50 IEEE WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS LETTERS, VOL. 2, NO.

1, FEBRUARY 2013

Probability of Strictly Positive Secrecy Capacity of the

Rician-Rician Fading Channel
Xian Liu, Senior Member, IEEE
AbstractCommunication security is critical in the marine
environment as information may be transmitted over large open
areas like high seas. In this letter, an analysis is conducted
Alice Bob
on the probability of secrecy capacity for wireless communi-
cations over the Rician fading channels. In particular, a closed-
form expression for the probability of strictly positive secrecy
capacity is derived. The result is applicable to the scenarios
of Rayleigh/Rayleigh, Rician/Rayleigh, Rayleigh/Rician, and Ri- Eve
cian/Rician.
Index TermsInformation-theoretic secrecy, Rician fading, Fig. 1. System model.
secrecy capacity, wireless communications.
Let the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of Bob
be U. In the case of Rician fading, the probability density
I. I NTRODUCTION function (PDF) of U takes the following form [7] (eq. 2.16):

W IRELESS communication plays an important role in

the surveillance and control systems deployed in the
marine environment. Currently there is an increasing concern
fU (u) = a(1 + ka ) exp(ka ) exp[a(1 + ka )u]
  
I0 2 aka (1 + ka )u , (u 0) (1)
with the information security in various marine projects in-
cluding offshore hurricane monitoring, offshore earthquake where a = 1/E(U ), ka is the Rician factor, and E(U ) stands
surveillance, offshore wind farms, etc. The security must be for the average of U . Accordingly, the cumulative distribution
strengthened since the involved transmission channels may function (CDF) of U can be expressed as [7] (p. 420):
  
be over high seas. In the marine environment, usually there FU (u) = 1 Q1 2ka , 2a(1 + ka )u , (2)
exists a line-of-sight (LOS) between the transmitter and the
receiver, thus the RF fading can be characterized by the Rician where Q1 (, ) is the first-order Marcum Q function, defined
distribution. In the present work, we conduct an analysis on as [7] (eq. 4.34):
the security of Rician channels in the context of information-   2

x + 2
theoretic secrecy (ITS). The notion of ITS can be traced back Q1 (, ) = x exp I0 (x)dx, (3)
to Shannons landmark work [1] and has been elaborated since 2
then by several researchers ( [2], [3], [4]). Comprehensive where I0 () is the modified Bessel function of the first kind
descriptions on developments of ITS with wireless and fading of order zero. Similarly, denote the instantaneous SNR of Eve
can be found in [5] and [6]. One of the key concepts in as W, then the PDF and CDF of W respectively are:
these studies is the secrecy capacity (SC), defined as the
largest communication rate achievable from the legitimate fW (w) = b(1 + kb ) exp(kb ) exp[b(1 + kb )w]
  
transmitter to the legitimate receiver, under the condition that I0 2 bkb (1 + kb )w , (w 0) (4)
the eavesdropper obtains no information.   
The rest of this letter is organized as follows. In Section FW (w) = 1 Q1 2kb , 2b(1 + kb )w , (5)
II, we derive a closed-form expression for the probability of
strictly positive secrecy capacity (SPSC). Then, in Section III, where b = 1/E(W ), kb is the Rician factor, and E(W ) stands
several simulation results are presented. Finally, the conclusion for the average of W .
is included in Section IV. Lemma 1 [6]: The SC for one realization of the SNR pair
(U, W ) of the quasi-static complex fading wiretap-channel is
given by:
II. S ECRECY C APACITY OF R ICIAN FADING 
log2 (1 + U ) log2 (1 + W ), (U > W )
H = (6)
In the present work, a generic wireless system consisting of 0. (U W )
three entities is considered: the legitimate transmitter (Alice),
the legitimate receiver (Bob), and an eavesdropper (Eve). The outage probability (OP) of SC is Poutage = 1 Ph ,
When Alice sends messages to Bob, Eve can intercept the where
information (Fig. 1). Ph = Pr(H > )

1+U
Manuscript received September 10, 2012. The associate editor coordinating = Pr ln >h , (7)
the review of this letter and approving it for publication was X. Wang. 1+W
X. Liu is with the Department of Systems Engineering, University of
Arkansas at Little Rock, USA (e-mail: xxliu@ualr.edu). where h = ln 2. The OP defined in (7) can be further
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/WCL.2012.101812.120660 elaborated to the following expression:
2162-2337/13$31.00 
c 2013 IEEE
LIU: PROBABILITY OF STRICTLY POSITIVE SECRECY CAPACITY OF THE RICIAN-RICIAN FADING CHANNEL 51

Note that in the above we have used an identity:

Ph   2
1+U Q1 (0, ) = exp . (13)
= Pr > exp(h) 2
1+W
= b(1 + kb ) exp(kb )
    III. P ERFORMANCE E VALUATION
exp[b(1 + kb )w]I0 2 bkb (1 + kb )w
0  The relative strength of the main channel compared to the
 
Q1 2ka , 2a(1 + ka )[exp(h)(1 + w) 1] dw. eavesdropper channel can be characterized by the ratio of the
average of U to the average of W , i.e.,
(8)
E(U ) b
The derivation of (8) is included in the Appendix. r = = . (14)
In secure communications, the probability of strictly pos- E(W ) a
itive secrecy capacity (SPSC) is a fundamental benchmark.
Then (10) can be rewritten as follows:
This probability can be obtained by setting h = 0 in (8):
  
2kb (1+ka ) 2ka r(1+kb )
P0 = b(1 + kb ) exp(kb ) exp[b(1 + kb )w] P0 = 1 Q1 r(1+kb )+(1+ka ) , r(1+kb )+(1+ka )
0    
   + r(1+kr(1+kb )
exp kb (1+ka )+rka (1+kb )
I0 2 bkb (1 + kb )w b )+(1+ka ) r(1+kb )+(1+ka )
 
   2 rka kb (1+kb )(1+ka )
Q1 2ka , 2a(1 + ka )w dw. (9) I0 r(1+kb )+(1+ka ) . (15)

Based on a pivotal formula found in Prices work [8] (eq. 3.5),

As a general formula, eq. (15) can be readily used for
we are able to derive a closed-form formula as follows:
  several scenarios. In the security problem under investigation,
2kb a(1+ka ) 2ka b(1+kb )
P0 = 1 Q1 b(1+kb )+a(1+ka ) , b(1+kb )+a(1+ka )
one of the representative scenarios is ka > kb . First, for the
    case of kb = 0, eq. (15) is reduced to:
b(1+kb ) akb (1+ka )+bka (1+kb )
+ b(1+kb )+a(1+ka ) exp b(1+kb )+a(1+ka )

  r
2 abka kb (1+kb )(1+ka ) P0 = 1 + 1
I0 b(1+kb )+a(1+ka ) . (10) r + 1 + ka
 
r(r + 1)
The derivation outline of (10) is included in the Appendix. exp(r) exp . (16)
r + 1 + ka
We note that the Marcum Q function is supported by most
engineering mathematics software packages, including Matlab. The impact of ka on P0 can be analytically evaluated by
The availability of a closed-form expedites many procedures  
in numerical simulation. P0 ka r2 r(r + 1)
= exp(r) exp .(17)
In the communication theory, the Rician factor k is defined ka (r + 1 + ka )3 r + 1 + ka
as the ratio of the signal power of the dominant path to the
sum of scattered power. The values of k up to 16 (about 12 dB) Since the value of (17) is always positive, it is concluded
were reported in the literature. On the other hand, when k = that P0 will increase as ka increases. This result is especially
0, the Rician distribution becomes the Rayleigh distribution. important in the regime of r < 1, since it implies that the
Therefore, (10) can be used to characterize the following four secrecy can still be improved even when the eavesdropper
cases: channel is stronger than the main channel on the average. The
1) Rayleigh/Rayleigh (ka = kb = 0); similar result can also be obtained for the case of kb > 0.
2) Rayleigh/Rician (ka = 0, kb > 0); However, it is cumbersome to conduct an analysis like (17).
3) Rician/Rayleigh (ka > 0, kb = 0); So we turn to the numerical means. To gain an insight for the
4) Rician/Rician (ka > 0, kb > 0). impact of the eavesdropper channel, eq. (15) can be rewritten
as follows:
In particular, for the first case, (10) could be reduced to:
 
E(U ) 2cka (1+ka ) 2ka r(1+cka )
P0 =
b
= . (11) P0 = 1 Q1 r(1+cka )+1+ka , r(1+cka )+1+ka
b+a E(U ) + E(W )    
r(1+cka ) rka (1+cka )+cka (1+ka )
+ r(1+cka )+1+ka exp r(1+cka )+1+ka
This is just the result reported in [6] (eq. 7). The second case  
is not representative in practice. For the third case, (10) could 2ka cr(1+cka )(1+ka )
I0 r(1+cka )+1+ka , (18)
be simplified to:
 
bka
P0 = 1 exp where c = kb /ka . Three example profiles of (18) are illus-
b + a(1 + ka )
    trated in Figs. 2 through 4. It is observed that the probability
b bka of SPSC is nonzero even when r < 1. Secondly, P0 will
+ exp
b + a(1 + ka ) b + a(1 + ka ) increase as ka increases. Finally, as kb decreases while ka is
   
a(1 + ka ) bka fixed, P0 will increase in the regime of r < 1 but tend to be
= 1 exp (12)
.
b + a(1 + ka ) b + a(1 + ka ) flat in the regime of r > 1.
52 IEEE WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS LETTERS, VOL. 2, NO. 1, FEBRUARY 2013

k =2 k = 10
a a

0.8 1

0.8
0.6

0.6
0.4
P0

0
P
0.4

0.2
0.2

0 0
2 2
1.5 1 1.5 1
0.8 0.8
1 0.6 1 0.6
0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4
0.2 0.2
r 0 0 r 0 0
c c

Fig. 2. Probability of SPSC; ka = 2. Fig. 4. Probability of SPSC; ka = 10.

ka = 6

A PPENDIX
1
Proof of (8):
From (7), we have:
0.8
 
1+U
0.6 Ph = Pr > exp(h)
1+W
P0

0.4
= Pr[U > (1 + W ) exp(h) 1]
  
0.2
= fW (w) fU (u)du dw
0 0 (1+w) exp(h)1
2 
1.5 1
1
0.8 = fW (w) (1 FU [exp(h)(1 + w) 1]) dw
0.6 0
0.5 0.4 
0.2
r 0 0
c = 1 fW (w)FU [exp(h)(1 + w) 1]dw
0 

Fig. 3. Probability of SPSC; ka = 6. = exp(h) FW (w)fU [exp(h)(1 + w) 1]dw

0
= exp(h)a(1 + ka ) exp(ka )
IV. R EMARKS AND C ONCLUSION     
1 Q1 2kb , 2b(1 + kb )w
For the wireless communication systems involving fading 0
channels, their instantaneous SC can still be positive even exp{a(1 + ka )[exp(h)(1 + w) 1]}
in the case that the eavesdropper channel is stronger than   
I0 2 aka (1 + ka )[exp(h)(1 + w) 1] dw.
the main channel on the average. This is because Alice may
exploit the fading fluctuations and send messages to Bob via Alternatively, we have:
opportunistic transmissions. Currently there is an increasing  
concern with the information security of RF communications 1+U
Ph = Pr > exp(h)
in the marine environment, where the transmissions may be 1+W
affected by Rician fading. In this letter, the SC of Rician = Pr[U > (1 + W ) exp(h) 1]
  
fading channels is investigated. In particular, a closed-form
formula is derived for the probability of SPSC. The availability = fW (w) fU (u)du dw
0 (1+w) exp(h)1
of the closed-form formula will expedite the analysis and 
help gain deeper insights. For the main channel and the = fW (w) (1 FU [exp(h)(1 + w) 1]) dw
eavesdropper channel, two key parameters are considered in 0 
the analysis. The first is the ratio of their average SNRs and the
= b(1 + kb ) exp(kb ) exp[b(1 + kb )w]
second is the ratio of their Rician factors. The impacts of the 0
 
eavesdropper channel have been shown analytically (for the
I0 2 bkb (1 + kb )w
Rician/Rayleigh case) or numerically (for the Rician/Rician  

case). These results provide important guidelines how to Q1 2ka , 2a(1 + ka )[exp(h)(1 + w) 1] dw.
improve the performance even when the eavesdropper channel
is stronger than the main channel on the average. Proof of (10):
LIU: PROBABILITY OF STRICTLY POSITIVE SECRECY CAPACITY OF THE RICIAN-RICIAN FADING CHANNEL 53

From [8] (eq. 2.5), we have: Combining (19) with (20), we obtain:
  2

P0,0 (A, B; r) x + A2
  2
 x exp I0 (Ax)Q1 (B, rx)dx
x + A2 0 2
= x exp I0 (Ax)

0 2 Ar B
 rx  2
  = 1 Q1 ,
y + B2 1 + r2 1 + r2
y exp I0 (By)dy dx  

2 1 (A2 r2 + B 2 ) ABr
 0  2
 + exp I0 . (21)
x + A2 1 + r2 2(1 + r2 ) 1 + r2
= x exp I0 (Ax)
0 2 With appropriate variable substitutions, (21) leads to (10).
   2
 
y + B2
1 y exp I0 (By)dy dx
rx 2 R EFERENCES
  2

x + A2 [1] C. E. Shannon, Communication theory of secrecy systems, Bell Syst.
= x exp I0 (Ax)[1 Q1 (B, rx)]dx
0 2 Tech. J., vol. 28, pp. 656715, 1949.
  2
 [2] A. D. Wyner, The wire-tap channel, Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 54, pp.
x + A2 13551387, 1975.
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0 2
sages, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, IT-vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 339348, 1978.
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[8] R. Price, Some non-central F-distributions expressed in closed form,
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= Q1 , Biometrika, vol. 51, pp. 107122, 1964.
1 + r2 1 + r2
 

1 (A2 r2 + B 2 ) ABr
exp I0 .(20)
1 + r2 2(1 + r2 ) 1 + r2