2.

The Meaning of Philosophy and Phenomenology

At the end of his life, Scheler wrote that the central issue in his thought and writing was the question regarding the meaning of the human being (GW
IX, 9). This question not only guided his ever expanding philosophical endeavors, but also defined his approach and understanding of philosophy.
Like many of the Lebensphilosophen (philosophers of life) who had influenced him, Scheler strove to save philosophy and thought from the reductive
mindset of the positive sciences and to a degree, American pragmatism, a mindset that defined the human being as mere homo faber(tool-maker). The
human being is without a doubt a practical being, seeking to master and manipulate his or her environment to achieve desired results and avoid future
suffering. For Scheler, practical knowledge and practical consciousness are genetically the first form of knowledge for the individual. Yet, human
beings are not necessarily tied to practical affairs and have the ability to comprehend and regard the world in terms of its essence or being. Philosophy,
for Scheler, is the loving act of participation by the core of the human being in the essence of all things (GW V, 68). The move from the practical to
the philosophical is motivated by wonder, a concern for the world as it is in itself, a question of what the world means (GW VIII, 208).
Hence, what motivates philosophical thought is the love of a world full of wonder and the willingness to participate in its meaning. This loving
participation of philosophy is, however, distinct from the classical notion of love (eros) as a lack. Love is understood by Scheler here in terms of the
Christian sense of agape, loving as giving. The human being as a loving, philosophical being is not motivated to know by a sense of a lack, as is the
case with eros, but is rather motivated by the abundance and surfeit of the meaning of the world (GW VI, 84). Modernity's ethos of control and
domination has transformed the world into a mere object of utility. As a means to reawaken a sense of wonder, Scheler called for a rehabilitation of
virtue, in particular the virtues of humility and reverence (GW III, 15). The philosopher lives in reverence of the world, in astonishment of the worlds
inexhaustible depth and secrets (GW III, 26).
Philosophical thought attends to the core meaning of knowledge as a Seinsverhltnis, an ontological relation. Knowledge, according to Scheler, is a
relation between beings, a relation wherein a being participates in what another being is in itself (GW VIII, 203). It is the humble divesting of
oneself that opens one up to the other (GW VIII, 204) and presupposes the loving willingness to be open to that which is other.
Following Augustine, Scheler takes the emotional and affective life as foundational for any form of knowledge (GW VI, 87). Before the world is
known, it is first given. Love is that which opens the human being up to the world, to that which is other. This openness demonstrates that there is a
moral precondition for knowledge. Knowledge is possible only for a loving being (GW V, 83). This love is the movement of transcendence, a going
beyond oneself, an opening to ever richer meaning. Love is always already directed to the infinite, to absolute value and being (GW V, 90). With this
understanding of the relation of love to knowledge, Scheler declares that knowledge is ultimately from the divine and for the divine (GW VIII, 211).
It was not until he read Husserl's Logical Investigations and learned of the idea of phenomenology, however, that Scheler came upon a style of
thinking that best captured for him the loving disposition of philosophy. Although he was greatly indebted to Husserl's genius and originality, Scheler
was often critical of Husserl when describing the nature of phenomenology. For Scheler, phenomenology is unequivocally not a method, but an
attitude (GW X, 380). Grasping the meaning or essence of an object has meant, since Plato, a type of disengagement from or suspension of an object's
immediate and present existence. The intent of this disengagement is not to abstract from an object of cognition as it exists, but rather to look at the
object as it is in itself. Phenomenology cultivates a shift in seeing so that the world is no longer taken for granted, as it is in the natural worldview, but
is regarded critically. The phenomenological attitude does not negate the practical or the natural world and way of being. It merely holds the world
in abeyance and brackets it by suspending judgment. Such a suspension is motivated not by a disdain or a devaluation of the practical life, but by a
love of the world. It is in this respect that Scheler describes phenomenological attitude as a psychic technique comparable to Buddhist techniques of
suffering (GW VIII, 139).
Scheler shares the conviction with the others such as Adolf Reinach that the essential insight of phenomenology is that by bracketing the world, one
can intuitively and immediately grasp the essence of an object of cognition. This grasping of the object is never complete, but merely partial insight of
the thing itself (GW V, 199). Scheler rejects the Kantian and neo-Kantian position that all knowledge of an object is mediated and manufactured
knowledge. Whereas Modern thinkers suffer from a fundamental mistrust in the world, the phenomenologist assumes a fundamental trust. It is the
world that gives itself to intuition, beckoning us to participate ever more fully in its significance. By virtue of this loving trust, the world itself is given.
The phenomenological attitude is an expression of this trust and demonstrates that the human being is fundamentally open to that which is other.