RIFERIO VS CA

(GR. 129008, Jan.13, 2004)

HELD:
FACTS:
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal
Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several personal and real personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the
properties. He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he had provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that (t)he rights to succession are
seven children who are the herein respondents. transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." The provision in turn is
the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent
Also, the decedent also left his paramour and their children. They are petitioner
and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another
Teodora Riofero and co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena. Respondents
or others by his will or by operation of law.
Alfonso James and Lourdes (legitimate children of the deceased) discovered that
petitioner Teodora and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may
a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper
decedent located in Dagupan City. modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party
representation.
Respondent Alfonso filed a Petition for Letters of Administration. Respondents filed a
Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate.
Petitioners raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-
interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the
administration proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the
appointment of an administrator.

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PNB VS CA

Gr. 121597 June 29, 2001

ISSUE: Whether or not PNB may demand Allan Chua or the estate to cover the
(Remedial Law Special Proceedings Remedies of a Mortgagee in Mortgages
deficiency which was not paid off in the extrajudicial foreclosure.
Involving an Estate)

FACTS:
HELD: No. Once a deed of real estate mortgage executed by an administrator
Allan Chua was the administrator of the estate of Antonio Chua (his dead father). In
involving a property belonging to the estate is registered with the Registry of Deeds, it
1989, Allan was authorized by the probate court to take out a loan of P550k using a
is as if the mortgage has been executed by the deceased himself. As such, the
land belonging to Antonios estate as a collateral. Allan then took out a P450k loan
indebtedness belongs to the estate. It is true that if the proceeds from an extrajudicial
from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the loan was secured by a real estate
foreclosure is not enough to pay off the loan, the mortgagee can file a civil case
mortgage involving the said parcel of land.
against the mortgagor to satisfy the deficiency. However, this rule is only applicable to
Allan however defaulted from paying the loan. The loan has now grown to ordinary mortgages. In mortgages involving properties of an estate, pursuant to Rule
P679,185.63 inclusive of interests. In December 1990, PNB chose to foreclose 89 of the Rules of Court as well as prevailing case laws, the mortgagee (in this case
extrajudicially the mortgaged land. So a public sale was held and PNB was the PNB) has three remedies in case the estate defaults from paying the loan, to wit:
highest bidder at P306,360.00. Since the purchase price was not sufficient to cover
Allans indebtedness, PNB filed a complaint against Allan in his capacity as 1. To waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor
administrator of the Chua Estate. (deemed as Antonio Chua) as an ordinary claim;
2. To foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim;
Allan defaulted in the civil case and it was heard ex parte. Nevertheless, the RTC
and
dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC. The case was
3. To rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is
dismissed because it was ruled that PNB can no longer run after the estate after the
barred by prescription without right to file a claim for any deficiency.
extrajudicial foreclosure. PNB contends that under prevailing jurisprudence, when the
proceeds from an extrajudicial foreclosure is not enough to pay off the loan, the
In the case at bar, PNB chose the third remedy which as an exclusive remedy. The
mortgagee can file a civil case against the mortgagor to satisfy the deficiency.
third remedy includes extrajudicial foreclosure as what PNB opted to have. As a
result, PNB waived all right to recover against the estate of the deceased debtor for
any deficiency remaining unpaid after the sale.

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QUITA VS COURT OF APPEALS

GR. 124862 December 22, 1998

ISSUE:
FACTS:
(1) Whether or not Blandinas marriage to Arturo void ab initio.
Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the
Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got divorce in San Francisco on July 23, 1954. (2) Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary beneficiary as surviving
spouse of Arturo.
Both of them remarried another person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan, the
respondent herewith. They were blessed with six children. On April 16, 1972, when
Arturo died, the trial court was set to declared as to who will be the intestate heirs.
RULING:
The trial court invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case held that the divorce acquired by
the petitioner is not recognized in our country. No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The citizenship of Fe D. Quita at
the time of their divorce is relevant to this case. The divorce is valid here since she
Private respondent stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light was already an alien at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in their
of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Rommillo Jr that aliens who obtain divorce abroad are countrys national law. Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo.
recognized in the Philippnes provided they are valid according to their national law. She cannot be the primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse of
The petitioner herself answered that she was an American citizen since 1954. Arturo
Through the hearing she also stated that Arturo was a Filipino at the time she
obtained the divorce. Implying the she was no longer a Filipino citizen.

The Trial court disregarded the respondents statement. The net hereditary estate
was ordered in favor the Fe D. Quita and Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and
the Padlan children moved for reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 partial
reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of
Alexis, entitled to one- half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the
other half to Fe Quita.

Private respondent was not declared an heir for her marriage to Arturo was declared
void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to
petitioner. Blandina and her children appeal to the Court of Appeals thatthe case was
decided without a hearing in violation of the Rules of Court.

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EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR. ET. AL. VS. MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING
G.R. NO. 12790 AUGUST 9, 2005
Doctrine:
When a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the
estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his
property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title
adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be
determined in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings.
FACTS:
On 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value of
P10.5M, stock investments worth P518,783.00, bank deposits amounting to P6.54M,
and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her husband (Petitioner) and
their 2 minor children.
Consequently, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition for the settlement of
Miguelitas estate. He prayed that (a) letters of administration be issued in his name,
and (b) that the net residue of the estate be divided among the compulsory heirs.
Miguelitas mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching (Respondent) filed an opposition,
specifically to petitioners prayer for the issuance of letters of administration on the
grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an
administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelitas estate is composed of paraphernal
properties. Respondent prayed that the letters of administration be issued to her
instead. Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her appointment as special
administratrix.
Petitioners allegations: That the resp. had no direct and material interest in the estate,
she not being a compulsory heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse, has the
preferential right to be appointed as administrator under the law.
Respondents contentions: That she has direct and material interest in the estate
because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of
them would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of
business partners. In her omnibus motion, she nominated her son Emmanuel to act as
special administrator.
The RTC appointed petitioner and Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the
estate. Both were issued letters of administration after taking their oath and posting the
requisite bond.
No claims were filed against the estate within the period set. Thereafter, petitioner
submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelitas estate. Emmanuel did not
submit an inventory.
The RTC declared petitioner and his 2 minor children as the only compulsory heirs of
Miguelita.
Petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion praying, among others, that
an Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and
distribution of the estate among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorneys fees.
The intestate court partially allowed the motion. It denied petitioners prayer for partition
and distribution of the estate, holding that it is premature.
The intestate court ratiocinated as follows:
The Court finds the prayer of petitioner in this regard to be premature.
Thus, a hearing is necessary to determine whether the properties listed
in the amended complaint filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal or the
paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a co-ownership between the
oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership venture.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the
intestate courts Order and Resolution. (CA dismissed)
ISSUE: Whether or not a trial court (acting as an intestate court) can hear and pass
upon questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedents
estate?
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HELD: No, the question of ownership of properties alleged to be part of the estate must
be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.
(Petition GRANTED. CA Reversed)
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a
probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and
probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this
rule is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction.
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate
court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine
whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. In such situations the
adjudication is merely incidental and provisional.
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction
of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondents claim. Such reliance is
misplaced. Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the purpose of the
intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon questions of ownership is merely
to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory.
The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which
must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional
trial court. Jurisprudence teaches us that:
A probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be
a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties.
All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine
whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute,
well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the
opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court
cannot do so.
Hence, respondents recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general
jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her
adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate.

The facts of this case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.
Respondents purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what
properties should or should not be included in the inventory. She wanted to secure
from the intestate court a final determination of her claim of ownership over properties
comprising the bulk of Miguelitas estate.

Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction.
Its proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the matter. It is
well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that
when a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of
the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by
virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the
deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course of an
intestate or probate proceedings.

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REPUBLIC VS CA
GR. 143483 Jan.31, 2002
FACTS :
Private respondent Amada Solano, for more than 3 decades, served as the all-
around personal domestic helper of the late Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a French
national. During Ms. Hankins' lifetime and most especially during the waning years of
her life, respondent Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a constant companion
since no close relative was available to tend to her needs. Because of Solanos
faithfulness and dedication, Ms. Hankins executed in her favor 2 deeds of donation
involving 2 parcels of land (TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808) Private respondent alleged that
she misplaced the deeds of donation and were nowhere to be found.
Republic filed a petition for the escheat of the estate of Hankins before the RTC of
Pasay City. During the proceedings, a motion for intervention was filed by Romeo
Solano, spouse of private respondent, and one Gaudencio Regosa. But on June 24,
1987 the motion was denied by the trial court for the reason that "they miserably
failed to show valid claim or right to the properties in question. Since it was
established that there were no known heirs and persons entitled to the properties of
decedent Hankins, the lower court escheated the estate in favor of petitioner Republic
of the Philippines.
The Registry of Deeds of Pasay City cancelled TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 and issued
new ones in the name of Pasay City, by virtue of the decision of the trial court. In the
meantime, private respondent claimed that she accidentally found the deeds of
donation she had been looking for a long time. In view of this development,
respondent Solano filed on January 28, 1997 a petition for annulment of judgment
before the Court of Appeals. Contentions: The deceased Elizabeth Hankins
having donated the subject properties to the petitioner, did not and could not form part
of her estate when she died on 1985. Consequently, they could not validly be
escheated to the Pasay City Government; Even assuming arguendo that the
properties could be subject of escheat proceedings, the decision is still legally infirm
for escheating the properties to an entity, the Pasay City Government, which is not
authorized by law to be the recipient thereof. The property should have been
escheated in favor of the Republic of the Philippines under Rule 91, Section 1 of the
New Rules of Court.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on March 1997, representing public respondents
RTC and the Register of Deeds (petitioner) filed an answer setting forth their
affirmative defenses, to wit:
(a) lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action; and,
(b) the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations.
The Court of Appeals, on November 1998, issued the assailed Resolution upholding
the theory of respondent Solano.
CAs Ruling: Petitioner (Solano) invokes lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
on the part of respondent RTC to entertain the escheat proceedings because the
parcels of land have been earlier donated to herein petitioner prior to the death of
said Hankins; and therefore, respondent court could not have ordered the escheat of
said properties in favor of the Republic of the Philippines x x x
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifically laid down the grounds of annulment
filed before this Court, to wit: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over
the subject matter is conferred by law and this jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations of the complaint. It is axiomatic that the averments of the complaint
determine the nature of the action and consequently the jurisdiction of the courts.
The issues presented in the petition can only be resolved only after a full blown trial.
It is for the same reason that respondents espousal of the statute of limitations
against herein petition for annulment cannot prosper at this stage of the proceedings.
Sec 4, Rule 91 of the Rules of Court which provides for the period for filing claim in
escheat proceeding (5 years) is not applicable. Petitioner (Solano) is not claiming
anything from the estate of the deceased at the time of her death; rather she is
claiming that the subject parcels of land should not have been included as part of the
estate of the said decedent as she is the owner thereof by virtue of the deeds of
donation in her favor.
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Petitioner is claiming ownership of the properties in question and the consequent
reconveyance thereof in her favor which cause of action prescribes ten (10) years
after the issuance of title in favor of respondent Pasay City on August 7, 1990.
Therefore, the petition was seasonably filed on February 3, 1997.
The CA likewise denied the motion for reconsideration filed by public respondents.
Petitioner contends that the lower court had jurisdiction when it escheated the
properties in question in favor of the city government and the filing of a petition for
annulment of judgment on the ground of subsequent discovery of the deeds of
donation did not divest the lower court of its jurisdiction on the matter.
Petitioner also insists that notwithstanding the execution of the deeds of donation in
favor of private respondent, the 5-year statute of limitations within which to file claims
before the court as set forth in Rule 91 of the Revised Rules of Court has set in.
generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed within which such action
must be brought. In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file
his claim "within five (5) years from the date of such judgment, such person shall have
possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be
accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim not made
shall be barred forever.
The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any
claimant; on the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants
to be punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a
final judgment.
In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower court as
early as June 1989 but it was only on January 1997, more or less seven (7) years
after, when private respondent decided to contest the escheat judgment in the guise
of a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES: Obviously, private respondent's belated assertion of her right over the escheated
properties militates against recovery. In the mind of this Court the subject properties
(1) Whether or not private respondent Solano, allegedly a donee, have the
were owned by the decedent during the time that the escheat proceedings were being
personality to be a claimant within the purview of Sec. 4, Rule 91 of the
conducted and the lower court was not divested of its jurisdiction to escheat them in
Rules of Court.
favor of Pasay City notwithstanding an allegation that they had been previously
donated.
(2) Whether or not the petition for annulment of judgment filed by private
respondent is barred by prescription. The certificates of title covering the subject properties were in the name of the
decedent indicating that no transfer of ownership involving the disputed properties
was ever made by the deceased during her lifetime.
HELD:
In the absence therefore of any clear and convincing proof showing that the subject
In the case of Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna v. Colegio de San Jose, Inc.
lands had been conveyed by Hankins to Solano, the same still remained part of the
In a special proceeding for escheat the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive
estate of the decedent and the lower court was right not to assume otherwise.
interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property
Wherefore, the petition is granted, the CAs resolutions are SET ASIDE and the
sought to be escheated is likewise an interested party and may appear and oppose
RTCs decision is REINSTATED.
the petition for escheat.

Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the state,

by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of a
person who dies intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a
property is claimed by the state to forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the
first comers.

Since escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually does,
prescribe the conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such property may
be made. The procedure by which the escheated property may be recovered is

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