The Alawi Capture of Power in Syria

Author(s): Daniel Pipes

Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Oct., 1989), pp. 429-450
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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 The Alawi Capture of Power in Syria
Daniel Pipes

For manycenturies,the Alawiswere the weakest,poorest, most rural,most

despisedandmostbackwardpeople of Syria.In recentyears,however,they
have transformedthemselves into the ruling elite of Damascus. Today,
Alawis dominate the government, hold key militarypositions, enjoy a
disproportionateshare of the educational resources, and are becoming
wealthy. How did this dramatic change occur? When did the Alawis
manageto escape their traditionalconfines, and what was the mechanism
of their rise?
Sunnisand others unsympatheticto the regimeof Hafiz al-Asadanswer
this question by accusing the Alawis of an elaborate and long-term
conspiracyto take powerin Syria.Annie Laurentsuggeststhat 'determined
to get their revenge'afterthe failureof a rebel leader, SulaymanMurshid,
'the Alawis put into effect a strategyof settingup cells in the armyand the
Ba'thParty,andthiswon thempowerin Damascus'. Adherentsof thisview
date the Alawi ascentto 1959, the year that the MilitaryCommitteeof the
Ba'th Partywas formed. Why, they ask, did leadersof this groupkeep its
existence secret from the party authorities?This furtivenesssuggests that
the MilitaryCommitteefrom the beginninghad a sectarianagenda. Matti
Moosa arguedthat 'it is almost certainthat the officerswere actingnot as
Baathists,but as Nusayris[Alawis],with the intent of using the Baath and
the armedforces to rise to power in Syria. The formationof the military
committee was the beginning of their plan for a future takeover of the
government'.2
This speculationis confirmedby the 1960 clandestinemeeting of Alawi
religiousleaders and officers (includingAsad) that reportedlytook place
in Qardaha,Asad's home town. 'The maingoal of this meetingwas to plan
how to forwardthe Nusayriofficersinto the ranksof the Ba'th Party.They
wouldthen exploit it as a meansto arriveat the rule in Syria'.3Three years
later, anotherAlawi meetingin Homs is said to have followedup the earlier
initiatives.Amongother steps, it calledfor the placementof moreAlawisin
the Ba'th Partyand army.Furthersecret meetingsof Alawi leadersappear
to have taken place later in the 1960s.4
Analysts better disposed to Asad tend to discountnot just these meet-
ings and a premeditateddrive for power, but the sectarianfactor more
generally. John F. Devlin, for example, denies that the disproportionof
Alawis in the army implies Alawi dominance of Syria. He would resist
seeing 'everydomesticdisagreementin terms of a Sunni-Alawiclash'. For
him, the fact that Alawis are in power is basicallyaccidental:'The Ba'th is
430 MIDDLE EASTERNSTUDIES

a secularparty, and it is heavy with minorities'.5AlasdairDrysdalecalls it

'reductionist'to focuson ethnicity,arguingthatthis is one of manyfactors-
geography,class, age, education,occupation- that define the rulingelite.6
Accordingto YahyaM. Sadowski,'sectarianloyalties play an insignificant
role in the Ba'th, and even confessionalbonds are only one among many
avenuesby whichpatronageis extended'.7
The truthlies betweenconspiracyand accident.The Alawis did not 'plan
for a future takeover'years in advance, nor was it mere chance that the
Ba'th Party was 'heavy with minorities'. Alawi power resulted from an
unplannedbut sectariantransformationof public life in Syria. Michael
van Dusen explains: 'From 1946 to 1963, Syria witnessed the gradual
erosion of the national and eventually subnational political power of
the traditionalelite, not so much through the emergence of new and
especiallydynamicelites but ratherby internalconflict'.8Translatedfrom
the jargon of politicalscience, van Dusen is saying that internaldivisions
caused non-Ba'thcivilianSunnisto lose power. This providedan opening
that Ba'thistofficersof Alawi originsexploited.
How these processesoccurredis my subject here. First, however, some
backgroundon the Alawis and their place in traditionalSyrian society,
followed by a sketchof their ascent.

THE ALAWI HERESYTO 1920

People and Faith

'Alawi' is the term that Alawis (also called Alawites) usually apply to
themselves;but until1920they were knownto the outsideworldas Nusayris
or Ansaris.The changein name- imposedby the Frenchupon theirseizure
of control in Syria- has significance.Whereas 'Nusayri'emphasizesthe
group's differencesfrom Islam, 'Alawi' suggests an adherentof Ali (the
son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad)and accentuates the religion's
similaritiesto Shi'i Islam.9Consequently,opponents of the Asad regime
habituallyuse the formerterm, supportersof the regime use the latter.
Alawistodaynumberapproximately1.3 million,of whomabouta million
live in Syria. They constitute some 12 per cent of the Syrianpopulation.
Three-quartersof the SyrianAlawislive in Latakia,a provincein the north-
west of Syria,where they make up almosttwo-thirdsof the population.
Alawi doctrinesdate fromthe ninthcenturyand derivefromthe Twelver
or Imami branchof Shi'i Islam (the sect that predominatesin Iran). In
about 859, one Ibn Nusayr declaredhimself the bab ('gatewayto truth'),
a key figure in Shi'i theology. On the basis of this authority,Ibn Nusayr
proclaimeda host of new doctrines10which, to cut a long story short, make
Alawisminto a separatereligion.Accordingto Ibn Kathir(d. 1372),where
THE ALAWICAPTUREOF POWERIN SYRIA 431

Muslimsproclaimtheir faith with the phrase:'There is no deity but God

andMuhammadis His prophet',Alawisassert'Thereis no deitybut Ali, no
veil but Muhammad,and no bab but Salman'.11AlawisrejectIslam'smain
tenets; by almostany standardthey must be considerednon-Muslims.
Some Alawi doctrines appear to derive from Phoenician paganism,
Mazdakism and Manichism. But by far the greatest affinity is with
Christianity.Alawi religiousceremoniesinvolve bread and wine; indeed,
wine drinkinghas a sacred role in Alawism, for it representsGod.12The
religionholds Ali, the fourth caliph, to be the (Jesus-like)incarnationof
divinity.13It has a holy trinity,consistingof Muhammad,Ali, and Salman
al-Farisi,a freed slave of Muhammad's.Alawis celebratemany Christian
festivals, includingChristmas,New Year's Day on 1 January,Epiphany,
Easter, Pentecost and Palm Sunday. They honor many Christiansaints:
St. Catherine, St. Barbara, St. George, St. John the Baptist, St. John
Chrysostom,and St. Mary Magdalene. The Arabic equivalentsof such
Christian personal names as Gabriel, John, Matthew, Catherine and
Helen are in common use. And, Alawis tend to show more friendliness
to Christiansthan to Muslims.
For these reasons, many observers- missionariesespecially- have sus-
pected the Alawis of a secret Christianproclivity.Even T. E. Lawrence
described them as 'those disciples of a cult of fertility, sheer pagan,
anti-foreign,distrustfulof Islam, drawn at moments to Christianityby
commonpersecution'.14The Jesuit scholarHenri Lammensunequivocally
concludedfrom his researchthat 'the Nusayriswere Christians'and their
practicescombineChristianwith Shi'i elements.15
The specificsof the Alawi faith are hidden not just from outsidersbut
even from the majorityof the Alawis themselves. In contrast to Islam,
which is premised on direct relations between God and the individual
believer, Alawismpermitsonly males born of two Alawi parentsto learn
the religiousdoctrines.When deemed trustworthy,these are initiatedinto
some of the rites at 16 to 20 years of age; other mysteriesare revealed
later and only gradually.Religious secrecy is strictlymaintained,on pain
of death and being incarnatedinto a vile animal.Whetherthe latterthreat
is made good, mortalscannot judge; but the first certainlyis. Thus, the
most renownedapostatefrom Alawism, SulaymanEfendi al-Adhani,was
assassinatedfor divulgingthe sect's mysteries.Even more impressive,at a
time of sectariantension in the mid-1960s,the suggestionthat the Alawi
officers who ran the country publish the secret books of their religion
caused Salah Jadid to respond with horror, saying that, were this done,
the religiousleaders 'wouldcrushus'.16
Women do most of the hard labor; they are prized 'preciselybecause
of the work they do that men will not do except grudgingly,finding it
incompatiblewith theirdignity'.17Womenare neverinductedinto the mys-
teries ('Wouldyou have us teach them whom we use, our holy faith?');18
432 MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIES

indeed, theiruncleanlinessrequirestheirexclusionfromall religiousrituals.

Femalesare thoughtto retainthe pagancultof worshippingtrees, meadows
andhills, andto have no souls.19In all, femalesare treatedabominably;but
one consequenceof this disrespectis that they need not be veiled andenjoy
greaterfreedomof movementthan Muslimwomen.
Unveiled women and several other Alawi practices - in particular,
permittingwine drinking,and holding some ceremonies at night - long
excited Muslimsuspicionsabout Alawi behavior.Then too, the obsessive
secrecy inherentto the religionsuggestedto many Sunnisthat the Alawis
had somethingto hide. But what?Overthe centuries,the Sunnis'imagina-
tions supplieda highlyevocativeanswer:sexual abandonand perversion.
Thus, the theologianal-Ash'ari(874-936) held that Alawismencourages
male sodomy and incestuous marriages,and the founder of the Druze
religious doctrine, Hamza ibn Ali (d. 1021), wrote that Alawis consider
'the male member entering the female nature to be the emblem of their
spiritualdoctrine'.20Accordingly,Alawi men freely sharetheirwives with
co-religionists.These andother accusationssurvivedundiminishedthrough
the centuriesand even circulatedamongEuropeans.21A Britishtravelerof
the early 1840s,who was probablyrepeatinglocal rumors,wrote that 'the
institutionof marriageis unknown.When a young man grows up he buys
his wife'.22Even Alawis believed in the 'conjugalcommunism'of their
religious leaders.23Such calumniesremain a mainstayof the anti-Alawi
propagandacirculatingin Syriatoday.
Although the charges are false, Alawis do reject Islam's sacred law,
the Shari'a,and therefore indulge in all mannerof activities that Islamic
doctrinestrictlyforbids. Alawis ignore Islamic sanitarypractices, dietary
restrictions,sexual mores and religious rituals. Likewise, they pay little
attentionto the fasting, almsgiving,and pilgrimageceremonies of Islam;
indeed, they consider the pilgrimageto Mecca a form of idol worship.
'Spiritualmarriages'between young (male) initiates and their religious
mentorsprobablylie at the root of chargesof homosexuality.
Most strikingof all, Alawishave no prayersor placesof worship;indeed,
they have no religious structuresother than tomb shrines. Prayerstake
place in privatehouses, usuallythose of religiousleaders. The fourteenth-
centurytravelerIbnBattutadescribedhow they respondedto a government
decree orderingthe constructionof mosques:'Everyvillagebuilta mosque
far from their houses, whichthe villagersneitherenter nor maintain.They
often sheltercattle and asses in it. Often a strangerarrivesand goes to the
mosque to recite the [Islamic]call to prayer;then they yell to him, "Stop
braying,your fodder is coming".24 Five centurieslater another attempt
was made to build mosques for the Alawis, this time by the Ottoman
authorities;despiteofficialpressure,these were deserted, abandonedeven
by the religiousfunctionaries,and once againused as barns.
Beyond specific divergences,non-conformityto the Shari'ameans that
THE ALAWI CAPTURE OF POWER IN SYRIA 433

Alawi life follows its own rhythms,fundamentallyunlike those of other

Muslims. Alawis do not act like Sunni Muslims; rather, they resemble
Christiansand Jews in pursuing a wholly distinct way of life. Moosa
notes that, 'like the other extremist Shi'ites ... the Nusayris had total
disregardfor Muslimreligiousduties'.25IgnazGoldziherputs it succinctly:
'This religion is Islam only in appearance'.26It is importantto make this
point very clear:Alawis have never been, and are not now, Muslims.
Yet, as Ibn Battuta'saccountsuggests,thereis a permanentinconsistency
in the Alawi wish to be seen as Muslim. In his case, it was mosques built
and then neglected; at other times it is some other half-heartedadoption
of Islamic ways. Alawis have a long history of claimingIslam when this
suits their needs and ignoringit at other times. In short, like other sects
of Shi'iorigins,Alawis practicetaqiya(religiousdissimulation).This might
mean, for example, prayingside by side with Sunni Muslimsbut silently
cursingthe Sunnicaliphs.The apostateAlawi, SulaymanEfendial-Adhani,
recountedhavingbeen swornto dissimulateabouthis religion'smysteries.27
An Alawi sayingexplains the sentimentbehind taqiya : 'We are the body
and other sects are but clothing. However a man dresses does not change
him. So we remainalwaysNusayris,even though we externallyadopt the
practicesof our neighbors. Whoever does not dissimulateis a fool, for
no intelligentperson goes naked in the market'.28Another Alawi phrase
expressesthis sentiment succinctly:'Dissimulationis our righteouswar!'
(al-kitmanjihadna).29
A Britishtravelerobserved in 1697that the Alawis are:
of a strangeand singularcharacter.For 'tis their principleto adhere
to no certain religion; but camelion-like,they put on the colour of
religion, whatever it be, which is reflected upon them from the
persons with whom they happen to converse. ... No body was ever
able to discoverwhat shape or standardtheir consciencesare really
of. All that is certain concerningthem is, that they make much and
good wine, and are great drinkers.30
A hundredand fifty years later, BenjaminDisraelidescribedthe Alawis in
a conversationin the novel Tancred:
Are they Moslemin?
It is very easy to say what they are not, and that is about the extent
of any knowledge we have of them; they are not Moslemin, they
are not Christian,they are not Druzes, and they are not Jews, and
certainlythey are not Guebres [Zoroastrians].31
Al-Adhaniexplainedthis flexibilityfrom within:
They take on the outwardpracticesof all sects. If they meet [Sunni]
Muslims,they swearto them and say, 'We are like you, we fast andwe
434 MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIES

pray'.But they fast improperly.If they enter a mosquewith Muslims,

they do not recite any of the prayers;instead, they lower and raise
their bodies like Muslims,while cursingAbu Bakr, Umar, Uthman,
and other [majorfiguresof the Sunnitradition].32

TaqiyapermitedAlawisto blow with the wind. WhenFranceruled,they

portrayedthemselvesas lost Christians.When Pan-Arabismwas in favor,
they became fervent Arabs.33Over 10,000 Alawis living in Damascus
pretended to be Sunnis in the years before Asad came to power, only
revealingtheirtrue identitieswhen this becamepoliticallyuseful.34During
Asad's presidency,concertedefforts were made to portraythe Alawis as
TwelverShi'is.

RelationswithSunnis
MainstreamMuslims,SunniandShi'ialike, traditionallydisregardedAlawi
efforts at dissimulation;they viewed Alawis as beyond the pale of Islam-
as non-Muslims.Hamzaibn Ali, who saw the religion'sappeallying in its
perversity,articulatedthis view: 'The first thing that promotesthe wicked
Nusayriis the fact that all thingsnormallyprohibitedto humans- murder,
stealing,lying, calumny,fornication,pederasty- is permittedto he or she
who accepts [Alawi doctrines]'.35Abu Hamid al-Ghazali(1058-1111), the
ThomasAquinasof Islam, wrote that the Alawis 'apostatizein mattersof
blood, money, marriage,and butchering,so it is a duty to kill them'.36
Ahmadibn Taymiya(1268-1328),the still highlyinfluentialSunniwriter
of Syrianorigins, wrote in a fatwa (religiousdecision) that 'the Nusayris
are more infidel than Jews or Christians,even more infidel than many
polytheists.They have done greaterharmto the communityof Muhammad
than have the warringinfidelssuch as the Franks,the Turks, and others.
To ignorantMuslimsthey pretendto be Shi'is, though in reality they do
not believe in God or His prophet or His book'. Ibn Taymiya warned
of the mischief their enmity can do: 'Wheneverpossible, they spill the
blood of Muslims... They are alwaysthe worst enemies of the Muslims'.
In conclusion, he argued that 'war and punishmentin accordancewith
Islamic law againstthem are among the greatest of pious deeds and the
most importantobligations'for a Muslim.37From the fourteenthcentury
on, Sunnisused the term 'Nusayri'to mean pariah.
Alawis had had no recognizedposition in the millet (sectarian)system
of the OttomanEmpire.An Ottomandecree from 1571notes that ancient
custom requiredAlawis to pay extra taxes to the authoritiesand justified
this on the grounds that Alawis 'neither practice the fast [of Ramadan]
nor the ritual prayers, nor do they observe any precepts of the Islamic
religion'.38Sunnisoften saw food producedby Alawis as unclean, and did
not eat it. Accordingto JacquesWeulersse, 'no Alawi would dare enter a
THE ALAWI CAPTUREOF POWERIN SYRIA 435

Muslimmosque. Formerly,not one of theirreligiousleaderswas able to go

to town on the day of publicprayer[Friday]withoutrisk of being stoned.
Any publicdemonstrationof the community'sseparateidentitywas taken
as a challenge[by the Sunnis]'.39
Sunniswere not alone in readingAlawisout of Islam- mainstreamShi'is
did likewise. And Alawis in turnsaw both groupsas deficient.
SunniheresiographersexcoriatedAlawibeliefsandviewedthe Alawis
as disbelievers (kuffar) and idolators (mushrikun).Twelver Shi'i
heresiographerswere only slightlyless vituperativeand regardedthe
Alawis as ghulat, 'those who exceed' all boundsin theirdeificationof
Ali. The Alawis, in turn, held TwelverShi'isto be muqassira,'those
who fall short'of fathomingAli's divinity.40
There was one exceptionto this consensusthat Alawis are not Muslims.
Towardthe end of the nineteenthcentury,as Christianmissionariesbegan
taking an interest in the Alawis, Ottomanauthoritiestried to bringthem
into Islam. The French alreadyhad special ties to their fellow Catholics,
the Maronites,and the authoritiesin Istanbulfeared a similarbond being
createdwith the Alawis. So they built mosquesin the Alawi areas, schools
to teachIslam,pressedAlawi religiousleadersto adoptSunnipractices,and
generallytried to make the Alawis act like properMuslims.This isolated
case of Sunnisreachingout to Alawis came to an end after a few decades
and had very little impacton Alawi behavior.
The Islamic religion reserves a special hostility for Alawis. Like other
post-Islamic sects (such as the Baha'is and Ahmadis), they are seen
to contradict the key Islamic tenet that God's last revelation went to
Muhammad, and this Muslims find utterly unacceptable. Islamic law
acknowledgesthe legitimacy of Judaismand Christianitybecause those
religionspreceded Islam; accordingly,Jews and Christiansmay maintain
their faiths. But Alawis are denied this privilege. Indeed, the preceptsof
Islamcall for apostateslike the Alawis to be sold into slaveryor executed.
In the nineteenthcentury, a Sunnishaykh, Ibrahimal-Maghribi,issued a
fatwa to the effect that Muslimsmay freely take Alawi propertyand lives;
and a Britishtravelerrecordsbeing told, 'these Ansayrii,it is better to kill
one than to praya whole day'.41
Frequentlypersecuted- some 20,000 were massacredin 1317 and half
that number in 151642- the Alawis insulated themselves geographically
from the outside world by stayingwithintheir own ruralregions. Jacques
Weulersseexplainedtheir predicament:
Defeated and persecuted, the heterodox sects disappearedor, to
survive,renouncedproselytism .... The Alawis silently entrenched
themselves in their mountains.... Isolated in rough country, sur-
roundedby a hostile population,henceforthwithoutcommunications
with the outside world, the Alawis began to live out their solitary
436 MIDDLE EASTERNSTUDIES

existence in secrecyand repression.Their doctrine,entirelyformed,

evolved no further.43

E.Janot describedthe problem:'Bullied by the Turks, victim of a deter-

mined ostracism,fleeced by his Muslimlandlord,the Alawi hardlydared
leave his mountain region, where isolation and poverty itself protected
him'.44In the late 1920s,less than half of one per cent lived in towns:just
771 Alawis out of a populationof 176,285.45In 1945, just 56 Alawis were
recordedlivingin Damascus46(thoughmanyothers may have been hiding
their identity). For good reason, 'the name Nusayribecame synonymous
with peasant'.47The few Alawis who did live away from their mountain
routinelypracticedtaqiya. Even today, Alawis dominate the rural areas
of Latakiabut make up only 11 per cent of the residentsin that region's
capitalcity.
Centuriesof hostility took their toll on the Alawi psyche. In addition
to praying for the damnationof their Sunni enemies, Alawis attacked
outsiders.They acquireda reputationas fierceand unrulymountainpeople
who resisted paying the taxes they owed the authoritiesand frequently
plunderedSunnivillagerson the plains.JohnLewisBurckhardtobservedin
1812that those villagers'hold the Anzeyrys[Ansaris]in contemptfor their
religion,and fear them, becausethey often descendfrom the mountainsin
the night, cross the Aaszy ['Asi, or OrontesRiver], and steal, or carryoff
by force, the cattle of the valley'.48
Mattersseemed to be even worse in 1860when SamuelLyde addedthat
'nothingis thought of thus killing a Mussulmanas a naturalenemy, or a
Christianas an unclean thing'.49Writingabout the same time, a British
travel-guidewriterwarnedof the cool receptionto be expected from the
Alawis: 'They are a wild and somewhatsavagerace, given to plunder,and
even bloodshed,when theirpassionsare excitedor suspicionroused'.With
wonderfulunderstatement,the guideauthorconcluded,'theircountrymust
thereforebe traversedwith caution'.50
Alawis retreated to the mountainsbecause of persecution;they then
remainedthere, shielded from the world at large, lackingpoliticalpower
beyond their region's confines, isolated from the larger polities around
them, almost outside the bounds of historicalchange. The survivalwell
into the twentieth century of archaicpractices made the Alawi region,
accordingto Weulersse,a 'fossile country'.Little changedin that country
because 'it is not the Mountainthat is humanized;man, rather, is made
savage'.Alawissufferedas a result:'the refugethey hadconqueredbecame
a prison;thoughmastersof the Mountainthey could not leave'.51
Governments had difficulty subduing the Alawi territory;indeed, it
only came under Ottoman control in the late 1850s. Pacificationof the
region then led to Sunnieconomicinroadsand the formationof an Alawi
underclass.As badlyeducatedpeasantslackingin politicalorganizationor
THE ALAWI CAPTUREOF POWERIN SYRIA 437

militarystrength,Alawis typicallyworked farmsbelongingto SunniArab

landlords,receivingbut a fifthof the produce.Ottomanagentswouldoften
exact double or triple the taxes due in the Latakiaregion.
Alawis were so badly off after the First World War that many of the
youth left theirhomelandto workelsewhere. Sons left to find meniallabor
or to join the armedforces. Daughterswent off at the age of seven or eight
years to work as domesticsfor urbanSunniArabs. Because manyof them
also ended up as concubines(one estimateholds that a quarterof all Alawi
childrenin the 1930s and 1940s had Sunni fathers),52both Muslimsand
Alawis saw this practice as deeply shameful. Some daughterswere even
sold. It is no exaggerationto say, as one indigenoushistoriandoes, that
Alawis 'were among the poorest of the East'.53The Reverend Samuel
Lyde went even further,writingin 1860 that 'the state of [Alawi] society
is a perfecthell upon earth'.54
The politicaleffects of povertywere exacerbatedby the natureof these
divisions,whichfollowedgeographicandcommunallines. Sunniswho lived
in the townsenjoyed a muchgreaterwealthand dominatedthe Alawi peas-
ants. Weulerssedescribedin 1934 how each community'lives apartwith
its own customsand its own laws. Not only are they differentbut they are
hostile . . . the idea of mixed marriagesappearsto be inconceivable'.55In
1946, he added that 'the antagonismbetween urbanand ruralpeople goes
so deep that one can almostspeak of two differentpopulationsco-existing
within one politicalframework'.56A generationlater, Nikolaos van Dam
observed, 'Urban-ruralcontrastswere sometimes so great that the cities
seemed like settlementsof alienswho spongedon the poverty-strickenrural
population.... In the course of time, the Alawi communitydeveloped a
strong distrustof the Sunnis who had so often been their oppressors.'57
This Alawi resentmentof Sunnishas proved enormouslyconsequentialin
recent years.

THE RISE OF THE ALAWIS, 1920-70

The Alawis' ascent took place over the course of half a century.In 1920,
they were still the lowly minorityjust described;by 1970, they firmlyruled
Syria.This stunningtransformationtook place in three stages:the French
mandate(1920-46), the periodof Sunnidominance(1946-63), and the era
of Alawi consolidation(1963-70).

TheFrenchMandate,1920-46
Accordingto Yusuf al-Hakim, a prominentSyrianpolitician, the Alawis
adopted a pro-French attitude even before the French conquest of
Damascus in July 1920. 'The Alawis saw themselves in a state of grace
after hell; accordingly,they were dedicated to the French mandate and
438 MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIES

did not send a delegationto the [General]SyrianCongress'.58So intensely

did they oppose Prince Faysal, the Sunni Arab ruler of Syria in 1918-20
whom they suspected of wanting to dominate them, that they launched
a rebellion against his rule in 1919, using French arms. According to
one well-informedobserver, the Alawis cursed Islam and prayed 'for
the destructionof the Ottoman Empire'.59General Gouraud received a
telegram in late 1919 from 73 Alawi chiefs representingdifferent tribes,
who asked for 'the establishmentof an independentNusayriunion under
our absoluteprotection'.60
Two yearslaterthe AlawisrebelledagainstFrenchrule underthe leader-
ship of Salih al-Ali, an event that the Asad governmentproudlypoints to
as an anti-imperialistcredential.But a close look61suggeststhat the revolt
had more to do with the fact that the Isma'ilishad sided with Franceand,
given the state of Isma'ili-Alawirelations, this led to hostilities between
the Alawis and the French. As soon as the French authoritiesgranted
autonomyto the Alawis, they won Alawi support.
Indeed, the establishmentof French rule after the First World War
benefited the Alawis more than any other community.French efforts to
co-operatewiththe minoritiesmeantthatAlawisgainedpoliticalautonomy
and escaped Sunnicontrol;the state of Latakiawas set up on 1 July 1922.
They also gained legal autonomy;a 1922 decision to end Sunni control
of court cases involvingAlawis transferredthese cases to Alawi jurists.62
The Alawi state enjoyed low taxationand a sizeable Frenchsubsidy.Not
surprisingly,Alawis accepted all these changes with enthusiasm.As an
anti-Alawihistorianlater put it, 'At the time when resistancemovements
were mountedagainstthe Frenchmandate,when Damascus,Aleppo, and
the Hawranwitnessedcontinuousrebellionson behalf of Syrianunity and
independence,the Nusayriswere blessingthe divisionof the countryinto
tiny statelets'.63
In return,Alawis helped maintainFrenchrule. They turnedout in large
numberswhen most Syriansboycotted the French-sponsoredelections of
January 1926.64They provided a disproportionatenumber of soldiers
to the government, forming about half of the eight infantry battalions
making up the Troupes Speciales du Levant,65serving as police, and
supplyingintelligence. As late as May 1945, the vast majorityof Troupes
Speciales remainedloyal to their French commanders.Alawis broke up
Sunni demonstrations,shut down strikes, and quelled rebellions. Alawis
publicly favored the continuationof French rule, fearing that France's
departurewould lead to a reassertionof Sunni control over them. Henri
de Jouvenel, the FrenchHigh Commissionerfor Syria (1925-27), quoted
a leadingAlawi politiciantellinghim: 'We have succeededin makingmore
progressin threeor fouryearsthanwe hadin threeor fourcenturies.Leave
us thereforein our presentsituation'.66
Pro-Frenchsentiment was expressed especially clearly in 1936, when
THE ALAWI CAPTUREOF POWERIN SYRIA 439

the temporaryincorporationof the Alawi state into Syriaprovokedwide

protests. A March 1936 petition referred to union with the Sunnis as
'slavery'.67On 11 June 1936, an Alawi leader wrote a letter to Prime
MinisterLeon Blum of France, remindinghim of 'the profoundnessof
the abyss that separatesus from the [Sunni]Syrians',and asking him to
'imaginethe disastrouscatastrophethat would follow' incorporation.68
Days later, six Alawi notables(includingSulaymanAsad, Hafizal-Asad's
grandfather)69sent another letter to Blum in which they made several
points:Alawis differfrom Sunnisreligiouslyandhistorically;Alawisrefuse
to be joined to Syria, for it is a Sunni state and Sunnis consider them
unbelievers (kafirs); ending the mandate would expose the Alawis to
mortal danger; 'the spirit of religiousfeudalism'makes the countryunfit
for self-rule; therefore, France should secure the Alawis' freedom and
independenceby stayingin Syria.70
An Alawi note to the Frenchgovernmentin July 1936 asked: 'Are the
French today ignorant that the Crusadeswould have succeeded if their
fortresseshad been in northeastSyria, in the Land of the Nusayris?....
We are the people most faithfulto France'.71Even more stronglyworded
was a petitionof September1936,signedby 450,000Alawis, Christiansand
Druzes, whichread:
The Alawis believe that they are humans, not beasts ready for
slaughter.No power in the world can force them to accept the yoke
of their traditionaland hereditaryenemies to be slaves forever. ...
The Alawis would profoundlyregretthe loss of their friendshipand
loyal attachmentto noble France,whichhas until now been so loved,
admired,and adoredby them.72
Although Latakia lost its autonomous status in December 1936, the
provincecontinuedto benefit from a 'specialadministrativeand financial
regime'.73
Alawi resistanceto Sunnirule took a new turnin 1939with the launching
of an armed rebellion led by Sulayman al-Murshid,the 'half-sinister,
half-ludicrousfigure of the obese, illiterate, miracle-working"god"'.74
Murshid,a bandit who proclaimedhimself divine, challengedSunni rule
with Frenchweaponsand some 5,000 Alawi followers.In the wordsof a a
1944Britishconsularreport:'ThelocalAlaouiteleaders,whoseconception
of the new order in Syriais a NationalistGovernmentwho will treat them
after the fashion of the French, upholdingtheir authorityand condoning
theirexcesses, are doing theirbest to combine, and the movementappears
to be supportedby the French'.75Murshidsucceededin keepingDamascus'
authorityout of Alawi territories.
Right up to independence,Alawi leaders continuedto submitpetitions
to the French in favor of continued French patronage. For example, a
manifestosigned by 12 leaders in March1945called for all Alawi soldiers
440 MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIES

to remainunder French commandand for French arbitrationof disputes

between the Alawi governmentand Damascus.76

SunniDominance,1946-63
It was the Sunnis, especially the urban Sunni elite, who inherited the
governmentwhen the Frenchmandateendedin 1946.Even afterindepend-
ence, Alawis continued to resist submissionto the central government.
Sulaymanal-Murshidled a second revolt in 1946, ending in his execution.
A thirdunsuccessfuluprising,led by Murshid'sson, took place in 1952.The
failureof these efforts led Alawis to look into the possibilityof attaching
Latakiato Lebanon or Transjordan- anythingto avoid absorptioninto
Syria. These acts of resistancefurthertarnishedthe Alawis' alreadypoor
reputationamongSunnis.
Whenthey cameto power, the Sunnirulersin Damascussparedno effort
to integrateLatakiainto Syria(in partbecausethis regionoffered the only
accessto the sea). Overcomingarmedresistance,they abolishedthe Alawi
state, Alawi militaryunits, Alawi seats in Parliament,and courtsapplying
Alawi laws of personalstatus. These measureshad some success;Alawis
becamereconciledto Syriancitizenshipafterthe crushingof a Druze revolt
in 1954and henceforthgave up the dreamof a separatestate. This change
of outlook, whichseemed to be a matterof relativelyminorimportanceat
the time, in fact usheredin a new era of Syrianpolitical life: the political
ascentof the Alawis.
Once they recognizedthattheirfuturelay withinSyria,the Alawisbegan
a rapidrise to power. Two key institutions,the armedforces and the Ba'th
Party, had special importancein their transformation.Even though the
special circumstanceswhich had brought them into the military lapsed
with the French departure,Alawis and other minoritiescontinued after
independenceto be over-representedin the army. Old soldiers remained
in service and new ones kept coming in. Given the Sunni attitudetoward
Alawis, the persistenceof large numbersof Alawis in the armedforces is
surprising.This anomalyresultedfrom several factors. First, the military
retainedits reputationas a place for the minorities.PatrickSeale observed
that Sunnilandedfamilies, 'beingpredominantlyof nationalistsentiment,
despisedthe armyas a profession:to join it between the warswas to serve
the French.Homs [MilitaryAcademy]to them was a place for the lazy, the
rebellious, the academicallybackward,or the socially undistinguished'.77
For the non-Sunnis,however, Homs was a place of opportunityfor the
ambitiousand talented.
Second, the Sunni rulers virtuallyignored the army as a tool of state;
fearing its power in domestic politics, they begrudged it funds, kept it
small, and renderedmilitarycareersunattractive.Third,the dire economic
predicamentof the Alawis and other ruralpeoples meant that they could
THE ALAWI CAPTUREOF POWERIN SYRIA 441

not pay the fee to exempt their children from military service. More
positively,those childrensaw militaryserviceas a meansto make a decent
living.
Accordingly, although the proportion of Alawis entering the Homs
MilitaryAcademy declined after 1946, Alawis remainedover-represented
in the officer corps. A report from 1949 stated that 'personsoriginating
fromthe minorities'commanded'all unitsof any importance'in the Syrian
military.78(This did not mean just Alawis; for example, the bodyguardof
PresidentHusniaz-Za'imin 1949was entirelyCircassian.)Alawisformeda
pluralityamongthe soldiersand some two-thirdsof the non-commissioned
officers.
Sunni leaders apparentlybelieved that reservingthe top positions for
themselveswouldsufficeto controlthe militaryforces. Accordingly,minor-
ities filled the lower ranks and for some years found it difficult to rise
above the company level. Ironically,this discriminationactually served
them well; as senior officers engagedin innumerablemilitarycoups d'etat
between 1949 and 1963, each change of governmentwas accompaniedby
ruinous power struggles among the Sunnis, leading to resignationsand
the depletionof Sunniranks.Wags claimed, with some justice, that there
were more officers outside the Syrianarmythan inside it. Standingapart
fromthese conflicts,the non-Sunnis,and Alawisespecially,benefitedfrom
the repeated purges.79As Sunni officers eliminated each other, Alawis
inherited their positions. With time, Alawis became increasinglysenior;
and, as one Alawi rose throughthe ranks,he broughthis kinsmenalong.
Purges and counter-purgesduring the 1946-63 period bred a deep
mistrust between the officers. Never knowing who might be plotting
againstwhom, superiorofficersfrequentlybypassedthe normalhierarchy
of commandin favorof kinshipbonds.As fearof betrayalcameto dominate
relationsbetween militarymen, having reliable ethnic ties gave minority
officers great advantage.In circumstancesof almost universalsuspicion,
those officerswithin reliablenetworkscould act far more effectivelythan
those without. Sunnis entered the military as individuals,while Alawis
enteredas membersof a sect; the latter,therefore,prospered.Alawi ethnic
solidarityoffereda farmoreenduringbasisof co-operationthanthe shifting
alliancesformedby Sunniofficers.
In additionto the military,Alawisalso acquiredpowerthroughthe Ba'th
Party. Fromits earliest years, the Ba'th held special attractionfor Syrians
of rural and minority backgrounds,includingthe Alawis, who joined in
disproportionatelylarge numbers(especiallyat the Ba'th Party'sLatakia
branch).Rural migrantswho went to Damascusfor educationalpurposes
constituteda majorityof the membershipin the Ba'th Party.They tended
to be studentsof lower middle-classorigins,the sons of ex-peasantsnewly
arrivedin the towns. In Aleppo, for example,the Ba'thclaimedas members
as manyas three-quartersof the high school studentsin some schools. One
442 MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIES

of the foundersof the partywas an Alawi, Zaki al-Arsuzi,and he brought

along manyof his (rural)coreligioniststo the Ba'th.
In particular, two doctrines appealed to the Alawis: socialism and
secularism. Socialism offered economic opportunities to the country's
poorest community. (The Ba'th's socialism was unclear, however, until
the 1960s; only when the minoritiestook over did this feature become
prominent.) Secularism- the withdrawalof religion from public life -
offered the promiseof less prejudiceto a despised minority.What could
be more attractiveto membersof a downtroddenreligiouscommunitythan
a combinationof these two ideologies?Indeed, these aspectsdrewAlawis
(and other poor rural minorities) to the Ba'th more than its Pan-Arab
nationalism.
The only rival to the Ba'th was the Syrian Social Nationalist Party
(SSNP), which offered roughlythe same attractions.The two competed
ratherevenly for a decade, until the Ba'th eliminatedthe SSNP through
the Maliki affairin 1955. From then on, especiallyin Syria, Alawis were
associatedpredominantlywith the Ba'th.80

Alawi Consolidation,1963-70
Threechangesin the regimemarkedthe Alawi consolidationof power:the
Ba'th coup d'etatof March 1963, the Alawi coup of February1966, and
the Asad coup of November 1970. The Alawis had a major role in the
coup of 8 March1963 and took many of the key governmentpositionsin
the Ba'th regimethat followed. Between 1963 and 1966, sectarianbattles
pittingminoritiesagainstSunnistook placewithinthe militaryandthe Ba'th
Party.
First the military:to resist President Amin al-Hafiz, a Sunni, and to
consolidate their new position, Alawi leaders flooded the militarywith
cosectarians.In this way, minorityofficers came to dominate the Syrian
militaryestablishment.When700 vacanciesopened in the armysoon after
the March 1963 coup, Alawis filled half the positions. So restrictedwere
Sunnisthat some graduatingcadets were denied their commissionsto the
officer corps. While Alawis, Druze, and Isma'ilisheld politicallysensitive
positionsin the Damascusregion, Sunniswere sent to regionsdistantfrom
the capital. Although communalaffiliationdid not drive every alliance,81
it providedthe basis for most enduringrelationships.Alawi leaders such
as Muhammad'Umran built key units of membersfrom their own reli-
gious community.Sunni officers often became figureheads,holding high
positions but disposingof little power. In retaliation, Hafiz came to see
nearly every Alawi as an enemy and pursued blatant sectarianpolicies,
for example, excludingAlawis from some positions solely on the basis of
communalaffiliation.
Even Alawi officerswho resistedconfessionalismeventuallysuccumbed
THE ALAWI CAPTUREOF POWERIN SYRIA 443

to it. Political events solidified ties between Alawis, reducingthe tribal,

social, and sectarian differences that historicallyhad split them. Itamar
Rabinovich,a leadingstudentof this period, explainshow confessionalism
acquireda dynamicof its own:
J'did [SalahJadid, rulerof Syria1966-70]was amongthose who (for
political reasons) denounced 'Umran for promoting"sectarianism"
(ta'ifiyya)but ironically he inherited the support of many 'Alawi
officerswho had been advancedby 'Umran.... The 'Alawi officers
promoted by 'Umran realized that their overrepresentationin the
upper echelons of the armywas resented by the majority,and they
seem to have ralliedaroundJ'did,by then the most prominent'Alawi
officer in the Syrian army and the person deemed most likely to
preservetheir high but precariousposition. It was also quite natural
for [Aminal-] Hafiz ... to tryto gatherSunniofficersaroundhimself
by accusing J'did of engaging in "sectarian"politics. . . . The solidarity
of [Jadid's]'Alawi supportersseems to have been furthercemented
by the feeling that the issue had assumeda confessionalcharacterand
that their collectiveand personalpositionswere at stake.82
The same factors caused Druze officers - also over-representedin high
militaryoffices - to throwin theirlot with the Alawis in 1965.
A similardynamicmove occurredin the Ba'thParty.Justas Alawisfilled
more than half of 700 militaryvacancies,so they moved in numbersinto
the party.To maketheirrecruitmentpossible,ideologicalrequirementsfor
admissionwere relaxedfor two yearsafterMarch1963.Manypartyofficials
broughtin membersof their family, tribe, village or sect. As an internal
Ba'th Party documentof 1966 explainedthe problem, 'friendship,family
relationshipand sometimesmere personalacquaintancewere the basis'of
admissionto the party, leading 'to the infiltrationof elements alien to the
party's logic and points of departure'.83While Alawis brought in other
Alawis, many Sunnis were purged. Membershipquintupledin the year
after the Ba'th Party'saccessionto power, transformingthe partyfrom an
ideologicalto a sectarianaffiliation.The Ba'thbecamean entirelydifferent
institutionduringits first two and half years in power (March1963to late
1965).
These changesculminatedin Hafiz' decision in February1966to purge
30 officers of minoritybackgroundfrom the army. Hearingof his plan, a
groupof mainlyAlawi Ba'thistofficerspre-emptedHafiz and took power
on 23 Februaryin Syria'sbloodiest-everchange of government.Once in
office, they purgedrivalofficersbelongingto other religiousgroups- first
the Sunnisand Druze, then the Isma'ilis- furtherexacerbatingcommunal
tensions.Alawi officersreceivedthe most importantpostings,and acquired
unprecedentedpower. The Regional Command of the Ba'th Party, a
key decision-makingcenter, includedno representativesat all duringthe
444 MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIES

1966-70 period from the Sunni urban areas of Damascus, Aleppo and
Hama. Two-thirdsof its members,however,were recruitedfrom the rural
and minoritypopulationsin Latakia, the Hawranand Dayr az-Zur. The
skewingwas even more apparentamongmilitaryofficers on the Regional
Command;during1966-70, 63 per cent came from Latakiaalone.
The Alawi hold on powerprovokedbittercomplaintsfromothercommu-
nities. A Druze militaryleader, SalimHatum, told the press after he fled
Syria that Alawis in the army outnumberedother religious communities
by a ratio of five to one. He noted that 'the situationin Syriawas being
threatenedby a civilwaras a resultof the growthof the sectarianandtribal
spirit'.He also observedthat 'whenevera Syrianmilitarymanis questioned
abouthis free officers,his answerwill be that they have been dismissedand
drivenaway, and that only Alawi officershave remained'.Playingon the
Ba'th slogan, 'One Arab nation with an eternal mission,' Hatum mocked
the rulersin Damascus,sayingthat they believe in 'One Alawi state with
an eternalmission'.84
Alawi dominationdid not assure stability. Two Alawi leaders, Salah
Jadidand Hafiz al-Asad,foughteach other for supremacyin Syriathrough
the late 1960s,a rivalrythat ended only when Asad prevailedin November
1970. In additionto differencesin outlook - Jadidwas more the ideologue
and Asad more the pragmatist- they representeddiverseAlawi sects. The
September1970war between the PLO and the Jordaniangovernmentwas
the decisiveevent in Asad's rise to power. Jadidsent Syriangroundforces
to help the Palestiniansbut Asad refusedto send air cover. The defeat of
SyrianarmorprecipitatedAsad's bloodless coup d'etattwo monthslater.
This, Syria'stenth militarycoup d'etatin 17 years, was to be the last for a
long time to come. It also virtuallyended intra-Alawifighting.
The manwho won the long contestfor controlof Syria,Hafiz ibn Ali ibn
Sulaymanal-Asad,85was bornon 6 October1930in Qardaha,a village not
farfromthe Turkishborderandthe seat of the Alawi religiousleader.Hafiz
was the ninth of his father'seleven children.The family belonged to the
Numaylatiyabranchof the Matawiratribe. (This means Asad's ancestors
came from Iraqin the 1120s.)
Hafiz'grandfatherand fatherhad completedthe transitionfrompeasant
to minornotable, so that the familywas relativelywell-off by the time he
was born. Thus, while Qardahaconsistedmostly of dried mud houses, he
grewup in a stone building.In lateryears,however,Asad cultivateda story
of poverty, recountingto visitors, for example, about havingto drop out
of school until his father found the sixteen Syrianpounds to pay for his
tuition.86True or not, Hafiz was a brightchild and the first of his familyto
attend school. His parentssent him in 1939-40 to live in the nearbytown
of Latakiafor studies. The next academicyear he returnedto the Qardaha
school. From1944to 1951he was backin Latakia,attendingthe College de
Lattaquie,a top high school.
THE ALAWI CAPTUREOF POWERIN SYRIA 445

Early in 1948, when only 17 years old, Asad went to Damascus and
volunteeredin the SyrianArmy to help destroythe nascentstate of Israel,
only to be rejected as under-age. Upon graduationin 1951, he enrolled
in the Homs MilitaryAcademy and then transferredto the just-formed
Aleppo Air School. Asad distinguishedhimself as a combat pilot and
graduatedas an officer in 1955. Assignedthat year to the Mezze Air Base
(outside Damascus), he was soon orderedto go to Egypt for a six-month
trainingcoursein jet aircraft.Backin Syriaduringthe Suezwar,he shot one
time at a Britishaircraft,withouthittingit. In mid-1958,just aftermarrying
Anisa Makhluf,Asad went to the Soviet Union for eleven months, where
he learnedhow to fly the MiG-15sand -17swhichhad just arrivedin Syria.
There, he pickedup a bit of the Russianlanguage.Duringthe UAR years,
he commandeda night-fightersquadronof MiG-19snear Cairo.
Asad had been active in politics as early as 1945. While at the College
de Lattaquie,he served as presidentof the Students'Committee,then he
went on to be elected presidentof the NationalUnion of Students.While
still a student,he was jailedby the Frenchauthoritiesfor politicalactivities.
Asad joined the Ba'th Partysoon afterits creationin 1947(makinghim one
of the party'searliestmembers).Even as he rose throughthe militaryranks,
he remainedactive in the Ba'th Party. In 1959, duringhis exile in Egypt,
Asad helped to found the MilitaryCommitteeand organizeits activities.
By that time, he had also begun the decade-longprocess of consolidating
his positionwithinthe Syrianarmedforces.
The dissolutionof the UAR in September1961 precipitateda difficult
two yearsfor Asad. In shortorder, he found himselfin jail in Egypt, Syria
and Lebanon.He spent a month and a half in an Egyptianjail by virtueof
being a Syriansoldier strandednear Cairo. Asad was a powerfulfigureby
that time, so on his returnto Syria,the conservativeleaderswho had taken
power in Damascusforcedhim to resignhis commissionas captainand put
him in a minor position in the Departmentof MaritimeTransportation.
Asad rarelyappearedfor work, spendinghis time insteadparticipatingin
MilitaryCommitteeactivities.
He ended up in Lebaneseand Syrianjails for his partin the failedputsch
in March1962.He fled to Tripoli,Lebanon,wherehe was apprehendedby
the authoritiesandjailedfor nine days, thenextraditedbackto Syria,where
he spent anotherfew days in prison. This misadventurenotwithstanding,
Asad continuedto engagein conspiratorialpoliticsandplayedan important
role in the March 1963 Ba'th coup. He was rewardedfor his efforts with
a recall to the militaryand a meteoric rise throughthe ranks, going from
captainin early 1963to major-generalin December 1964and field marshal
in 1968. (He resigned from the military in 1970 or 1971.) Asad took
commandof the key air force base at Dumayr after the 1963 coup and
quicklyestablishedhis control over the entire air force - his power-base
duringthe subsequentyears of turmoil.
446 MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIES

The 1963coup gave Asad his first taste of administrationand authority,

and right from the start he proved very competent at both. His timely
supportfor the rebellion in February1966 proved decisive in the events
that brought Alawis to power; his rewardwas to be appointed defense
ministerjust twenty minutes after the new regime had been proclaimed.
This new positiongave Asad an opportunityto extendhis authoritybeyond
the air force, especiallyto the combatforces of the army. He was already
the mostpowerfulfigurein the countryin 1968,but he bidedhis time before
taking complete control. The moment came in November 1970, when he
simultaneouslyousted his last rival, SalahJadid,and culminatedthe Alawi
rise to powerin Syria.

CONCLUSION
The manner of the Alawi ascent reveals much about Syria's political
culture, pointingto complex connectionsbetween the army, the political
parties and the ethnic communities.The Ba'th Party, the army and the
Alawis rose in tandem;but whichof these three had the most importance?
Were the new rulers Ba'thists who just happened to be Alawi soldiers,
or were they soldiers who happened to be Alawi Ba'thists? Actually, a
thirdformulationis most accurate:these were Alawis who happenedto be
Ba'thistsand soldiers.
True, the partyand the militarywere critical,but in the end it was the
transferof authorityfrom Sunnis to Alawis that counted most. Without
deprecatingthe critical roles of party and army, the Alawi affiliation
ultimatelydefined the rulersof Syria. Party and career mattered, but, as
so often in Syria,ethnicand religiousaffiliationultimatelydefinedidentity.
To see the Asad regimeprimarilyin termsof its Ba'thistor militarynature
is to ignorethe key to Syrianpolitics.Confessionalaffiliationremainsvitally
important;as throughthe centuries,a person'ssect mattersmore than any
other attribute.
The Sunniresponseto the new rulers,whichhas taken a predominantly
communalform, bearsout this view. The widespreadoppositionof Sunnis,
who make up about69 per cent of the Syrianpopulation,to an Alawi ruler
hasinspiredthe MuslimBrethrenorganizationto challengethe government
in violent, even terroristicways. Thoughso far unsuccessful,the Brethren
have on severaloccasionscome near to topplingthe regime.
It appearsinevitablethatthe Alawis- still a smalland despisedminority,
for all their present power - will eventuallylose their control over Syria.
When this happens, it is likely that conflicts along communallines will
bringthem down, with the criticalbattle taking place between the Alawi
rulersand the Sunnimajority.In this sense, the Alawis'fall - be it through
assassinationsof top figures,a palacecoup or a regionalrevolt- is likely to
resembletheir rise.
THE ALAWI CAPTUREOF POWERIN SYRIA 447

NOTES

1. Annie Laurent,'Syrie-Liban:Les faux freresjumeaux',PolitiqueEtrangere48 (1983)

p.598.
2. Matti Moosa, ExtremistShiites:The GhulatSects (Syracuse,NY: SyracuseUniversity
Press, 1988),p.297.
3. Anon., Al-Muslimunfi Suriya wa'l-Irhaban-Nusayri,1964-1979 (Cairo: n.p., n.d.),
p.46.
4. For the fullest accountof these meetings, see Abu Musa al-Hariri,Al-'Alawiyun-an-
Nusayriyun(Beirut,n.p., 1400/1980),pp.234-7.
5. John F. Devlin, The Ba'thParty:A Historyfrom Its Originsto 1966 (Stanford:Hoover
InstitutionPress, 1976), pp.319-20.
6. AlasdairDrysdale,'TheSyrianPoliticalElite, 1966-1976:A SpatialandSocialAnalysis',
MiddleEasternStudiesVol.17, No. 1 (January1981),p.27.
7. YahyaM. Sadowski,'Ba'thistEthicsand the Spiritof State Capitalism:Patronageand
Party in ContemporarySyria', in Peter J. Chelkowskiand Robert Pranger(eds.),
IdeologyandPowerin theMiddleEast:Studiesin Honorof GeorgeLenczowki(Durham,
NC: Duke UniversityPress, 1988),p.168.
8. Michaelvan Dusen, 'Syria:Downfall of a TraditionalElite', in FrankTachan(ed.),
Political Elites and Political Developmentin the Middle East (Cambridge, MA:
SchenkmanPublishing,1975),p.136.
9. Apologistshave constructedan elaborateargumentto prove that 'Alawiwas the sect's
originalname. See 'Ali'AzizIbrahim,Al-'Alawiyun:Fida'iyash-Shi'aal-Majhulun(n.p.,
1392/1972),pp.9-14.
10. For accountsof Alawi theology and doctrines, see many of the books cited in the
followingnotes, especiallythoseby SulaymanEfendial-Adhani,Halm,Lammens,Lyde,
Moosa, de Sacy, and Sharafad-Din.
11. Ibn Kathir, Al-Bidaya wa'n-Nihaya(Cairo: Matba'a as-Sa'ada, 1351-58/1932-39),
Vol.14, p.83.
12. See Wolff 'Auszuge aus dem Katechismusder Nossairier',Zeitschriftder Deutschen
morgenlindischenGesellschaft3 (1849), p.308.
13. Justas MuslimstraditionallyaccusedChristiansof makingJesusdivine,so they accused
Alawisof doingthe same to Ali; the parallelis striking.
14. T. E. Lawrence,Seven Pillarsof Wisdom:A Triumph(GardenCity, NY: Doubleday,
Doran& Co., 1935), p.329.
15. Henri Lammens,'Les Nosairis:Notes sur leur histoireet leur religion',Etudes(1899),
p.492.
16. Samial-Jundi,Al-Ba'th(Beirut:Dar an-Naharli'n-Nashr,1969),p.145.
17. PierreMay, L'Alaouite:ses croyances,ses moeurs,les cheikhs,les lois de la tribuet les
chefs(Beirut:Imprimeriecatholique,1931?),pp.42-3.
18. F. Walpole, The Ansayrii(or Assassins,) with Travelsto the FurtherEast, in 1850-51
(London:RichardBentley, 1851),Vol.3, p.64.
19. Heinz Halm, Die islamischeGnosis: die extremeSchia und die 'Alawiten(Zurich:
Artemis, 1982),p.316.
20. Hamzaibn'Ali, Ar-Risalaad-Damighali'l-Fasiqar-Radd'ala an-Nusayri.Textin Silvestre
de Sacy, Exposede la religiondes Druzes(Paris:A l'ImprimerieRoyale, 1838),Vol.2,
pp.571-3.
21. For a wild novelisticaccountof Alawi religiousorgies, see JehanCendrieux,Al-Ghadir
ou le Sexe-Dieu(Paris:Bibliotheque-Charpentier, 1926),pp.10-11.
22. 'An OrientalStudent', The ModernSyrians:or, NativeSocietyin Damascus,Aleppo,
and the Mountainsof the Druses (London:Longman,Brown, Green, and Longmans,
1844),p.281.
448 MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIES

23. SulaymanEfendi al-Adhani,Kitabal-Bakuraas-Sulaymaniya fi KashfAsrarad-Diyana

an-Nusayriya.Summaryand Arabic extractsin EdwardE. Salisbury,'The Book of
Sulaiman'sFirstRipe Fruit:Disclosingthe Mysteriesof the NusairianReligion',Journal
of theAmericanOrientalSociety,8 (1866), pp.285,306. Accordingto SulaymanEfendi,
this practiceoriginatesin an esotericinterpretationof the Qur'an,Sura33, Verse 49.
24. Ibn Battuta,Ar-Rihla(Beirut:Dar as-Sadrand Dar Bayrut,1384/1964),pp.79-80.
25. Moosa, ExtremistShiites,p.271.
26. Ignaz Goldziher,Vorlesungeniiber den Islam (HeidelbergC. Winter, 1910);trans. by
Andrasand Ruth Hamorias Introductionto IslamicTheologyand Law (Princeton,NJ:
PrincetonUniversityPress, 1981),p.228.
27. SulaymanEfendi al-Adhani,Kitabal-Bakura.Extractsin al-Husayni'Abdallah(ed.),
Al-Judhurat-Ta'rikhiyali'n-Nusayriyaal-'Alawiya(Cairo:Dar al-I'tisam,1400/1980),
p.55.
28. SulaymanEfendial-Adhani,Kitabal-Bakura,in Salisbury,'TheBook of Sulaiman'sFirst
RipeFruit',p.298.The thirdsentencein thisquotecomesfromHenriLammens,L'Islam,
croyanceset institutions,2nd ed. (Beirut:Imprimeriecatholique,1941),p.228.
29. PauloBoneschi,'Une fatwadu GrandMuftide J6rusalemMuhammad'Amin al-Husayni
sur les 'Alawites'.Revuede l'histoiredes religions122, 2-3 (Sept.-Dec. 1940),p.152.
30 HenryMaundrell,A JourneyfromAleppoto Jerusalemin 1697(London:J. White& Co.,
1810),pp. 16-17.
31. BenjaminDisraeli,Tancred,or TheNew Crusade(London:Longmans,Green, andCo.,
1847),pp.374-5.
32. SulaymanEfendial-Adhani,Kitabal-Bakura,in Salisbury,'TheBook of Sulaiman'sFirst
Ripe Fruit',p.298.
33. MuhammadRida Shamsad-Din, Ma'aal-'Alawiyinfi Suriya(Beirut:Matba'aal-Insaf,
1376),pp.5-6.
34. AnnieLaurentandAntoineBasbous,Guerressecretesau Liban(Paris:Gallimard,1987),
pp.71-2.
35. Hamzaibn 'Ali, Ar-Risalaad-Damigha,Vol.2, p.570. This accusationresemblesthose
used by medievalChristiansto explainthe popularityof Islam.
36. Quoted in 'Izz ad-Din al-Farisiand Ahmad Sadiq, 'Ath-Thawraal-Islamiyafi Suriya',
Al-Mukhtaral-lslami(Cairo,Oct. 1980),p.39.
37. Ahmadibn Taymiya,'Fatwafi'n-Nusayriya'.Arabictext in M. St. Guyard,'Le Fetwa
d'IbnTaimiyyahsur les Nosairis',JournalAsiatique,6th series, Vol.16, No.66 (1871):
pp.167, 168, 169, 177.For otherpre-modernSunniassessmentsof the Alawis- including
al-Ash'ari,Abd al-Qadiral-Baghdadi,Ibn Hazm, ash-Shahrastani,and Fakhrad-Din
ar-Razi- see as-Sayyid'Abdal-HusaynMahdial-'Askari,Al-'Alawiyunaw an-Nusayriya
(N.p., 1400/1980),pp.49-53.
38. Text in Robert Mantranand Jean Sauvaget(eds.), Reglementsfiscaux ottomans:Les
provincessyriens(Paris:Librairied'Ameriqueet d'Orient,1951), p.76. See also pp.77,
88, 93.
39. JacquesWeulersse, 'Antioche, un type de citd d'Islam', Comptesrendusdu Congres
internationalde Geographie,Varsovie1934 (WarsawKasa Im. Mianowskiego,1937),
Vol.3, p.258.
40. MartinKramer,'Syria'sAlawisandShi'ism',in MartinKramer(ed.), Shi'ism,Resistance,
and Revolution(Boulder,CO: WestviewPress, 1987),p.238.
41. SamuelLyde, TheAsianMystery:Illustratedin theHistory,Religion,and PresentStateof
the Ansaireehor Nusairisof Syria(London:Longman,Green, Longman,and Roberts,
1860),p.196;Walpole, TheAnsayrii,Vol.3, p.115.
42. Ibn Battuta,Ar-Rihla,p.80; MuhammadAmin Ghalib at-Tawil,Ta'rikhal-'Alawiyin,
2nd ed. (Beirut: Dar al-Andalus,1386/1966),p.342. Tawil, a leading Alawi shaykh,
publishedthe firsteditionof his historyin 1924.
43. JacquesWeulersse,Le pays des Alaouites(Tours:Arrault& Cie., 1940),Vol.1, p.54.
THE ALAWI CAPTUREOF POWERIN SYRIA 449

44. E. Janot, Des Croisadesau Mandat:Notes sur le peuple Alouite (Lyon: Imprimerie
L. Bascon, 1934), p.37.
45. PaulJacquot,L'etatdes Alaouites:Guide(Beirut:Imprimeriecatholique,1929),p.10.
46. R. Strothmann,'Die Nusairi im heutigen Syrien', Nachrichtender Akademie der
Wissenschaften in Gottingen,Phil. Hist. KI. No.4 (1950), p.35.
47. GeorgeSamne,La Syrie(Paris:Bossard,1920),p.340.
48. John Lewis Burckhardt,Travelsin Syriaand the Holy Land (London:John Murray,
1822),p.141.
49. Lyde, Asian Mystery,pp.219-20.
50. Handbookfor Travellersin Syriaand Palestine(London:JohnMurray,1858),p.xli.
51. Weulersse,Lepays desAlaouites,Vol.1,pp.73,317; idem., Paysansde Syrieet du Proche
Orient(Paris:Gallimard,1946),p.272. Etiennede Vaumasshowsthe similaritiesof the
LebaneseandAlawi regions,then explainsthe profounddifferencesof theirpopulations
in 'Le Djebel Ansarieh:Etudesde Geographiehumaine,'Revuede Geographiealpine,
48 (1960), 267-311.
52. NawfalIliyas,a lawyerwho workedfor the Alawi tribesduringthose decades;reported
by Laurentand Basbous, Guerressecretesau Liban, p.70. On Iliyas, see Jurj Gharib,
NawfalIliyas:Siyasa,Adab, Dhikriyat(Beirut:Dar ath-Thaqafa,1975).
53. Tawil, Ta'rikhal-'Alawiyin,p.470.
54. Lyde, Asian Mystery,p.222.
55. Weulersse,'Antioche',p.258.
56. Weulersse,Paysansde Syrie,p.85.
57. Nikolaos van Dam, The Strugglefor Power in Syria: Sectarianism,Regionalismand
Tribalismin Politics,1961-1978(New York:St. Martin'sPress, 1979),p.22.
58. Yusuf al-Hakim,Dhikriyatal-Hakim,Vol.3, Suriyawa'l-'Ahdal-Faysali(Beirut:Al-
Matba'aal-Kathulikiya,1966),p.94.
59. Lammens,L'Islam,p.228.
60. Gouraudto premierand foreign minister,29 December 1919, Ministeredes Affaires
Etrangeres, Series E, Levant, Syrie-Liban, Vol.20, pp.226-33. Quoted in Wajih
Kawtharani,Biladash-Sham(Beirut:Ma'hadal-Inma'al-'Arabi,1980),p.211.
61. Taqi Sharafad-Din,An-Nusayriya:DirasaTahliliya(Beirut:n.p., 1983),pp.73-5.
62. Arrete no. 623, 15 Sept. 1922. Quotedin E. Rabbath,L'Evolutionpolitiquede la Syrie
sous mandat(Paris:MarcelRiviere, 1928),p.185.
63. Sharafad-Din,An-Nusayriya:DirasaTahliliya,p.80.
64. Seventy-sevenper cent voted in the Alawi state, 20-25 per cent in Aleppo, and so
few in Hama that elections were cancelled. League of Nations, PermanentMandates
Commission,Minutesof the 9thSession,16thmeeting,17 June 1926,p.116.
65. Alawismadeup the 1st, 2nd, andmuchof the 5th battalions;Armeniansappearto have
madeup the 4th; and Christiansmadeup the 8th. The compositionof the 3rd, 6th, and
7th battalionsis unknown.Alawis had no cavalryrole. The 2nd battalion,for example,
had 773 soldiers,of whom623 were Alawi, 73 Sunni,64 Christian,and 13 Isma'ilis.See
R. Bayly Winder,'The ModernMilitaryTraditionin Syria',unpublisheddraftdated 5
March1959,pp.14-15; andJacquot,L'etatdes Alaouites,p.11.
66. Presidentof the Alawis' State RepresentativeCouncil,League of Nations, Permanent
MandatesCommission,Minutesof the 9thSession,16thmeeting,17 June 1926,p.112.
67. Petitiondated4 March1936,Bulletindu Comitedel'Asie Francaise,April 1936,p.131.
68. 11 June 1936, Ministeredes AffairesEtrangeres,Levant1918-1930,Syrie-Liban,Doc.
E-492,fol.195. Quotedin Laurentand Basbous,Guerressecretesau Liban, p.74.
69. For moreon him and his name, see note 85.
70. Document3547, dated 15 June 1936,Ministeredes Affairesltrangeres. Text in Hariri,
Al-'Alawiyun-an-Nusayriyun, pp.228-31. See also International Impact,28 March1980;
al-Farisiand Sadiq, 'Ath-Thawraal-Islamiyafi Suriya',p.39; Al-Irhaban-Nusayri,p.6;
Laurent,'Syrie-Liban',p.598;AnnieLaurentandAntoineBasbous,Uneproiepourdeux
450 MIDDLEEASTERNSTUDIES

Fauves?(Beirut:Ad-Da'irat,1983),p.96. Moosa, ExtremistShiites,pp.287-88provides

a full Englishtranslationof the letter. Laurentand Basbousreport(Guerressecretesau
Liban,p.76) thatthe letteris missingfromthe Quaid'Orsayandspeculatethatits absence
hasto do withthe embarrassment it causesthe Asad regime.Fourothermemorandafrom
the Alawis to the FrenchHigh Commissionerare quoted extensivelyin Sharafad-Din,
An-Nusayriya:Dirasa Tahliliya,pp.87-92.
71. Note dated3 July 1936, quotedin Sharafad-Din,An-Nusayriya:DirasaTahliliya,p.57,
n.67.
72. Petitiondated26 Sept. 1936,Bulletindu Comitede l'AsieFrancaise, Dec. 1936,p.340.
73. Arreteof 5 Dec. 1936, Echosde Syrie,13 Dec. 1936.
74. StephenHelmsleyLongrigg,SyriaandLebanonUnderFrenchMandate(London:Oxford
UniversityPress, 1958), p.210. Britishofficials called him a 'notoriousbrigand'.See
'Weekly Political Summary,Syria and the Lebanon', 2 Feb. 1944, E 1049/23/89,
FO 371/40299/7543.For photographsof this strangefigure, see Weulersse,Pays des
Alaouites,Vol.2, pp.XCI-XCII.
75. 'Weekly Political Summary,Syria and the Lebanon', 22 March 1944, E 2211/23/89,
FO 371/40300/7543.
76. 'The Present State of Syria and the Lebanon', SupplementII, 23 March 1945, FO
371/45562/7505.
77. PatrickSeale, TheStrugglefor Syria(London:OxfordUniversityPress, 1965),p.37.
78. FadallahAbu Mansur,A'asirDimashq(Beirut, 1959), p.51. The total numberof army
officersat this time, it shouldbe noted, was less than200.
79. The 'Adnanal-Malikiaffairof 1955,whicheliminatedthe SSNPfrompoliticalpowerin
Syria,was an exception,for the SSNPincludedmanyAlawis (includingSergeantYusuf
Abd al-Karim,the manwho assassinatedMaliki).Forsome yearsafterthisevent, Alawis
in the armylaid low.
80. On the Ba'th-SSNPrivalry,see my 'RadicalPolitics and the SyrianSocial Nationalist
Party',International Journalof MiddleEastStudies,Vol.20 (1988), pp.313-16.
81. The most prominentexceptionto communalalignmentwas the co-operationbetween
Amin al-Hafiz,a Sunni,and SalahJadidandHafizal-Asad,both Alawis. In subsequent
years, as non-AlawisincreasinglyservedAlawi purposes,cross-communalties became
unbalanced.
82. Itamar Rabinovich, Syria Under the Ba'th 1963-1966: The Army-Party Symbiosis
(Jerusalem:IsraelUniversitiesPress, 1972),p.181.
83. SyrianRegional Commandof the Ba'th Party, Azmat al-Hizb wa Harakat23 Shubat
(Damascus,1966), pp.20-21. This documentwas classifiedas a 'secretinternalpublica-
tion exclusivelyfor members'.
84. Ad-Difa'[Jerusalem],14 Sept. 1966;An-Nahar,15 Sept. 1966;Al-Hayat,29 Sept. 1966.
Quotedin van Dam, Strugglefor Power,pp.75-6. For manymoreexamplesof suspicion
about Alawis, see ibid., pp.110-24. Muchof my informationon the rise of the Alawis
derivesfromvan Dam'smeticulousstudy.
85. The family name was originallyWahsh, meaning'wild beast' or 'monster',then was
changedto Asad, meaning'lion'. The meaningof the two namesis akin, but the tone is
entirelydifferent.MichaelHillegasvanDusen, 'Intra-andInter-GenerationalConflictin
the SyrianArmy',unpublishedPh.D. dissertation,JohnHopkinsUniversity,1971,p.315.
Thereis some disagreementover the yearof the changein name. PatrickSeale, Asad of
Syria:TheStrugglefor the MiddleEast (Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1989),
p.6, gives 1927as the yearof the change.Ma'oz,Asad, p.24, has it around1944.Seale's
date fits withotherevidence(suchas his grandfathersigninghis nameas SulaymanAsad
in 1936).
86. Accordingto Ahmed Sulaymanal-Ahmad,Al-Watanal-'Arabi,5 August 1988.