AUDRYE Y.

WONG

Comparing Japanese and South Korean Strategies

toward China and the United States
All Politics Is Local

ABSTRACT

Japan and South Korea have had differing patterns of responding to Chinas rise and
aligning with the United States. This can be explained by shifting threat perceptions
based on interactions between evolving systemic and local threats, from both China
and North Korea, as well as their relative degrees of imminence.
K E Y W O R D S : Japan, South Korea, China, threat perception, triangular relations

INTRODUCTION

Comparisons of Japan and South Korea offer rich possibilities for students of
international relations. As the closest US allies in Asia while also the largest
Asian economies increasingly drawn into Chinas economic orbit, they are at
the head of a large group of countries caught between these two major
powers. Yet, the pattern of adapting to Chinas rise while still depending
on the US alliance has differed between the two states and over time, in ways
that have yet to be systematically studied. I assess the changing balance of
Japans and South Koreas relations with these two powers from 1992 to 2015.
In 1992, when South Korea normalized relations with the Peoples Repub-
lic of China (PRC) and the Japanese emperor visited China, there was much
optimism in both countries about bilateral relations and scant worry over US
alliances. From this shared high point, I trace three periods of responses,
leading to todays situation of strengthened US ties but sharp Korean-

AUDRYE Y . WONG is a Ph.D. candidate in Security Studies at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs at Princeton University and was previously a Junior Fellow at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. She wishes to thank Thomas Christensen,
G. John Ikenberry, Gilbert Rozman, and the anonymous reviewers for their help in preparing this article,
and the Woodrow Wilson School for providing research funds. Email: <aywong@princeton.edu>.

Asian Survey, Vol. 55, Number 6, pp. 12411269. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. 2015
by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission
to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Presss Reprints and
Permissions web page, http://www.ucpress.edu/journals.php?preprints. DOI: 10.1525/AS.2015.55.6.1241.

1241
1242  ASIAN SURVEY 55:6

Japanese divergence in relations with China. I use the concepts of alignment

toward the US and distancing from China to capture the triangular nature of
relations. This study distinguishes strong, moderate, and weak alignment to
compare the degree of political and strategic closeness with the US, including
alliance robustness. Similarly, strategic distancing from China can be divided
into strong, moderate, and weak. The extent of alignment and distancing can
be measured by policies such as military acquisitions and defense strategies,
diplomatic and military exchanges, and political statements. By combining
these two categories, we construct a spectrum of possible responses, with
strong alignment and distancing at one extreme, and weak alignment and
distancing at the other. At the same time, navigating ties with China and the
US is not zero-sumbetter relations with one does not necessarily mean
worse relations with the other.
This paper argues that Japan and South Korea respond rst to local and
imminent threats, rather than abstract, structural threats such as the rise of
China. A dual-threat framework explains why Japanese and South Korean
behaviors diverge. Foreign policy depends on the interaction between two
types of threat: systemic versus local threats, and how imminent they are.
While a systemic threat affects the geopolitical system as a whole, with
implications for the overall balance of power or international order, a local
threat primarily affects the security of a specic target, such as a nearby
country. Moreover, threats can be imminent, with military escalation or
a provocative show of force suggesting high likelihood of attack in the near
term, or they can be potentialthat is, a long-term future threat. For exam-
ple, Chinas overall military modernization might constitute a systemic,
potential threat, while North Korean missiles pose a local, imminent threat
targeted at South Korea. The interplay of threat perceptions is also amplied
by national identity gaps, formed when a country has a positive image of itself
and a negative image of the other country. This gap increases when there is an
increase in the extent of perceived differences in national values (such as
political governance, economic development, and social norms) and interna-
tional roles (the nature of contributions to external security and stability).1

1. This denition builds on Gilbert Rozman, The Sino-U.S. National Identity Gap, Australia,
and the Formation of an Asia-Pacic Community, Asian Survey 54:2 (March/April 2014); and Leif-
Eric Easley, Diverging Trajectories of Trust in Northeast Asia: South Koreas Security Relations
with Japan and China, in Gilbert Rozman (ed.), Asia at a Tipping Point: Korea, the Rise of China and
the Impact of Leadership Transitions, Korea Economic Institute, vol. 23 (2012).
 WONG / POLITICS AND POLICY IN JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA  1243

For South Korea in particular, North Korea remains a critical mediating

variable, in which the degree of policy overlap between Seoul and China
inuences perceptions of China as a threat and the strength of alliance ties
with the US. Domestic leadership is more a moderating than a determining
variable in state positioning between the two larger powers.

1990S: RISING CHINA, DIVERGING RESPONSES

Although increasing Chinese military expenditure and regional provocations

over Taiwan and the South China Sea posed a structural threat, during the
1990s both Japan and South Korea were eager to engage with China. While
South Korea maintained minimal distancing from China and moderate ally-
ing with the US, Japan soon shifted to a moderate if still publicly minimal
distancing from China, alongside the gradual strengthening of a formerly
troubled US alliance. As will be discussed further, this divergence in threat
perceptions grew from a mix of realist geopolitical factors and was exacer-
bated by differing national identity gaps.

Japan: Distancing from China under a North Korean Pretext, 19921999

Expansionist PRC maritime territorial policies affected Japan but not South
Korea. In 1992, the PRC government adopted a contentious law explicitly
claiming as Chinese territory several disputed offshore islands in the East and
South China Seas.2 Militarized clashes with Southeast Asian claimants under-
lined Chinese willingness to use force over territorial disputes. Still, this
military threat remained a largely potential one for Japan. Concerns over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute were assuaged by the moderate position of
Chinese leaders, who were then little inclined toward any escalation, adhering
to Deng Xiaopings statement on shelving the issue. Thus, Tokyo adhered to
a strategy of careful engagement, avoiding direct ofcial references to China
and dampening any tensions.3 Tokyos 1993 defense white paper and 1994
national defense guidelines identied Russia and the Korean Peninsula,
rather than China, as major concerns. Japanese troops and battle tanks

2. Peoples Republic of China, Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, UN Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (National Legislation), February 25, 1992.
3. Christopher W. Hughes, Japans Security Agenda: Military, Economic & Environmental Di-
mensions (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004); Reinhard Drifte, Japans Security Relations with China
since 1989: From Balancing to Bandwagoning (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).
1244  ASIAN SURVEY 55:6

remained largely stationed in the countrys geographical north, similar to the

Cold War era.4
The 199596 Taiwan Strait crisis, with a Chinese missile landing within 60
kilometers of Yonaguni Island in Okinawa, Japans southernmost prefecture,
demonstrated Beijings ability to wield military prowess to achieve its political
goals. Greater threat perceptions of China led to moderate Japanese distancing
from China alongside moderate US alignment. China also increased maritime
activities in Japans Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and close to the disputed
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, despite claiming that its vessels were only for scientic
research.5 As a result, Japans defense white papers since the mid-1990s became
more critical of Chinas opaque and understated defense budget. Bolstering its
traditionally weak maritime air defenses, Tokyo acquired missile helicopter
destroyers, F-15J ghters, P-3C antisubmarine patrol aircraft, and SH-60 mar-
itime patrol helicopters, and commissioned its rst amphibious landing ship
and antisubmarine attack submarines in 1998.6
Tightening its US alliance, Japan issued a 1996 Joint Declaration on
Security that reafrmed the need to restructure the alliance for the postCold
War era; the revised defense guidelines in 1997 included provision of rear area
support by US forces in areas surrounding Japan. Emphasizing that the
concept was not geographic but situational, Tokyo was deliberately equiv-
ocal on what situations would affect its security, avoiding reference to specic
threats or countries, so as to minimize criticisms of Japanese remilitarization.7
Despite fears that the US would play China off against Japan, worries over
Chinese security ambitions led Tokyo to favor more overt security alignment
with the US.
Arguably, the revised USJapan security guidelines were spurred primarily
by Korean Peninsula tensions. China was still seen more as a potential threat

4. John F. Fei, Beyond Rivalry and Camaraderie: Explaining Varying Asian Responses to China.
PhD Dissertation, Pardee RAND Graduate School (2011); Hughes, Japans Security Agenda.
5. The number of EEZ incursions in the East China Sea increased sharply from 16 in 1998 to 33 in
1999. In mid-May and mid-July, respectively, 12 and 10 Chinese naval vessels were seen in Japans
EEZ north of the disputed Senkaku Islands. A countrys EEZ extends 200 nautical miles from its
continental baseline, and confers special rights to the exploitation and use of marine resources in that
zone. See National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2000 (Tokyo, 2000).
6. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, On the Mid-Term Defense Build-up Plan (FY1996-
FY2000) (Tokyo, December 1995); Fei, Beyond Rivalry and Camaraderie.
7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, The Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation
(Tokyo, September 1997).
 WONG / POLITICS AND POLICY IN JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA  1245

than an actual one, compared to the tense military standoff on the peninsula
and test ring of ballistic missiles by North Korea during the 199394 nuclear
crisis. The crisis, which was sparked by North Korean withdrawal from the
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, continuation of plutonium enrichment
activities, and refusal of international inspections, exposed critical shortcom-
ings of the alliance in tackling regional contingencies. This was certainly a (if
not the) major driving force underlying the National Defense Program Out-
line revision and improved alliance coordination.8 The revision and improve-
ments were not necessarily targeted against the China threat per se, and also
stemmed from American dissatisfaction with Tokyos Gulf War checkbook
diplomacy. Coming at a time of initial US troop reductions in East Asia and
trade frictions, Tokyo reafrmed the alliance out of fears of abandonment.
Nonetheless, continued provocations from the Democratic Peoples
Republic of Korea (North Korea, DPRK) became a diplomatic code word
in Japan for concerns also over Chinas military buildup, providing renewed
impetus to strengthen alliance ties.9 Under its 1990s policy of strategic
engagement and commercial liberalism, Japan refrained from aligning pub-
licly against China. The DPRKs Taepodong missile launch in 1998 was
a convenient rationale for security initiatives, including the ballistic missile
defense system.10 The crucial point is: defense measures against North Korea
could easily be applied in a China contingency. Thus, the overlap of immi-
nent North Korean and potential Chinese threats muted relative Japanese
threat perceptions of China while enabling subtle, moderate distancing from
its large neighbor.

South Korea: Eager Engagement with Beijing and Overlapping Priorities on

North Korea, 19921998

In contrast, the Republic of Koreas (South Korea, ROK) diplomatic progress

with China evolved contemporaneously with diminished ROK threat per-
ceptions of China. China posed no concrete military threat to South Korea,
and an overlap in the desired policy outcomes regarding the DPRK led in the

8. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, National Defense Program Outline in and after FY1996
(Tokyo, December 1995); Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyos Grand Strategy and the Future
of East Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007).
9. Drifte, Japans Security Relations with China.
10. Mike M. Mochizuki, interview by Audrye Wong, Washington, DC, December 20, 2012.
1246  ASIAN SURVEY 55:6

ROK to relatively benign views of Beijing. Engaging China was part of

a broader ROK strategy to expand ties outside of the US alliance and establish
a strategic safety net around North Korea, seen as the overwhelmingly immi-
nent, local threat. During the rst nuclear crisis, in 199394, Seoul eagerly
lobbied China for help in restraining North Korean belligerence. For exam-
ple, in 1993 alone, the ROK foreign minister met with his Chinese counter-
part six times, in scheduled bilateral visits as well as on the sidelines of other
international meetings.11 Both South Korea and the US publicly credited
China for pushing Pyongyang, behind the scenes, toward negotiations.
While Beijing did not always offer full support, refusing to approve UN
sanctions against North Korea, Seoul was most alarmed by US demands for
Pyongyangs denuclearization even at the cost of war. While the US made
plans for a preemptive strike on DPRKs nuclear facility at Yongbyon using
F-117 stealth ghter jets and cruise missiles,12 the South Korean administra-
tion strongly opposed any unilateral and military actions.13 South Korea and
China were most worried about possible economic and humanitarian con-
sequences. Beijing prized stability and Seoul feared another war,14 producing
signicant policy dissonance with Washington. South Korean frustrations
were revealed when Ambassador to China Hwang Byung-Tae publicly sug-
gested that South Koreas diplomacy should break out of its heavy reliance
exclusively on the United States and increase independent cooperation with
China. Although he later retracted his remarks, they were tacitly endorsed by
numerous diplomats and politicians.15
Thus, South Korea viewed China as an important partner and source of
leverageperhaps even a counterweight to the USin achieving strategic
goals on the Korean Peninsula. President Kim Young-sams administration
(19931998) started to move beyond economic diplomacy with Beijing. Dur-
ing the rst summit visit to South Korea by a PRC president, in 1995, Jiang

11. Scott Snyder, Chinas Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security (Boulder, CA:
Lynne Rienner, 2009).
12. Washington Was on the Brink of War with North Korea 5 Years Ago, CNN, October 4,
1999, <http://www.cnn.com/US/9910/04/korea.brink/>.
13. US Planned Attack on Yongbyon in 1994, Korea Times, April 13, 2009, <http://www.
koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/04/116_43091.html>.
14. Korean Crisis Is Different This Time, New York Times, August 3, 2009, <http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/08/04/world/asia/04iht-letter.html>.
15. Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2007).
 WONG / POLITICS AND POLICY IN JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA  1247

Zemins enthusiasm for improving economic and security ties alongside

support for inter-Korean dialogue was interpreted as a major turning point
in bilateral relations.16 A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman further
implied that Chinas Peoples Liberation Army forces would not automati-
cally defend the DPRK should it attack the South.17 While this did not mean
that Beijing was deferring to South Korean interests, its relatively cooperative
policies reinforced Seouls optimistic view. Postnuclear crisis, US engage-
ment with the DPRK reduced the dilemma in navigating between the two
larger powers, allowing Seoul to align moderately with the US with minimal
distancing from China.
By extension, military deployment and acquisitions during the 1990s con-
tinued to focus on DPRK land-based and coastal threats.18 South Korean
defense white papers reected little alarm over China. Neutral and descriptive
references were made to rising PRC military expenditures, while Chinas
positive impact on peninsular stability and unication was highlighted.19
The Taiwan Strait crisis arguably presented the rst major security dilemma
for South Korea, and its response was muted compared to those of Japan and
the US. To avoid entanglement, Seoul indicated support for the one China
policy but opposed further military escalation:20 Chinas immediate utility in
handling the local threat of North Korea was far more important than broad-
er issues in the region that did not directly threaten ROK security.

The Exacerbating Role of Different National Identities and National

Identity Gaps

Differences in great and middle power identity further contributed to diverging

Japanese and South Korean threat perceptions. Tokyo originally viewed itself
as a bridge between China and the US,21 adopting commercial liberalism to

16. In-Taek Hyun, Strategic Thought in Kim Young-Sam Era, in South Korean Strategic
Thought toward Asia, ed. Gilbert Rozman, In-Taek Hyun, and Shin-wha Lee (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2008).
17. Samuel S. Kim, The Two Koreas and the Great Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2006).
18. Janes Fighting Ships, 19961997 (Janes Fighting Ships, 1996).
19. Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper 1997 (Seoul, 1997).
20. Hyun, Strategic Thought.
21. Ming Wan, Chinas National Identity and the Sino-US National Identity Gap: The View
from Japan, Association for Asian Studies Annual Conference, San Diego, 2013.
1248  ASIAN SURVEY 55:6

guide Chinas reintegration into the global community while bolstering Japans
economic and political status.22 Post-Tiananmen, Japan was the rst country to
resume aid and the rst G7 country to have its head of state visit China. Until
the mid-1990s, historical guilt led Japan to be obsequious toward China,
largely accommodating the latters interests, including Taiwan.23 But this was
increasingly replaced over the 1990s by fears that the United States would seek
closer ties with China at the expense of Japan, particularly as the Clinton
administration actively engaged Beijing. Economic stagnation further height-
ened Japans sense of vulnerability and undermined its identity as a regional
powerhousejust as the Chinese economy was taking off.
Furthermore, the SinoJapanese national identity gap was far greater com-
pared to the SinoSouth Korean gap. Although both Tokyo and Seoul largely
saw China as more of an opportunity than a threat, China did not treat both
countries the same way. Chinese leaders actively demonized Japan (but not
South Korea), perpetuating negative images of the former. Japan was over-
whelmingly targeted by Beijing (sometimes echoed by Seoul) over historical
issues through Chinas patriotic education campaign. President Jiang Ze-
mins 1998 visit to Japan was remembered for his insistent criticism of Japans
war history. Negative Chinese policies limited Japanese attempts to broaden
or deepen cooperation. Tokyo actively initiated bilateral security dialogues
and military exchanges with China, but requests for more frequent exchanges
were unreciprocated.24 Frequently cancelling or delaying dialogues,25 Beijing
used them as symbols to express displeasure at other policies.

Conclusion

To conclude, for both Japan and South Korea in the 1990s, the relative lack of
targeted escalation meant that Chinese military modernization was not yet
seen as an active threatthis would only change in the late 2000s. North
Korea remained the more imminent and local threat for both countries.
Because worries over a Chinese threat remained largely potential (Beijings

22. Gilbert Rozman, Japans Images of China in the 1990s: Are They Ready for Chinas Smile
Diplomacy or Bushs Strong Diplomacy? Japanese Journal of Political Science 2:1 (May 2001): pp.
97125; Michael Green and Benjamin Self, Japans Changing China Policy: From Commercial
Liberalism to Reluctant Realism, Survival 38:2 (1996).
23. Mochizuki interview.
24. Drifte, Japans Security Relations with China.
25. National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2000.
 WONG / POLITICS AND POLICY IN JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA  1249

focus was still on Taiwan), Japan only leaned moderately toward the US,
despite moderately and quietly increasing its strategic distance from China.
For example, it started to restructure its alliance with the United States, but
continued to emphasize the North Korean threat and refrained from overtly
criticizing China. This would contrast with its increasingly strong alignment
with the US and overt distancing from China in future decades.

THE 2000S: DOMESTIC FLUCTUATIONS AMID CHANGING

SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS

Japanese and South Korean foreign policies were most divergent during the
2000s. Tokyo openly sought political and military alignment toward the US,
and continued to distance itself moderately but more explicitly from China.
Seoul, on the other hand, adopted an unprecedentedly weak alignment with
its traditional ally and attempted to reduce the political distance from Beijing.
First, the two countries faced increasingly different security environments.
Although China continued to commission new submarines and destroyers,26
South Korea faced no direct military provocation from China: Beijing inten-
sied its maritime activities near Japan. In November 2004, a PRC nuclear-
powered submarine navigated without surfacing near the Sakishima Islands, at
the southernmost end of the Japanese archipelago near Okinawa, a violation of
international law.27 Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ships periodically
conducted intelligence-gathering and marine-observation activities with naval
applications. Amid continued disagreement over Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ) boundaries and natural resource rights in the East China Sea, Chinese
vessels started to enter Japans EEZ more frequently, often violating a February
2001 agreement on advance consultation regarding marine research activities.28
Bilateral frictions shifted from mere oceanographic surveys to competing devel-
opment of oil and gas elds. A series of negotiations produced a joint under-
standing in 2008 over the joint development of energy resources, but this was
never fully implemented due to disagreement over development in the area
around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.29

26. Fei, Beyond Rivalry and Camaraderie.

27. Ministry of Defense of Japan, Defense of Japan 2005 (Tokyo: 2005).
28. National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2000.
29. Reinhard Drifte, The Japan-China Confrontation Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands:
Between Shelving and Dispute Escalation, Asia-Pacic Journal 12, issue 30, no. 3 (July 28, 2014).
1250  ASIAN SURVEY 55:6

Differing threat perceptions of China were reected in national defense

policies. Japan became increasingly explicit when expressing concerns over
Chinas blue water navy.30 Japans 2005 National Defense Program Guide-
lines noted new threats from China including its expanding . . . area of
operations at sea. It referenced the invasion of Japans offshore islands and
violation of Japans airspace and the intrusion of armed special-purpose ships
and other similar vessels.31 The Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) deployed
new units and equipment to bolster coastal surveillance and island defense.
This included a new naval base on Honshu, a Western Army infantry regiment
on Kyushu for offshore defense and reconnaissance, a signal intelligence facility
on Miyako Island, and advanced Souryu-class submarines and Aegis-equipped
destroyers to be based conveniently between North Korea and the southwest-
ern Ryukyu island chain.32 Moreover, the Japanese government cleverly side-
stepped the countrys 1% cap on defense spending by reconditioning the sizable
eet of armed Coast Guard ships, and sending new jets and ships with
advanced re-control systems and cannons to patrol disputed waters. A revised
2001 law permitted use of force in an emergency or for justiable defense
against maritime intruders.33 Although Japans naval and ballistic missile
defense capabilities could be used to counter DRPK threats,34 Chinese mari-
time contingencies were of growing concern. The Japan Defense Agency began
planning in the early 2000s for three scenarios: (1) Chinese attacks to prevent
Japan from helping US forces during a Taiwan crisis; (2) Chinese seizure of
Senkaku/Diaoyu in a move aimed at helping top ofcials in Beijing consolidate
their domestic leadership; and (3) Chinese development of disputed East China
Sea gas elds.35 Tokyo also developed in 2004 a plan to defend islands off
Kyushu and Okinawa against potential Chinese invasion.36

30. Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 2001 (Tokyo, 2001).

31. Ministry of Defense of Japan, National Defense Program Guidelines, FY 2005- (Tokyo, 2004).
32. Navy, Japan, Janes Sentinel Security Assessment: China and Northeast Asia, September 3,
2004; Army, Japan, Janes Sentinel Security Assessment: China and Northeast Asia, November 24,
2005; Fei, Beyond Rivalry and Camaraderie.
33. Samuels, Securing Japan.
34. North Korean spy ships had twice intruded into Japanese territorial waters. Discovery of
DPRKs uranium enrichment facility spurred Japans announcement of ground- and sea-based
ballistic missile defense systems, and DPRK missile launches and a nuclear test in 2006 hastened
missile deployment.
35. Samuels, Securing Japan.
36. Evan S. Medeiros et al., Pacic Currents: The Responses of US Allies and Security Partners in
East Asia to Chinas Rise (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008).
 WONG / POLITICS AND POLICY IN JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA  1251

Unlike in Japan, ROK policy documents did not question Chinese military
transparency and intentions, focusing instead on DPRK military capabilities.
Security threats from China were seen as directed toward the US and Japan, and
defense white papers highlighted concerns over new strains between China
on one side and the US and Japan on the other.37 Although the Defense Reform
2020 plan called for modernizing a smaller defense force with new destroyers
and ghters,38 this was driven by decreased threat perceptions of the North and
seen as commensurate with South Koreas strong economic growth.39 Cuts in
land forces were based on the projection that the DPRK threat was diminishing
over time, in tandem with South Koreas Sunshine Policy. Moreover, Beijing
was considered a partner in addressing the North Korean issue. The 2003
Participatory Government Defense Policy paper highlighted Chinas crucial role
as a concerned party and a mediator in the Six Party Talks on North Korea.
Sounding relatively sanguine, it noted that Beijing was making every effort to
calm the fears of neighboring countries of an emerging Chinese threat.40
Second, domestic politics in Japan and South Korea shifted in opposite
ideological directions. Japan swung to the right and South Korea to the left,
intensifying differing attitudes toward China and the US. This accentuated
SinoJapanese history and identity clashes, and boosted the role of the North
Korea variable for ROK views of the two larger powers.
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiros iconoclastic qualities, which
allowed him to push through major institutional reforms,41 also worsened
diplomatic ties with China, not least because of his yearly visits to the
controversial Yasukuni Shrine, which memorializes war criminals, among
others. Although Koizumi was openly pro-US, he was not zealously anti-
China. But Beijing took his insistence on visiting Yasukuni as an affront.
Political frictions in the 2000s were marked by a resurgence of thorny

37. Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper 2000 (Seoul,
2000).
38. Fei, Beyond Rivalry and Camaraderie.
39. Beom Chul Shin, chief, North Korean Military Research Division, Korean Institute for
Defense Analyses, interview by Audrye Wong, Seoul, January 25, 2013.
40. Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, Participatory Government Defense
Policy 2003 (Seoul, 2003).
41. For example, he sent Japanese troops to Iraq for non-combat missions, won the LDP
nomination and general elections as an underdog, pushed through privatization of the postal and
highway systems, and ultimately sought to break up the traditional power monopoly of the big
businesses, bureaucracy, and insider politics in the LDP. See The Koizumi Restoration, Economist,
September 14, 2006; Japan Politics: The Man who Remade Japan, Economist, September 15, 2006.
1252  ASIAN SURVEY 55:6

historical problems. The shrine was a symbol of more-fundamental identity

clashes and growing mutual distrust between Tokyo and Beijing. While
Japan had been relatively acquiescent on history issues in favor of maintaining
friendship with China, attitudes shifted with Jiang Zemins repeated criti-
cisms of Japans war responsibility in 1998. Public sentiment toward China
worsened after widespread 2005 Chinese demonstrations against Japanese
history textbooks.42 China was increasingly seen as a potential economic and
military rival, unrestrained despite strategic engagement.
Nonetheless, despite frosty SinoJapanese ties during the Koizumi era,
a hot economics relationship remained unharmed by cold politics (seirei
keinetsu). From 2004, China became Japans foremost destination for trade,
business entrepreneurs, and student exchanges. Tokyos foreign policy was
more a reection of Koizumis individual personality and public opinion.43
Although intensied political dialogue did not necessarily translate into sub-
stantive cooperation, Beijing responded proactively to improve bilateral ties
after Abe Shinzos election. Tokyo referred to SinoJapanese ties as a mutually
benecial strategic relationship,44 while Premier Wen Jiabao pledged to make
the East China Sea a sea of peace, cooperation and friendship. Intensied
bilateral summitry and top-level exchange visits were heralded as the coming of
Springtime,45 distinguishing Tokyos strategic considerations from the post-
2010 militarized situation. While SinoJapanese bilateral relations in the early
2000s were plagued by mutual mistrust and identity clashes, continued eco-
nomic ties and a relative lack of direct security provocations from China did
moderate Japanese threat perceptions of China to some extent.
In South Korea, two progressive presidencies led to signicant policy
changes toward the North, in turn altering strategic interactions with China.
Kim Dae-jungs (in ofce 19982003) Sunshine Policy and push for inter-
Korean reconciliation removed zero-sum competition between Seoul and
Pyongyang in relations with Beijing.46 Even if for slightly different end goals,

42. Ryosei Kokubun, Changing Japanese Strategic Thinking toward China, in Japanese
Strategic Thought toward Asia, eds. Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph P. Ferguson (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
43. Ibid.
44. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan-China Joint Press Statement, Tokyo, October
8, 2006.
45. Glenn Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher Hughes, and Hugo Dobson, Japans International
Relations, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2012).
46. Snyder, Chinas Rise and the Two Koreas.
 WONG / POLITICS AND POLICY IN JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA  1253

Seoul and Beijing both prioritized peninsula stability and regional engagement.
Seoul sought to bolster inter-Korean exchanges and integrate North Korea into
the regional community.47 Chinas burgeoning economic growth made the
country averse to conict, and it also started to promote multilateralism and
neighboring diplomacy, at least on the surface. With Beijings positive
response, SinoSouth Korean bilateral ties grew symbolically from a coopera-
tive partnership in 1998 to an all-around cooperative partnership in 2000.
Roh Moo-hyun (in ofce 20032008) further articulated an ambitious
vision for South Korea to act as a balancer in Northeast Asia,48 warning
that Seoul did not want to be locked into a Cold Warera alliance. In the rst
summit between Roh and Chinese President Hu Jintao, in 2003, they af-
rmed a comprehensive, cooperative partnership, agreeing on a host of
issues from diplomatic engagement of North Korea to broadened economic
cooperation. Hu described the two countries as friends that could learn
from and complement each other.49 The next summit deepened high-level
political contacts and military exchanges, alongside plans for Chinas assis-
tance on peninsula stability.50

Diverging Alliance Trajectories

Diverging views of China were reected in the contrast between a tightened

USJapan alliance and tumultuous USROK alliance. Japanese fears of
abandonment and Japan-passing outweighed potential entrapment on issues
such as Taiwan. In contrast, South Korea was highly reluctant to expand the
scope of its alliance, worrying over implications for ties with China.
Under Koizumi, Tokyo became a prime American supporter regionally
and internationally, passing several unprecedented measures broadening SDF
roles. The 2001 authorization of SDF vessels to refuel ships in the Indian
Ocean, supporting the Afghanistan war, marked the rst time since 1945 that
Japanese forces had been sent outside areas surrounding Japan. In 2003,
new laws allowed the SDF to use force to defend itself, justied inter-state

47. Ibid.
48. Gilbert Rozman, Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2011).
49. Snyder, Chinas Rise and the Two Koreas.
50. Korea Steps Up Military Cooperation with China, Chosun Ilbo [Chosun Daily], April 4,
2005.
1254  ASIAN SURVEY 55:6

wartime cooperation (not least supporting US troops stationed in Japan), and

deployed SDF personnel to Iraq for non-combat missions.51 Combined mil-
itary exercises increased appreciably in frequency and scope, almost doubling
between 1985 and 2004, covering live re training and large-scale joint opera-
tions across all three military services.52 Likely in response to growing Chinese
military provocations in the East China Sea, 2006 saw Japans rst (and
highly publicized) combat exercise focused on offshore island defense.53
In contrast, South Korea responded negatively to the US concept of
strategic exibility, which called for signicant reduction and repositioning
of American troops in South Korea away from the Demilitarized Zone,
facilitating force redeployment beyond the peninsula. US efforts to restruc-
ture smaller infantry battalions easily mobilized for a conict and the inte-
gration of US air force assets in Korea into multifunctional aerospace
expeditionary forces heightened ROK fears that Washington was intending
to target China and use the alliance to defend Taiwan.54 In March 2005, Roh
declared his opposition to the deployment of United States Forces Korea
troops in possible conicts with China.55 The US alliance was arguably most
turbulent under Roh, who had been elected amid fervent anti-Americanism
after two Korean schoolgirls were killed by a US Army vehicle in 2002.
Nonetheless, Roh was not strictly anti-US or pro-China, although his ambi-
tious vision for an autonomous South Korea was frequently interpreted as
such. Eventually, Roh attempted to reassure his American counterparts with
major bilateral milestones such as signing the USKorea free trade agreement
and consolidating US military bases in South Korea.56

The Interplay of Domestic Politics and the DPRK in South Korean Threat
Perceptions

Kim did not set out to distance South Korea from the US, nor did Roh seek
to align with China per se. Rather, ROK discontent over American policies

51. Samuels, Securing Japan.

52. Ibid.; Fei, Beyond Rivalry and Camaraderie.
53. Ministry of Defense of Japan, Defense of Japan 2006 (Tokyo, 2005).
54. Jae-Jeok Park, A Comparative Case Study of the US-Philippines Alliance in the 1990s and
the US-South Korea Alliance between 1998 and 2008, Asian Survey 51:2 (March/April 2011): pp. 268
289.
55. Roh Hints at New East Asian Order, Chosun Ilbo [Chosun Daily], March 22, 2005.
56. Shin interview.
 WONG / POLITICS AND POLICY IN JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA  1255

toward North Korea contrasted sharply with SeoulBeijing rapprochement.

By classifying North Korea under the axis of evil in his 2002 State of the
Union speech, President George Bush promoted his post-9/11 doctrine of
preemption. This raised fears of unilateral American strikes on the peninsula,
alongside possible coercive tactics such as nancial sanctions on North
Korea.57 US policy was seen as unhelpful given ongoing NorthSouth rap-
prochement, and Seoul turned to Beijing.
From 2003, China emerged as a pivotal mediator and host of the Six Party
Talks, elevating Beijings strategic importance in South Korean eyes. China
was seen as playing a positive role in persuading North Korea to negotiate,
providing diplomatic reassurance to Pyongyang in the face of American
hostility. In 2003, Deputy Foreign Minister Wang Yi and former Foreign
Minister Qian Qichen visited Pyongyang, requesting an immediate halt to
nuclear provocations.58 China used a mix of carrots, dangling promises of
additional food and oil assistance, with occasional sticks, such as withdrawing
oil deliveries in February 2003 to restrain DPRK aggression, although tech-
nical difculties were cited as the ofcial reason.59
While the US demanded denuclearization before anything else, both Seoul
and Beijing preferred a multistage package linking denuclearization with
foreign assistance, and prioritizing economic and political exchange over
human rights. This is not to suggest that Seoul and Beijing forged cohesive,
long-term interestsChina was more worried about USDPRK conict,
and wanted to promote its latest slogan of great-power diplomacy with
responsibilities.60 Regardless, both South Korea and China had overlapping
aims of gradual reform, stability over denuclearization, and peaceful resolu-
tion. Compared to the US, China presented a more helpful partner in engag-
ing North Korea, as it did not pose a threat to the DPRKs legitimacy or
survival, was less subject to US pressure, and was able to leverage cross-border
channels independent of the negotiating framework.61
Policies toward China were thus a function of Seouls strategic priority of
maintaining Beijings support on the North Korean issue. The ROK gov-
ernment avoided provoking Beijings displeasure on key strategic interests,

57. Snyder, Chinas Rise and the Two Koreas.

58. Chung, Between Ally and Partner.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Rozman, Strategic Thinking.
1256  ASIAN SURVEY 55:6

particularly Tibet and Taiwan. In 2002 it refused to grant political asylum to

Xu Bo, a political dissident during the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations, and
repeatedly refused permission for a Dalai Lama visit despite civil society
requests.62 In contrast, Tokyo was far from deferential to Chinese prefer-
ences, allowing former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui to visit twice,
while dismissing Chinese criticisms.63 A 2005 USJapan Security Consulta-
tive Committee statement outlined the peaceful resolution of cross-strait
issues as a common strategic objective.64
On North Korea, Japan was unwilling to seriously consider multilateral-
ism, remaining suspicious of Beijings potentially dominant role at Japans
expense. China had already been pushing for the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations ASEAN3 framework in opposition to Japans preferred East
Asian Summit, inciting Japanese fears of marginalization should China take
a leading role in the Six Party Talks.65 While the DPRK factor helped to
reduce ROK threat perceptions of China in the 2000s, Japan saw the pen-
insula in terms of its great-power identity rivalry with China.
Yet, as Koreas Sunshine Policy started to wane in the mid-2000s,
national identity clashes came into greater play in SinoROK relations.
The Koguryo historical dispute marked a major turning point for a domestic
South Korean audience who had viewed China through a positive economic
lens. Chinas Northeast Asian History project claimed the ancient Koguryo
kingdom, which stretched across present-day northeast China into the
Korean peninsula from roughly 37 BCE to 668 CE, as a Chinese vassal
state.66 Interpreted as an attempt to Sinicize Korean history and identity,
the claim aroused visceral public reaction and media coverage in South
Korea. Koguryo, one of the three precursors of a unied Korea, symbolized
nationalistic survival and resistance to foreign invaders.67 South Koreans

62. No Excuse for Shameful Delay, Taipei Times, Febuary 24, 2003; Chinese Man Allegedly
Faces Deportation Threats, Korea Herald, September 26, 2002; Snyder, Chinas Rise and the Two
Koreas.
63. Kokubun, Changing Japanese Strategic Thinking.
64. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Joint Statement US-Japan Security Consultative
Committee, Tokyo, February 19, 2005.
65. Rozman, Strategic Thinking.
66. Zhongguo Gongbu Gaojulikao Guyanjiu Zuixinchengguo [China Announces Latest
Research Findings on Ancient Koguryo], Peoples Daily Online, July 1, 2004.
67. Peter Hays Gries, The Koguryo Controversy, National Identity, and Sino-Korean Relations
Today, East Asia 22:4 (Winter 2005): 317.
 WONG / POLITICS AND POLICY IN JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA  1257

saw evidence of PRCs hegemonic territorial intentions in the event of

Korean unication.68
To the extent that ROK strategic planning is concerned not just with
present-day DPRK aggravations but also with future reunication, the Ko-
guryo dispute increased uncertainty over whether Beijing would remain
amenable to South Korean interests in the long run, especially as policies
and interests on North Korea diverged alongside the stagnating Six Party
Talks. Expanding Chinese economic ties with the North sparked fears of
unwanted Chinese leverage over terms of potential reunication. While ROK
access was limited to Mount Kumgang and the Kaesong industrial zone,
China had developed trade and investment ties with the North, particularly
through concessions in mining and natural resources.69 Although this expan-
sion was essentially extractive and many Chinese business people remain
leery,70 it sparked alarmed debate on whether North Korea was becoming
the fourth province of Northeast China.71 The convergence of threats to
Korean security and identity, perceived by political elites and the general
public, provided impetus for moderate distancing from China.

Conclusion

The 2000s was arguably the period where domestic political leadership had
the greatest moderating effect, accentuating divergent policies toward Bei-
jing. Wariness of the regional military context and increasing Chinese mar-
itime activities close to Japan, coupled with intensifying identity and
historical clashes, made the Chinese security threat more imminent and local
than in the 1990s. This led Tokyo to align more toward the US and maintain
a disdainful distance from China. Japan improved military cooperation with
and support for US military policies, while remaining watchful over Chinese
maritime activities. In contrast, South Koreas preoccupation with the North

68. Seeking Peace in a Once and Future Kingdom, New York Times, August 25, 2004.
69. Snyder, Chinas Rise and the Two Koreas. A special tourist region was set up on Mount
Kumgang in 2002 for South Koreans to visit, but was closed in 2008 after a DPRK guard shot and
killed a South Korean tourist. The Kaesong industrial zone was opened, also in 2002, as a joint
economic development venture between the two Koreas, in which South Korean companies em-
ployed North Korean workers.
70. Hyoung-zhin Kim, former director, North American Division, ROK Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, interview by Audrye Wong, Tokyo, January 31, 2013.
71. Rozman, Strategic Thinking.
1258  ASIAN SURVEY 55:6

Korean threat and what it perceived as positive Chinese cooperation made it

inclined to seek rapprochement with China even at the expense of weakened
alignment with the US. Yet, when Chinas self-interested policies on the
Koguryo dispute suggested adverse implications for reunication, simulta-
neously threatening Korean security and identity, the progressive ROK gov-
ernment under Roh Moo-hyun sought to move away from China.
Nonetheless, the lack of a direct and imminent PRC military threat meant
that Seouls alignment toward the US or its distancing from China was still
moderate, relatively quiet, and less pronounced than that of Tokyo.

POST-2010 TURNING POINT: CONVERGENT OUTCOMES,

DIFFERENT PATHS

Most recently, especially since 2010, Japan and South Korea have been bolstering
military capabilities and tightening US alliance cooperation. While both coun-
tries have chosen unprecedentedly strong alignment with the US, they have
adopted slightly different degrees of distancing from China, responding to
different sources of threat and via different decision-making paths. China now
poses a very concrete, localized threat specically to Japan in the form of mar-
itime incursions and militarized escalation over territorial disputes, and Tokyo
has not hesitated to overtly and strongly distance itself from China. For South
Korea, Chinas military modernization remains a relatively vague systemic threat
compared to renewed DPRK aggression. Beijings support for North Korea to
the detriment of ROK security has induced greater strategic distancing, but the
lack of a direct military threat has allowed more space for ROK to avoid heavy
distancing while attempting to close the political gap with China.

Japan: From Potentiality to a New Militarized Normal

The latest escalation over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute is unprece-

dented. Tensions have heightened beyond even the frostiest period during
the Koizumi era, when potential militarized action was never in sight, and the
mantra of hot economics, cold politics provided an element of stability.
The 2010 rare earths export ban on Japan, after Tokyo detained a Chinese
trawler captain for ramming Japanese Coast Guard ships, revealed Chinas
willingness to wield economic heft for political objectives, and 2012 marked
the rst time (postCold War) that Japan was targeted by Chinese militarized
 WONG / POLITICS AND POLICY IN JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA  1259

force, in the aftermath of the Japanese governments purchase of the Senka-

ku/Diaoyu Islands. Beijing has intensied its maritime patrols and incursions
into Japanese EEZ and territorial waters around the islands, and in December
2012, Japanese ghter jets intercepted a PRC surveillance plane that ew over
the islands, marking the rst Chinese incursion into Japanese airspace since
records began in 1958.72 In January 2013, Chinese military planes entered
Japans air defense identication zone, and a Chinese navy frigate locked
re-control radartantamount to a simulated attackonto a Japanese
destroyer and helicopter patrolling the East China Sea.73 While the Soviet
threat was targeted mainly at the United States and fell under the umbrella of
Cold War rivalry, China is now seen as an arrow pointing directly from
China to Japan that has to be dealt with primarily by Tokyo and not via the
US alliance.74 Chinese military assertiveness is no longer simply a part of
systemic SinoUS rivalry but is now framed as a direct, concrete threat to
Japans national security, where intrusion into territorial waters has become
the new status quo, with use of force apparently on the table. Seen as even
more imminent and dangerous than sporadic DPRK provocations, this has
spurred fundamental changes in Japans security discourse.
Geographically, Chinese access to the Western Pacic passes through or near
the Japanese archipelago. PLAN penetrations have spiked from essentially none
in preceding years to 11 between 2008 and mid-2012. Flotillas have conducted
formation exercises, including ship-based helicopter ights, mid-ocean refuel-
ing, and unmanned aerial vehicle or drone test ights,75 suggesting that
China is seeking enhanced joint operational capabilities outside of its contig-
uous zones between the rst and second island chains in the Pacic Ocean.76
There are two possible contingencies. The rst is a targeted Chinese attack to

72. Japan Scrambles Jets in Island Dispute with China, New York Times, December 13, 2012.
73. James Hardy, Japans Navy: Sailing towards the Future, The Diplomat, January 21, 2013;
Chinas Use of Fire-Control Radar Ramps Up Tension in East China Sea, Asahi Shimbun, Feb-
ruary 6, 2013.
74. Kazuhiko Togo, retired ambassador and professor at Kyoto Sangyo University, interview by
Audrye Wong, Tokyo, January 29, 2013.
75. Ministry of Defense of Japan, Defense of Japan 2012 (Tokyo, 2012).
76. National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2000. The rst island
chain stretches from the Kurile Islands, Japan, to the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, and
down to Indonesia. The second island chain is further out in the Pacic, comprising the Kuriles,
Japan, the Bonin Islands, the Marianas Islands, Palau, and Indonesia. See also Bernard D. Cole,
Reections on Chinas Maritime Strategy: Island Chains and the Classics, EMC Chair Conference
Paper, US Naval War College.
1260  ASIAN SURVEY 55:6

open an access corridor by capturing islands adjoining vital passages such as the
Miyako and Ishigaki Straits east of Taiwan. Second, PLAN could attempt to
capture the entire Ryukyu chain as an anti-access/anti-denial strategy to pre-
vent US reinforcements in the event of a military conict, while stopping
existing theater forces from entering areas such as the Taiwan Strait.77
Reecting such concerns, Japans 2009 defense white paper included a map
detailing Chinese maritime activities in and near Japanese waters.78 The year
2010 marked a public revamp of Japans defense policies. Even as the sup-
posedly more pro-China Democratic Party of Japan government tried to
expand trade and investment ties with Beijing, its security responses were
pushed to the right after the 2010 trawler incident.79 The 2011 National
Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) articulated a major shift, replacing
passive force structures geared for a conventional Soviet invasion with
a Dynamic Defense Force of mobile units capable of rapid deployment in
response to diverse contingencies.80 Subsequent white papers described
Chinese maritime activities around Senkaku/Diaoyu with greater force: the
Japanese word kouatsuteki, translated as assertive, also has a stronger, emo-
tional nuance of pressing from a superior position.81
Although the PLAN amphibious eet is relatively rudimentary and lacks
expeditionary experience,82 Chinese military spending has focused on naval

77. James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, Ryukyu Chain in Chinas Island Strategy, China
Brief, September 10, 2010.
78. Ministry of Defense of Japan, Defense of Japan 2009 (Tokyo, 2009).
79. The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute between Japan and China ared up in September 2010, when
the Japanese authorities detained a Chinese trawler captain for ramming Japanese Coast Guard ships
and for refusing to leave the waters or allow inspection of his vessel. PRC State Councilor Dai
Bingguo summoned the Japanese ambassador to China, demanding the immediate and uncondi-
tional release of shing boat and crew, and Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Jiang Yu warned
of a serious impact on the larger interests of China-Japan relations (see Bloomberg News, China
Tells Japan to Take Wise Decision, Free Fishermen, Boat, Bloomberg News, September 12, 2010).
Chinese State Oceanic Administration vessels attempted to prevent Japanese Coast Guard ships from
conducting ocean surveys around Okinawa, and Beijing further retaliated by cutting off ministerial-
level talks on joint energy development, and blocking rare earth exports, a key component for Japans
auto and electronics industry. Two weeks later, Tokyo backed down and released the Chinese
captain without charges, in what was widely seen (and domestically criticized) as a diplomatic defeat.
80. Adam P. Liff, Japans 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines: Reading the Tea Leaves,
Asia Pacic Bulletin, December 22, 2010.
81. Toshiya Takahashi, A New Trend in Japans Defense White Paper, East Asia Forum,
August 21, 2012.
82. Dennis J. Blasko, PLA Amphibious Capabilities: Structured for Deterrence, China Brief,
August 2010.
 WONG / POLITICS AND POLICY IN JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA  1261

enhancement, including stealth submarines, an aircraft carrier, and antiship

ballistic missile weapons.83 Japan has responded by bolstering joint air and
maritime defense capabilities in areas targeted by Chinese naval activity such
as the southwesterly islands such as Miyako and Ishigaki, where new ground
forces, radar, and F-15 ghters are being repositioned. Japan expanded its
submarine eet for the rst time since 1976; two new 27,000-ton helicopter
carriers are being built, similar to light aircraft carriers used in Marine opera-
tions, and a new early-warning radar station will be built on Yonaguni Island,
around 110 km east of Taiwan.84 Since 2010, Tokyo has also operationalized
offensive-oriented capabilities training, namely amphibious landings and is-
land defense trainings independently and with US Marines, with plans to
station small contingents on the two key islands Miyako and Ishigaki (the
latter is about 240 km east of Taiwan). The rst-ever combined island
defense exercises in December 2010 incorporated recapture plans for the
Ryukyu Islands.85
Certainly, there remains considerable emotional and institutional resis-
tance to major shifts in Japanese security policy. Even as Abe pushed through
new security legislation in September 2015 to expand the legal operational
scope of Japanese Self-Defense Forces, public opinion remained highly neg-
ative, and support for the administration has been declining.86 Yet, the post-
2012 militarization of the Senkaku dispute, where American commitment is
likely the weakest, could well represent a turning point in Japanese strategic
thinking toward ramping up military capabilities as well as reinterpreting the
Constitution to exercise the right of collective self-defense. Compared to
occasional Chinese EEZ incursions or even hypothetical scenarios of Chinese
attacks on Japans Ryukyu islands, the Senkaku Islands already represent
a concrete, recurrent, and increasingly escalatory dispute that cannot be
compromised. At stake is no longer simply disputed EEZ rights and eco-
nomic resources, but wider geostrategic rivalry for potential control of vital
maritime spaces and interests, with possible broader implications for

83. Holmes and Yoshihara, Ryukyu Chain in Chinas Island Strategy.

84. Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, The Japanese Archipelago through Chinese Eyes,
China Brief, August 5, 2010; James Hardy, Japans Navy: Sailing towards the Future, Diplomat,
January 21, 2013.
85. Holmes and Yoshihara, Ryukyu Chain in Chinas Island Strategy.
86. Yuki Tatsumi and Mengjia Wan, Dont Expect Too Much of Japans Defense Reforms,
Diplomat, October 9, 2015; Japans Defense Reforms Tarnished by Low Public Support, Uncon-
vincing Sales Pitch, Japan Times, September 16, 2015.
1262  ASIAN SURVEY 55:6

navigational freedom. Underlining this shift, in 2013 Tokyo released its rst
national security strategy and new National Defense Program Guidelines,
explicitly criticizing China for attempting to alter the status quo by force in
the skies and seas of the East . . . and South China Sea, and reversed a long
decline in military spending. Much of the projected 5% increase in Japans
defense budget over the next ve years will go toward new drones, amphib-
ious assault vehicles, and Osprey aircraft, as well as increased early-warning
capabilities to bolster Marine Corpslike deployments on the southwesterly
islands.87

South Korea: Disillusionment with China over North Korea

A new conservative ROK administration from 2008 focused on patching up

relations with the US. President Lee Myung-bak adopted an alliance rst
policy, announcing a Joint Vision for the Future and providing military
support in the Middle East.88 Yet Lee continued to build extensive consul-
tative mechanisms with China,89 held four bilateral summits in 2008 (rela-
tions were upgraded to a strategic cooperative partnership), and started
foreign ministerlevel dialogues and naval and air force hotlines.90
Nonetheless, progress was largely economic.91 Diplomatic exchanges did
not translate into concrete security cooperation. Injecting a zero-sum ele-
ment, Beijing perceived Lees pro-US stance as rejecting the apparently pro-
China policy of previous Korean governments. SinoSouth Korean relations
were described as generally healthy but with some dark currents that can
affect the relationship . . . hot in economics, warm in diplomacy, but cool in
security terms.92 In particular, Beijing was annoyed at Seouls attempt to

87. Martin Fackler, Japan Moves to Strengthen Military Amid Rivalry with China, New York
Times, December 17, 2013.
88. Jae Ho Chung, Leadership Changes and South Koreas China Policy, in Asia at a Tipping
Point: Korea, the Rise of China, and the Impact of Leadership Transitions, ed. Gilbert Rozman, Joint
US-Korea Academic Studies Vol. 23 (Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute, 2012).
89. Van A. Jackson, strategist, Regional Policy Planning and Analysis Department, Ofce of the
Secretary of Defense, interview by Audrye Wong, Washington, DC, December 19, 2012.
90. Scott Snyder and See-won Byun, Sweet and Sour Aftertaste, Comparative Connections 10,
no. 4 (January 2009).
91. A secretariat was established in Seoul to coordinate trilateral ChinaJapanROK summits.
The Lee administration also successfully pushed to open more consulates in China, even in far-ung
or politically sensitive areas such as Chengdu (close to Tibet). Kim interview.
92. Chung, Leadership Changes.
 WONG / POLITICS AND POLICY IN JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA  1263

take on an international role, articulated through Lees concept of a Global

Korea. China saw this as a South Korean overreach, adopting Western-style
values-based diplomacy and neglecting to show appropriate deference.93
Thus, South Korea started to fall into the same position Japan had long been
in: subject to greater mistrust and harsher criticism from China, exacerbated
by widening national identity gaps. Although senior South Korean Foreign
Ministry ofcials have argued that Lee gave equal attention to building
relations with China,94 Beijings unreceptiveness spurred Seouls closer align-
ment with the US.
This was further compelled by external events that threatened ROK secu-
rity, albeit via the DPRK factor, which renewed perceptions of the North as
the most imminent, unpredictable threat. Beijings unhelpful response to
North Koreas 2010 attacks on the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong and
the naval corvette Cheonan turned public and elite opinion against China.
Beijings continued shielding of Pyongyang pushed Seoul to take a more
assertive stance toward China and tack toward the US. South Korean percep-
tions of the two larger powers were again framed in terms of the North Korea
factor. While US President Barack Obama condemned the attacks and re-
afrmed Americas extended deterrence commitment in a joint commu-
nique, China delayed offering its condolences and refused to condemn
Pyongyangs aggressions. Defying international pressure, Beijing declared
a neutral equal distance posture despite investigative evidence of Pyon-
gyangs involvement in the Cheonan sinking.95 Repeated meetings between
the Chinese and South Korean presidents produced no joint understanding
on a coordinated response or on how to address tensions on the peninsula.96
The long-delayed and watered-down UN Security Council statement issued
in July avoided pinpointing the DPRK as the culprit.
Seoul also perceived Beijing as pursuing simultaneous diplomacy to use
closer ties with North Korea as a bargaining chip with the ROK.97 Amid

93. Leif-Eric Easley, Diverging Trajectories of Trust in Northeast Asia: South Koreas Security
Relations with Japan and China, in Asia at a Tipping Point.
94. Kim interview.
95. China to make Objective, Fair Judgment on S. Korean Warship Sinking: Wen, Xinhua,
May 28, 2010.
96. Scott Snyder and See-won Byun, Cheonan and Yeonpyeong: The Northeast Asian Response
to North Koreas Provocations, Rusi Journal, April/May 2011: 7481.
97. Scott Snyder and See-won Byun, A Fragile China-ROK Strategic Partnership, Comparative
Connections 13, no. 2 (September 2011).
1264  ASIAN SURVEY 55:6

continued tensions over the Cheonan incident, Hu Jintao met successively

with Lee Myung-bak and North Koreas leader, Kim Jong-il, in May 2010,
without informing the ROK in advance of the latter summit. In 2011,
Premier Wen Jiabao met Lee in Tokyo as the DPRK leader visited China.
The annual ChinaROK High-Level Strategic Dialogue has produced no
joint measures toward North Korea. Seoul re-aligned strongly toward the
US after nding that it had miscalculated Beijings strategic responses
toward Pyongyang, with China prioritizing DPRK relations (disguised
under the code word of regional stability) at the expense of South Korean
security. South Koreas hopes for China to take on a benevolent interna-
tional role were dashed by the latters self-interest, leading to a decrease in
mutual trust between the two countrys elites and a growing gap in security
identity, in which the ROK government had lowered expectations of pro-
ductive cooperation with the PRC government and felt that it could no
longer be relied upon to address the North Korean security threat.98 The
South Korean public now sees China as the greatest threat to Korea after
unication.99
Major security concerns in South Korea relating to China stem largely
from a potential threat to Korean reunication. North Korean provocations
continue to be the main policy driver for Seoul,100 including the proactive
deterrence strategy under the Defense Reform 11-30 plan, which replaced the
previous Defense Reform 2020 plan.101 Recent ROK defense policy also man-
ifests longer-term preparations against Chinese military power related to
peninsular conict scenarios. China might be likely to intervene via access-
denial activities to hinder US naval deployments and South Korean lines of
communication in the Yellow Sea.102 Of the military services, the ROK Navy
has received the most government investment, including Sejong-class de-
stroyers equipped with Aegis weapons systems, the 14,000-ton Dokdo

98. Easley, Diverging Trajectories.

99. Christopher W. Hughes, Chinas Military Modernization: US Allies and Partners in
Northeast Asia, in Strategic Asia 2012-13: Regional Impact and Responses, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, pp. 197
239 (Seattle: National Bureau for Asian Research, 2012).
100. Insun Her, Second Secretary, ROK-US Security Cooperation Division, ROK Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, interview by Audrye Wong, Seoul, January 24, 2013.
101. Asan-CSIS Strategic Dialogue, Future of ROK-US Alliance (Seoul: Asan Institute for
Policy Studies, 2012).
102. Hughes, Chinas Military Modernization.
 WONG / POLITICS AND POLICY IN JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA  1265

amphibious and light helicopter carrier, and advanced diesel-electric submar-

ines.103 Alongside this moderate military distancing from China, the ROK
turned to Washington for closer security cooperation. In June 2012, South
Korea, Japan, and the US held naval drills around Jeju Island off the south-
west Korean coast, marking the rst time Seoul went on the record about
participation.104 In early February 2013, South Korean Air Force personnel
observed annual Cope North exercises for the rst time, involving Japan,
Australia, and the US.
Given regional security tensions, it is unsurprising that Seoul and Tokyo
are both pursuing tighter alliance cooperation with the US. This trend has
continued with the new governments in 2013. Under Presidents Abe Shinzo
and Park Geun-hye respectively, both countries recently concluded successful
alliance dialogues with the US. At the same time, the orientation of the two
alliances remains slightly different. The ROKs alliance cooperation and
reliance on US wartime Operational Control (OPCON)105 focuses on deter-
rence against the North Korean threat. Foreign Ministry ofcials and defense
analysts continue to emphasize that the USROK alliance is targeted at
North Korea.106 In contrast, the broader USJapan alliance involves hosting
X-band radar and unmanned Global Hawk drones to enhance long-range
reconnaissance and intelligence capabilities around Japan.
Furthermore, Japan and South Korea are again starting to diverge in
degrees of political and strategic distancing from China. Xi and Abe have
not had an ofcial summit and bilateral communication channels were until
recently frozen over the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. While the two leaders met
briey at the APEC summit in Beijing in November 2014 and again in April
2015 on the sidelines of the Asia Africa Summit in Indonesia, there has been
little concrete progress on substantive issues. Analysis of the four-point
consensus released by Beijing and Tokyo before the 2014 APEC summit
suggests a more tactical political move with little compromises on either side

103. Yoji Koda, The Emerging Republic of Korea Navy, Naval War College Review 63:2 (2010):
2326.
104. China Takes Exception to US-Japan-South Korea Military Exercises, Hani, June 23, 2012.
105. In the event of a military conict, the US military will take control over both US and ROK
forces on the peninsula. This arrangement is a legacy of the Korean War, and purported wartime
OPCON transfer from the US to the ROK has been delayed many times, although peacetime
OPCON was transferred to South Korea in 1994.
106. Interviews with Shin, Her, and Kim.
1266  ASIAN SURVEY 55:6

rather than a genuine strategic breakthrough in bilateral relations.107 In con-

trast, Park concluded a June 2013 summit meeting in Beijing with much
fanfare, and Seoul and Beijing have launched 22 security consultations.
These emphasize cooperation under Seouls envisioned broader trust-build-
ing through its Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative. The ROKs
dominant DPRK threat perception means that Beijing is more able to use the
US alliance as a pressure point on South Korea. Privately, Chinese ofcials
have been blunt in linking the USROK alliance with prospects for improved
ChinaROK relations.108 A former senior Chinese Foreign Ministry ofcial
warned that a regionally expanded alliance that covered contingencies outside
the Korean peninsula, such as a Taiwan conict, would make South Korea a
potential military target.109
The absence of a signicant SinoSouth Korean territorial dispute is
a major distinguishing factor from SinoJapanese relations. Sporadic Sino
ROK clashes in the Yellow Sea center on shing rights and lower-key EEZ
disagreements rather than visible political-level disputes. Both governments
have adhered to a tacitly agreed middle line. Interviews with several ROK
analysts suggest that this is not seen as an important source of policy fric-
tion.110 Thus, the Chinese security threateven relating to the Korean Pen-
insularemains largely potential, despite strategic mistrust of Chinese
foreign policy behavior. This is a diplomatic rather than military conict,111
allowing President Park to narrow her countrys political distance from
China. Thus, even as South Korea and Japan re-align heavily toward the

107. For example, each government released its own ofcial statement rather than a joint
agreement. Key issues of contention remained unaddressed, such as Tokyos concern over provoc-
ative Chinese maritime and aerial maneuvers around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, or Beijings two
demands for Abe to acknowledge the presence of a sovereignty dispute and to refrain from visiting
the Yasukuni Shrine as prime minister, set as preconditions for the resumption of high-level political
dialogue. See Adam P. Liff, Principles without Consensus: Setting the Record Straight on the 2014
Sino-Japanese Agreement to Improve Bilateral Relations, working paper, November 8, 2014; Yun
Sun, Understanding China and Japans Four Point Consensus: A Breakthrough or Political
Expediency? Stimson Center Spotlight, November 13, 2014, <http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/
understanding-china-and-japans-four-point-consensus-a-breakthrough-or-political-expediency/>.
108. Scott Snyder and See-won Byun, China-Korea Relations: Under New Leaderships,
Comparative Connections 14, no. 3 (January 2013).
109. China Asks Whom South Korea-US Alliance Targets, Korea Times, December 31, 2012.
110. Kim interview; Jongryn Mo, professor at Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei
University, interview by Audrye Wong, Seoul, January 23, 2013.
111. Shin interview.
 WONG / POLITICS AND POLICY IN JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA  1267

US, Japanese distancing from China is far greater, whereas South Korea
attempts a more moderate, optimistic stance.
Yet the PRCs announcement in November 2013 of an Air Defense Iden-
tication Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea could represent another turn-
ing point. While political rhetoric has focused on the implications for Japan
and the US of Chinas inclusion of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, the declared
zone also overlaps with the ROKs ADIZ and covers the disputed (but ROK-
controlled) Ieodo Rock.112 Chinas suggestion of future zones also raised
worrying implications given conicting EEZs in the Yellow Sea. Certainly,
these developments have come as a rude shock to the SinoROK mini-
honeymoon, producing reactions similar to that of Japan. Seoul lodged pro-
tests of regret with Beijing and extended its own ADIZ. Prime Minister
Abe has openly criticized Beijings actions as unilateral and dangerous,
vowing to defend against any change in status quo.113 South Korea, Japan,
and the US have all sent military planes, unannounced, into Chinas demar-
cated ADIZ, in deance of reporting requirements.
At the same time, China is showing different hands to Japan and South
Korea. While slamming Tokyos reaction as absolutely groundless and unac-
ceptable and reiterating Chinese sovereignty over Senkaku/Diaoyu, Beijing
quickly downplayed any tensions with Seoul, saying it had no territorial
dispute and sought friendly consultations and negotiations.114 Moreover,
as Tokyo publicly called for China to repeal its ADIZ, Seoul quietly re-
quested that Beijing redraw the zone to remove the overlap with Koreas.115
Although atly rejected by Beijing, this reveals South Koreas narrower focus
on avoiding conict with China, even at the potential expense of American
and Japanese interests. This adds to the picture of a South Korea seeking to
reduce strategic distance from China despite risking weaker political align-
ment with the US. In contrast, Japan is scrambling to prevent any appearance
of daylight between Tokyo and Washington. Again, Chinese actions are seen
by Japan as part of a strategy to change the status quo by force around the

112. Known as Suyan Rock by China, which also claims the underwater pinnacle, and by others as
Socotra Rock.
113. Japan, China Trade Barbs over Controversial Air Defense Zone, Kyodo, November 25,
2013.
114. China Says No Dispute with S. Korea over Ieodo in New Air Zone, Yonhap, November
25, 2013.
115. Victor Cha, Koreas Mistake on Chinas ADIZ Controversy, Korea Chair Platform
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2, 2013).
1268  ASIAN SURVEY 55:6

Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, whereas Seoul faces no equivalent concern and

remains preoccupied with local North Korean provocations and missile and
nuclear tests.

CONCLUSIONS

Japan and South Korea adopt differing strategies toward China and the US.
Alongside increasing US alignment, Tokyo has steadily shifted from moder-
ate, subtle distancing in the 1990s (under the guise of a North Korean threat)
to todays openly strong distancingpolitically and militarilyfrom Beijing.
On the other hand, Seouls strategic alignment with the US was weaker,
particularly during the 2000s, but has rmed up in recent years. Yet, this
strengthened alliance relationship has not been correlated with greater dis-
tancing from China. South Korea has wavered between minimal and mod-
erate distancing, and is still attempting to reduce political distance from
Beijing despite recently heightened mistrust.
Differing threat perceptions, depending on the interplay of China and
North Korea, and how imminent each threat is, help explain these different
and shifting strategies. Moreover, the DPRK threat acts as an important
mediating variable for South Korea but not Japan. Whereas Japans threat
perceptions of China grew progressively more concrete, imminent, and local-
ized over time due to escalating sovereignty clashes, in turn creating a closer
Japanese alignment with the US, South Korea adopted uctuating strategies
toward both larger powers, because threat perceptions were affected by the
degree of SinoSouth Korean policy alignment on North Korea, alongside
a relative lack of direct security threats from China itself. Nonetheless, both
South Korea and Japan respond foremost to local, imminent threats, be they
North Korea or specic territorial disputes with Beijing, rather than systemic,
potential ones like Chinas abstract rise.
In addition, national identity gaps and historical rivalryif not as domi-
nant a driverfeed into diverging views of China, as well as differing orienta-
tions in managing the US relationship, causing each country to position itself
differently. More extensive identity rivalry between Tokyo and Beijing con-
tributes to greater mistrust and threat perceptions, and more explicit policies.
Seoul is less affected, except when it has implications for Korean reunication.
As threat perceptions increase, domestic political leadership has been pushed
to the right, making it less of a determining factor in both countries.
 WONG / POLITICS AND POLICY IN JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA  1269

Arguably, Japan and South Korea are now at a crossroads in recalibrating

their strategies. Wishful optimism is being replaced by a more hard-nosed
US-oriented strategy and increased distancing from China. This is more
denite for Japan; ROK policy remains less certain. Seouls new strand of
middle power diplomacy could enhance its mediating role or leave it
trapped between China and the US, as the two tug in opposite directions.
Indeed, while Tokyo has capitalized on USChina divisions to pull Wash-
ington closer, Seoul prefers positive USChina relations. Latest ADIZ devel-
opments highlight the persistence of sovereignty issues, and may push South
Korea to ultimately follow the same trajectory as Japan. Free-riding on the
USJapan alliance to counter Beijing may become less feasible should China
pose increasingly imminent and local security threats.
Whether any convergence is a temporary or long-term trend also depends
on the Chinese response. Beijing could either erase the optimistic goodwill
from the 2013 Xi-Park summit, ormore likelyattempt to mollify South
Korea in order to drive a wedge between Seoul, Tokyo, and the US. PRC
president Xi Jinpings July 2014 visit to Seoul is a case in point, as is Park
Geun-hyes recent September 2015 visit to Beijing during a major military
parade to commemorate victory against Japan in World War II. As an inter-
esting complication, recent Korean nationalism against Japans greater secu-
rity role could weaken USROK trust, highlighting the continued role of
national identity gaps in uctuating relations among the four countries. But
overt Chinese pressure over national security issues such as South Korean
participation in US-led ballistic missile defense systems or any provocation
over sovereignty disputes may ultimately push South Korea away from Bei-
jing, and closer to the US and Japan. Finally, relations with larger powers are
not necessarily zero-sum. Seoul (and likely Tokyo, if it had the chance) would
in fact prefer to strengthen ties with Beijing in a context of a robust US
alliance, to give itself greater maneuvering leverage over its own priority
issues, be they Korean reunication or territorial disputes. The familiar
maxim remains: All politics is local.