G.R. No.
L-18463 October 4, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GREGORIO PERFECTOR, defendant-appellant.
Alfonso E. Mendoza and the appellant in behalf of the latter.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The important question is here squarely presented of whether article 256 of the
Spanish Penal Code, punishing "Any person who, by . . . writing, shall defame, abuse,
or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority . . .," is still in force.
About August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M.
Guerrero, discovered that certain documents which constituted the records of
testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil companies, had disappeared
from his office. Shortly thereafter, the Philippine Senate, having been called into
special session by the Governor-General, the Secretary for the Senate informed that
body of the loss of the documents and of the steps taken by him to discover the guilty
party. The day following the convening of the Senate, September 7, 1920, the
newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article reading
as follows:
Half a month has elapsed since the discovery, for the first time, of the
scandalous robbery of records which were kept and preserved in the iron
safe of the Senate, yet up to this time there is not the slightest indication that
the author or authors of the crime will ever be discovered.
To find them, it would not, perhaps, be necessary to go out of the Sente
itself, and the persons in charge of the investigation of the case would not
have to display great skill in order to succeed in their undertaking, unless
they should encounter the insuperable obstacle of offical concealment.
In that case, every investigation to be made would be but a mere comedy
and nothing more.
After all, the perpetration of the robbery, especially under the circumstances
that have surrounded it, does not surprise us at all.
The execution of the crime was but the natural effect of the environment of
the place in which it was committed.
How many of the present Senators can say without remorse in their
conscience and with serenity of mind, that they do not owe their victory to
electoral robbery? How may?
The author or authors of the robbery of the records from the said iron safe of
the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators who
secured their election through fraud and robbery.
The Philippine Senate, in its session of September 9, 1920, adopted a resolution
authorizing its committee on elections and privileges to report as to the action which
should be taken with reference to the article published in La Nacion. On September
15, 1920, the Senate adopted a resolution authorizing the President of the Senate to
indorse to the Attorney-General, for his study and corresponding action, all the papers
referring to the case of the newspaper La Nacion and its editor, Mr. Gregorio
Perfecto. As a result, an information was filed in the municipal court of the City of
Manila by an assistant city fiscal, in which the editorial in question was set out and in
which it was alleged that the same constituted a violation of article 256 of the Penal
Code. The defendant Gregorio Perfecto was found guilty in the municipal court and
again in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
During the course of the trial in the Court of First Instance, after the prosecution had
rested, the defense moved for the dismissal of the case. On the subject of whether or
not article 256 of the Penal Code, under which the information was presented, is in
force, the trial judge, the Honorable George R. Harvey, said:
This antiquated provision was doubtless incorporated into the Penal Code of
Spain for the protection of the Ministers of the Crown and other
representatives of the King against free speech and action by Spanish
subjects. A severe punishment was prescribed because it was doubtless
considered a much more serious offense to insult the King's representative
than to insult an ordinary individual. This provision, with almost all the other
articles of that Code, was extended to the Philippine Islands when under the
dominion of Spain because the King's subject in the Philippines might
defame, abuse or insult the Ministers of the Crown or other representatives
of His Majesty. We now have no Ministers of the Crown or other persons in
authority in the Philippines representing the King of Spain, and said
provision, with other articles of the Penal Code, had apparently passed into
"innocuous desuetude," but the Supreme Corut of the Philippine Islands has,
by a majority decision, held that said article 256 is the law of the land to-day.
...
The Helbig case is a precedent which, by the rule of stare decisis, is binding
upon this court until otherwise determined by proper authority.
In the decision rendered by the same judge, he concluded with the following
language:
In the United States such publications are usually not punishable as criminal
offense, and little importance is attached to them, because they are
 generally the result of political controversy and are usually regarded as more
or less colored or exaggerated. Attacks of this character upon a legislative
body are not punishable, under the Libel Law. Although such publications
are reprehensible, yet this court feels some aversion to the application of the
provision of law under which this case was filed. Our Penal Code has come
to us from the Spanish regime. Article 256 of that Code prescribes
punishment for persons who use insulting language about Ministers of the
Crown or other "authority." The King of Spain doubtless left the need of such
protection to his ministers and others in authority in the Philippines as well
as in Spain. Hence, the article referred to was made applicable here.
Notwithstanding the change of sovereignty, our Supreme Court, in a majority
decision, has held that this provision is still in force, and that one who made
an insulting remark about the President of the United States was punishable
under it. (U.S. vs. Helbig, supra.) If it applicable in that case, it would appear
to be applicable in this case. Hence, said article 256 must be enforced,
without fear or favor, until it shall be repealed or superseded by other
legislation, or until the Supreme Court shall otherwise determine.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds the defendant guilty
as charged in the information and under article 256 of their Penal Code
sentences him to suffer two months and one day of arresto mayor and the
accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs of both
instances.
The fifteen errors assigned by the defendant and appellant, reenforced by an
extensive brief, and eloquent oral argument made in his own behalf and by his
learned counsel, all reduce themselves to the pertinent and decisive question which
was announced in the beginning of this decision.
It will be noted in the first place that the trial judge considered himself bound to follow
the rule announced in the case of United States vs. Helbig (R. G. No. 14705, 1 not
published). In that case, the accused was charged with having said, "To hell with the
President and his proclamations, or words to that effect," in violation of article 256 of
the Penal Code. He was found guilty in a judgment rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Manila and again on appeal to the Supreme Court, with the writer of the
instant decision dissenting on two principal grounds: (1) That the accused was
deprived of the constitutional right of cross-examination, and (2) that article 256 of the
Spanish Penal Code is no longer in force. Subsequently, on a motion of
reconsideration, the court, being of the opinion that the Court of First Instance had
committed a prejudicial error in depriving the accused of his right to cross-examine a
principal witness, set aside the judgment affirming the judgment appealed from and
ordered the return of the record to the court of origin for the celebration of a new trial.
Whether such a trial was actually had, is not known, but at least, the record in the
Helbig case has never again been elevated to this court.
There may perchance exist some doubt as to the authority of the decision in the
Helbig case, in view of the circumstances above described. This much, however, is
certain: The facts of the Helbig case and the case before us, which we may term the
Perfecto case, are different, for in the first case there was an oral defamation, while in
the second there is a written defamation. Not only this, but a new point which, under
the facts, could not have been considered in the Helbig case, is, in the Perfecto case,
urged upon the court. And, finally, as is apparent to all, the appellate court is not
restrained, as was the trial court, by strict adherence to a former decision. We much
prefer to resolve the question before us unhindered by references to the Helbig
decision.
This is one of those cases on which a variety of opinions all leading to the same result
can be had. A majority of the court are of the opinion that the Philippine Libel Law, Act
No. 277, has had the effect of repealing so much of article 256 of the Penal Code as
relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the information and the
facts, the defendant is neither guilty of a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code, nor
of the Libel Law. The view of the Chief Justice is that the accused should be acquitted
for the reason that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute a violation of
article 156 of the Penal Code. Three members of the court believe that article 256
was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over
the Philippines and is inconsistent with democratic principles of government.
Without prejudice to the right of any member of the court to explain his position, we
will discuss the two main points just mentioned.
1. Effect of the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, on article 256 of the
Spanish Penal Code. The Libel Law, Act No. 277, was enacted by the
Philippine Commission shortly after organization of this legislative body.
Section 1 defines libel as a "malicious defamation, expressed either in
writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, or public theatrical
exhibitions, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach
the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural deffects of
one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt or
ridicule." Section 13 provides that "All laws and parts of laws now in force, so
far as the same may be in conflict herewith, are hereby repealed. . . ."
That parts of laws in force in 1901 when the Libel Law took effect, were in conflict
therewith, and that the Libel Law abrogated certain portion of the Spanish Penal
Code, cannot be gainsaid. Title X of Book II of the Penal Code, covering the subjects
of calumny and insults, must have been particularly affected by the Libel Law. Indeed,
in the early case of Pardo de Tavera vs. Garcia Valdez ([1902], 1. Phil., 468), the
Supreme Court spoke of the Libel Law as "reforming the preexisting Spanish law on
the subject of calumnia and injuria." Recently, specific attention was given to the
effect of the Libel Law on the provisions of the Penal Code, dealing with calumny and
insults, and it was found that those provisions of the Penal Code on the subject of
calumny and insults in which the elements of writing an publicity entered, were
abrogated by the Libel Law. (People vs. Castro [1922], p. 842, ante.)
The Libel Law must have had the same result on other provisions of the Penal Code,
as for instance article 256.
The facts here are that the editor of a newspaper published an article, naturally in
writing, which may have had the tendency to impeach the honesty, virtue, or
reputation of members of the Philippine Senate, thereby possibly exposing them to
public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, which is exactly libel, as defined by the Libel Law.
Sir J. F. Stephen is authority for the statement that a libel is indictable when defaming
a "body of persons definite and small enough for individual members to be recognized
as such, in or by means of anything capable of being a libel." (Digest of Criminal Law,
art. 267.) But in the United States, while it may be proper to prosecute criminally the
author of a libel charging a legislator with corruption, criticisms, no matter how severe,
on a legislature, are within the range of the liberty of the press, unless the intention
and effect be seditious. (3 Wharton's Criminal Law, p. 2131.) With these facts and
legal principles in mind, recall that article 256 begins: Any person who, by . . . writing,
shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority,"
etc.
The Libel Law is a complete and comprehensive law on the subject of libel. The well-
known rule of statutory construction is, that where the later statute clearly covers the
old subject-matter of antecedent acts, and it plainly appears to have been the
purpose of the legislature to give expression in it to the whole law on the subject,
previous laws are held to be repealed by necessary implication. (1 Lewis' Sutherland
Statutory Construction, p. 465.) For identical reasons, it is evident that Act No. 277
had the effect so much of this article as punishes defamation, abuse, or insults by
writing.
Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also
have affected article 256, but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a
pronouncement.
2. Effect of the change from Spanish to Amercian sevoreignty over the
Philippine son article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code. Appellant's main
proposition in the lower court and again energetically pressed in the
appellate court was that article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is not now in
force because abrogated by the change from Spanish to American
sovereignty over the Philippines and because inconsistent with democratic
principles of government. This view was indirectly favored by the trial judge,
and, as before stated, is the opinion of three members of this court.
Article 256 is found in Chapter V of title III of Book II of the Spanish Penal Code. Title
I of Book II punishes the crimes of treason, crimes that endanger the peace or
independence of the state, crimes against international law, and the crime of piracy.
Title II of the same book punishes the crimes of lese majeste, crimes against
the Cortes and its members and against the council of ministers, crimes against the
form of government, and crimes committed on the occasion of the exercise of rights
guaranteed by the fundamental laws of the state, including crime against religion and
worship. Title III of the same Book, in which article 256 is found, punishes the crimes
of rebellion, sedition, assaults upon persons in authority, and their agents, and
contempts, insults, injurias, and threats against persons in authority, and
insults, injurias, and threats against their agents and other public officers, the last
being the title to Chapter V. The first two articles in Chapter V define and punish the
offense of contempt committed by any one who shall be word or deed defame, abuse,
insult, or threathen a minister of the crown, or any person in authority. The with an
article condemning challenges to fight duels intervening, comes article 256, now
being weighed in the balance. It reads as follows: "Any person who, by word, deed, or
writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in
authority, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or by reason of such
performance, provided that the offensive minister or person, or the offensive writing
be not addressed to him, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor," that is, the
defamation, abuse, or insult of any Minister of the Crown of the Monarchy of
Spain (for there could not be a Minister of the Crown in the United States of
America), or other person in authority in the Monarchy of Spain.
It cannot admit of doubt that all those provisions of the Spanish Penal Code having to
do with such subjects as treason, lese majeste, religion and worship, rebellion,
sedition, and contempts of ministers of the crown, are not longer in force. Our present
task, therefore, is a determination of whether article 256 has met the same fate, or,
more specifically stated, whether it is in the nature of a municipal law or political law,
and is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the
characteristics and institutions of the American Government.
It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous
political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to
denominate the laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the
sovereign. (American Insurance Co. vs. Canter [1828], 1 Pet., 511; Chicago, Rock
Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542; Roa vs. Collector of
Customs [1912], 23 Phil., 315.) Mr. Justice Field of the United States Supreme Court
stated the obvious when in the course of his opinion in the case of Chicago, Rock
Island and Pacific Railway Co. vs. McGlinn, supra, he said: "As a matter of course, all
laws, ordinances and regulations in conflict with the political character, institutions
and Constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession
of political jurisdiction and legislative power and the latter is involved in the former
to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an established religion
or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual
punishments, and he like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any
declaration to that effect." To quote again from the United States Supreme Court: "It
cannot be admitted that the King of Spain could, by treaty or otherwise, impart to the
United States any of his royal prerogatives; and much less can it be admitted that
they have capacity to receive or power to exercise them. Every nation acquiring
territory, by treaty or otherwise, must hold it subject to the Constitution and laws of its
own government, and not according to those of the government ceding it."
(Pollard vs. Hagan [1845], 3 Hos., 210.)
On American occupation of the Philippines, by instructions of the President to the
Military Commander dated May 28, 1898, and by proclamation of the latter, the
municipal laws of the conquered territory affecting private rights of person and
property and providing for the punishment of crime were nominally continued in force
in so far as they were compatible with the new order of things. But President
McKinley, in his instructions to General Merritt, was careful to say: "The first effect of
the military occupation of the enemy's territory is the severance of the former political
relation of the inhabitants and the establishment of a new political power." From that
day to this, the ordinarily it has been taken for granted that the provisions under
consideration were still effective. To paraphrase the language of the United States
Supreme Court in Weems vs. United States ([1910], 217 U. S., 349), there was not
and could not be, except as precise questions were presented, a careful
consideration of the codal provisions and a determination of the extent to which they
accorded with or were repugnant to the "'great principles of liberty and law' which had
been 'made the basis of our governmental system.' " But when the question has been
squarely raised, the appellate court has been forced on occasion to hold certain
portions of the Spanish codes repugnant t democratic institutions and American
constitutional principles. (U.S. vs. Sweet [1901], 1 Phil., 18; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913],
25 Phil., 273; U.S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 533; Weems vs. U.S., supra.)
The nature of the government which has been set up in the Philippines under
American sovereignty was outlined by President McKinley in that Magna Charta of
Philippine liberty, his instructions to the Commission, of April 7, 1900. In part, the
President said:
In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which they are
authorized to prescribe, the Commission should bear in mind that he
government which they are establishing is designed not for our satisfaction
or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace,
and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the measures
adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even
their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of
the indispensable requisites of just and effective government. At the same
time the Commission should bear in mind, and the people of the Islands
should be made plainly to understand, that there are certain great principles
of government which have been made the basis of our governmental
system, which we deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of
individual freedom, and of which they have, unfortunately, been denied the
experience possessed by us; that there are also certain practical rules of
government which we have found to be essential to the preservation of
these great principles of liberty and law, and that these principles and these
rules of government must be established and maintained in their islands for
the sake of their liberty and happiness, however much they may conflict with
the customs or laws of procedure with which they are familiar. It is evident
that the most enligthened thought of the Philippine Islands fully appreciates
the importance of these principles and rules, and they will inevitably within a
short time command universal assent.
The courts have naturally taken the same view. Mr. Justice Elliott, speaking for our
Supreme Court, in the case of United States vs. Bull ([1910], 15 Phil., 7), said: "The
President and Congress framed the government on the model with which American
are familiar, and which has proven best adapted for the advancement of the public
interests and the protection of individual rights and privileges."
Therefore, it has come with somewhat of a shock to hear the statement made that the
happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands and their
customs, habits, and prejudices, to follow the language of President McKinley,
demand obeisance to authority, and royal protection for that authority.
According to our view, article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted by the
Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the representatives of the
King. With the change of sovereignty, a new government, and a new theory of
government, as set up in the Philippines. It was in no sense a continuation of the old,
although merely for convenience certain of the existing institutions and laws were
continued. The demands which the new government made, and makes, on the
individual citizen are likewise different. No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a
person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must speak of him only
with bated breath. "In the eye of our Constitution and laws, every man is a sovereign,
a ruler and a freeman, and has equal rights with every other man. We have no rank or
station, except that of respectability and intelligence as opposed to indecency and
ignorance, and the door to this rank stands open to every man to freely enter and
abide therein, if he is qualified, and whether he is qualified or not depends upon the
life and character and attainments and conduct of each person for himself. Every man
may lawfully do what he will, so long as it is not malum in se or malum prohibitum or
does not infringe upon the qually sacred rights of others." (State vs. Shepherd [1903],
177 Mo., 205; 99 A. S. R., 624.)
It is true that in England, from which so many of the laws and institutions of the United
States are derived, there were once statutes of scandalum magnatum, under which
words which would not be actionable if spoken of an ordinary subject were made
actionable if spoken of a peer of the realm or of any of the great officers of the Crown,
without proof of any special damage. The Crown of England, unfortunately, took a
view less tolerant that that of other sovereigns, as for instance, the Emperors
Augustus, Caesar, and Tiberius. These English statutes have, however, long since,
become obsolete, while in the United States, the offense of scandalum magnatum is
not known. In the early days of the American Republic, a sedition law was enacted,
making it an offense to libel the Government, the Congress, or the President of the
United States, but the law met with so much popular disapproval, that it was soon
repealed. "In this country no distinction as to persons is recognized, and in practice a
person holding a high office is regarded as a target at whom any person may let fly
his poisonous words. High official position, instead of affording immunity from
slanderous and libelous charges, seems rather to be regarded as making his
character free plunder for any one who desires to create a senation by attacking it."
(Newell, Slander and Libel, 3d ed., p. 245; Sillars vs. Collier [1890], 151 Mass., 50; 6
L.R.A., 680.)
Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of
the American character and system of government. The gulf which separates this
article from the spirit which inspires all penal legislation of American origin, is as wide
as that which separates a monarchy from a democratic Republic like that of the
United States. This article was crowded out by implication as soon as the United
States established its authority in the Philippine Islands. Penalties out of all proportion
to the gravity of the offense, grounded in a distorted monarchical conception of the
nature of political authority, as opposed to the American conception of the protection
of the interests of the public, have been obliterated by the present system of
government in the Islands. 1awph!l.net
From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article punishes
contempts against executive officials, although its terms are broad enough to cover
the entire official class. Punishment for contempt of non-judicial officers has no place
in a government based upon American principles. Our official class is not, as in
monarchies, an agent of some authority greater than the people but it is an agent and
servant of the people themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect and
obedience when they are acting within the scope of their authority and jurisdiction.
The American system of government is calculated to enforce respect and obedience
where such respect and obedience is due, but never does it place around the
individual who happens to occupy an official position by mandate of the people any
official halo, which calls for drastic punishment for contemptuous remarks.
The crime of lese majeste disappeared in the Philippines with the ratification of the
Treaty of Paris. Ministers of the Crown have no place under the American flag.
To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the opinion,
although for different reasons, that the judgment should be reversed and the
defendant and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.
Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur.
A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982
BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,
vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J:
In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R. Macariola charged
respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, with "acts unbecoming a judge."
The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971 of then
Associate Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court of Appeals now retired Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom this case was referred on October 28, 1968
for investigation, thus:
Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a
complaint for partition filed by Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R.
Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, and
Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs, against Bernardita R. Macariola,
defendant, concerning the properties left by the deceased
Francisco Reyes, the common father of the plaintiff and defendant.
In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. Macariola
alleged among other things that; a) plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales was
not a daughter of the deceased Francisco Reyes; b) the only legal
heirs of the deceased were defendant Macariola, she being the
only offspring of the first marriage of Francisco Reyes with Felisa
Espiras, and the remaining plaintiffs who were the children of the
deceased by his second marriage with Irene Ondez; c) the
properties left by the deceased were all the conjugal properties of
the latter and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and no properties were
acquired by the deceased during his second marriage; d) if there
was any partition to be made, those conjugal properties should first
be partitioned into two parts, and one part is to be adjudicated
solely to defendant it being the share of the latter's deceased
mother, Felisa Espiras, and the other half which is the share of the
deceased Francisco Reyes was to be divided equally among his
children by his two marriages.
On June 8, 1963, a decision was rendered by respondent Judge
Asuncion in Civil Case 3010, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, upon a
preponderance of evidence, finds and so holds,
and hereby renders judgment (1) Declaring the
plaintiffs Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes,
Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes
as the only children legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of Francisco Reyes Diaz to
Irene Ondez; (2) Declaring the plaintiff Sinforosa
R. Bales to have been an illegitimate child of
Francisco Reyes Diaz; (3) Declaring Lots Nos.
4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803, 4581, 4506 and
1/4 of Lot 1145 as belonging to the conjugal
partnership of the spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz
and Felisa Espiras; (4) Declaring Lot No. 2304
and 1/4 of Lot No. 3416 as belonging to the
spouses Francisco Reyes Diaz and Irene Ondez
in common partnership; (5) Declaring that 1/2 of
Lot No. 1184 as belonging exclusively to the
deceased Francisco Reyes Diaz; (6) Declaring
the defendant Bernardita R. Macariola, being the
only legal and forced heir of her mother Felisa
Espiras, as the exclusive owner of one-half of
each of Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265, 4803,
4581, 4506; and the remaining one-half (1/2) of
each of said Lots Nos. 4474, 4475, 4892, 5265,
4803, 4581, 4506 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth
(1/4) of Lot No. 1154 as belonging to the estate
of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (7) Declaring Irene
Ondez to be the exclusive owner of one-half (1/2)
of Lot No. 2304 and one-half (1/2) of one-fourth
(1/4) of Lot No. 3416; the remaining one-half
(1/2) of Lot 2304 and the remaining one-half (1/2)
of one-fourth (1/4) of Lot No. 3416 as belonging
to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz; (8)
Directing the division or partition of the estate of
 Francisco Reyes Diaz in such a manner as to
give or grant to Irene Ondez, as surviving widow
of Francisco Reyes Diaz, a hereditary share of.
one-twelfth (1/12) of the whole estate of
Francisco Reyes Diaz (Art. 996 in relation to Art.
892, par 2, New Civil Code), and the remaining
portion of the estate to be divided among the
plaintiffs Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa,
Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes,
Priscilla Reyes and defendant Bernardita R.
Macariola, in such a way that the extent of the
total share of plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales in the
hereditary estate shall not exceed the equivalent
of two-fifth (2/5) of the total share of any or each
of the other plaintiffs and the defendant (Art. 983,
New Civil Code), each of the latter to receive
equal shares from the hereditary estate,
(Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528; Diancin vs.
Bishop of Jaro, O.G. [3rd Ed.] p. 33); (9) Directing
the parties, within thirty days after this judgment
shall have become final to submit to this court, for
approval a project of partition of the hereditary
estate in the proportion above indicated, and in
such manner as the parties may, by agreement,
deemed convenient and equitable to them taking
into consideration the location, kind, quality,
nature and value of the properties involved; (10)
Directing the plaintiff Sinforosa R. Bales and
defendant Bernardita R. Macariola to pay the
costs of this suit, in the proportion of one-third
(1/3) by the first named and two-thirds (2/3) by
the second named; and (I 1) Dismissing all other
claims of the parties [pp 27-29 of Exh. C].
The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal,
and on October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to
Judge Asuncion which is marked Exh. A. Notwithstanding the fact
that the project of partition was not signed by the parties
themselves but only by the respective counsel of plaintiffs and
defendant, Judge Asuncion approved it in his Order dated October
23, 1963, which for convenience is quoted hereunder in full:
The parties, through their respective counsels,
presented to this Court for approval the following
project of partition:
COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in
the above-entitled case, to this Honorable Court
respectfully submit the following Project of
Partition:
l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506
shall belong exclusively to Bernardita Reyes
Macariola;
2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of
2,373.49 square meters along the eastern part of
the lot shall be awarded likewise to Bernardita R.
Macariola;
3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be
awarded to Sinforosa Reyes Bales;
4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of
1,834.55 square meters along the western part of
the lot shall likewise be awarded to Sinforosa
Reyes-Bales;
5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided
equally among Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita
Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla
Reyes in equal shares;
6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot
No. 3416 after taking the portions awarded under
item (2) and (4) above shall be awarded to Luz
Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto
Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal
shares, provided, however that the remaining
portion of Lot No. 3416 shall belong exclusively
to Priscilla Reyes.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the
Project of Partition indicated above which is
made in accordance with the decision of the
Honorable Court be approved.
Tacloban City, October 16, 1963.
(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the
Defendant Tacloban City
(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the Plaintiff
Tacloban City
While the Court thought it more desirable for all
the parties to have signed this Project of
Partition, nevertheless, upon assurance of both
counsels of the respective parties to this Court
 that the Project of Partition, as above- quoted,
had been made after a conference and
agreement of the plaintiffs and the defendant
approving the above Project of Partition, and that
both lawyers had represented to the Court that
they are given full authority to sign by themselves
the Project of Partition, the Court, therefore,
finding the above-quoted Project of Partition to be
in accordance with law, hereby approves the
same. The parties, therefore, are directed to
execute such papers, documents or instrument
sufficient in form and substance for the vesting of
the rights, interests and participations which were
adjudicated to the respective parties, as outlined
in the Project of Partition and the delivery of the
respective properties adjudicated to each one in
view of said Project of Partition, and to perform
such other acts as are legal and necessary to
effectuate the said Project of Partition.
SO ORDERED.
Given in Tacloban City, this 23rd day of October,
1963.
(SGD) ELIAS B. ASUNCION Judge
EXH. B.
The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on November
11, 1963, only for the purpose of giving authority to the Register of
Deeds of the Province of Leyte to issue the corresponding transfer
certificates of title to the respective adjudicatees in conformity with
the project of partition (see Exh. U).
One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot
1184 or rather one-half thereof with an area of 15,162.5 sq. meters.
This lot, which according to the decision was the exclusive property
of the deceased Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in said project
of partition to the plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita Ruperto, Adela, and
Priscilla all surnamed Reyes in equal shares, and when the project
of partition was approved by the trial court the adjudicatees caused
Lot 1184 to be subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A
to 1184-E inclusive (Exh. V).
Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a stenographer in
Judge Asuncion's court (Exhs. F, F-1 and V-1), while Lot 1184-E
which had an area of 2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold on July 31,
1964 to Dr. Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 2) who was issued transfer
certificate of title No. 2338 of the Register of Deeds of the city of
Tacloban (Exh. 12).
On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a portion
of Lot 1184-E with an area of around 1,306 sq. meters to Judge
Asuncion and his wife, Victoria S. Asuncion (Exh. 11), which
particular portion was declared by the latter for taxation purposes
(Exh. F).
On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon
conveyed their respective shares and interest in Lot 1184-E to "The
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc." (Exit 15 & 16).
At the time of said sale the stockholders of the corporation were
Dominador Arigpa Tan, Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan,
Judge Asuncion, and the latter's wife, Victoria S. Asuncion, with
Judge Asuncion as the President and Mrs. Asuncion as the
secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E-7). The Articles of Incorporation of "The
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc." which we shall
henceforth refer to as "TRADERS" were registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission only on January 9, 1967
(Exh. E) [pp. 378-385, rec.].
Complainant Bernardita R. Macariola filed on August 9, 1968 the instant complaint
dated August 6, 1968 alleging four causes of action, to wit: [1] that respondent Judge
Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by
purchase a portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in
Civil Case No. 3010 decided by him; [2] that he likewise violated Article 14,
paragraphs I and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Section 3, paragraph H, of R.A. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 12, Rule XVIII
of the Civil Service Rules, and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, by
associating himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., as a
stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance
of Leyte; [3] that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard
of judicial decorum by closely fraternizing with a certain Dominador Arigpa Tan who
openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney when in truth and in
fact his name does not appear in the Rolls of Attorneys and is not a member of the
Philippine Bar; and [4] that there was a culpable defiance of the law and utter
disregard for ethics by respondent Judge (pp. 1-7, rec.).
Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his answer to which a reply
was filed on October 16, 1968 by herein complainant. In Our resolution of October 28,
1968, We referred this case to then Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court of
Appeals, for investigation, report and recommendation. After hearing, the said
Investigating Justice submitted her report dated May 27, 1971 recommending that
respondent Judge should be reprimanded or warned in connection with the first cause
of action alleged in the complaint, and for the second cause of action, respondent
should be warned in case of a finding that he is prohibited under the law to engage in
business. On the third and fourth causes of action, Justice Palma recommended that
respondent Judge be exonerated.
The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. 481, 477, rec.), (d) he sum of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
complainant herein instituted an action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, [PI0,000.00] for Attorney's Fees.
entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et al.,
defendants," which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4235, seeking the annulment of B. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
the project of partition made pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR HERSELF AND
two orders issued by respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the partition FOR THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED
of the estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages. It appears, however, GERARDO VILLASIN
that some defendants were dropped from the civil case. For one, the case against Dr.
Arcadio Galapon was dismissed because he was no longer a real party in interest
when Civil Case No. 4234 was filed, having already conveyed on March 6, 1965 a (1) Dismissing the complaint against the defendants Mariquita
portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and on August 31, 1966 the remainder was Villasin and the heirs of the deceased Gerardo Villasin;
sold to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. Similarly, the case
against defendant Victoria Asuncion was dismissed on the ground that she was no (2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants Mariquita Villasin
longer a real party in interest at the time the aforesaid Civil Case No. 4234 was filed and the heirs of Gerardo Villasin the cost of the suit.
as the portion of Lot 1184 acquired by her and respondent Judge from Dr. Arcadio
Galapon was already sold on August 31, 1966 to the Traders Manufacturing and C. IN THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
Fishing industries, Inc. Likewise, the cases against defendants Serafin P. Ramento, SINFOROSA R. BALES, ET AL., WHO WERE
Catalina Cabus, Ben Barraza Go, Jesus Perez, Traders Manufacturing and Fishing PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 3010
Industries, Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial and Pilar P. Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla and
Remedios Petilla, Salvador Anota and Enriqueta Anota and Atty. Zotico A. Tolete
were dismissed with the conformity of complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her (1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants Sinforosa R.
counsel. Bales, Adela R. Herrer, Priscilla R. Solis, Luz R. Bakunawa,
Anacorita R. Eng and Ruperto O. Reyes.
On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, who was directed and authorized on June 2, 1969 by the then Secretary (now D. IN THE CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT
Minister) of Justice and now Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile to hear BONIFACIO RAMO
and decide Civil Case No. 4234, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows: (1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio Ramo;

A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B. ASUNCION
(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the issue of the legality
and validity of the Project of Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the two
Orders [Exhibits "C" and "C- 3"] approving the partition;
(2) dismissing the complaint against Judge Elias B. Asuncion;
(3) adjudging the plaintiff, Mrs. Bernardita R. Macariola to pay
defendant Judge Elias B. Asuncion,
(a) the sum of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS [P400,000.00] for moral damages;
(b) the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS [P200,000.001 for exemplary damages;
(c) the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
[P50,000.00] for nominal damages; and
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio Ramo the
cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.]
It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was elevated to the
Court of Appeals upon perfection of the appeal on February 22, 1971.
I
WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant Bernardita R.
Macariola, under her first cause of action, that respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion
violated Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a
portion of Lot No. 1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case
No. 3010. 'That Article provides:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase,
even at a public or judicial action, either in person or through the
mediation of another:
 xxx xxx xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and
inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with
the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or
levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction
or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition
includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the
object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession [emphasis supplied].
The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or assignment of the
property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. WE have
already ruled that "... for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the
property must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property"
(The Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88 SCRA 513, 519 [1979], Rosario vda. de
Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646 [1978]).
In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion
of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8,
1963 was already final because none of the parties therein filed an appeal within the
reglementary period; hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation.
Moreover, at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's order dated October
23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October
16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long
become final for there was no appeal from said orders.
Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965
directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who
earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs, namely,
Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R. Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in
Civil Case No. 3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or more specifically one-half
thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, Luz
Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and the
same was subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. As
aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Galapon for which he was
issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, and on March 6,
1965 he sold a portion of said lot to respondent Judge and his wife who declared the
same for taxation purposes only. The subsequent sale on August 31, 1966 by
spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their respective shares and interest in
said Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., in which
respondent was the president and his wife was the secretary, took place long after
the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent two aforesaid
orders therein approving the project of partition.
While it appears that complainant herein filed on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 an
action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte docketed as Civil Case No. 4234,
seeking to annul the project of partition and the two orders approving the same, as
well as the partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances, the same,
however, is of no moment.
The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot
1184-E from Dr. Arcadio Galapon; hence, after the finality of the decision which he
rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No. 3010 and his two questioned orders
dated October 23, 1963 and November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no
longer subject of litigation.
The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No. 4234 can no
longer alter, change or affect the aforesaid facts that the questioned sale to
respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice, was effected and consummated
long after the finality of the aforesaid decision or orders.
Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken
place over one year after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as
the two orders approving the project of partition, and not during the pendency of the
litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.
It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of Lot 1184-E to
Dr. Arcadio Galapon by Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and Luz R. Bakunawa was only
a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical transfer of said lot to respondent
Judge as a consideration for the approval of the project of partition. In this connection,
We agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice thus:
And so we are now confronted with this all-important question
whether or not the acquisition by respondent of a portion of Lot
1184-E and the subsequent transfer of the whole lot to "TRADERS"
of which respondent was the President and his wife the Secretary,
was intimately related to the Order of respondent approving the
project of partition, Exh. A.
Respondent vehemently denies any interest or participation in the
transactions between the Reyeses and the Galapons concerning
Lot 1184-E, and he insists that there is no evidence whatsoever to
show that Dr. Galapon had acted, in the purchase of Lot 1184-E, in
mediation for him and his wife. (See p. 14 of Respondent's
Memorandum).
xxx xxx xxx
On this point, I agree with respondent that there is no evidence in
the record showing that Dr. Arcadio Galapon acted as a mere
"dummy" of respondent in acquiring Lot 1184-E from the Reyeses.
Dr. Galapon appeared to this investigator as a respectable citizen,
credible and sincere, and I believe him when he testified that he
bought Lot 1184-E in good faith and for valuable consideration from
the Reyeses without any intervention of, or previous understanding
with Judge Asuncion (pp. 391- 394, rec.).
On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted illegally in
approving the project of partition although it was not signed by the parties, We quote
with approval the findings of the Investigating Justice, as follows:
1. I agree with complainant that respondent should have required
the signature of the parties more particularly that of Mrs. Macariola
on the project of partition submitted to him for approval; however,
whatever error was committed by respondent in that respect was
done in good faith as according to Judge Asuncion he was assured
by Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the counsel of record of Mrs. Macariola,
That he was authorized by his client to submit said project of
partition, (See Exh. B and tsn p. 24, January 20, 1969). While it is
true that such written authority if there was any, was not presented
by respondent in evidence, nor did Atty. Ramo appear to
corroborate the statement of respondent, his affidavit being the only
one that was presented as respondent's Exh. 10, certain actuations
of Mrs. Macariola lead this investigator to believe that she knew the
contents of the project of partition, Exh. A, and that she gave her
conformity thereto. I refer to the following documents:
1) Exh. 9 Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520 covering Lot
1154 of the Tacloban Cadastral Survey in which the deceased
Francisco Reyes holds a "1/4 share" (Exh. 9-a). On tills certificate
of title the Order dated November 11, 1963, (Exh. U) approving the
project of partition was duly entered and registered on November
26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);
2) Exh. 7 Certified copy of a deed of absolute sale executed by
Bernardita Reyes Macariola on October 22, 1963, conveying to Dr.
Hector Decena the one-fourth share of the late Francisco Reyes-
Diaz in Lot 1154. In this deed of sale the vendee stated that she
was the absolute owner of said one-fourth share, the same having
been adjudicated to her as her share in the estate of her father
Francisco Reyes Diaz as per decision of the Court of First Instance
of Leyte under case No. 3010 (Exh. 7-A). The deed of sale was
duly registered and annotated at the back of OCT 19520 on
December 3, 1963 (see Exh. 9-e).
In connection with the abovementioned documents it is to be noted
that in the project of partition dated October 16, 1963, which was
approved by respondent on October 23, 1963, followed by an
amending Order on November 11, 1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4
thereof was adjudicated to Mrs. Macariola. It is this 1/4 share in Lot
1154 which complainant sold to Dr. Decena on October 22, 1963,
several days after the preparation of the project of partition.
Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however, that the latter
sold her one-fourth share in Lot 1154 by virtue of the decision in
Civil Case 3010 and not because of the project of partition, Exh. A.
Such contention is absurd because from the decision, Exh. C, it is
clear that one-half of one- fourth of Lot 1154 belonged to the estate
of Francisco Reyes Diaz while the other half of said one-fourth was
the share of complainant's mother, Felisa Espiras; in other words,
the decision did not adjudicate the whole of the one-fourth of Lot
1154 to the herein complainant (see Exhs. C-3 & C-4). Complainant
became the owner of the entire one-fourth of Lot 1154 only by
means of the project of partition, Exh. A. Therefore, if Mrs.
Macariola sold Lot 1154 on October 22, 1963, it was for no other
reason than that she was wen aware of the distribution of the
properties of her deceased father as per Exhs. A and B. It is also
significant at this point to state that Mrs. Macariola admitted during
the cross-examination that she went to Tacloban City in connection
with the sale of Lot 1154 to Dr. Decena (tsn p. 92, November 28,
1968) from which we can deduce that she could not have been kept
ignorant of the proceedings in civil case 3010 relative to the project
of partition.
Complainant also assails the project of partition because according
to her the properties adjudicated to her were insignificant lots and
the least valuable. Complainant, however, did not present any
direct and positive evidence to prove the alleged gross inequalities
in the choice and distribution of the real properties when she could
have easily done so by presenting evidence on the area, location,
kind, the assessed and market value of said properties. Without
such evidence there is nothing in the record to show that there
were inequalities in the distribution of the properties of
complainant's father (pp. 386389, rec.).
Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491
of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in
litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired the same. He
should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that:
"A judge's official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his
personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties,
but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach." And as aptly observed by
the Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise and indiscreet on the part of respondent to
have purchased or acquired a portion of a piece of property that was or had been in
litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of which he and
his wife were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. One who occupies an
exalted position in the judiciary has the duty and responsibility of maintaining the faith
and trust of the citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly
honest and just, but his actuations must be such as not give cause for doubt and
mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice. In this particular case of
respondent, he cannot deny that the transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and
render his actuations open to suspicion and distrust. Even if respondent honestly
believed that Lot 1184-E was no longer in litigation in his court and that he was
purchasing it from a third person and not from the parties to the litigation, he should
nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it to a
corporation in which he and his wife were financially involved, to avoid possible
suspicion that his acquisition was related in one way or another to his official
actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of respondent gave cause for the litigants
in civil case 3010, the lawyers practising in his court, and the public in general to
doubt the honesty and fairness of his actuations and the integrity of our courts of
justice" (pp. 395396, rec.).
II
With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that respondent
Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he
associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a
stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation having been organized to engage
in business. Said Article provides that:
Article 14 The following cannot engage in commerce, either in
person or by proxy, nor can they hold any office or have any direct,
administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or industrial
companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in
which they discharge their duties:
1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the
department of public prosecution in active service. This provision
shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal
prosecuting attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily
discharging the functions of judge or prosecuting attorney.
xxx xxx xxx
5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not
engage in commerce in a determinate territory.
It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the
Code of Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it,
however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship
between the government and certain public officers and employees, like justices and
judges.
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the
organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the
relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil.
887, 897 [1922]). It may be recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law
of public corporations, administrative law including the law on public officers and
elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the
nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public
officers and employees with respect to engaging in business: hence, political in
essence.
It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of
Commerce of 1885, with some modifications made by the "Commission de
Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines by
the Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on
December 1, 1888.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the
United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce
must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is change of
sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with
those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly
re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:
By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one
nation to another, either following a conquest or otherwise, ... those
laws which are political in their nature and pertain to the
prerogatives of the former government immediately cease upon the
transfer of sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).
While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict
with the, laws of the new sovereign continue in force without the
express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the political laws
do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such
political laws of the prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the
constitution or institutions of the new sovereign, may be continued
in force if the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the
commander-in-chief during the war, or by Congress in time of
peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 43 L.
Ed. 142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356
Bales of Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief
Justice Marshall said:
On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has
never been held that the relations of the
inhabitants with each other undergo any change.
Their relations with their former sovereign are
dissolved, and new relations are created between
them and the government which has acquired
their territory. The same act which transfers their
country, transfers the allegiance of those who
remain in it; and the law which may be
denominated political, is necessarily changed,
although that which regulates the intercourse and
general conduct of individuals, remains in force,
until altered by the newly- created power of the
State.
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is
a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous
political relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the
aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from
Spain to the United States and then to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently,
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply
to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of
the Court of Appeals.
It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated paragraph H,
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, which provides that:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or
pecuniary interest in any business, contract or
transaction in connection with which he
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or
in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by
any Iaw from having any interest.
Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated paragraph because
there is no showing that respondent participated or intervened in his official capacity
in the business or transactions of the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries,
Inc. In the case at bar, the business of the corporation in which respondent
participated has obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. The
business of said corporation is not that kind where respondent intervenes or takes
part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance. As was held in one case
involving the application of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code which has a similar
prohibition on public officers against directly or indirectly becoming interested in any
contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene, "(I)t is not enough to be
a public official to be subject to this crime; it is necessary that by reason of his office,
he has to intervene in said contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official who
intervenes in contracts or transactions which have no relation to his office cannot
commit this crime.' (People vs. Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134, cited by
Justice Ramon C. Aquino; Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11 [1976]).
It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation gained any
undue advantage in its business operations by reason of respondent's financial
involvement in it, or that the corporation benefited in one way or another in any case
filed by or against it in court. It is undisputed that there was no case filed in the
different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in which the corporation was
either party plaintiff or defendant except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled "Bernardita R.
Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales, et al.," wherein the complainant herein
sought to recover Lot 1184-E from the aforesaid corporation. It must be noted,
however, that Civil Case No. 4234 was filed only on November 9 or 11, 1968 and
decided on November 2, 1970 by CFI Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno when respondent
Judge was no longer connected with the corporation, having disposed of his interest
therein on January 31, 1967.
Furthermore, respondent is not liable under the same paragraph because there is no
provision in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions of the Philippines, nor is there an
existing law expressly prohibiting members of the Judiciary from engaging or having
interest in any lawful business.
It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known as the
Judiciary Act of 1948, does not contain any prohibition to that effect. As a matter of
fact, under Section 77 of said law, municipal judges may engage in teaching or other
vocation not involving the practice of law after office hours but with the permission of
the district judge concerned.
Likewise, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges from engaging
in commerce is, as heretofore stated, deemed abrogated automatically upon the
transfer of sovereignty from Spain to America, because it is political in nature.
Moreover, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code against
the purchase by judges of a property in litigation before the court within whose
jurisdiction they perform their duties, cannot apply to respondent Judge because the
sale of the lot in question to him took place after the finality of his decision in Civil
Case No. 3010 as well as his two orders approving the project of partition; hence, the
property was no longer subject of litigation.
In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made pursuant
to the Civil Service Act of 1959 prohibits an officer or employee in the civil service
from engaging in any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with
any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written
permission from the head of department, the same, however, may not fall within the
purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
because the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a prohibition by the Constitution
or law on any public officer from having any interest in any business and not by a
mere administrative rule or regulation. Thus, a violation of the aforesaid rule by any
officer or employee in the civil service, that is, engaging in private business without a
written permission from the Department Head may not constitute graft and corrupt
practice as defined by law.
On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We hold that the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No.
2260) and the Civil Service Rules promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12 of
Rule XVIII, do not apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under said Section 12: "No
officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the Head of Department ..."
It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member of the
Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act No. 296, as amended, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article X, 1973 Constitution.
Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was then vested
in the President of the Philippines, not in the Commissioner of Civil Service, and only
on two grounds, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency, and upon the
recommendation of the Supreme Court, which alone is authorized, upon its own
motion, or upon information of the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to conduct the
corresponding investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the grounds and
prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges.
And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the Supreme
Court can discipline judges of inferior courts as well as other personnel of the
Judiciary.
It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The Commissioner
may, for ... violation of the existing Civil Service Law and rules or of reasonable office
regulations, or in the interest of the service, remove any subordinate officer or
employee from the service, demote him in rank, suspend him for not more than one
year without pay or fine him in an amount not exceeding six months' salary." Thus, a
violation of Section 12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary action against civil
service officers and employees.
However, judges cannot be considered as subordinate civil service officers or
employees subject to the disciplinary authority of the Commissioner of Civil Service;
for, certainly, the Commissioner is not the head of the Judicial Department to which
they belong. The Revised Administrative Code (Section 89) and the Civil Service Law
itself state that the Chief Justice is the department head of the Supreme Court (Sec.
20, R.A. No. 2260) [1959]); and under the 1973 Constitution, the Judiciary is the only
other or second branch of the government (Sec. 1, Art. X, 1973 Constitution).
Besides, a violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII cannot be considered as a ground for
disciplinary action against judges because to recognize the same as applicable to
them, would be adding another ground for the discipline of judges and, as
aforestated, Section 67 of the Judiciary Act recognizes only two grounds for their
removal, namely, serious misconduct and inefficiency.
Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the Commissioner
of Civil Service who has original and exclusive jurisdiction "(T)o decide, within one
hundred twenty days, after submission to it, all administrative cases
against permanent officers and employees in the competitive service, and, except as
provided by law, to have final authority to pass upon their removal, separation, and
suspension and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of
such officers and employees; and prescribe standards, guidelines and regulations
governing the administration of discipline" (emphasis supplied). There is no question
that a judge belong to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government
as a Presidential appointee and is therefore not covered by the aforesaid provision.
WE have already ruled that "... in interpreting Section 16(i) of Republic Act No. 2260,
we emphasized that only permanent officers and employees who belong to the
classified service come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil
Service" (Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710,713 [1965], Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, 9
SCRA 619 [1963]).
Although the actuation of respondent Judge in engaging in private business by joining
the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking
officer, is not violative of the provissions of Article 14 of the Code of Commerce and
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as well as Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Civil Service Rules promulgated pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959,
the impropriety of the same is clearly unquestionable because Canon 25 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics expressly declares that:
A judge should abstain from making personal investments in
enterprises which are apt to be involved in litigation in his court;
and, after his accession to the bench, he should not retain such
investments previously made, longer than a period sufficient to
enable him to dispose of them without serious loss. It is desirable
that he should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain from all
relations which would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that
such relations warp or bias his judgment, or prevent his impartial
attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties. ...
WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his wife had
withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the aforesaid corporation and sold their
respective shares to third parties, and it appears also that the aforesaid corporation
did not in anyway benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as there was no
case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance of Leyte from the
time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12,
1966, up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967, and the eventual withdrawal of
respondent on January 31, 1967 from said corporation. Such disposal or sale by
respondent and his wife of their shares in the corporation only 22 days after the
incorporation of the corporation, indicates that respondent realized that early that their
interest in the corporation contravenes the aforesaid Canon 25. Respondent Judge
and his wife therefore deserve the commendation for their immediate withdrawal from
the firm after its incorporation and before it became involved in any court litigation
III
With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant alleged that
respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard of judicial
decorum, and that there was culpable defiance of the law and utter disregard for
ethics. WE agree, however, with the recommendation of the Investigating Justice that
respondent Judge be exonerated because the aforesaid causes of action are
groundless, and WE quote the pertinent portion of her report which reads as follows:
The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the claim that
respondent associated and closely fraternized with Dominador
Arigpa Tan who openly and publicly advertised himself as a
practising attorney (see Exhs. I, I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact
said Dominador Arigpa Tan does not appear in the Roll of
 Attorneys and is not a member of the Philippine Bar as certified to
in Exh. K.

The "respondent denies knowing that Dominador Arigpa Tan was

an "impostor" and claims that all the time he believed that the latter
was a bona fide member of the bar. I see no reason for disbelieving
this assertion of respondent. It has been shown by complainant that
Dominador Arigpa Tan represented himself publicly as an attorney-
at-law to the extent of putting up a signboard with his name and the
words "Attorney-at Law" (Exh. I and 1- 1) to indicate his office, and
it was but natural for respondent and any person for that matter to
have accepted that statement on its face value. "Now with respect
to the allegation of complainant that respondent is guilty of
fraternizing with Dominador Arigpa Tan to the extent of permitting
his wife to be a godmother of Mr. Tan's child at baptism (Exh. M &
M-1), that fact even if true did not render respondent guilty of
violating any canon of judicial ethics as long as his friendly relations
with Dominador A. Tan and family did not influence his official
actuations as a judge where said persons were concerned. There is
no tangible convincing proof that herein respondent gave any
undue privileges in his court to Dominador Arigpa Tan or that the
latter benefitted in his practice of law from his personal relations
with respondent, or that he used his influence, if he had any, on the
Judges of the other branches of the Court to favor said Dominador
Tan.

Of course it is highly desirable for a member of the judiciary to

refrain as much as possible from maintaining close friendly
relations with practising attorneys and litigants in his court so as to
avoid suspicion 'that his social or business relations or friendship
constitute an element in determining his judicial course" (par. 30,
Canons of Judicial Ethics), but if a Judge does have social
relations, that in itself would not constitute a ground for disciplinary
action unless it be clearly shown that his social relations be clouded
his official actuations with bias and partiality in favor of his friends
(pp. 403-405, rec.).

In conclusion, while respondent Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of the Court
of Appeals, did not violate any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of land which
was in litigation in his court and in engaging in business by joining a private
corporation during his incumbency as judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, he
should be reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities,
because his conduct as a member of the Judiciary must not only be characterized
with propriety but must always be above suspicion.

WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF

APPEALS IS HEREBY REMINDED TO BE MORE DISCREET IN HIS PRIVATE AND
BUSINESS ACTIVITIES.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003 Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:

FRANCISCO VS HOR ARTICLE XI

There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate Accountability of Public Officers
and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination by the
independent branches of government of the nature, scope and extent of their
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
and bases for its resolution.
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times
turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
confronted with one such today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but
controversy subject of the instant petitions whether the filing of the second not by impeachment.
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of
Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have
whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis. the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of
conscience.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee
pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods
within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within
protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the
sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
Constitution.
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever
mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote
power assigned to it by the sovereign people. of each Member shall be recorded.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at
carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these
least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute
three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co- the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
equality.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official

Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended
as they are to insure that governmental power is wielded only for the good of the
people, mandate a relationship of interdependence and coordination among these
branches where the delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are
harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is in the greater
interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath
or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person
 shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members
In cases where a verified complaint or a
of the Senate.
resolution of impeachment is filed or
endorsed, as the case may be, by at
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal least one-third (1/3) of the Members of
from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the the House, impeachment proceedings
Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject are deemed initiated at the time of the
to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law. filing of such verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment with the
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively Secretary General.
carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th RULE V Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of
Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Impeachment Proceedings. Within a
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT period of one (1) year from the date
28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules 1 approved by the impeachment proceedings are deemed
11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House initiated as provided in Section 16
Section 14. Scope of Bar. No hereof, no impeachment proceedings, as
Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:
impeachment proceedings shall be such, can be initiated against the same
initiated against the same official more official. (Italics in the original; emphasis
11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES than once within the period of one (1) and underscoring supplied)
year.

RULE II
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT
Section 2. Mode of Initiating
Impeachment. Impeachment shall be
initiated only by a verified complaint for
impeachment filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement
by any Member thereof or by a verified
complaint or resolution of impeachment
filed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the
Members of the House.
RULE V
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, 2 sponsored by
Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice
BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL Fund (JDF)."3
Section 16. Impeachment On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment
Proceedings Deemed Initiated. In complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr.
cases where a Member of the House and seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution,
files a verified complaint of impeachmentbetrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by
or a citizen files a verified complaint that Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
is endorsed by a Member of the House Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
through a resolution of endorsement 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
against an impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings against such
official are deemed initiated on the day Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
the Committee on Justice finds that the Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution
verified complaint and/or resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order
against such official, as the case may of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee
be, is sufficient in substance, or on the within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
date the House votes to overturn or majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within
affirm the finding of the said Committee sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
that the verified complaint and/or resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
resolution, as the case may be, is not House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
sufficient in substance.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on
October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the Committee Report
to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the
said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or
on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it,
the second impeachment complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the
House12 by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix
William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied
by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of
all the Members of the House of Representatives.13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of
which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution
that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within a period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a
duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal
remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his
petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance,
and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules
of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress," 14 posits
that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House
Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of
Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections
5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of
mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with
Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second
impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of
Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution;
and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and
taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of transcendental importance, pray,
in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually"
prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ
"perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon
from accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event
that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as
citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use
of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second
impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining
Congress from conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has
recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases
of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the second impeachment
complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and
members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order
prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving
and transmitting to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents
De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the
Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy
Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of
Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring that only constitutional
impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition
that the second impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be
declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a
right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and
that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the
integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is
instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the
second impeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be
declared null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President
from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment
complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and
agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act on the impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are
citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and
a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition, which does not state
what its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment complaint involves
paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House
Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment
be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member
of the Philippine Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the
House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is
mandated by the Code of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution,
prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V
and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared
unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently enjoined from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared
unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their
petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of
all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding
generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents House
of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further proceedings on the
second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the
second impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives
in interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging
that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and transcendental
significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct
and substantial interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its
officials in discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for the
issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or
giving the impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his
petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they
filed the second impeachment complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to
do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail
the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofilea,
alleging that as professors of law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter
of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue
"which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House
of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying the
Articles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared null
and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus
standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of
whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with
law and that the House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the
examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and
Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment
complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues
raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve matters of
transcendental importance, prays in its petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the
second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared
null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be
prohibited from accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any
proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and
taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second
impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and impeachment
by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and void and (2)
respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from
accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that
they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited from proceeding with the
impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first
three of the eighteen which were filed before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of
Representatives from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the
second impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R.
No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House
Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which
were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing
docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a
legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on
the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the
constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a
motion was put forth that the second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted
to the Senate, but it was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned
for lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of Impeachment
have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices
Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the Court rejected their offer.
Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of
October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent
House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to
comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the
petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed
distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20In addition, this Court called on
petitioners and respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and
others acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.
the petitions moot.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and
Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues outlined in an Advisory
appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an
independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution, from the Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked;
performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and whether it should be
even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to exercised by this Court at this time.
Intervene (Ex Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated
petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the
impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the
one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to a) locus standi of petitioners;
the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."22
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a)
consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file c) political question/justiciability;
their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for
oral arguments on November 5, 2003.
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President
Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of
petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact, adding that as of impeachment;
the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since
(1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court commences f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-
only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the vis Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and
principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the
House of Representatives.
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)

On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the
G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning
instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and
the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground
against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court has sifted and determined them
that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock"
to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of
and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet
judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether
ripe for judicial determination.
or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have
been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed be discussed in seriatim.
in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein
Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
Judicial Review

On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga

As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On
review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also
filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310. This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
 SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis
supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice
Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission23 after
the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present
Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on
what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several departments and among the
integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection
and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of our people,
acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the
expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a
republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious
whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific
limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution
sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations
upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and
limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the
course of government along constitutional channels, for then the
distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere
expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere
political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in
our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the
United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their
constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not
to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest
by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries.
In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear
implication from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to
determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary
as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned
to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees
to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual
cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by
the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More
than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people
as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.24 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper
allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the
course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a
necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly
conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by
popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries." To be sure,
it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial
review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be
the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not
the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made
in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States
confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all
written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void;
and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that
instrument.28 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935
Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate
constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted political law professor and
former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative
branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial
review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or
non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution,
the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid
only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is indeed an integral
component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the
corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form
of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the
people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division
in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be
kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution
has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as
the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the
exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative of the
Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x
x judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of
powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of
government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority
and control between them."33 To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only,
medium of participation or instrument of intervention of the judiciary in that
balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of
discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history,
into block letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the
nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the
sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional
Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and
explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of
the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our
experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed
regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number
of cases against the government, which then had no legal defense at
all, the solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and
got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning
particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order
the release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation
and effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense
of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political,
we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary
feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It
did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people,
but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial
law regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the
agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers.
In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether
or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction
or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature.
 This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the
courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature,
by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.35(Italics in
the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must
necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of
constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must
be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus,
in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking
through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its
meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It
is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed in which case the significance thus attached to them
prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the
people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according
to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases
where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum. 37 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution
should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this
Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying
the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in
construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be
accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of
the times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution
was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the
framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the
whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to
effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue40 where, speaking through
Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the
fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of
the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be
given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain
and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the
people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed
that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.
Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran
declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have
dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the benefit of one
person without considering that it could also affect others.When they
adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision
should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by
itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great
document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one
provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to
be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a
particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted
as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing
on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together
as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section
is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable
construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean
in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than
one which may make the words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids
is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this
Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason
and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only
when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the
terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual
members, and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no
 light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the
mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the
force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution
from what appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore
depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than
in the framers's understanding thereof.46(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and
jurisprudential application of the power of judicial review that respondents Speaker De
Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the
Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial
review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that
impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence,
any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the impeachment proceeding is
beyond the reach of judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to
try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review over
it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to determine constitutional
questions relative to impeachment proceedings.49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are
outside the scope of judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and
intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on American authorities, principally the
majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it
runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try
impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under
which impeachment is the only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a
lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise point to
deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate judicial power of
review in cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American
Constitution and American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition
that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide impeachment cases," as provided for
under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the total
exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the
impeachment process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it
necessarily confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine
constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution,
are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction
and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is
concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving
constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence
some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different
constitutional settings and needs."53 Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can
trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long
since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical
cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and
that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is
only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that
granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for
in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded
definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of
any government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine
Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over
impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of
impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation, 54 our Constitution,
though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power
as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations
include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the
impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines
their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus,
they call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that
"whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people expressed
legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride." 56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-
mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not
intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead,
it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v.
Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of
such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited by respondents
in support of the argument that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of
judicial review, are not in point. These cases concern the denial of petitions for writs
of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not
concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial
review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court
ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the
Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of
discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v.
Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy
and that when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed
the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a
resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and
rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral
Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v.
Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the
political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to
judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is
subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although under the
Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not
detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of
Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the
National Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election
is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge the duties and
enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and
balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is
not to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral components of the calibrated
system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial
review, like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several
limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge;
he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question
of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the
parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that,
courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments,
not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.68 (Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that
petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will
sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor
General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing
since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned
citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public interest 70 and transcendental
importance,71 and that procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine
whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves within the
limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion
given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is
of the same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule
exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by
seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for ethical
reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant
petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule
on standing, for the former is a concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has
constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments set forth regarding standing,
it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify
what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has
been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing
because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different
from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in
interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed
towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing
restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader
policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases
suits are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the
operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens,
 taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the
question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is
"the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party
entitled to the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before
us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they
invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights as taxpayers; members of
Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of the
legal profession which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional
acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when
specific requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of
a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law
or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining
has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of
the statute or act complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion
of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of
personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds
are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review,
however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not
sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the
public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit
should be entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners,
given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of
Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the
expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action
which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the
House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers
and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.83
While an association has legal personality to represent its members, 84 especially
when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital
interests,85 the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any
member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing
more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its
interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However,
a reading of the petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents.86It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to
resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons
intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all
concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all interests involved in the
suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is,
under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not
they were before the court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be
sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous
petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since
petitioners additionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their
petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of
transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is
mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following
instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the
case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and
(3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the
issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus
standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to
the public.91 Such liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party
should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very
least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can
take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the
case. He does not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court
requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of
the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be
permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the
requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they
seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one
additional issue, they raise the same issues and the same standing, and no objection
on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as earlier
stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et.
al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as
citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the
minority members of the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found
the requisites for intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263,
160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of transcendental importance, World War
II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with
Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the
grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino,
Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a
legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were
hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited
purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate
President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate
President does will undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an
impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the
House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the herein petitions
are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the
matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was, as earlier stated,
allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for,
while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement
for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of
public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their
tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional
protection against abuses of legislative power," or that there is a
misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public money
is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to
restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an
invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act
of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money
being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member
of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by
then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into
the picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and
when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the
second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the
House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the constitutionality of
which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second
impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the
2001 Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite
that the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before
suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are
premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that
there may be no urgent need for this Court to render a decision at this time, it being
the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all
remedies in the House and Senate should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who
suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage
signatories to the second impeachment complaint to withdraw their signatures and
opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to
raise constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment are
presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that
even assuming that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can
raise the issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives
of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their
constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the
questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the
ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution97 and, therefore,
petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both
Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as
previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is clothed
with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether
concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively
vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined
the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in
ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the
language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.99 (Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme
or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which
involved political questions. In some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the
political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review. 100 In
other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues
involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.101 Even in the landmark
1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether
the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the political
question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a
Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse
to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief
Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this
Court's power of judicial review and its application on issues involving political
questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual
comment that the judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches of the
service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the executive the sword, the
judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or commands except the
power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God,
and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the
body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on
the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and
explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality of
the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our
experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents
in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was
marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases
against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the
solicitor general set up the defense of political questions and got away
with it. As a consequence, certain principles concerning particularly
the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the
release of political detainees, and other matters related to the
operation and effect of martial law failed because the government set
up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well,
since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on
the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions
involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of
the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof
during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are
familiar with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the
Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with a
decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the
Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on
September 22, although the proclamation was dated September 21. The
obvious reason for the delay in its publication was that the administration
had apprehended and detained prominent newsmen on September 21. So
that when martial law was announced on September 22, the media hardly
published anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not
only because our main writers were already incarcerated, but also because
those who succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being
the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional Convention
had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not finished the
Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I
forgot to say that upon the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to
that 1971 Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One
of them was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the
unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by representatives of
Malacaang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971
Constitutional Convention had been unable to accomplish for about 14
months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to the President
around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President issued a decree calling
a plebiscite which suspended the operation of some provisions in the martial
law decree which prohibited discussions, much less public discussions of
certain matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a
free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to
be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our
colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of
the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that
Malacaang felt the danger of its approval. So, the President suspended
indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and announced that he would consult
the people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to January 15. But
the questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until
the eve of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not of
the Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as "citizens
assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into existence. The
questions to be propounded were released with proposed answers thereto,
suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers
given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the
plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying
that the holding of the referendum be suspended. When the motion was
being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to
the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new Constitution
was already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in
the referendum favored the Constitution. Immediately after the departure of
the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the session room where the case was
being heard. I then informed the Court and the parties the presidential
proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been ratified by the
people and is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation
null and void. The main defense put up by the government was that the
issue was a political question and that the court had no jurisdiction to
entertain the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January
15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all
members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of them
had been notified of any referendum in their respective places of residence,
much less did they participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw
any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of
the members of the Court felt that there had been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big
difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of
justices upheld the defense that the issue was a political question.
Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the only major case in
which the plea of "political question" was set up. There have been a
number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the
issue was clearly justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions,
it faced the following questions: What is judicial power? What is a political
question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle
actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and
enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be
enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained that
his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We
can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound to
comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main
marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but
they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be
highly derogatory to human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical
questions. In a presidential system of government, the Supreme Court
has, also another important function. The powers of government are
generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own
sphere and independent of the others. Because of that supremacy
power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in
courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the
agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers.
In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether
or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
 constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction
or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to
pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that
the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this
nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners
may have an initial food for thought on the subject of the judiciary. 103 (Italics
in the original; emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion
further clarified the concept of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but
judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in
other lower courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to
identify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But there is a
difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary
cases but where there is a question as to whether the government had
authority or had abused its authority to the extent of lacking
jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question.
Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the
Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the
political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of
discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended
to do away with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is
judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial power
includes" and the reason being that the definition that we might make
may not cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising
from the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly
political questions are beyond the pale of judicial power.104 (Emphasis
supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot
be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature called the political question
doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1,
Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this
clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly
political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the
doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions which are not
truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of
Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions
which are not truly political following the effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene
Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and
broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under
previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments
to decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice Teodoro Padilla,
this Court declared:
 The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must
perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he
political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial
determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot
abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although
said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the
principle in appropriate cases."108(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less
tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the
issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon
us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. 110 x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political
questions and non-justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these two
species of political questions may be problematic. There has been no clear standard.
The American case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.112 (Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination
of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not separate and
distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens
the conclusion that the others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of
judicial review is radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution provides our courts with far less discretion in determining whether
they should pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable
political question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.
If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall
thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint
constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with
Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into
the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the
constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment
adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5)
of Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint
over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of
this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely
political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of
the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for
impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust,
elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the records of the 1986
Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no better way to
approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by
alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear
cut definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to
decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial
power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of
a governmental act should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto
v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a
constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid,
unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the
record also presents some other ground upon which the court may
rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional
question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a
decision upon such question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657
for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites
of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there
must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights
susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have
been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the
question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case
itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly
unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of
the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues
upon which the outcome of this controversy could possibly be made to rest. In
determining whether one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be
passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that "the court
should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise
facts to which it is applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other
reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a
Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and
legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a
violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an
open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the
constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the
independence of the judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied
opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and
resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the
second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would, in the
Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the separate
and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader
than is required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further
strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in support of
their petition which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries
has already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article
VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as
provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It
follows then that the right rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be
respected, including the right to due process and the right not be compelled
to testify against one's self.123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra,
while joining the original petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new
argument that since the second impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the same does
not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution which
reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is
filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a
Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for
the application of the afore-mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members of
the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the
signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a
"Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the Resolution
of Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the
abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix
William B. Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in
order for said second impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of
Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that
the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the
Members of the House of Representatives. Not having complied with this
requirement, they concede that the second impeachment complaint should have been
calendared and referred to the House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2),
Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any
Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution
of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order
of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee
within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within
sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for
Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more
representatives who signed and verified the second impeachment complaint
as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment.
Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the members of the House
of Representatives as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment contemplated
by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at
least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does
indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment,
more compelling considerations militate against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of
the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal
and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for
invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground
as the basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for
naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts
presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the
determination of the instant cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors
Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the
latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly
prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are,
constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16
of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution;
and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred
under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the
Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates that the power of judicial review
includes the power of review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a
moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment
because all the Members thereof are subject to impeachment." 125 But this argument is
very much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with
penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives are subject to
them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this
Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified.
Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other tribunal to which the
controversy may be referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty
vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with
authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant
petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not
just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if
it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of
government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other
office has the authority to do so.128 On the occasion that this Court had been an
interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with
officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with
detachment and fairness."129 After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public
has laid on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and
morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they
expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to displease
any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to
resist the temptations lurking in [his] office." 130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already
been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that case, the
petitioners filed with the respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for
Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and
resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested
parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunal's
membership to only its three Justices-Members whose disqualification was not
sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of
any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the
Senate without inviting the same objections to the substitute's competence,
the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave
the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body
can perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the
participation of its entire membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration that the Tribunal be not
prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform,
the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by its
being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of
the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an election
contest that would involve all Senatorselect, six of whom would inevitably
have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again
in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all
24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no
scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of
Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought.
Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and hopes of
vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the
Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in
judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal
may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of
a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would
stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely
saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators
and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-
Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election
contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a
majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself of its
jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge
is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one designated
by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with
the Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is
equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects
the very heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification,
if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to
abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation
of its entire membership of Justices.133 (Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it
exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven
pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court
Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a
friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such
questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It
never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the
legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of
the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of
the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide
questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a
decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon
which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied
application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one
involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory
construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals
from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under
the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can
be sustained on an independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of
one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many
applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of
challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge
by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty will
not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the
dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth
Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the
 challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by
the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the
instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even
if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that
this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided (citations omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v.
TVA from different decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be
encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the
facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the
operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the
exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint
the possibility that "judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing
conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the
appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the scenario
that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at home
and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an
impeachable official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that
failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the
diminution of its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the
judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the
Solicitor General, the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a
reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment
cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their action
may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is
not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the
constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not only juridical
effects but also political consequences. Those political consequences may
follow even where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an
act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act
explicitly, one way or the other, itself constitutes a decision for the
respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split and "in the
end there were not enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain
respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional order was disrupted which
paved the way for the establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate
branches of the government would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty
under the law to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no
reason to believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a precipitate
manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging
disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the
doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If
[public officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed
to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by
law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A
government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary
powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, [public
officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it
without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments, political
parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section
3 (5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does
not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of Representatives,
as a collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as
Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways,
to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of
Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House of
Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have been violated as
the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and seven Associate
Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as
the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate."
Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner
Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed
on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional
Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which
he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on
the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of
"initiating" included the act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any
doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the
Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to
begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of
the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first
action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who
elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in
this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus
of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the
transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate. The middle consists
of those deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the articles of
impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and
its referral to the Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by
Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment is
"deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of
impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the Committee.
Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated but
rather are "deemed initiated." The language is recognition that initiation
happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a
time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the
intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be
pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and
the substantive provisions on impeachment, I understand there have been
many proposals and, I think, these would need some time for Committee
action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a
resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been
furnished the Members of this body. This is borne out of my experience as a
member of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good Government
which took charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First
Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the
resolution covers several steps in the impeachment
proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker committee
action, calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal referral
to the Senate, trial and judgment by the Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a
reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by
Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we
do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the
floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the
initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually
done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the
Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on
Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I
could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of
President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted
the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the
body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body
which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on
that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging these
words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing
with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress.
The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard
Nixon are with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has
already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record.
 xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the
approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the
substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules of
the House of Representatives of the United States regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this
provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the
words which read: "to initiate impeachment proceedings" and the
comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH
THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and
replace the word "by" with OF, so that the whole section will now read: "A
vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary
either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the
Committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member
shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the
House of Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts
from the filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach
always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the
words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the
direct filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the
House. I will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not
vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform
procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress.
Thank you, Madam President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted
by the Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the
complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the
obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate impeachment proceedings" as
contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it
understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings
starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a
resolution of impeachment does not initiate the impeachment proceedings which
was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3,
paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is
Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that
the word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding,
however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint
moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word
"initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate."
The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second
sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singuala
sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term "proceedings." An
impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate.
Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its
members, can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has
"exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can do it.
However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding"
must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To
initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand,
proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes
place not in the Senate but in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the
filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or
by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives; (2)
there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either
reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects
or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further
processing; and (4) there is the processing of the same complaint by the House of
Representatives which either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or
overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least
one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are
prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an
impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable public official is
successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully charged with an
impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when
the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the
House proceeding and the beginning of another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither
is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the
resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has
already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the
proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or
begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for
action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning.
Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of
all the Members of the House shall be necessary to initiate impeachment
proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the
vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a
complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the present
Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding
shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year," it means that no second verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the
Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on
the common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He
reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and
sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning
into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it
and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate
impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment,"
This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo
singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two
former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate"
refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial
action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or,
by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with
the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year
period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2)
once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that
the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing
or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a
verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of
the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules
give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use
contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI,
citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions
(referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the
matter at issue expressed during this Court's our deliberations stand on a different
footing from the properly recorded utterances of debates and proceedings." Further
citing said case, he states that this Court likened the former members of the
Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles that
intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning because of the latter's
balanced perspectives and disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are
at present only two members of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission Chief Justice Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide
has not taken part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court
has not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members of the
Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations and
proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI,
it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its
rules governing impeachment. Its argument is premised on the assumption that
Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is
misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose
of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover,
Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to
make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee
within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within
sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the
House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The vote
of each Member shall be recorded.
 (4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at
least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute
the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental
law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by
necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the
Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmea v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province of either House
of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted
"disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando,
speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v.
Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons
other than members of the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature.
In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,153 Justice
Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers
each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be
a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the
rule and the result which is sought to be attained. It is only within these limitations that
all matters of method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same
case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine
setting there is even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of
Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner
are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of
separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even
in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an
impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases
involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a
window to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US
Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of the judiciary to
review congressional rules. It held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may
determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this
authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the
names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who
do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and recorded in the journal, and
reported to the Speaker with the names of the members voting, and be
counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do
business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question,
therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the
Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a
quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition
place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the
wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial
consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or
violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule
and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these
limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House,
and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be
better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a
rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time.
The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is
a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and
within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any
other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the
validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are
constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to
satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did
not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable
relationship with the result sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the
Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of
the principle of separation of powers.154
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts
to categorically reject the political question defense when its
interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of
our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x x to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." This power is new and was not
granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also
xeroxed from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The
CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our
experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state power
were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political
question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers
of the judiciary vis--vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of
government.155
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is
not a mere power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter
this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court
to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or
any of its officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has
elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other branches of
government despite their more democratic character, the President and the
legislators being elected by the people.156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of
justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the capstone of the
efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court
vis--vis the other branches of government. This provision was dictated by
our experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and more
independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of
government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution
transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This transformation,
dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but
revolutionary.Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court
approached constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot
do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress this Court is
mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what
it should not do but what it must do. The Court must discharge this
solemn duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this
new constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define
the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the
House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against
government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we
wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to
unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly emboldened other
branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our
courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this
novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino
and its interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on
inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the lessons
of our own history should provide us the light and not the experience of
foreigners.157(Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions.
Here, the third parties alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution are
involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US158 as basis for
arguing that this Court may not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17
of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution
simply provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole power of
impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this "sole
power" is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme
Court concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
a constitutional power to the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold
with regard to impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since
our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating how
that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules
which state that impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a
finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns
the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is
not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-
General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of
impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly contravene
Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning different from
"filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment
complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken
thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not
be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section
3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former
President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven
associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House
Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the
Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the
initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a
one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a
phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual and collective
consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for human drama, conflict or
tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy over the
Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an
exasperating, mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have
fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively believe to be
the correct position or view on the issues involved. Passions had ran high as
demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to
the streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the
matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the academe
and denominations of faith offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in
the official relations of the governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived
resulting instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had
been constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no
action of any kind and form with respect to the prosecution by the House of
Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public
official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this
Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made through what are now the
arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint"
aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have a bearing on the
impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of
the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been already explained, the Court found
the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally
vested power and duty of judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely
called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of
the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only
this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with
the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government. Face-to-face thus
with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction, no other
course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of
impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without
basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the
merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against
the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule.
Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor
indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it
is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two
great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to
complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own powers to
bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and ordered our
society upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the
impeachment proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have
actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on
said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be farther
from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held
and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights
regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions. This Court has
dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit
or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could be made to
it, so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not
now be trusted to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is the highest
ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the
fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branch's official act as
tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition
of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to
disqualify this entire institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme
Court as likely incapable of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case,
which is simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal
system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's
moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its
commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is
most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme
Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application
to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence.
The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court.
But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in
law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of
his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once
again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly,
this Court has resorted to no other than the Constitution in search for a solution to
what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed
immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal
principles, it is equally important that it went through this crucible of a democratic
process, if only to discover that it can resolve differences without the use of force and
aggression upon each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on
November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the
Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003
is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-6355-56 August 31, 1953
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for
appellant.
Manuel O. Chan for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila
declaring section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the
appellant Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice
Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing the income tax collected on
his salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice
Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46, representing the income tax collected on
his salary from January 1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court
of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to December 31,1950, as Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court, without special pronouncement as to costs.
Because of the similarity of the two cases, involving as they do the same question of
law, they were jointly submitted for determination in the lower court. Judge Higinio B.
Macadaeg presiding, in a rather exhaustive and well considered decision found and
held that under the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer,
85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and
Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and therefore was in
violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said
taxes.
We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and considering the proposition
and the arguments pro and cons involved in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra,
which are raised, brought up and presented here. In that case, we have held despite
the ruling enunciated by the United States Federal Supreme Court in the case of O
'Malley vs. Woodrought 307 U. S., 277, that taxing the salary of a judicial officer in the
Philippines is a diminution of such salary and so violates the Constitution. We shall
now confine our-selves to a discussion and determination of the remaining question
of whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify and
legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers.
According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of
Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not
received favorably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation,
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor
General reproduced what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House
of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.
For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 9, Article VIII of our
Constitution:.
SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts
shall hold office during good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy
years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. They
shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office. Until the Congress shall
provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an
annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate
Justice, fifteen thousand pesos.
As already stated construing and applying the above constitutional provision, we held
in the Perfecto case that judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax
on their salaries, because the collection thereof by the Government was a decrease
or diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office, a thing which is
expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thereafter, according to the Solicitor
General, because Congress did not favorably receive the decision in the Perfecto
case, Congress promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to counteract the ruling in
that decision, at least now to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on
the salaries of judicial officers. We quote section 13 of Republic Act No. 590:
SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of
the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment
of which is hereby declared not to be dimunition of his compensation fixed
by the Constitution or by law.
So we have this situation. The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting the
Constitution, particularly section 9, Article VIII, has held that judicial officers are
exempt from payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof
was a diminution of such salaries, specifically prohibited by the Constitution. Now
comes the Legislature and in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, says that "no salary
wherever received by any public officer of the Republic (naturally including a judicial
officer) shall be considered as exempt from the income tax," and proceeds to declare
that payment of said income tax is not a diminution of his compensation. Can the
Legislature validly do this? May the Legislature lawfully declare the collection of
income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease
of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise? To
determine this question, we shall have to go back to the fundamental principles
regarding separation of powers.
Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is
assigned the power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged
with the execution of carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation
and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this
authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts
can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and
ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the
Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if
there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and
unconstitutional.
Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative
branch may not limit or restrict the power granted to the courts by the
Constitution. (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al., 44N. W., 2nd 341, 342.)
When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the
legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act
unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it without violating their
oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the
fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief
Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental
law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution.
Any other course would lead to the destruction of the Constitution. Since the
question as to the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the courts
will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action
might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of the
judicial tribunals. (11 Am. Jur., 714-715.)
Under the American system of constitutional government, among the most
important functions in trusted to the judiciary are the interpreting of
Constitutions and, as a closely connected power, the determination of
whether laws and acts of the legislature are or are not contrary to the
provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions. (11 Am. Jur., 905.).
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act NO. 590, Congress says
that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a
clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office," found in section 9, Article
VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of
interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the
well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.
The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any
declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so
as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a
word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used
elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in
defining a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis supplied)
The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional
provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a
declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional
inhibition. (11 Am. Jur., 919, emphasis supplied)
We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned
the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is
more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is
not within the sphere of the Legislative department. If the Legislature may declare
what a law means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution means, especially
after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by interpretation and
applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial
processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court determination of a
case based on a judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be
undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law
or of the Constitution by the Legislative department. That would be neither wise nor
desirable, besides being clearly violative of the fundamental, principles of our
constitutional system of government, particularly those governing the separation of
powers.
So much for the constitutional aspect of the case. Considering the practical side
thereof, we believe that the collection of income tax on a salary is an actual and
evident diminution thereof. Under the old system where the in-come tax was paid at
the end of the year or sometime thereafter, the decrease may not be so apparent and
clear. All that the official who had previously received his full salary was called upon
to do, was to fulfill his obligation and to exercise his privilege of paying his income tax
on his salary. His salary fixed by law was received by him in the amount of said tax
comes from his other sources of income, he may not fully realize the fact that his
salary had been decreased in the amount of said income tax. But under the present
system of withholding the income tax at the source, where the full amount of the
income tax corresponding to his salary is computed in advance and divided into equal
portions corresponding to the number of pay-days during the year and actually
deducted from his salary corresponding to each payday, said official actually does not
receive his salary in full, because the income tax is deducted therefrom every payday,
that is to say, twice a month. Let us take the case of Justice Endencia. As Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals, his salary is fixed at p12,000 a year, that is to say, he
should receive P1,000 a month or P500 every payday, fifteenth and end of month.
In the present case, the amount collected by the Collector of Internal Revenue on
said salary is P1,744.45 for one year. Divided by twelve (months) we shall have
P145.37 a month. And further dividing it by two paydays will bring it down to P72.685,
which is the income tax deducted form the collected on his salary each half month.
So, if Justice Endencia's salary as a judicial officer were not exempt from payment of
the income tax, instead of receiving P500 every payday, he would be actually
receiving P427.31 only, and instead of receiving P12,000 a year, he would be
receiving but P10,255.55. Is it not therefor clear that every payday, his salary is
actually decreased by P72.685 and every year is decreased by P1,744.45?
Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection with House Bill No. 1127,
which became Republic Act No. 590, it would seem that one of the main reasons
behind the enactment of the law was the feeling among certain legislators that
members of the Supreme Court should not enjoy any exemption and that as citizens,
out of patriotism and love for their country, they should pay income tax on their
salaries. It might be stated in this connection that the exemption is not enjoyed by the
members of the Supreme Court alone but also by all judicial officers including
Justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of inferior courts. The exemption also
extends to other constitutional officers, like the President of the Republic, the Auditor
General, the members of the Commission on Elections, and possibly members of the
Board of Tax Appeals, commissioners of the Public Service Commission, and judges
of the Court of Industrial Relations. Compares to the number of all these officials, that
of the Supreme Court Justices is relatively insignificant. There are more than 990
other judicial officers enjoying the exemption, including 15 Justices of the Court of
Appeals, about 107 Judges of First Instance, 38 Municipal Judges and about 830
Justices of the Peace. The reason behind the exemption in the Constitution, as
interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve
the independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of the other
courts, whose present membership number more than 990 judicial officials.
The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial officers, but was
grounded on public policy. As said by Justice Van Devanter of the United States
Supreme Court in the case of Evans vs. Gore (253 U. S., 245):
The primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to benefit
the judges, but, like the clause in respect of tenure, to attract good and
competent men to the bench and to promote that independence of action
and judgment which is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties,
limitations and pervading principles of the Constitution and to the
administration of justice without respect to person and with equal concern for
the poor and the rich. Such being its purpose, it is to be construed, not as a
private grant, but as a limitation imposed in the public interest; in other
words, not restrictively, but in accord with its spirit and the principle on which
it proceeds.
Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the Philippines enjoying this
exemption, especially when the great bulk thereof are justices of the peace, many of
them receiving as low as P200 a month, and considering further the other exemptions
allowed by the income tax law, such as P3,000 for a married person and P600 for
each dependent, the amount of national revenue to be derived from income tax on
the salaries of judicial officers, were if not for the constitutional exemption, could not
be large or substantial. But even if it were otherwise, it should not affect, much less
outweigh the purpose and the considerations that prompted the establishment of the
constitutional exemption. In the same case of Evans vs. Gore, supra, the Federal
Supreme Court declared "that they (fathers of the Constitution) regarded the
independence of the judges as far as greater importance than any revenue that could
come from taxing their salaries.
When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from
payment of income tax on his salary, as a privilege . It is already attached to his
office, provided and secured by the fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but
based on public interest, to secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought
and action. When we come to the members of the Supreme Court, this excemption to
them is relatively of short duration. Because of the limited membership in this High
Tribunal, eleven, and due to the high standards of experience, practice and training
required, one generally enters its portals and comes to join its membership quite late
in life, on the aver-age, around his sixtieth year, and being required to retire at
seventy, assuming that he does not die or become incapacitated earlier, naturally he
is not in a position to receive the benefit of exemption for long. It is rather to the
justices of the peace that the exemption can give more benefit. They are relatively
more numerous, and because of the meager salary they receive, they can less afford
to pay the income tax on it and its diminution by the amount of the income tax if paid
would be real, substantial and onerous.
Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing unusual or abhorrent in it, as
long as it is based on public policy or public interest. While all other citizens are
subject to arrest when charged with the commission of a crime, members of the
Senate and House of Representatives except in cases of treason, felony and breach
of the peace are exempt from arrest, during their attendance in the session of the
Legislature; and while all other citizens are generally liable for any speech, remark or
statement, oral or written, tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a
natural or juridical person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead, Senators and
Congressmen in making such statements during their sessions are extended
immunity and exemption.
And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who enjoy this exemption.
Persons, natural and juridical, are exempt from taxes on their lands, buildings and
improvements thereon when used exclusively for educational purposes, even if they
derive income therefrom. (Art. VI, Sec. 22 [3].) Holders of government bonds are
exempted from the payment of taxes on the income or interest they receive therefrom
(sec. 29 (b) [4], National Internal Revenue Code as amended by Republic Act No.
566). Payments or income received by any person residing in the Philippines under
the laws of the United States administered by the United States Veterans
Administration are exempt from taxation. (Republic Act No. 360). Funds received by
officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Army who served in the Armed Forces of
the United States, allowances earned by virtue of such services corresponding to the
taxable years 1942 to 1945, inclusive, are exempted from income tax. (Republic Act
No. 210). The payment of wages and allowances of officers and enlisted men of the
Army Forces of the Philippines sent to Korea are also exempted from taxation.
(Republic Act No. 35). In other words, for reasons of public policy and public interest,
a citizen may justifiably by constitutional provision or statute be exempted from his
ordinary obligation of paying taxes on his income. Under the same public policy and
perhaps for the same it not higher considerations, the framers of the Constitution
deemed it wise and necessary to exempt judicial officers from paying taxes on their
salaries so as not to decrease their compensation, thereby insuring the independence
of the Judiciary.
In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer,
supra, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is
a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. We further hold that the
interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive
province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the
Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it
may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in
their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought
and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in
a case by the highest court of the land.
In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed, with no pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-2348 February 27, 1950
GREGORIO PERFECTO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BIBIANO MEER, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Francisco Carreon
for oppositor and appellant.
Gregorio Perfecto in his own behalf.
BENGZON, J.:
In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio
Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year
1946. After paying the amount (P802), he instituted this action in the Manila Court of
First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable
for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the
Constitution.
The Manila judge upheld his contention, and required the refund of the amount
collected. The defendant appealed.
The death of Mr. Justice Perfecto has freed us from the embarrassment of passing
upon the claim of a colleague. Still, as the outcome indirectly affects all the members
of the Court, consideration of the matter is not without its vexing feature. Yet
adjudication may not be declined, because (a) we are not legally disqualified; (b)
jurisdiction may not be renounced, ad it is the defendant who appeals to this Court,
and there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred; (c) supreme
courts in the United States have decided similar disputes relating to themselves; (d)
the question touches all the members of the judiciary from top to bottom; and (e) the
issue involves the right of other constitutional officers whose compensation is equally
protected by the Constitution, for instance, the President, the Auditor-General and the
members of the Commission on Elections. Anyway the subject has been thoroughly
discussed in many American lawsuits and opinions, and we shall hardly do nothing
more than to borrow therefrom and to compare their conclusions to local conditions.
There shall be little occasion to formulate new propositions, for the situation is not
unprecedented.
Our Constitution provides in its Article VIII, section 9, that the members of the
Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts "shall receive such compensation as
may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office."
It also provides that "until Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos".
When in 1945 Mr. Justice Perfecto assumed office, Congress had not "provided
otherwise", by fixing a different salary for associate justices. He received salary at the
rate provided by the Constitution, i.e., fifteen thousand pesos a year.
Now, does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount to a
diminution thereof?.
A note found at page 534 of volume 11 of the American Law Reports answers the
question in the affirmative. It says:
Where the Constitution of a state provides that the salaries of its judicial
officers shall not be dismissed during their continuance in office, it had been
held that the state legislature cannot impose a tax upon the compensation
paid to the judges of its court. New Orleans v. Lea (1859) 14 La. Ann. 194;
Opinion of Attorney-General if N. C. (1856) 48 N. C. (3 Jones, L.) Appx. 1;
Re Taxation of Salaries of Judges (1902) 131 N. C. 692, 42 S. E. 970; Com.
ex. rel. Hepburn v. Mann (1843) 5 Watts & S,. (Pa.) 403 [but see to the
contrary the earlier and much criticized case of Northumberland county v.
Chapman (1829) 2 Rawle (Pa.) 73]*
A different rule prevails in Wisconsin, according to the same annotation. Another state
holding the contrary view is Missouri.
The Constitution of the United States, likes ours, forbids the diminution of the
compensation of Judges of the Supreme Court and of inferior courts. The Federal
Governments has an income tax law. Does it embrace the salaries of federal judges?
In answering this question, we should consider four periods:
First period. No attempts was made to tax the compensation of Federal judges up to
1862 1.
Second period. 1862-1918. In July, 1862, a statute was passed subjecting the
salaries of "civil officers of the United States" to an income tax of three per cent.
Revenue officers, construed it as including the compensation of all judges; but Chief
Justice Taney, speaking for the judiciary, wrote to the Secretary of the Treasury a
letter of protest saying, among other things:
The act in question, as you interpret it, diminishes the compensation of every
judge 3 per cent, and if it can be diminished to that extent by the name of a
tax, it may, in the same way, be reduced from time to time, at the pleasure of
the legislature.
The judiciary is one of the three great departments of the government,
created and established by the Constitution. Its duties and powers are
specifically set forth, and are of a character that requires it to be perfectly
independent of the two other departments, and in order to place it beyond
the reach and above even the suspicion of any such influence, the power to
reduce their compensation is expressly withheld from Congress, and
excepted from their powers of legislation.
Language could not be more plain than that used in the Constitution. It is,
moreover, one of its most important and essential provisions. For the articles
which limits the powers of the legislative and executive branches of the
government, and those which provide safeguards for the protection of the
citizen in his person and property, would be of little value without a judiciary
to uphold and maintain them, which was free from every influence, direct
 and indirect, that might by possibility in times of political excitement warp
their judgments.
Upon these grounds I regard an act of Congress retaining in the Treasury a
portion of the Compensation of the judges, as unconstitutional and void 2.
The protest was unheeded, although it apparently bore the approval of the whole
Supreme Court, that ordered it printed among its records. But in 1869 Attorney-
General Hoar upon the request of the Secretary of the Treasury rendered an opinion
agreeing with the Chief Justice. The collection of the tax was consequently
discontinued and the amounts theretofore received were all refunded. For half a
century thereafter judges' salaries were not taxed as income.3
Third period. 1919-1938. The Federal Income Tax Act of February 24, 1919 expressly
provided that taxable income shall include "the compensation of the judges of the
Supreme Court and inferior courts of the United States". Under such Act, Walter
Evans, United States judge since 1899, paid income tax on his salary; and
maintaining that the impost reduced his compensation, he sued to recover the money
he had delivered under protest. He was upheld in 1920 by the Supreme Court in an
epoch-making decision.*, explaining the purpose, history and meaning of the
Constitutional provision forbidding impairment of judicial salaries and the effect of an
income tax upon the salary of a judge.
With what purpose does the Constitution provide that the compensation of
the judges "shall not be diminished during their continuance in office"? Is it
primarily to benefit the judges, or rather to promote the public weal by giving
them that independence which makes for an impartial and courageous
discharge of the judicial function? Does the provision merely forbid direct
diminution, such as expressly reducing the compensation from a greater to a
less sum per year, and thereby leave the way open for indirect, yet effective,
diminution, such as withholding or calling back a part as tax on the whole?
Or does it mean that the judge shall have a sure and continuing right to the
compensation, whereon he confidently may rely for his support during his
continuance in office, so that he need have no apprehension lest his
situation in this regard may be changed to his disadvantage?
The Constitution was framed on the fundamental theory that a larger
measure of liberty and justice would be assured by vesting the three powers
the legislative, the executive, and the judicial in separate departments,
each relatively independent of the others and it was recognized that without
this independence if it was not made both real and enduring the
separation would fail of its purpose. all agreed that restraints and checks
must be imposed to secure the requisite measure of independence; for
otherwise the legislative department, inherently the strongest, might
encroach on or even come to dominate the others, and the judicial, naturally
the weakest, might be dwarf or swayed by the other two, especially by the
legislative.
The particular need for making the judiciary independent was elaborately
pointed our by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist, No. 78, from which we
excerpt the following:
xxx xxx xxx
At a later period John Marshall, whose rich experience as lawyer, legislator,
and chief justice enable him to speak as no one else could, tersely said
(debates Va. Gonv. 1829-1831, pp. 616, 619): . . . Our courts are the
balance wheel of our whole constitutional system; and our is the only
constitutional system so balanced and controlled. Other constitutional
systems lacks complete poise and certainly of operation because they lack
the support and interpretation of authoritative, undisputable courts of law. It
is clear beyond all need of exposition that for the definite maintenance of
constitutional understandings it is indispensable, alike for the preservation of
the liberty of the individual and for the preservation of the integrity of the
powers of the government, that there should be some nonpolitical forum in
which those understandings can be impartially debated and determined.
That forum our courts supply. There the individual may assert his rights;
there the government must accept definition of its authority. There the
individual may challenge the legality of governmental action and have it
adjudged by the test of fundamental principles, and that test the government
must abide; there the government can check the too aggressive self-
assertion of the individual and establish its power upon lines which all can
comprehend and heed. The constitutional powers of the courts constitute the
ultimate safeguard alike of individual privilege and of governmental
prerogative. It is in this sense that our judiciary is the balance wheel of our
entire system; it is meant to maintain that nice adjustment between individual
rights and governmental powers which constitutes political liberty.
Constitutional government in the United States, pp. 17, 142.
Conscious in the nature and scope of the power being vested in the national
courts, recognizing that they would be charge with responsibilities more
delicate and important than any ever before confide to judicial tribunals, and
appreciating that they were to be, in the words of George Washington, "the
keystone of our political fabric", the convention with unusual accord
incorporated in the Constitution the provision that the judges "shall hold their
offices during good behavior, and shall at stated times receive for their
services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office." Can there be any doubt that the two things thus
coupled in place the clause in respect of tenure during good behaviour
and that in respect of an undiminishable compensation-were equally coupled
in purpose? And is it not plain that their purposes was to invest the judges
with an independence in keeping with the delicacy and importance of their
task, and with the imperative need for its impartial and fearless
performance? Mr. Hamilton said in explanation and support of the provision
(Federalist No. 79): "Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute
more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their
support. . . . In the general course of human nature, a power over a man's
subsistence amounts to a power over his will.
 xxx xxx xxx
These considerations make it very plain, as we think, that the primary
purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the judges,
but, like the clause in respect of tenure, to attract good and competent men
to the bench, and to promote that independence of action and judgment
which is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations, and
pervading principles of the constitution, and to the admiration of justice
without respect to persons, and with equal concern for the poor and the rich.
xxx xxx xxx
But it is urged that what plaintiff was made to pay back was an income tax,
and that a like tax was exacted of others engaged in private employment.
If the tax in respect of his compensation be prohibited, it can find no
justification in the taxation of other income as to which there is no
prohibition, for, of course, doing what the Constitution permits gives no
license to do what it prohibits.
The prohibition is general, contains no excepting words, and appears to be
directed against all diminution, whether for one purpose or another; and the
reason for its adoption, as publicly assigned at the time and commonly
accepted ever since, make with impelling force for the conclusion that the
fathers of the Constitution intended to prohibit diminution by taxation as well
as otherwise, that they regarded the independence of the judges as of far
greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their
salaries. (American law Reports, annotated, Vol. 11, pp. 522-25; Evans vs.
Gore, supra.)
In September 1, 1919, Samuel J. Graham assumed office as judge of the Unites
States court of claims. His salary was taxed by virtue of the same time income tax of
February 24, 1919. At the time he qualified, a statute fixed his salary at P7,500. He
filed action for reimbursement, submitting the same theory on which Evans v. Gore
had been decided. The Supreme Court of the United States in 1925 reaffirmed that
decision. It overruled the distinction offered by Solicitor-General Beck that Judge
Graham took office after the income tax had been levied on judicial salaries, (Evans
qualified before), and that Congress had power "to impose taxes which should apply
to the salaries of Federal judges appointed after the enactment of the taxing statute."
(The law had made no distinction as to judges appointed before or after its passage)
Fourth period. 1939 Foiled in their previous attempts, the Revenue men persisted,
and succeeded in inserting in the United States Revenue Act of June, 1932 the
modified proviso that "gross income" on which taxes were payable included the
compensation "of judges of courts of the United States taking office after June 6,
1932". Joseph W. Woodrough qualified as United States circuit judge on May 1, 1933.
His salary as judge was taxed, and before the Supreme Court of the United States
the issue of decrease of remuneration again came up. That court, however, ruled
against him, declaring (in 1939) that Congress had the power to adopt the law. It said:
The question immediately before us is whether Congress exceeded its
constitutional power in providing that United States judges appointed after
the Revenue Act of 1932 shall not enjoy immunity from the incidence of
taxation to which everyone else within the defined classes of income is
subjected. Thereby, of course, Congress has committed itself to the position
that a non-discriminatory tax laid generally on net income is not, when
applied to the income of federal judge, a diminution of his salary within the
prohibition of Article 3, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. To suggest that it makes
inroads upon the independence of judges who took office after the Congress
has thus charged them with the common duties of citizenship, by making
them bear their aliquot share of the cost of maintaining the Government, is to
trivialize the great historic experience on which the framers based the
safeguards of Article 3, Sec. 1. To subject them to a general tax is merely to
recognize that judges also are citizens, and that their particular function in
government does not generate an immunity from sharing with their fellow
citizens the material burden of the government whose Constitution and laws
they are charged with administering. (O'Malley vs. Woodrough, 59 S. Ct.
838, A. L. R. 1379.)
Now, the case for the defendant-appellant Collector of Internal Revenue is premised
mainly on this decision (Note A). He claims it holds "that federal judges are subject to
the payment of income taxes without violating the constitutional prohibition against
the reduction of their salaries during their continuance in office", and that it "is a
complete repudiation of the ratio decidenci of Evans vs. Gore". To grasp the full
import of the O'Malley precedent, we should bear in mind that:
1. It does not entirely overturn Miles vs. Graham. "To the extent that what the Court
now says is inconsistent with what said in Miles vs. Graham, the latter can not
survive", Justice Frankfurter announced.
2. It does not expressly touch nor amend the doctrine in Evans vs, Gore, although it
indicates that the Congressional Act in dispute avoided in part the consequences of
that case.
Carefully analyzing the three cases (Evans, Miles and O'Malley) and piecing them
together, the logical conclusion may be reached that although Congress may validly
declare by law that salaries of judges appointed thereafter shall be taxed as income
(O'Malley vs. Woodrough) it may not tax the salaries of those judges already in
office at the time of such declaration because such taxation would diminish their
salaries (Evans vs. Gore; Miles vs. Graham). In this manner the rationalizing principle
that will harmonize the allegedly discordant decision may be condensed.
By the way, Justice Frankfurter, writing the O'Malley decision, says the Evans
precedent met with disfavor from legal scholarship opinion. Examining the issues of
Harvard Law review at the time of Evans vs. Gore (Frankfurter is a Harvard graduate
and professor), we found that such school publication criticized it. Believing this to be
the "inarticulate consideration that may have influenced the grounds on which the
case went off"4, we looked into the criticism, and discovered that it was predicated on
the position that the 16th Amendment empowered Congress "to collect taxes on
incomes from whatever source derived" admitting of no exception. Said the Harvard
Law Journal:
In the recent case of Evans vs. Gore the Supreme Court of the United States
decided that by taxing the salary of a federal judge as a part of his income,
Congress was in effect reducing his salary and thus violating Art. III, sec. 1,
of the Constitution. Admitting for the present purpose that such a tax really is
a reduction of salary, even so it would seem that the words of the
amendment giving power to tax 'incomes, from whatever source derived',
are sufficiently strong to overrule pro tanto the provisions of Art. III, sec. 1.
But, two years ago, the court had already suggested that the amendment in
no way extended the subjects open to federal taxation. The decision in
Evans vs. Gore affirms that view, and virtually strikes from the amendment
the words "from whatever source derived". (Harvard law Review, vol. 34, p.
70)
The Unites States Court's shift ofposition5 might be attributed to the above detraction
which, without appearing on the surface, led to Frankfurter's sweeping expression
about judges being also citizens liable to income tax. But it must be remembered that
undisclosed factor the 16th Amendment has no counterpart in the Philippine
legal system. Our Constitution does not repeat it. Wherefore, as the underlying
influence and the unuttered reason has no validity in this jurisdiction, the broad
generality loses much of its force.
Anyhow the O'Malley case declares no more than that Congress may validly enact a
law taxing the salaries of judges appointed after its passage. Here in the Philippines
no such law has been approved.
Besides, it is markworthy that, as Judge Woodrough had qualified after the express
legislative declaration taxing salaries, he could not very well complain. The United
States Supreme Court probably had in mind what in other cases was maintained,
namely, that the tax levied on the salary in effect decreased the emoluments of the
office and therefore the judge qualified with such reduced emoluments.6
The O'Malley ruling does not cover the situation in which judges already in office are
made to pay tax by executive interpretation, without express legislative declaration.
That state of affairs is controlled by the administrative and judicial standards herein-
before described in the "second period" of the Federal Government, namely, the
views of Chief Justice Taney and of Attorney-General Hoar and the constant practice
from 1869 to 1938, i.e., when the Income Tax Law merely taxes "income" in general,
it does not include salaries of judges protected from diminution.
In this connection the respondent would make capital of the circumstance that the Act
of 1932, upheld in the O'Malley case, has subsequently been amended by making it
applicable even to judges who took office before 1932. This shows, the appellant
argues, that Congress interprets the O'Malley ruling to permit legislative taxation of
the salary of judges whether appointed before the tax or after. The answer to this is
that the Federal Supreme Court expressly withheld opinion on that amendment in the
O'Malley case. Which is significant. Anyway, and again, there is here no
congressional directive taxing judges' salaries.
Wherefore, unless and until our Legislature approves an amendment to the Income
Tax Law expressly taxing "that salaries of judges thereafter appointed", the O'Malley
case is not relevant. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold
that salaries of judges are not included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax
Law. Two paramount circumstances may additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when
the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did
not include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from diminution. That
was the prevailing official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to have
been transplanted here;7 and second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention
approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution off the judges' compensation,
the Federal principle was known that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs
them. Evans vs. Gore and Miles vs. Graham were then outstanding doctrines; and the
inference is not illogical that in restraining the impairment of judicial compensation the
Fathers of the Constitution intended to preclude taxation of the same. 8
It seems that prior to the O'Malley decision the Philippine Government did not collect
income tax on salaries of judges. This may be gleaned from General Circular No. 449
of the Department of Finance dated March 4, 1940, which says in part:
xxx xxx xxx
The question of whether or not the salaries of judges should be taken into
account in computing additional residence taxes is closely linked with the
liability of judges to income tax on their salaries, in fact, whatever resolution
is adopted with respect to either of said taxes be followed with respect to the
other. The opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case
of O'Malley v. Woodrough, 59 S. Ct. 838, to which the attention of this
department has been drawn, appears to have enunciated a new doctrine
regarding the liability of judges to income tax upon their salaries. In view of
the fact that the question is of great significance, the matter was taken up in
the Council of State, and the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice was
requested to give an opinion on whether or not, having in mind the said
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of O'Malley v.
Woodrough, there is justification in reversing our present ruling to the effect
that judges are not liable to tax on their salaries. After going over the opinion
of the court in the said case, the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, stated
that although the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States is not
binding in the Philippines, the doctrine therein enunciated has resolved the
issue of the taxability of judges' salaries into a question of policy. Forthwith,
His Excellency the President decided that the best policy to adopt would be
to collect income and additional residence taxes from the President of the
Philippines, the members of the Judiciary, and the Auditor General, and the
undersigned was authorized to act accordingly.
In view of the foregoing, income and additional residence taxes should be
levied on the salaries received by the President of the Philippines, members
of the Judiciary, and the Auditor General during the calendar year 1939 and
thereafter. . . . . (Emphasis ours.)
Of course, the Secretary of Justice correctly opined that the O'Malley decision
"resolved the issue of taxability of judges' salaries into a question of policy." But that
policy must be enunciated by Congressional enactment, as was done in the O'Malley
case, not by Executive Fiat or interpretation.
This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay
taxes. Upon buying gasoline, or other commodities, they pay the corresponding
duties. Owning real property, they pay taxes thereon. And on incomes other than their
judicial salary, assessments are levied. It is only when the tax is charged directly on
their salary and the effect of the tax is to diminish their official stipend that the
taxation must be resisted as an infringement of the fundamental charter.
Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive
and block encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form. The
undiminishable character of judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of judges
personal and therefore waivable but a basic limitation upon legislative or executive
action imposed in the public interest. (Evans vs. Gore)
Indeed the exemption of the judicial salary from reduction by taxation is not really a
gratuity or privilege. Let the highest court of Maryland speak:
earning, and affects the Executive and the Legislative branches in equal measure.
However, means are provided thereafter in other laws, for the increase of salaries of
the Executive and the Legislative branches, or their perquisites such as allowances,
per diems, quarters, etc. that actually compensate for the 30 per cent reduction on
their salaries. Result: Judges compensation is thereby diminished during their
incumbency thanks to the income tax law. Consequence: Judges must "toe the line"
or else. Second consequence: Some few judges might falter; the great majority will
not. But knowing the frailty of human nature, and this chink in the judicial armor, will
the parties losing their cases against the Executive or the Congress believe that the
judicature has not yielded to their pressure?
Respondent asserts in argumentation that by executive order the President has
subjected his salary to the income tax law. In our opinion this shows obviously that,
without such voluntary act of the President, his salary would not be taxable, because
of constitutional protection against diminution. To argue from this executive gesture
that the judiciary could, and should act in like manner is to assume that, in the matter
of compensation and power and need of security, the judiciary is on a par with the
Executive. Such assumption certainly ignores the prevailing state of affairs.
The judgment will be affirmed. So ordered.

The exemption of the judicial compensation from reduction is not in any true Moran, C.J., Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.
sense a gratuity, privilege or exemption. It is essentially and primarily
compensation based upon valuable consideration. The covenant on the part
of the government is a guaranty whose fulfillment is as much as part of the
consideration agreed as is the money salary. The undertaking has its own
particular value to the citizens in securing the independence of the judiciary
in crises; and in the establishment of the compensation upon a permanent
foundation whereby judicial preferment may be prudently accepted by those
who are qualified by talent, knowledge, integrity and capacity, but are not
possessed of such a private fortune as to make an assured salary an object
of personal concern. On the other hand, the members of the judiciary
relinquish their position at the bar, with all its professional emoluments,
sever their connection with their clients, and dedicate themselves exclusively
to the discharge of the onerous duties of their high office. So, it is irrefutable
that they guaranty against a reduction of salary by the imposition of a tax is
not an exemption from taxation in the sense of freedom from a burden or
service to which others are liable. The exemption for a public purpose or a
valid consideration is merely a nominal exemption, since the valid and full
consideration or the public purpose promoted is received in the place of the
tax. Theory and Practice of Taxation (1900), D. A. Wells, p. 541. (Gordy vs.
Dennis (Md.) 1939, 5 Atl. Rep. 2d Series, p. 80)

It is hard to see, appellants asserts, how the imposition of the income tax may imperil
the independence of the judicial department. The danger may be demonstrated.
Suppose there is power to tax the salary of judges, and the judiciary incurs the
displeasure of the Legislature and the Executive. In retaliation the income tax law is
amended so as to levy a 30 per cent on all salaries of government officials on the
level of judges. This naturally reduces the salary of the judges by 30 per cent, but
they may not grumble because the tax is general on all receiving the same amount of
G.R. No. 78780 July 23, 1987
DAVID G. NITAFAN, WENCESLAO M. POLO, and MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO,
JR., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE FINANCIAL OFFICER,
SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19
and 53, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all
with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court,
from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.
In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or
compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their
salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
mandating that "(d)uring their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary
envisioned in and by said Constitution."
It may be pointed out that, early on, the Court had dealt with the matter
administratively in response to representations that the Court direct its Finance
Officer to discontinue the withholding of taxes from salaries of members of the Bench.
Thus, on June 4, 1987, the Court en banc had reaffirmed the Chief Justice's directive
as follows:
RE: Question of exemption from income taxation. The Court
REAFFIRMED the Chief Justice's previous and standing directive to the
Fiscal Management and Budget Office of this Court to continue with the
deduction of the withholding taxes from the salaries of the Justices of the
Supreme Court as well as from the salaries of all other members of the
judiciary.
That should have resolved the question. However, with the filing of this petition, the
Court has deemed it best to settle the legal issue raised through this judicial
pronouncement. As will be shown hereinafter, the clear intent of the Constitutional
Commission was to delete the proposed express grant of exemption from payment of
income tax to members of the Judiciary, so as to "give substance to equality among
the three branches of Government" in the words of Commissioner Rigos. In the
course of the deliberations, it was further expressly made clear, specially with regard
to Commissioner Joaquin F. Bernas' accepted amendment to the amendment of
Commissioner Rigos, that the salaries of members of the Judiciary would be subject
to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers.
This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the
Constitution as approved and ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although the
intent may have been obscured by the failure to include in the General Provisions a
proscription against exemption of any public officer or employee, including
constitutional officers, from payment of income tax, the Court since then has
authorized the continuation of the deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of
the members of the Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all other members
of the Judiciary. The Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the
ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David, infra, that declared the salaries of
members of the Judiciary exempt from payment of the income tax and considered
such payment as a diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office. The
Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are properly subject
to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners and that the payment of
such income tax by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional
protection against decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.
A comparison of the Constitutional provisions involved is called for. The 1935
Constitution provided:
... (The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts)
shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not
be diminished during their continuance in office ... 1 (Emphasis supplied).
Under the 1973 Constitution, the same provision read:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme
court, and of judges of inferior courts shall be fixed by law, which shall not
be decreased during their continuance in office. ... 2 (Emphasis ours).
And in respect of income tax exemption, another provision in the same 1973
Constitution specifically stipulated:
No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee,
including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income
tax. 3
The provision in the 1987 Constitution, which petitioners rely on, reads:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. 4(Emphasis
supplied).
The 1987 Constitution does not contain a provision similar to Section 6, Article XV of
the 1973 Constitution, for which reason, petitioners claim that the intent of the framers
is to revert to the original concept of "non-diminution "of salaries of judicial officers.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10,
Article VIII, negate such contention.
The draft proposal of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution read:
Section 13. The salary of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court and of judges of the lower courts shall be fixed by law.
During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be diminished nor
subjected to income tax. Until the National Assembly shall provide
otherwise, the Chief Justice shall receive an annual salary of
_____________ and each Associate Justice ______________
pesos. 5 (Emphasis ours)
During the debates on the draft Article (Committee Report No. 18), two
Commissioners presented their objections to the provision on tax exemption, thus:
MS. AQUINO. Finally, on the matter of exemption from tax of the salary of
justices, does this not violate the principle of the uniformity of taxation and
the principle of equal protection of the law? After all, tax is levied not on the
salary but on the combined income, such that when the judge receives a
salary and it is comingled with the other income, we tax the income, not the
salary. Why do we have to give special privileges to the salary of justices?
MR. CONCEPCION. It is the independence of the judiciary. We prohibit the
increase or decrease of their salary during their term. This is an indirect way
of decreasing their salary and affecting the independence of the judges.
MS. AQUINO. I appreciate that to be in the nature of a clause to respect
tenure, but the special privilege on taxation might, in effect, be a violation of
the principle of uniformity in taxation and the equal protection clause. 6
xxx xxx xxx
MR. OPLE. x x x
Of course, we share deeply the concern expressed by the sponsor,
Commissioner Roberto Concepcion, for whom we have the highest respect,
to surround the Supreme Court and the judicial system as a whole with the
whole armor of defense against the executive and legislative invasion of
their independence. But in so doing, some of the citizens outside, especially
the humble government employees, might say that in trying to erect a
bastion of justice, we might end up with the fortress of privileges, an island of
extra territoriality under the Republic of the Philippines, because a good
number of powers and rights accorded to the Judiciary here may not be
enjoyed in the remotest degree by other employees of the government.
An example is the exception from income tax, which is a kind of economic
immunity, which is, of course, denied to the entire executive department and
the legislative. 7
And during the period of amendments on the draft Article, on July 14, 1986,
Commissioner Cirilo A. Rigos proposed that the term "diminished" be changed to
"decreased" and that the words "nor subjected to income tax" be deleted so as to
"give substance to equality among the three branches in the government.
Commissioner Florenz D. Regalado, on behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary,
defended the original draft and referred to the ruling of this Court in Perfecto vs.
Meer 8 that "the independence of the judges is of far greater importance than any
revenue that could come from taxing their salaries." Commissioner Rigos then moved
that the matter be put to a vote. Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas stood up "in
support of an amendment to the amendment with the request for a modification of the
amendment," as follows:
FR. BERNAS. Yes. I am going to propose an amendment to the amendment
saying that it is not enough to drop the phrase "shall not be subjected to
income tax," because if that is all that the Gentleman will do, then he will just
fall back on the decision in Perfecto vs. Meer and in Dencia vs.
David [should be Endencia and Jugo vs. David, etc., 93 Phil. 696[ which
excludes them from income tax, but rather I would propose that the
statement will read: "During their continuance in office, their salary shall not
be diminished BUT MAY BE SUBJECT TO GENERAL INCOME TAX."IN
support of this position, I would say that the argument seems to be that the
justice and judges should not be subjected to income tax because they
already gave up the income from their practice. That is true also of Cabinet
members and all other employees. And I know right now, for instance, there
are many people who have accepted employment in the government
involving a reduction of income and yet are still subject to income tax. So,
they are not the only citizens whose income is reduced by accepting service
in government.
Commissioner Rigos accepted the proposed amendment to the amendment.
Commissioner Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr. then moved for a suspension of the
session. Upon resumption, Commissioner Bernas announced:
During the suspension, we came to an understanding with the original
proponent, Commissioner Rigos, that his amendment on page 6,. line 4
would read: "During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
DECREASED."But this is on the understanding that there will be a provision
in the Constitution similar to Section 6 of Article XV, the General Provisions
of the 1973 Constitution, which says:
No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or
employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from
payment of income tax.
 So, we put a period (.) after "DECREASED" on the understanding that the
salary of justices is subject to tax.
When queried about the specific Article in the General Provisions on non-exemption
from tax of salaries of public officers, Commissioner Bernas replied:
FR BERNAS. Yes, I do not know if such an article will be found in the
General Provisions. But at any rate, when we put a period (.) after
"DECREASED," it is on the understanding that the doctrine in Perfecto vs.
Meer and Dencia vs. David will not apply anymore.
The amendment to the original draft, as discussed and understood, was finally
approved without objection.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Bengzon). The understanding, therefore, is
that there will be a provision under the Article on General Provisions. Could
Commissioner Rosario Braid kindly take note that the salaries of officials of
the government including constitutional officers shall not be exempt from
income tax? The amendment proposed herein and accepted by the
Committee now reads as follows: "During their continuance in office, their
salary shall not be DECREASED"; and the phrase "nor subjected to income
tax" is deleted.9
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional
provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that
the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the
salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in
keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of
the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given
effect.10 The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter
assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption
of the Constitution.11 it may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the
Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. 121avvphi1
Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for
clarity, is again reproduced hereunder:
The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their
continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. (Emphasis
supplied).
it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate
of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which
they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to
those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the
provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional
Commission.
With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the
imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so
violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer,13 as affirmed in Endencia vs.
David 14 must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter
ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and
import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted
Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the
discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens
should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should
share the burden of general income taxation equitably.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for Prohibition is hereby dismissed.
The invocation of his right to free speech by petitioner Amelito Mutuc, then a
candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention, in this special civil action for
prohibition to assail the validity of a ruling of respondent Commission on Elections
enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign purposes, was not in vain. Nor could
it be considering the conceded absence of any express power granted to respondent
by the Constitutional Convention Act to so require and the bar to any such implication
arising from any provision found therein, if deference be paid to the principle that a
statute is to be construed consistently with the fundamental law, which accords the
utmost priority to freedom of expression, much more so when utilized for electoral
purposes. On November 3, 1970, the very same day the case was orally argued, five
days after its filing, with the election barely a week away, we issued a minute
resolution granting the writ of prohibition prayed for. This opinion is intended to
explain more fully our decision.
In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29, 1970, petitioner, after
setting forth his being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga, and his candidacy for the
position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention, alleged that respondent
Commission on Elections, by a telegram sent to him five days previously, informed
him that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but prohibited him from
using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers, an
order which, according to him, is "violative of [his] constitutional right ... to freedom of
speech." 1 There being no plain, speedy and adequate remedy, according to
petitioner, he would seek a writ of prohibition, at the same time praying for a
preliminary injunction. On the very next day, this Court adopted a resolution requiring
respondent Commission on Elections to file an answer not later than November 2,
1970, at the same time setting the case for hearing for Tuesday November 3, 1970.
No preliminary injunction was issued. There was no denial in the answer filed by
respondent on November 2, 1970, of the factual allegations set forth in the petition,
but the justification for the prohibition was premised on a provision of the
Constitutional Convention Act, 2which made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase,
produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such
as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic
or foreign origin." 3It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by
petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible
propaganda material, under the above statute subject to confiscation. It prayed that
the petition be denied for lack of merit. The case was argued, on November 3, 1970,
with petitioner appearing in his behalf and Attorney Romulo C. Felizmena arguing in
behalf of respondent.
This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for urgency, the
election being barely a week away, issued on the afternoon of the same day, a
minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition, setting forth the absence of statutory
authority on the part of respondent to impose such a ban in the light of the doctrine
of ejusdem generis as well as the principle that the construction placed on the statute
by respondent Commission on Elections would raise serious doubts about its validity,
considering the infringement of the right of free speech of petitioner. Its concluding
portion was worded thus: "Accordingly, as prayed for, respondent Commission on
Elections is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing or
demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political jingles by
candidates. This resolution is immediately executory." 4
1. As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the question before us was
one of power. Respondent Commission on Elections was called upon to justify such a
prohibition imposed on petitioner. To repeat, no such authority was granted by the
Constitutional Convention Act. It did contend, however, that one of its provisions
referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets,
mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials,
wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the
words "and the like." 5 For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to
justify such an order. We view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit our
approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words
following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as
those specifically referred to. 6 It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the
Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement
to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.
The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of respondent Commission was its
failure to manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of construction that a statute should be
interpreted to assure its being in consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any
constitutional command or prescription. 7 Thus, certain Administrative Code
provisions were given a "construction which should be more in harmony with the
tenets of the fundamental law." 8 The desirability of removing in that fashion the taint
of constitutional infirmity from legislative enactments has always commended itself.
The judiciary may even strain the ordinary meaning of words to avert any collision
between what a statute provides and what the Constitution requires. The objective is
to reach an interpretation rendering it free from constitutional defects. To paraphrase
Justice Cardozo, if at all possible, the conclusion reached must avoid not only that it
is unconstitutional, but also grave doubts upon that score. 9
2. Petitioner's submission of his side of the controversy, then, has in its favor
obeisance to such a cardinal precept. The view advanced by him that if the above
provision of the Constitutional Convention Act were to lend itself to the view that the
use of the taped jingle could be prohibited, then the challenge of unconstitutionality
would be difficult to meet. For, in unequivocal language, the Constitution prohibits an
abridgment of free speech or a free press. It has been our constant holding that this
preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be
curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital
right of suffrage. What respondent Commission did, in effect, was to impose
censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this constitutional right is directed. Nor
could respondent Commission justify its action by the assertion that petitioner, if he
would not resort to taped jingle, would be free, either by himself or through others, to
use his mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is not to be
emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not perpetuating what is
uttered by him through tape or other mechanical contrivances. If this Court were to
sustain respondent Commission, then the effect would hardly be distinguishable from
a previous restraint. That cannot be validly done. It would negate indirectly what the
Constitution in express terms assures. 10
3. Nor is this all. The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth
the criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest
official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is
to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the
topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in the
discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield
obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress
in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its
authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the
execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying
the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain
inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to
pass upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of
adjudication is a logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is
paramount. It overrides any governmental measure that fails to live up to its
mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its being the supreme law.
To be more specific, the competence entrusted to respondent Commission was aptly
summed up by the present Chief Justice thus: "Lastly, as the branch of
the executive department although independent of the President to which the
Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of the 'enforcement and administration of
all laws relative to the conduct of elections,' the power of decision of the Commission
is limited to purely 'administrative questions.'" 11 It has been the constant holding of
this Court, as it could not have been otherwise, that respondent Commission cannot
exercise any authority in conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no higher law
than the Constitution. 12 Our decisions which liberally construe its powers are
precisely inspired by the thought that only thus may its responsibility under the
Constitution to insure free, orderly and honest elections be adequately
fulfilled. 13 There could be no justification then for lending approval to any ruling or
order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of which would be to nullify so
vital a constitutional right as free speech. Petitioner's case, as was obvious from the
time of its filing, stood on solid footing.
WHEREFORE, as set forth in our resolution of November 3, 1970, respondent
Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or implementing
or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the use of political taped
jingles. Without pronouncement as to costs.