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John P. Doyle

ON THE PURE INTENTIONALITY

OF PURE INTENTIONALITY

'Big fleas have little fleas that on their backs do bite'm,

and little fleas have lesser fleas, and so ad infinitum.'
After Jonathan Swift (1667-1745)

I.

W ITH his own intention of instructing novices, Luis de Lossada, S.J. (1681-
1748), has summarized the new, yet old, terminology of the disputed
Scholastic doctrine of intellectual intentionality.1 Although the Scholastics (and I
to entitle the present essay) have ambiguously used the term intentionfirst in
relation to will and then to understanding,2 in executing his intention Lossada has
employed it simply to designate an act of the human intellect.3 Such an act may be
either first or second, depending upon whether it directly represents the physical
reality of its object or reflexly represents an object as already known or insofar as
it has some being derived from the intellect.4 From these intellectual acts, the
words which signify things as first and directly conceived are called terms of first
intention, while those which signify things as secondly and reflexly known are
called terms of second intention, that is to say terms corresponding to a second
intending by the intellect. Examples of the former terms may be man, animal,
or sun, while terms like universal, genus, species, subject, or predicate are
examples of the latter.5 Moreover, since objects are customarily named from the
knowledges they terminate, both first and second intentions (whether one looks at
acts of understanding or the words which express them) may be either formal or
objective.6
As Lossadas Jesuit predecessor and idol,7 Francisco Surez, (1548-1617),
had earlier used it in at least one place, the term intentio was all but synonymous
with the objective concept (conceptus objectivus). Connected and contrasted
with the formal concept, which was simply an act of the mind conceiving some
thing or common character (ratio),8 the objective concept was the thing or the
character properly and immediately known or represented through a formal con-
cept.9 Strictly speaking, it was not a concept at all; rather it was the object with
regard to which the formal concept was employed and which was directly intend-

The Modern Schoolman, LXXIX, November 2001 57

Mod Schlmn Nov. 2001 r1 :Mod Schlmn Nov. 2001
ed by the minds thrust.10 For this reason, Surez suggests, some people, follow-
ing Averroes, have called it intentio intellecta which is to say, an understood
intention.11
1Ut terminorum hujus controversiae vetusta
novitas inclarescat tyronibus, aliqua praenoto,
. . . Cursus philosophici (hereafter CP),
Logica, Tr. I, disp. 2, c. 4, n. 1; ed. Barcinonae:
Apud Vid. et Fil. J. Subirana, 1883 [originally:
Salamanca, 1724], vol. 1, p. 204.
2So at times, intention was taken properly
as designating an act of the will and then by
transference one of the intellect; cf. e.g.
Intentio licet proprie loquendo sit actus volun-
tatis quo tendimus in finem, sumitur nihilomi-
nus hic pro actu intellectus, per quem tendimus
in objectum, seu illi attendimus. Thomas
Compton Carleton, S.J. (1591-1666),
Philosophia universa (Antwerpiae: Apud
Jacobum Meursium, 1649), Logica, d. 14, s. 3,
n. 1 (p. 80) . In different passages St. Thomas
brings out the ambiguity here; cf. e.g.: . . . cum
dicitur: Finis prior est in intentione, intentio
sumitur pro actu mentis, qui est intendere. De
veritate 21, 3, ad 5; ed. (IX) R. Spiazzi, O.P.
(Taurini: Marietti, 1953), p. 380; . . . intentio
est actus voluntatis; . . . Non tamen est actus
voluntatis absolute, sed in ordine ad rationem.
ibid., 22, 13c; ed. Spiazzi, pp. 410-411. For
both sides of the Scholastic doctrine in this, cf.
P. Engelhardt, Intentio, in Historisches
Wrterbuch der Philosophie, IV (Basel/
Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co. Verlag, 1971), cols.
466-74. On the intellectual side of intentionali-
ty after Brentano, cf. Roderick Chisholm,
Intentionality, in The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (New York/London: Collier
Macmillan, 1967), vol. 4, pp. 201-204.
3Actus intellectus humani vocari solet
Intentio rationis: CP, Logica, Tr. I, d. 2, c. 4,
n. 1 (vol. 1, p. 204).
4 . . . ita, ut cognitio directa representans
objectum secundum esse physicum, vocatur
Intentio prima: cognitio vero reflexa reprae-
sentans objectum ut jam praecognitum, vel
secundum esse derivatum ab intellectu, vocetur
Intentio secunda. ibid.
5Hinc nomina significantia res ut primo et
directe concipiuntur, dicuntur nomina primae
intentionis, cujusmodi sunt, Homo, Animal,
Sol, etc.: quae vero res significant ut secundo
et reflexe cognoscuntur, vocantur nomina
secundae intentionis, idest, respondentia
secundae Intellectus intentioni, qualia sunt,
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7/12/11 10:58 AM Page 58
Universale, Genus, Species, Subjectum,
Praedicatum, etc. ibid.
6Sed quia cognitionum objecta solent etiam
earum nominibus appellari, idcirco tam prima,
quam secunda Intentio, alia est formalis, alia
objectiva. ibid. Also, cf.: Duplex est, for-
malis et objectiva: formalis est ipse actus,
objectiva objectum ab actu cognitum, sicut
fides dicitur vel actus quo credimus, vel res
ipsa credita, sicut etiam dicimus definitio for-
malis et definitio objectiva. T. Compton
Carleton, Philosophia . . ., Logica, d. 14, s. 3,
n. 2 (p. 80); and George Reeb, S.J. (1594-
1662), Thesaurus philosophorum seu distinc-
tiones et axiomata philosophica, a J. M.
Cornoldi recognita et aucta (Brixinae: Typis
Wagnerianis, 1871 [originally: Ingolstadt,
1629]), p. 76.
7Cf. ibid., Venerabili P. Francisco Suarez
. . ., (vol. 1, pp. 721).
8Conceptus formlis dicitur actus ipse, seu
(quod idem est) verbum quo intellectus rem ali-
quam seu communem rationem concipit . . .,
Disputationes Metaphysicae (hereafter referred
to as DM and cited by disputation, section, and
paragraph, plus volume and page number in
parentheses from Surezs Opera omnia [ed.
Vivs: Paris, 1856-66]), 2. 1. 1 (25: 64); cf.
also: ibid., 8.4.2 (p. 290); ibid., 48.2.16ff (26:
878).
9Conceptus objectivus dicitur res illa, vel
ratio, quae proprie et immiediate per concep-
tum formalem cognoscitur seu repraesentatur
. . . , ibid., 2.1.1 (25: 65); and 2.3 (70). For an
extended treatment of Surezs understanding
of the objective concept, cf. E. Elorduy, S. J.
El concepto objetivo en Surez,
Pensamiento, nmero extraordinario (1948),
pp. 335-423.
10. . . non est conceptus ut forma intrinsece
terminans conceptionem, sed ut objectum et
materiam circa quam versatur formalis concep-
tio, et ad quam mentis acies directe tendit . . .,
DM 2.1. 1 (25: 65). The direct tending here has
an obvious teleological cast to it. For another
context in which intentio has a volitional
cast, cf. DM 23.1.8 (25: 845) ; n. 10 (846) ; 2.2
(847); nn. 14, 16 (851); 3.3-4 (852); n. 11
(854).
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Through the Middle Ages and after, objective as well as formal intentionality
had been recognized as having the different levels mentioned by Lossada.12 There
was a level of first intention immediately following upon actual things or those
which could be possible outside the mind (Aristotles t xw n13).14 Then came
a level of second intention in the apprehension of items like species, genus, sub-
ject, predicate, etc., which were not per se impossible but which could not exist
outside the mind.15 Hierarchized between themselves,16 both first and second
intentions could again be hierarchized in the sense that there could be levels with-
in each order of intentionality. Thus, there could be first intentions of (l) John, (2)
man, or (3) animal17 and second intentions of (1) individual, (2) species, or (3)
genus.18
All of these levels were possible in the sense that they could without contra-
diction exist outside the mind or in the mind itself. That is to say, they were possi-
ble either physically or at least logically.19 But intentionality also appears to
embrace items beyond all possibility whatever. These would be pure fictions or
purely impossible objects.20 Again, this intelligibility also can in some way be
hierarchized. Immediately, by a kind of reduction (necessary inasmuch as they
are known only secondarily, after the fashion of real things21), items like a sphinx
or a chimera could be known in a first intentional way.22 We need, however, reflect
but a moment to realize that a sphinx, a chimera, a goat-stag, a man-lion, etc., all
of which involve contradictory conjunctions of incompossible essences,23 can
each be regarded as falling under a species, or together under a genus of impossi-
ble animal. Again together they may be known under the broader notion of
impossible object, which can then be regarded in some way as their wider genus
or category.24
Connected to this is the understanding of beings of reason (entia rationis)
which Surez bequeathed to seventeenth-century Scholasticism. As Surez saw
them, beings of reason were defined by the fact that they existed only objectively
in the intellect.25 As such, they were of three kinds: negations, privations and rela-
tions.26 Within this division, a pride of place was accorded to impossible or self-
contradictory items, which would include things like chimerae27 and goat-stags.28
Apprehended in comparison with real (either actual or possible29) beings30 and
classified under negations,31 such impossible items would, most of all things, have
their being only objectively in the intellect.32 Although he may have got his refer-
ence wrong, Surez clearly attributed this understanding to Averroes.33 And in this
he was followed by many seventeenth-century scholastics, especially Jesuits.34
Relatedly, the schoolmen of that century divided beings of reason into those
which had some foundation in reality and those which did not. The former were

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usually referred to as beings of reasoned reason (entia rationis ratiocinatae) or

beings of reason with a basis in reality (entia rationis cum fundamento in re),
while the latter were called beings of reasoning reason (entia rationis ratioci-
nantis) or beings of reason without a basis in reality (entia rationis sine funda-
mento in re).35 These latter most of all would exist only in the mind. Their reality
would thus in a purest sense be intellectually intentional.36 And it is the purely
volitional intentionality, viz. the intrinsic teleology, of this pure intellectual inten-
tionality which is the concern of this essay.

11. . . propter quod ab aliquibus, ex Averroe, 13 Metaphysics 11.8.1065a24.

intentio intellecta appellatur; . . . ibid. With 14 Cf. Compton Carleton, Philosophia . . .,
this, contrast Cajetan [a.k.a. Thomas del Vio Logica, d. 14, s. 3, n. 3 (p. 80).
(1469-1534)] telling us that philosophers have 15Ibid. Also see note 5, above. Cf . John of

used the term intention to designate the formal
concept: Conceptus formalis est idolum
quoddam quod intellectus possibilis format in
seipso, repraesentativum objectaliter rei intel-
lectae, quod a philosophis vocatur intentio, a
theologis vero verbum. In De Ente et essentia
D. Thomae Aquinatis commentaria, c. 1, q. 2;
ed. P. Laurent (Taurini: Marietti, 1934), p. 25.
Also, consider St. Thomas: Haec autem
intentio intellecta, cum sit terminus intelligi-
bilis operationis, est aliud a specie intelligibili
quae facit intellectum in actu, . . . Contra
Gentiles I, 53; Esse intentionis intellectae in
ipso intelligi consistit. ibid., IV, 11. On
Averroes terminology in this context, cf.
St. Thomas, O. P. (a.k.a. John Poinsot [1589-
1644]), Cursus philosophicus thomisticus, ed.
Reiser: I (Taurini: Marietti, 1930), Logica II,
q. 2, a. 2 (p. 293b); ibid. q. 4, a. 2 (p. 347); and
Sylvester Mauro, S.J. (1619-1687): Aristotelis
Opera omnia quae extant brevi paraphrasi et
litterae perpetuo inhaerente expositione illus-
trata, I (Parisiis: Sumptibus et Typis P. Lethi-
elleux, 1885), Prooemium in Aristotelis
Logicam et Porphyrii Introductionem, n. 2 (p.
4); ibid., n. 4; idem, Quaestiones philosophi-
cae (hereafter QP) ed. M. Liberatore (Paris:
Bloud et Barral, 1876 [originally published at
Rome in 1658]), qu. 5 (pp. 137-8).
16Cf. e.g. Atque illa quidem merito dicuntur

Andr Hayen, S.J., Lintentionnel dans la
philosophie de Saint Thomas (Paris: Descle
de Brouwer, 1942), pp. 51-3. Hayen himself
thinks that St. Thomas uses intentio in dis-
tinction from ratio in the way Thomists
distinguish the formal from the objective con-
cept; ibid., pp. 212-3. For a seventeenth-centu-
ry Thomist who might see it both ways, cf. . .
. apud Logicos et Metaphysicos, intentio
intentiones primae, haec secundae, quia cum
illa sint horum fundamenta, intellectus noster
prius in illa, quam in haec intendit, Pedro da
Fonseca, S.J. (1528-1599), Institutionum
dialecticarum, libri octo, I, c. 32; edited and
translated as Instituiies dialcticas by
Joaquim Ferreira Gomes (Coimbra, 1964
[originally 1575]), vol. 1, p. 90.
17Cf. e.g. Lossada giving animal as an

accipitur pro conceptu formali intellectus; . . . example of an objective first intention, CP,
Rursus, accipitur apud eosdem pro conceptu Logica, I, 2, 4, n. 2 (vol. 1, p. 205).
objectivo; . . . Francisco de Araujo, O.P. 18Cf. . . . distinguantur a dialecticis genera,

(1580-1664), Commentariorum in universam species, et individua in ipsis entibus rationis,

Aristotelis Metaphysicam. Tomus Primus . . . Surez, DM 4.9.12 (25: 144).
(Burgis et Salmanticae, 1617), 111, q. 2, a. 2, 19Cf. DM 43.4.2-3 (26: 645); ibid., 42.3.9

n. 4 (p. 347). On the role of the Arabs, and of (613).

Averroes in particular, for the development of 20For the equivalence here, cf. . . . est pro-

terminology between volitional and cognition-
al intentionality, see P. Engelhardt, Intentio, .
. ., cols. 469-71.
12Cf. e.g. Intentio tum formalis tum objecti-
va duplex est, prima et secunda. T. Compton
prie ens fictum quod ita mente apprehendi
potest, ut in se involvat repugnantiam, et
impossibilitatem, quae est negatio quaedam;
. . . DM 3.2.13 (25: 111).
21For Surez attributing secondary intelligi-

Carleton, Philosophia . . ., Logica, d. 14, s. 3, n. bility to beings of reason, see De Anima IV,
3 (p. 80). cap. 1, n. 4 (1: 714).

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II.
That beings of reason with a foundation could serve purposes within differ-
ent sciences was commonly recognized in medieval and post-medieval philoso-
phy. For examples: privation could in part explain natural change;37 absolute time
and space might be of use in measuring and explaining physical realities;38 epicy-
cles, deferents, excentrics, etc., could serve various purposes for astronomers;39
and second intentions could obviously do the same for logicians.40 At the end of
the sixteenth century, to indicate such utility Surez used the term doctrinal
(doctrinalis).41 Thus beings of reason with some foundation in reality were gener-
ally acknowledged to have a doctrinal character inasmuch as they could function
for teaching (doctrina) and learning within scientific contexts. Against this,
beings of reason which lacked foundadon were thought to lack such doctrinal
character. One can find this thought among seventeenth-century scholastics, both
Protestant42 and Catholic.43
To be sure, through and after the Middle Ages, questions arose about the very
existence of beings of reason which would lack all foundation. Impossible
objects, distinct from all possible objects, would appear to be the only candidates
for such status.44 Earlier, however, the exisience of such impossible objects had
been in effect rejected by Alexander of Aphrodisias (ca. 200 A.D.), who by rele-
gating self-contradictory items, like goat-stags, to the status of accidental being
(Aristotles t n kat sumbbhkj45) had reduced them to a combination of
two or more possible objects.46
Without mentioning Alexander, both St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) and
Duns Scotus (1266-1308) were with him in this. Strictly impossible items, which
included an internal contradiction, were outside the pale of understanding.47 They
would be, in fact, not one object but rather a conjunction of two or more mutually
contradictory objects.48 As such, they would at best have the status of entia per
accidens, and on that account would be excluded from being in the categories and
seemingly even from being as true (Aristotles t n j lhh/j49).
In some opposition here was Averroes (1126-1198) for whom impossible
objects, which involved opposites simultaneously in the intellect (contraria
simul in intellectu), seem to be the very model of Aristotelian being as true.50 To
my knowledge, however, Averroes nowhere claimed a doctrinal use for such
objects. Neither did he explicitly claim any teleology for them, especially any
intrinsic teleology, some finis operis as opposed to a finis operantis.51 Indeed,
even though their creator or maker might have some purpose in fabricating them,
impossible items themselves would not seem to have any aim or utility.
Furthermore, inasmuch as impossible objects would lack any essence,52 they

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should also lack any capacity to be of themselves a goal of activity or operation.
Thus purely intentional objects of understanding would apparently lack any pure
intentionality in the sense of intrinsic purpose or finality.
22Cf. Quamquam vero figmentorum nomina
ut Sphinx, Chimaera, et similia non sint pri-
mae, nec secundae intentionis posteriori accep-
tione, . . . possunt tamen reductione quadam
dici primae intentionis, quia res fictae, etsi res
verae non sunt, tamen finguntur esse verae.
Fonseca, Institutionum . . ., I, 32, (I, p. 90). Also
cf. Hinc infero, nec omnem primam inten-
tionem objectivam esse Ens reale, ut cum
primo concipit quis Chimaeram, ac proinde
non semper requiritur secunda intentio ad Ens
Rationis formandum: . . . Compton Carleton,
Philosophia . . ., Logica, d. 14, s. 3, n. 4 (p. 80).
For earlier recognition of this, cf.: . . . dico
quod hircocervus, chimaera et consimilia perti-
nent ad primam intentionem. Hervaeus
Natalis, De Intentionibus sec. f. 10r., as cited by
Theo Kobusch, Sein und Sprache: Historische
Grundlegung einer Ontologie der Sprache
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1987), p. 139.
23For this, see e.g.: . . . compositio ex
Hirco et Cervo in unam essentiam, non est
realis, quin potius realiter impossibilis, eo
quod contradictionem implicet, eandem rem
esse Hircum et Cervum; quia si Hircus sit, non
erit Cervus, si Cervus, non erit Hircus. Martin
Smiglecki, S.J. (1562-1618), Logica I (Oxonii:
Impensis H. Crypps, J. Godwin et R. Blagrave,
1658 [originally: 1618]), d. 1, q. 1 (p. 3); for a
recent article which brings out the nuances of
Smigleckis doctrine here, see Gino
Roncaglia, Smiglecius on entia rationis,
Vivarium, 33:1 (May 1995), pp. 27-49. Also
cf. . . . chymaera enim est objectum in se
includens duo praedicata, quae repugnant
existere: quia unum immediate destruit aliud,
exempli gratia hominem esse Leonem, aut
habentem lucem esse tenebrosum: quia Leo
includit irrationalitatem, qua destruit rationali-
tatem, et hominem: tenebrae autem destruunt
immediate lucem: . . . P. Hurtado de Mendoza,
S.J. (1578-1651), Disputationes metaphysicae
(Lugduni: Sumpt. A. Pillehotte, 1617), d. 2, s.
1, n. 7 (p. 1035). On disagreement among six-
teenth and seventeenth-century authors about
the composition of a chimaera, see my article,
Surez on Beings of Reason and Truth (1), Surezs disciples cf. P. Hurtado de Mendoza,
Vivarium, 25: 1 (May 1987), pp. 47-75, esp.
n. 132.
62
7/12/11 10:58 AM Page 62
24What Surez has said about second inten-
tions seems applicable here to impossible
objects; . . . possit intellectus supra ipsasmet
secundas intentiones iterum reflecti, et conve-
nientias, vel differentias inter ipsas consider-
are, et eas definire, vel ex eis discurrere, atque
ita in eis similes relationes fundare; ut ex
genere et specie abstrahit relationem univer-
salis, et illud denominat denominat genus, et
sic de aliis; . . . DM 54.6.11 (26: 1041); cf.
Francisco Surez, S.J., On Beings of Reason
(De Entibus Rationis) Metaphysical
Disputation LIV, Translated with Introduction
and Notes, by John P. Doyle (Milwaukee:
Marquette University Press, 1995), p. 122.
Again, what Surez has said (DM 3.2.13 [25:
111]) about the infinite multiplication of use-
less negations is directly applicable to impos-
sible objects, which he has explicitly classed
under negations (DM 54.4.10 [26: 1031]; tr.
Doyle, p. 97). Also cf. Antonio Rubio, S.J.
(1548-1615): Et hujusmodi Entia rationis, in
infinitum possunt multiplicari ab intellectu,
sicut infinitis modis potest res diversae speciei
conjungere. Logica Mexicana (Lugduni:
Sumpt. A. Pillehotte, 1620), Tract. de natura
Entis rationis, dub. 3 (p. 72). At the same
time, Rubio seems to deny the point made in
our text: De Ente rationis non habente funda-
mentum in rebus, certum est non posse reduci
ad ordinem praedicamentalem; quia componi-
tur ex rebus diversis secundum essentiam: et
ideo non habet unam aliquam determinatam
naturam, secundum quam possit in praedica-
mento ordinari. ibid., dub. 7 (p. 79); on a
being of reason without a foundation in reali-
ty, cf. notes 35 and 36, below.
25Et ideo recte definiri solet, ens rationis,
esse illud, quod habet esse objective tantum in
intellectu, seu esse id, quod a ratione cogitatur
ut ens, cum tamen in se entitatem non habeat.
DM 54.1.6 (26: 1016); tr. Doyle , p. 62.
26For this, see DM 54.3 (26: 1026-8); tr.
Doyle, pp. 84-90.
27Ibid., s. 1, n. 7 (p. 1017); tr. Doyle, p. 63.
On the impossibility of a chimera, among
S.J., Disp. metaphys. 2, s. 1, n. 7, as cited above
in note 23.
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III.
This last thought is explicit in Surez, who denies any essence to an impossi-
ble object,53 and who writes, with regard to the final causality of a being of reason,
especially one without a foundation in extra-mental reality:
Since it is not something which is directly (per se) intended by nature
or by any agent, a being of reason does not of itself (ex se) properly have
a final cause. If, however, on the part of a man contriving or fashioning
beings of reason, some final cause (ratio) can be offered, that is more the
final cause of that mans thinking than of the object made and thought.54
Surez is significant in this context for at least three reasons. As a glance over
seventeenth-century writers will make plain, Surezs extended treatise on being
of reason was a Q-document or a Gogols overcoat for just about every subse-
quent treatment of this topic. Second, unlike St. Thomas and Duns Scotus, Surez
does admit impossible objects and, as mentioned, places them at the heart of his
being of reason doctrine,55 which he sees as continuing Aristotles doctrine of
being as true.56 And third, Surez explicitly cited Averroes as the source of his
main understanding of such beings of reason, i.e. as those which have being only
objectively in the intellect.57

IV.
Among those coming after Surez in the following century, I have found lit-
tle discussion of any teleology of impossibie objectsof any intentionality of
pure intentionality. Those few who touch on the matter have generally said noth-
ing more than Surez.58 Or if they have said something more it may seem trivial.
Francisco de Araujo, O.P. (1580-1664), for example, who restricted those beings
of reason which are negations to self-contradictory items,59 disagrees with Surez
on the teleology of beings of reason generally and sees them as in themselves
both a cause of pleasure and as having logical and grammatical utility.60 While
logical and grammatical utility would easily fall under the doctrinal character
attaching to beings of reason with a real foundation, simply being pleasurable
would reach toward various items beyond. For instance, it might embrace literary
fictions, which could originate in the minds creativity61 and which could of
course be impossible.62

V.
Decades earlier the issue of the teleology of impossible items missed taking
on another nuance. Opportunity for this came from an objection to his masters

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doctrine entertained by Averroes irenic follower, the Padua professor, M.

Antonio Zimara (1460-1532).63 As Zimara framed this objection, Averroes stood
accused of being inconsistent. On one hand, he admitted opposites existing simul-
taneously in the mind. But on the other hand, he accepted Aristotles defense of
the principle of non-contradiction against a position attributed to Heraclitus.64
This defense, which Zimara termed a deduction for the impossible,65 evidently
rested upon the inadmissibility of thinking two opposites at once.66
Zimara himself answered first by interpreting Averroes to hold for simultane-
ous opposites at the incomplex level of apprehension while denying such oppo-
sites at the complex level of judgment.67 Precisely to the objection then, Zimara
says that Averroes has expounded Aristotles text in a different way from the
Latins.68 By the Latin interpretation, Aristotle is proving that two contradictories
cannot simultaneously be true, since if someone were to deny this, it would fol-
low that because contradictory opinions are contrary, then contraries would exist
in the same man.69 But Averroes, says Zimara, expounded that passage very much
otherwise: reasoning that if the dictum attributed to Heraclitus [i.e. that affirma-
tion and negation are the same] were true, since two different men could say and
think contradictory things to be true, it would follow that two contradictories
would be simultaneously truewhich is not possible.70 Thus Averroes is not here
addressing any presence of opposites in one intellect, especially at the level of
simple apprehension.
Had Averroes been alive, he might well have accepted Zimaras defense of
his position. But then again he might have taken the opportunity to defend it in
another way. One such other way was in part later intimated by Clemens Timpler

28Cf. e.g. DM 54.6.3 (26: 1039); tr. Doyle, p.
118. The impossibility of a goat-stag is patent
because it would be at once a goat but also not
a goat (inasmuch as it is a stag, which pre-
cludes its being a goat), a stag and also not a
Finite Being as such, On the Existence of that
Essence and their Distinction, Translated with
Introduction by Norman J. Wells (Milwaukee:
Marquette University Press, 1983), pp. 63-4.
30Cf. DM 54.2.16 (26: 1022); tr. Doyle, pp.

stag (inasmuch as it would be a goat, which 76-7.

precludes its being a stag). For this among 31Cf. Surez, DM 54.4.10 (26: 1031); tr.

those after Surez, cf. e.g.: . . . intellectus Doyle, p. 97. Also: ibid., 3.2.13 (25: 111), text
uniendo speciem hirci ac speciem cervi concipt in note 20, above.
hircocervum impossibilem. Sylvester Mauro, 32On this, see: Suarez on Beings of Reason

S.J., QP, qu. 4 (I, p. 134). Also: . . . si and Truth (1), . . ., esp. pp. 69-75.
conciperetur hircocervus impossibilis, verif- 33Unde recte dixit Comment., 6 Metaphys.,

icaretur de eo, quod si poneretur, esset hircus et
non esset hircus, esset cervus et non esset
cervus; . . . ibid., q 48, n. 2 (p. 479); while this
occurs in an objection to Mauros own doc-
trine, he would agree with its description of the
impossibility of a goat-stag. Also see M.
Smiglecki, Logica I, d. 1, q. 1, as cited above in
note 23.
29Cf. e.g. DM 31.2.10 (26: 232); ibid., n. 11;
for this, see: Francis Surez, On the Essence of
comment. 3 [sic], ens rationis solum posse
habere esse in objective in intellectu. DM
54.1.6 (26: 1016), tr. Doyle, p. 62. The correct
text of Averroes is: . . . loquamur de ente ve-
ridicanti, secundum quod est veridicans, et hoc
est illud, quod est in anima. haec enim entia
facta sunt ab intellectu . . . et est universaliter
istud ens tantum in affirmatione aut negatione.
Averroes, In Metaph. VI, comm. 8; (Venetiis:
Apud Junctas, 1562), VIII, f. 152r, D.33.

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(1567-l624), a Calvinist Scholastic very much influenced by the Jesuit Surez. In

Timplers view, nothing (nihil), which is wide enough to include impossible
objects, has to be understood first, in order to understand principles like From
nothing comes nothing, or Something cannot be explained (resolvi) in noth-
ing.71 Related to this, Timpler accepts an argument that unless one could know
with certainty whether something is possible or impossible, nothing could ever be
certainly proven by a demonstration to impossibility (demonstratio ad impossi-
ble). But that would be absurd and would fly in the face of common philosophical
opinion.72

VI.
Much the same had been previously implied by Surez, who noted the uni-
versal sweep of arguments ad impossibile and remarked that Averroes recognized
this in commenting on Aristotle.73 In the same context, Surez quasi-tautologous-
ly spoke of impossibility as the ultimate term of resolution in demonstration to
impossibility.74 Moreover, even as he allowed for a distinction between this kind
of demonstration and the argument with which the principle of non-contradiction
is itself defended, Surez would think this latter argument would a fortiori pre-
suppose the conception of what is impossible.75 The obvious implication of it all
is that rather than getting in the way of first principles, the first of which is non-
contradiction, impossible objects may well be required in order to understand
them.
Something like this was suggested by one of Surezs Jesuit successors in the
seventeenth century. Like Surez, Sylvester Mauro (1619-1687) cited Averroes as
a prime source for his understanding of beings of reason. Indeed, Mauros depen-
dence upon Surez here is strikingly shown by the fact that he has repeated the
same faulty citation of Averroes which Surez originally gave.76 But more explic-
itly and in much more detail than Surez, Mauro defended the existence of impos-
sible objects, distinct from all things actual or possible.77
In support of such objects, Mauro reasons that the adequate object of the
intellect is the intelligible; hence, everything which is intelligible can be appre-
hended by the intellect. But the intelligible can be divided into that which can be
and that which cannot be. Thus the intellect can apprehend not just that which is
but also that which is not. Again, it can apprehend not only that which is not and
yet can be, but also that which is not and cannot be, i.e. the impossible.78
In confirmation, Mauro continues. That potency which can divide its ade-
quate object into members which it can describe and distinguish can without
doubt apprehend all of those members. But the intellect can and does divide the

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intelligible into these four members: what is, what is not, what can be, and what
cannot be. And it does describe and distinguish each. Therefore, it apprehends all
these members. But not only does it apprehend them. Its whole discourse con-
cerns them as first and most known, when about some intelligible item it asks and
answers whether it is or is not, whether it can be, or whether it cannot be and is
therefore impossible, whether it can not-be, or whether it cannot not-be and is

34For some other Jesuits citing Averroes in
the same way as Surez, cf. Conimbricenses, In
Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae.
Prima Pars (Lugduni: Apud Horatium Cardon,
1607), in Praefationam Porphyrii, Qu. 6, art. 1
(p. 138): Definitur ens rationis a
Commentatore libr. 6. Metaphys. com. 3. Ens,
quod solum habet esse objective in intellectu.;
and Richard Lynch, S.J. (1610-1676), Universa
Philosophia Scholastica. Tomus Tertius
(Lugduni: Sumpt. Borde, Arnaud, et Rigaud,
1654), Metaphysica, IV, Tr. I, c. 1 (p. 227): . . .
et ita definiri consuevit: ens rationis est, quod
habet esse objective tantum in intellectu. Haec
autem definitio a Commentatore 6. metaphys.
comment. 3. et B. Thoma. opusc. 42, cap. 1. ac
P. Suarez disp. 54 met. sect. 1. num. 7. et
reliquis scholasticis communiter accepta, ita
explicari solet, ac debet. For St. Thomas as
Lynch, inexactly following Surez (DM 54.1.6
[26: 1016]), cites him here, cf. De natura
generis, c. 1, in Opuscula Omnia necnon opera
minora, ed. R. P. Joannes Perrier, O. P., Tomus
primus (Paris, 1949), p. 495, and c. 2, p. 500;
this work is regarded by James Weisheipl
Aristotelis Junctis Peregis Physicae quas in
alma, et Archi-Episcopali Universitate
Salisburgensi . . . (Salisburgi, 1696), II,
Metaphysica, Qu. V. De fictione Entis (p. 231):
Commentator Aristotelis in librum 6. Metaph.
illud sic definit: Ens quod solum habet esse
objective in intellectu; quae definitio cum
plausu ab omnibus de facto recepta est.; and
Ludwig Babenstuber, O.S.B. (1660-1726),
Philosophia Thomistica Salisburgensis sive
Cursus philosophicus secundum doctrinam D.
Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici (Augustae
Vindelicorum: Sumpt. G. Schlteri, 1706)
Metaphysica, disp. 3, art. 5. n. 1: Impossibile,
. . . est id quod implicat contradictionem: sive,
id est, quod, si ponatur existere, sequitur con-
tradictio. De hoc impossibili, ait Sylvester
Mauro, verificatur definitio ens rationis tradita
ab Averroe 6. Met, com. 3. quod habet esse
solum objective in intellectu (pp. 76-7) . This
last passage is of special interest inasmuch as it
marks the influence of Surez, through
Sylvester Mauro, on the Benedictines at
Salzburg.
35For this, see e.g.: Antonio Rubio, Logica

(Friar Thomas DAquino: His Life, Thought,
and Work [New York, 1974], p. 403) as of
uncertain authenticity. Also cf., De hoc
impossibili verificatur definitio entis rationis
tradita ab Averroe 6. Met. com. 3, quod habet
esse solum objective in intellectu. Sylvester
Mauro, QP, qu. 48, resp. (vol. 1, pp. 481-2);
and . . . definitur sic: Ens, quod habet esse tan-
tum objective in intellectu. Quam definitionem
cum Commentatore lib. 6. met. admittunt, et
probant Philosophi, . . . Ignacio Peynado, S.J.
(1633-1696), Disputationes in Universam
Aristotelis Logicam (Compluti: Sumpt. Colleg.
Complutensis Soc. Jesu. Apud J. Espartosa,
Typographum Universitatis, 1721originally
published in 1671), Tr. IV, disp. 1, sec. 1, n. 1
(p. 335). Outside the Jesuits, see e.g.: P.
Antonio Stroz, O.S.B. (1656-1725), Praeside,
Quaestiones speculativo-morales. In Logicam,
et Metaphysicam Angelici Doctoris, et
mexicana, Tr. de nat. entis rationis, dub. 3 (pp.
71-72) ; P. Hurtado de Mendoza, Disp.
Metaph. (Lugdani, 1624), d. 19, s. 4, n. 70 (p.
953) and s. 5, n. 87 (p. 955); Francisco de
Oviedo, S.J. (1602-1651), Integer cursus phi-
lasophicus, II (Lugduni: Sumpt. P. Prost,
1640), Metaphysica, Cont. XII, P. 3 (p. 434);
L. de Lossada, CP, Logica, I, disp. 2, c. 4, n. 5
(vol. 1, p. 206) and Metaphysica, IV, c. 4, n. 39
(vol. 10, p. 272); and John of St. Thomas,
Cursus . . ., Logica II, q. 1, a. 3 (vol. 1, p.
260a); ibid., II, q. 2, a. I (p. 287). Earlier, cf. S.
Thomae Aquinatis, Scriptum super libros
Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, I, d. 2,
q. 1, art. 3; ed. R.P. Mandonnet, O.P., T. I
(Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1929), pp. 63-72; ibid.,
d. 19, q. 5, a. 1; ed. Mandonnet, pp. 484-490.
Later, cf. I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A
670.

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therefore necessary.79 In this way, the first and most evident truth is about what is
impossible, as when we say it is impossible that the same thing simultaneuosly
be and not be. Therefore, whoever denies that the impossible is conceived denies
the conception of a primary item of intellectual concern.80
Were Mauro here answering the objection considered by Zimara, I am not
sure that Averroes would accept his argument.81 Yet I do think there is a valid
response in what Mauro is saying. Far from blocking any argument ad impossi-
bile, or any argument by refutation for the principle of non-contradiction itself,
our ability to conceive a contradiction, viz., to hold impossible objects in mind, is
the necessary presupposition of such arguments. And in this, impossible objects
manifest a kind of teleology toward such arguments, which is about as close as
one might come to a pure intentionality of pure intentionality.

VII.
In the twentieth century, an objection in part similar to that entertained by
Zimara against Averroes was the chief complaint lodged by Bertrand Russell
against Alexius Meinongs Theory of Objects (Gegenstandstheorie82). As
Russell saw it, in admitting impossible objects (such as a round square), Meinong
had violated the principle of contradiction.83 Meinong himself took note of
Russells argument and answered it by excluding impossible objects from the
scope of the principle of contradiction (der Satz des Widerspruches), which he
restricted to actual or possible things.84
At the same time, whether they are among those objects which he terms
complete (vollstndige) or those he calls incomplete (unvollstndige),85
Meinong regards impossible objects as coming within the scope of the principle
of excluded middle.86 This last position agrees with one taken centuries before by
Surez in reply to an objection against his own doctrine regarding impossible
objects.87 But on another point as well, Meinong and Surez appear very much
together. For just as Surez and others had earlier asserted that the opponents of
impossible objects could not deny them without in the course of their denial
admitting them,88 Meinong, while hoping to avoid an ad hominem argument,
alluded to the fact that Russell in his very denial of the round square and other
impossible objects necessarily had to employ them.89
Not far away from this are two other points. First, in the same work in which
he confronts Russell, Meinong has twice noted the use of impossible objects in
indirect proofs, or reductiones ad impossibile.90 Second, although he has not
said it in so many words, Meinong also would seem to think that one would need
impossible objects in order to use the principle of contradiction itself. Thus in

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order to know that there is a violation of this principle it seems necessary to know
that there is some synthesis which, because it involves a contradiction, cannot be. It
seems necessary, for example, to know that A cannot without qualification be -A or
that the synthesis of A and -A is contradictory, which is to know something as impos-
sible.91 Implicitly then, Meinong sees a purpose for what is impossible and thus is
aiming at some purely teleological intentionality for purely intellectual intentionality.

VIII.
Antonio Milln-Puelles makes it explicit in his magnificent book devoted to
the theory of the pure object.92 Quite different from Mienongs

36Cf. e.g. . . . ens rationis praeter esse
objectivum, et intentionale, quod habet in
intellectu, neque habet, neque potest habere
aliud esse ipsi intrinsecum sive existentiae, . . .
Nam ens rationis idem est, ac impossibile, ut
constat ex communi acceptione
Philosophorum, . . . sed impossibile (in
imaginarii in doctrina sphaerica: . . . Clemens
Timpler (1568-1624), Metaphysicae Systema
Methodicum (Hanoviae: Apud P. Antonium,
1616), I, c. 3, prob. 11 (p. 36). Calvinist
scholastics, both Goclenius and Timpler were
much influenced by Surez.
40Cf. e.g. . . . ens rationis acceptum pro

quocumque impossibilitas consistat) illud est,
quod cognosci potest ab intellectu, et in ipso
objective existere, et praeter hoc esse objec-
tivum, nullum aliud esse potest habere sibi
intrinsecum existentiae, . . . ergo ens rationis
illud est, quod potest habere esse objectivum
extrinsecum, et intentionale, et praeter hoc
esse, nullum aliud potest habere sibi intrinse-
cum existentiae, futuritionis, aut praeteritionis
realis. I. Peynado, Disputationes . . ., Tr. IV,
secunda intentione sit formale objectum
Logicae, possit illud dici per se inspectum ab
arte, et secundario ordinatum ab ipsa in finem
adquirendi alias scientias. J. Saenz de
Aguirre, O.S.B. (1630-1699), Philosophia
rationalis nov-antiqua sive Disputationes
selectae in Logicam et Metaphysicum
Aristiotelis (Salmanticae: Apud Lucam Perez,
1675), Logica, Tr. II, d. 9, n. 1 (p. 114).
41Cf. esp. Francisco Surez, S.J., DM 54.4.2

sect. 1, n. 2 (p. 335). . . . ens rationis in hoc
differt ab ente reali, quod habeat hanc existen-
tiam intentionalem tantum; nullam vero
intrinsecam et realem habeat, nec habere pos-
sit. L. de Lossada, CP, Metaphysica, IV, c. 4,
n. 38 (vol. 10, p. 272).
37Cf. Aristotle, Physics 1.8.191b15ff and
Met-aphysics 11.3.1061al8ff. Also see: DM
54.4.17 (26: 1036) ; tr. Doyle, p. 109.
38DM 54.4.1 (26: 1029); ibid. n. 7 (1030). On
a possible doctrinal use of empty space, see
Francisco Surez, S.J. On Beings of Reason
. . ., pp. 35-6.
39Cf. e.g. Epicyclus in Astronomia est ens
rationis, id est in coelo locatus est non naturae
consilio, sed hominum arbitrio, ut fictitia
hypothesis, . . . Rudolph Goclenius (1547-
1628), Isagoge in peripateticorum et scholas-
ticorum Primam Philosophiam, quae dici
consuevit Metaphysica (Francofurti: Ex offic.
M. Z. Palthenii, 1598), C. 1, n. 1 (p. 15), and
Deinde aliud [ens rationis] fundamentum
habere in ipsis rebus, ut sunt orbes et circuli
(26: 1029); cf. Doyle, p. 92, n. 121. For doctri-
nalis so used earlier, cf. Disputationis vero
quatuor sunt species: scilicet doctrinalis,
dialectica, tentativa et sophistica . . . Doctrinalis
sive demonstrativa est quae ad scientiam ordi-
natur, . . . St. Thomas Aquinas, De fallaciis,
cap. I, n. 3, in S. Thomae Aquinatis, Opuscula
omnia necnon opera minora. Tamus primus,
Opuscula philosophica, ed. R.P. Joannes
Perrier, O.P. (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1949), p.
431; on authenticity of the De fallaciis, see J.
Weisheipl, Friar Thomas DAquino . . ., p. 386.
42See, e.g. Solentque haec entia rationis
vocari doctrinales, eo quo iis in docendo solea-
mus uti. . . . Atque sic omne ens rationis (spe-
cialiter sumpta voce pro ente rationis, quod
doctrinale est, quodque ficto contra distingui-
tur) est vel relatio, vel privatio, vel negatio.
Christoph Scheibler (1589-1653), Opus meta-
physicum (Giessae Hessorum: Typis N.
Hampelii, 1617), I, cap. 27, art. 1, n. 63 (p.
878).

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Gegenstandstheorie,93 Milln-Puelles work focuses on the unreal in its myriad

manifestations.94 Again unlike Meinong, who has admitted his ignorance of
Scholastic doctrine,95 Milln-Puelles is very much aware of the Scholastics and
their seventeenth-century treatises on beings of reason. While such beings of rea-
son would occupy but one section (slo un fragmente96) of his wider theory of
objects,97 it is a most important section at the very heart of the theory itself.98
Specifically, beings of reason would be necessarily nonexistent intelligible quid-
dities, characterized by the fact that their only possibility consists in their being
objects of understanding.99 In this purely intentional condition, they would con-
trast with just factually nonexistent intelligible objectssuch as mere possibles,
the past, and the future100which even though unreal are more than purely inten-
tional at least in the sense that they do not exclude all being outside that of being
an object.101
In the coarse of a chapter (19) devoted to the teleology of the unreal (La
Finalidad de lo Irreal), Milln-Puelles asks about the para qu, what Aristotle
would call the a ^ u nka,102 of an unreal intelligible object.103 What he has in
mind is not merely a finis operantis but rather a finality which should be classified
as a finis operis.104 More precisely, his question is nuanced in a way different from
that of Surez. Whereas the great Jesuit had asked about the finality of beings of
reason in the sense of how they themselves could be an end of the minds activity,
Milln-Puelles asks how they, and unreal objects generally, can have any finality
beyond themselveshow can they be means to some further end?105
In this context, Milln-Puelles has no trouble following the Scholastic divi-
sion of beings of reason into those which have and those which do not have a
basis in reality.106 A para qu in the case of beings of reason with a foundation in
reality seems obvious enough. In general, like all beings of reason, they have
beyond themselves the end of complementing intellectual activity.107 In particular,
different ones have diiferent functions, particular finalities,108 which would make
them doctrinal in the sense of the Scholastics.
But what of beings of reason without foundation? Specifically, what of
impossible objects? Even if one assumes or allows their existence, what further
finality can they have? Milln-Puelles sees such purely fictional entities as also
having a twofold finality. In general, they too will serve to complete certain intel-
lectual activities.109 Looking in the opposite direction from Surez, he here is
thinking that such fictional entities generally have the further end of perfecting
intelligence rather than being themselves as unreal the end of an intelligence
which would be real.110 But even if one allows that,111 the further question is pre-
cisely what particular finality could they have?

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Milln-Puelles has explicitly considered Araujos position that beings of rea-

son without foundation, merely impossible objects, can have the end of provid-
ing pleasure.112 He has, however, rejected this for the reason that such objects
give pleasure precisely inasmuch as they are products of imagination rather
than of reason or intellect.113 That is to say, what pleases us about things like
centaurs, sirens, or winged horses is their sensible appearance, not any intelligi-
ble unreality (i.e. being of reason) which they present to us.114 For what plea-

43Cf. e.g. Dico ergo divisionem hanc recte 3, a. 5, n. 3 (p. 77).

assignatam esse pro Entibus Rationis tantum
doctrinalibus, sub qua proinde divisione non
continentur mere fictitia, quaeque nihil ad sci-
entias deserviunt, nec ad entis realis cogni-
tionem quidquam conducunt: . . . T. Compton
Carleton, S.J., Philosophia . . ., Logica, d. 14,
s. 2, n. 2 (p. 80) ; the division of which
Carleton is speaking here is of beings of rea-
son into negations, privations, and relations.
Earlier in the Jesuit tradition, cf. . . . respon-
deri potest. Primo admittendo figmenta, in toto
rigore, esse entia rationis; non fuisse tamen
comprehensa a Philosophis in tradita divi-
sione, . . . In Philosophia vero non est usus,
nisi earum rerum, quae aliquam habent veri-
tatem, cum de rebus in mundo existentibus
affirmantur. Unde a quibusdam addi solet in
definitione entis rationis (quod de rebus veris
dici potest). Conimbricenses, In universam
Dialecticam . . . Prima pars, In praefationem
Porphyrii, q. 6, a. 2 (p. 144). Also, cf. Ens
rationis iterum est a. Doctrinale, quod scientiis
inservit; puta secundae intentiones Logicae. b.
Non-doctrinale, quod scientiis minime
inservit, v.g. Hippocentaurus. Pierre Godart,
Lexicon philosophicum I (Parisiis: Apud Vid.
J. le la Caille et R. de la Caille, 1675), Tr. 4 (p.
139).
44For this, cf., e.g. Infero secundo. Sola
enim impossibilia esse entia rationis: quia ens
rationis est illud, quod in re non potest exis-
tere: At quod in re non potest existere, est
impossibile. Ergo ens rationis est id quod est
impossibile. M. Smiglecki, Logica I, d. 1, q. 1
(p. 3); Ens rationis essentialiter seu in statu
essentiae suae est ens impossibile, quatenus
potest cognosci, et existere in cognitione.
Maximilian Wietrowski, S.J. (1660-1737),
Philosophia disputata (Pragae: Typis Univ. C.
Ferd., 1697), Logica, Concl. 14, cap. 2, n. 1 (p.
276); Dico iam. Definitio entis rationis recte
attributur omni et soli impossibili. L.
Babenstuber, Philosophia . . . Metaphysica, d.
45Cf. e.g. Metaphysics 5.7.1017a7;
6.2.1026a34-1027a28; 11.8.1065a22.
46Cf. w{spr gar o[noma ti movnon to; kat
sumbbhkov$ stin spr gr
trage/lao$. o[noma m/n sti, pra ^gma d kai;
fuvsi$ ti$ kai; o{lw$ ti o]n oujdamw`$ stin, ou{tw
kai; to; kat sumbbhko;$ o]n o[noma movnon s-
tiv. In Metaph. VI, 2; ed. Hayduck, p. 448, 11.
36-9. For earlier Stoic highlighting of the juxta-
position involved in such objects, cf. T.
Kobusch, Sein und Sprache . . ., pp; 29-32, 45-
46.
47Cf. . . . ea quae sunt secundum se impos-
sibilia non cadunt in intellectum, cum sibi
ipsis repugnent; . . . St. Thomas, Summa con-
tra gentiles I, c. 84; also: Summa theologiae I,
25, 3.
48Cf. . . . impossibile simpliciter includit
incompossibilia, quae ex rationibus suis for-
malibus sunt incompossibilia, . . . Duns
Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 43, q. un., in Opera
omnia VI (Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis
Vaticanis, 1963), p. 359, n. 16.
49Cf. Metaphysics 6.2.1026a33-1026b2; and
11.8.1065a 22 ff.
50For this, cf. In Metaphys., L. VI, c. 1, t. 8
(152r-v). For some of the dimensions of the
difference here between Averroes and
Alexander as it works out in later Scholastic
debate, see my article: Another God,
Chimerae, Goat-Stags, and Man-Lions: A
Seventeenth-Century Debate about Impossible
Objects, The Review of Metaphysics, 48:4
(June 1995), pp. 771-808.
51For this distinction, see e.g., St. Thomas,
Summa Theologiae II-II, 141, 6, ad 1; Scriptum
super Sententiis Mag. P. Lombardi, IV, d. 16, q.
3, a. 1, 2, ad 3; ed. M. F. Moos, O.P., T. IV
(Paris: Lethielleux, 1947), p. 796; and John of
St. Thomas, Cursus . . ., Naturalis philosophi-
ae, I. P., q. 13, a. 1; ed. Reiser, II (1933), p.
271b.

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sure, he asks, could the intellectual grasp of the impossible unity of such para-
doxical things give us?115
Even as he asks this, however, Milln-Puelles will admit in association with
impossible objects a certain intellectual satisfaction, which may be present, for
instance, when we demonstrate something to be impossible.116 This satisfaction is
quite different from the pleasure that follows on the sensible features of imagined
objects.117 Yet the fact that it occurs at all is significant and ties in to an earlier
remark Milln-Puelles has made to the effect that those arguments which are
reductiones ad absurdum can result in impossible objects divided against them-
selves118 and, furthermore, that it is only because there are such objects that
reductiones ad absurdum are possible.119
Immediately adjacent to this is Milln-Puelles main thought about the partic-
ular teleology of beings of reason without a basis in reality, i.e. intelligibly unreal
impossible objects. As he puts it: in openly paradoxical things (i.e. those evi-
dently divided against themselves) we encounter the fact that beyond having the
general finality natural to all beings of reason they have a finality proper to them-
selves alone inasmuch as they make possible the concept of the impossible.120
Indeed, he continues, without a concrete objectual121 matter to serve as a basis
for their understanding, no universal notions at all could be objectified.122 But the
concrete objectual matter which is required for the universal concept of the impossi-
ble is always that of an openly paradoxical quiddity. That is to say, without objects
such as a round square, a woman-fish (i.e. a mermaid), or a man-horse (a centaur),
etc. we would totally lack the idea of the impossible and, as a result, we would lack
one of the most radical and indispensable resources of intellectual life itself.123 A fur-
ther result would be that all reductiones ad absurdum would be impossibleand
even the principle of contradiction itself would be unworkable since what is
expressed in it is an absolute impossibility and not just a a simple negative fact.124

IX.
Even for those who have no trouble with teleology in general, there are obvious
problems about a supposed teleology for beings of reason. Evils such as sickness,
death, madness, sin or moral disorder are not intrinsically impossible items. But nei-
ther are they positive realities in their own right. They are, instead, negations or pri-
vations of being. And when they are conceived in the likeness of being,125 they
become beings of reason with a foundation in reality.126 Questions regarding their
purpose go deep into physical, metaphysical, epistemological, psychological, and
moral areas. Reaching beyond human beings to the Divine Reality itself, in various
ways they drive deep into the realms of intellectual and volitional intentionality.127

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Mod Schlmn Nov. 2001 r1 :Mod Schlmn Nov. 2001
There are questions, however, even deeper and wider about beings of reason
which have no foundation in reality outside the mind, questions about those pure-
ly impossible objects which Milln-Puelles has called openly paradoxical. The
52Cf. Sed debes scire universaliter quod
nomen ens, quod significat essentiam rei, est
aliud ab ente quod significat verum. Averroes,
In Metaph. V, c. 7, t. 14; f. 117r.; on this, also
cf.: . . . aliqua enim hoc modo dicuntur entia
quae essentiam non habent, . . . unde
Commentator in eodem loco dicit quod ens
primo modo dictum est quod significat essenti-
am rei. St. Thomas Aquinas, De ente et essen-
tia, c. 1, ed. M.-D. Roland Gosselin, O.P.
(Paris: Vrin, 1948), p. 3; . . . ens uno modo
dicitur de quo possunt propositiones formari,
etsi essentiam non habeat. De natura generis,
c. 1, n. 1 in S. Thomae Aquinatis, Opuscula
omnia necnon opera minora. I, ed. Perrier, p.
495; on the uncertain authenticity of the De
natura generis, see J. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas
DAquino: . . ., p. 403.
53Cf. . . . nec dici possunt habere essenti-
am. Surez, DM 54.1.10 (26: 1018); tr. Doyle,
p. 65. Recall Surazs acknowledged depen-
dence upon Avveroes for his basic understand-
ing of a being of reason; see note 33, above.
54. . . nam ens rationis ex se nullam proprie
habet finalem causam, quia non est aliquid per
se intentum a natura, vel ab aliquo agente.
Quod si ex parte hominis excogitantis aut fin-
gentis entia rationis, finalis aliqua ratio reddi
possit, illa magis est finalis ratio ipsius cogita-
tionis hominis, quam ipsius objecti facti et
cogitati, . . . DM 54.2.1 (26: 1018); tr. Doyle,
p. 66.
55For this, see the reference at note 32,
above.
56Cf. DM 54.1.4 (26: 1016); tr. Doyle, pp.
60-1; DM 31.2.11 (26: 232); tr. Wells, p. 64.
For Aristotle, see Metaphysics 5.7.1017a31;
6.2.1026a34-5; 6.4.1027b18-1028a3; 11.8.
1065a21.
57Cf. notes 25 and 33, above.
58Cf. e.g.: Ut enim optime observat Eximius
Suarez disp. 54. Metaph. ens rationis, cum non
sit per se inspectum a natura, vix potest habere
alium finem, quam praescriptum pro libito ab
ipso operante. Saenz de Aguirre, Philosophia
. . ., Logica, Tr. 2, d. 9, n. 1 (p. 114). Notavit
bene P. Suar. tantum posse disputari de causa
efficiente entis rationis, quia cum non sit per se
intentum a natura non habet finalem causam, si
72
7/12/11 10:58 AM Page 72
autem quis intenderet entis rationis fingere,
posset ex parte hominis fingentis finalis causa
assignari, quae proprie esset causa suae inten-
tionis, et secundario actus intellectus, quo ens
rationis fingitur, valde tamen improprie, et
remote respectu entis rationis ficti. Oviedo,
Integer Cursus . . ., Metaphys., cont. 12, punct.
6, n. 1 (p. 440).
59Cf. . . . chimera haec, sicut et quaevis
alia, ex diversis et repugnantibus accidentibus
conficta, est negatio, contenta sub primo
membro huius divisionis, in quo illae duntaxat
negationes comprehenduntur, quae consistunt
in repugnantia quadam et incompossibili
compositione, conficta ab intellectu.
Commentariorum . . ., III, q. 1, a. 4, n. 27 (pp.
338-9); . . . negationem, prout est tertium
membrum a caeteris huius divisionis condis-
tinctum, solum pro chimericis composition-
ibus accipi, quae nullo gaudent fundamento.
ibid., n. 29 (p. 339).
60Denique implicat, aliquid habere aliquo
modo causam efficientem, quin habeat eodem
modo causam finalem: cum forma ipsa causa
sit finis suae generationis. Maxime, quia intel-
lectus multoties confingit quaedam entia, et illa
cognoscit propter aliquem finem, ut causa
delectionis, et causa faciendi aliquas praedica-
tiones, attribuit extremis praedicationis varias
intentiones, v.g. subjecti, praedicati, individui,
speciei, etc. ergo. ibid. n.15, p. 328.
61What Surez called fecunditas intellec-
tus; cf. DM 54.1.8 (26: 1017); tr. Doyle, p. 64.
62Cf. Nomine entis rationis hic intelligo id,
quod est contradistinictum ab omni ente reali:
ita tamen, ut non sit omnino nihil, sed habeat
aliquod esse ab intellectu fictum, quod sit
impossibile realiter: quapropter ens rationis
bene dicitur id esse, quod habet tantum esse
objectivum in ratione; . . . ut patet in fiction-
nibus poetarum, quae acumine ingenii excogi-
tatae sunt: . . . Sforza Pallavicino, S.J.
(1607-1667), De Universa Philosophia
(Romae: Typographia Francisci Corbelletii,
1628), Philosophia contemplativa, II, c. 27, nn.
919-920 (pp. 174-5).
63On Zimara, see Ernest Renan, Averroes et
L'Averrosme (Paris: Auguste Durand, 1852),
pp. 297-300.
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particular question in this essay about the intrinsic finality of such objects may not
seem to shake the earth. To some it may appear merely a matter of little fleas and
lesser fleas. But, against this, my hope is to have shown some of its importance, as
well to have displayed a continuing historical trend towards its resolution. In my
opinion, the question of the pure intentionality of pure intentionality does indeed
verge upon a primary item of intellectual concern.128 Approaching an Ultima
Thule of philosophical discourse, attempts to answer it are probing the limits of
thought, speech, and action themselves.

On the Pure Intentionality

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John P. Doyle

73
Mod Schlmn Nov. 2001 r1 :Mod Schlmn Nov. 2001
64Cf. For it is impossible for any one to
believe the same thing to be and not to be, as
some think Heraclitus says. For . . . it is impos-
sible that contrary attributes should belong at
the same time to the same subject . . . and if an
opinion which contradicts another is contrary
to it, obviously it is impossible for the same
man to at the same time believe the same thing
to be and not be; for if a man were mistaken on
this point he would have contrary opinions at
the same time. Metaphysics 4.3. 1005b23-31,
tr. W.D. Ross, in The Basic Works of Aristotle,
ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random
House, 1941) p. 737.
65Zimara here makes no distinction between
Aristotles hJ ij$ to; duvnaton povdixi$ (cf. nobis intelligi non possunt; cuiusmodi sunt:
e.g. Anal. Post. 1.11.77a22) and his podi`xai
lgktikw`$ (Metaph. 4.4.1006a11-12). Ex nihilo nihil fit. Aliquid in nihilum non
Connected with this, see note 75, below.
66Dicit Commentator quod anima potest
simul opposita recipere. Hujus tamen opposi-
tum habet. 4. meta. tex. com. 9. ubi
Commentator et Philosophus probant per
deductionem ad impossibile, quod, si primum
principium non esset verum, tunc opiniones
contrariae in eodem essent. Et Commentator in
commento dicit, quod qui dicit aliquod intelli-
gibile, ponit hoc fundamentum, quod duo opp
osita non congregantur insimul. Marcae
Antonii Zimarae, Solutiones contradictionum
in dictis Aristotelis et Averrois, VI Meta. com.
ult., in Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois com-
mentariis, Aristotelis Metaphysicorum libri
XIIII, etc. (Venetiis: Apud Junctas, 1562), VIII,
f. 409v. For Averroes, cf. . . . impossibile est,
ut duo opposita sint insimul, . . . In Metaphy.
IV, c. 2, com. 9 (f. 75rC); and ibid. (f. 75vK-L),
as cited in note 81, below.
67De istis igitur contrariis incomplexis iudi-
co dictum Aver. veritatem habere sine dubio:
sed de contrarietate, quae est inter complexa:
difficultas est, . . . Zimara, ibid, f. 409v.
68Ad formam igitur contradictionis dicen-
dum puto, quod longe aliter Averroes exponit
tex. illud nonum 4. met. quam exponit nostri
Latini. ibid.
69Nam secundum Latinos Aristoteles ibi
secundum eorum expositionem probat, quod
duo contradictoria non possunt simul vera esse,
quia, si quis opinaretur oppositum primi prin-
cipii, sequeretur quod cum opiniones de con-
tradictoriis sint contrariae, tunc accideret
contraria in eodem esse. ibid. With this, cf. St.
Thomas Aquinas, In XII libros Meta-
physicorum Aristotelis, L. IV, 1. 6; ed. M.-R.
Cathala (Taurini: Marietti, 1950), p. 167, n.
74
7/12/11 10:58 AM Page 74
603; and Fonseca, In Metaph. Arist., L. IV,
Capitis tertii explanatio, P (p. 846).
70Sed longe aliter exponit locum illum
Commentator et sua expositio talis est, quod si
dictum Heracliti esset verum, cum contingat
duos diversos homines dicere contradictoria, et
existimare ea vera esse, sequeretur ergo duo
contradictoria esse vera simul, quod non est
possibile: . . . Zimara, f. 409v. With this, cf.
Aristotle oik d oJ mn Hraklivtou lovgo",
l/gwn pnta i\nai kai; mh; i\nai, panta
a>lhq poii`n, . . . Metaphysics 4.7.1012a23-
5.
71Cf. e.g. Nihil . . . est intelligibile. Quod
nisi fieret, multa principia Philosophica. . . a
Quicquid est, aut est a nihilo, aut ab aliquo.
potest resolvi; inter nihil et aliquid nulla est
proportio. Cum autem hoc sit absurdum et
pugnet cum sano cuiusque hominis judicio,
statuendum omnino est, Nihil est intelligi-
bile. Metaphysicae Systema . . ., L. 1, c. 2, pr.
I (p. 21).
72. . . nisi homo semper certo posset
cognoscere utrum aliquid sit possibile vel
impossibile, sequeretur inde, non omnia certo
probari posse per demonstrationem ad impossi-
bile ducentem: Sed consequens est absurdum,
et pugnat non tantum cum natura illius demon-
strationis, sed etiam cum communi
Philosophorum decreto: Ergo absurdum est
antecedens. ibid., c. 7, n. 3 (p. 138); Timpler
gives this argument in support of an affirmative
answer to the question: Whether one can
always know with certainty whether something
is possible or impossible? (Utrum ab homine
semper certo possit utrum aliquid sit possibile
vel impossibile?).
As regards Timpler's own basic view of
inpossible objects, we may note some ambigui-
ty. From his definition of entia rationis
[Denique ens rationis dici [potest] quodlibet
ens, quod a ratione fingitur et excogitatur, ad
modum entis realis, neque citra mentis cogita-
tionem existere aptum est. ibid., c. 3. pr. 6 (p.
30)], they would seem to be on the side of
being, even as they have no aptitude for exis-
tence. But, against this, he has explicitly put
them on the side of non-being; cf. Quidquid
enim implicat contradictionem, id involvit aliq-
uid destruens rationem entis. ibid.,II, c. 7, pr. 1
(p. 135).
73Imo in omni genere demonstrationis, . . .
vis illationis virtute fundatur in deductione ad
impossibile, scilicet, quia fieri non potest quod
Mod Schlmn Nov. 2001 r1 :Mod Schlmn Nov. 2001
simul sit et non sit, vel quod duae contradictori-
ae simul sint verae. Propter quod dixit
Averroes, 2 Metaphys., cap. 1, sine illo princi-
pio ab Aristotele posito neminem posse
philosophari, disputare aut ratiocinari. DM
3.3.6 (25: 113). Surezs citation of Averroes
here is incorrect. For the correct citation, cf.
Averroes, In Metaph. IV, c. 2, com. 9 (f. 75rC
and 75vG).
74Cf. DM 3.3.8 (25: 113-4).
75Cf. . . . ipsum [i.e. principium contradic-
tionis] autem nullo modo ostendi potest etiam
deductione ad impossibile, quia nullum aliud
impossibilius inferri potest, quam sit illud quod
in eo pronunciatur, . . . DM 3.3.9 (25: 114);
also cf. . . . non modo conclusiones omnes,
sed etiam caetera omnia principia confirmantur
a priori, deductione ad contradictionem, quod
est omnium maximum, ac manifestissimum
impossibile. Hujusmodi autem impossibile hoc
solo principio exprimitur. Praeterea illud est
primum principium simpliciter, quod cum est
necessarium nec ostensive, nec per deduc-
tionem ad impossibile demonstrari potest: at
hoc principium est hujusmodi. Fonseca, In
Metaph. IV, c. 3, q. 1 (p. 851D-E). In conjunc-
tion with this, see note 65, above.
76Cf. note 33, above.
77For this, cf. QP, q. 48 (vol. 1, pp. 478-91).
78Sed objectum adaequatum proportion-
aliter respondens intellectui est intelligibile, . . .
ergo omne id in quod potest dividi intelligibile
est attingibile ab intellectu; sed intelligibile
dividitur in id quod est, in id quod non est, in id
quod potest esse et in id quod non potest esse;
ergo intellectus potest attingere non solum
quod est, sed etiam quod non est, non solum
quod potest esse, sed etiam quod non potest
esse, quod est impossibile. ibid., p. 482.
79Cf. Confirmatur, quia potentia, quae
potest dividere suum objectum adaequatum in
aliqua membra, singula describendo et dis-
tinguendo, proculdubio potest attingere omnia
illa membra; sed intellectus potest dividere et
de facto dividit intelligibile in haec quatuor
membra: quod est; quod non est; quod potest
esse; quod non potest esse; ac singula describit
ac distinguit; ergo attungit haec, tanquam circa
prima et notissima versatur totus discursus,
dum de intelligibili quaerit ac judicat utrum sit
vel non sit; utrum possit esse, vel non possit
7/12/11 10:58 AM Page 75
esse, adeoque est impossibile; utrum possit non
esse, vel non possit non esse, adeoque sit nec-
essarium. ibid., pp. 482-3.
80Ita primum et evidentissimum verum est
circa impossibile, dum enuntiat impossibile est
idem simul esse et non esse; . . . ergo qui negat
concipi impossibile, negat concipi unum ex
quatuot circa quae tanquam circa prima versat-
ur intellectus. ibid., p. 483.
81Cf. e.g. . . . impossibile est, ut aliquis ind-
ucat demonstrationem, quod hoc principium
est verum: nisi sit demonstratio errans, si ille,
qui hoc dicit, dicat aliquid, i.e. aliquod intelligi-
bile. Et dicit hoc, quia cum dixit aliquod intelli-
gibile, ponit hoc fundamentum, scilicet quod
duo opposita non congregantur insimul. In
Metaphys. IV, c. 2, t. 9 (f. 75vK-L). Note that in
the 16th century translation of Aristotles
Metaphysics which Averroes text accompa-
nies, Aristotles proof by refutation is rendered
as demonstratio per modum erroris.
82For this, see: ber Gegenstandstheorie
(1904); rep. in Alexius Meinong Ge-
samtausgabe, II Abhandlungen zur Er-
kenntnistheorie und Gegenstandstheorie, bear-
beitet von R. Haller (Graz: Akademische
Druck-u. Verlagsanstalt, 1971), pp. 481-535;
trans. as The Theory of Objects in Roderick
M. Chisholm, ed., Realism and the Background
of Phenomenology (Glencoe, 1960). Also cf.:
ber die Stellung der Gegestanstheorie im
System der Wissenschaften (Leipzig: R.
Voigtlnder, 1907); and J. N. Findlay,
Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values, 2nd
ed (Oxford, 1963).
83Cf. But the chief objection to Meinong's
view seems to me to lie in the fact that it
involves denying the law of contradiction when
impossible objects are constituents. B.
Russell, Critical Notice on Untersuchungen
zur Gegestandstheorie und Psychologie. Mit
Untersttzung des k.k. Ministeriums fr Kultus
und Unterricht in Wien herausgegeben von A.
Meinong. Leipziz: Verlag von Johann
Ambrosius Barth. 1904, Pp. xi, 634, Mind, NS
XIV (1905), p. 533.
84Cf. . . . der Satz des Widerspruches ist ja
von niemandem auf anderes als auf Wirkliches
und Mgliches bezogen worden. ber die
Stellung der Gegestandstheorie . . ., p. 16.
On the Pure Intentionality
of Pure Intentionality
John P. Doyle
75
Mod Schlmn Nov. 2001 r1 :Mod Schlmn Nov. 2001
85On complete vs. incomplete objects, cf.
esp. ber Mglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit
(Leipzig: Verlag Barth, 1915), n. 25, pp. 168-
81.
86For this with respect to impossible objects
as complete, cf. ibid., p. 179. As regards
impossible objects as incomplete, see A.
Meinong, Selbstdarstellung, Zweiter Absch-
nitt, B, II, pp. 16-17, in Gesamtausgabe, Bd.
VII, pp. 18-19.
87Cf. DM 54.5.14 (26: 1035), tr. Doyle, p.
107. For a different view, cf. Peynado, Logica,
T. 4, d. 3, s. 3, n. 30 (p. 378) and n. 35 (p. 381).
88For this, see Surez, DM 54.1.7 (26: 1017);
tr. Doyle, p. 63. Also, cf. e.g. Compton
Carleton, Philosophia universa, Logica, d. 13,
s 5, n. 1 (p. 69); Peynado, Logica, T. 4, d. 3., s.
2, n. 22 (p. 374); and Andreas Semery, S.J.
(1630-1717) Triennium philosophicum, ed. 2a,
Annus primus (Romae: Sumpt. Felicis
Caesaretti, 1682), Logica, d. 4, q. 7, a. 2 (p.
536).
89Cf. Ausserdem aber scheint er mir, indem
er dies tut, bereits selbstdies wird hoffentlich
kein unstatthaftes argumentum ad hominem
seinvon den unmglichen Gegenstnden zu
handeln und so selbst den Nachweis zu liefern,
dass derlei Gegenstnde unser Denken sehr
wohl beschftigen knnen. ber die Stellung alto . . . ibid., p. 23.
der Gegestandstheorie . . ., p. 18.
90Cf. . . . in jedem indirkten Beweise tritt ein
unmglicher Gegenstand oder treten deren
mehrere in die engsten Beziehungen zu
Mglichem und Wirklichem. ibid., p. 19;
Wie schon zu berhren war [referring to the
passage just cited from page 19], wird dies
durch jeden indireckten Beweis belegt, der aus
der Unmglichkeit der Konsequenzen die
Unmglichkeit einer angenommenen
Voraussetzung erkennen lsst. ibid., p. 79.
91Cf. Es ist das Verhltnis, zu dessen
Bezeichnung die moderne Logistik sich gern
des berstrichs bedient, so dass, falls man mit
E. Mally die Objective durch griechische
Buchstaben symbolisiert, etwa a und -a zu
schreiben wre. Solch ein positives und ein
negatives Objektiv mit bereinstimmendem
Material stehen bei geeigneter Beschaffenheit
dieses Materials im Verhltnis des
Widerstreites, das unter diesen besonderen
Umstnden Widerspruch genannt wird. Ihm
gilt das principium contradictionis, und einen
Gegenstand, der gegen dieses Prinzip nicht ver-
stsst, indem er keinen inneren Widerspruch
enthlt, pflegt man besonders gern als logisch
mglich zu bezeichen. ber Mglichkeit . . .,
76
7/12/11 10:58 AM Page 76
n. 10, p. 58. On this, cf.: La cognoscibilidad
de lo imposible se hace an ms patente si nos
percatamos de lo que conlleva formular el prin-
cipio de contradiccin. Para saber que algo
viola este principio parece necesario saber lo
que es una contradiccin, de lo contrario no se
ve cmo se pueda entonces decir de algo que
es contradictorio o, sin ms, el poder enunciar
el principio de contradiccin. Para poder saber
que A no puede ser no-A en el mismo sentido,
hay que entender lo que es A, lo que es no-A y,
por ltimo, que la sntesis de A y no-A es con-
tradictoria, que es precisamente la ndole de lo
imposible., V. Velarde Mayol, La Toria de
los objetos en Alexius Meinong, Pensamiento,
45 (1980), p. 466.
92Toria del objeto puro, Madrid: Ediciones
Rialp, 1990.
93Ibid., pp. 29-39.
94Ibid., esp. pp. 163-167.
95ber Annahmen (Leipzig: Verlag Barth,
1910), Vorwort zur ersten Auflage, p. vii.
96Toria . . ., p. 23.
97On the distinction between the unreal and
beings of reason, see e.g., ibid., pp. 22-25, 175,
249, 324, 454, 456-7, and 695.
98Cf. . . . la doctrina del ente de razn tiene
el innegable privilegio de ocupar el lugar ms
99Cf. . . . lo que en ltimo trmino caracteri-
za a los entes de razn es el ser quiddidades
tales que no cabe que existan y cuya nica posi-
bilidad consiste, as, en su aptitud para compor-
tarse como objectos de una actividad
intelectiva. ibid., p,. 457.
100Mientras lo apodicticamente irrealel
ens rationises cognoscible slo en el ejerci-
cio de la actividad intelectiva, lo fcticamente
irreal puede ser objeto sensible u objeto intel-
igible. . . . lo inteligible fcticamente inexis-
tente abarca las tres modalidades do lo
meramente posible, lo pretrito y lo futuro,
. . . ibid., p. 549.
101Cf. En efecto, ni el porvenir en tanto que
porvenir, ni el pasado como pasado, pueden
lcitamente ser tenidos por verdaderos entes de
razn, ya que es bien claro que no excluyen
para s mismos, de una manera absoluta, todo
posible valor transobjectual, . . . ibid., p. 23;
on the merely possible, see ibid., pp. 549-55.
102Cf. e.g., Physics 2.2.194a27; 2.3.194b33;
and Metaphysics 1.3.983a3l; 4.2.1013a33.
103Cf. 2. El para que de lo irreal inteligi-
ble Toria . . ., p. 776.
Mod Schlmn Nov. 2001 r1 :Mod Schlmn Nov. 2001
104Cf. his remarks on the unreal in general,
ibid., p. 757; and the sensibly unreal in particu-
lar, ibid., p. 760.
105Cf. . . . el argumento que Surez aduce, a
saber, que el ente de razn no es algo pretendi-
do por la naturaleza o por algn agente (quia
non est aliquid per se intentum a natura vel ab
aliquo agente) demuestra que el ente de razn
no es causa final de nada, no que no tiene
ninguna causa final. El no ser de suyo pretendi-
do es compatible con el ser pretendido como
medio, en funcin de algo otro, que sera justa-
mente su finalidad. ibid., p. 609. For Surez,
see note 54, above. Milln-Puelles distinction
of final causes here seems equivalent to
Surezs distinction between a finis cui and a
finis cujus, cf. DM 23.2.2-8 (25: 847-9).
106Es, pues, lcita la divisin general de los
entes de razn en la clase de los que tienen
algn fundamento in re y la clase de los que no
poseen ningn fundamento de esa indole.
Toria . . ., p. 493.
107La ms genrica de las finalidades natu-
rales a las que el ente razn se ordenala final-
idad a la que ningn ente de razn deja
naturalmente de servires el proprio ejercicio
de la actividad intelectiva en la que este objeto
se genera. ibid., p. 776.
108Cf. ibid., pp. 781-6.
109Cf. note 107, above.
110Cf. Por consiguiente, o bien se juzga que
el ente de razn es asimismo un cierto fin en s,
o bien se piensa que su razn teleolgica de ser
se encuentra en la inteleccin para la que es
necesario como trmino intencional. Lo
primero no es admisible, porque se requerira
para ello que la facultad intelectiva se
ordenarse al ente de razn (tal como se ordena
a la operacin intelectiva), lo cual implicara el
absurdo de que algo ontolgicamente posible
estuviese subordinado a lo que no es posible
ontolgicamente. Toria . . ., p. 777.
111Milln-Puelles argument may seem less
than apodictic for those who, like Surez (cf.
DM 23.8.7 [25: 880]) recognize that for final
causality real being is not required inasmuch as
esse apprehensum will suffice.
112See note 60, above.
113La estricta inmediatez de la manera
segn la cual el deleite constituye el finis qui de
las irrealidades imaginadas que poseen la
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capacidad de generarlo es cosa que atae a este
tipo de objetos nica y simplemente en tanto que
objetos de la facultad de imaginar, . . . Es, por
tanto, incorrecta la asignacin, que en algunos
pensadores de la Escuela se encuentra, de una
finalidad de deleite a ciertos entes de razn para
los cuales la imaginacin proporciona un apoyo
sensible que en cuanto tal nos complace. El
deleite que as queda atribuido como causa final
(vase, por ejemplo, Araujo, Comm. in univ.
Metaph. Aristot. Lib. III, q. 1, a. 2), a eos entes
de razn no se debe, en verdad, a ellos mismos
en su formal calidad de contrucciones que el
entendimiento lleva a cabo, sino a los productos
de la imaginacin que les sirven de apoyo.
Toria . . ., p. 763. For Surez on willing an
impossibie object for some pleasure or good rep-
resented in it, cf. DM 23.6.18 (25: 874).
114Lo que nos complace en los centauros,
las sirenas, los caballos alados, etc., son las
concretas figuras que les darnos en nuestra
imaginacin y que constituyen su ms inmedi-
ato qu, vale decir, su mero apecto sensible,
no el aspecto inteligible que presentan, como
entidades quimricas, a la luz del entendimien-
to. Toria . . ., p. 763.
115Qu satisfaccin o complacenia nos
puede producir la inteleccin de la imposible
unidad de una quiddidad paradjica?` ibid.
116Considerada en s misma y por s sola,
esta inteleccin no se confunde con la
demostracin del carcter contradictorio de una
sntesis que no parece, a primera vista, imposi-
ble. ibid.
117Semejante demostracin nos puede satis-
facer o complacer, aunque, indudablemente, de
una manera distinta de aquella en la que
pueden sernos deleitables nuestras fantasas de
los centauros, las sirenas, los caballos alados,
etc. ibid.
118Cf. ibid., p. 492.
119Cf. Incluso cabe observar que la ficcin
conceptual de quiddidades divididas contra s
mismas puede tener lugar con ocasin, y como
consecuencia, de ciertos razonamientos, a
saber, todos que son demonstraciones por
reduccin ad absurdum. (La comprensin de
cualquiera de estas pruebastanto si la
demonstracin es quia como s es propter quid
no puede tener lugar sin la ficcin conceptu-
al del absurdo correspondiente. ibid., p. 497.
On the Pure Intentionality
of Pure Intentionality
John P. Doyle
77
Mod Schlmn Nov. 2001 r1 :Mod Schlmn Nov. 2001
120Si ahora pasamos a considerar las quiddi-
dades abiertamente paradjicas, nos encon-
tramos con que, adems de servir para la ms
general de las finalidades naturales del ente de
razn, valen tambin para una funcin que slo
ellas pueden desempear: hacer posible el con-
cepto de lo imposible. ibid., p. 779.
121On the difference Milln-Puelles sees
between objectual and objective (which
mutatis mutandis is roughly like that in English
between actual and active), cf. ibid., esp. p. 21.
122En efecto, sin un concreto apoyo objectu-
al, es decir, sin una materia objetual concreta
que le sirva de base en la respectiva intellic-
cin, las nociones universales no pueden llegar
a ser objetivadas, . . . ibid., p. 779.
123. . . y la materia objetual concreta que
para la intelectcin del concepto universal de lo
imposible se requiere es, en cada caso, una
quiddidad abiertamente paradjica. Sin objetos
tales como el cuadrado redondo, la mujer-pez,
78
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el hombre-caballo, etc., careceramos de toda
idea de lo imposible, y nos faltara, por con-
siguiente, uno de los ms imprescindibles y
radicales recursos de la vida intelectual. ibid.
124Todas las pruebas por reduccin al absur-
do quedaran imposibilitadas, y aun el mismo
<<principio de contradiccin>> vendra a
resultarnos inviable, ya que con l se expresa
una absoluta imposibilidad, no un puro y sim-
ple hecho negativo. ibid., pp. 779-780. On the
universal character of the principle of non-con-
tradiction, cf. Surez, DM 3.3.11 (25: 115).
125For this, cf. DM 54.3.4 (26: 1027), tr.
Doyle, pp. 86-7; ibid. 5.20-26 (1037-8); tr.
Doyle, pp. 86-7, 111-115.
126Ibid., 54.4.2 (1029); Doyle, p. 92; cf. also
54.2.15-16 (1022); Doyle, pp. 75-7.
127For a little of this, cf. DM 23.6.2 and 19
(25: 868, 874).
128Cf. esp. notes 80 and 123, above.