of the
ailments that precipitated De Castros separation from the military service CAD and
hypertensive cardiovascular disease. These are occupational diseases. No less than the
ECC itself confirmed the status of these ailments when it declared that "Contrary to the
ruling of the System, CAD is a form of cardiovascular disease which is included in the list
of Occupational Diseases." Essential hypertension is also listed under Item 29 in Annex
"A" of the Amended ECC Rules as an occupational disease.
Despite the compensable character of his ailments, both the GSIS and the ECC found De
Castros CAD to be non-work related and, therefore, noncompensable. To use the wording
of the ECC decision, it denied De Castros claim "due to the presence of factors which are
not work-related, such as smoking and alcohol consumption." De Castros own military
records triggered this conclusion ashis Admitting Notes, made when he entered the V.
Luna General Hospital due to chest pains and hypertension, were that he was a smoker
and a drinker.
As the CA did, we cannot accept the validity of this conclusion at face value because it
considers only one side the purely medical side of De Castros case and even then
may not be completely correct. The ECC itself, in its decision, recites that CAD is caused,
among others, by atherosclerosis of the coronary arteries that in turn, and lists the
following major causes: increasing age; male gender; cigarette smoking; lipid disorder due
to accumulation of too much fats in the body; hypertension or high blood pressure; insulin
resistance due to diabetes; family history ofCAD. The minor factors are: obesity; physical
inactivity; stress; menopausal estrogen deficiency; high carbohydrate intake; and alcohol.
We find it strange that both the ECC and the GSIS singled out the presence of smoking
and drinking as the factors that rendered De Castros ailments, otherwise listed as
occupational, to be non-compensable. To be sure, the causes of CAD and hypertension
that the ECC listed and explained in its decision cannot be denied; smoking and drinking
are undeniably among these causes. However, they are not the sole causes of CAD and
hypertension and, at least, not under the circumstances of the present case. For this
reason, we fear for the implication of the ECC ruling if it will prevail and be read as
definitive on the effects of smoking and drinkingon compensability issues, even on
diseases that are listed as occupational in character. The ruling raises the possible
reading that smoking and drinking, by themselves, are factors that can bar compensability.
We ask the question of whether these factors can be sole determinants of compensability
as the ECC has apparently failed to consider other factors such as age and gender from
among those that the ECC itself listed as major and minor causes of atherosclerosis and,
ultimately, of CAD. While age and gender are characteristics inherent in the person (and
thereby may be considered nonwork related factors), they also do affect a workers job
performance and may in this sense, together with stresses of the job, significantly
contribute to illnesses such as CAD and hypertension. To cite an example, some
workplace activities are appropriate only for the young (such as the lifting of heavy objects
although these may simply be office files), and when repeatedly undertaken by older
workers, may lead to ailments and disability. Thus, age coupled with an age-affected work
activity may lead to compensability. From this perspective, none of the ECCs listed
factors should be disregarded to the exclusion of others in determining compensability.
In any determination of compensability, the nature and characteristics of the job are as
important as raw medical findings and a claimants personal and social history. This is a
basic legal reality in workers compensation law. We are therefore surprised that the ECC
and the GSIS simply brushed aside the disability certification that the military issued with
respect to De Castros disability, based mainly on their primacy as the agencies with
expertise on workers compensation and disability issues. 28 (Emphasis supplied)
This case should not have been difficult for the petitioner to resolve on its own, given that
so many cases have been decided in the past which should have provided it the guiding
hand to decide disability cases on its own rightly instead of putting claimants in the
unfortunate position of having to chase the benefits they are clearly entitled to, and waste
years prosecuting their claims in spite of their adverse circumstances in life. This Court
should not have to parrot over and over again what clearly has been the settled rule; in
many ways, this is a waste of time, and it only indicates that petitioner has eithernot
learned its lesson, or it refuses to realize it.
type in final form the judges decisions, which activities extend beyond office hours and
without additional compensation or overtime pay30 all these contributed to the
development of her hypertension or hypertensive cardiovascular disease, as petitioner
would call it.31 Consequently, her age, work, and hypertension caused the impairment of
vision in both eyes due to "advanced to late stage glaucoma",which rendered her "legally
blind."32
Contrary to petitioners submissions, there appears to be a link between blood pressure
and the development of glaucoma, which leads the Court to conclude that respondents
glaucoma developed as a result of her hypertension.
Although intra ocular pressure (IOP) remains an important risk factor for glaucoma, it is
clear that other factors can also influence disease development and progression. More
recently, the role that blood pressure (BP) has in the genesis of glaucoma has attracted
attention, as it represents a clinically modifiable risk factor and thus provides the potential
for new treatment strategies beyond IOP reduction. The interplay between blood pressure
and IOP determines the ocular perfusion pressure (OPP), which regulates blood flow to
the optic nerve. If OPP is a more important determinant of ganglion cell injury than IOP,
then hypotension should exacerbate the detrimental effects of IOP elevation, whereas
hypertension should provide protection against IOP elevation. Epidemiological evidence
provides some conflicting outcomes of the role of systemic hypertension in the
development and progression of glaucoma. The most recent study showed that patients at
both extremes of the blood pressure spectrum show an increased prevalence of
glaucoma. Those with low blood pressure would have low OPP and thus reduced blood
flow; however, that people with hypertension also show increased risk is more difficult to
reconcile. This finding may reflect an inherent blood flow dysregulation secondary to
chronic hypertension that would render retinal blood flow less able to resist changes in
ocular perfusion pressure.33 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In recent years, weve learned a lot about ocular perfusion pressure (OPP), i.e., the
pressure difference between blood entering the eye and IOP. Its clear that three forces
OPP, IOP and blood pressure are interconnected in the glaucoma disease process.
The mechanics of that relationship, however, remain ambiguous.
xxxx

The ties between hypertension and glaucoma are less well established but the data, in
Applying Bauland De Castro to the instant case and looking at the factual milieu, the Court
addition to my involvement in a new study (discussed below), have convinced me they
agrees with the CAs conclusion and so declares that respondents illness is compensable.
probably do exist. Therefore, I believe potential hypertension, along with potential low
Respondent served the government for 30 long years; veritably, as the ECC itself said,
blood pressure, should be investigated in patients whose glaucoma continues to progress
"[h]er duties were no doubt stressful and the same may have caused her to develop her
despite what appears to be well controlled IOP.
ailment, hypertension"29 which is a listed occupational disease, contrary to the CAs
pronouncement that itis not. And because it is a listed occupational disease, the
"increased risk theory" does not apply again, contrary to the CAs declaration; no proof
of causation is required.

It can also be said that given respondents age at the time, and taking into account the
nature, working conditions, and pressures of her work as court stenographer which
requires her to faithfully record each and every day virtually all of the courts proceedings;
transcribe these notes immediately in order to make them available to the court or the
parties who require them; take down dictations by the judge, and transcribe them; and
BOARD RESOLUTION 3914-A
"Going to and Coming from the Place of Work"
Rule 13 WHEREAS, in several regular meetings that the Employees' Compensation
Commission (ECC) Board of Commissioners has held since 1987, the Board has taken
cognizance of the need to come up with a new, operative principle to underpin an
updated, definitive, fair and just policy aimed at causing the provision of benefits to
employees or covered members, who suffer injury or die in accidents, while they are in
route to, or coming from, the workplace;
and WHEREAS, during the 11th regular meeting of the ECC Board of Commissioners,
series of 1988, held on July 5,1988, The Board developed the general agreement that
whether an accident wherein an employee suffers an injury or dies, occurs proximate to,
or not, to his workplace, the assumption or operating principle is that such an employee
will not meet an accident and get injured or die, if he is not going to or coming from work,
or he does not carry out an official directive of his office or superiors in connection with his
work; On motion of Hon. Hector R. Inductivo, member-designate representing the Social
Security System (SSS), that Hon. Amante R. Rimando, member-designate representing
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), duly seconded, This Commission
resolves, as it hereby resolves, to approve as a policy that an injury or death of a covered
member in an accident while he is going to, or coming from, the workplace, shall
henceforth be duly considered compensable in the purview of PD 626, as amended, and
its approved, amended implementing rules, provided that the following conditions shall be
established definitively:
1. The act of the employee going to, or coming from, the workplace, must have been a
continuing act, that is, he had not been diverted therefrom by any other activity, and he
had not departed from his usual route to, or from, his workplace; and
2. Re: an employee on special errand, the special errand must have been official and in
connection with his work; and This Commission resolves, as it hereby resolves, that the
foregoing approved, updated criteria be duly incorporated into pertinent provisions of PD
626, as amended, and its approved, amended implementing rules; and This Commission
resolves, as it hereby resolves finally, that a copy of this resolution be duly furnished the
SSS and the GSIS, and all other concerned institutions, agencies or parties, for their
information and proper guidance. Approved and confirmed: July 5, 1988.
BOARD RESOLUTION 93-08-0068 14
Policy on Prescription, Permanent Total Disability, Increased Risk, Progression
(Deterioration) of Illness or Injury, Presumptive Death, Personal Comfort Doctrine
and Definition of Excepting Circumstances
RESOLVED, THAT the following policy instructions 01-93 of the Employees'
Compensation Commission (ECC) be approved effective immediately:
To insure proper implementation of Title II, Book IV, on Employees' Compensation and
State Insurance Fund of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, and its approved
implementing Rules and Regulations concerning the processing and adjudication of
employees' compensation (EC) cases, the following rules and regulations are hereby
issued for the guidance of all concerned:
1. PRESCRIPTION (See Sec. 6, Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation)
2. PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY (PTD):
2.1. As a rule, a sickness or injury requiring prolonged treatment shall be
deemed temporary total for a period of not more than one hundred twenty days (120)
days; thereafter, if disability still persists, the grant of temporary total disability (TTD)
benefits shall be continued up to a maximum of (240) days. Thereafter, if the claimant is
still sick and unable to report for work as established by proper medical examination, his
disability shall be considered permanent and total; and
2.2. If the employee retires or otherwise is separated from employment after the
first 120 days of temporary total disability (TTD), but before 240 days, he may present
himself to the System for another physical and medical examination, to determine if he is
entitled to additional benefits;
3. INCREASED RISK:
3.1. There is increased risk if the illness is caused or precipitated by factors
inherent in the employees' nature of work and working conditions. It does not include
aggravation of a pre-existing illness; and
3.2. To establish compensability of the claim under the increased risk theory,
the claimant must show proof of workconnection. The degree of proof required is merely
substantial evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a
conclusion;
4. PROGRESSION (DETERIORATION) OF ILLNESS OR INJURY:
4.1. Where the primary illness or injury is shown to have arisen in the course of
employment, every natural consequence that flows from the illness or injury shall be
deemed employment-related; and 15
4.2. Upon the death of a covered member during the period he was receiving
permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits, the remainder of his PPD benefits shall be
paid to his primary beneficiaries. However, the beneficiaries shall be entitled to the same
benefits enjoyed by the beneficiaries of a PTD pensioner upon his death: Provided, That,
the cause of death was the same illness or injury for which he was awarded PPD benefits;
5. PRESUMPTIVE DEATH: Guidelines on the Grant of EC benefits for the Beneficiaries of
Missing Persons while in the Performance of Duty during Calamity or Fatal Events
5.1. Coverage. These guidelines shall apply to all covered workers or
employees and uniformed personnel who had been reported missing while they were in
the performance of their duties during calamities or fatal events such as, but not limited to,
police or military operation, earthquake, typhoon, and volcanic eruption.
5.2. Period of Filing. The beneficiaries may file their claims for EC death with
funeral benefits within the three yearprescriptive period from the time the missing person
has been presumed dead after the lapse of four years from the occurrence of the incident.
In lieu of Death Certificate, the Systems may require the submission of certification from
any concerned government institution showing that the concerned employee or uniformed
personnel has been included in the list of missing persons due to a calamity or fatal event
and/or has been missing for a period of four years.
5.3. Grant of EC funeral benefits. EC funeral benefits shall be provided to the
qualified beneficiaries despite the absence of burial ceremony.
5.4. Non-Refund of EC benefits. If the missing employee appears or without
appearing his/her existence is proved, the EC death with funeral benefits which have been
previously provided shall no longer be returned by the concerned beneficiaries to the
Systems. (as provided under BR No. 14-07-20, July 28, 2014)
6. PERSONAL COMFORT DOCTRINE:
6.1. Acts performed by an employee within the time and space limits of his
employment, to minister to personal comfort, such as satisfaction of his thirst, hunger or
other physical demands, or to protect himself from excessive cold, shall be deemed
incidental to his employment and injuries the employee suffered in the performance of
such acts shall be 16 considered compensable and arising out of and in the course of
employment.
7. EXCEPTING CIRCUMSTANCES:
7.1. Intoxication Intoxication refers to a persons condition in being under the
influence of liquor or prohibited drugs to the extent that his acts, words or conduct is
impaired visibly, as to prevent him from physically and mentally engaging in the duties of
his employment;
7.2. Notorious Negligence Notorious negligence is something more than mere
or simple negligence. It signifies a deliberate act of the employee to disregard his own
safety, or ignore established warning or precaution; and
7.3. Willful Intent to Injure or Kill Oneself or Another This contemplates a
deliberate intent on the part of the employee to inflict injuries on himself or another; and
Resolved, finally, that this Board Resolution be duly circularized immediately not only to
the administering agencies of the Employees Compensation Program (ECP) for the
private sector and the public sector, namely, the Social Security System (SSS) and the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), but to the general public as well, for
guidance of all concerned. Unanimously approved: Quezon City, Metro Manila, 05 August
1993
of a policy on the compensability of death of an employee due to assault in accordance
with the rulings of the Highest Court;
WHEREAS, Article 177 (c) empowers this Commission to approve rules and regulations
governing the processing of EC claims; ON MOTION DULY MADE AND SECONDED,
This Commission RESOLVES AS IT HEREBY RESOLVED, to declare the compensability
of death of an employee due to an assault notwithstanding the fact the motive is personal
in nature if the same occurred in any of the following situations, in addition to those
provided under Item II of Circular No. 03-079 dated 22 July 2009: 1. The employee was at
his assigned/designated workplace, or at a place where his work requires him to be; 2.
The employee was executing an order from the employer regardless of the time and place
of the incident, or in the performance of his official functions; or 3. The employee was
going to or coming from his workplace, subject to the existing guidelines of the same.
RESOLVES FURTHER, that copies of this Resolution be duly furnished to the concerned
agencies for information and appropriate action. APPROVED in the City of Makati, this
09th day of March 2012.

BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 12-03-08

Declaring The Compensability of Death of an Employee due to Assault When the
Same Occurred in the Course of the Performance of Official Functions
Notwithstanding the Fact that the Motive is Personal in Nature

WHEREAS, in the cases of Enao vs. ECC (G.R. No. L-46046, April 15, 1985), Lentejas vs.
ECC (G.R. No. 89168, May 14, 1991), and in the case of GSIS vs. Mecayer (G.R. No.
156182, April 13, 2007), the Supreme Court held, in substance, that the death of an
employee as a result of a murderous assault upon him/her by an enemy is still
compensable when the same occurred in the course of the performance of official
functions; WHEREAS, in those cases, the Supreme Court ruled that criminal intent should
not be regarded as a supervening cause that will nullify the compensability of the death of
an employee, who was attacked and killed at the place where his work required him to be,
and while in the course of performing his official duties; 40 WHEREAS, on 22 July 2009,
this Commission issued Circular No. 03-709, Guidelines in the Evaluation of Legal Claims,
included Death of an Employee due to Assault under Item II thereof, which provides:
A. The death of an employee as a result of a murderous assault is compensable when the
same occurred in the course of performance of official functions.
B. Motive of assault need not be established if the covered employee sustained injury
while:
1. the employee was at the assigned/designated workplaces; or
2. the employee was executing orders of employer, regardless of the time and
place of the incident.
C. Motive is important in cases where the covered employee was on vacation leave, off-
duty, or was at home when the incident happened. Disclosure of the motive is an aid in
determining in causal connection between the incident and the employment.

WHEREAS, in order to elaborate clearer guidelines and prevent further delay in resolving
meritorious claims at the level of the Systems, the Secretariat proposes the promulgation