Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
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2, 1996
Interdisciplinary approaches to the study of the past and the present have
become commonplace: anthropologists now situate cultures in their historical
contexts, while historians pursue particularistic ends within politicoeconomic
or ideational structures. Archaeologists have cast their nets even more widely,
not only toward anthropology and history, but to fields ranging from molecular
biology to hermeneutics. Postmodernist approaches maintain that
archaeologists shouM be looking at the past from muln'ple perspectives and
listening to its muItivocality. Archaeologists, in fact, not only develop different
ways of understanding the past, but actually develop alternative pasts. This
paper argues that multiple paths to alternative pasts enhance archaeological
understanding and, at the same time, stimulate the development of
archaeological theory.
KEY WORDS: postmodernism; modernism; postprocessualism; social/interpretive archaeology.
INTRODUCTION
127
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128 Knapp
can only hope that such inane, post-modernist, reflexive, critical, post-structuralist
abcesses do not affect archaeology.
Thomas and Tilley (1992, p. 106) maintain that postmodernism is the "most
nebulous of terms" which refers to a "loss of faith in progress and western
rationality, a loss of confidence in the fixity of meaning . . . . [and] a reduc-
tion of identities to the status of alternative commodities." Postmodernism,
then, is not an intellectual movement as much as "a set of actually existing
circumstances" (Thomas and Tilley, 1992, p. 106). Another archaeological
impression holds that postmodernism has consecrated rapid change and
instability in our material conditions: changing forms of production and
attitudes to consumption now provide us with new goods to meet needs
we never knew we had (Gosden 1994, p.60).
Given these essentially caustic opinions, it might be concluded that
most anthropologists and archaeologists today are highly skeptical of post-
structuralism and postmodernism. A broad survey of the current archae-
ological and anthropological literature demonstrates otherwise, although
one must wonder how many fieldworkers actually practice postmodern an-
thropology or archaeology. Whereas consideration of anthropological and
sociological perspectives is never far distant in this study, the main concern
is with archaeology. How has postmodernism, or the plurality of other
"isms" that characterize social theory today, affected the field of archae-
ology? Is the past "real"? How, and to what extent, is postmodernism re-
lated to postprocessualism? And how has the latter impacted upon an
archaeological view of the past?
Of course, it is not only archaeology, anthropology, or history that
has been affected by the spread of postmodernism: other fields include
architecture (where it all started), literary criticism, English, psychology,
feminist and masculinist studies, and "science." One can comprehend eas-
ily some postmodern trends or debates in architecture, the visual arts, and
literature (e.g., Fokkema and Bertens, 1986; Burgin, 1986; Soja, 1989).
But when one turns to mainstream social theory (e.g., Nicholson, 1990;
Rosenau, 1992; Seidman and Wagner, 1992; Seidman, 1994), postmod-
ernism is regarded more as a threat to the integrity of the field, at the
Postmodernism and the Past 129
very least a problem that must be investigated. In order to deal with this
very unwieldy topic, and to examine its denial of and/or impact upon sev-
eral fields that seek to find some meaning in the past, I propose to cate-
gorize these fields--archaeology, anthropology, history--collectively as
social approaches to the study of the past, as human science. This should
dispel any charges of prejudice toward either the social sciences or the
humanities. From an archaeological perspective, this division seems arti-
ficial if not counter-productive: the past is human and involves individual
histories; the past is social and involves ideological, technological, and en-
vironmental patterns and processes.
Postmodernists regard most approaches to the study of the past as
creations of modern, first-world, Western societies: they are, in postmodern
terms, oppressive to third-w0rld societies, irrelevant to the present, lacking
in reality, and--in a word--exhausted. The more "critical" postmodemists
(discussed below) question whether there is a real, knowable past, and deny
any notion of evolutionary progress. They not only question objectivity, but
also dispute the idea that reason is a valid means of explaining the past.
Postmodernists, predictably, share a counterintuitive view of time, space,
and history: cyclical, polychronic (not linear) time, and inconstant, immeas-
urable space are more germane to their viewpoint and, so, deserve more
attention than the past as a means of comprehending the present. To a
critical postmodernist, the study of the past is too subject-centered, logo-
centric, prejudiced, closed, and privileged to be of much concern. Knowl-
edge and meaning (at least "etic" meaning) are irrelevant--postmodernists
are concerned chiefly with style, with surface rather than depth. The icons
of yesterday have been discarded in favor of the seductive charms of any-
thing new (Gold, 1992, p. 239).
In this paper, I examine critically the postmodernist position vis-a-vis
the study of the past. My aim is twofold: (1) to provide an overview of
postmodernism as a contemporary cultural phenomenon and (2) to con-
sider its impact on human science generally and, more specifically, upon
social approaches in archaeology. Another main concern is to examine the
relationship of postmodernism to postprocessualism in archaeology and the
extent to which present-day archaeology may be termed postprocessual in
its outlook (cf. Bintliff, 1991, 1993). Finally, I argue that a multiplicity of
paths to the past if not multiple pasts, wherever or whenever they may
have been, must enhance archaeological understanding and stimulate our
attempts to develop archaeological theory. There is no ultimate explanation
but, rather, an array of interpretive approaches that can provide a better
understanding of past environments, social processes, cognition, and human
agency.
130 Knapp
and social boundaries, even if economic, ethnic, and ideological barriers still
stand. Industrialization, high technology, urbanization, life in the fast lane:
all were idealized in a positivist, modernist world, and all are challenged
and denied, many on moral or ethical grounds, by postmodernism. From
Andy Warhol and the Velvet Underground to Devo and the Talking Heads,
to INXS and the gangster-rap, machine-gun volley of Ice-T or Snoop Doggy
Dog, pop culture relishes in undermining authority, denying values, ques-
tioning reality. And this pop culture blends fight into mainstream Anglo-
American or west European culture, even into high culture.
How is it that Western capitalism has so effectively invented, appropri-
ated, and exploited postmodemism? Postmodernism's broad appeal results
in part from its open-endedness and tack of specific definition, a blankness
that condemns capitalism and commodification even as it endorses and per-
petuates it. This postmodern apprehension of the world highlights the in-
herent instability of meaning, and the capacity to invert or recycle symbols
in different contexts, thus transforming their point of reference (Daniels and
Cosgrove, 1988, pp. 7-8). For Jameson (1984, p. 79), the amorphous, free-
floating qualities of symbols and images are tantamount to the unrestrained
circulation of commodities (Thomas, 1993, p. 8).
On the one hand, postmodernism may be regarded as an intellectual
luxury for a generation of Americans, Europeans, and Australians who en-
joyed political liberty and freedom from want and who could afford to focus
on the individual instead of the collective. On the other hand, postmod-
ernism is a product born out of desperation, particularly to a generation
of scholars who, upon graduating with higher degrees in the late 1970s-
1980s, confronted a dwindling job market, loss of credibility, and unem-
ployment. Economic privation, in this case, promoted nostalgia as well as
resentment (Habermas, 1986, p. 150; Stauth and Turner, 1988; Rosenau,
1992, p. 11). With its focus on the marginal, the decentered, and the pow-
erless, perhaps it is the very content of postmodernism that explains its
mixed attraction within academic disciplines. And yet, postmodernists have
used their involvement in this highly vocal and very trendy intellectual
movement to further their own careers. This sort of "conceptual position-
ing" through denunciation of older traditions is common throughout aca-
demia (see, e.g., Price and Lewis, 1993, p. 2).
There is a contradiction here between power and powerlessness. As
an example, take the case of gender, for two decades a central tenet of
feminist theory (e.g., di Leonardo, 1991). Whereas postmodernists substi-
tute for Enlightenment tradition, or "reason," the study of the contingent,
the historically specific, and the culturally constructed, feminists maintain
that gender, and whatever practices may constitute gender, are one of the
most crucial contexts in which to situate the "universal" subject of reason
134 Knapp
(Bender, 1993, p. 258) and has been undercut by its tendencies to insist
on the "correct" destabilization of general categories like class, race, and
gender. In so doing, postmodernism has promoted a fragmentation of the
feminist critique.
For those of us who want to understand the world systematically in order to change
it, postmodernist theories at their best give little guidance .... At their worst,
postmodernist theories merely recapitulate the effects of Enlightenment
theories--theofies that deny marginalized people the fight to participate in defining
the terms of interaction with people in the mainstream. (Hartsock, 1987, pp.
190-191)
tivity do not exist inherently as abstract principles in the past but, rather,
have to be demonstrated and "crafted."
The four main tenets of a "relativist epistemology" (Laudan, 1990 as
outlined by Trigger, 1991, pp. 65-66)--subjectivity, underestimation of the-
ory through the use of data, a holistic approach, science as a social activ-
ity-serve to deconstruct the positivist approach that has long characterized
Anglo-American archaeology. Given the polysemous nature of human cul-
ture and the diversity of material culture, a theoretical and methodological
pluralism is dearly warranted. In the field of (cultural) anthropology, criti-
cal postmodernists have welcomed relativism because it incorporates their
own belief that cultural traditions are unique, synchronic, and analytically
unable to encompass the meaning and discourse of other cultural traditions
(Tyler, 1984, p. 328; Marcus and Fisher, 1986, p. 32). Whereas histOrians
have often embraced a moderate form of relativism (e.g., Collingwood,
1946; Carr, 1961), Trigger (1989a, pp. 778, 791) warns that the social sci-
ences must avoid "the current trap of extreme relativism." In archaeology,
the application of critical theory as a way of linking the material past, self-
reflexively, to the present first led to the call for experimental site reports,
excavation as theater, and other "alternative forms of archaeological dis-
course" (Potter, 1991; Tilley, 1989; Hodder, 1989b). R. Watson (1990, pp.
678-679) castigated much of this "dogmatic relativism" as contradictory or,
at best, inconsistent. However one regards these earlier stances in post-
processualism, there is a growing acceptance among archaeologists that hu-
man behavior has produced an archaeological record far too variable and
complex to be explained by Neo-evolutionism and/or ecological determi-
nism (Trigger, 1991, p. 66; Wylie, 1992a, 1993).
Moderate postmodernists seem uncomfortable with both relativism
and objectivity and, occasionally, make contradictory compromises. Femi-
nists, for example, support postmodernism's criticism of modern social sci-
ence and its denial of a privileged male status; at the same time they must
denounce postmodernism because it gives equal authority to the oppressor
and the oppressed, to perpetrators and victims alike. A relativist form of
postmodernism, in other words, is inconsistent with a commitment to chal-
lenge an objective reality (Harding, 1990, pp. 88, 102, n. 6; Rosenau, 1992,
p. 115). While the mainly male, white, and Western postmodernists are
proclaiming the death of anthropology and the social sciences generally,
the voices of women, people of color, and aborigines struggle to constitute
themselves as subjects of history, and makers of their own history (Lee,
1992, p. 36).
On the one hand, then, "polyvocality" may be regarded as highly rele-
vant for developing contemporary social theory or as deeply significant for
those utilizing "signifiers" to push semiotic theory in anthropology and ar-
138 Knapp
present as a source of real knowledge, and reject any preference for the
complex, intellectual lifestyle of the modern urban center over the more
simple, practical, peasant routines of the countryside (Rosenau, 1992, p.
6). Traces of 61ite culture, material or documentary, have too long been
used to construct discourses applied to society as a whole, rather than--as
would be more appropriate--to other, alternative voices or meanings within
society (Barrett, 1988, pp. 9-12). Postmodernists regard the traditional, the
sacred, and the irrational as worthy of serious scholarly attention, as they
do studies related to custom, myth, intuition, chronology, magic, and mys-
ticism.
At the same time, postmodernists reveal a measure of contempt for
conventional history. Any attempt to know and represent the past is re-
garded with suspicion, and the critical postmodernists collapse history into
an instantaneous moment between yesterday and tomorrow. Critical post-
modernists promote a depthless, synchronic history, a personal rhetoric
which maintains that we can only catch hazy glimpses of a past that has
never really existed (Walsh, 1990, p. 281). Time and space are regarded as
uncontrollable and unpredictable, and in the end there remains only "pas-
tiche," a free-floating hodge-podge of views and ideas, including elements
of opposites [such as old and new (Rosenau, 1992, pp. 21-22)], that denies
logic and symmetry and, instead, sanctions contradiction and confusion. In
terms of modern society, culture is seen to have reached its pinnacle: all
that can be done is to copy and/or remix previous styles and call them
something new. Postmodernists are especially critical of "humanist" history,
i.e., the view that humans can direct the course of events, and that human
agents represent society's individual and collective experiences (Rosenau,
1992, p. 63). Postmodernists, like poststructuralists, make an issue of de-
centering individuals or of discounting human beings as subjects of inten-
tionality (Patterson, 1989, p. 559); in Trigger's (1991, p. 68) estimation,
"such approaches treat people as prisoners of their own culture."
Moderate postmodernists, however, while agreeing that the more re-
pressive qualities of time, space, and history need to be transformed, look
for inspiration to various forms of "New History" (e.g., Burke, 1991)--ge-
nealogy, gender, microhistory, oral history, "history from below"--and give
priority to local regional space. In other words, they seek to revitalize his-
tory, perhaps to reconsider its epistemologicat assumptions rather than to
annihilate it as their more radical counterparts might. These postmodernists
regard "storytelling" (Terrell, 1990), what Geertz termed "thick descrip-
tion," to be as valuable' as explanation; there is tittle room for exclusively
event-oriented history on their agenda. Contradictions are acceptable, in-
asmuch as we may expect many different "stories" for any historical epoch
or event (Scott, 1989), not least because each generation--if not each dif-
140 Knapp
processualists often surmised that material data alone provided more "ob-
jective" evidence. This position, of course, presumed that new archaeolo-
gists had no biases whatsoever, based as they were in sound "Scientific,"
and thus "objective," procedure. This position was perhaps revealed most
directly in Earle and Preucel's (1987, p. 506) review of processual archae-
ology, where they stated that prehistory is the primary focus of archaeology
and that a "contextual" approach (like that of Hodder) might lead archae-
ologists astray, toward fuller consideration of historical and ethnographic
contexts (similarly Gamble, 1993, p. 39). Why were some processualists so
blinkered to historical and ethnographic input? Why was historical archae-
ology, primarily the domain of anthropological archaeologists like Stanley
South, James Deetz, or Mark Leone, marginalized within mainstream
American archaeology? Why did processualists believe so strongly that ar-
chaeology was primarily the study of prehistory?
Data were paramount, numbers were privileged, and the cult of the
computer was restricted to a small but growing elite. In other words, proc-
essualism involved a clear power strategy. The sharp dividing line between
those who studied lithics and skeletal evidence (the majority of American
anthropological archaeologists) and those who worked with pottery, metals,
and architecture was more than just material in nature. This breach also
involved more than Giddens' (1982, p. 7) "double hermeneutic" in sociol-
ogy (the social world; the world of social science) or Shanks and Tilley's
(1992, pp. 107-108) "fourfold hermeneutic" in archaeology (past and pre-
sent; the "other;" contemporary society; contemporary archaeology): it is
likely that at some deep level of materialism, "man the hunter" was felt
to be a more suitable topic of study than woman the gatherer, or potter
(similarly, Conkey and Williams, 1991, pp. 115-117; Gosden, 1994, p. 170).
Such an observation is mitigated by the fact that virtually all archaeology
from its inception to the 1960s was dominated by white, middle- and up-
per-class males.
The methodological and theoretical rift that separates processualism
and postprocessualism once seemed insuperable (Renfrew, 1980; Dyson,
1982; Glock, 1985; Snodgrass, 1985; Schiffer, 1988), but a competent ar-
chaeological discussion engages both positions (Gamble, 1986), what
Shanks and Hodder (1994) have recently termed a "fusion of horizons."
The prehistorian must deal with the same type of hermeneutic issues as
an archaeologist working in historical or protohistoric periods: one cannot
assume that any given culture in space and time was more similar to our
own culture than any other. But can processualism possibly span the hori-
zons of postprocessuat archaeology, with its jarring and often inconsistent
postmodernist irruptions?
Postmodernism and the Past 143
data are fragmentary, and often have poor contextual associations, while
archaeological time is distant, unconnected to the present. Archaeological
data tend to be of an everyday, nonelitist nature and, accordingly, provide
access to the mundane, the neglected, or the deprived. As such, they are
susceptible to commodification. Indeed, the past can often be packaged and
sold as a commodity: Viking coins at Yorvik, Cypriot pottery that replicates
in detail the styles and techniques of Bronze and Iron Age potters, an ex-
hibition catalogue which instructs the buyer in the pedigree of an artifact
(Gill and Chippendale, 1993), or guides a consumer/collector in its purchase.
The past, claims Hodder, is also put to use by various "subordinate groups,"
in order that they may situate themselves in relation to their heritage or
experience, and thus maintain an alternative identity: national and ethnic
minorities, women; rural and local folk and their lineage: At the same time,
dominant groups and developers commercialize the past in the attempt to
undermine claims to legitimacy (e.g., property ownership, access to mineral
resources) made by subordinate groups (Hodder, 1990, p. 15).
The perception and condemnation of postmodernism by Bintliff
(1993), Lamberg-Karlovsky (1989), and Peebles (1991, 1993) are constricted
and unwarranted, particularly inasmuch as they see it in monolithic terms
and thus regard the postmodern "agenda" as inimical to the interests of
individuals and socially marginalized groups alike. More to the point is
Sherratt's charge (1993, p. 123) that a postcolonial guilt has often led to
denunciations of the comparative method as inherently racist and coloni-
alist, which in turn means that the "parochial tendencies of culture-histori-
cal archaeology" adopted by the postprocessualists preclude broader
examination of the role and meaning of material culture. Yet this obser-
vation too must be tempered in part by realizing that certain trends in
postprocessual archaeology are actively committed to understanding the
broader (comparative) structures in which local manifestations occur and
to considering a full range of spatial and temporal scales (e.g., Hodder,
1987; Knapp, 1992).
Thomas and Tilley (1992, p. 107) insist that by its very nature there
is no such thing as a postmodernist archaeology. They regard the barrage
of new theoretical stances in archaeology as a generalized extension and
opening up of the discipline to the current concerns of a social archaeology
and the human sciences. This realignment of archaeology has enabled it
to take on board a wide range of intellectual positions, many of which have
little in common with postmodernism and to inculcate those positions into
their own areas of expertise, e.g., into material culture theory, the study of
long-term socio-structural change, or the role of human agency in the past
and in the recreation of the past (Thomas and Tilley, 1992, p. 107; as an
example, see Dobres and Hoffman, 1994). The fact that archaeologists write
Postmodernism and the Past 145
from within a given cultural and historical situation, lacking total knowledge
of the world in general and the object(s) of their study in particular, does
not mean that "anything goes." Gosden (1994, p. 59) makes much the same
point: "Post-structuralism and hermeneutics represent an ongoing attempt
to move from an objective of the world towards the idea that all truth is
contingent, being culturally and historically based." Thomas (1993, p. 5)
rejects any simplistic notion of a postmodernist archaeology, and instead
presents a position which, whilst seeking no truths or common language,
nonetheless eschews "a retreat into solipsism or an unqualified relativism."
Following Bhaskar (1989), Shanks and Hodder (1994) now subscribe
to an "epistemic relativism," in which knowledge is constructed and firmly
grounded in a particular time and culture; this is quite different from main-
taining that all forms of knowledge are equally valid. Just because we can-
not present the full and indisputable "truth" about what really happened,
it does not follow that total relativism is the only course open. "What it
means is that while we accept that different accounts of the past may be
written by different people, they are [all] equally deserving of our scrutiny
within a critical archaeology" (Thomas and Tilley, 1992, p. 108; original
italics). The real problem lies not with those who write from a particular
viewpoint--be it political, Green, ethnic, sexist, masculinist, or feminist--
since they make clear their points of view; the problem lies with those who
believe they are writing objective, apolitical, ideology-free archaeology.
Among the more basic issues to emerge in postmodernism and post-
processualism alike are the centrality of the "text" (both as metaphorical
material product and as concrete historical document), and the changing
nature of textual production and consumption. Trigger (1991, p. 70) warns
that equating archaeological data and speech as "text" ignores the active
and symbolic aspects of certain artifacts. As material culture, "texts" are
said to represent enclosed symbolic systems that ordered and impacted on
people's daily lives even as, recursively, people created these symbolic sys-
tems. As documents, most "texts" that concern archaeologists were pro-
duced by 61ites and must be assessed in a way that permits them to be
seen as possibly biased attempts to impose a specific worldview, to legiti-
mize the relations of subordination and domination, and to reify the his-
torically contingent (Moreland, 1990, pp. 256-257). Both archaeologists and
historians, therefore, function as "readers" and as "second authors" (Dyson,
1993, p. 202) who write down new texts that re-create the past. The mean-
ing of any text may change as a result of the context and conditions of its
reading--texts are not fixed but in a continuous process that structures,
produces, and transforms their reading (Tilley, 1993, p. 12). In other words,
the meaning of the text is not inherent in it, but in the way that people
read or experience the text (Bruner, 1994, p. 407). Literacy and textuality
146 Knapp
(Goody, 1986) do not have the same social meanings and implications
through time and throughout space. Archaeologists must deal recursively
with ethnohistoric documents and material data (Knapp, 1992), which gain
meaning only in relationship to one another, not in isolation. Both are
forms of discourse (Barrett, 1988) that constitute and transform social re-
lationships (Moreland, 1990, p. 257).
Whereas such considerations provide both the necessity and the
methodology for bringing together materiality and intentionality, the re-
lationship between archaeology and history is still fraught with difficulties,
misunderstandings, and conflicting--often nationalistic--traditions (vari-
ous chapters in Hodder, 1991d; Klejn, 1993). Inasmuch as archaeology,
like history, is concerned with the study of the past, both should draw
inspiration from the ongoing discourse between the humanities and the
social sciences. Archaeology, in fact, represents the critical methodological
and theoretical link between the historical and the prehistoric approaches
to the study of the past (similarly Schiffer, 1992). Because historians are
by training bound to documentary sources, they often regard archaeology
simply as the handmaiden--the man-servant?--of history. This viewpoint,
archaeology as the means through which documentary data can be illu-
minated or "proven," is not only naive and misinformed, but detrimental
to the practice of a holistic history. Archaeological data and primary docu-
mentary sources are as often contrasting or contradictory as they are com-
plementary.
In the study of a past informed (or dominated) by textual evidence,
there must be a recursive dialogue between archaeological and documen-
tary resources. Ancient textual evidence often deals with elite situations,
whereas archaeological data stem from both extraordinary and mundane
circumstances. Anyone who studies the past must not only make use of a
diverse range of relevant material or documentary data, they must also be
prepared to evaluate those data within an appropriate and relevant inter-
pretative framework. Even if the resulting interpretations are often contra-
dictory, this does not mean that one interpretation or the other is
necessarily right or wrong; multiple interpretations of the past must be ex-
pected. We cannot gain the ultimate "truth." When we ask different ques-
tions of the past, we must expect different answers.
However early, or "prehistoric," or "mute" the archaeological record
may be, people acted according to the social construction of their world
(Head, 1993, pp. 495-496). The "meanings" archaeologists place upon the
material record must be regarded as public and social, rather than individ-
ual in nature (Shanks and Hodder, 1994). Furthermore, in terms of their
theoretical perspectives, archaeologists are influenced by the contemporary
sociocultural matrix as well as the material record of any given region, and
Postmodernism and the Past 147
ology in the late 20th century. The second most important factor, already
foreshadowed by processualism, is the recognition of the active role played
by material culture in past social practice and social change. The former,
namely, the role of the human agent in society, is consistently downplayed
or denied by most strains of postmodernism, whereas the latter--material
culture, and the changing nature of material relationships--forms an im-
portant tenet of "moderate" postmodernism.
Unlike other human sciences, archaeology is seldom able to probe
the nature of specific events, individual histories, or immediate circum-
stances. Rather it must set out the parameters and outline the circum-
stances in which human action takes place in the world. To do so, the
notion of past meaning in social theory within archaeology must be seen
as only one level of (pre)history, stemming from and interacting with
other, slower-moving, behavioural, economic, or ecoenvironmental levels
beneath (Gosden, 1992, p. 808). Moreover, past "meanings" of material
goods were never fixed in the objects themselves but, rather, were "read"
into them from other experiences and expectations, and acted upon: so-
cial life is therefore played out against material conditions which are
themselves revised or reworked according to an individual's interpreta-
tion of some material reality (Barrett, 1994a, p. 170). As archaeologists,
we must give primacy to material data, but "mindless empiricism" (Lee,
1992, p. 41) will not suffice: we must have a theoretical context as well.
To do this, archaeology cannot simply borrow theory or metaphor from
postmodernism or any other intellectual movement or discipline: it must
continue to develop its own (Schiffer, 1976; Binford, 1977; Clarke, 1978;
Hodder, 1991e; Yoffee and Sherratt, 1993b). This is the real way forward
in the study of the past.
It is simply no good to talk about studying the past; we need to specify what
processes/practices/forces we wish to discuss and then explain how we are going to
proceed. (Barrett, 1994b)
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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