SULIGUIN VS COMELEC 485 SCRA 219 2

PACANAN JR. VS COMELEC 597 SCRA 189 9

TAGIUAM VS COMELEC 594 SCRA 474 18

PENERA VS COMELEC 21

FORMS OF POPULAR INTERVENTION

I. Elections

(i) Definition/How exercised

(ii) Essence of Elections/Basis

(iii) Construction/Limitations

Duremdes vs Comelec
178 SCRA 746 26

II. Kinds of Elections/Distinctions

III. Initiative

IV. Referendum

(i) RA6735

Lambino vs Comelec
505 SCRA 160 31

ELECTION LAWS 2015 1

 EN BANC
convened to canvass the votes for all the
candidates. Petitioner received 6,605 votes while
MARGARITO C. SULIGUIN, G.R. No. 166046
respondent Ecelson Sumague received 6,647
Petitioner,
Present: votes. However, in the Statement of Votes (SOV) covering
Precincts 1A to 19A, Sumague appears to have received
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO, only 644 votes when, in fact, he received 844 votes. The
*
QUISUMBING, MBOC failed to notice the discrepancy and proclaimed the
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, winning candidates at around 7:00 p.m. of May 13,
CARPIO, 2004. Petitioner was proclaimed as the 8th Sangguniang
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA, Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna, garnering a total of
CARPIO MORALES, 6,605 votes.
[3]

CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA, Thereafter, Sumague requested for a recomputation of the
THE COMMISSION ON CHICO-NAZARIO, and [4]
ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPAL GARCIA, JJ. votes received by him and Suliguin in a Letter dated May
BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF 15, 2004, it appearing that there was a mistake in adding
NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA, and Promulgated:
ECELSON C. SUMAGUE, the figures in the Certificate of Canvass of votes. He pointed
Respondents. March 23, 2006 out that he officially garnered 6,647 votes, as against
petitioners 6,605 votes.
x---------------------------------------------
-----x
The MBOC summoned petitioner and respondent Sumague
DECISION to a conference. Upon review, the MBOC discovered that it
had, indeed, failed to credit respondent Sumague his 200
CALLEJO, SR., J.: votes from Precincts 1A to 19A, and that with his 6,647
votes, he should have been proclaimed as the 8th
Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna, instead
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
[1] of petitioner Suliguin.
Rules of Court seeking to reverse the Resolution of the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) En Banc in SPC No. 04-
On May 26, 2004, the MBOC filed before the Comelec a
209 dated November 18, 2004 which denied
Petition to Correct Entries Made in the Statement of Votes
petitioner Margarito Suliguins motion for reconsideration of
[2] for Councilor. The error was attributed to extreme physical
the July 21, 2004 Resolution of the Comelecs First
and mental fatigue which the members of the board
Division. TheComelec nullified his proclamation as the 8th
experienced during the election and the canvassing of
Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan, Laguna.
votes.

The antecedents are as follows:

In the meantime, on June 9, 2004, petitioner took his oath
[5]
of office before Judge Renato B. Bercades.
Petitioner Margarito Suliguin was one of the candidates for
the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna during
On July 21, 2004, the Comelec (First Division) issued a
the May 10, 2004 elections. At around 6:00 p.m. on said
[6]
Resolution granting the petition of the MBOC. The
date, respondent Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC)

ELECTION LAWS 2015 2

Commission nullified the proclamation of petitioner
Suliguin as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of
Nagcarlan, Laguna during the May 10, 2004 National and
Local Elections for being based on an erroneous
computation of votes. It then ordered the MBOC of
Nagcarlan, Laguna to reconvene and effect the necessary
corrections in the SOV, and forthwith proclaim Sumague as
the 8th duly elected Sangguniang Bayan member of
[7]
Nagcarlan, Laguna.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the
resolution but the Comelec En Banc denied the motion
on November 18, 2004; hence, this petition. Petitioner
alleges that respondent Commission committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling against him. In support of his petition,
he alleges that:
4.1 THE PETITION TO CORRECT ENTRIES
MADE IN THE STATEMENT OF VOTES FOR
COUNCILOR, NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA WAS
UNDISPUTEDLY FILED OUT OF TIME, and
4.2 THE PETITION TO CORRECT ENTRIES
MADE IN THE STATEMENT OF VOTES FOR
COUNCILOR, NAGCARLAN, LAGUNA WAS
FILED BY THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS IN DEFIANCE OF EXISTING
COMELEC RULES AND REGULATIONS AND
WAS OBVIOUSLY BIAS IN FAVOR OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT CANDICATE
[8]
ECELSON C. SUMAGUE.
[9]
Petitioner argues that pursuant to Sections 35, 36(c) and
[10]
(f) of Comelec Resolution No. 6669 (General Instructions
for Municipal/City/Provincial and District Boards of
Canvassers in Connection with the May 10, 2004 Elections),
the MBOC should not have entertained the letter-request
of respondent Sumague as it was filed only on May 17,
2004, or four (4) days after the canvassing of votes was
terminated and after he (petitioner) was proclaimed winner
as the 8th Sangguniang Bayan member of Nagcarlan,
Laguna.Furthermore, respondent Sumague never entered
any objection during the proceedings of the canvassing of
ELECTION LAWS 2015
votes. The MBOC itself filed the Petition to Correct Entries
Made in the Statement of Votes before the Comelec only
on May 26, 2004, 13 days after the canvassing of votes was
terminated. Petitioner maintains that the Comelec should
have denied the petition, since according to the Revised
Comelec Rules, it should have been filed not later than five
(5) days following the date of the proclamation.
Petitioner likewise questions the personality of the MBOC
itself to file the petition before the Comelec. He further
argues that upon the proclamation of the winning
candidates in the election, the MBOC adjourns sine die and
becomes functus officio.
The issue is whether or not respondent Comelec erred in
granting the petition of the MBOC to nullify petitioners
proclamation as the 8th member of the Sangguniang Bayan
in Nagcarlan, Laguna.
The petition is bereft of merit.
In an election case, the Comelec is mandated to
ascertain by all means within its command who the real
candidate elected by the electorate is. The Court frowns
upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that would
hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of
the votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment
[11]
of the results. In the case at bar, the simple
mathematical procedure of adding the total number of
votes garnered by respondent Sumague as appearing in the
Statement of Votes submitted to the Comelec would readily
reveal the result that he has forty-two (42) votes more than
petitioner. Such result would, in effect, dislodge petitioner
from said post, and entitle respondent Sumague to occupy
the eighth and last seat of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Nagcarlan, Laguna. Petitioner himself never disputed the
discrepancy in the total number of votes garnered by
respondent Sumague, and instead questioned the
3
 the electorate. An election is the
personality of the MBOC to file the petition and insisted
embodiment of the popular will, the
that such petition was not filed on time. expression of the sovereign power of the
people. Specifically, the term election, in
the context of the Constitution, may refer
[12] [13]
Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 1 of the Comelec Rules of to the conduct of the polls, including the
Procedure explicitly provide that such rules may be liberally listing of voters, the holding of the
electoral campaign, and the casting and
construed in the interest of justice. Indeed, the Comelec counting of votes. The winner is the
has the discretion to liberally construe its rules and, at the candidate who has obtained a majority or
plurality of valid votes cast in the
same time, suspend the rules or any portion thereof in the election. Sound policy dictates that public
interest of justice.
[14]
Disputes in the outcome of elections elective offices are filled by those who
receive the highest number of votes cast
involve public interest; as such, technicalities and in the election for that office. For, in all
procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they republican forms of government the basic
idea is that no one can be declared
constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will elected and no measure can de declared
of the electorate in the choice of their elective carried unless he or it receives a majority
or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
officials. Laws governing such disputes must be liberally election.
[19]

construed to the end that the will of the people in the

choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere We quote, with approval, the ruling of the Comelec (First
[15]
technical objections. Division) granting the petition of the MBOC:

What is involved in the present petition is the correction of A careful perusal of the records
show that there was, indeed, an honest
a manifest error in reflecting the actual total number of error committed by petitioner MBOC in
votes for a particular candidate. Section 32, subparagraph 5 the computation of votes for candidate
Ecelson Sumague which resulted in the
of Comelec Resolution No. 6669 includes mistake in the
erroneous proclamation of respondent as
addition of the votes of any candidate as a manifest one of the winners for the said office.
[16] [17]
error. As correctly cited by the Comelec, a manifest
A manifest
clerical error is one that is visible to the eye or obvious to clerical error is one that
is visible to the eye or
the understanding and is apparent from the papers to the
obvious to the
eye of the appraiser and collector, and does not include an understanding and is
error which may, by evidence dehors the record be shown apparent from the
papers to the eye of the
to have been committed. appraiser and collector,
and does not include an
error which may, by
The MBOC sought relief from the Comelec to reflect the evidence dehors the
true winner elected by the voting public, to occupy the record be shown to
have been committed.
eighth position as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Nagcarlan, Laguna. In Carlos v. Angeles,
[18]
the Court had The contention of respondent
that the instant petition should be
the occasion to declare: dismissed for being filed out of time
cannot be given merit because his
In this jurisdiction, an election means the proclamation was flawed. It must be
choice or selection of candidates to public stressed that a proclamation based on
office by popular vote through the use of faulty tabulation of votes is flawed, and a
the ballot, and the elected officials of petition to correct errors in tabulation
which are determined through the will of under Section 7, Rule 27 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, even if filed out of
ELECTION LAWS 2015 4
 time, may be considered, so as not to
thwart the proper determination and
resolution of the case on substantial
grounds and to prevent a stamp of validity
on a palpably void proclamation based on
an erroneous tabulation of votes.
Furthermore, where the
proclamation is flawed because it was
based on a clerical error or mathematical
mistake in the addition of votes and not
through the legitimate will of the
electorate, there can be no valid
proclamation to speak of and the same
can be challenged even after the
candidate has assumed office.
There is no showing that
petitioner MBOC acted with manifest bias
and committed a grave abuse of
discretion. Grave abuse of discretion
implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility which must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an invasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law. Petitioner MBOC
is merely doing its function that is
mandated by law to canvass votes in the
election returns submitted to it in due
form, adding or compiling the votes cast
for each candidate as shown in the face of
such returns and eventually proclaim the
winning candidates. Respondent
miserably failed to prove that petitioner
exhibited manifest bias thereby thwarting
his chances of winning the last slot for
Sangguniang Bayan Member. Absent a
strong showing to the contrary, the court
must accept the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duty and
strong evidence is necessary to rebut this
presumption.
Likewise, it cannot be said that
petitioner MBOC violated the sanctity of
the ballots. Unlike the Board of Election
Inspectors which counts the votes from
the precinct levels, the MBOC computes
the votes as appeared in the election
returns.
Finally, a subsequent annulment
of the proclamation of the respondent
does not constitute a clear violation of his
right. In the first place, there is no valid
proclamation to speak of. He was not
elected by a majority or plurality of
voters. His alleged right was based on an
erroneous proclamation. By any
mathematical formulation, the
respondent cannot be construed to have
obtained such plurality of votes;
otherwise, it would be sheer absurdity to
proclaim a repudiated candidate as the
choice of the voters. Where a
proclamation is null and void, the
proclamation is no proclamation at all and
the proclaimed candidates assumption of
office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the
power to make such declaration a
nullity. Respondent also cannot claim that
he was denied of his right to due process
of law since he was given the opportunity
to be heard. He was duly notified by
petitioner MBOC of the erroneous
computation which resulted in his
proclamation and was afforded the
opportunity to be heard by this
Commission.
The COMELEC
exercises immediate
supervision and control
over the members of
the Boards of Election
Inspectors and
Canvassers. Its statutory
power of supervision
and control includes the
power to revise, reverse
or set aside the action
of the boards, as well as
to do what boards
should have done, even
if questions relative
thereto have not been
elevated to it by an
aggrieved party, for
such power includes the
authority to
initiate motu proprio or
by itself steps or actions
that may be required
[20]
pursuant to law.
Petitioner posits that the Comelecs reliance in the ruling of
[21]
this Court in Bince, Jr. v. Commission on Elections is
misplaced since, unlike the present petition, petitioner

ELECTION LAWS 2015 5


therein was an affected candidate who filed his petition on
time.
The argument of petitioner does not persuade. The Court,
in Bince, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,
[22]
declared that:
Assuming for the sake of argument that
the petition was filed out of time, this
incident alone will not thwart the proper
determination and resolution of the
instant case on substantial
grounds.Adherence to a technicality that
would put a stamp of validity on a
palpably void proclamation, with the
inevitable result of frustrating the peoples
will cannot be countenanced. In Benito v.
COMELEC, we categorically declared that:
x x x Adjudication of
cases on substantive
merits and not on
technicalities has been
consistently observed by
this Court. In the case
of Juliano vs. Court of
Appeals (20 SCRA 808)
cited in Duremdes v.
Commission on
Elections (178 SCRA
746), this Court had the
occasion to declare that:
Well-settled is the doctrine that
election contests involve public
interest, and technicalities and
procedural barriers should not
be allowed to stand if they
constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of
the electorate in the choice of
their elective officials. And also
settled is the rule that laws
governing election contests must
be liberally construed to the end
that the will of the people in the
choice of public officials may not
be defeated by mere technical
objections (Gardiner v. Romulo,
26 Phil. 521; Galang v. Miranda,
35 Phil. 269; Jalandoni v. Sarcon,
G.R. No. L-6496, January 27,
1962; Macasunding v.
Macalaang, G.R. No. L-
22779, March 31, 1965; Cauton
v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. L-25467, April 27, 1967). In
ELECTION LAWS 2015
an election case, the court has
an imperative duty to ascertain
by all means within its command
who is the real candidate elected
by the electorate. (Ibasco v. Ilao,
G.R. No. L-17512, December 29,
1960). x x x (Juliano vs. Court of
Appeals, supra, pp. 818-
819). (Italics ours)
In the later case
of Rodriguez v.
Commission on
Elections (119 SCRA
465), this doctrine was
reiterated and the Court
went on to state that:
Since the early case of Gardiner
v. Romulo (26 Phil. 521), this
Court has made it clear that it
frowns upon any interpretation
of the law or the rules that
would hinder in any way not
only the free and intelligent
casting of the votes in an
election but also the correct
ascertainment of the
results. This bent or disposition
continues to the present. (Id., at
p. 474).
The same principle still
holds true
today. Technicalities of
the legal rules
enunciated in the
election laws should not
frustrate the
determination of the
popular will.
Undoubtedly therefore, the only issue
that remains unresolved is the allowance
of the correction of what are purely
mathematical and/or mechanical errors in
the addition of the votes received by both
candidates. It does not involve the
opening of ballot boxes; neither does it
involve the examination and/or
appreciation of ballots. The correction
sought by private respondent and
respondent MBCs of Tayug and San
Manuel is correction of manifest mistakes
in mathematical addition. Certainly, this
only calls for a mere clerical act of
reflecting the true and correct votes
received by the candidates by the MBCs
involved. In this case, the manifest errors
6
 sought to be corrected involve the proper
and diligent addition of the votes in the
municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel,
[23]
Pangasinan.
The Court made a similar pronouncement in Tatlonghari v.
[24]
Commission on Elections, to wit:
The argument is devoid of merit. For one
thing, records indicate that respondents
assumption of office was effected by a
clerical error or simple mathematical
mistake in the addition of votes and not
through the legitimate will of the
electorate. Thus, respondents
proclamation was flawed right from the
very beginning. Having been based on a
faulty tabulation, there can be no valid
proclamation to speak of insofar as
respondent Castillo is concerned. As this
Court once said:
x x x Time and again, this Court
has given its imprimatur on the
principle that Comelec is with
authority to annul any canvass
and proclamation which was
illegally made. The fact that a
candidate proclaimed has
assumed office, we have said, is
no bar to the exercise of such
power. It, of course, may not be
availed of where there has been
a valid proclamation. Since
private respondents petition
before the Comelec is precisely
directed at the annulment of the
canvass and proclamation, we
perceive that inquiry into this
issue is within the area allocated
by the Constitution and law to
Comelec.
xxx
We have but to
reiterate the oft-cited
rule that the validity of a
proclamation may be
challenged even after
the irregularly
proclaimed candidate
has assumed office.
xxx
ELECTION LAWS 2015
It is, indeed, true that,
after proclamation, the
usual remedy of any
party aggrieved in an
election is to be found
in an election
protest. But that is so
only on the assumption
that there has been a
valid
proclamation. Where as
in the case at bar the
proclamation itself is
illegal, the assumption
of office cannot in any
way affect the basic
issues. (Aguam v.
Commission on
Elections, 23 SCRA 883
[1968]; cited in
Agbayani v. Commission
on Elections, 186 SCRA
[25]
484 [1990]).
Thus, the Comelec was correct in annulling the
proclamation of petitioner for being based on an erroneous
computation of votes. As the Court declared in Espidol v.
[26]
Commission on Elections, where the proclamation is null
and void, the proclaimed candidates assumption of office
cannot deprive the Commission the power to declare such
proclamation a nullity. We emphasized that a defeated
candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
[27]
In fine, the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in annulling the proclamation of petitioner. In a
special civil action for certiorari, the burden is on the part of
petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent issuing the
impugned order. Grave abuse of discretion means a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion
is not enough, it must be so grave as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
7
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
[28]
in contemplation of law.

To the credit of the MBOC, when it realized that it made a

mistake in computing the total number of votes for
respondent Sumague, it took swift action and called the
attention of the Comelec by filing the Petition to Correct
Entries Made in the Statement of Votes for Councilor.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Resolutions

of the Commission on Elections in SPC No. 04-209
dated July 21, 2004 and November 18,
2004 areAFFIRMED. The Status Quo Order issued by the
Court dated January 11, 2005 is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

ELECTION LAWS 2015 8

 In the Order of March 17, 2008, the Comelec First Division
EN BANC
dismissed the appeal for failure to pay the correct appeal
CONSTANCIO D. PACANAN, JR., G.R. No.
fee as prescribed by the Comelec Rules of Procedure within
Petitioner, 186224
the five-day reglementary period.
Present:
In the assailed Resolution dated January 21, 2009,
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING, the Comelec En Banc denied petitioners motion for
YNARES- reconsideration, declaring that the Comelec did not acquire
*
SANTIAGO,
- versus - jurisdiction over the appeal because of the non-payment of
CARPIO,
CORONA, the appeal fee on time, and that the Comelec First Division
CARPIO
MORALES, was correct in dismissing the said appeal.
CHICO-
NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR., The antecedent facts are as follows:
**
NACHURA,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
LEONARDO-DE
FRANCISCO M. LANGI, SR., Petitioner Constancio D. Pacanan, Jr. and private
CASTRO,
Respondents.
BRION, respondent Francisco M. Langi, Sr. were candidates for
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN, mayor in the municipality of Motiong, Samar during
DEL CASTILLO, the May 14, 2007 elections. After the canvassing of votes,
and
the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) of
ABAD, JJ.
Motiong, Samar proclaimed petitioner as the duly elected
Promulgated:
mayor, having garnered a total of 3,069 votes against
August 25, private respondents 3,066 votes.
2009
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------x Thereafter, private respondent filed with the RTC a
[4]
Protest dated May 25, 2007 which was docketed as
DECISION Election Case No. 07-1, contesting the results of the
elections in ten (10) of the forty-nine (49) precincts in
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Motiong, Samar, and alleging acts of violence and
intimidation and other election irregularities in the
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari which
[1] appreciation of the votes by the MBC. Thereafter,
seeks to set aside 1) the Order dated March 17, 2008 of
petitioner filed his Verified Answer with Counter-
the Commission on Elections (Comelec) First Division and 2)
[5]
[2] Protest dated June 4, 2007, asserting that private
the Resolution dated January 21, 2009 of the Comelec En
respondents allegations of threat and intimidation, fraud
Banc dismissing petitioner Constancio D. Pacanan, Jr.s
[3] and other irregularities in the conduct of elections were
appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
mere allegations unsupported by any documentary
Branch 27, Catbalogan, Samar, in Election Case No. 07-1,
evidence. Petitioner also disputed the election results with
which declared private respondent Francisco M. Langi, Sr.
respect to seven (7) precincts.
as the winning Mayor of Motiong, Samar.

ELECTION LAWS 2015 9


On January 7, 2008, the RTC rendered a
[6]
decision in Election Case 07-1, which declared private
respondent as the winner in the May 14, 2007 mayoralty
race for Motiong, Samar with a plurality of six (6) votes, viz:
Wherefore, in view of the
foregoing Protestant Francisco M. Langi,
Sr. having obtained the over all total votes
of 3,074 and the Protestees 3,068 total
and final votes is declared the winner in
the Mayoralty contest in Motiong, Samar
with a plurality of (6) votes. Therefore the
proclamation on May 17, 2007 is hereby
annulled and declared Francisco Langi, Sr.
y Maceren as the duly elected Mayor of
Motiong, Samar. The winner is awarded
the amount of P 32,510 as actual damages
and no evidence aliunde for damages for
the court to award. xxx
On January 10, 2008, petitioner filed a notice of
appeal and paid P3,000.00 appeal fee per Official Receipt
No. 6822663 before the RTC, Branch
Catbalogan, Samar.He also appealed the RTC decision
dated January 7, 2008 to the Comelec which docketed the
case as EAC No. A-13-2008. Out of the P3,000.00 appeal fee
required by Section 3, Rule 40 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, petitioner only paid the amount of P1,000.00
(plus P200.00 to cover the legal research/bailiff fees) to the
Cash Division of the Comelec, per Official Receipt No.
0510287. The said payment was made on February 14,
2008.
[7]
On March 17, 2008, the Comelec First Division
[8]
issued an Order dismissing the appeal, viz.:
Pursuant to Sections 3 and 4,
Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure which provide for the payment
of appeal fee in the amount of P3,000.00
within the period to file the notice of
appeal, and Section 9 (a), Rule 22 of the
same Rules which provides that failure to
pay the correct appeal fee is a ground for
the dismissal of the appeal, the
Commission (First Division)RESOLVED as it
hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant
case for Protestee-Appellants failure to
ELECTION LAWS 2015
pay the correct appeal fee as prescribed
by the Comelec Rules of Procedure within
the five-(5)-day reglementary period.
SO ORDERED.
On March 28, 2008, petitioner filed a Motion for
[9]
Reconsideration which the Comelec En Banc denied in the
[10]
Resolution dated January 21, 2009, declaring that the
appeal was not perfected on time for non-payment of the
complete amount of appeal fee and for late payment as
well. The Comelec En Banc held that the Comelec did not
acquire jurisdiction over the appeal because of the non-
payment of the appeal fee on time. Thus, the Comelec First
Division correctly dismissed the appeal.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari raising the
following grounds:
The respondent COMELEC
27, committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in holding
that the correct appeal fee was
not paid on time.
The respondent COMELEC
committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in failing
to consider that assuming that
the correct appeal fee was not
paid on time, the alleged non-
payment of the correct appeal
fee is not in anyway
attributable to herein
petitioner.
The respondent COMELEC
committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in failing
to consider that assuming that
the correct appeal fee was not
paid on time, there are highly
justifiable and compelling
reasons to resolve the subject
case on the merits in the
interest of justice and public
interest.
10
Petitioner further claims that he paid a total of P4,215.00
for his appeal, as follows: In his Comment, respondent Langi, Sr. states that
the petition was just a mere rehash of the Motion for
a. To RTC on January 10, 2008 ------
P3,000.00 Reconsideration that petitioner filed with the Comelec En
10.00
Banc.Respondent maintains that for the Comelec to
5.00
TOTAL P3,015.00 exercise its authority to administer proceedings, grant
leniency, issue orders, and pass judgment on issues
b. To Comelec on February 14, 2008 --
P1,000.00 presented, it must first be shown that it has acquired the
50.00 requisite jurisdiction over the subject matter pursuant to
150.00
TOTAL P1,200.00 the initiatory acts and procedural compliance set as

Petitioner submits that it is incumbent upon the conditions precedent.

RTC to transmit to the Comelec the entire P3,000.00 appeal

fee that he paid on January 10, 2008. Petitioner also Respondent also argues that the negligence and

advances another interpretation of the Comelec Rules that mistakes of petitioners counsel bind petitioner. He then

the RTC is under obligation to remit to the Comelec reiterates the cases where this Court held that the non-

the P2,000.00 representing the excess amount of payment or insufficiency of payment of filing fees is a valid

the P1,000.00 appeal fee.Thus, petitioner claims that he ground for the dismissal of the appeal and that the

must be deemed to have complied, in full or at least subsequent full payment thereof does not cure the

substantially, with the Comelec Rules on the payment of jurisdictional defect.

appeal fees.
We grant the petition.

Petitioner maintains that the alleged non-payment Section 3, Rule 22 (Appeals from Decisions of Courts in

of the correct appeal fee is not due to his own fault or Election Protest Cases) of the Comelec Rules of Procedure

negligence. He claims that the laws on appeals in election mandates that the notice of appeal must be filed within five

protest cases are not yet well-established, thus, he must
not be made to suffer for an oversight made in good
faith. The Resolution No. 8486 of July 15, 2008 adopted by
the Comelec to clarify the rules on compliance with the
required appeal fees in election cases should not be applied
retroactively to the subject election protest.
(5) days after promulgation of the decision, thus:
SEC. 3. Notice of Appeal. Within five (5)
days after promulgation of the decision of
the court, the aggrieved party may file
with said court a notice of appeal, and
serve a copy thereof upon the attorney of
record of the adverse party.

Moreover, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40 of the

Lastly, petitioner invokes liberality in the Comelec rules require the payment of appeal fees in
application of the election law. He asserts that the popular appealed election protest cases, the amended amount of
will of the people expressed in the election of public officers which was set atP3,200.00 in Comelec Minute Resolution
should not be defeated by reason of sheer No. 02-0130,
[11]
to wit:
technicalities. Petitioner argues that the true will of the
SEC. 3. Appeal Fees. The
people of Motiong in the May 14, 2007 elections should be
appellant in election cases shall pay an
determined by ordering the Comelec to give due course to appeal fee as follows:
(a) For election cases
his appeal and to resolve the same on the merits.
appealed from

ELECTION LAWS 2015 11

 Regional Trial WHEREAS, the Commission
Courts.P3,000.00 on Elections is vested with
(per appellant) appellate jurisdiction over all
(b) For election cases contests involving elective
appealed from municipal officials decided by
courts of limited trial courts of general
jurisdiction..P3,00 jurisdiction, and those involving
0.00 (per elective barangay officials,
appellant) decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction;
SEC. 4. Where and When to Pay.
The fees prescribed in Sections 1, 2 and 3 WHEREAS, Supreme Court
hereof shall be paid to, and deposited Administrative Order No. 07-4-
with, the Cash Division of the Commission 15 (Rules of Procedure in
within a period to file the notice of Election Contests Before the
appeal. Courts Involving Elective
Municipal and Barangay
Officials) promulgated on May
15, 2007 provides in Sections 8
Sections 8 and 9, Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-
and 9, Rule 14 thereof the
[12]
SC also provide the procedure for instituting an appeal procedure in instituting the
and the required appeal fees to be paid for the appeal to be appeal and the required appeal
fees to be paid for the appeal
given due course, to wit: to be given due course, to wit:

SEC. 8. Appeal. An aggrieved Section 8. Appeal. An

party may appeal the decision to the aggrieved party may
Commission on Elections, within five days appeal the decision to
after promulgation, by filing a notice of the Commission on
appeal with the court that rendered the Elections, within five
decision, with copy served on the adverse days after
counsel or party if not represented by promulgation, by filing a
counsel. notice of appeal with
the court that rendered
SEC. 9. Appeal fee. The appellant the decision, with copy
in an election contest shall pay to the served on the adverse
court that rendered the decision an counsel or party if not
appeal fee of One Thousand Pesos represented by counsel.
(P1,000.00), simultaneously with the filing
of the notice of appeal. Section 9. Appeal
Fee. The appellant in an
election contest shall
A reading of the foregoing provisions reveals that pay to the court that
rendered the decision an
two different tribunals (the trial court that rendered the appeal fee of One
decision and the Comelec) require the payment of two Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00),
different appeal fees for the perfection of appeals of simultaneously with the
election cases. This requirement in the payment of appeal filing of the notice of
appeal.
fees had caused much confusion, which the Comelec
addressed through the issuance of Comelec Resolution No. WHEREAS, payment of
[13] appeal fees in appealed
8486. Thus, to provide clarity and to erase any ambiguity election protest cases is also
in the implementation of the procedural rules on the required in Section 3, Rule 40
of the COMELEC Rules of
payment of appeal fees for the perfection of appeals of
Procedure the amended
election cases, the resolution provides: amount of which was set

ELECTION LAWS 2015 12

 at P3,200.00 in COMELEC Commissions Cash
Minute Resolution No. 02-0130 Division through the
made effective on September Electoral Contests
18, 2002. Adjudication
Department (ECAD) or
WHEREAS, the requirement by postal money order
of these two appeal fees by payable to the
two different jurisdictions had Commission on
caused confusion in the Elections through
implementation by the ECAD, within a period
Commission on Elections of its of fifteen days (15)
procedural rules on payment of from the time of the
appeal fees for the perfection filing of the Notice of
of appeals of cases brought Appeal with the lower
before it from the Courts of court. If no payment is
General and Limited made within the
Jurisdictions. prescribed period, the
appeal shall be
WHEREAS, there is a need dismissed pursuant to
to clarify the rules on Section 9(a) of Rule 22
compliance with the required of the COMELEC Rules
appeal fees for the proper and of Procedure, which
judicious exercise of the provides:
Commissions appellate
jurisdiction over election Sec. 9. Grounds
protest cases. for Dismissal of
Appeal. The
WHEREFORE, in view of the appeal may be
foregoing, the Commission dismissed upon
hereby RESOLVES to DIRECT as motion of
follows: either party or
at the instance
1. That if the of the
appellant had already Commission on
paid the amount any of the
of P1,000.00 before the following
Regional Trial Court, grounds:
Metropolitan Trial (a) Failure of
Court, Municipal Trial the appellant
Court or lower courts to pay the
within the five-day correct appeal
period, pursuant to fee; xxx
Section 9, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Procedure 2. That if the
in Election Cases appellant failed to pay
Before the Courts the P1,000.00 appeal
Involving Elective fee with the lower
Municipal and court within the five (5)
Barangay Officials day period as
(Supreme Court prescribed by the
Administrative Order Supreme Court New
No. 07-4-15) and his Rules of Procedure but
Appeal was given due the case was
course by the Court, nonetheless elevated
said appellant is to the Commission, the
required to pay the appeal shall be
Comelec appeal fee dismissed outright by
of P3,200.00 at the the Commission, in

ELECTION LAWS 2015 13

 accordance with the
aforestated Section
9(a) of Rule 22 of the
Comelec Rules of
Procedure.
The Education and Information
Department is directed to
cause the publication of this
resolution in two (2)
newspapers of general
circulation.
This resolution shall take effect
on the seventh day following its
publication.
SO ORDERED.
Our ruling in the very recent case of Aguilar v.
[14]
Comelec, quoted hereunder, squarely applies to the
instant case:
Sections 8 and 9, Rule 14 of A.M.
No. 07-4-15-SC provide for the following
procedure in the appeal to the COMELEC
of trial court decisions in election protests
involving elective municipal
and barangay officials:
SEC. 8. Appeal. An
aggrieved party may appeal the
decision to the Commission on
Elections, within five days after
promulgation, by filing a notice of
appeal with the court that
rendered the decision, with copy
served on the adverse counsel or
party if not represented by
counsel.
SEC. 9. Appeal fee. The
appellant in an election contest
shall pay to the court that
rendered the decision an appeal
fee of One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00), simultaneously with
the filing of the notice of appeal.
Section 8 was derived from
Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the
Constitution and Rule 40, Section 3, par. 1
and Rule 41, Section 2(a) of the Rules of
Court. Section 9 was taken from Rule 141,
Sections 7(1) and 8(f) of the Rules of
Court.
ELECTION LAWS 2015
It should be noted from the
afore-quoted sections of the Rule that the
appeal fee of P1,000.00 is paid not to the
COMELEC but to the trial court that
rendered the decision. Thus, the filing of
the notice of appeal and the payment of
the P1,000.00 appeal fee perfect the
appeal, consonant with Sections 10 and
11 of the same Rule. Upon the perfection
of the appeal, the records have to be
transmitted to the Electoral Contests
Adjudication Department of the COMELEC
within 15 days. The trial court may only
exercise its residual jurisdiction to resolve
pending incidents if the records have not
yet been transmitted and before the
expiration of the period to appeal.
With the promulgation of A.M.
No. 07-4-15-SC, the previous rule that the
appeal is perfected only upon the full
payment of the appeal fee, now pegged
at P3,200.00, to the COMELEC Cash
Division within the period to appeal, as
stated in the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, as amended, no longer
applies.
It thus became necessary for the
COMELEC to clarify the procedural rules
on the payment of appeal fees. For this
purpose, the COMELEC issued on July 15,
2008, Resolution No. 8486, which the
Court takes judicial notice of. The
resolution pertinently reads:
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing resolution is
consistent with A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC and
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as
amended. The appeal to the COMELEC of
the trial courts decision in election
contests involving municipal
and barangay officials is perfected upon
the filing of the notice of appeal and the
payment of the P1,000.00 appeal fee to
the court that rendered the decision
within the five-day reglementary
period. The non-payment or the
insufficient payment of the additional
appeal fee of P3,200.00 to the
COMELEC Cash Division, in accordance
with Rule 40, Section 3 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, as amended, does not
affect the perfection of the appeal and
does not result in outright or ipso
facto dismissal of the appeal. Following,
Rule 22, Section 9 (a) of the COMELEC
Rules, the appeal may be dismissed. And
14
 pursuant to Rule 40, Section 18 of the
same rules, if the fees are not paid, the
COMELEC may refuse to take action
thereon until they are paid
and may dismiss the action or the
proceeding. In such a situation, the
COMELEC is merely given the discretion
to dismiss the appeal or not.
Accordingly, in the instant case,
the COMELEC First Division, may dismiss
petitioners appeal, as it in fact did, for
petitioners failure to pay the P3,200.00
appeal fee.
Be that as it may, the Court finds
that the COMELEC First Division gravely
abused its discretion in issuing the order
dismissing petitioners appeal. The Court
notes that the notice of appeal and
the P1,000.00 appeal fee were,
respectively, filed and paid with the MTC
of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte on April 21,
2008. On that date, the petitioners appeal
was deemed perfected. COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 8486 clarifying the rule on
the payment of appeal fees only on July
15, 2008, or almost three months after
the appeal was perfected. Yet, on July 31,
2008, or barely two weeks after the
issuance of Resolution No. 8486, the
COMELEC First Division dismissed
petitioners appeal for non-payment to the
COMELEC Cash Division of the
additional P3,200.00 appeal fee.
Considering that petitioner filed
his appeal months before the
clarificatory resolution on appeal fees,
petitioners appeal should not be unjustly
prejudiced by COMELEC Resolution No.
8486. Fairness and prudence dictate that
the COMELEC First Division should have
first directed petitioner to pay the
additional appeal fee in accordance with
the clarificatory resolution, and if the
latter should refuse to comply, then, and
only then, dismiss the appeal. Instead,
the COMELEC First Division hastily
dismissed the appeal on the strength of
the recently promulgated clarificatory
resolution which had taken effect only a
few days earlier. This unseemly haste is
an invitation to outrage.
The COMELEC First Division
should have been more cautious in
dismissing petitioners appeal on the mere
ELECTION LAWS 2015
technicality of non-payment of the
additional P3,200.00 appeal fee given the
public interest involved in election
cases. This is especially true in this case
where only one vote separates the
contending parties. The Court stresses
once more that election law and rules are
to be interpreted and applied in a liberal
manner so as to give effect, not to
frustrate, the will of the electorate.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the petition for certiorari
is GRANTED. The July 31, September 4
and October 6, 2008 Orders and the
October 16 2008 Entry of Judgment issued
by the COMELEC First Division in EAC
(BRGY) No. 211-2008
are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The case
is REMANDED to the COMELEC First
Division for disposition in accordance with
this Decision.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis
supplied)
From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the
appeal from the trial court decision to the Comelec is
perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal and the
payment of the P1,000.00 appeal fee to the trial court that
rendered the decision. With the promulgation of A.M.
No. 07-4-15-SC, the perfection of the appeal no longer
depends solely on the full payment of the appeal fee to the
Comelec.
In the instant case, when petitioner filed his Notice of
Appeal and paid the appeal fee of P3,015.00 to the RTC
on January 10, 2008, his appeal was deemed
perfected. However, Comelec Resolution No. 8486 also
provides that if the appellant had already paid the amount
of P1,000.00 before the trial court that rendered the
decision, and his appeal was given due course by the court,
said appellant is required to pay the Comelec appeal fee
of P3,200.00 to the Comelecs Cash Division through the
Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) or by
postal money order payable to the Comelec, within a period
of fifteen (15) days from the time of the filing of the Notice
of Appeal with the lower court. However, if no payment is
made within the prescribed period, the appeal shall be
15
dismissed pursuant to Section 9 (a), Rule 22 of the Comelec
Rules of Procedure, which provides:
SEC. 9. Grounds for Dismissal of
Appeal. The appeal may be dismissed
upon motion of either party or at the
instance of the Commission on any of the
following grounds:
(a) Failure of the
appellant to pay the correct appeal fee;
xxx
Thus, when petitioners appeal was perfected
on January 10, 2008, within five (5) days from
promulgation, his non-payment or insufficient payment of
the appeal fee to the Comelec Cash Division should not
have resulted in the outright dismissal of his appeal. The
Comelec Rules provide in Section 9 (a), Rule 22, that for
failure to pay the correct appeal fee, the appeal may be
dismissed upon motion of either party or at the instance of
the Comelec. Likewise, Section 18, Rule 40
[15]
thereof also
prescribes that if the fees are not paid, the Comelec may
refuse to take action on the appeal until the said fees are
paid and may dismiss the action or the proceeding.
with the Comelec Cash Division, and should not have
dismissed outright petitioners appeal. This would have been
more in consonance with the intent of the said resolution
which sought to clarify the rules on compliance with the
required appeal fees.
[17]
In Barroso v. Ampig, Jr., we ruled, thus:
xxx An election contest, unlike an
ordinary civil action, is clothed with a
public interest. The purpose of an election
protest is to ascertain whether the
candidate proclaimed by the board of
canvassers is the lawful choice of the
people. What is sought is the correction of
the canvass of votes, which was the basis
of proclamation of the winning
candidate. An election contest therefore
involves not only the adjudication of
private and pecuniary interests of rival
candidates but paramount to their claims
is the deep public concern involved and
the need of dispelling the uncertainty
over the real choice of the electorate. And
the court has the corresponding duty to
ascertain by all means within its
command who is the real candidate
elected by the people.

Moreover, the Comelec Rules of

Here, petitioner paid P1,200.00 to the Comelec on Procedure are subject to a liberal
February 14, 2008. Unfortunately, the Comelec First construction. This liberality is for the
purpose of promoting the effective and
Division dismissed the appeal on March 17, 2008 due to efficient implementation of the objectives
petitioners failure to pay the correct appeal fee within the of ensuring the holding of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections
five-day reglementary period. In denying petitioners motion and for achieving just, expeditious and
for reconsideration, the Comelec En Banc, in the Resolution inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and
datedJanuary 21, 2009, declared that the Comelec did not
proceeding brought before the
acquire jurisdiction over the appeal because of the non- Comelec. Thus we have declared:
payment of the appeal fee on time.
It has been frequently
decided, and it may be stated
as a general rule recognized by
However, during the pendency of petitioners
all courts, that statutes
Motion for Reconsideration dated March 27, 2008, the providing for election contests
are to be liberally construed to
Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 8486 to clarify the
the end that the will of the
implementation of the Comelec Rules regarding the people in the choice of public
payment of filing fees. Thus, applying the mandated liberal officers may not be defeated by
mere technical objections. An
[16]
construction of election laws, the Comelec should have election contest, unlike an
initially directed the petitioner to pay the correct appeal fee ordinary action, is imbued with

ELECTION LAWS 2015 16

 public interest since it involves
not only the adjudication of the
private interests of rival
candidates but also the
paramount need of dispelling
the uncertainty which beclouds
the real choice of the
electorate with respect to who
shall discharge the prerogatives
of the office within their
gift. Moreover, it is neither fair
nor just to keep in office for an
uncertain period one whose
right to it is under suspicion. It
is imperative that his claim be
immediately cleared not only
for the benefit of the winner
but for the sake of public
interest, which can only be
achieved by brushing aside
technicalities of procedure
which protract and delay the
trial of an ordinary action.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Order

dated March 17, 2008 of the Comelec First Division and the
Resolution dated January 21, 2009 of the Comelec En Banc
in EAC No. A-13-2008 are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, let the case be REMANDED to the
Comelec First Division for further proceedings, in
accordance with the rules and with this disposition. The
Regional Trial Court, Branch 27 of
Catbalogan, Samar is DIRECTED to refund to petitioner
Constancio D. Pacanan, Jr., the amount of Two Thousand
Pesos (P2,000.00) as the excess of the appeal fee per
Official Receipt No. 6822663 paid on January 10, 2008.

SO ORDERED.

ELECTION LAWS 2015 17

G.R. No. 184801 July 30, 2009
JONAS TAGUIAM, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANTHONY C.
TUDDAO, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
1
injunction assails the December 20, 2007 Resolution of
2 implement this Resolution with dispatch.
the Second Division of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in SPC No. 07-171 which granted private
respondent Anthony C. Tuddaos Petition for Correction of
Manifest Error and Annulment of Proclamation of
petitioner Jonas Taguiam as the 12th winning candidate for
theSangguniang Panglungsod of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan.
3
Also assailed is the October 9, 2008 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc denying petitioners Motion for
4
Reconsideration.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition filed by
Anthony Tuddao for Correction of Manifest Error and
Annulment of Proclamation of Jonas Taguiam is hereby
GRANTED.
ACCORDINGLY, the City Board of Canvassers of Tuguegarao,
Cagayan is hereby DIRECTED to (i) RECONVENE after giving
due notice to the concerned parties, (ii) CORRECT the errors
in the Statement of Votes by Precinct (SOVP), and
thereafter proclaim the 12th winning candidate for the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tuguegarao, Cagayan.1avvphi1
Let the City Board of Canvassers of Tuguegarao, Cagayan
10
SO ORDERED.
The COMELEC held that the belated filing of private
respondents petition cannot deter its authority to ascertain
the true will of the electorate and thereafter affirm such
will. Thus, after due proceedings, the COMELEC found
private respondents allegations duly substantiated with
material evidence and confirmed the following:

Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the A. With regard to the votes of private respondent:
position of Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tuguegarao City in
Cagayan during the 2007 National and Local Elections. On
May 19, 2007, petitioner was proclaimed by the City Board Precinct SOVP ER No. Votes Votes Votes
of Canvassers (CBOC) as the 12th ranking and winning No. No. in in ER Affected
5
candidate for the said position with 10,981 votes. Private SOVP
6
respondent obtained 10,971 votes and was ranked no. 13. 1 69A/69B 15327 9602679 27 27 0

On May 25, 2007, private respondent filed with the 2 87A/87B 10543 9602699 13 13 0
COMELEC a petition for correction of manifest errors in the
Election Returns and Statement of Votes for 27 clustered 3 192A/192B 10531 9602801 20 19 -1
7
precincts and for the annulment of the proclamation of the
4 326A 10532 9602921 43 53 +10
affected winning candidate in Tuguegarao City. He alleged
that he was credited with less votes in several Statements TOTAL +9
of Votes by Precincts (SOVP) as compared with the tally of
his votes in the election returns ERs), whereas petitioner
was credited with more votes. Private respondent offered
Precinct No. SOVP ER No. Votes Votes Votes
evidence in the following nine precincts: 0035A/0036A,
No. in in ER Affected
0061A/0063A, 69A/69B, 87A/87B, 192A/192B, 264A/265A,
SOVP
324A/325B, 326A, and 328B.
1 35A/36A 10543 9602647 40 33 -7
Petitioner denied the allegations of private respondent and
argued that the petition should be dismissed for having 2 61A/63A 10539 9602672 55 50 -5
been filed late or six days after the proclamation of the 3 264A/265A 10528 9602871 39 29 -10
8
winning candidates. Meanwhile, the members of the CBOC
of Tuguegarao City denied private respondents allegations 4 324A/325A 10533 9602920 62 61 -1
of manifest errors in the SOVP; maintained that petitioner
5 328B 10527 9602924 33 32 -1
garnered more votes than those obtained by private
respondent; and that they have properly performed their TOTAL -24
9
duties and functions.

On December 20, 2007, the Second Division of the B. With regard to the votes of petitioner:
COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution, to wit:

ELECTION LAWS 2015 18

The COMELEC concluded that nine votes should be added
to the total number of votes garnered by private
respondent; while 24 votes should be deducted from the
total number of votes obtained by petitioner. Thus, the
total number of votes obtained by private respondent was
10,980, while the total number of votes received by
petitioner was 10,957. As such, private respondent was
rightfully the 12th winning candidate for the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied by the COMELEC En Banc on October 9, 2008.
11
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari raising the issue of
whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when
it took cognizance of private respondents petition for
correction of manifest errors in the Election Returns and
Statement of Votes despite its late filing.
Petitioner avers that private respondents petition for
correction of manifest errors should have been dismissed
outright for failure to show any justification for its late
filing; that, if the petition had been properly dismissed,
private respondent had other remedies available, such as
an election protest.
Rule 27, Section 5 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure
expressly states that:
Pre-proclamation Controversies Which May Be Filed
Directly with the Commission
(a) The following pre-proclamation controversies may be
filed directly with the Commission:
xxxx
2) When the issue involves the correction of manifest errors
in the tabulation or tallying of the results during the
canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election returns or
certificate of canvass was tabulated more than once, (2)
two or more copies of the election returns of one precinct,
or two or more copies of certificate of canvass were
tabulated separately, (3) there has been a mistake in the
copying of the figures into the statement of votes or into
the certificate of canvass, or (4) so-called returns from non-
existent precincts were included in the canvass, and such
errors could not have been discovered during the
canvassing despite the exercise of due diligence and
proclamation of the winning candidates had already been
made.
xxxx
If the petition is for correction, it must be filed not later
than five (5) days following the date of proclamation and
ELECTION LAWS 2015
must implead all candidates who may be adversely affected
thereby.
While the petition was indeed filed beyond the 5-day
reglementary period, the COMELEC however has the
discretion to suspend its rules of procedure or any portion
thereof. Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 1 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure state, to wit:
Sec. 3. Construction. These rules shall be liberally
construed in order to promote the effective and efficient
implementation of the objectives of ensuring the holding of
free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and to
achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination
and disposition of every action and proceeding brought
before the Commission.
Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. In the interest of justice
and in order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters
pending before the Commission, these rules or any portion
thereof may be suspended by the Commission.
Certainly, such rule of suspension is in accordance with the
spirit of Section 6, Article IX-A of the Constitution which
bestows upon the COMELEC the power to "promulgate its
own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or
before any of its offices" to attain justice and the noble
12
purpose of determining the true will of the electorate.
13
In Jaramilla v. Commission on Elections and Dela Llana v.
14
Commission on Elections, the Court affirmed the
COMELECs suspension of its rules of procedure regarding
the late filing of a petition for correction of manifest error
and annulment of proclamation in view of its paramount
duty to determine the real will of the electorate. We have
consistently employed liberal construction of procedural
rules in election cases to the end that the will of the people
in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by
15
mere technical objections.
In the instant case, records show that petitioner was
declared the 12th winning candidate based on SOVPs
containing mathematical and clerical errors. The total
number of votes in the SOVPs of the identified precincts are
markedly different from the votes tabulated in their
respective ERs, i.e., petitioner was given additional votes,
while private respondents votes were reduced, which
altered the outcome of the election. Petitioner was
declared the last winning candidate for the position
of Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tuguegarao City, instead of
private respondent.
16
In Torres v. Commission on Elections, the Court reiterated
that while the remedy of the losing party is an election
protest after his opponent has already been proclaimed as
winning candidate, such recourse is on the assumption,
however, that there has been a valid proclamation. Where
19
a proclamation is null and void, the proclamation is no
proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's
assumption of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the
17
power to declare such nullity and annul the proclamation.

It is significant to note that petitioner did not assail the

factual findings of the COMELEC of manifest error in the
tabulation of votes but only raised issues on the foregoing
technicalities. Hence, the COMELECs unrebutted findings of
fact are therefore sustained.

Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or

tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence. Grave abuse of discretion means such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as would
amount to lack of jurisdiction; it contemplates a situation
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by, or to act at
all in contemplation of law. In a certiorariproceeding, as in
the instant case, it is imperative for petitioner to show
caprice and arbitrariness on the part of the court or agency
18
whose exercise of discretion is being assailed.

For acting pursuant to its Constitutional mandate of

determining the true will of the electorate with
substantiated evidence, the Court finds no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of COMELEC in annulling the
proclamation of petitioner. Said proclamation is flawed
from the beginning because it did not reflect the true and
legitimate will of the electorate. Having been based on a
faulty tabulation, there can be no valid proclamation to
19
speak of.

WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for

lack of merit. The December 20, 2007 Resolution of the
Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
and the October 9, 2008 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ELECTION LAWS 2015 20

G.R. No. 181613 November 25, 2009
ROSALINDA A. PENERA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR T.
ANDANAR, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
We grant Rosalinda A. Peneras (Penera) motion for
reconsideration of this Courts Decision of 11 September
2009 (Decision).
The assailed Decision dismissed Peneras petition and
affirmed the Resolution dated 30 July 2008 of the COMELEC
En Banc as well as the Resolution dated 24 July 2007 of the
COMELEC Second Division. The Decision disqualified Penera
from running for the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica, Surigao
del Norte and declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed
Penera.
In support of her motion for reconsideration, Penera
submits the following arguments:
1. Penera was not yet a candidate at the time of
the incident under Section 11 of RA 8436 as
amended by Section 13 of RA 9369.
2. The petition for disqualification failed to submit
convincing and substantial evidence against Penera
for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
3. Penera never admitted the allegations of the
petition for disqualification and has consistently
disputed the charge of premature campaigning.
4. The admission that Penera participated in a
motorcade is not the same as admitting she
engaged in premature election campaigning.
Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code defines a
"candidate" as "any person aspiring for or seeking an
elective public office, who has filed a certificate of
candidacy x x x." The second sentence, third paragraph,
Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by Section 13 of RA
9369, provides that "[a]ny person who files his certificate of
candidacy within [the period for filing] shall only be
considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign
period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." The
immediately succeeding proviso in the same third
paragraph states that "unlawful acts or omissions applicable
to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
aforesaid campaign period." These two provisions
determine the resolution of this case.
ELECTION LAWS 2015
The Decision states that "[w]hen the campaign period starts
and [the person who filed his certificate of candidacy]
proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into
actuality, we can already consider his/her acts, after the
filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as
the promotion of his/her election as a candidate, hence,
constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may
1
be disqualified."
Under the Decision, a candidate may already be liable for
premature campaigning after the filing of the certificate of
candidacy but even before the start of the campaign period.
From the filing of the certificate of candidacy, even long
before the start of the campaign period, the Decision
considers the partisan political acts of a person so filing a
certificate of candidacy "as the promotion of his/her
election as a candidate." Thus, such person can be
disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done
before the start of the campaign period. In short, the
Decision considers a person who files a certificate of
candidacy already a "candidate" even before the start of
the campaign period. lawphil
The assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and
letter of the law.
2
The Decision reverses Lanot v. COMELEC, which held that a
person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a
candidate until the start of the campaign period.
In Lanot, this Court explained:
Thus, the essential elements for violation of Section 80 of
the Omnibus Election Code are: (1) a person engages in an
election campaign or partisan political activity; (2) the act is
designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates; (3) the act is done outside the
campaign period.
The second element requires the existence of a
"candidate." Under Section 79(a), a candidate is one who
"has filed a certificate of candidacy" to an elective public
office. Unless one has filed his certificate of candidacy, he is
not a "candidate." The third element requires that the
campaign period has not started when the election
campaign or partisan political activity is committed.
Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their
certificates of candidacy on the last day, which under
Section 75 of the Omnibus Election Code is the day before
the start of the campaign period, then no one can be
prosecuted for violation of Section 80 for acts done prior to
such last day. Before such last day, there is no "particular
candidate or candidates" to campaign for or against. On the
day immediately after the last day of filing, the campaign
period starts and Section 80 ceases to apply since Section
80 covers only acts done "outside" the campaign period.
21
Thus, if all candidates file their certificates of candidacy on
the last day, Section 80 may only apply to acts done on such
last day, which is before the start of the campaign period
and after at least one candidate has filed his certificate of
candidacy. This is perhaps the reason why those running for
elective public office usually file their certificates of
candidacy on the last day or close to the last day.
There is no dispute that Eusebios acts of election
campaigning or partisan political activities were committed
outside of the campaign period. The only question is
whether Eusebio, who filed his certificate of candidacy on
29 December 2003, was a "candidate" when he committed
those acts before the start of the campaign period on 24
March 2004.
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 ("RA 8436") moved the
deadline for the filing of certificates of candidacy to 120
days before election day. Thus, the original deadline was
moved from 23 March 2004 to 2 January 2004, or 81 days
earlier. The crucial question is: did this change in the
deadline for filing the certificate of candidacy make one
who filed his certificate of candidacy before 2 January 2004
immediately liable for violation of Section 80 if he engaged
in election campaign or partisan political activities prior to
the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004?
Section 11 of RA 8436 provides:
SECTION 11. Official Ballot. The Commission shall
prescribe the size and form of the official ballot which shall
contain the titles of the positions to be filled and/or the
propositions to be voted upon in an initiative, referendum
or plebiscite. Under each position, the names of candidates
shall be arranged alphabetically by surname and uniformly
printed using the same type size. A fixed space where the
chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors shall affix
his/her signature to authenticate the official ballot shall be
provided.
Both sides of the ballots may be used when necessary.
For this purpose, the deadline for the filing of certificate of
candidacy/petition for registration/ manifestation to
participate in the election shall not be later than one
hundred twenty (120) days before the elections: Provided,
That, any elective official, whether national or local, running
for any office other than the one which he/she is holding in
a permanent capacity, except for president and vice-
president, shall be deemed resigned only upon the start of
the campaign period corresponding to the position for
which he/she is running: Provided, further, That, unlawful
acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect
upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided,
finally, That, for purposes of the May 11, 1998 elections,
the deadline for filing of the certificate of candidacy for the
positions of President, Vice-President, Senators and
candidates under the party-list system as well as petitions
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for registration and/or manifestation to participate in the
party-list system shall be on February 9, 1998 while the
deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy for other
positions shall be on March 27, 1998.
The official ballots shall be printed by the National Printing
Office and/or the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas at the price
comparable with that of private printers under proper
security measures which the Commission shall adopt. The
Commission may contract the services of private printers
upon certification by the National Printing Office/Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas that it cannot meet the printing
requirements. Accredited political parties and deputized
citizens arms of the Commission may assign watchers in
the printing, storage and distribution of official ballots.
To prevent the use of fake ballots, the Commission through
the Committee shall ensure that the serial number on the
ballot stub shall be printed in magnetic ink that shall be
easily detectable by inexpensive hardware and shall be
impossible to reproduce on a photocopying machine, and
that identification marks, magnetic strips, bar codes and
other technical and security markings, are provided on the
ballot.
The official ballots shall be printed and distributed to each
city/municipality at the rate of one (1) ballot for every
registered voter with a provision of additional four (4)
ballots per precinct.
Under Section 11 of RA 8436, the only purpose for the early
filing of certificates of candidacy is to give ample time for
the printing of official ballots. This is clear from the
following deliberations of the Bicameral Conference
Committee:
SENATOR GONZALES. Okay. Then, how about the campaign
period, would it be the same[,] uniform for local and
national officials?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Personally, I would
agree to retaining it at the present periods.
SENATOR GONZALES. But the moment one files a certificate
of candidacy, hes already a candidate, and there are many
prohibited acts on the part of candidate.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Unless we. . . .
SENATOR GONZALES. And you cannot say that the
campaign period has not yet began (sic).
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). If we dont provide that
the filing of the certificate will not bring about ones being a
candidate.
22
SENATOR GONZALES. If thats a fact, the law cannot change
a fact.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). No, but if we can
provide that the filing of the certificate of candidacy will not
result in that official vacating his position, we can also
provide that insofar he is concerned, election period or his
being a candidate will not yet commence. Because here, the
reason why we are doing an early filing is to afford enough
time to prepare this machine readable ballots.
So, with the manifestations from the Commission on
Elections, Mr. Chairman, the House Panel will withdraw its
proposal and will agree to the 120-day period provided in
the Senate version.
THE CHAIRMAN (SENATOR FERNAN). Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
xxxx
SENATOR GONZALES. How about prohibition against
campaigning or doing partisan acts which apply
immediately upon being a candidate?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Again, since the
intention of this provision is just to afford the Comelec
enough time to print the ballots, this provision does not
intend to change the campaign periods as presently, or
rather election periods as presently fixed by existing law.
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). So, it should be
subject to the other prohibition.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). Thats right.
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (SEN. FERNAN). Okay.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. TANJUATCO). In other words,
actually, there would be no conflict anymore because we
are talking about the 120-day period before election as the
last day of filing a certificate of candidacy, election period
starts 120 days also. So that is election period already. But
he will still not be considered as a candidate.
Thus, because of the early deadline of 2 January 2004 for
purposes of printing of official ballots, Eusebio filed his
certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003. Congress,
however, never intended the filing of a certificate of
candidacy before 2 January 2004 to make the person filing
to become immediately a "candidate" for purposes other
than the printing of ballots. This legislative intent prevents
the immediate application of Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code to those filing to meet the early deadline. The
clear intention of Congress was to preserve the "election
periods as x x x fixed by existing law" prior to RA 8436 and
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that one who files to meet the early deadline "will still not
3
be considered as a candidate." (Emphasis in the original)
Lanot was decided on the ground that one who files a
certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of
the campaign period. This ground was based on the
deliberations of the legislators who explained the intent of
the provisions of RA 8436, which laid the legal framework
for an automated election system. There was no express
provision in the original RA 8436 stating that one who files a
certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of
the campaign period.
When Congress amended RA 8436, Congress decided to
expressly incorporate the Lanot doctrine into law, realizing
that Lanot merely relied on the deliberations of Congress in
holding that
The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the
"election periods as x x x fixed by existing law" prior to RA
8436 and that one who files to meet the early deadline "will
4
still not be considered as a candidate." (Emphasis supplied)
Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a certificate
of candidacy under the early deadline required by the
automated election system would be disqualified or
penalized for any partisan political act done before the start
of the campaign period. Thus, in enacting RA 9369,
Congress expressly wrote the Lanot doctrine into the
second sentence, third paragraph of the amended Section
15 of RA 8436, thus:
xxx
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for
the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition for
registration/manifestation to participate in the election.
Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this
period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start
of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of
candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the
start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally,
That any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the armed forces, and
officers and employees in government-owned or -
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at
the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of
candidacy. (Boldfacing and underlining supplied)
Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by
specifically inserting it as the second sentence of the third
paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436, which
cannot be annulled by this Court except on the sole ground
of its unconstitutionality. The Decision cannot reverse Lanot
23
without repealing this second sentence, because to reverse
Lanot would mean repealing this second sentence.
The assailed Decision, however, in reversing Lanot does not
claim that this second sentence or any portion of Section 15
of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, is unconstitutional. In
fact, the Decision considers the entire Section 15 good law.
Thus, the Decision is self-contradictory reversing Lanot
but maintaining the constitutionality of the second
sentence, which embodies the Lanot doctrine. In so doing,
the Decision is irreconcilably in conflict with the clear intent
and letter of the second sentence, third paragraph, Section
15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.
In enacting RA 9369, Congress even further clarified the
first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436.
The original provision in RA 8436 states
x x x Provided, further, That, unlawful acts or omissions
applicable to a candidate shall take effect upon the start of
the aforesaid campaign period, x x x.
In RA 9369, Congress inserted the word "only" so that the
first proviso now reads
x x x Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable
to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
aforesaid campaign period x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its
mandatory directive that election offenses can be
committed by a candidate "only" upon the start of the
campaign period. This clearly means that before the start of
the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so
committed.
When the applicable provisions of RA 8436, as amended by
RA 9369, are read together, these provisions of law do not
consider Penera a candidate for purposes other than the
printing of ballots, until the start of the campaign period.
There is absolutely no room for any other interpretation.
We quote with approval the Dissenting Opinion of Justice
Antonio T. Carpio:
x x x The definition of a "candidate" in Section 79(a) of the
Omnibus Election Code should be read together with the
amended Section 15 of RA 8436. A "candidate refers to
any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office,
who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or
through an accredited political party, aggroupment or
coalition of parties." However, it is no longer enough to
merely file a certificate of candidacy for a person to be
considered a candidate because "any person who files his
certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only
be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign
period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Any
ELECTION LAWS 2015
person may thus file a certificate of candidacy on any day
within the prescribed period for filing a certificate of
candidacy yet that person shall be considered a candidate,
for purposes of determining ones possible violations of
election laws, only during the campaign period. Indeed,
there is no "election campaign" or "partisan political
activity" designed to promote the election or defeat of a
particular candidate or candidates to public office simply
because there is no "candidate" to speak of prior to the
start of the campaign period. Therefore, despite the filing of
her certificate of candidacy, the law does not consider
Penera a candidate at the time of the questioned
motorcade which was conducted a day before the start of
the campaign period. x x x
The campaign period for local officials began on 30 March
2007 and ended on 12 May 2007. Penera filed her
certificate of candidacy on 29 March 2007. Penera was thus
a candidate on 29 March 2009 only for purposes of printing
the ballots. On 29 March 2007, the law still did not consider
Penera a candidate for purposes other than the printing of
ballots. Acts committed by Penera prior to 30 March 2007,
the date when she became a "candidate," even if
constituting election campaigning or partisan political
activities, are not punishable under Section 80 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Such acts are within the realm of a
citizens protected freedom of expression. Acts committed
by Penera within the campaign period are not covered by
Section 80 as Section 80 punishes only acts outside the
5
campaign period.
The assailed Decision gives a specious reason in explaining
away the first proviso in the third paragraph, the amended
Section 15 of RA 8436 that election offenses applicable to
candidates take effect only upon the start of the campaign
period. The Decision states that:
x x x [T]he line in Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8436, as
amended, which provides that "any unlawful act or
omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only
upon the start of the campaign period," does not mean that
the acts constituting premature campaigning can only be
committed, for which the offender may be disqualified,
during the campaign period. Contrary to the
pronouncement in the dissent, nowhere in said proviso was
it stated that campaigning before the start of the campaign
period is lawful, such that the offender may freely carry out
the same with impunity.
As previously established, a person, after filing his/her COC
but prior to his/her becoming a candidate (thus, prior to the
start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts
described under Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election
Code as election campaign or partisan political activity,
However, only after said person officially becomes a
candidate, at the beginning of the campaign period, can
said acts be given effect as premature campaigning under
Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only after said
24
person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the
campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for
acts constituting premature campaigning. Obviously, it is
only at the start of the campaign period, when the person
officially becomes a candidate, that the undue and
iniquitous advantages of his/her prior acts, constituting
premature campaigning, shall accrue to his/her benefit.
Compared to the other candidates who are only about to
begin their election campaign, a candidate who had
previously engaged in premature campaigning already
enjoys an unfair headstart in promoting his/her
6
candidacy. (Emphasis supplied)
It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless
expressly declared unlawful by law. This is specially true to
expression or speech, which Congress cannot outlaw except
on very narrow grounds involving clear, present and
imminent danger to the State. The mere fact that the law
does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the
act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare
in Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, that
political partisan activities before the start of the campaign
period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that
"any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate
shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign
period." The only inescapable and logical result is that the
same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period,
are lawful.
In laymans language, this means that a candidate is liable
for an election offense only for acts done during the
campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight
any election offense that may be committed by a candidate
under any election law cannot be committed before the
start of the campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable
for premature campaigning for partisan political acts before
the start of the campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores
the clear and express provision of the law.
envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and
curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void
for vagueness.
Congress has laid down the law a candidate is liable for
election offenses only upon the start of the campaign
period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and
express mandate of the law that "any person who files his
certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only
be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign
period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy."
Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and
clear language of the law that "any unlawful act or omission
applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the
start of the campaign period."
The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and
enacting remedial measures, is not this Court but the
Legislature. This Court has no recourse but to apply a law
that is as clear, concise and express as the second sentence,
and its immediately succeeding proviso, as written in the
third paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by
RA 9369.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner Rosalinda A. Peneras
Motion for Reconsideration. We SET ASIDE the Decision of
this Court in G.R. No. 181613 promulgated on 11
September 2009, as well as the Resolutions dated 24 July
2007 and 30 January 2008 of the COMELEC Second Division
and the COMELEC En Banc, respectively, in SPA No. 07-224.
Rosalinda A. Penera shall continue as Mayor of Sta. Monica,
Surigao del Norte.
SO ORDERED.

The Decision rationalizes that a candidate who commits

premature campaigning can be disqualified or prosecuted
only after the start of the campaign period. This is not what
the law says. What the law says is "any unlawful act or
omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only
upon the start of the campaign period." The plain meaning
of this provision is that the effective date when partisan
political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the
campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign
period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.

The law does not state, as the assailed Decision asserts, that
partisan political acts done by a candidate before the
campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only
upon the start of the campaign period. Neither does the law
state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before
the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes
unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. This is
clearly not the language of the law. Besides, such a law as
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G.R. No. 86362-63 October 27, 1989
RAMON D. DUREMDES, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS OF ILOILO, LAKAS NG BANSA and CIPRIANO
B. PENAFLORIDA, respondents.
Panganiban, Benitez, Barinaga & Bautista Law Offices, Lead
Counsel for petitioner.
Nery D. Duremdes Co-counsel for petitioner.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro & Arcilla Law Offices for
private respondent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
At stake in this election controversy is the Vice-
gubernatorial position of the Province of Iloilo.
The chronology of the facts and of the case follows:
1. In the 18 January 1988 elections, petitioner Ramon D.
DUREMDES, private respondent Cipriano B. PENAFLORIDA,
and Rufino Palabrica ran for the office of Vice-Governor of
the Province of Iloilo.
DUREMDES was the official candidate of the Liberal Party
(LP) and PDP-Laban coalition, while PENAFLORIDA was the
official candidate of the Lakas ng Bansa (Lakas).
2. During the canvass of votes by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Iloilo, which lasted from 20 January to 31
January 1988, PENAFLORIDA objected verbally to some 110
election returns from various precincts, which he followed
up with written objections. The Board overruled the same
in separate Orders either because they were not timely
filed or that the formal defects did not affect the
genuineness of the returns, or that in case of allegations of
tampering, no evidence was presented to support the
charge. The Board thus ordered the inclusion of the
questioned election returns. This was reflected in a
separate column under the heading "Contested/Deferred
Votes" in the "Certificate of Votes of Candidates" (Form No.
13A, Annex "K," Petition, p. 60 Rollo).
3. Under date of 29 January 1988, PENAFLORIDA and the
Lakas filed with the COMELEC an "Appeal by Way of a
Petition for Review," from the aforesaid rulings of the Board
pleading, among others, for the exclusion of the questioned
election returns and for PENAFLORIDA's proclamation as
the elected Vice-Governor of Iloilo (Annex "L," Ibid., p. 62,
Rollo).
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4. On 30 January 1988, PENAFLORIDA filed, also with the
COMELEC, a Petition seeking the annulment of election
returns and the suspension of the proclamation of any
candidate, docketed as SPC Case No. 88-448 (Annex
"Q," Ibid., p. 96, Rollo).
5. On 31 January 1988, in a "Certification of Canvass of
Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for
Provincial Offices" (Form No. 26, Annex "N," Ibid., p. 84,
Rollo), the Board proclaimed DUREMDES as the duly elected
Vice- Governor, together with the duly elected Governor
and only eight (8) members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Iloilo. Certified to was that DUREMDES had
garnered 157,361 votes (the number of his uncontested
votes) in 2,377 precincts.
Apparently, the Board had made the proclamation upon
DUREMDES' "Manifestation and Motion," dated the same
day, 31 January 1988, that "the contested returns will not
adversely affect the uncontested results of the election (See
Section 245, Omnibus Election Code) ... because of the
absolute certainty that candidate Ramon Duremdes has
obtained the highest number of votes, whether or not the
contested votes were excluded."
6. The tabulated data in the Certificate of Votes of
Candidates (Annex "K," Petition) is reproduced below in so
far as the protagonists herein are concerned, with the totals
and/or remainders supplied by us:
Non-Contested Contested/
Deferred
Votes
DUREMDES 157,361 13,373
PENAFLORIDA 150,075 + 4,427
7,286 17,800
6. On 2 February 1988, DUREMDES took his oath and
assumed office (Annex "O," Ibid.).
7. Also on 2 February 1988, an "Intervention with Motion to
Dismiss" was filed by DUREMDES and two other candidates
for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, seeking the denial of
PENAFLORIDA's Petition for Annulment before the
COMELEC, for lack of merit.
8. On 12 February 1988, Perla S. Zulueta (also an Intervenor
in SPC Case No. 88-448), filed SPC Case No. 88-653 pleading
that she be proclaimed as one of the winning candidates in
the 10-member Iloilo Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
26
9. On 8 March 1988, PENAFLORIDA filed an Amended
Petition challenging, in addition, the legality of the
composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers, "a
ground just known lately," and praying for a recanvassing of
the objected election returns.
10. On 4 April 1988, the COMELEC granted a Motion for the
consolidation of SPC Case No. 88-653 with SPC Case No. 88-
448.
11. On 20 June 1988, PENAFLORIDA filed with the COMELEC
a Supplemental Petition ('in amplification of the Amended
petition for verification and correction") charging, among
others, that DUREMDES was proclaimed "on the basis of
increased votes in the unofficial and separately tallied
Statement of Votes, more than what was actually reflected
in the Election Returns."
Investigation or any other investigative
arm of the Government for that purpose
is necessary, to request for such
assistance.
No pronouncement as to costs. (pp. 137-
138, Rollo) (Italics ours).
13. On 27 September 1988, PENAFLORIDA moved for
reconsideration, whereupon, the Second Division certified
and elevated the case to the COMELEC en banc.
14. On 4 October 1988, PENAFLORIDA filed a Motion to
Suspend Implementation of the Second Division Resolution
of 20 September 1988 pending resolution of his Motion for
Reconsideration, which suspension was granted by the
COMELEC on 5 October 1988.

12. On 20 September 1988, the COMELEC (Second Division),
after hearing, issued a Per Curiam Resolution, sustaining the
rulings of the Board of Canvassers on PENAFLORIDA's
objections as well as DUREMDES' proclamation. The
decretal portion of that Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered:
15. In the meantime, on 10 December 1988, the Board
reconvened for the purpose of proclaiming the 9th and
10th placers for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Iloilo. It
was at the scheduled promulgation of 15 December 1988
that the Chairman of the Board openly admitted the
existence of discrepancies between the entries of votes in
the Statement of Votes and the votes reflected in the
questioned election returns (P. 6, COMELEC en
bancDecision).

1. Sustaining and affirming the rulings of 16. On 12 January 1989, the COMELEC en banc rendered
the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Iloilo the assailed Per Curiam Decision with the following
on the objections interposed by petitioner disposition:
on the inclusion in the canvass of the
questioned returns; WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
2. Sustaining the proclamation of the rendered:
winning candidate for Vice- Governor;
1. Affirming the following parts of the
3. Directing the Provincial Board of dispositive portion of the Resolution of
Canvassers to immediately reconvene and the Second Division promulgated on 20
to include in the canvass the questioned September 1988:
election returns; and thereafter to
proclaim the winning candidates for the 1. Sustaining and
Ninth (9th) and Tenth (10th) slots for the affirming the rulings of
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province the Provincial Board of
of Iloilo; and Canvassers of Iloilo on
the objections
4. Directing the Law Department of the interposed by petitioner
Commission to conduct a thorough on the inclusion in the
investigation into the matter of the canvass of the
reported falsification of the transcripts of questioned returns.
the stenographic notes of Stenographer
Nelly C. Escana to determine the parties 2. Directing the
responsible therefor and to cause the Provincial Board of
filing of the necessary criminal complaint Canvassers to
against those probably guilty thereof as immediately reconvene
the evidence may warrant, and if the and to include in the
assistance of the National Bureau of canvass the questioned

ELECTION LAWS 2015 27

 election returns and purpose, the Board shall make a formal
thereafter to proclaim tabulation of the results of the contested
the winning candidates returns and shall prepare a new
for the Ninth (9th) and Statement of Votes and Certificate of
Tenth (10th) slots for Canvass; and
the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the 5. Directing the Provincial Board of
Province of Iloilo; and Canvassers to thereafter proclaim the
winning candidate for Vice-Governor of
3. Directing the Law Iloilo (pp. 38-40, Rollo). (Italics ours)
Department of the
Commission to conduct His proclamation having been nullified by the COMELEC,
a thorough investigation DUREMDES avails of this recourse.
into the matter of the
reported falsification of On 17 January 1989, the Court ordered that the status
the transcripts of the quo existing prior to the promulgation of the above
stenographic notes of COMELEC en banc Decision be maintained until further
Stenographer Nelly orders.
Escana to determine the
parties responsible
DUREMDES faults the COMELEC with grave abuse of
therefor and to cause
discretion for having disregarded the well-settled doctrines
the fling of the
(1) that matters of protest, objections or issues not
necessary criminal
originally raised before the Board of Canvassers upon the
complaint against those
opening of the returns, cannot be raised for the first time
probably guilty thereof
before the COMELEC; and (2) that after a proclamation has
as the evidence may
been made, a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer
warrant, and if the
viable, the proper recourse, being an election protest.
assistance of the
National Bureau of
It is true that, before the Board of Canvassers,
Investigation or any
PENAFLORIDA did not raise in issue the matter of the
other investigative arm
discrepancies between the number of votes appearing in
of the Government for
the Statement of Votes and that in the Election Returns. As
that purpose is
a matter of fact that matter is not even listed as one of the
necessary, to request
issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversies
for such assistance. 1
under Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code.
2. Reversing that part of the dispositive
Nonetheless, as aptly stated in the assailed COMELEC en
portion which reads:
banc Decision:
2. Sustaining the
Indeed, errors in the Statement of Votes
proclamation of the
do not indubitably appear to be issues
winning candidate for
that may be raised in a pre-proclamation
Vice- Governor and
controversy under Section 243 of the
setting aside the
Omnibus Election Code. In this respect,
proclamation of
Intervenor Ramon the law is silent as to when the same may
be raised. We are, however, not
Duremdes as Vice-
unmindful of the fact that the statement
Governor of Iloilo.
of votes supports the certificate of
canvass and shall be the basis of
3. Declaring as null and void the
proclamation (Sec. 231, paragraph 2).
proclamation of Intervenor Ramon
Consequently, any error in the Statement
Duremdes;
of Votes would affect the proclamation
made on the basis thereof. The true will
4. Directing the Provincial Board of of the electorate may thus be not fully
Canvassers of Iloilo to immediately and faithfully reflected by the
reconvene and to include in the canvass proclamation (at pp. 7-8).
of votes for Vice-Governor the
questioned/contested returns. For that
ELECTION LAWS 2015 28
We find no grave abuse of discretion in the foregoing
COMELEC pronouncement. The Statement of Votes is a
tabulation per precinct of the votes garnered by the
candidates as reflected in the election returns. Its
preparation is an administrative function of the Board of
Canvassers. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, "it is a
purely mechanical act of the Board of Canvassers in the
performance of which the Commission has direct control
and supervision," pursuant to Section 227 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
Sec. 227. Supervision and control over
board of canvassers. The Commission
shall have direct control and supervision
over the board of canvassers.
xxx xxx xxx
By virtue of that power, added to its overall function to
"decide all questions affecting elections" (Article IX[C]
Section 2[3], 1987 Constitution), a question pertaining to
the proceedings of said Board may be raised directly with
the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation controversy.
Sec. 241. Definition. A pre-
proclamation controversy refers to any
question pertaining to or affecting the
proceedings of the board of canvassers
which may be raised by any candidate or
by any registered political party or
coalition of political parties before the
board or directy with the Commission, or
any matter raised under Sections 233,
234, 235 and 236 in relation to the
exploration, transmission, receipt,
custody and appreciation of the election
returns (Omnibus Election Code). (Italics
supplied).
When so elevated, the COMELEC acts in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction for which reason it is not indispensable
that the issue be raised before the Board of Canvassers
during the canvassing. The COMELEC is not discharging its
appellate jurisdiction under Section 245 of the Omnibus
Election Code, which has to do with contests regarding the
inclusion or exclusion in the canvass of any election returns,
2
with a prescribed appellate procedure to follow.
Cognizance may also be taken of the fact that at the time
PENAFLORIDA filed the Supplemental Petition on 20 June
1988, there was no clear-cut rule on the matter. It was only
in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which took effect on
15 November 1988, wherein it was provided under
subparagraph (2), paragraph (a), Section 4 of Rule 27, that
the matter of correction of the statement of votes may be
the subject of a pre-proclamation case which may be filed
directly with the Commission. Nonetheless, there should be
no question, considering the aforequoted Section 241 in
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relation to Section 227 of the Omnibus Election Code, that
the issue is one that can be raised directly with the
COMELEC. It is a procedure that best recommends itself
specially considering that the Statement of Votes is a vital
component in the electoral process. It supports the
Certificate of Canvass and is the basis for proclamation.
SEC. 231. Canvass by the board.
xxx xxx xxx
The respective board of canvassers shall
prepare a certificate of canvass duly
signed and affixed with the imprint of the
thumb of the right hand of each member,
supported by a statement of the votes
received by each candidate in each polling
place and, on the basis thereof, shall
proclaim as elected the candidates who
obtained the highest number of votes cast
in the province, city, municipality or
barangay. Failure to comply with this
requirement shall constitute an election
offense.
xxx xxx xxx
DUREMDES also calls attention to Rule 13, Section 1 (g) of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which does not allow the
filing of supplemental pleadings. As stated heretofore,
however, these Rules took effect only on 15 November
1988, or five months after the Supplemental Petition was
filed. Said rule, therefore, cannot be given retroactive effect
the legal truth being that laws of procedure may be
retroactively applied provided no substantial rights are
impaired (Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 30821,
December 14,1988).
That discrepancies exist between the entries in the
Statement of Votes and that reflected in the questioned
election returns, was openly admitted by the Chairman of
the Board of Canvassers at the scheduled promulgation on
15 December 1988 of the 9th and 10th placers of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan (p. 6, COMELEC Decision). What
is more, it is also admitted by the parties except that
PENAFLORIDA assails the correctness of the Statement of
Votes, while DUREMDES maintains its correctness but avers
the possibility of the tampering of the questioned election
returns (p. 7, Ibid.).
Under the circumstances, therefore, and considering that
any error in the Statement of Votes would affect the
proclamation made on the basis thereof, and primordially,
in order to determine the true will of the electorate, the
COMELEC Decision ordering the Board of Canvassers to
reconvene and prepare a new Statement of Votes and
Certificate of Canvass should be upheld.
29
 The Commission on Elections has ample
power to see to it that elections are held
in a clean and orderly manner and it may
decide all questions affecting the
elections. It has original jurisdiction on all
matters relating to election returns,
including the verification of the number of
votes received by opposing candidates in
the election returns as compared to the
statement of votes in order to insure that
the true will of the people is known. Such
clerical error in the statement of votes
can be ordered corrected by the
COMELEC (Villaroya vs. Comelec, L-79646-
47,13 November 1987,155 SCRA 633).
It is DUREMDES' further submission that his proclamation
could not be declared null and void because a pre-
proclamation controversy is not proper after a
proclamation has been made, the proper recourse being an
election protest. This is on the assumption, however, that
there has been a valid proclamation. Where a proclamation
is null and void, the proclamation is no proclamation at all
and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot
deprive the COMELEC of the power to declare such nullity
and annul the proclamation (Aguam vs. COMELEC, L- 28955,
28 May 1968, 23 SCRA 883).
DUREMDES' proclamation must be deemed to have been
null and void. It was made on 31 January 1988 after
PENAFLORIDA had filed with the COMELEC on 29 January
1988 an "Appeal by Way of a Petition for Review" from the
rulings of the Board, and on 30 January 1988, a Petition for
the annulment of' election returns and the suspension of
the proclamation of any candidate (SPC Case No. 88-448).
The COMELEC had not resolved either Petition at the time
the proclamation was made. Pursuant to Sections
245, supra, and 238 of the Omnibus Election Code,
therefore, the Board of Canvassers should not have
proclaimed any candidate without waiting for the
authorization by the COMELEC. Any proclamation thus
made is void ab initio.
SEC. 238. Canvass of remaining or
unquestioned returns to continue. In
cases under Sections 233, 234, 235 and
236 hereof, the board of canvassers shall
continue the canvass of the remaining or
unquestioned election returns. If, after
the canvass of all the said returns, it
should be determined that the returns
which have been set aside will affect the
result of the election, no proclamation
shall be made except upon orders of the
Commission after due notice and hearing.
Any proclamation made in violation
hereof shall be null and void.
ELECTION LAWS 2015
In this case, with 110 contested election returns and 25,930
ballots questioned (COMELEC Resolution, September
20,1988, p. 4, p. 115, Rollo), DUREMDES' margin of 7,286
non-contested votes could very well be off-set.
Moreover, DUREMDES' proclamation was made on the
basis of an official canvass of the votes cast in 2,377
precincts only (Annex "N," Petition), when there were
actually 2,487 precincts. The votes in 110 precincts,
therefore, were not included, which is exactly the number
of 110 election returns questioned by PENAFLORIDA.
Further, DUREMDES was certified to have garnered 157,361
votes (ibid.), which number represents the non-contested
votes only, and clearly excludes the totality of the
"contested/deferred votes" of the candidates concerned.
DUREMDES' proclamation having been based on an
incomplete canvass, no grave abuse of discretion can be
ascribed to the COMELEC for directing the Provincial Board
of Canvassers of Iloilo "to immediately reconvene and to
include in the canvass of votes for Vice-Governor the
questioned/contested returns." All the votes cast in an
election must be considered because to disregard returns is
in effect to disenfranchise the voters (Mutuc vs. COMELEC,
L-28517, February 21, 1968, 22 SCRA 662). A canvass can
not be reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless all
returns are considered and none is omitted (Datu Sinsuat
vs. Pendatun, L-31501, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 630).
Over and above all else, the determination of the true will
of the electorate should be the paramount consideration.
Election contests involve public interest.
Technicalities and procedural barriers
should not be allowed to stand if they
constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the
electorate in the choice of their elective
officials ... Laws governing election
contests must be liberally construed to
the end that the will of the people in the
choice of public officials may not be
defeated by mere technical objections. In
an election case the court has an
imperative duty to ascertain by all means
within its command who is the real
candidate elected by the electorate"
(Juliano vs. CA and Sinsuat, 20 SCRA 808,
818-19, July 28,1967).
WHEREFORE, absent any grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent Commission on Elections, this Petition
for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The status quo Order
heretofore issued is hereby ordered LIFTED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
30
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER
WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS,Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------ x
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN,
MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN
V. OPLE, and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., Intervenors.
x------------------------------------------------------ x
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, Intervenor.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina
Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA represented by its
Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO
represented by its Secretary General Joel Maglunsod,
HEAD represented by its Secretary General Dr. Gene
Alzona Nisperos, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM
represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas, MIGRANTE
represented by its Chairperson Concepcion Bragas-
Regalado, GABRIELA represented by its Secretary General
Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY
represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina Palabay, ANAKBAYAN
represented by Chairperson Eleanor de Guzman, LEAGUE
OF FILIPINO STUDENTS represented by Chair Vencer
Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the League of
Concerned Professionals and Businessmen, DR. DARBY
SANTIAGO of the Solidarity of Health Against Charter
Change, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS of Health Action for
Human Rights, Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA
THERESA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL,Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
ELECTION LAWS 2015
LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA),
CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M.
TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR.,
FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT
INCIONG, Intervenors.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and
RUELO BAYA, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS
ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR. VICTORINO F.
BALAIS, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President,
MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION,
INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA
KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L. SALVADOR, and RANDALL
TABAYOYONG, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND
CEBU PROVINCE CHAPTERS, Intervenors.
x --------------------------------------------------------x
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.
and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA III, JAMBY MADRIGAL,
JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO
LACSON, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG
PILIPINO, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
31
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman
BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and Commissioners
RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR.,
ROMEO A. BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T.
FERRER, and John Doe and Peter Doe,, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated
31 August 2006 of the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") denying due course to an initiative petition to
amend the 1987 Constitution.
Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153,
namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino
1 committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course
Group"), with other groups and individuals, commenced
gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the
1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group
filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that
will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and
2 3
(c) and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative
and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the
support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least
twelveper centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each
legislative district represented by at least three per
centum(3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group
also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified
the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987
Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
4 The Solicitor General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735
(Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII
5 and its implementing rules "as temporary devises to
(Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled
6 implement the system of initiative."
"Transitory Provisions." These proposed changes will shift
the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group
prayed that after due publication of their petition, the
ELECTION LAWS 2015
COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a
plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES
VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION,
CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM
THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND
PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE
SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended
Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in the
proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their
7
initiative.
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution
denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack
of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend
the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling
8
in Santiago v. Commission on Elections declaring RA 6735
inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals
9
to amend the Constitution.
In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the
issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to set
aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to
compel the COMELEC to give due course to their initiative
petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC
to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent.
Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims
that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their
petition deserves cognizance as an expression of the "will of
the sovereign people."
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that
the Court require respondent COMELEC Commissioners to
show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for
the COMELEC's verification of signatures and for
"entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the
permanent injunction in Santiago. The Court treated the
Binay Group's petition as an opposition-in-intervention.
In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the
Solicitor General joined causes with the petitioners, urging
the Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling.
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing
pleadings supporting or opposing the Lambino Group's
10
petition. The supporting intervenors uniformly hold the
32
view that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the
11
opposing intervenors hold the contrary view and maintain
that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing
intervenors also challenged (1) the Lambino Group's
standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the signature
gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's
compliance with the minimum requirement for the
percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition under
12
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; (4) the
nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere
amendments as provided under Section 2, Article XVII of
the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's
compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA
6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral
arguments on 26 September 2006. After receiving the
parties' memoranda, the Court considered the case
submitted for resolution.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies
with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
amendments to the Constitution through a people's
initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling
in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement
the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group's
petition.
The Ruling of the Court
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the
basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a
people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to
revisit Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal
based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to
comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For
following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of
discretion is attributable to the Commision on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the
People
ELECTION LAWS 2015
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing
constitutional provision that allows a people's initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution. This section
states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the total number of
registered voters of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly
explain the meaning of an amendment "directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition," thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us
say some voters want to propose a constitutional
amendment. Is the draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment ready to be shown to
the people when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed,
Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The
draft is ready and shown to them before they
sign. Now, who prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam
President.
MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there
is already a draft shown to them and they are
asked whether or not they want to propose this
constitutional amendment.
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino
can prepare that proposal and pass it around for
13
signature. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the
"draft of the proposed constitutional amendment" should
be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign
such proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they
sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers
also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the
proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that
proposal and pass it around for signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition" is that the entire
proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means
two essential elements must be present. First, the people
must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
33

representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an
initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied
in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of
the proposed amendments is first shown to the people
who express their assent by signing such complete proposal
in a petition. Thus, an amendment is "directly proposed by
the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the
people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either
written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so
attached, the petition must state the fact of such
attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the
several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the
full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time
constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of
signatories had seen the full text of the proposed
amendments before signing.
14
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed the
concept of people's initiative from the United States where
various State constitutions incorporate an initiative clause.
15
In almost all States which allow initiative petitions,the
unbending requirement is that the people must first see
the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign
to signify their assent, and that the people must sign on an
initiative petition that contains the full text of the
16
proposed amendments.
The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly
explained in several decisions of various courts. Thus,
inCapezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by the First Circuit Court
of Appeals, declared:
[A] signature requirement would be meaningless
if the person supplying the signature has not first
seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further,
and more importantly, loose interpretation of the
subscription requirement can pose a significant
potential for fraud. A person permitted to describe
orally the contents of an initiative petition to a
potential signer, without the signer having actually
examined the petition, could easily mislead the
signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or
even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the
petition that might not be to the signer's
liking. This danger seems particularly acute when,
in this case, the person giving the description is
the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a
vested interest in seeing that it gets the requisite
17
signatures to qualify for the ballot. (Boldfacing
and underscoring supplied)
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18
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury, the Court of Appeals of
Oregon explained:
The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to
amendments by initiative commonly are described
in similar terms. x x x (The purpose of the full text
requirement is to provide sufficient information
so that registered voters can intelligently evaluate
whether to sign the initiative petition."); x x x
(publication of full text of amended constitutional
provision required because it is "essential for the
elector to have x x x the section which is proposed
to be added to or subtracted from. If he is to vote
intelligently, he must have this knowledge.
Otherwise in many instances he would be required
to vote in the dark.") (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the
time of signing of the nature and effect of that which is
proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and
19
misleading" which renders the initiative void.
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly
state that the petition must set forth the full text of the
proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the
framers of our Constitution clearly show that the framers
intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on
people's initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the
framers intended that the people must first see the full
text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and
that the people must sign on a petition containing such full
text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735, the
Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group
invokes as valid, requires that the people must sign the
"petition x x x as signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from
the people. The proponents secure the signatures in their
private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents
are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain
the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed
amendments to the people. The proponents present
favorably their proposal to the people and do not present
the arguments against their proposal. The proponents, or
their supporters, often pay those who gather the
signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents
observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that
they complied with the constitutional requirements in
gathering the signatures - that the petition contained, or
incorporated by attachment, the full text of the proposed
amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition
with this Court a copy of the paper that the people signed
34
as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text
20
this Court a copy of a signature sheet after the oral of the proposed changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty.
arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments
Memorandum on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet before this Court on 26 September 2006.
with this Court during the oral arguments was the signature
21
sheet attached to the opposition in intervention filed on 7 The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the
September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra. people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to
the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of
and the signature sheet attached to the Lambino Group's the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the
Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below the signature sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the
signature sheet in full: "petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned
when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2,
Province: City/Municipality: Article XVII of the Constitution.
No. of
Legislative District: Barangay:
Petitioner
Verified Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during
the signature-gathering from February to August 2006, the
Lambino Group circulated, together with the signature
Signatures:
sheets, printed copies of the Lambino Group's draft petition
which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the
PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF COMELEC. When asked if his group also circulated the draft
ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, of their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the
CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE COMELEC, Atty. Lambino initially replied that they
PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL- circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his
PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO answer and stated that what his group circulated was the
ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, not the draft
IN GOVERNMENT; AND PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS of the 25 August 2006 petition.
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM
ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?"
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they
prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended
I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 petition almost seven months earlier in February
Constitution. My signature herein which shall form part of 2006 when they started gathering signatures. Petitioner
the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies Erico B. Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25
my support for the filing thereof. August 2006 petition, as well as of the 30 August 2006
amended petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as
Precinct Name Address Birthdate
follows: Signature Verification
Number
Last Name, First Name, MM/DD/YY
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing
M.I. [Amended] Petition in my personal capacity as a
1 registered voter, for and on behalf of the Union of
2 Local Authorities of the Philippines, as shown by
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached,
3
and as representative of the mass of signatories
4 hereto. (Emphasis supplied)
5
6 The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP
7 Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present petition. However,
8 the "Official Website of the Union of Local Authorities of
22
the Philippines" has posted the full text of Resolution No.
9
2006-02, which provides:
10
_________________ _________________ RESOLUTION
__________________
NO. 2006-02
Barangay Official Witness Witness
(Print Name and Sign) (Print Name and Sign) (Print Name
RESOLUTION and Sign) THE PROPOSALS OF
SUPPORTING
THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION ON
CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of
the Lambino Group's proposed changes in the signature
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 INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF
AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local
Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a
common stand on the approach to support the
proposals of the People's Consultative Commission
on Charter Change;
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support
to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms as
embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for
Constitutional Reforms signed by the members of
the ULAP and the majority coalition of the House
of Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in
October 2005;
WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission
on Charter Change created by Her Excellency to
recommend amendments to the 1987 Constitution
has submitted its final report sometime in
December 2005;
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current
political developments in Congress which militates
against the use of the expeditious form of
amending the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its
institutional members and the failure of Congress
to amend the Constitution as a constituent
assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue
the constitutional reform agenda through People's
Initiative and Referendum without prejudice to
other pragmatic means to pursue the same;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY
RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-LEAGUES OF
THE UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS
(SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE (SIC)
COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH
PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A
MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board
special meeting held on 14 January 2006 at the
23
Century Park Hotel, Manila. (Underscoring
supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner
Aumentado to prepare the 25 August 2006 petition, or the
30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC.
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 "support(s) the porposals
(sic) of the Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter
Change through people's initiative and referendum as a
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mode of amending the 1987 Constitution." The proposals of
24
the Consultative Commission arevastly different from the
proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the 25 August
2006 petition or 30 August 2006 amended petition filed
with the COMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative
Commission affect all provisions of the existing
Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory
Provisions. The proposed revisions have profound impact
on the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of
the existing Constitution, provisions that the Lambino
Group's proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino
Group's proposed changes purport to affect only Articles VI
and VII of the existing Constitution, including the
introduction of new Transitory Provisions.
The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January
2006 or more than six months before the filing of the 25
August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended
petition with the COMELEC. However, ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group
caused the circulation of the draft petition, together with
the signature sheets, six months before the filing with the
COMELEC. On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02
casts grave doubt on the Lambino Group's claim that they
circulated the draft petition together with the signature
sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not refer at all
to the draft petition or to the Lambino Group's proposed
changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition
before the COMELEC, the Lambino Group declared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly
realized that the proposed amendments alleged in
the Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of
Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the
Transitory Provisions were inaccurately stated and
failed to correctly reflect their proposed
amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending
the petition because the amended petition was what they
had shown to the people during the February to August
2006 signature-gathering. Instead, the Lambino Group
alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately
stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed
amendments."
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006
petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the
COMELEC that they circulated printed copies of the draft
petition together with the signature sheets. Likewise, the
Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition
before this Court that they circulated printed copies of the
draft petition together with the signature sheets. The
signature sheets do not also contain any indication that the
36
draft petition is attached to, or circulated with, the
signature sheets.
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-
Interventions that the Lambino Group first claimed that
they circulated the "petition for initiative filed with the
COMELEC," thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect
that "(w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a signer who
did not read the measure attached to a
referendum petition cannot question his
signature on the ground that he did not
understand the nature of the act." [82 C.J.S.
S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283
Mo. 546.] Thus, the registered voters who signed
the signature sheets circulated together with the
petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC
below, are presumed to have understood the
proposition contained in the petition. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the
people "the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC"
appears an afterthought, made after the intervenors
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and
Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out
that the signature sheets did not contain the text of the
proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino
Group alleged that they circulated "the petition for
initiative" but failed to mention the amended petition. This
contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the oral
arguments that what they circulated was the draft of
the amended petition of 30 August 2006.
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris
Secundum, stating that "a signer who did not read the
measure attached to a referendum petition cannot
question his signature on the ground that he did not
understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group
quotes an authority that cites a proposed
changeattached to the petition signed by the people. Even
the authority the Lambino Group quotes requires that the
proposed change must be attached to the petition. The
same authority the Lambino Group quotes requires the
people to sign on the petition itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the
proposed amendment must be incorporated with, or
attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In
the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed
changes were not incorporated with, or attached to, the
signature sheets. The Lambino Group's citation of Corpus
Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared,
printed, circulated, from February to August 2006 during
the signature-gathering period, the draft of the petition or
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amended petition they filed later with the COMELEC. The
Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in their
belated claim that they printed and circulated, together
with the signature sheets, the petition or amended
petition. Nevertheless, even assumingthe Lambino Group
circulated the amended petition during the signature-
gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted circulating
only very limited copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly
admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies of the
draft petition they filed more than six months later with
the COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also asked
other supporters to print additional copies of the draft
petition but he could not state with certainty how many
additional copies the other supporters printed. Atty.
Lambino could only assure this Court of the printing of
100,000 copies because he himself caused the printing of
these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11
October 2006, the Lambino Group expressly admits that
"petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and
reproduction of 100,000 copies of the petition for
25
initiative x x x." This admission binds the Lambino Group
and establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group
failed to show the full text of the proposed changes to the
great majority of the people who signed the signature
sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories
could have received with certainty one copy each of the
petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution with no
wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company attached one copy
of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000
signature sheets could have circulated with the petition.
Each signature sheet contains space for ten signatures.
Assuming ten people signed each of these 100,000
signature sheets with the attached petition, the maximum
number of people who saw the petition before they signed
the signature sheets would not exceed 1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would
be physically impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3
million signatories to have seen the petition before they
signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclusion is
that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million
signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever,
not more than one million signatories saw the petition
before they signed the signature sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not
contain the full text of the proposed changes, either on the
face of the signature sheets, or as attachment with an
indication in the signature sheet of such
attachment.Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during
the oral arguments, and this admission binds the Lambino
Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere reading of the
37
signature sheet. This omission is fatal. The failure to so
include the text of the proposed changes in the signature
sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance with
the constitutional requirement that the amendment must
be "directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition." The signature sheet is not the "petition"
envisioned in the initiative clause of the Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who
signed the signature sheets did not see the full text of the
proposed changes before signing. They could not have
known the nature and effect of the proposed changes,
among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature
will be lifted and thus members of Parliament can
26
be re-elected indefinitely;
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function
indefinitely until its members, who are almost all
the present members of Congress, decide to call
for new parliamentary elections. Thus,
the members of the interim Parliament will
determine the expiration of their own term of
27
office;
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the
proposed changes, the interim Parliament shall
convene to propose further amendments or
28
revisions to the Constitution.
These three specific amendments are not stated or even
indicated in the Lambino Group's signature sheets. The
people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that
they were proposing these amendments. These three
proposed changes are highly controversial. The people
could not have inferred or divined these proposed changes
merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the
signature sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated
that he and his group assured the people during the
signature-gathering that the elections for the regular
Parliament would be held during the 2007 local elections if
the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 local
elections. However, the text of the proposed
changes belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory
Provisions, as found in the amended petition, states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide
for the election of the members of
Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held
simultaneously with the election of all local
government officials. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
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Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular
Parliament will be held simultaneously with the 2007 local
elections. This section merely requires that the elections for
the regular Parliament shall be held simultaneously with the
local elections without specifying the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal
drafter of the proposed changes, could have easily written
the word "next" before the phrase "election of all local
government officials." This would have insured that the
elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the
next local elections following the ratification of the
proposed changes. However, the absence of the word
"next" allows the interim Parliament to schedule the
elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously
with any future local elections.
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide
the expiration of their own term of office. This allows
incumbent members of the House of Representatives to
hold office beyond their current three-year term of office,
and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of
regular members of the Parliament. Certainly, this is
contrary to the representations of Atty. Lambino and his
group to the 6.3 million people who signed the signature
sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3
million signatories, and even the entire nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign
an initiative petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments to avoid fraud or
misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million
signatories had to rely on the verbal representations of
Atty. Lambino and his group because the signature sheets
did not contain the full text of the proposed changes. The
result is a grand deception on the 6.3 million signatories
who were led to believe that the proposed changes would
require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular
Parliament simultaneously with the local elections.
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on
the people who signed the signature sheets. The proposed
changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further
amendments or revisions to the Constitution. The proposed
Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from
ratification of these amendments, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose amendments
to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent
with the principles of local autonomy,
decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
(Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this
provision is a "surplusage" and the Court and the people
should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this
provision invalidates the Lambino Group's initiative.
38
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the
shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-
Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on initiatives
outlaws this as logrolling - when the initiative petition
incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same
petition. This puts the people in a dilemma since they can
answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition,
forcing them to sign a petition that effectively contains two
propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is
to nullify the entire proposition and not only the unrelated
29
subject matter. Thus, in Fine v. Firestone, the Supreme
Court of Florida declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one
proposal constitutes "logrolling," which, if our
judicial responsibility is to mean anything, we
cannot permit. The very broadness of the
proposed amendment amounts to logrolling
because the electorate cannot know what it is
voting on - the amendment's proponents'
simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the
iceberg. x x x x The ballot must give the electorate
fair notice of the proposed amendment being
voted on. x x x x The ballot language in the instant
case fails to do that. The very broadness of the
proposal makes it impossible to state what it will
affect and effect and violates the requirement that
proposed amendments embrace only one subject.
(Emphasis supplied)
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute
30
Air Alaska v. McAlpine, the Supreme Court of Alaska
warned against "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in
logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process,
all of the problems that the single-subject rule was enacted
to prevent are exacerbated. There is a greater danger of
logrolling, or the deliberate intermingling of issues to
increase the likelihood of an initiative's passage, and there
is a greater opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth and
fraud" in the enactment-by-initiative process. The drafters
of an initiative operate independently of any structured or
supervised process. They often emphasize particular
provisions of their proposition, while remaining silent on
other (more complex or less appealing) provisions, when
communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative
promoters typically use simplistic advertising to present
their initiative to potential petition-signers and eventual
voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the
initiative before the election. More importantly, there is no
process for amending or splitting the several provisions in
an initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly distinguish
the initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis
supplied)
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Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary
step for further amendments or revisions to be undertaken
by the interim Parliament as a constituent assembly. The
people who signed the signature sheets could not have
known that their signatures would be used to propose an
amendment mandating the interim Parliament to
propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution.
Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed
Section 4(4) to compel the interim Parliament to amend or
revise again the Constitution within 45 days from
ratification of the proposed changes, or before the May
2007 elections. In the absence of the proposed Section 4(4),
the interim Parliament has the discretion whether to
amend or revise again the Constitution. With the proposed
Section 4(4), the initiative proponents want the interim
Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise
again the Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for
this rush in amending or revising again so soon the
Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain what
specific amendments or revisions the initiative proponents
want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a
need for such further amendments or revisions. The people
are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect
of the proposed changes. Certainly, such an initiative is not
"directly proposed by the people" because the people do
not even know the nature and effect of the proposed
changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the
Lambino Group's amended petition of 30 August 2006. The
proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in
2010 shall be members of Parliament until noon of
the thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will
remain as member of Parliament if the interim Parliament
does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by
30 June 2010. However, there is no counterpart provision
for the present members of the House of Representatives
even if their term of office will all end on 30 June 2007,
three years earlier than that of half of the present Senators.
Thus, all the present members of the House will remain
members of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010.
Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises all the powers of
the President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule
elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010, the
Prime Minister will come only from the present members of
the House of Representatives to theexclusion of the
present Senators.
39
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination
against the Senators. The 6.3 million people who signed
the signature sheets could not have known that their
signatures would be used to discriminate against the
Senators. They could not have known that their signatures
would be used to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim
Parliament's choice of Prime Minister only to members of
the existing House of Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people
without first showing to the people the full text of the
proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can
operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That is why the
Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly
proposed by the people x x x in a petition" - meaning that
the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text
of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as
amending the nation's fundamental law, the writing of the
text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from
the people under a general or special power of attorney to
unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to
directly propose amendments to the Constitution. This
Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members
of this Court do not personally know the people who sign
the petition. However, this trust emanates from a
fundamental assumption: the full text of the proposed
amendment is first shown to the people before they sign
the petition, not after they have signed the petition.
In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and
unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the
requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition."
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only
to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its
revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional
convention can propose both amendments and revisions to
the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of
all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
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Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of
amending the Constitution. The first mode is through
Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The
second mode is through a constitutional convention. The
third mode is through a people's initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second
modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring
to the third mode, applies only to "[A]mendments to this
Constitution." This distinction was intentional as shown by
the following deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the
Members of the Commission that pursuant to the
mandate given to us last night, we submitted this
afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7
which embodies the proposed provision governing
the matter of initiative. This is now covered by
Section 2 of the complete committee report. With
the permission of the Members, may I quote
Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of
the last plebiscite held, directly propose
amendments to this Constitution thru initiative
upon petition of at least ten percent of the
registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original
Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was
suggested on the theory that this matter of
initiative, which came about because of the
extraordinary developments this year, has to be
separated from the traditional modes of amending
the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The
committee members felt that this system of
initiative should be limited to amendments to the
Constitution and should not extend to the
revision of the entire Constitution, so we
removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the
proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x
x
xxxx
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by
providing this process of initiative as a separate
section in the Article on Amendment. Would the
sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment
40
 in terms of realigning Section 2 as another
subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it
up as another separate section as if it were a self-
executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that,
as we clarified a while ago, this process of
initiative is limited to the matter of amendment
and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution.
That was the sense that was conveyed by the
Committee.
MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was
attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes
(a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of
revision; whereas, the process of initiation to
amend, which is given to the public, would only
apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms
envisioned in the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you,
Madam President.
xxxx
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question:
Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on
line 1 refers to "amendments." Does it not cover
the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner
Padilla when he made the distinction between
the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because
"amendments" and "revision" should be covered
by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned,
it can only relate to "amendments" not
"revision."
31
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you. (Emphasis
supplied)
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the
Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction
between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution.
The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a
constitutional convention may propose revisions to the
Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a
people's initiative may propose only amendments to the
Constitution. Where the intent and language of the
Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to
propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot
propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose
amendments.
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This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts
32
in the United States. Thus, in McFadden v. Jordan, the
Supreme Court of California ruled:
The initiative power reserved by the people by
amendment to the Constitution x x x applies only
to the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of
'laws and amendments to the Constitution' and
does not purport to extend to a constitutional
revision. x x x x It is thus clear that a revision of the
Constitution may be accomplished only through
ratification by the people of a revised constitution
proposed by a convention called for that purpose
as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the scope
of the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter
termed 'the measure') now before us is so broad
that if such measure became law a substantial
revision of our present state Constitution would be
effected, then the measure may not properly be
submitted to the electorate until and unless it is
first agreed upon by a constitutional convention,
and the writ sought by petitioner should issue. x x
x x (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v.
33
Appling:
It is well established that when a constitution
specifies the manner in which it may be amended
or revised, it can be altered by those who favor
amendments, revision, or other change only
through the use of one of the specified means. The
constitution itself recognizes that there is a
difference between an amendment and a revision;
and it is obvious from an examination of the
measure here in question that it is not an
amendment as that term is generally understood
and as it is used in Article IV, Section 1. The
document appears to be based in large part on the
revision of the constitution drafted by the
'Commission for Constitutional Revision'
authorized by the 1961 Legislative Assembly, x x x
and submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It
failed to receive in the Assembly the two-third's
majority vote of both houses required by Article
XVII, Section 2, and hence failed of adoption, x x x.
While differing from that document in material
respects, the measure sponsored by the plaintiffs
is, nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the
present constitution x x x.
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.
Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is
not such a measure as can be submitted to the
people through the initiative. If a revision, it is
subject to the requirements of Article XVII, Section
41
 2(1); if a new constitution, it can only be proposed
at a convention called in the manner provided in
Article XVII, Section 1. x x x x
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a
people's initiative can only propose amendments to the
Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to
amendments. There can be no deviation from the
constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the
Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by 6.3
million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the
specific modes prescribed in the Constitution itself.
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative
34
Petition No. 364:
It is a fundamental principle that a constitution
can only be revised or amended in the manner
prescribed by the instrument itself, and that any
attempt to revise a constitution in a manner
other than the one provided in the instrument is
almost invariably treated as extra-constitutional
and revolutionary. x x x x "While it is universally
conceded that the people are sovereign and that
they have power to adopt a constitution and to
change their own work at will, they must, in doing
so, act in an orderly manner and according to the
settled principles of constitutional law. And where
the people, in adopting a constitution, have
prescribed the method by which the people may
alter or amend it, an attempt to change the
fundamental law in violation of the self-imposed
restrictions, is unconstitutional." x x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and
protect the Constitution, cannot shirk from its solemn oath
and duty to insure compliance with the clear command of
the Constitution that a people's initiative may only
amend, never revise, the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative
constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution? If
the Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision, then
the present petition should be dismissed for being outside
the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an
amendment and a revision of a constitution. One of the
earliest cases that recognized the distinction described the
fundamental difference in this manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an
instrument of a permanent and abiding nature,
and the provisions contained therein for its
revision indicate the will of the people that the
underlying principles upon which it rests, as well
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as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall
be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the
other hand, the significance of the term
"amendment" implies such an addition or change
within the lines of the original instrument as will
effect an improvement, or better carry out the
35
purpose for which it was framed. (Emphasis
supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic
principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of
separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances.
There is also revision if the change alters the substantial
entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects
substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other
hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds,
reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle
involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of
the constitution, while amendment generally affects only
the specific provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments
but not revisions to the constitution just like in our
Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the
quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative
test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in
its provisions as to change directly the 'substantial entirety'
of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of
36
numerous existing provisions." The court examines only
the number of provisions affected and does not consider
the degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of
the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is
whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching
changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to
37
amount to a revision." Whether there is an alteration in
the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry.
Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental
plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the
38
fundamental powers of its Branches." A change in the
nature of the basic governmental plan also includes
changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of
39
government and the system of check and balances."
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the
Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an
amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed
changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature
and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105
40
provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the
proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of
government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the
Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of
government in the present Constitution are reduced into
42
two. This alters the separation of powers in the
Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system
is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and
executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the
locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers
and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise,
the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the
system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and
constitutes a revision of the Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a
Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President
and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond
doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone
of the Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily
apparent that the changes will radically alter the
framework of government as set forth in the Constitution.
Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member of the
Constitutional Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few
specific and separable provisions. The guiding original
intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or
to add new provisions deemed necessary to meet new
conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have
become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In
revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan
contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or
of provisions of the document which have over-all
implications for the entire document, to determine how
and to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for
instance a switch from the presidential system to a
parliamentary system would be a revision because of its
over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So
would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral
system be because of its effect on other important
41
provisions of the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
42
In Adams v. Gunter, an initiative petition proposed the
amendment of the Florida State constitution to shift from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The issue turned on
whether the initiative "was defective and unauthorized
where [the] proposed amendment would x x x affect
several other provisions of [the] Constitution." The
Supreme Court of Florida, striking down the initiative as
outside the scope of the initiative clause, ruled as follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III
of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a
Unicameral Legislature affects not only many
other provisions of the Constitution but provides
for a change in the form of the legislative branch
of government, which has been in existence in the
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United States Congress and in all of the states of
the nation, except one, since the earliest days. It
would be difficult to visualize a more
revolutionary change. The concept of a House and
a Senate is basic in the American form of
government. It would not only radically change
the whole pattern of government in this state and
tear apart the whole fabric of the Constitution,
but would even affect the physical facilities
necessary to carry on government.
xxxx
We conclude with the observation that if such
proposed amendment were adopted by the people
at the General Election and if the Legislature at its
next session should fail to submit further
amendments to revise and clarify the numerous
inconsistencies and conflicts which would result, or
if after submission of appropriate amendments the
people should refuse to adopt them, simple chaos
would prevail in the government of this State. The
same result would obtain from an amendment, for
instance, of Section 1 of Article V, to provide for
only a Supreme Court and Circuit Courts-and there
could be other examples too numerous to detail.
These examples point unerringly to the answer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the
hundreds of men and women and many sessions
of the Legislature in bringing about the
Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate
inconsistencies and conflicts and to give the State a
workable, accordant, homogenous and up-to-date
document. All of this could disappear very quickly
if we were to hold that it could be amended in the
manner proposed in the initiative petition
43
here. (Emphasis supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater
force to the present petition. The Lambino Group's initiative
not only seeks a shift from a bicameral to a unicameral
legislature, it also seeks to merge the executive and
legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did not
even touch the executive department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18
sections of the Florida Constitution that would be affected
by the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. In
the Lambino Group's present initiative, no less than 105
provisions of the Constitution would be affected based on
44
the count of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. There
is no doubt that the Lambino Group's present initiative
seeks far more radical changes in the structure of
government than the initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between
"amendment" and "revision" is only one of procedure, not
43

of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a
deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the
Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions"
because members of the deliberative body work full-time
on the changes. However, the same substantive changes,
when proposed through an initiative, are called
"amendments" because the changes are made by ordinary
people who do not make an "occupation, profession, or
vocation" out of such endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of
their theory in their Memorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the
constitutional provisions expressly provide for
both "amendment" and "revision" when it speaks
of legislators and constitutional delegates, while
the same provisions expressly provide only for
"amendment" when it speaks of the people. It
would seem that the apparent distinction is based
on the actual experience of the people, that on
one hand the common people in general are not
expected to work full-time on the matter of
correcting the constitution because that is not
their occupation, profession or vocation; while on
the other hand, the legislators and constitutional
convention delegates are expected to work full-
time on the same matter because that is their
occupation, profession or vocation. Thus, the
difference between the words "revision" and
"amendment" pertain only to the process or
procedure of coming up with the corrections, for
purposes of interpreting the constitutional
provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference between
"amendment" and "revision" cannot reasonably
be in the substance or extent of the correction. x x
x x (Underlining in the original; boldfacing
supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a
constitutional convention had drafted the same proposed
changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the present
initiative, the changes would constitute a revision of the
Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the
proposed changes in the present initiative constitute a
revision if Congress or a constitutional convention had
drafted the changes. However, since the Lambino Group as
private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the
changes are merely amendments to the Constitution. The
Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of changing
the fundamental law of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language
of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group's theory.
Where the intent of the framers and the language of the
Constitution are clear and plainly stated, courts do not
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45
deviate from such categorical intent and language. Any
theory espousing a construction contrary to such intent and
language deserves scant consideration. More so, if such
theory wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form
of government established in the Constitution. Such a
theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting
inconsistencies in the Constitution, only exposes the
flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory
advocating that a proposed change involving a radical
structural change in government does not constitute a
revision justly deserves rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative
proponents in American jurisdictions have attempted to
46
advance without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling, the
Supreme Court of Oregon rejected this theory, thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not
apply to changes to the constitution proposed by
initiative. His theory is that Article XVII, section 2
merely provides a procedure by which the
legislature can propose a revision of the
constitution, but it does not affect proposed
revisions initiated by the people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure
constitutes a wholesale change to the constitution
that cannot be enacted through the initiative
process. They assert that the distinction between
amendment and revision is determined by
reviewing the scope and subject matter of the
proposed enactment, and that revisions are not
limited to "a formal overhauling of the
constitution." They argue that this ballot measure
proposes far reaching changes outside the lines of
the original instrument, including profound
impacts on existing fundamental rights and radical
restructuring of the government's relationship
with a defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert
that, because the proposed ballot measure "will
refashion the most basic principles of Oregon
constitutional law," the trial court correctly held
that it violated Article XVII, section 2, and cannot
appear on the ballot without the prior approval of
the legislature.
We first address Mabon's argument that Article
XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit revisions
instituted by initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x
x, the Supreme Court concluded that a revision of
the constitution may not be accomplished by
initiative, because of the provisions of Article XVII,
section 2. After reviewing Article XVII, section1,
relating to proposed amendments, the court said:
"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV,
Section 1, authorizes the use of the initiative as a
means of amending the Oregon Constitution, but it
44

contains no similar sanction for its use as a means
of revising the constitution." x x x x
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating
to revisions, and said: "It is the only section of the
constitution which provides the means for
constitutional revision and it excludes the idea that
an individual, through the initiative, may place
such a measure before the electorate." x x x x
Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that
Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to
constitutional revisions proposed by initiative.
(Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory
which negates the express intent of the framers and the
plain language of the Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum,
at one end green for amendments and at the other end red
for revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors
fuse and difficulties arise in determining whether there is
an amendment or revision. The present initiative is
indisputably located at the far end of the red spectrum
where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a radical
overhaul of the existing separation of powers among the
three co-equal departments of government, requiring far-
reaching amendments in several sections and articles of the
Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific
provision of the Constitution without affecting any other
section or article, the change may generally be considered
an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change
47
reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years is an
amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing
Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100
percent to 60 percent is an amendment and not a
48
revision. Also, a change requiring a college degree as an
additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an
49
amendment and not a revision.
The changes in these examples do not entail any
modification of sections or articles of the Constitution other
than the specific provision being amended. These changes
do not also affect the structure of government or the
system of checks-and-balances among or within the three
branches. These three examples are located at the far green
end of the spectrum, opposite the far red end where the
revision sought by the present petition is located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is
an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of
one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not
an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word
"republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1,
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50
Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire
structure of government and the fundamental ideological
basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will
have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it
affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the
structure of government, the carefully crafted system of
checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of
the existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or
several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body
with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a
revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several
provisions, but also the altered principles with those that
remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize
deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or
constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the
other hand, constitutions allow people's initiatives, which
do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or
recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and
not revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed
Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the
incumbent President and Vice President, with the
exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be
amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be
deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby
retained and renumbered sequentially as Section
2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are
inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of
government, in which case, they shall be
amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government; x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law
is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law, the later law
prevails. This rule also applies to construction of
constitutions. However, the Lambino Group's draft of
Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this
rule of construction by stating that in case of such
irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall be
amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form
of government." The effect is to freeze the two
irreconcilable provisions until the earlier one "shall be
amended," which requires a future separate constitutional
amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment,
petitioner Atty. Lambino readily conceded during the oral
arguments that the requirement of a future amendment is
a "surplusage." In short, Atty. Lambino wants to reinstate
the rule of statutory construction so that the later provision
45
automatically prevails in case of irreconcilable
inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed
Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is not between a
provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a
provision in the proposed changes. The inconsistency is
between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
and the "Parliamentary system of government," and the
inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a "unicameral
parliamentary form of government."
Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of
government" do the Lambino Group's proposed changes
refer to the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New
Zealand models, which are among the few countries
withunicameral parliaments? The proposed changes
could not possibly refer to the traditional and well-known
parliamentary forms of government the British, French,
Spanish, German, Italian, Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian
models, which have all bicameral parliaments. Did the
people who signed the signature sheets realize that they
were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or
New Zealand parliamentary form of government?
This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not
meant for revisions of the Constitution but only for
amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-
Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system requires
harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the
Constitution. Revision of the Constitution through a
people's initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the
Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino
Group's initiative is a revision and not an amendment. Thus,
the present initiative is void and unconstitutional because it
violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution limiting
the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this
Constitution."
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to
comply with the basic requirements of Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a
people's initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no
need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA
6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms
and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend
the Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of Santiagowill
not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this
Court must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively
ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the requirements
of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on
amendments to the Constitution.
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This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the
constitutionality of a statute if the case before the Court
can be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a
logical consequence of the well-settled doctrine that courts
will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the
51
case can be resolved on some other grounds.
Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to
implement the constitutional provision on initiatives to
amend the Constitution, this will not change the result here
because the present petition violates Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present
initiative must first comply with Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution even before complying with RA 6735.
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA
6735 which requires that the "petition for an initiative on
the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as
signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the
people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25
August 2006 or the amended petition of 30 August 2006
filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty.
Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty. Alberto C. Agra signed
the petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L.
Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the
COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to act "together
with" the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the
signature sheets to the petition and amended petition.
Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the
COMELEC did not even comply with the basic requirement
of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid.
The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates
Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition embracing
more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the
electorate; x x x." The proposed Section 4(4) of the
Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to
propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the
shift in the form of government. Since the present initiative
embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits
submission of the initiative petition to the electorate. Thus,
even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will
still fail.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of
Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino Group's Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the
COMELEC en banc merely followed this Court's ruling
inSantiago and People's Initiative for Reform,
52
Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. COMELEC. For
following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is
attributable to the COMELEC. On this ground alone, the
46
present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this
Court should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no
grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to
the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the
petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing that it
only complied with the dispositions in the
Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325,
promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its
Resolution of June 10, 1997.
5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land,
deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all the
citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution
by cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant violation of
the clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid
down in the Constitution itself.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift
the Constitution in unchartered waters, to be tossed and
turned by every dominant political group of the day. If this
Court allows today a cavalier change in the Constitution
outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow
the new dominant political group that comes will demand
its own set of changes in the same cavalier and
unconstitutional fashion. A revolving-door constitution does
not augur well for the rule of law in this country.
manipulative changes by political groups gathering
signatures through false promises. Then, the Constitution
ceases to be the bedrock of the nation's stability.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the
"people's voice." However, the Lambino Group unabashedly
states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of
their petition with the COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains
its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional
reforms." The Lambino Group thus admits that their
"people's" initiative is an "unqualified support to the
agenda" of the incumbent President to change the
Constitution. This forewarns the Court to be wary of
incantations of "people's voice" or "sovereign will" in the
present initiative.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and
protect the Constitution. The Constitution, which embodies
the people's sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This
Court exists to defend and protect the Constitution. To
allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by
deceptively gathered signatures, to alter basic principles in
the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the
Constitution. To allow such alteration and desecration is to
lose this Court's raison d'etre.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
SO ORDERED.

An overwhelming majority 16,622,111 voters comprising

53
76.3 percent of the total votes cast approved our
Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11 February
1987. That approval is the unmistakable voice of the
people, the full expression of the people's sovereign will.
That approval included the prescribed modes for
amending or revising the Constitution.

No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million

signatures gathered by the Lambino Group, can change our
Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the people,
in their sovereign capacity, prescribed when they ratified
the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional
change, which means subverting the people's sovereign
will and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the
Court cannot and should never do. As the ultimate guardian
of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to perform its
solemn duty to defend and protect the Constitution, which
embodies the real sovereign will of the people.

Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will,"

or "let the people decide" cannot override the specific
modes of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the
Constitution itself. Otherwise, the Constitution the
people's fundamental covenant that provides enduring
stability to our society becomes easily susceptible to

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