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ARTURO M.

DE CASTRO,
Petitioner, - versus -
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO,
Respondents.

Citation: G. R. No. 191002

Facts of the case:

This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the controversy that has arisen
from the forthcoming compulsory requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or
seven days after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V.
Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that
the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately.
In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC passed a resolution which stated that
they have unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice
to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice. As a
result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and
published for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the
Philippine Star. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next
step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their
sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010.
Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno
in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President
its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy in this case being unresolved.
The compiled cases which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for either
the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus for the JBC to pass the shortlist,
or that the act of appointing the next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A
precedent frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998
of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch
62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here as
the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the
exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period
therein fixed.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice

Ruling:

1. Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill
a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the judiciary. The records of
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to
meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness
indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were
not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their
intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. As can be seen,
Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers
vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt
with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the
meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4
(1), Article VIII.
The framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because
their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of
candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC
ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. If midnight
appointments in the mold of Aytona were made in haste and with irregularities, or made by
an outgoing Chief Executive in the last days of his administration out of a desire to subvert
the policies of the incoming President or for partisanship the appointments to the Judiciary
made after the establishment of the JBC would not be suffering from such defects because
of the JBCs prior processing of candidates. Indeed, it is axiomatic in statutory construction
that the ascertainment of the purpose of the enactment is a step in the process of
ascertaining the intent or meaning of the enactment, because the reason for the enactment
must necessarily shed considerable light on the law of the statute, i.e., the intent; hence,
the enactment should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose, and
the court should seek to carry out this purpose rather than to defeat it.

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