epublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 154282 April 7, 2006

VANGIE BARRAZONA, Petitioner,

vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 61, BAGUIO CITY and SAN-AN
REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, herein represented
by RODRIGO CHUA TIU, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For our resolution is the instant Petition for

Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Order dated June
19, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61,
Baguio City, denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss
Civil Case No. 5238-R, entitled "SAN-AN REALTY and
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, herein represented by RODRIGO
CHUA TIU, plaintiff, v. VANGIE BARRAZONA, defendant."

San-an Realty and Development Corporation, respondent,

owns a building located at Naguilian corner Asin Road,
Baguio City. Vangie Barrazona, petitioner, has been
leasing portions of the building identified as Units
203 A and B at the second floor. The period of the
lease is for two (2) years, commencing July 15, 2001
and ending June 30, 2003. The monthly rental is P400.00
per square meter for Unit 203 A and P500.00 per square
meter for Unit 203 B.

Starting August 2001, petitioner defaulted in the

payment of the monthly rentals and failed to pay
despite demands by respondent. Thus, on May 14, 2002,
respondent filed with the RTC, Branch 61, Baguio City,
a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money with
Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 5238-R.

On June 3, 2002, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion

to Dismiss on the ground, among others, that the RTC
has no jurisdiction over the complaint considering that
the allegations therein clearly indicate that the
action is one for ejectment (illegal detainer) which is
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC). Petitioner pointed out the following
allegations in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the complaint
showing that it is not for sum of money but for
ejectment:

4. That the defendant has failed to pay the rentals for

the said leased premises for the month of August 2001
up to the present;

5. That the plaintiff has demanded the defendant to pay

her overdue account, now amounting to P971,838.15, the
last demand to vacate and payment of arrears having
been made in writing on March 27, 2002 xxx.

In an Order dated June 19, 2002, the RTC denied the

Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.

Forthwith, petitioner filed the instant Petition for

Certiorari alleging that: (1) the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in denying her Motion to Dismiss; and (2)
the Resolution denying her Motion to Dismiss is
unconstitutional as it does not state its legal basis.

On the other hand, respondent, in praying for the

dismissal of the petition, contends that (1) the
complaint is for the collection of unpaid rentals as
there is absolutely no allegation that its intent is to
eject petitioner from the premises; (2) petitioner
should have first filed a motion for reconsideration
before resorting to the extraordinary suit of
certiorari; and (3) the assailed order denying
petitioners motion to dismiss is interlocutory and,
therefore, cannot be the subject of a petition for
certiorari.1avvphil.net

We hold that in denying petitioners motion to dismiss

the complaint, the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion.

Petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint for lack

of jurisdiction is pursuant to Section 1, Rule 16 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which
provides:

Sec. 1. Grounds. Within the time for but before filing

the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a
claim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the
following grounds:

x x x x x x x x x

b.) That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject

matter of the claim.

As mentioned earlier, petitioner stated in her motion

that respondents allegations in its complaint show
that it is one for ejectment cognizable, not by the RTC
but, by the MTC of Baguio City.

In Herrera, et al. v. Bollos, et al.,1 we emphasized the

basic rule that jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter of the action is determined by the
allegations of the complaint at the time of its filing,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. What determines the jurisdiction of
the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The
averments therein and the character of the relief
sought are the ones to be consulted.
It bears reiterating paragraph 5 of the complaint,
thus:

5. That the plaintiff has demanded the defendant to pay

her overdue account, now amounting to P971,838.15, the
last demand to vacate and payment of arrears having
been made in writing on March 27, 2002 xxx.

This allegation clearly shows that respondent made

several demands upon petitioner to pay her overdue
rentals and to vacate the premises; and that the last
demand to pay and vacate in writing was on March 27,
2002. Respondent thus complied with Section 2, Rule 70
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which
provides:

Sec. 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after

demand. Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by
the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay
or comply with the conditions of the lease and to
vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written
notice of such demand upon the person found on the
premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if
no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to
comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of
land or five (5) days in the case of buildings. (2a)

Indeed, while the complaint is captioned "Collection of

Sum of Money with Damages," the allegations therein
show that respondents action is for ejectment. All
ejectment cases are within the jurisdiction of the MTC.2

Next, petitioner maintains that the Order of the RTC

denying her Motion to Dismiss violates the Constitution
as it does not state the facts and the law on which it
is based. The challenged Order is reproduced as
follows:

O R D E R
This Court finds that the grounds stated in the Motion
to Dismiss to be without merit, hence, the same is
denied.

SO ORDERED.

We have admonished the trial courts not to issue a

minute order or resolution like the one specified
above. A trial court should state in its order the
reasons for the dismissal of the complaint so that when
the order is appealed, the appellate court can readily
determine from a casual perusal thereof whether there
is a prima facie justification for the dismissal.3

Under Section 3, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, as amended, we require that resolutions
disposing of a motion to dismiss shall state clearly
and distinctly the reasons therefor, thus:

Sec. 3. Resolution of motion. After the hearing, the

court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion,
or order the amendment of the pleading.

The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion

for the reason that the ground relied upon is not
indubitable.

In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and

distinctly the reasons therefor.

This requirement proscribes the common practice of

perfunctorily dismissing a motion to dismiss for "lack
of merit." Such cavalier dispositions can often pose
difficulty and misunderstanding on the part of the
aggrieved party in taking recourse therefrom and
likewise on the higher court called upon to resolve the
same, usually on certiorari.4

While an order denying a motion to dismiss is

interlocutory and non-appeallable, however, if the
denial is without or in excess of jurisdiction,
certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies from
such order of denial.5 In Time, Inc. v. Reyes,6 this
Court, speaking through Justice J.B. L. Reyes, held:
The motion to dismiss was predicated on the respondent
courts lack of jurisdiction to entertain the action;
and the rulings of this Court are that writs of
certiorari or prohibition, or both, may issue in case
of a denial or deferment of an action or on the basis
of a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.7 Verily, the writ of certiorari is granted
to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.8

Lastly, we cannot go along with respondents contention

that petitioner should have first filed a motion for
reconsideration before resorting to the remedy of
certiorari. While the rule is that before certiorari
may be availed of, petitioner must first file a motion
for reconsideration with the lower court of the act or
order complained of,9however, such rule is not without
exception. We have, in several instances, dispensed
with the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a
lower courts ruling, such as: where the proceedings in
which the error occurred is a patent nullity;10 where
the question is purely of law; when public interest is
involved; where judicial intervention is urgent or its
application may cause great and irreparable
damage;11 and where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction,12 as in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated

June 19, 2002 issued by the RTC, Branch 61, Baguio
City, in Civil Case No. 5238-R, is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision

were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the

Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
G.R. No. 138258, January 18, 2002, 374 SCRA 107;
see also R.V. Marzan Freight, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 128064, March 4, 2004, 424 SCRA
597.
2
Tala Realty Services Corporation v. Banco
Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No.
137533, November 22, 2002, 392 SCRA 506.
3
Continental Bank v. Tiangco, G.R. No. 50480,
December 14, 1979, 94 SCRA 715.
4
Regalado, Volume I, Remedial Law Compendium, p.
260.
5
Ablan, Sr. v. Madarang, No. L-32963, September
30, 2971, 41 SCRA 213; Philippine National Bank v.
Florendo, G.R. No. 62082, February 26, 1992, 206
SCRA 582.
6
L-28882, May 31, 1971, 39 SCRA 303, cited in
Ablan, Sr. v. Madarang, supra.
7
Id.
8
Aguilar v. Tan, L-23600, January 30, 1970, 31
SCRA 205; Bautista, et al. v. Sarmiento, et al. L-
45137, September 23, 1985, 138 SCRA 587.
9
Villa-Rey Transit v. Bello, L-18957, April 23,
1963, 7 SCRA 735; Yao v. Perello, G.R. No. 153828,
October 24, 2003, 414 SCRA 474; Go v. Tong, G.R.
No. 151942, November 27, 2003, 416 SCRA 557.
10
Director of Lands v. Santamaria and Javellana,
No. 20151, March 6, 1923, 44 Phil. 594.
11
Philippine Industrial Trading Corporation v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 152688, November 19,
2003, 416 SCRA 245.
12
Malayang Manggagawa sa Esso v. Esso Standard
Eastern, Inc., L-24224, July 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 801.