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MORALES V.

CA
Facts:

On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit, was filed by Atty. Renato


Bondal and Nicolas Ching Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against
Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati,
accusing them of Plunder and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019
otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in connection with the
five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking
Building(Makati Parking Building).

On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators to


conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the
necessary complaint, if warranted (1stSpecial Panel).Pursuant to the Ombudsman's
directive, on March 5, 2015,the1stSpecial Panel filed a complaint(OMB Complaint)
against Binay, Jr., et al., charging them with six ( 6) administrative cases for Grave
Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service, and six (6) criminal cases for violation of Section 3(e)of RA 3019, Malversation
of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).As to Binay, Jr.,
the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in anomalous activities attending the
following procurement and construction phases of the Makati Parking Building project,
committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati.

On even date, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-
G.R. SPNo.139453,seeking the nullification o the preventive suspension order, and
praying for the issuance of a TRO and/orWPI to enjoin its implementation. Primarily,
Binay, Jr. argued that hecould not be held administratively liable for any anomalous
activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building project since:
a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in2010;and
b)Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of
Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability there for, if any,
thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic. In any event,
Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman s preventive suspension order failed to show
that the evidence of guilt presented against him is strong, maintaining that he did not
participate in any of the purported irregularities. In support of his prayer for injunctive
relief, Binay argued that he has a clear and unmistakable right to hold public office,
having won by landslide vote in the 2010 and 2013 elections, and that, in view of the
condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of evidence to sustain the charges against
him, his suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the
services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and voted into office.
Issue:

Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari
in CA-G.R. SP No.139453.

Ruling:

Albeit raised for the first time by the Ombudsman in her Memorandum it is nonetheless
proper to resolve the issue on the CAs lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main
petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, in view of the well-established rule that
a courts jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. The rationale is that subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the
lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render
judgment on the action. Hence, it should be preliminarily determined if the CA indeed
had subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as the
same determines the validity of all subsequent proceedings relative thereto. It is
noteworthy to point out that Binay, Jr. was given the opportunity by this Court to be
heard on this issue, as he, in fact, duly submitted his opposition through his comment to
the Ombudsman s Memorandum.

That being said, the Court perceives no reasonable objection against ruling on this
issue. The Ombudsman s argument against the CAs lack of subject matter jurisdiction
over the main petition, and her corollary prayer for its dismissal, is based on her
interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act, which reads in full:

Section14Restrictions. -No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an


investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a
prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. No court shall hear any appeal or
application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the
Supreme Court, on pure question oflaw.

The subject provision may be dissected into two (2) parts. The first paragraph of
Section 14 RA 6770is a prohibition against any court (except the Supreme Court) from
issuing a writ of injunction to delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman. Generally speaking, "injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding
whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It maybe the main
action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action."

Considering the textual qualifier "to delay," which connotes a suspension of an action
while the main case remains pending, the "writ of injunction" mentioned in this
paragraph could only refer to injunctions of the provisional kind, consistent with the
nature of a provisional injunctive relief. The exception to the no injunction policy is when
there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the
office's jurisdiction. The Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority overall
elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies, with the exception only of impeachable officers,
Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.

Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains the power to investigate any serious misconduct
in office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of
filing a verified complaint for impeachment.

Note that the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over certain administrative cases
which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agencies, but has
primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee
who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14RA677provides that no appeal
or application for remedy may be heard against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, with the exception of the Supreme Court on pure questions of law. This
paragraph, which the Ombudsman particularly relies on in arguing that the CA had no
jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, as it is supposedly this Court
which has the sole jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or findings, is
vague for two (2) reasons:(1)it is unclear what the application for remedy or
the word findings refers to; and (2) it does not specify what procedural remedy is solely
allowable to this Court, save that the same be taken only against a pure question of law.
The task then, is to apply the relevant principles of statutory construction to resolve the
ambiguity. The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislature
should be sought in the words employed to express it, and that when found, it should be
made to govern, x xx.

The words of the law seem to be of doubtful import, it may then perhaps become
necessary to look beyond them in order to ascertain what was in the legislative mind at
the time the law was enacted; what the circumstances were, under which the action was
taken; what evil, if any, was meant to be redressed; and where the law has
contemporaneously been put into operation, and in doing so a construction has
necessarily been put upon it, this construction, especially if followed for some
considerable period, is entitled to great respect, as being very probably a true
expression of the legislative purpose, and is not lightly to be overruled, although it is not
conclusive.

As an aid to construction, courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the
legislative body in interpreting a statute of doubtful meaning. In case of doubt as to what
a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative
deliberations may be adopted ,albeit not controlling in the interpretation of the law.

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