LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs.

AQUINO
(G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986)

FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1
announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the
Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government
was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people
assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.

The Court further held that:

The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control
of the entire country;
It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government;
and
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new
government.

Macariola v. Asuncion Case Digest

Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77, May 31, 1982
(En Banc), J. Makasiar

FACTS:
When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by respondent Hon. Judge
Elias B. Asuncion of Court of First Instance of Leyte became final on June 8,
1863 for lack of an appeal, a project of partition was submitted to him which he
later approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963. Among the parties thereto
was complainant Bernardita R. Macariola.

One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This
lot according to the decision rendered by Judge Asuncion was adjudicated to
the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots
denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E.
On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a
portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria Asuncion.
Thereafter spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective
shares and interests in Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries Inc. wherein Judge Asuncion was the president.

Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9, 1968 docketed as Civil

Case No. 4234 in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion with "acts
unbecoming a judge" alleging that Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a
portion of Lot 1184-E violated Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Art. 14,
pars. 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of R.A. 3019, Sec. 12
Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics.

On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of Leyte rendered

a decision dismissing the complaints against Judge Asuncion.

After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by Justice

Cecilia Munoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, she recommended on her
decision dated March 27, 1971 that Judge Asuncion be exonerated.

ISSUE:
Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals violated any
law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot 1184-E which he previously decided
in a Civil Case No. 3010 and his engagement in business by joining a private
corporation during his incumbency as a judge of the CFI of Leyte constitute an
"act unbecoming of a judge"?

RULING:
No. The respondent Judge Asuncion's actuation does not constitute of an "act
unbecoming of a judge." But he is reminded to be more discreet in his private
and business activities.

SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies
only to operate, the sale or assignment of the property during the pendency of
the litigation involving the property. Respondent judge purchased a portion of
Lot 1184-E on March 6, 1965, the in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on
June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an
appeal within the reglementary period. Hence, the lot in question was no longer
subject to litigation. Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy the lot in question
directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon
who earlier purchased Lot1184-E from the plaintiffs Reyes after the finality of
the decision in Civil Case No. 3010.

SC stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US and later
on from the US to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of Code of
Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is
change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether
compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated,
unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the
aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce, consequently, Art. 14 of the
Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the
respondent Judge Asuncion.

Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par. H, Section 3 of R.A. 3019
because the business of the corporation in which respondent participated had
obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office.

SC stated that respondent judge and his wife deserve the commendation for
their immediate withdrawal from the firm 22 days after its incorporation realizing
that their interest contravenes the Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics

G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014

MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III,

FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the
sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy
needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came
up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).

The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government

projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects
to priority projects instead of waiting for next years appropriation. So what
happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being
undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will
be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as
savings by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority
projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic
growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the
DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).

Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations
made by Congress in the GAA.

Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos

claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as
an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato
Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but
was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.

This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not
only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive
projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera
Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation
Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each,
P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.

This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang

Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with
the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions
was:

DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which

provides that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law.

Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the
GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the
Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive
Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to
use savings, respectively).

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1),
Art. VI, Constitution).

II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments

by the executive.

III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.

IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is

constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

RULING:

I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was
merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation.
It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate
the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In
DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an
appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were
already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.

II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds

refers to the Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or
deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited
by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget
deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the
case at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.

III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that
the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government)
are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such
transfer or realignment should only be made within their respective offices.
Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the
DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the
Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive
agencies.

Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment

of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some
projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as
the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA.
Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they are still non-existent
under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such,
transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.

On the issue of what are savings

These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by
the Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur,
among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain
project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA
does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project.
Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the
DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be
declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already
being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being
declared as savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.

IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source
for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a
certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue
collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such
certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.

V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an
act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is
applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded
numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the
DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer
be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what they
received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the
Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers,
and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil,
criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.