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Gender Binary K

The discourse that we use shapes our realities.


Karlberg 05 [Michael Karlberg 05 is a Professor in the Department of Communication at Western Washington University, The Power of
Discourse and the Discourse of Power: Pursuing Peace through Discourse Intervention.,
http://www.gmu.edu/academic/ijps/vol10_1/Karlberg_101IJPS.pdf]

The ways we think and talk about a subject influence and reflect the ways we act in relation to that
subject. This is the basic premise of discourse theory (refer, for example, to Foucault, 1972, 1980; Hall,
1997; Phillips & Hardy, 2002). This paper is about the ways we tend to think and talk about power. In
Western-liberal societies, our discourses of power are almost exclusively conflictual or adversarial. Power
tends to be associated with competition at best, coercion or domination at worst. Given that the ways
we think and talk about a subject influence the ways we act in relation to that subject, these adversarial
discourses of power can be problematic because they obscure the mutualistic dimensions of power that
have played a significant role in human history and that will need to play an even more significant role if
we are to learn how to live together peacefully in an increasingly interdependent world. Peace
researchers such as Kenneth Boulding (1990), along with feminist writers and theorists such as Hartsock
(1974) and Miller (1982), have articulated alternative ways of thinking and talking about power for
precisely this reason. These efforts can be understood as a project of discourse intervention an effort
to change our social reality by altering the discourses that help constitute that reality. To date, this
project is still in a nascent stage and thus remains an important yet incomplete intervention in the
Westernliberal culture of conflict. To further advance this project, an alternative discourse of power
needs to be more clearly articulated. It also needs to be more fully reconciled with the conflictual
models of power that are necessary for critical social analysis but insufficient as a normative framework
for social practice. Toward this end, this paper briefly traces the contours of revailing discourses of power
by examining them in their most explicitly articulated form: academic discourses of power. After
identifying the limitations of these existing discourses, the paper outlines an alternative vocabulary,
along with a simple analytical schema, for thinking and talking about power in both its mutualistic and
adversarial expressions. The paper concludes with an examination of how one alternative discourse
community the international Bah' community is already constructing alternative models of social
practice. Power as Domination As a central concept within Western social theory, the academic study of
power has been approached in many ways, yielding diverse and valuable insights. For example, some
theorists have focused on the different forms that power takes, as well as the bases or resources that
permit the exercise of power (Wartenberg, 1990; Wrong, 1997); some have explored the complex
relationship between the quantitative distribution of power and the processes of social consent that
legitimate various expressions of power (Hindess, 1996); some have examined the changing ways that
power circulates throughout societies, constructing social institutions as well as individual subjectivities,
as it imposes order and discipline in historically specific ways (Foucault, 1980); and others have
approached the subject of power from other theoretical perspectives. A review of such a rich and
complex body of literature is, of course, beyond the scope of this article. What this article will focus on is
a dominant current of thought within late-twentieth-century scholarship that reflects popular Western-
liberal discourses and assumptions regarding power. In the latter half of the twentieth century, theorists
of power began to invoke what has become a widely-used distinction between two broad ways of
thinking and talking about power. This distinction is made by contrasting the expression power to with
the expression power over (e.g., Connolly, 1974; Coser, 1976; Dowding, 1996; Hartsock, 1974, 1983;
Lukes, 1986; Macpherson, 1973; Pitkin, 1972). As Wartenberg (1990, p.27) explains, the expressions
power-to and power-over are a shorthand way of making a distinction between two fundamentally
different ordinary-language locutions within which the term power occurs. Depending upon which
locution one takes as the basis of ones theory of power, one will arrive at a very different model of the
role of power in the social world. The predominant model of power in Western social theory what I call
the power as domination model derives from the latter of these expressions. Although power to is
the basis of models in the physical and natural sciences, power over highlights issues of social conflict,
control, and coercion, which have been the primary focus of Western social and political scientists. This
power as domination paradigm traces back, either implicitly or explicitly, through the writings of diverse
social and political theorists, from Machiavelli (1961) to Weber (1986) to Bourdieu (1994). It informed
Hobbes (1968) notion of a war of all against all as well as Marx and Engels (1967) theory of historical
materialism. Indeed, as Giddens (1984, pp. 256-7) points out, this conflictual model of power underlies
virtually all major traditions of Western social and political theory, from the left and the right.

Their framing of violence is gender essentialistit posits men as the perpetrators and
women as the oppressed, which reinforces an exclusionary gender binary and
magnifies their impacts.

Truitt 14 [Jos Truitt is the Executive Director of Feministing in charge of Development, THE DANGERS OF A GENDER ESSENTIALIST
APPROACH TO SEXUAL VIOLENCE, Feministing, 2014, http://feministing.com/2013/01/31/the-dangers-of-a-gender-essentialist-approach-to-
sexual-violence/]

Rape is absolutely a gendered crime. This is true of how it plays out in the real world, and of our concept
of rape both the act and idea of rape are used to perpetuate a patriarchal gender hierarchy. Violence in
general is function and gendered, as Eesha Pandit made clear in her powerful theory of violence. We
know sexual violence is overwhelmingly perpetrated by men against women. But we dont actually know
how strong the gender disparity is largely because of how gendered our concept of rape is. The FBI
has only recently begun changing their archaic definition of rape from the carnal knowledge of a female
forcibly and against her will, an incredibly narrow definition that means FBI statistics exclude lots of
female survivors, and anyone the FBI doesnt identify as female. Because our idea of sexual violence is
gendered in such an essentialist way, we dont actually have a broad picture of the gendered ways these
crimes play out in the real world.

This is part of how the gender binary works. It sets up two boxes: one for the people in power men
and one for the people to oppress women. Anyone who doesnt fit our cultures narrow definitions for
man or woman, and anyone who isnt a man or a woman, falls outside, where its difficult to even make
people recognize our humanity, let alone our experiences of oppression. Theres a ton of problems with
this set up, not the least of which is painting women broadly as victims and men as perpetrators.
Another way gendered violence functions is by erasing the many people whose experiences of sexual
violence dont fit this model survivors who are men (cis or trans), trans women, genderqueer, two
spirit, or in some other way gender non-conforming, intersex folks, and survivors of crimes perpetrated
by atypical attackers, like survivors of queer relationship violence. Sadly, feminists end up perpetuating
this exclusion when we talk about victims only as women and perpetrators only as men. Rape is
absolutely a gendered crime, but the act of rape itself doesnt necessarily follow those rules. We need to
be able to hold an understanding of rape as a genderless act at the same time that we recognize it as
embedded in a gendered culture of violence. No one said feminism was easy.

Sadly, Reds experience is not unique. We have a very hard time recognizing and understanding sexual
violence that doesnt fit the standard narrative. I have to wonder how much this plays into the
widespread shocked reaction to cases like that of Jerry Sandusky or the Catholic Church. Its also been
difficult for these cases which involve the abuse of boys to come to light. I have to wonder about
the cases involving men we dont hear about, not to mention cases involving gender non-conforming
people, which most of our culture doesnt even know how to talk about.

Lori and I have written a good deal on this site about expanding abortion care to people who arent
women but who need abortions. As I wrote about that topic:

Yes, the majority of people who have abortions are cis women. Recognizing that not everyone who
needs to access the procedure is a woman does not erase this fact, or do anything to make abortion less
accessible to this majority. I certainly do not want to see women taken out of the discussion at all I just
want to see it expanded to include everyone whos lived reality includes abortion. But the idea that
abortion politics should be focused on cis women because they are the impacted majority is pretty much
the opposite of a social justice stance. Its the people in the margins usually a minority who most
need their voices and concerns lifted up. Because they are the easiest to forget about, the easiest to
exclude.

The same is true when it comes to sexual violence. We absolutely must continue highlighting the
gendered nature of sexual violence. But its vital to do so in a way that doesnt leave people out. There
are real world implications to only seeing victims who are cis women. Respondents to the National
Transgender Discrimination Survey reported harassment and denial of equal treatment in domestic
violence shelters and rape crisis centers, as well as other health care facilities and at the hands of law
enforcement. Trans and gender non-conforming people are often excluded from services all together. I
want to be clear: letting the Violence Against Women Act expire is absolutely despicable. As Zerlina
highlighted so personally, this legislation funds vital services that real people depend on. While VAWAs
name is very gendered, in principal the legislation is supposed to be gender neutral. In practice, its an
ongoing process to make sure services VAWA covers reach as many people as possible. In an incredibly
disturbing turn, the House GOPs apparent reason for letting VAWA expire was that it would offer too
many services to immigrants, Native Americans, and LGBT folks. Yes, they killed VAWA in an attempt to
ensure vital services wouldnt reach my community. We absolutely need VAWA, and we need to keep
expanding its services to people who arent cis women. One piece of positive change that has occurred
within government: last year, the Department of Justice released national standards to prevent prison
rape that include protections for trans and gender non-conforming folks. We need more changes like
that, and less changes like killing VAWA because it might help too many LGBT folks.

Given how overwhelmingly gendered sexual violence is, its easy and understandable to slip into
essentialist language when talking about the issue, to paint all victims as women and all perpetrators as
men. By missing parts of the reality, weve left space for folks like Mens Rights Activists to fill. Obviously,
the feminist take on rape has much more to do with reality than the MRA take. But when youve got one
side going what about the menz! and another side responding but victims are overwhelmingly
women! youre having the wrong conversation. As feminists, we need to find ways to do this work that
serve everyone whos been targeted with sexual violence.

Violence in general is incredibly gendered in our culture, as Maya wrote in the wake of the Sandy Hook
shooting. We absolutely need to be talking about violence and masculinity. We should continue taking to
the streets to shout that rape and sexual violence are gendered crimes that are embedded in and
perpetuate patriarchy. But we need to work to do this in a way that doesnt perpetuate the exclusions of
the gender binary by leaving victims out.

The alternative is to recognize the fluid of gendersgender is fluid and performed,


not made to fall within a male/female binary.

Mirabelli 12 [Rebecca Mirabelli, My Anatomy, Your Sex: Deconstructing the sex/gender


binary and heteronormativity through the isolation of gender from
sexuality http://youngchicagoauthors.org/girlspeak/blog/essays-articles/my-anatomy-
your-sex-deconstructing-the-sexgender-binary-and-heteronormativity-through-the-
isolation-of-gender-from-sexuality-by-rebecca-mirabelli) GHSGB
In a patriarchal society that encourages heteronormative behaviours, we are
persuaded to believe that
AND
think outside of two genders? It becomes ubiquitous by dismantling into
nothing.
Gender Binary K vs. Fem Ks
The feminist standpoint inherently legitimates a gender duality. By defining
women as a distinct social and biological group with certain characteristic
experiences, the aff divides the world into male and female.

Ferguson 91 (Kathy E. Professor of Philosophy, University of HawaiiInterpretation and


Genealogy in Feminism Signs, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Winter, 1991), pp. 322-339) GHSGB
An important tension
AND
knowledge and politics.
This exclusion is dangerous if you dont fit into neatly defined categories
your experiences dont count and you dont matter.
Hope 12 - (Hope PR specialist and journalist A Penis and a Dress: Why the Gender
Binary Needs to Go Away Huffington Post) GHSGB
If your genitalia
AND
and limiting categories.
Gender Binary v3 K
The 1AC discusses the fact that there were 12 womxn at the TOC and only
two judges who were womxn she ascribes a certain meaning to bodies that
havent self-identified which defines a static notion of what it means to be a
womxn and what it means to be a man that operates within transphobic
notions of gender
2 The AFF advocacy literally says the words Treat himself/herself as a
metaphorical juror if this isnt a link I dont know what is by exclusivity
limiting the accessibility of the aff advocacy to those who conform to
stereotypical constructs of gender
3 By defining womxn as a distinct social and biological group with certain
characteristic experiences, the aff divides the world into male and female.
Ferguson 91 (Kathy E. Professor of Philosophy, University of HawaiiInterpretation and
Genealogy in Feminism Signs, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Winter, 1991), pp. 322-339) GHSGB
An important tension within current feminist theory is that between
articulating women's voice and deconstructing
AND
voices which create different, albeit related, possibilities for knowledge and
politics.
4 The 1AC defines some norms or traits as inherently "masculine" and others
"feminine". Thats essentialist, turns case.
Phillips 10, Anne (2010) Whats wrong with essentialism? Distinktion: Scandinavian
journal of social theory, 11 (1). pp. 47-60. ISSN 1600-910X DOI:
10.1080/1600910X.2010.9672755 pp 12-13
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/30900/1/What's20wrong20with20essentialism20(LSERO).pdf ghs
/bb
In the second version of essentialism, characteristics are attributed, not to the
individuals
AND
not simply given to us by nature. It is itself a social act
This exclusion is dangerous if you dont fit into neatly defined categories
your experiences dont count and you dont matterwe agree that sexism is
bad in debate, but the problem is the point of departure. Who perpetuates
sexism and what does it mean to different people?
Hope 12 - (Hope PR specialist and journalist A Penis and a Dress: Why the Gender
Binary Needs to Go Away Huffington Post) GHSGB
If your genitalia don't match the gender you most identify with, the American
Psychiatric
AND
against those who do not fit cleanly into the existing and limiting categories.
The alternative is to deconstruct gender and reject the male/female binary
that perpetuates heteronormativity as the only proper form of existence.
Mirabelli 12 (Rebecca My Anatomy, Your Sex: Deconstructing the sex/gender binary
and heteronormativity through the isolation of gender from
sexuality http://youngchicagoauthors.org/girlspeak/blog/essays-articles/my-anatomy-
your-sex-deconstructing-the-sexgender-binary-and-heteronormativity-through-the-
isolation-of-gender-from-sexuality-by-rebecca-mirabelli) GHSGB
In a patriarchal society that encourages heteronormative behaviours, we are
persuaded to believe that
AND
think outside of two genders? It becomes ubiquitous by dismantling into
nothing.
Specifically true in debaterhetoric we use reflects the real worldthis is
tangible.
Vincent 13 (Christopher Debate Coach, former college NDT debater Re-
Conceptualizing Our Performances: Accountability In Lincoln Douglas
Debate http://victorybriefs.com/vbd/2013/10/re-conceptualizing-our-performances-
accountability-in-lincoln-douglas-debate)GHSGB
Charles Mills argues that the moral concerns of African Americans have
centered on the
AND
color, and in turn destroy the transformative potential this community could
have.
Gender Binary Long
Feminist Movements are inherently Western dominated and exclude people of color-
guts alt solvency
Contreras 92 [Antonio Conteras is a contributor to Review of Womens Studies , 1992, Political Ideologies of Western Feminism in the
Context of the Womens Movement in the Philippines, Review of Womens Studies, Volume 2: 2, 90-97]

Tensions Between Gender, Class and Race The Western traditions of feminism
have always been troubled by tensions between women belonging to different groups
in society, even as it is already divided along different ideological strands. Although
woman- hood is already a social category, it is a reality that rich women have
different experiences, and therefore different concerns, compared to poor
women; and that the oppression of women of color is different from the oppression of
white women. The picture becomes even more confusing if we force ourselves to
compare between white, rich women; white, poor women; rich women of color; and
poor women of color, what further complicates the matter is when we try to locate in
the equation-or the calculus of oppressionthe place for a poor man of color.
One of the most disenabling enterprises in political discourse is to answer the
question of who is more oppressed. It becomes divisive and depoliticizing since it
tears social categories asunder. Feminists have always been divided across class
and racial lines; Marxists across gender and racial lines; and anti-colonialists across
class and gender lines. It is perhaps helpful to consider that there is always a
hierarchy of oppression which is ontologically based and determined in a given
resistor-subject condition. Someone who is pondering on what strategies of
resistance to take in a given context should carefully analyze the dynamics of the
situation in order to determine the required and appropriate political action: people
should decide whether they are oppressed more as women, or as members of the
working class, or as persons of color. Some would even argue that differentiations
such as these are essential, even if they are divisive, since they lead to a more
focused struggle, a more clearly-defined array of political niches which could lay the
foundations for alliances and fronts referred to in the literature as "radical
pluralism" (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).

A focus on feminine bodies fails to account for a plurality of gender identities; their
mode of analysis cant account for everyone and constructs an excess population of
trans people who they exclude.
Butler '4 -- Judith, Prof. of Rhetoric and Comp. Lit. @ UC Berkeley, "Undoing Gender,"
p. 6
If a decade or two ago, gender discrimination applied tacitly to women, that no
longer serves as the exclusive framework for understanding its contemporary usage.
Discrimination against women continues especially poor women and women of
color, if we consider the differential levels of poverty and literacy not only in the United States, but
globallyso this dimension of gender discrimination remains crucial to
acknowledge. But gender now also means gender identity, a particularly salient
issue in the politics and theory of transgenderism and transsexuality. Transgender refers
to those persons who cross-identify or who live as another gender, but who may or may not have
Among transsexuals and
undergone hormonal treatments or sex reassignment operations.
transgendered persons, there are those who identify as men (if female to male) or
women (if male to female), and yet others who, with or without surgery,
with or without hormones, identify as trans, as transmen or transwomen; each of these
social practices carries distinct social burdens and promises.

The universality of the affirmatives claims re-enforces the masculine/feminine


binaries making the power structures it wishes to eliminate inevitable

Judith Butler (PhD, Yale, Maxine Elliot Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative
Literature) 1999 Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity p. 6-8

The politicalassumption that there must be a universal basis for feminism , one which must
be found in an identity assumed to exist cross-culturally, often accompanies the notion that the
oppression of women has some singular form discernible in the universal or
hegemonic structure of patriarchy or masculine domination. The notion of a universal
patriarchy has been widely criticized in recent years for its failure to account for the
workings of gender oppression in the concrete cultural contexts in which it
exists. Where those various contexts have been consulted within such theories, it has been to find examples
or illustrations of a universal principle that is assumed from the start. That form of feminist theorizing has
come under criticism for its efforts to colonize and appropriate non-Western cultures to support highly Western
notions of oppression, but because they tend as well to construct a Third World or even an Orient in which
gender oppression is subtly explained as symptomatic of an essential, non-Western barbarism.
The urgency
of feminism to establish a universal status for patriarchy in order to strengthen the
appearance of feminisms own claims to be
representative has occasionally motivated the shortcut to a categorial or fictive
universality of the structure of domination, held to produce womens common
subjugated experience. Although the claim of universal patriarchy no longer enjoys the kind of
credibility it once did, the notion of a generally shared conception of women, the
corollary to that framework, has been much more difficult to displace. Certainly, there
have been plenty of debates: Is there some commonality among women that preexists their oppression, or do
women have a bond by virtue of their oppression alone? Is there a specificity to womens cultures that is
independent of their subordination by hegemonic, masculinist cultures? Are the specificity and integrity of
womens cultural or linguistic practices always specified against and, hence, within the terms of some more
dominant cultural formation? If there is a region of the specifically feminine, one that is both differentiated
from the masculine as such and recognizable in its difference by an unmarked and, hence, presumed universality
of women?The masculine/feminine binary constitutes not only the exclusive
framework in which that specificity can be recognized, but in every other way the
specificity of the feminine is once again fully decontextualized and separated off
analytically and politically from the constitution of class, race, ethnicity, and other
axes of power relations that both constitute identity and make the singular notion
of identity a misnomer.4 My suggestion is that the presumed universality and unity of the
subject of feminism is effectively undermined by the constraints of the
representational discourse in which it functions. Indeed, the premature insistence on
a stable subject of feminism, understood as a seamless category of women,
inevitably generates multiple refusals to accept the category. These domains of
exclusion reveal the coercive and regulatory consequences of that construction,
even when the construction has been elaborated for emancipatory purposes. Indeed,
the fragmentation within feminism and the paradoxical opposition to feminism from women whom feminism
The suggestion that feminism
claims to represent suggest the necessary limits of identity politics.
can seek wider representation for a subject that it itself constructs has the ironic
consequence that feminist goals risk failure by refusing to take account of the
constitutive powers of their own representational claims. This problem is not ameliorated
through an appeal to the category of women for merely strategic purposes, for strategies always have
meanings that exceed the purposes for which they are intended. In this case, exclusion itself might qualify as
By conforming to a requirement of
such an unintended yet consequential meaning.
representational politics that feminism articulate a stable subject, feminism thus
opens itself to charges of gross misrepresentation.

Calls to help women or advance feminist notions are self-defeating. By eliminating


the fluidity of identity and sex the affirmative locks the individual into a power
structure produced by juridical formation of language and politics. This makes the
identity a part of gender as a stable structure re-enforcing heternormative thought and
disempowering movements it seeks to help

Judith Butler (PhD, Yale, Maxine Elliot Professor of Rhetoric and Comparative
Literature) 1999 Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity p. 3-5

feminist theory has assumed that there is some


i.WomenastheSubjectofFeminism For the most part,
existing identity, understood through the category of women, who not only initiates
feminist interests and goals within discourse, but constitutes the subject for whom
political representation is pursued.But politics and representation are controversial terms. On the one
hand, representation serves as the operative term within a political process that
seeks to extend visibility and legitimacy to women as political subjects; on the other
hand, representation is the normative function of a language which is said either to
reveal or to distort what is assumed to be true about the category of women. For
feminist theory, the development of a language that fully or adequately represents women has seemed
necessary to foster the political visibility of women. This has seemed obviously important considering the
pervasive cultural condition in which womens lives were either misrepresented or not represented at
all. Recently, this prevailing conception of the relation between feminist theory and politics has come under
challenge from within feminist discourse. The very subject of women is no longer understood in stable or abiding
terms. There is a great deal of material that not only questions the viability of the subject as the ultimate
there is very little agreement after all on
candidate for representation or, indeed, liberation, but
what it is that constitutes, or ought to constitute, the category of women. The domains
of political and linguistic representation set out in advance the criterion by which subjects themselves are
In
formed, with the result that representation is extended only to what can beacknowledged as a subject.
other words, the qualifications for being a subject must first be met before
representation can be extended. Foucault points out that juridical systems of power produce the
subjects they subsequently come to represent.1 Juridical notions of power appear to regulate political life in
purely negative termsthat is, through the limitation, prohibition, regulation, control, and even protection of
individuals related to that political structure through the contingent and retractable operation of choice. But the
subjects regulated by such structures are, by virtue of being subjected to them, formed, defined, and reproduced
in accordance with the requirements of those structures. If this analysis is right, thenthe
juridical
formation of language and politics that represents women as the subject of
feminism is itself a discursive formation and effect of a given version of
representational politics. And the feminist subject turns out to be discursively
constituted by the very political system that is supposed to facilitate its
emancipation. This becomes politically problematic if that system can be shown to
produce gendered subjects along a differential axis of domination or to produce
subjects who are presumed to be masculine. In such cases, an uncritical appeal to
such a system for the emancipation of women will be clearly self-defeating.

This re-entrenches gender binaries

Butler 99 (Judith Butler, Professor of Humanities, Johns Hopkins University,


GENDER TROUBLE, 1999, 5)

For gender to belong to philosophy is for Wittig to belong to that body of self-evident concepts without which
philosophers believe they cannot develop a line of reasoning and which for them go without saying, for they exist
prior to any thought, any social order, in nature. Wittigs view is corroborated by that popular discourse on gender
identity that uncritically employs the inflectional attribution of being to genders and to sexualities. The
unproblematic claim to be a woman and be heterosexual would be symptomatic of that metaphysics of gender
this claim tends to subordinate the notion of
substances. In the case of both men and women,
gender under that of identity and to lead to the conclusion that a person is a gender
and is one in virtue of his or her sex, psychic sense of self, and various expressions
of that psychic self, the most salient being that of sexual desire. In such a pre-feminist
context, gender, naively (rather than critically confused with sex, serves as a unifying principle of the embodied
self and maintains that unity over and against an opposite sex whose structure is presumed to maintain a
parallel but oppositional internal coherence among sex, gender, and desire. The articulation I feel like a woman
by a female or I feel like a man: by a male presupposes that in neither case is the claim meaninglessly
redundant, although it might appear unproblematic to be a given anatomy. Although we shall later consider the
way in which that project is also fraught with difficulty) the experience of a gendered psychic disposition or
cultural identity is considered an achievement. Thus, I feel like a woman is true to the extent that Aretha
Franklins invocation of the defining other is assumed: You make me feel like a natural woman This achievement
one is ones gender to the extent that
requires a differentiation from the opposite gender. Hence,
one is not the other gender, a formulation that presupposes and enforces the
restriction of gender within that binary pair.

Relying on gender as a category for mobilization forces us to ignore the complexities


of identity.
Butler 99 (Judith Butler, Professor of Humanities, Johns Hopkins University,
GENDER TROUBLE, 1999, 3)
there is the political
A part from the foundationalist fictions that support the notion the subject, however,
problem that feminism encounters in the assumption that the term women denotes a
common identity Rather than a stable signifier that commands the assent of those whom it purports to
describe and represent, women, even in the plural, has become a troublesome term, a site of contest, a cause for
anxiety. As Denise Rileys title suggests, Am I That Name? is a question produced by the very possibility of the
names multiple significations. If one is a woman that is surely not all one is; the term fails to be exhaustive, not
becausea pre-gendered person transcends the specific paraphernalia of its gender,
because gender intersects with racial, class, ethnic, sexual, and regional modalities
of discursively constituted identities. As a result, it becomes impossible to separate
out gender from the political and cultural intersections in which it is invariably
produced.

Gender must be rejected as a category for mobilization. Emancipatory gender models


can only reify existing power relations.
Butler 99 (Judith Butler, Professor of Humanities, Johns Hopkins University,
GENDER TROUBLE, 1999, 94)
In the first volume of The History of Sexuality, Foucault argues that the univocal construct of sex (one is ones
sex and, therefore, not the other) is (a) produced in the service of the social regulation and control of sexuality
and ( conceals and artificially unifies a variety of disparate and unrelated sexual functions and then postures
within discourse as a cause, an inferior essence which both produces and renders intelligible all manner of
sensation, pleasure and desire as sex-specific. In other words, bodily pleasures are not merely casually reducible
to this ostensibly sex-specific essence, but they become readily interpretable as manifestations or signs of this
sex. In opposition to this false construction of sex as both univocal and casual, Foucault engages a reverse-
discourse which treats sex as an effect rather than an origin. In the place of sex as the original and continuous
case and signification of bodily pleasures, he proposes sexuality as an open and complex historical system of
discourse and power that produces the misnomer of sex as part of a strategy to conceal and, hence, to
perpetuate power-relations. One way in which power is both perpetuated and concealed is through the
establishment of an external or arbitrary relation between power, conceived as repression or domination, and sex,
conceived as a brave but thwarted energy waiting for release or authentic self-expression. The use of this
juridical model presumes that the relation between power and sexuality is not only
ontologically distinct, but that power always and only works to subdue or liberate a
sex which is fundamentally intact, self-sufficient, and other than power itself. When sex is essentially in this
way, it becomes ontologically immunized from power relations and from its own historicity. As a result, the
analysis of sexuality is collapsed into the analysis of sex, and any inquiry into the historical production of the
category of sex itself is precluded by this inverted ad falsifying causality. According to Foucault, sex must not
only be contextualized within the terms of sexuality, but juridical power must be reconceived as a construction
produced by a generative power which, in turn, conceals the mechanism of is own productivity. The notion of sex
brought about a fundamental reversal; it made it possible to invert the representation of the relationships of
power to sexuality, causing the latter to appear, not in its essential and positive relation to power, but as being
Foucault
rooted in a specific and irreducible urgency which power tries as best it can to dominate.
explicitly takes a stand against emancipatory or liberationist models of sexuality in
The History of Sexuality because they subscribe to a juridical model that does not
acknowledge the historical production of sex as a category, that is, as a mystifying
effect of power relations. His ostensible problem with feminism seems also to emerge here: Where
feminist analysis takes the category of sex and, thus, according to him, the binary
restriction of gender as its point of departure. Foucault understands his own project
to be an inquiry into how the category of sex and sexual difference are constructed
within discourse as necessary features of bodily identity. The juridical model of law which
structures the feminist emancipatory model presumes, in his view, that the subject of emancipation, the sexed
boy in some sense is not itself in need of a critical deconstruction. As Foucault remarks about some humanist
the criminal subject who gets emancipated may be even more
efforts at prison reform,
deeply shackled than the humanist originally thought. To be sexed , for Foucault, is to be
subjected to a set of social regulations, to have the law that directs those regulations reside both as
the formative principle of ones sex, gender, pleasures and desires and as the hermeneutic principle of self-
interpretation. The category of sex is thus inevitably regulative, and any analysis which makes that category pre-
suppositional uncritically extends and further legitimates that regulative strategy as a power knowledge regime.
The Affirmatives Understanding of Sex As Either Male or Female Creates Political
Exclusions of the Transgendered Body Resisting This Dichotomy is Essential to Usurp
the Normative Conditions That Make All Violence Possible
Dr. Signe Bremer PhD in Cultural Sciences @ Gothenburg University 2013 Penis as
Risk: A Queer Phenomenology of Two Swedish Transgender Womens Narratives on
Gender Correction Somatechnics 3.2 (2013): 329350
The Legal Advisory Council, ... radical strategies than those available in a human rights
discourse will be needed (Spade 2011).

Rejection of the 1AC Discourse is Key to Change the Way that Policy Discourse is
Shaped This is Key to Recognize the Way that Sex is Constructed and Operationalized
in Public Discourses
Dr. Sarah Topp PhD @ KU, Director of Debate @ Trinity, 2010 Rhetorical
Interactions Of Social Movement Organizations In A Movement: A Study Of The
Intersex Rights Advocacy Movement Submitted to the graduate degree program in
Communication Studies and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas
There is remarkable variety in human physiology. Indeed, ... the chapters that follow I analyze each of the key issues in depth.

The queer body encounters the cross-roads at birth. The essential question of is it a
boy? haunts the 1AC. Dissected alive. Sliced. Divided. Queer bodies arent seen for
who they are, but who they are supposed to be. The medical intervention is a kind
of natal alienation that heteronormatizes bodies from birththis is the starting point
of near life: queer social death, outside Humanity.
Ezie 10 Ezie, Chinyere, Deconstructing the Body: (Transgender and Intersex Identities & Sex
Discrimination The Need for a Strict Scrutiny Approach (April 14, 2010). Columbia Journal of Gender and
Law, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1589519
Losing ones faith in the science of sex does not require much; it is enough to learn how
bodies become designated as male and female in the first place . Although high-school
biology textbooks usually instruct that male and women are defined by reference to
chromosomes (XX, XY), hormones, gonads, (testes, ovaries, ovo-testes), internal
organs (prostates; vaginas, uteruses); external sex organs (penises, scrotums;
clitorises, labia), secondary sex characteristics (hair, breasts, bone structure), sex of
rearing and sexual identity, 13 physicians tasked with determining the sex of a
newborn rely on a much cruder indication: the appearance of a newborns
genitals.14 When a child is born with a normal sized clitoris (less than 3/8ths of an
inch), 15 that infant will leave the hospital designated as a girl; if a child is born with
an adequate penis (one inch or longer and capable of penetrative sex), that infant
will leave the hospital christened a boy.16 However, all other infantsthose with
small penises, large clitorises, or internal and external morphology that conflictwill
promptly find themselves on an operating table with doctors debating which course
of treatment to commence, in order to ensure they end up as functioning
heterosexuals.17 Indeed, medical interventions seeking to normalize intersex
bodies have traditionally breezed past the question of hormones or chromosomes
(although these, too can be misleading)18 and centered on ensuring that a body can
penetrate or be penetrated.19 Thus, when an XY child appears incapable of
penetrative sex (due to intersex condition, accidental castration or penis size), that
infant is typically designated a girl20 and subjected to feminizing procedurese.g.
clitioridectomy, clitoral reduction, vaginoplasty, vaginal dilation, hormonal
treatments, and the removal of internal sex organs if presentwithout much regard
to chromosomes.21 As the physician who pioneered this approach explains: The rationale for
such a program is simple: it is possible, with surgery and hormonal therapy, to
habilitate a baby with a grossly defective penis more effectively as a girl than a boy. .
. . Vaginoplasty permits a normal sex life, whereas phalloplasty would not.22 Although this
practice of ensuring that newborns function sexually may seem befuddling or even prurient, queer theory
helps explain the origins of such interest, and why pediatric assignment of sex has only recently been
The mark of gender appears to qualify
aggressively questioned.23 As Judith Butler remarks:
bodies as human bodies; the moment in which an infant becomes humanized is when
the question, it is a boy or girl? is answered. Those bodily figures who do not fit
into either gender fall outside the human, indeed, constitute the domain of the
dehumanized and the abject against which the human itself is
constituted.24 However cosmetically successful the process of engineering legible
bodiese.g. those equipped to penetrate or be penetratedintersex surgery often
leaves its targets without the ability to experience orgasms or sexual
sensation.25Studies of pediatric genital surgery have shown that results are also
poor, with infants requiring an average of three to five surgical procedures, or as many
as twenty-two, over the course of a lifetime.26 In addition, genital surgeries are often
performed without the consent of the intersex patient, by way of parents who agree
to surgery while operating under a false sense of urgency created by the physician;
oftentimes without benefit of even basic information regarding the procedure and its
possible harms, or a description of alternatives..27 In turn, intersex patients are often
denied basic information about their medical conditions and treatment histories well
into their adolescence and adult lives. 28 This policy of deceit has long enjoyed the
official endorsement of the medical community, and John Money has formally
recommended that intersex children never be told about their medical conditions for
purposes of their psychological development and wellbeing. 29 Today these standards
of practice are contradicted by now copious amounts of evidence that non
consensual genital normalization surgery causes harm that greatly exceeds having
an ambiguous sexual identity. 30 Intersex children regularly grow up being told they
have an obscure, chronic illnessapparently a kinder explanation for their repeat
trips to the hospital than the truth. 31 Furthermore, intersex patients frequently report feeling as
though they have been assaulted and battered by their attending physicians if or when the truth is finally
many grow up strongly desiring bodies and sexual identities other
revealed.32 In addition,
than the ones they were assigned.33 As one researcher explains, Coping with this gender
dysphoria, as it is termed in the medical community, is very difficult for an
intersexual whose genitals of the sex with which they now identify were intentionally
surgically removed with their parents consent.34 Yet, even where doctors
successfully predict the sex a child assumes as an adult, feelings of deceit, betrayal
and outrage remain.35 For these reasons, since its founding in 1993, the Intersex Society of North
America (ISNA) has urged physicians to delay genital surgeries until patients are old enough to give
informed consent36disputing the notion that binary sex assignment is necessary for healthy childhood
development.37 In rejecting treatment regimes bent on normalizing bodies, ISNA have also protested
I could not accept that it
against their erasure. As Cheryl Chase notes in her candid narrative:
was just or right or good to treat any person as I had been treatedmy sex changed,
my genitals cut up, my experience silenced and rendered invisible.38 Through their
advocacy, intersex organizers also reject the notion that coherent gender is a
presupposition of humannessor that which rends humans intelligible.39 For
Chase, not only do these attitudes create a hierarchy of normal and abnormal bodies,
they naturalize the notion of binary sex for heterosexist ends: Cutting intersex
genitals becomes yet another hidden mechanism for imposing normalcy upon unruly
flesh, a means of containing the potential anarchy of desires and
identifications . . . ..40Thus, studying the intersex experience reveals biological
conceptions of sex to be discursive as well as generativecreating the very thing it
describes. Viewed in this lens, the terms male and female do not describe what is
inherent as much as what has been assigned41first by medicine and then by
cultural forces which inscribe meaning and hierarchies of value to a social construct,
viewed instead as social fact.42
Any attempt to bring about equality through focus on sex and gender binaries brings
focus to a locus pointfocus on a static female identity. This approach deprioritizes
racism, homophobia, and classism while ensuring they can never solve, and reinforces
gender roles that hurt feminism in the long run.
ROGUE 2012 (J., intersectional anarchist-communist who has been organizing in
anarchist, feminist and radical queer movements for 10+ years, "Dessentializing
Anarchist Feminism: Lessons from the Transfeminist Movement" from Queering
Anarchism: Essays on Gender, Power, and Desire, pdf online)
Out of the conversations between Marxist feminism and radical feminism another approach emerged
called dual systems theory.4 A product of what came to be dubbed socialist feminism, dual systems
to develop a theoretical account which gives as much
theory argued that feminists needed
weight to the system of patriarchy as to the system of capitalism.5 While this approach
did much to resolve some of the arguments about which fight should be primary (i.e. the struggle against
capitalism or the struggle against patriarchy), it still left much to be desired. For example, black feminists
where was oppression
argued that this perspective left out a structural analysis of race.6 Further,
based on sexuality, ability, age, etc. in this analysis? Were all of these things reducible to
capitalist patriarchy? And importantly, for this chapter, where were the experiences of trans
folksparticularly trans women? Given this historical lack, feminism required a specifically trans
feminism.Transfeminism builds on the work that came out of the multiracial feminist
movement, and in particular, the work of Black feminists. Frequently, when confronted with
allegations of racism, classism, or homophobia, the womens movement dismisses
these issues as divisive or secondary (as spelled out in the narrative above). The more
prominent voices promoted (and still promote) the idea of a homogenous universal
female experience, which, as it is based on commonality between women, theoretically promotes a
sense of sisterhood. In reality, it means pruning the definition of woman and trying to fit
all women into a mold reflecting the dominant demographic of the womens
movement: white, affluent, heterosexual, and non-disabled [women]. This policing
of identity, whether conscious or not, reinforces systems of oppression and
exploitation. When women who do not fit this mold have challenged it, they have frequently
been accused of being divisive and disloyal to the sisterhood. The hierarchy of
womanhood created by the womens movement reflects, in many ways, the dominant
culture of racism, capitalism, and heteronormativity.7 Mirroring this history, mainstream
feminist organizing frequently tries to find the common ground shared by women, and
therefore focuses on what the most vocal members decide are womens issuesas if the
female experience existed in a vacuum outside of other forms of oppression and
exploitation. However, using an intersectional approach to analyzing and organizing around
oppression, as advocated by multiracial feminism and transfeminism, we can discuss these
differences rather than dismiss them.8 The multiracial feminist movement developed this
approach, which argues that one cannot address the position of women without also addressing their
Forces
class, race, sexuality, ability, and all other aspects of their identity and experiences.
of oppression and exploitation do not exist separately. They are intimately related
and reinforce each other, and so trying to address them singly (i.e. sexism divorced from
racism, capitalism, etc) does not lead to a clear understanding of the patriarchal
system. This is in accordance with the anarchist view that we must fight all forms of hierarchy,
oppression, and exploitation simultaneously; abolishing capitalism and the state does not
ensure that white supremacy and patriarchy will somehow magically disappear.9 Tied
to this assumption of a universal female experience is the idea that if a woman surrounds herself with
The
those that embody that universal woman, then she is safe from patriarchy and oppression.
concept of womens safe spaces (being women-only) date back to the early lesbian feminist
movement, which was largely comprised of white women who were more affluent, and prioritized
addressing sexism over other forms of oppression. This notion that an all-women space is inherently safe
not only discounts the intimate violence that can occur between women, but also
ignores or de-prioritizes the other types of violence that women can experience
racism, poverty, incarceration, and other forms of state, economic, and social
brutality.10 Written after the work of, and influenced by, transfeminist pioneers like Sandy Stone, Sylvia
Riviera, and her Street Transvestite Action Revolutionaries (STAR), the Transfeminist Manifesto states:
Transfeminism believes that we construct our own gender identities based on what
feels genuine, comfortable and sincere to us as we live and relate to others within
given social and cultural constraint.11 The notion that gender is a social construct is
a key concept in transfeminism, and is also essential (no pun intended) to an anarchist
approach to feminism. Transfeminismalso criticizes the idea of a universal female experience
and argues against the biologically essentialist view that ones gender is defined by
ones genitalia.Other feminisms have embraced the essentialist argument, seeing the idea of
womens unity as being built off a sameness, some kind of core woman-ness. This
definition of woman is generally reliant on what is between a persons legs. Yet what
specifically about the definition of woman is intrinsic to two X chromosomes? If it is
defined as being in possession of a womb, does that mean women who have had hysterectomies are
Reducing gender to biology relegates the definition of
somehow less of a woman?
woman to the role of child-bearer. That seems rather antithetical to feminism. Gender roles
have long been under scrutiny in radical communities. The idea that women are born to be mothers, are
more sensitive and peaceful, are predisposed to wearing the color pink, and all the
otherstereotypesout there are socially constructed, not biological. If the (repressive)
gender role does not define what a woman is, and if a doctor marking F on a birth
certificate do not define gender either,12 the next logical step is to recognize that
gender can only be defined by the individual, for themselves or perhaps we need as many
genders as there are people, or even further, that gender should be abolished. While these ideas
may cause some to panic, that does not make them any less legitimate with regards to peoples identities,
Trying to simplify
or experiences, or the kinds of difficult political projects we might have ahead of us.
complex issues, or fighting to maintain a hold on how gender was taught to us, does not help us
understand patriarchy and how it functions. Instead, it does revolutionary feminisms a
disservice. Having encountered a lack of understanding of trans issues in radical circles, I feel it
not all transgender people choose to physically transition, and that
important to note that
each persons decision to do so or not is their own. The decision is highly personal
and generally irrelevant to theoretical conceptions of gender. There are many reasons to
physically change ones body, from getting a haircut to taking hormones. One reason might be to feel more
at ease in a world with strict definitions of male and female. Another is to look in the mirror and see on the
outside (the popular understanding of) the gender one feels on the inside. Surely, for some, it is the belief
radicals who
that gender is defined by the physical construction of ones genitalia. Too often, however,
are unfamiliar with trans politics and ideas react strongly to individuals choices with
regard to their bodiesrather missing the point altogether. But rather than to draw from
speculation as to the motivations for the personal decisions of trans people (as if they were not vast and
it is more productive to note the challenge to the idea that biology is
varied),
destiny. 13 Surely everyone would benefit from breaking down the binary gender
system and deconstructing gender rolesthat is the work of revolutionaries, not
fretting over what other people should or shouldnt do to their bodies. Thus far, gender and feminist
theory that includes trans experiences exists almost solely in academia. There are very few
working class intellectuals in the field, and the academic language used is not
particularly accessible to the average person. 14 This is unfortunate, since the issues that
transfeminism addresses affect all people. Capitalism, racism, the state, patriarchy,
and the medical field mediate the way everyone experiences gender. There is a
significant amount of coercion employed bythese institutions to police human experiences,
which applies to everyone, trans and non-trans (some prefer the term cis) alike. Capitalism and the
state play a very direct role in the experiences of trans people. Access to hormones
and surgery, if desired, cost a significant amount of money, and people are often
forced to jump through bureaucratic hoops in order to acquire them. Trans people are
disproportionately likely to be poor. However, within the radical queer and transfeminist
communities, while there may be discussions of class, they are generally framed around identityarguing
for anti-classist politics, but not necessarily anti-capitalist.

They present difference through the lens of stable identity tropes, which are the
product of MAJORITARIAN thought. Rather than fluid, they see identity as
territorialized in CULTURAL PRACTICES AND NORMS, dooming their project as they are
subsumed within the hegemonic logic of representation. They create a static, unified
Other, from which we cant learn or help there is no one concrete experience of the
Other from which we can base a politics and this ERASES their own subject position.
Tormey 2k6 Simon Tormey, Politics at University of Nottingham, 2006,
Parliamentary Affairs 2006 59(1):138-154 AR; accessed 8/12/14
The issue for Deleuze is how to recognise and celebrate difference, not as negation, or as a being against (not-
A), but as an affirmation, as something valued in itself. In Difference and Repetition Deleuze follows up the novel (and influential)
reading of Nietzsches account of eternal return offered in his earlier Nietzsche and Philosophy to show that the value of being is not relative,
proportional or analogical to something else, but immanent to becomingas opposed to being.9 Difference should be thought in
terms of a process in which the binarisation that abstract ontological theorising entails is displaced through the
elaboration of an ontology of becoming. This would follow Nietzsches account of Zarathustra. Here [t]he eternal return does not
bring back "the same", but returning constitutes the only Same of that which becomes. Returning is the becoming-identical of becoming
itself.10 This would be an ontology that recognises the centrality of the capacity of being to differentiate itself from
the same. It would thus offer the possibility of an escape from the A/not-A binary that is, in Deleuzes view , so
complicit in the representative function. Indeed it would de-binarise difference altogether, so that it is unable to be
represented or classified in any system of thought . This in turn would be difference thought in and for itselfas opposed to
difference from. Assuming the operation is tenable, it would, as Deleuze maintains, represent the overturning of Platonism and indeed neo-
Platonic and dialectical systems of thought generally in favour of pure immanence. Yet there are further ingredients to add to the mix, for it is
far from clear how one becomes in the sense referred to here. How does univocity translate from an analytical category into one that can
illuminate the political field? Here the formal exposition of Nietzsches thought in relation to the development of the idea of univocity is greatly
enlarged in A Thousand Plateaus, where eternal return re-emerges as the concept of becoming minor.11 As opposed to the
majoritarian logic of ontology, an ontology of becoming involves resisting the superior codes and meanings of the
social field, rather than allowing them to subordinate difference to the Same, as in the case of analogy and
associations. 12 This translates as a continual struggle against territorialising attempts to envelop within the
categories and codes that underpin sociality, and in particular against being subsumed within logics of
representation. It means resisting subordination to the process of molar aggregation that identitarian logics
foster. This might be in terms of resisting the leftist reduction of singularity to class identity, the progressive
reduction to group, collective or communal identity (Irish white male), or the conservative reduction to national or sub-national
descriptors (decent, law-abiding citizen). It means resisting the view that singularity can be encompassed within group or
collective identities and hence that such identities can be thought of as prior to the singularityas capturing singularity. Becoming
minoritarian is, rather, posited as an eternal process of affirmation of difference through the rejection of attempts
to reduce difference to the same. This is in contrast to processes of ontological representation that subsume difference within identity,
one that requires no further action on the part of the one represented (Everyone recognises that ... ). It is this essential passivity between that
which represents and that which is represented which signals for Deleuze the denial of difference. Something is represented, but it is notand
cannot bethe singularity. It is the singular that always escapes reduction to the Same. Becoming minoritarian, setting a face
against representation, categorisation, pigeonholing is a denial or negation of the logic of representation ; but this is a
denial that is itself active and thus constitutive of difference itself. Through the denialDeleuze wants to saythe singular affirms its singularity
as opposed to any collective, group, genetic or given identity that others attempt to impose upon it. The act of negating is in this sense
affirmative of difference, as opposed to sameness considered in representational terms . To assert that I am not like that
is a negation; but it is also a form of affirmation on these terms. It is a disavowal of the possibility of being contained by the
representative claim, whilst at the same time an affirmation of singularity.

You cant end policing by becoming the police yourself the problem isnt which set of
ideals are patrolling the streets, its that theres any patrolling at all. The only reason
we can even have any concept of supremacy in the first place, is because debate at
all accepts the ability to be governed by a single image of thought. The K is the
repeatedly lost dream of every single failed revolution in history from the Jacobian
purges of the French Revolution to the forced collectivization of the Bolsheviks, the
winners just impose a new dictatorship. As long as debate is exclusionary of any style,
we will never be truly free. The reason we can even have a concept of supremacy in
the first place is because debate at all accepts the ability to be governed by a single
image of thought.
MacDonald 9 Michael MacDonald, Postdoctoral Fellow @ the University of
Alberta, Deleuze and the Wild, http://halfsharpmusi...e-and-the-wild/ - AR; accessed
8/12/14
And this reaction is the creation of difference, or hierachy, and of the subject itself, We do not feel,
experience or know any becoming but becoming-reactive {Deleuze, 1962/1983 #20} 64. But becoming reactive is not the
negation of creativity. Creativity is expressed in the negotiation unleashed by becoming-
reactive. The act of becoming therefore is always in relation to something else. Since
the community and the environment are all outside of the subject, and since the
subject is defined by their reaction to what is outside, then it is unnecessary and
even misleading to suggest that there is a special set of negotiations between
people and objects. Everything is an object to the mind and the minds negotiations
and creative reactions with all of these objects affect the individual. Therefore the
natural world, people, art, ideas are all particles that are synthesized in the
establishment of the subject and subjects are synthesized into community. Deleuze used
Nietzsches thought to replace the binary good/bad with an alternative. Deleuze said that everything
is already reactive. But even in reaction there is, what Nietzsche called a will to power being expressed. The will is
not Hobbes General Will. It is not a transcendental expression of community or humanity that motivates and
activates the community through the individual. The will, according to Deleuze, is not merely the desire for power
or the need for self aggrandizement. The will is not something so simple and selfish. The will to power is the,
genetic element of force 53. And the force is a response in reaction. Reaction therefore is more than simple
response. Reaction has two possibilities. Reaction, which defines the subject, defines the subjects relationships as
well. The will to power, says Nietszche is not without morality. But it is not the morality of the Church or the State.
Nietzsche claims that he has invented a new conception of the will. A will that does not finds its essence outside of
itself but in the relationship between self and the world. The relationship may take two forms. It must either be
reaction as subservience or reaction as creation. In either case creativity remains the constant. The will is the expression
of creativity. The will to power is creativity. Nietzsche, through Deleuze, is a philosopher of creativity. There is no God as a
metaphysical engine. Nietzsche taught that god is dead. But it is not the death of something concrete. Not even
of something divine. But it is the death of exteriority. Replaced by an inner creativity that is no less theistic,
monotheistic and polytheistic. God has been replaced by creativity and being creative. There is no longer a need for a
metaphysical driver if creativity itself is the engine of all desire. The desire to create is the will to power. Creativity itself is not the
act of the arts or the intuition. Creativity is the act of thought. Thought is creativity. Thought is the basic experience of
life. Through Delezue Nietzsche states that, the will to power is essentially creative and givingpower is something
inexpressible in the will (85). This is the role Nietzsche plays for Deleuze. Through him Deleuze is able to
find a way to ground french deconstruction in the Spinoza-Nitzscheian critical
heritage. Deleuze claims that Nietzsches genealogy is a critical but ultimately
creative discourse. Morality is dependent, not upon socially constituted rules and
norms but in the evaluation of creativity. The will to power is expressed. Creativity is
expressed by everyone. But everyone does not express creativity equally or, to use
moral terminology, in an equally upstanding way. The good is the creative and the joyful and the bad is the
creative that is bounded and without freedom. Creativity that is reactive-active or reactive-reactive. A reactive-active
creativity occurs in critique, Critique is destruction as joy, the aggression of the creator. A creator of values cannot
be distinguished from a destroyer, from a criminal or from a critic: a critic of established values, reactive values and
baseness (87). But Deleuze opens himself to criticism here. He claimed to avoid the role of judge. But through
Nietzsche he established a criterion to judge value. But to do so he tore down class, community, tradition, and even
revolution and replaced it all with a morality of creativity. Ranciere suggested that this philosophy runs into a dead
end. Zizek is troubled because Deleuze attempts to always dissolve the contradiction to never allow the ultimate
moment of pure negativity. But Deleuze does this to avoid the dialectic. The judge is the dialectic. The will to
power, creativity, does away with the need for the judge. There is no need to choose between becoming a or becoming b. In the
reactive-active many options are created, a multiplicity. The multiplicity is the expression of
creativity and the choice is the creativity in reaction. Choices are inventions and
inventions are creations. Deleuze used Nietzsche to dissolve the subject:object
binary, to establish a creative deconstruction called genealogy, and to deny the
binary creating dialectic. The good is defined by free creativity. Free creativity can be
described in another way. Nietzsches good genealogy has a lot in common with composting. The breaking down of
items to create from their debris a fertile ground from which new life can spring. Composting is life affirming and
destructive. Intellectual composting, the act of destroying to affirm life, is a more active genealogy. Deleuze would
prefer composting. It is a creative, life affirming act that demonstrates immanence. If Deleuze had been born in
America instead of France his orientation may have been different. If genealogy is translated through
deconstruction to composting then Deleuze may have more of a connection with contemporary ecology than one
may think. Free creativity is the wild.
Their fight against the construction of the female body is flawed it bases the fight
against domination in collective identify of the woman which reinforces the
masculine/feminine binary that marginalizes those that seek neither representation.
Judith Butler, Former Prof. of Humanities at Johns Hopkins University and Current
Professor and Dept. Chair of English at UC Berkeley,1999, Gender Trouble: Feminism
and the Subversion of Identity, JL
Apart from the foundationalist fictions that support the notion of the subject,
however, there is the political problem that feminism encounters in the assumption
that the term women denotes a common identity. Rather than a stable signifier that
commands the assent of those whom it purports to describe and represent, women,
even in the plural, has become a troublesome term, a site of contest, a cause for
anxiety. As Denise Rileys title suggests, Am I That Name? is a question produced by
the very possibility of the names multiple significations. If one is a woman, that is
surely not all one is; the term fails to be exhaustive, not because a pregendered
person transcends the specific paraphernalia of its gender, but because gender is
not always constituted coherently or consistently in different historical contexts, and
because gender intersects with racial, class, ethnic, sexual, and regional modalities
of discursively constituted identities. As a result, it becomes impossible to separate
out gender from the political and cultural intersections in which it is invariably
produced and maintained. The political assumption that there must be a universal
basis for feminism, one which must be found in an identity assumed to exist cross-
culturally, often accompanies the notion that the oppression of women has some
singular form discernible in the universal or hegemonic structure of patriarchy or
masculine domination. The notion of a universal patriarchy has been widely criticized
in recent years for its failure to account for the workings of gender oppression in the
concrete cultural contexts in which it exists. Where those various contexts have
been consulted within such theories, it has been to find examples or illustrations
of a universal principle that is assumed from the start. That form of feminist
theorizing has come under criticism for its efforts to colonize and appropriate non-
Western cultures to support highly Western notions of oppression, but because they
tend as well to construct a Third World or even an Orient in which gender
oppression is subtly explained as symptomatic of an essential, non-Western
barbarism. The urgency of feminism to establish a universal status for patriarchy in
order to strengthen the appearance of feminisms own claims to be representative
has occasionally motivated the shortcut to a categorial or fictive universality of the
structure of domination, held to produce womens common subjugated experience.
Although the claim of universal patriarchy no longer enjoys the kind of credibility it
once did, the notion of a generally shared conception of women, the corollary to
that framework, has been much more difficult to displace. Certainly, there have been
plenty of debates: Is there some commonality among women that preexists their
oppression, or do women have a bond by virtue of their oppression alone? Is there a
specificity to womens cultures that is independent of their subordination by
hegemonic, masculinist cultures? Are the specificity and integrity of womens
cultural or linguistic practices always specified against and, hence, within the terms
of some more dominant cultural formation? If there is a region of the specifically
feminine, one that is both differentiated from the masculine as such and
recognizable in its difference by an unmarked and, hence, presumed universality of
women? The masculine/feminine binary constitutes not only the exclusive
framework in which that specificity can be recognized, but in every other way the
specificity of the feminine is once again fully decontextualized and separated off
analytically and politically from the constitution of class, race, ethnicity, and other
axes of power relations that both constitute identity and make the singular notion
of identity a misnomer.

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