Voter Turnout

The Impact of Race and Ethnicity, Immigration and Political
Context on Participation in American Electoral Politics

John R. Logan, Brown University
Jennifer Darrah, Harvard University
Sookhee Oh, University of Missouri-Kansas City
This study uses national survey data in federal election years from 1996 through 2004 to
examine voter registration and voting. It shows that racial/ethnic disparities in socio-
economic resources and rootedness in the community do not explain overall group differ-
ences in electoral participation. It contradicts the expectation from an assimilation
perspective that low levels of Latino participation are partly attributable to the large share
of immigrants among Latinos. In fact net differences show higher average Latino participa-
tion than previously reported. The study focuses especially on contextual factors that could
affect collective responses of group members. Moving beyond past research, significant
effects are found for the groups representation among office holders, voting regulations
and state policies related to treatment of immigrants.
Abundant research demonstrates the effects of personal background characteristics on

political participation, such as age, education and residential stability. Such characteristics,
often described as indicators of resources and rootedness, are fungible: they enhance
political participation regardless of group membership. This research focuses instead
on how group membership, defined by race, ethnicity and nativity, structures political
participation above and beyond such personal characteristics. We use a large national
sample, compare four major racial/ethnic groups, and test for differences between immi-
grants and natives in every group, including non-Hispanic whites. This design allows us
not only to identify persistent group differences but also to document the unexpected
high level of participation for Latino immigrants, after controlling for other factors. The
analysis also draws attention to several dimensions of the political context, which we
term the group context of participation. This is the first nationally representative study
to show evidence of increased participation for blacks where there are co-ethnic officials
(i.e., political empowerment) and evidence that state voter ID policies dampen turnout.
Sources of Group Differences in Political Participation

Studies of political participation at the individual level suggest that political participation
is associated with individual resources of time, political experience and money (Verba
etal. 1993). Scholars have found that people who are locally rooted are more likely to
A previous version of this article was presented at the 2007 annual meeting of the Eastern Sociological
Society. This research was supported by the Russell Sage Foundation and by the research initiative on
Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences at Brown University. The authors appreciate the contributions of
several reviewers to the improvement of this study. Direct correspondence to John R. Logan, Department of
Sociology, Box 1916, Brown University, Providence RI 02912. E-mail: john_logan@brown.edu.
The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the University of North Carolina at Social Forces 90(3) 9931022, March 2012
Chapel Hill. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com. doi: 10.1093/sf/sor024
Advance Access publication March 9, 2012
994 Social Forces 90(3)
participate (Putnam 1995), as measured through indicators such as older age, residential
stability and marriage (Bueker 2006; Highton 2000; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade
2001; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Timpone 1998; Wolfinger and Wolfinger 2008).
Many efforts have been made to explain overall group differences in participation
especially lower participation by Latinos and Asians in terms of compositional differ-
ences on these dimensions (Antunes and Gaitz 1975; Leighley 2001; Martinez 2005;
Ramakrishnan 2005; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001; Uhlaner, Cain and Kiewet
1989). Citrin and Highton (2002) argue that low Latino voting in California can be
accounted for by Latinos lower citizenship rate, relative youth and lower socioeconomic
status. But researchers have been particularly hard-pressed to come up with explanations
for why, given their more favorable socioeconomic position, Asian-Americans turnout at
the polls is relatively low (Citrin and Highton 2002; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995).
Asians have higher-than-average resources and they appear to be strongly rooted.
Something else about being Asian, not reducible to individual-level processes, seems
to make a difference. Scholars have offered several explanations, pointing to Asian-
Americans geographic dispersion across the country, a community norm to avoid
political involvement or the learned attitude that electoral politics are a waste of time,
lack of political leadership and experiences of discrimination in the United States
(Uhlaner, Cain and Kiewet 1989:217).
From the perspective of assimilation theory (Alba and Nee 2003), a likely sus-
pect isrecent immigration. Both Asians and Latinos which include many recent
immigrants are expected to be incorporated slowly into mainstream society. But
the second and later generations of group members should progressively participate
on a more equal footing in key institutions, including politics (Skerry 2004). Some
researchers report that foreign-born persons are less likely to vote than persons in the
second generation (Cho 1999; DeSipio 1996). But there is also contradictory evidence
(Lien 2004). In fact it has been suggested that immigrants who choose to become
citizens are more likely than natives to participate in the political process (Barreto etal.
2005; Cassel 2002; Garcia and Arce 1988; Pantoja etal. 2001; Segal 2002). Others
show that only for Asians is participation increasing in successive generations. By
contrast, there is a decline across generations among Latinos. And among whites, the
2nd generation is more likely to vote than the first or third generation (Lien 2004;
Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001; Ramakrishnan 2005).
Our approach to racial and ethnic differences is to focus on collective factors that
could account for them. In the immigration literature, the key concept is the context
of reception that a newcomer encounters (Portes and Rumbaut 1996). We apply this
concept to all Americans, using the more general term group context of participation.
The Group Context of Participation

Collective conditions could either depress or enhance participation. The political
environment may be perceived as discouraging or even threatening (see Pantoja,
Ramirez and Segura 2001 on the threat perceived by Latinos in California in the
Race, Ethnicity and Participation in U.S. Politics 995
mid-1990s). Obstacles to voting by blacks continue to stimulate litigation and

policy debate. Yet blacks have been found to have distinctively high rates of voting,
overcoming deficits in socioeconomic and other resources (Tate 1991, 1993). This
phenomenon has been attributed to group consciousness and mobilizing institu-
tions specific to black communities such as the black church (Harris 1994; Brown
and Brown 2003) and civil rights organizations (Antunes and Gaitz 1975). Similar
processes that could shape political consciousness, encourage group identity or
invite mobilization have been discussed for other groups (Bueker 2005; Cho 1999;
Choetal. 2006; Gay 2001; Jones-Correa 2005; Leighley 2001; Ramaskrishnan and
Espenshade 2001; Timpone 1998).
A prominent hypothesis derived from this reasoning is political empowerment
(Bobo and Gilliam 1990) the argument that voting is encouraged by increased
numbers of black elected officials who can promote mobilization and enhance feel-
ings of solidarity. Washington (2006) found that black candidates for the House of
Representatives had a positive impact on black voting, but a countervailing increase
in white turnout voting against the black candidates. Pantoja and Segura (2003) also
found support for this hypothesis, showing that greater numbers of Latino legislators
slightly decreased political alienation among Latinos in California and Texas. We test
whether political representation affects registration and voting not only for blacks but
also for Latinos and Asians.
We consider for the first time at the national level two other aspects of the political
environment that are particularly likely to affect Latinos and Asians. One is general
public attitudes toward immigrants. Van Hook, Brown and Bean (2006) found higher
rates of naturalization in more welcoming states. We expect similar effects for voting. A
second factor is state restrictions on immigrants access to welfare services. Van Hook
showed that immigrants were more likely to naturalize in states with more restrictive
policies, suggesting an instrumental effort to gain better access to services. A parallel
effect could be to promote registration and voting.
The historical black experience with discriminatory voting policies calls attention
to other dimensions of the group context of participation. First, participation could
be enhanced by voting rights legislation. Existing studies have yielded mixed results.
Jones-Correa (2005) reported that Asians and Latinos were more likely to vote in states
that offer bilingual voting and registration materials. By contrast, Ramaskrishnan and
Espenshade (2001) found that minority rights provisions did not significantly affect
voting among immigrant Latinos.
The political systems more general rules of the game can also influence participa-
tion. We examine three kinds of rules. One question is how long before an election a
person must register in order to vote. Jones-Correa (2001) found no significant impact,
but Burden etal. (2010) found a strong negative effect of restrictive policies (see also
Leighley and Nagler 1992; Timpone 1998). A second question is provision for absentee
voting. Ramakrishnan and Espenshade (2001) and Jones-Correa (2001) both found
that restrictions on absentee voting decrease turnout, while allowing people to vote by
mail increases turnout. But Burden etal. (2010) found negative effects.
Recently a third type of regulation has become prominent in policy debates:

requirements to show identification prior to voting. Provisions for photo identification
are spreading. One study found that strict voter identification requirements depressed
voting turnout in 2004, and that this effect was especially pronounced for minority
voters (Eagleton Institute 2006; Burden etal. 2010; Muhlhausen and Sikich 2007).
Research Design
Our purpose requires us to use a nationally representative sample that includes mem-
bers of all of the major racial/ethnic groups (like Bass and Casper 2001; Bueker 2005;
Ramakrishnan 2005). We rely on the Current Population Survey in the years 1996,
1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004. In these years the November survey included a voting
and registration supplement. It also recorded the nativity and citizenship status of
respondents, facilitating generational comparisons. Pooling six years of data provides
adequate samples in each generation for each of four major racial/ethnic categories.
The CPS also records geographic location; the smallest identifiable geographical unit
of residence is the Metropolitan Statistical Area. For this study, contextual variables con-
structed from the 2000 U.S. Census summary tape files and other sources were merged
with CPS data based on state or MSA/PMSA of residence. The MSA definitions used
in the 2004 CPS data differ from prior years; we have recoded these to correspond as
closely as possible to the definitions in earlier CPS years and in the 2000 U.S. Census.
Dependent Variables: Registration and Voting

Table 1 provides a summary of variable definitions from all data sources. The outcome
variables are self reports of voting or being registered for the November election in a
given year. Citizens ages 18 and above were asked: In any election some people are
not able to vote because they are sick or busy or have some other reason, and others do
not want to vote. Did (you/name) vote in the election held on Tuesday, November_?
A follow-up question is asked of those who did not vote: (Were you/Was name)
registered to vote in the November __ election?
The wording of these questions is designed to diminish stigma associated with
non-voting or non-registration (Bueker 2006). Presser, Traugott and Traugott (1990)
have shown that the CPS contains less misreporting than other surveys such as the
NES (see also Ramakrishnan 2005). Other studies employing validated data cited by
Ramakrishnan (2005) found no significant differences by nativity or generation in the
reliability of self-reported voting. However, Shaw, de la Garza and Lee (2000) found
Latino over-reporting in a validated voting study in Texas, California and Florida.
Group Membership: Race/Ethnicity and Generation

Race and ethnicity are represented by four broad categories constructed from the CPS
race and Hispanic origin questions. The race question allows respondents to select one
of five racial categories (White, Black, American Indian, Aleut or Eskimo, Asian or
Pacific Islander or something else). Respondents were not given the option to select
Table 1: List of Variables
Variable Variable Values Data Source
Dependent Variables
Registration Reference = not-registered; 1 = registered CPS voting supplement
Voting Reference = did not vote; 1 = voted CPS voting supplement
Resources and Rootedness
Educational attainment Reference = more than a BA CPS Basic
Less than high school and over age 25
High school
Some college
Bachelors degree
Total family income Reference = less than $14,999 CPS Basic

$15,000-39,999
$40,000-74,999
$75,000 +
Don't know income
Home ownership Reference = tenant/renter; 1 = homeowner CPS Basic

Age Reference = age 55+ CPS Basic
ages 18-24
ages 25-40
ages 41-55
Continued
Table 1 continued
Variable Variable Values Data Source
Marital status Reference = not married (including never married, divorced, widowed); 1 = CPS Basic
married (spouse present or absent, includes married but separated)
Children in household Total children < 18 in household CPS Basic
Gender Reference = female; 1 = male CPS Basic

Residential mobility Reference = less than 1 year at address CPS voting supplement
1-2 years at address
3-4 years at address
5+years at address
don't know years at address
Assimilation
Generation and nativity Reference = 1st generation; 2nd generation (foreign-born parent); 3+ CPS Basic
generation (native, native parents)
Linguistic isolation** Reference = not all household members speak only Spanish; 1 = all household CPS Basic
(Spanish-only household) members speak only Spanish
Context of Participation
Residential isolation of group in Continuous: Isolation index* (0-100) The average member of racial group lives Census 2000 Summary File 1
MSA (results not reported)* in a tract that is i % of the same racial group
Relative group income in MSA* Continuous: ratio of groups median household income to median income of Census 2000 Summary File 3
non-Hispanic whites
Co-ethnic political representation Reference = 0-5 co-ethnic public officials; 1 = more than 5 co-ethnic public Computed from lists of Latino and
in MSA* officials Asian elected and appointed
officials, and black elected officials
Voter identification policy*** Reference = no voter ID required; 1 = voter ID required Election Reform Information Project,
Electionline.org and Constitution
Project (2002); Eagleton Institute
and Moritz College of Law (2006)
Absentee voting policy*** Reference = rigid absentee voting policy; 1 = flexible absentee policies Hansen/Task force on Federal
Election System
Bilingual ballot provision*** Reference = no bilingual ballot in state; partial state coverage; statewide Hansen/Task force on Federal
coverage Election System
Early voting policy*** Reference = no early voting; 1 = early voting allowed Hansen/Task force on Federal
Election System
Immigrant receptivity*** Index of public attitudes toward immigrants aggregated to states (standardized Van Hook, Brown and Bean (2006)
score)
Immigrant safety net*** Index of welfare support to immigrants Reference = less available; 1 = more Zimmerman and Tumlin (1999)
available
Election year Year of data collection (CA 1996 includes cases living in California in 1996) CPS Basic
Metropolitan status Reference = metropolitan; Non-metropolitan or not identified; No match MSA = CPS Basic
(CPS MSA boundary definitions not convertible across years)
Notes: *These variables are race-specific. **Only included in analysis of Latinos. ***State policies.
multiple race categories except in the 2004 CPS. There is a separate question about
Hispanic origin or descent.
We combined responses into four broad racial/ethnic categories: non-Hispanic
white, non-Hispanic black, Asian/Pacific Islander and Latino (other race respondents
have been excluded from the sample). Persons who indicated Hispanic origin are
treated as Latino regardless of race. Non-Hispanics are categorized as white, black or
Asian/Pacific Islander based on the race question. Information from the 2004 CPS and
2000 U.S. Census (used in constructing contextual variables) was recoded to match
these categories as closely as possible.
We also use information about birthplace and parental birthplace to measure gen-
erations. Those born outside of the United States are 1st generation. Those born in
the United States with at least one parent born outside of the country are classified as
members of the 2nd generation. The remaining 3+ generation cases are individuals born
in the United States whose parents were also born here.
Table 2 provides a starting point for the analysis based on our pooled sample of
citizens ages 18 and older. It shows a turnout gap (Citrin and Highton 2002) between
Latinos and Asians, on the one hand, and blacks and non-Hispanic whites, on the
other. This gap is due mainly to differences in voter registration (10-13 points), with
an additional deficit in voting by Latino registered voters (5-7 points less than other
groups). The table shows that Asian immigrants and children of immigrants were
10-12 points less likely to vote than those in later generations. The opposite effect is
found among Latinos, whose foreign-born citizens had modestly higher voting turnout
(due to greater likelihood that registered voters actually vote). This finding is a first
example of effects that turn out to be contingent on group membership.
We elaborate on these initial findings in multivariate analyses where registration and
voting are treated in turn as dependent variables. We present one set of models in which
members of all four racial/ethnic groups are pooled, which allows us to identify the
group differences net of variations in other factors, and to show how the population as a
whole is affected by contextual factors such as electoral rules that are not group-specific.
Surprisingly, one key result is to upend the expected hierarchy of group participation,
placing first-generation Latinos above non-Hispanic whites. We then estimate sepa-
rate models for each group, adding variables representing important elements of their
context of participation. Our intention is two-fold: demonstrating the importance of
contextual conditions and showing which of their effects are group-specific.
Measures of Socio-Economic Resources and Rootedness

The multivariate models include several indicators of resources and rootedness (listed in
Table 1).1 Educational attainment, family income and home ownership are the socio-
economic status indicators. Demographic variables include age, marital status, number
of children under 18 in the household, gender and residential mobility (years at the
current address). (Note that, because education is reported only for persons ages 25 and
above, the age category of 18-24 must be interpreted both as a category of age and as an
indicator of persons without a reported education.) All indicators of greater resources and
Table 2: Registration and Voting by Race/Ethnicity and Generation in the United States,
1996-2004 (Citizens Ages 18+)
Percentages Registered Registered & Voted Net Voted N
Latino
All 66 71 47 34,781
Foreign born 65 78 51 7,745
2nd generation 66 71 47 8,765
3+ generation 66 68 45 18,271
Asian
All 66 76 50 12,534
3+ generation 72 82 59 3,077
Non-Hispanic Black
All 76 78 59 57,897
3+ generation 77 77 59 54,858
Non-Hispanic White
All 79 78 62 369,383
3+ generation 78 78 61 329,002
Source: Current Population Survey 1996-2004.
Notes: N reported here is total count of those who responded to voting turnout question,
summed across years.
rootedness (higher education and income, home ownership, older age, being married,
female and having kids) are hypothesized to lead to increased political participation.
Assimilation Indicators
To examine the assimilation hypothesis we constructed three categories of generation
in the United States. In the pooled analysis, generation is combined with race/ethnic-
ity to create a series of 12 dummy variables. Another related indicator is linguistic
isolation. This is the only language measure available in the November CPS, and it
indicates whether a person lives in a household where only Spanish is spoken. We used
this household variable in our models for Latinos, based on the assimilation hypothesis
that linguistic isolation would reduce participation.
The Group Context of Participation

A weakness of the CPS for our purpose is the lack of explicit indicators of group
consciousness or other relevant attitudes. We therefore turn to other sources to create
variables that reflect various aspects of the context of participation.
We use 2000 U.S. Census data to capture key information about demographic
context at the level of the metropolitan region.2 The year 2000 is at the midpoint of
our 1996-2004 CPS data, and the census is the most reliable source for metropolitan-
level population variables. The metropolitan variable reported here is the ratio of the
median household income of each racial group in the MSA to the median income of
households headed by non-Hispanic whites. This is a measure of relative affluence or
poverty that could show whether (net of their own socioeconomic standing) members
of relatively poorer groups would participate less.
Measures of political context were drawn from a variety of sources. The test of
the empowerment thesis for Latinos, Asians and blacks is based on office holding at
thelevel of metropolitan regions. Information about Latino office holders is from the
2000 directory prepared by the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed
Officials (NALEO 2000). This directory includes elected and appointed public officials
at all levels. Listings of black elected officials at all levels were provided by the Joint
Center for Political and Economic Studies. Listings of Asian elected and appointed offi-
cials were obtained from the National Asian Pacific American Political Almanac 2001-
2002 (UCLA Asian American Studies Center 2002). We linked zip codes of office
holders in these files to MSAs using the Missouri Census Data Center Geographical
Correlation Engine (Missouri Census Data Center 2007).
We examined several ways to code these data, treating the total number of co-ethnic
political officials within each MSA as an interval scale or as a set of up to 10 categories
to test for non-linear effects. We found that a simple dichotomy adequately reflects
the observed relationships: 0-5 (the reference category) or more than 5 representatives.
The measure for all groups is for the year 2000, midway in the 1996-2004 period that
we study.
Other indicators of the context of participation are measured for states. Some
are rules about voting and registration that could affect participation by members
of any group. A key variable of this type that has rarely been studied before is voter
identification policy. The question is whether or not a respondent lives in a state
requiring prospective voters to show some form of personal identification before
casting a ballot. Forms of identification required or requested may include photo or
non-photo ID. We draw here mainly on the classification of policies by state from
reports published by the Election Reform Information Project (2002 and 2006)
conducted in conjunction with Electionline.org and The Constitution Project and
the Eagleton Institute and Moritz College of Law (2006), with corrections from a
report of the Heritage Center for Data Analysis (Muhlhausen and Sikich 2007). We
use information about state-level policies in 2000 as indicators of state-level policies in
1998 and 1996. Significant legislative changes after 2000 are reflected in our coding
for 2002 and 2004.
The Election Reform Information Project and the Eagleton Institute used
slightly different classification systems with five categories. We collapsed these
into a simple dichotomy based only on the maximum requirement: does the state
request documentary evidence at the polls of the prospective voters identification?
(For a discussion of other dimensions of ID requirements, see Eagleton and Moritz

2006.)
Two additional indicators of electoral rules are drawn from the Task Force on the
Federal Election System (Hansen 2001). These are the availability of early voting
and the flexibility of absentee voting policies, both of which are expected to facilitate
participation. Tucker and Espino (2007) also provide information about the number
of counties within each state that are covered by bilingual voting ballot provisions,
as mandated by the Federal Voting Rights Act, potentially increasing participation
by Latinos and/or Asians. We used these data at the state level to construct three
categories reflecting the amount of coverage by these provisions: (1. no coverage
(meaning no counties are required to comply with the bilingual ballot provisions);
(2. some coverage (meaning that some counties offer bilingual ballots by law); and
(3. full coverage (meaning that all counties offer bilingual ballots by law). This ballot
variable indicates the significant presence of non-English speaking populations and
a political-institutional climate formally designed to promote linguistic minority
participation.
Additional variables measure features of the political context at the state level that
are particularly relevant to immigrants. First is a measure of immigrant receptivity
that is intended to capture public attitudes toward immigrants. The original scale
was developed for metropolitan areas by De Jong and Tran (2001), using data from
the General Social Survey in the years 1995 to 1997. This measure was expanded to
the state level and converted to standardized scores by Van Hook, Brown and Bean
(2006). Second is a measure of the social policy safety net for immigrants, an index
developed to capture the spread of social services and welfare available to non-citizens
by Zimmerman and Tumlin (1999). This index measures immigrant access to benefits
in 12 separate social policy areas, including post-1996 access to TANF, Medicaid and
Food Stamps. We collapse the original four-category measure into two categories, the
least restrictive states (where the safety net is most and somewhat available) vs. the
most restrictive.
Election year is included to account for the historical particularities of each electoral
contest. Presidential election years (1996, 2000 and 2004) are expected to have higher
turnout. One additional measure of the impact of group-specific mobilization, or
group specific reaction to racial discrimination, is a dummy variable identifying cases
in which the respondent lived in California during 1996. This variable is intended
to test speculation that anti-immigration legislation Californias Proposition 187,
enacted in 1994 to deny undocumented immigrants access to social services, health
care and public education would have a mobilizing effect on naturalized citizens in
the subsequent 1996 election (Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001), especially for
Latinos (Shaw, de la Garza and Lee 2000).
Finally, we include variables indicating whether the person lives in an identifiable
metropolitan area, lives in a non-metropolitan region, or lives in a metropolis for which
we could not match the CPSs MSA code. These dummy variables are included simply
as control variables, and we do not seek to interpret these coefficients.
Analytical Procedures
We report the results of logit models of both voting and registration.3 We selected only
potential voters: citizens (including both U.S. born and naturalized foreign born) ages
18 and older in the year of the survey. In order to correct for autocorrelation between
household members, we also randomly selected one person per household (for the
group-specific models this is done after selecting by race/ethnicity). The sample for
voting analyses included only individuals who report having registered.
We first present results for a model that combines persons from all four groups. We
then present separate models for each race/ethnicity. In all analyses, cases are weighted
by the CPS second stage/final step weight. Because these weights artificially inflate
the overall sample size, we divided them by 1,000 so that cases are weighted properly in
relation to one another, but the overall sample size is close to the original unweighted
number.
There are two other concerns with our estimates from logistic regression models.
First, it is necessary to correct the standard errors of coefficients for contextual vari-
ables to account for the clustering of sampled cases by metropolitan area or state. We
explored two procedures for this correction: the Huber/White procedure (the robust
cluster option in Stata) and a full multilevel model. Some results are the same using
either option, but more consistent effects for absentee voting and the welfare safety
net are found with the Huber/White approach. Because these two contextual variables
are substantively important, we report these coefficients but with the proviso that the
same effects are not found in multi-level models. The second potential problem arises
from the large number of predictors that are defined at the state level. With only
51cases (50 states plus the District of Columbia), it is desirable to limit the number
of these variables. We accomplish this by a stepwise procedure, beginning by entering
each state-level variable into the model by itself (with the full range of individual-level
predictors), then examining models with two, three or more of these variables in com-
bination. The most robust results are for voter ID requirements and group political
representation. The models reported include only those predictors that had significant
effects in a consistent direction after these two variables were entered.
Results
The overall levels of registration and voting by race/ethnicity and generation were
presented in Table 2. We turn now to multivariate analysis to discover whether dif-
ferences by race/ethnicity persist after introduction of controls, what other resource,
political context and group-specific factors affect these outcomes, and how these may
vary by race/ethnicity.
Group Membership: Race and Generation Effects in Pooled Models

Table 3 presents models for registration and for voting (among registered voters only)
in which persons of all racial/ethnic categories are pooled together and with the Huber/
White correction. The models in Table 3 do not include variables that are defined only
Table 3: Logistic Regression Model for Registration and Voting: All Races, 1996-2004
Group Membership Registration Voting
B Sig. exp (B) B Sig. exp (B)
Race and Generation 3rd generation white (reference)
1st generation white -.583 *** .558 -.216 *** .805
2nd generation white .137 *** 1.147 .105 *** 1.111
1st generation black -.359 ** .698 .262 *** 1.299
2nd generation black -.067 .935 .411 *** 1.509
3rd generation black .455 *** 1.577 .442 *** 1.556
1st generation Asian -1.192 *** .304 -.549 *** .578
2nd generation Asian -.616 *** .540 -.400 *** .670
3rd generation Asian -.453 *** .636 -.100 .909
1st generation Hispanic -.388 *** .679 .214 ** 1.239
2nd generation Hispanic -.224 *** .799 -.181 ** .835
3rd generation Hispanic -.115 ** .892 -.151 ** .860
Education More than a BA (reference)
Less than high school and 25 + -2.156 *** .116 -1.596 *** .203
High school -1.542 *** .214 -1.038 *** .354
Some college -.888 *** .411 -.621 *** .538
BA -.346 *** .707 -.247 *** .781
Continued
Table 3 continued
Group Membership Registration Voting
B Sig. exp (B) B Sig. exp (B)
Family income Less than $14,999 (reference)
$15,000-39,999 .138 *** 1.148 .217 *** 1.242
$40,000-74,999 .316 *** 1.371 .353 *** 1.423
$75,000+ .516 *** 1.675 .444 *** 1.559

Don't know income .143 *** 1.154 .271 *** 1.312
Homeowner Owner (reference = renter) .282 *** 1.326 .222 *** 1.249
Age Ages 55+ (reference)
Ages 18-24 -2.445 *** .087 -1.930 *** .145
Ages 25-40 -.856 *** .425 -.946 *** .388
Ages 41-55 -.617 *** .540 -.536 *** .585
Marital status Married (reference = unmarried) .263 *** 1.300 .224 *** 1.251
Children in household -.04 *** .957 -.040 *** .960
Gender Male (reference = female) -.201 *** .818 -.020 .985
Residential mobility Less than 1 year at address
(reference)
1-2 years at address .202 *** 1.224 .295 *** 1.344
3-4 years at address .447 *** 1.564 .438 *** 1.550
5+ years at address .777 *** 2.174 .580 *** 1.786
Don't know years at address .394 *** 1.483 .389 *** 1.476
Voter ID policy .090 1.094 -.107 *** .899
Absentee voting policy .028 1.028 .231 *** 1.259
Immigrant safety net .093 1.098 .178 *** 1.195
Election year 2000 (reference)
1996 -.008 .992 -.208 *** .812
1998 -.255 *** .775 -1.148 *** .317
2002 -.238 *** .788 -1.115 *** .328
2004 .188 *** 1.207 .248 *** 1.282
California in 1996 .137 *** 1.147 -.124 *** .883
Metropolitan status Identified MSA (reference)
Non MSA or not identified .041 1.042 -.040 .961
No match MSA -.040 .960 -.100 .909
Constant 2.131 *** 8.420 2.079 *** 7.994
Source: Current Population Survey (1996-2004)
*p < .05 **p < .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)
for specific groups (the Spanish language variable, relative group income level and
political representation). Among the variables for combinations of race/ethnicity and
nativity, non-Hispanic whites in the 3+ generation are taken as the reference category.
Separate dummy variables identify 1st and 2nd generation non-Hispanic whites, as well
as blacks, Latinos and Asians of each generation.
Net of other factors, are there racial and ethnic differences, and is there a signifi-
cant difference in political participation across generations? Let us first compare these
groups in the 3rd generation. With the non-Hispanic white 3rd generation as the refer-
ence category, 3+ generation blacks are substantially and significantly more likely to
register and to vote. The coefficients are large, representing odds of both registering and
voting that are more than 50 percent higher than those of whites. Latinos in the 3+
generation are moderately but significantly less likely to register and vote than whites.
Asians in this generation are much less likely to register (with odds only two-thirds as
high as whites). After they are registered they are not significantly less likely than whites
to vote, but their coefficient (-.095) is similar to the coefficient for Latinos (-.151).
Hence among members of the native generation and controlling for other variables,
the racial/ethnic hierarchy of participation puts blacks at the highest level, followed by
whites, then Latinos and Asians.
These models do not provide significance tests of differences between groups within
the 1st and 2nd generation, but the size of the coefficients offers a guide to how they
stand. In the 2nd generation the results are generally consistent with those for the 3+
generation. Whites are most likely to register (b =.137), followed by blacks (b=-.067),
Latinos (b=-.224) and Asians (b=-.616). For voting, the relative positions of blacks
and whites are switched, again followed by Latinos and Asians.
It is in the 1st generation that there is a more surprising result. All coefficients for
registration are negative, meaning that first-generation immigrants of all racial/ethnic
background are less likely to register than are third-generation whites. The least nega-
tive coefficient is for blacks, followed by Latinos, whites and Asians, in that order. For
voting the relative ranking is the same. The positive coefficients for first-generation
blacks (.262) and Latinos (.214) mean that these immigrants are even more likely to
vote (after registering) than third-generation whites. The white coefficient is negative
(-.216), and Asians again have the strongest negative coefficient.
Assimilation Effects
These results in Table 3 can also be read in terms of the effect of generation within each
group, but a better test is provided in the group-specific models in tables 4-5 where
additional contextual variables are taken into account and all parameters are allowed
to vary across groups. Table4 presents results for every group for registration; Table 5,
for voting. The results are much more complex than anticipated by assimilation theory.
For registration (Table 4), blacks, Latinos and Asians show the expected assimi-
lation pattern in which the 3+ generation is most likely to register and the 1st
generation is least likely. But among whites there is what could be called a 2nd
Table 4: Logistic Regression Models for Registration, 1996-2004
Non Hispanic Whites Non-Hispanic Blacks Hispanics Asians
B exp (B) B exp (B) B exp (B) B exp (B)
Education More than BA (reference)
Less than high school. -2.327*** .0976 -2.312*** .099 -1.620*** .198 -1.822*** .162
High school -1.607*** .200 -1.789*** .167 -1.207*** .299 -1.232*** .292
Some college -.927*** .396 -1.120*** .326 -.576*** .562 -.779*** .459
BA -.350*** .705 -.762*** .467 -.225 .798 -.433*** .649
$15,000-39,999 .159*** 1.172 .122*** 1.130 .117** 1.124 -.010 .988
$40,000-74,999 .350*** 1.419 .323*** 1.382 .249*** 1.283 .110 1.117
$75,000 + .530*** 1.699 .254* 1.289 .455*** 1.575 .372*** 1.450
Don't know .197*** 1.218 .110 1.117 -.01 .992 -.246** .782
Homeowner Owner .307*** 1.359 .161 1.175 .242*** 1.274 .155 1.168
Age Ages 55+ (ref)
Ages 18-24 -2.457*** .086 -2.890*** .056 -2.279*** .102 -1.784*** .168
Ages 25-40 -.927*** .396 -.601*** .548 -.773*** .462 -.596*** .551
Ages 41-55 -.666*** .514 -.390*** .677 -.534*** .586 -.452*** .637
Marital status Married .321*** 1.379 .073 1.076 .121*** 1.129 .217*** 1.242
Children in household -.050*** .948 -.060*** .942 -.040*** .963 -.050** .949
Gender Male -.160*** .852 -.502*** .606 -.207*** .813 -.139** .870
Residential mobility Less than 1 year at address (reference)
1-2 years at address .212*** 1.236 .313*** 1.368 .147* 1.158 -.02 .985
3-4 years at address .444*** 1.559 .688*** 1.989 .406*** 1.501 .256* 1.292
5+ years at address .803*** 2.233 .774*** 2.168 .730*** 2.075 .430*** 1.537
Don't know years at address .374*** 1.454 .456*** 1.578 .310* 1.364 .688 1.989
Continued
Table 4 continued
Assimilation
Generation 3+ generation (reference)
1st generation -.586*** .557 -.715*** .489 -.266*** .766 -.636*** .529
2nd generation .137*** 1.147 -.438*** .645 -.06 .943 -.182 .834
Spanish-only household -.254** .776
Relative group income na -.013*** .987 -.008** .992 -.005* .995
Co-ethnic > 5 representatives na .284*** 1.328 .102 1.108 -.258*** .772
representation
Voter ID policy .124 1.131 .016 1.016 .043 1.044 -.109 .897
Absentee voting policy .067 1.070 .018 1.018 -.113** .893 .017 1.017
Immigrant safety net .102 1.107 -.060 .947 .072 1.074 .250** 1.284
1996 .007 1.007 -.020 .984 .001 1.001 -.020 .977
1998 -.243*** .785 -.379*** .684 -.177*** .838 -.376*** .687
2002 -.227*** .797 -.245* .783 -.243*** .785 -.298*** .742
2004 .187*** 1.206 .237*** 1.267 .159** 1.173 .131 1.140
California in 1996 .139** 1.149 .035 1.036 .218*** 1.243 .082 1.086
Non-MSA or not identified .068 1.070 -.559* .572 -.508 .602 -.469* .626
No match MSA -.070 .931 -.212 .809 -.477** .621 -.562* .570
Constant 2.088*** 8.069 3.515*** 33.60 2.375*** 1.75 2.380*** 1.81
generation surge. The 2nd generation is most likely to register, while the 1st genera-
tion is least likely. This same 2nd generation surge is found for white voting. For
Asian voting, the assimilation pattern is repeated. Among blacks there is no linear
generation effect (there is some indication of a second generation surge for voting
but no significant difference between 1st and 3rd generation). The generation effects
among Latinos are unusual but consistent with what was shown in Table 3 here it
is the 1st generation that is most likely to vote, while there is no significant difference
between the 2nd and 3+ generations.
These findings show interaction effects between race/ethnicity and generation that
support no simple theoretical model. In most comparisons, apparently whites overall
parity with blacks as seen in Table 2, is due to their advantages in other background
characteristics that have been controlled in the multivariate models. All else equal,
blacks participate more in terms of both registration and voting than do whites. Asians
higher overall participation than Latinos is due to the same compositional differences.
But all else equal, Asians in every generation are less likely to register than Latinos. If
registered, they are less likely than Latinos to vote except in the 3+ generation.
Also relevant for the assimilation perspective are the findings for Latinos on linguis-
tic isolation. We find that those who live in Spanish-speaking households are less likely
to register; but surprisingly they are substantially more likely to vote.
Effects of the Context of Participation

The pooled models in Table 3 also offer evidence of the overall effects of the context of
participation. None of these measures of context, except for voting year, show significant
effects for registration in the all-races model (for the sake of parsimony Table 3 omits a
number of non-significant predictors such as bilingual ballots and immigrant receptivity).
Voter ID requirements sharply reduce the odds of voting. People in states that allow absen-
tee voting are substantially more likely to vote (a 25% increase in the odds). And residents
of states with a stronger immigrant safety net are also significantly more likely to vote.4
The election year also has strong effects. Registration and voting are both lower
in 1998 and 2002, the non-Presidential years, than in 2000. Considering only the
Presidential election years of 1996, 2000 and 2004, there is a clear upward trend in
registration and voting. California in 1996 had a significantly higher registration than
in 2000, but lower voter turnout not consistent with the expectation of heightened
participation in that year with a highly publicized debate on immigrant issues.
Group-specific Effects of Social and Political Context

Tables 4 and 5 allow us to see how the context of participation may differentially affect
members of different racial-ethnic groups, and also to introduce contextual variables
that are specific to each minority group.
The black, Latino and Asian models include a measure of relative group economic
position in the metropolitan context: the groups median income in comparison to
that of non-Hispanic whites in the metropolis. Controlling for individuals own
Table 5: Logistic Regression Models for Voting, 1996-2004
Education More than a BA (reference)
Less than high -1.728*** .178 -1.639*** .194 -1.302*** .272 -.502** .605
High school -1.089*** .336 -1.112*** .329 -.968*** .380 -.561*** .571
Some college -.646*** .524 -.649*** .523 -.700*** .496 -.235** .790
BA -.259*** .772 -.381 .683 -.371** .690 -.257** .774
$15,000-39,999 .224*** 1.250 .167* 1.182 .113** 1.120 -.140 .869
$40,000-74,999 .361*** 1.435 .344*** 1.410 .293*** 1.340 -.000 .996
$75,000 + .429*** 1.536 .713*** 2.041 .390*** 1.478 .369* 1.446
Don't know .271*** 1.311 .392*** 1.480 .326*** 1.385 .052 1.053
Homeowner Owner .209*** 1.233 .255** 1.291 .252*** 1.287 .015 1.015
Age Ages 55+ (reference)
Ages 18-24 -1.969*** .140 -1.969*** .140 -1.967*** .140 -1.368*** .255
Ages 25-40 -1.022*** .360 -.716*** .489 -.803*** .448 -.863*** .422
Ages 41-55 -.585*** .557 -.400*** .671 -.486*** .615 -.484*** .617
Marital status Married .274*** 1.316 .127 1.135 .095 1.100 .148 1.160
Children in household -.030*** .969 -.07*** .936 -.110*** .896 .0265 1.027
Gender Male .023 1.024 -.180*** .835 -.080 .924 -.040 .958
Residential mobility Less than 1 year at address (reference)
1-2 years at address .329*** 1.389 .246* 1.279 .174* 1.190 .252* 1.287
3-4 years at address .431*** 1.540 .637*** 1.891 .396*** 1.486 .562*** 1.753
5+ years at address .581*** 1.788 .691*** 1.995 .545*** 1.725 .623*** 1.864
Don't know years at .283*** 1.327 .738*** 2.092 .344 1.410 1.080** 2.944
address
Assimilation
Generation 3+ generation (reference)
1st generation -.209*** .811 .195 1.215 .244*** 1.276 -.345*** .708
2nd generation .115*** 1.122 .480* 1.617 -.034 .967 -.222 .801
Spanish-only household .509*** 1.664
Relative group income -.010 .994 .004 1.004 .003 1.003
Co-ethnic > 5 representatives .393*** 1.482 .079 1.083 -.040 .965
representation
Voter ID policy -.091** .913 -.190** .827 -.244*** .783 .261** 1.298
Absentee voting policy .251*** 1.285 .089 1.093 .238*** 1.268 .279*** 1.322
Immigrant safety net .172*** 1.188 -.015 .985 .221*** 1.247 .191* 1.210
1996 -.210*** .811 -.289* .749 -.040 .960 -.144 .866
1998 -1.179*** .308 -1.082*** .339 -1.065*** .345 -.982*** .375
2002 -1.130*** .323 -1.014*** .363 -1.131*** .323 -1.134*** .322
2004 .264*** 1.302 .328*** 1.388 .113 1.119 .277* 1.319
California in 1996 -.110** .895 .140 1.150 -.333*** .716 .201** 1.222
Non-MSA or not -.010 .988 -.226 .798 .237 1.268 .138 1.147
No match MSA -.194** .824 .255 1.290 .638 1.893 .352 1.422
Constant 2.107*** 8.224 2.563*** 12.97 1.724*** 5.604 1.427*** 4.166

socioeconomic status, we expected participation of minorities to be depressed in met-

ropolitan areas where their groups income (as a ratio to whites) is low. However,
strikingly, for blacks, Latinos and Asians the coefficient for registration is negative. And
there are no significant effects on voting.
Similarly the measure of co-ethnic political representation is included only in the
models for the three minority groups. The effect of having more than five co-ethnic
public officials in the metropolitan area is positive and very strong for blacks, resulting in
an increase of more than 30 percent in registration and more than 40 percent in voting.
There are no significant effects for Latinos (although in the multilevel model there is a
positive effect on Latino voting). For Asians, there is an unexpected negative effect on
registration and no impact on voting. One possible interpretation of the positive effects
for blacks is that higher levels of voting by group members contribute to greater co-ethnic
representation (a reversal of the causal order). This interpretation is buttressed by the fact
that higher residential isolation (which implies that minority voters are likely to be more
concentrated in certain electoral districts) is associated with higher political representa-
tion and voting. This is why residential isolation could not be included in these models.
However these are results at the individual level, which are net of several strong control
variables. They can be translated only indirectly into associations at the level of electoral
districts (at the local, state or federal level).
Other measures of political context are included in the models for all four groups.
Voter identification requirements have a substantially negative impact on the voting of
all groups except for Asians (though there is no significant impact for registration on any
group). Particularly strong negative effects are seen for blacks and Hispanics: a decrease
in voting by 18 percent and 22 percent respectively. Even whites show dampened turn-
out associated with voter ID policies. Yet for Asians, strikingly, voter ID has the opposite
effect, boosting turnout by nearly 30 percent. This is an intriguing instance in which
Asian participation patterns markedly differ from that of other groups.
More liberal absentee voting policies increase the odds of voting for whites, Latinos
and Asians, although there is no effect for blacks. The only significant effect on registra-
tion is a surprising negative coefficient for Latinos.
Greater immigrant access to a social service safety net is the other state-level predic-
tor that has some significant effects. These are positive for white, Latino and Asian
voting. There are also strong positive effects shown for Asian registration: an increase in
the odds of registering by almost 30 percent. There is no significant effect on registra-
tion for any other group and no significant effects at all for blacks.
The last measure of political context included in the analysis is the dummy variable
for the 1996 general election in California (note that there is a 1996 effect shared by
all states, and this dummy variable represents additional variation for California resi-
dents). Apparently the conditions present in California in 1996 were associated with
higher levels of white and Latino registration, but this variable shows countervailing
negative effects on voting for both groups. Only Asians showed the expected boost in
voting while no effects were seen for black registration or voting.
Table 6 summarizes the findings

on contextual effect for all races and
Registration Voting Registration Voting Registration Voting Registration Voting Registration Voting
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
+
+
+
for each group-specific model. It
includes variables that were omitted
Asians
from tables 4-5 that we examined

and found to have no significant
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns

+
effects: early voting, bilingual ballot
provisions and immigrant receptivity
in public opinion.
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns

+
Hispanics
Socio-Economic Resources and

Rootedness
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns

+ Although the effects of what we

term resources and rootedness are
not the main concern of this study,
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns

+
Non-Hispanic
they are clearly important predic-

Blacks
tors of political participation. Aside

from generation and race/ethnicity,
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns

+
Table 3 shows significant and theo-

retically important effects of peoples
resources, and these are confirmed in
the group-specific models. As found
ns
ns
ns

+
Non-Hispanic
in previous research, having more

Whites
resources and indicators of stronger

connections to the local community
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
+
increases the propensity of register-

ing and voting for all groups. There
Table 6: Summary of Findings for Contextual Effects
is a uniform relationship between

ns
ns
ns

socioeconomic status and registra-

All Races
tion/voting for all groups. The higher

a persons education or income level,
the more likely the person is to reg-
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
+
ister and vote. Compared to renters,

homeowners are also more likely
to register and vote in almost every
Absentee voting receptivity
Co-ethnic representation
model (the exception is the model

Relative group income
Immigrant receptivity
for Asian voting where the coeffi-

Immigrant safety net
Early voting policy
cient is insignificant).
Bilingual ballot
California 1996
Older people register and vote

at higher rates. Marriage generally
Voter ID
enhances registration and voting (the

exception is voting among blacks
where the coefficient is insignificant). However, for all groups (except for Asians in
the voting model), having more children in the household depresses registration and
voting. This suggests that children in this context are not social connectors but perhaps
a time demand that conflicts with political participation. For the most part, women are
more likely to register and vote than men, with some variation (among whites, men
are more likely to vote and there is no significant difference between Asian men and
women in voting). People who have lived longer in their current place of residence are
much more likely to register and vote.
Discussion and Conclusion

This study has examined a very wide range of factors that contribute to variations in
political participation. The results confirm that resources and rootedness-based models
go a long way toward explaining the likelihood of participation. Some aspects of the
political context are also significant. The main contribution here, though, is to explore
group-specific effects. This has been accomplished in several ways: by pinpointing the
net differences across groups after controlling for other factors, by testing whether
resource and political context operate similarly for each group, and by including nativ-
ity and several contextual measures that are specific to each minority group. Although
electoral participation is ultimately something that people do in isolation in a voting
booth, we have emphasized that it is also a collective act. The significant associations
shown here between these individual behaviors and indicators of the things group
members have in common support the conclusion that the group context of participa-
tion influences choices to register and vote.
The pooled analyses presented in Table 3 offer the best evidence of net differences
across racial/ethnic groups. Like previous studies we have shown that all else equal,
blacks register and vote at higher rates than whites. Among the largely immigrant
groups with lower levels of participation, Latinos register and vote at higher rates than
Asians. Unexpectedly, though, we showed that these group differences are conditional
on nativity, because among immigrants Latinos participate more than either whites or
Asians and almost as much as blacks.
Looked at another way, the effects of nativity are contingent on race and Hispanic
origin. Although there has been speculation that the high share of immigrants in the
voting-eligible Latino and Asian populations could help to explain their lower political
participation, the impact of nativity is not uniform across groups and does not account
for the differences between groups in participation. For whites it is the 2nd generation
that is more likely to register and vote. For other groups it is the 3+ generation that
is more likely to register, but in terms of Latino voting it is the immigrant generation
that stands out.
In this respect the assimilation model, which has proved useful in studying other
aspects of social and economic life and posits a general direction of incorporation
across generations, is only partly right. Even language (measured here as linguistic
isolation), which is a strong predictor of such outcomes as occupational achievement
among immigrants, has mixed effects on Latinos in this study. Living in a Spanish-
speaking household reduces the likelihood of registering but increases voting. Race,
Hispanic origin and immigration status apparently combine to produce distinc-
tive collective influences on peoples understanding of the political system and their
engagement in it.
Other aspects of group members shared situation also affect participation. This
study included no direct measure of group consciousness or mobilization. It would
be desirable to have direct measures of organized efforts to mobilize voter turnout,
such as voter registration drives or campaigns on specific issues that could stimulate
greater participation. We introduced the California 1996 variable in hopes of tap-
ping such activity, especially among Latinos. Our results confirm that Latino and
white participation were boosted, but only for registration and surprisingly with the
opposite effect on voting. Minority political representation (our measure of co-ethnic
public officials in the metropolitan region) is a related factor, and we found strong
positive effects for blacks along with some evidence that there may be an effect also
for Latinos. Although the direction of causality in this finding is not certain and the
Asian results run in the opposite direction, these findings should encourage further
efforts to bring measures of group-based organizational activity into analysis of
individual political behavior.
State voting rules are especially important because these are amenable to change,
and we examined a wide range of these policies. There is a consistent effect for voter ID
requirements. Some states have recently introduced new identification requirements
and others are considering it. The evidence here suggests that this policy will depress
white, black and Latino participation in electoral politics and the effect could be
especially strong for blacks and Latinos. On the other hand liberal absentee voting poli-
cies lead to higher voter turnout except, surprisingly, for blacks. Finally there is some
evidence that a stronger immigrant service safety net is associated with greater political
participation an effect which is particularly clear for Asians for both registration and
voting but again not for blacks.
Other contextual variables, such as the requirement of bilingual ballots in some
states, availability of early voting, receptivity of public opinion to immigrants, and
the relative income of group members in relation to non-Hispanic whites, are not
significant in any of the models that we examined for voter turn-out (and they are not
included in the models reported here). Another important finding is that relative group
income is surprisingly negative for all minority groups for registration. This suggests
that minorities in a position of lesser economic disadvantage relative to white counter-
parts in a given MSA may be less likely to register. From an assimilation perspective,
one would have expected the opposite effect because higher income at the individual
level is associated with higher likelihood of registration.
It is valuable to learn which aspects of the policy or political context make a dif-
ference. Perhaps more important, the variations in how different groups respond to
their community contexts reminds us how little we still know about the group basis of
political behavior and group solidarity (Junn 2006). This study has pinpointed several
specific ways in which patterns of political participation for Asian Americans differ
from other groups. All else equal, our study shows that Asians respond differently
to co-ethnic representation (when it comes to registering), voter ID policy (for voter
turnout), and the environment of political threat present in California in 1996.
Moreover, Asian registration, unlike for the other minority groups, is positively affected
by a robust social policy safety net for immigrants.
We have uncovered original evidence of an empowerment effect for blacks
along with hints of the opposite effect for Asian Americans. Future research is
required to investigate the social processes (and the direction of the causal arrow)
that underlie this relationship. Future work might analyze the relationship between
co-ethnic representation and political participation over time or space (with atten-
tion to sub-state variation) and might consider additional variables such as co-
ethnic group size. Furthermore, given that our multilevel analyses showed hints
of a positive impact of co-ethnic officials on Latino participation (which were not
robust and thus not reported in our tables), future research should probe for these
effects for Latinos.
It is natural to find variations in coefficient estimates when many predictors are
introduced in models for four different groups. We believe, however, that there are
real differences here that remain unexplained. The challenge for researchers (from
this study as well as many prior studies that allow group differences to be revealed)
is to understand the specific circumstances of each groups arrival and incorpora-
tion into American society. This study shows that group differences are not solely
a function of the resources and rootedness of group members or a consequence of
the high proportion of immigrants among Latinos and Asians. Attention now needs
to be focused on the contexts of participation faced by each group, and how their
participation is facilitated or discouraged by their shared conditions in the com-
munities where they live.
Notes
1. One potentially relevant variable not used in the analysis is length of residency in the
United States. This variable could only be defined for 1st generation immigrants. It is also
logically linked to the residential mobility indicator.
2. A theoretically important factor of this type that we studied but do not report here is
racial isolation, based on indices calculated from tract level data. The Isolation Index
measures the proportion of same-group members in the tract. Based on the literature,
we expected isolation to enhance political participation by blacks, but possibly to
reduce participation by Latinos and Asians. In fact, the effects turned out to be
positive for both blacks and whites, while negative or mixed for Latinos and Asians.
Unfortunately isolation is very highly associated with group political representation.
This is not unexpected because communities with large minority populations are more
likely to elect minority officials. But multicollinearity prevents inclusion of both these
predictors.
3. We also estimated multivariate probit models of voting and registration (with and without
selection bias). Either type of model is appropriate for dichotomous outcome variables.
Timpone (1998) has argued that selection is an important consideration because voting is
contingent on registration, and he recommends correction for selection bias using a probit
model discussed by Dubin and Rivers (1989). In such a model, the selection equation
(registration) should contain at least one variable that is not in the outcome equation
(voter turnout). To implement this procedure for the registration model, we included an
indicator that is likely only to affect registration (how close in time to an election a person
is allowed to register). For the voter turnout model, we added the voting policy variables
that indicate states early voting and liberalized absentee voting policy. (All the personal
characteristics shown to be strong predictors of registration are also expected to influence
voting, so these were included in both models.) Analyses yielded counter-intuitive results
(that those who did not register would have been more likely to vote, had they registered,
than those who did register) that reduced our confidence in the selection model. We then
compared the magnitudes and signs of the estimated coefficients in the logit voting turnout
equation (estimated only for registered voters) with coefficients in probit models with and
without correction for selection bias. We found no significant differences. Therefore we
conclude that the logit approach, which has easier interpretability of model coefficients,
provides a sound basis for analysis in this case.
4. The multilevel models for all races replicate these findings for the impact of voter ID and
absentee voting policies on voting. However, by contrast the multilevel models show no
significant effects for immigrant safety net on voting while also showing negative effects
of voter ID on registration.
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The Impact of Race and Ethnicity, Immigration and Political

Context on Participation in American Electoral Politics

Abundant research demonstrates the effects of personal background characteristics on

Sources of Group Differences in Political Participation

The Group Context of Participation

mid-1990s). Obstacles to voting by blacks continue to stimulate litigation and

Recently a third type of regulation has become prominent in policy debates:

Dependent Variables: Registration and Voting

Group Membership: Race/Ethnicity and Generation

Total family income Reference = less than $14,999 CPS Basic

Home ownership Reference = tenant/renter; 1 = homeowner CPS Basic

Gender Reference = female; 1 = male CPS Basic

Measures of Socio-Economic Resources and Rootedness

The Group Context of Participation

(For a discussion of other dimensions of ID requirements, see Eagleton and Moritz

Group Membership: Race and Generation Effects in Pooled Models

$75,000+ .516 *** 1.675 .444 *** 1.559

Effects of the Context of Participation

Group-specific Effects of Social and Political Context

Source: Current Population Survey (1996-2004)

socioeconomic status, we expected participation of minorities to be depressed in met-

Table 6 summarizes the findings

from tables 4-5 that we examined

Socio-Economic Resources and

+ Although the effects of what we

they are clearly important predic-

tors of political participation. Aside

Table 3 shows significant and theo-

in previous research, having more

resources and indicators of stronger

increases the propensity of register-

is a uniform relationship between

socioeconomic status and registra-

tion/voting for all groups. The higher

ister and vote. Compared to renters,

model (the exception is the model

for Asian voting where the coeffi-

Older people register and vote

enhances registration and voting (the

Discussion and Conclusion

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$75,000+ .516 * 1.675 .444 * 1.559