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Most presocratic philosophers were interested mainly in the oppositions they saw in the universe
between change and permanence and between unity and multiplicity.
The earliest thinkers, the Milesians (Miletus was one of the great cities of Ionia on the coast of Asia Minor), are important because
they were the first thinkers to try to answer such problems without appealing to myth or religious dogma. They are usually
called cosmologists. While understandably they did not distinguish between philosophy and science as we know it today, their
'theories' are nevertheless broadly scientific in the sense that they relied on observation (in the case of astronomy systematically
collected) though they did not engage in any experimentation to 'test' their hypotheses.
MATERIALISM
Thales of Miletus is said to have predicted an eclipse in 585 B.C. and to have made a contribution to the development of
navigational techniques.
CRITICAL SUMMARY
Thales is important because he was the first to move beyond purely mythopoeic thinking to ask the questions whether underlying
the multiplicity of things and changes in the world there is common principle or 'stuff'. His claims seem to suggest (1) there is a
regularity in the universe (or cosmos the Greek word means 'order'); (2) it is possible through observation and rational thought
for man to gain some understanding of it and the fundamental principle.
It might be said that in singling out water and talking of magnets having souls Thales is actually supposing that there
are two principles the one material and the other spiritual. However, it is unlikely that at this early stage philosophers would
have thought in terms of a matter-spirit distinction; and to find a definition of a living thing we today would in general look for
more than just the ability to initiate motion. It is therefore perhaps more reasonable to interpret both Thales' primary element and
his reference to forces in materialist terms.
MATERIALISM
Anaximander was born in Miletus. Like Thales he was interested in scientific observation and tried to explain the weather and the
movements of the stars.He is also thought to have been a map maker and to have put forward a simple kind of evolution theory.He
would seem to have been the first Greek to write a book only a fragment of which remains however.
CRITICAL SUMMARY
Although most scholars accept that Anaximander believed there to be an infinite number of universes, there is some disagreement
over what he had to say about the relationship of the opposites to the apeiron.Their reabsorption into the unlimited may well have
been a reparation for having brought about injustice: but was this because they had trespassed against each other or against the
unlimited? The second view seems more likely if the unlimited is to be thought of as a kind of cosmic judge. As for his argument
about the supposed non-movement of the Earth, this was certainly original but it may not be valid; there need be no contradiction
in thinking of movement as random and uncaused.Nevertheless this early thinker continues to be of interest for the rationality of
his geometrical model of the universe and his tacit appeal to what later came to be called 'The Principle of Sufficient Reason'
CRITICAL SUMMARY
By comparison with Anaximander Anaximenes' postulation of air as a primary principle might seem to represent a regression to the
approach of Thales. However, his theory of air, unlike Anaximander's apeiron, is firmly grounded in observation of the world; and
he accounts for the Hot and the Cold and all kinds of change in terms of the fundamental concepts of rarefaction and condensation
without appealing to the general abstract 'opposites' of justice and retribution. But he is not completely consistent in that high and
low densities of things do not always coincide with the hot-cold distinction.
'DUALISM'
Pythagoras was born on the island of Samos but emigrated to southern Italy about 525. As the charismatic but authoritarian founder
of a secret and frequently persecuted society of religious ascetics he is something of a legendary figure. However, it is not easy to
distinguish his own contributions to philosophy from the various modifications introduced by his followers in the Pythagorean
'school', particularly as he wrote nothing himself.
CRITICAL SUMMARY
There is an intimate connection between the mathematical/rationalist/'scientific' aspects of Pythagorean philosophy and his concern
with the mystical, religious and ethical. However, there are problems with both. We know that numbers are used in measurement,
but Pythagoras's apparent identification of physical objects with them seems less acceptable. The association of higher numbers
with abstract ideas such as justice and opportunity in a quasi-mystical sense is even more philosophically suspect. Likewise,
metempsychosis presents difficulties for the concept of personal identity and the relationship of 'soul' to body. But while
Pythagorean thought is in some sense 'dualistic', it is probably mistaken to think of it in, say, Platonic or Cartesian terms; at this
early stage of Greek philosophy no clear-cut distinction between matter and form had been explicitly articulated. Nevertheless the
Pythagorean account of numbers and the doctrine of transmigration were to prove important influences on Plato's early thought and
that of many neo-Platonic philosophers.
MATERIALISM
Heraclitus came from Ephesus in what is now Turkey. He seems to have been a man of strong character and rather contemptuous
of his fellow men. Only fragments of his writings remain, and these are to be found in the works of later commentators. These
sayings, moreover, are usually unclear, gnomic, and often seem to contradict one another. Because of this confusion in his thought
we cannot always be sure what Heraclitus actually meant. In ancient times he was often known as 'Heraclitus the Obscure'.
In this remark he is referring in particular to opposites [d] or contrasts of various kinds, such as disease and health, cold and warm,
wet and dry. And what he may mean is that each member of a pair both comes from and, when in harmony [e] with the other,
makes up a single thing. As he says,
They do not comprehend how a thing agrees being at variance with itself; it is attunement which turns back on itself, like that of
Heraclitus identifies this unifying principle with the logos [f]: "...the Logos is common" [Fr. 2] This is a problematic term because
of the many meanings it had in Greek: not only 'principle' but also 'utterance', 'account' 'word', 'proportion', 'ratio', 'reason',
'formula' n most of which Heraclitus seems to have employed in different fragments at different times. But it is reasonable to
suppose that he intended it particularly to mean both what, in the opening of his book, he calls "this account" of all things [Fr. 1]
and, more especially, that which the account refers to, namely a principle or formula which is at the same time independent of and
manifested in the universe. He goes further by identifying this principle also with Fire as the primary 'element' of all things (and
indeed as 'divine') [see Fr. 67] [g] ):
All things are exchanges for fire, and fire for all things, as goods for gold and gold for goods. [Fr. 90]
This ordered universe, the same for all, no god nor man has made, but it ever was and is and will be: fire ever living, being kindled
This is interesting because fire itself seems always to be in a state of constant change. And several hundreds of years later the
Stoics supposed Heraclitus to have held the view that the universe undergoes periodic conflagrations [h]: but it is more likely that
Heraclitus meant no more than that all things change from and back into fire.
While Fragment 30 suggests that the universe is not made by any god, elsewhere [for example, Fr. 67] Heraclitus compares god to
fire. And in Fragment 64 he perhaps implicitly identifies god with fire: "The thunderbolt steers all things". He seems also to have
suggested a relationship between fire and the other two 'elements' water and earth [i]. Each is either hot or cold, wet or dry. So
air is hot and wet, fire is hot and dry, water is cold and wet, earth cold and dry. Each element changes in succession into the other:
but it is not certain how he thought this occurred. Some commentators [for example, Hussey] believe he held a theory of four
elements depending on the translation of 'burner' (prester) in Fr. 31:
The turnings of fire [the pure cosmic fire]: first sea, and of sea the half is earth and half burner ['hot air', 'fiery lightning'?] is
dispersed as sea and is measured so as to form the same proportion as existed before it became earth.
PSYCHOLOGY/ KNOWLEDGE
[2] It is also possible that Heraclitus equated fire with wisdom and believed that the human soul can acquire wisdom because it
possesses the divine quality of fieriness: "One thing, the only truly wise, does not and does consent to be called by the name of
Zeus" [Fr. 32]; "A dry soul is wisest and best" [Fr. 118]. The 'fiery' soul as the principle of intelligence [a] both makes possible our
understanding of the everyday world we perceive through our senses and is the means by which we can penetrate to
the logos [a]. Heraclitus seems also to have thought that virtuous souls, remaining 'dry', survive death to become part of the world-
fire [b].
ETHICS
[3] Heraclitus's moral philosophy is grounded in his philosophy of nature. His central principle accordingly is that the individual
should seek to understand and model himself on the logos as "divine law, common to all"[Fr. 114] [a]. Right thinking and wisdom
will lead to right actions [b]. "Man's character", he says [Fr. 119] "is his daimon [destiny]", by which he means to emphasize that
one's future is under one's own control.
CRITICAL SUMMARY
It is difficult to pin down Heraclitus's philosophy; he seems so often to be shifting his position epitomizing the flux which he
sees as a central feature of the universe. His fragments are therefore often open to a variety of interpretations. The idea of harmony
in Fr. 50, for example, has been described as an attunement which either "turns back on itself" or "is pulled both ways"
depending on the text. The former would seem to support an 'oscillatory' universe rather than one in equilibrium. Likewise there
may be a difficulty in reconciling the views of fire as a physical element and as the controlling agency of the universe as a whole,
sometimes identified with god but in other fragments seen as separate from god. However, the main points of Heraclitus's world-
view are fairly clear: he stresses that strife is the norm (there is no Being, only Becoming); and that this is exhibited most
obviously in fire. Generally we may say he is noteworthy for his originality as a speculative philosopher rather than for his
'scientific' reasoning.
MATERIALISTIC MONISM
Parmenides came from Elea in Southern Italy. Philosophers belonging to the 'school' he founded are therefore usually called the
Eleatics. His own thought was developed in an allegorical poem the main ideas of which were set out by Simplicius, a
commentator of the sixth century A.D.
CRITICAL SUMMARY
Parmenides clearly emphasizes Being in contrast to the becoming stressed by Heraclitus. But there are difficulties with his thesis.
Firstly, the word 'is' has four functions, which early Greek philosophers were not generally aware of (and which were not easily
distinguishable in the Greek language) [a]. It may be used with a predicate (as in 'The table is round'); it may enable us to say
something is true (as in ' "2 + 2 = 4" is true'); it may suggest that something exists ('John is', that is, exists); or lastly it may express
identity (for example, 'Hesperus [the evening star] is Phosphorus [the Morning Star]' both names referring to the planet Venus).
There has been much dispute among scholars as to which meaning best fits Parmenides' fragments; and on balance it would seem
that the existential interpretation makes most sense. But this leads to a second problem. Parmenides seems to be committed to the
view that names can be meaningful only if they denote or refer to existent things. Unfortunately it is not clear whether he intends it
to follow that we cannot therefore think about (1) things that do not happen (contingently) to exist (for example, unicorns); or (2)
things that necessarily cannot exist (for example, a round square which is a self-contradictory concept). Nevertheless, both
views lead to the conclusion that what does not exist (for whatever reason) cannot be thought about. This claim does, however,
depend on this 'denotative' theory of meaning, which many philosophers today reject. But despite such difficulties, Parmenides is
significant in Greek philosophy (1) as the first thinker to introduce a priori deductive reasoning; (2) for his emphasis on the
concept of Being. He may therefore perhaps be regarded as the first metaphysician.
MATERIALISTIC DUALISM
Although born in Clazomenae in Ionia Anaxagoras spent most of his life in Athens. He returned to Ionia about 450 after he had
been condemned for alleged impiety by the political opponents of his famous pupil Pericles. He was influenced by both the
Milesians and the Eleatics; and his philosophy may be regarded as an attempt to reconcile these two schools of thought.
KNOWLEDGE
[3] While allowing for the possibility of error in our perception of the world, Anaxagoras does not accept that our experience is
totally illusory. We can gain some knowledge of it through the senses: "Appearances are a glimpse of the obscure" [fr. 21a]. His
theory is that sensation occurs when unlikes act on unlikes [a]. Thus we can experience a warm object when our hand is relatively
cold.
CRITICAL SUMMARY
Anaxagoras's idea of 'seeds' is of course original and interesting. It has been objected that his theory is not coherent because it
involves an infinite regress: all stuffs are made of other stuffs each of which contains all the others, and so on. But this regress can
probably be avoided if his idea of predominance is emphasized. While the gold, ash, and so on which make up the wood are
themselves made up of other stuffs, the gold stuff is called gold, and the ash stuff is called ash, because it contains more of that
than the other stuffs. Nevertheless this would seem to commit Anaxagoras to making a distinction between the seed gold and a
stuff gold; and it is debatable whether this can be reconciled with his idea of infinite divisibility.
There are also problems with his notion of the nous. Plato and Aristotle criticized him for using the concept as a stop-gap and
perhaps for not being sufficiently radical. Quite apart from the question whether it is spiritual or 'thinly' material (it is probable that
even in Anaxagoras's day no such clear distinction had been made), there is the problem of how the nous can remain pure and
unmixed if it in some sense permeates the individual mind.
MATERIALISTIC PLURALISM
Empedocles came from Sicily. He was the author of two philosophical 'poems' which came to be known as On
Nature and Purifications. He seems also to have been something of a 'character'; there are many stories about his exploits as a
magician and 'miracle-worker'.
KNOWLEDGE
[2] According to Theophrastus (3rd century B.C.) [On the Senses 7; see also Plato, Meno 76c], Empedocles tried to account for
sense-perception by attributing 'effluences' to things. These are being given off all the time; and vision, for example, occurs when
the effluences of external objects entering through the correctly sized pores of sense-organs meet the fiery effluence which come
from inside the eye. Thus likes are attracted to like [a]:
We see earth by means of earth, water by means of water, divine air by means of air, and destructive fire by means of wretched
Strife. [Fr. 109]
RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY
[3] Although there appears to be some overlapping of the two poems, Purifications tends to be concerned more with the nature
of individual souls or 'divinities' (daimones) and their attempts, through living a life of purity, to avoid being reborn in other bodies
the doctrine of transmigration [a] and so to escape from the physical world altogether. He does not, however, explicitly say
that they are actually immortal only that they possess immensely long life [fr. 18, l. 5]. Empedocles' description of souls as
'divinities' suggests their identification with the One, the perfect sphere of Love, the Divine itself [b] (who is, "only mind, holy and
indescribable, darting through the entire Kosmos with his swift thoughts" [fr. 134] ). The differention of the daimones occurs when
the sphere, through the intervention of Strife, fragments once more into multiplicity.
CRITICAL SUMMARY
Empedocles is significant in that he tried to explain the nature and changeability of things in terms of four fundamental 'elements'
which combine in various ways through the agency of Love and Strife. (This may perhaps be seen as anticipating today's quantum
physics which accounts for attractive and repulsive forces in terms of fundamental particles as being both material and
manifestations of energy.) His 'effluence' theory of perception is original and important; and he also had some interesting ideas
about what we would call chemical mixtures and about the evolution of animals and plants.
There are a number of problems of interpretation in his philosophy. Some commentators have argued for a three rather than a four
phase cosmic cycle. It has also been argued [for example, by Hussey] that the attraction of like for like [fr. 109] suggests
Empedocles invoked a third 'agency', but it is equally possible to view this as but an aspect of Strife itself. Perhaps the main
problem with his thought, according to some writers, is that there seems to be a conflict between his two poems. In On Nature he
sets out what is essentially a materialist cosmology, while Purifications is mainly concerned with religious and moral issues.
Different solutions are proposed variously by Kahn , Hussey, and Barnes. But it has to be admitted that these two positions are not
readily reconciled; his religious philosophy would seem to require a more 'spiritualistic' interpretation of Love and Strife.
MATERIALISTIC MONISM
Zeno of Elea was Parmenides' favourite pupil and accompanied him to Athens in about 448. He is famous for his so-called
paradoxes, which were seen by Plato [Parmenides, 128c] as an attempt to show the incoherence of the views on plurality held by
Pythagoras and other opponents of the Eleatic philosophers. Aristotle called him "the founder of dialectic" because of his skill in
formulating arguments logically and systematically, by means of which fallacies might be revealed.
METAPHYSICS/ COSMOLOGY
[1] Zeno constructed a number of dialectical arguments [a] against the view that the universe is made up of many things [b]. His
paradoxes of magnitude are typical.
(a) According to a later commentator, Simplicius [Commentary on Aristotle's Physics, 139/140], Zeno said that each of the "many
things" must have no magnitude because "each is the same as itself and one" [fr. 2] Nothing more is known of his argument, but
"each is one" suggests that he was referring to the common view that things are units, ultimate and indivisible. If they had
magnitude they would be divisible and therefore not ultimate [c]. By "each is the same as itself" he probably meant that a thing is
homogeneous, that is, the same throughout, lacking internal distinction. If it were not homogeneous it would not be a genuine
unity.
(b) However, Zeno also argues that each of the many things has unlimited magnitude [fr. 1]. (i) That which has no magnitude
would not exist, for if it were added to or subtracted from an existing thing that thing would not be made respectively bigger or
smaller; what is added or taken away would already be nothing. [Cf. fr. 2: Existing things are not nothing, so they must have
magnitude, as must their parts.] (ii) Why then is each thing unlimited in magnitude? Zeno's argument is that a magnitude can be
divided into parts [c], and these parts into further parts which have no magnitude, and so on; therefore there must be an infinite
number of parts with magnitude; hence the original magnitude is unlimited. The conclusions to (a) and (b) clearly contradict each
other. The notion of a plurality must be rejected.
[2] Zeno also worked out some interesting arguments to show that motion and change cannot be coherently described and are
therefore, together with space and time, illusions of sense [a]. rather than belonging to what is real. We owe our knowledge of
these to Aristotle [see Physics 9, 239ff].
(a) The Stadium paradox [9, 239b11]. Suppose a man is running in a race from A to B. Let the distance be, say, 2 kilometres. He
must first traverse half the distance from A to B. But at this point he then has to run half this distance, thus 1 km. And so on ad
infinitum: 1 + 1/2 + 1/4 + ... So to get to the end the runner has to traverse an infinite number of distances. This is impossible,
either as a matter of logic or because a person could not perform an infinite number of tasks. Because the distance AB can be any
length we wish, he cannot get anywhere at all. So motion is impossible.
(b) A variation on this argument is a paradox which later came to be known as the 'Achilles' paradox or 'Achilles and the Tortoise'
[9 239b14] [a]. Achilles, challenged to race with a tortoise, gives him a start of half the course. By the time Achilles has reached
the tortoise's starting point the tortoise has moved on further. And so on. It would seem then that the tortoise must always be in
front, although by an ever decreasing distance. To overtake the tortoise Achilles would have to go through an infinite number of
distances. This being impossible, motion must be illusory.
(c) Another argument is the 'Arrow' paradox. Aristotle's account [9 239b 30-3, 5-9] is not very clear, but the essentials seem to be
as follows. Take any instant in an arrow's flight. The arrow occupies its own volume and not a greater one. It is not therefore
traversing a distance and is therefore not at rest. But during its flight it must always be at some instant. Hence it must be at rest
throughout its flight; it does not really move.
CRITICAL SUMMARY
Zeno's paradoxes (only a few of which have been summarized above) have engendered a great deal of philosophical debate and a
variety of responses. Much of his reasoning is regarded as fallacious though it is not always easy to pin down precisely what his
errors are. One might question, say, his claim (argument 1a) that 'ultimates' cannot have magnitude. The electrons, quarks, and so
on of modern quantum physics are arguably counter-examples. His inference (in 1b) from the assertion that an object possesses an
infinite number of parts with magnitude to the conclusion that the original object has unlimited is also certainly dubious. As for the
arguments concerning motion (2a and b), we may note:
(i) The traversing of an infinite number of positions in space (and indeed instants of time, time and space being inseparable)
does not entail that the finite distance over which the race is run cannot be completed. Geometrical series of the type 1 + 1/2 + 1/4
+ ... tend to a definite limit (in this particular case to 2) as the number of terms approaches infinity.
(ii) It follows that if the course is completed, what is expected of the runner (in terms of physical 'tasks') must have been achieved
'task' here being defined as what is needed for the runner to traverse each point or instant.
It is of course an ongoing dispute as to whether or not Zeno's attacks on pluralism are tenable. Some scholars have argued that
Parmenides' monism is equally susceptible to his arguments [see Kirk, Raven and Schofield]. However, his importance as a
philosopher is not in doubt. He remains significant for his introduction into philosophy of dialectical argument, and for the
stimulus he gave to the examination by later philosophers of the concepts of space , time, and infinity.
RELATIVISM
Protagoras was born in Abdera, an Ionian colony in Thrace. In 444 he drafted the constitution of a new Athenian colony for the
great statesman Pericles. It is said that he was later exiled from Athens, and his books (which included On Truth and On the Gods)
burned, because of his alleged impiety towards the popular gods. His writings have not survived, and we rely on Plato, Aristotle,
and Sextus Empiricus for our knowledge of his philosophy.
KNOWLEDGE
[2] As applied to our sense experiences Protagoras' doctrine means that, for example, if honey seems sweet to some people but
bitter to others then it is sweet to the former and is bitter to the latter. There cannot therefore be any objective knowledge or
truth concerning what things are 'really' like, that is, knowledge which is the same for everybody and open to all. All qualities are
attributable to convention ['law', nomos] and not to 'nature' (phusis) [a].
ETHICS
[3] Protagoras's relativism in ethics is implicit in his recognition that people in other communities often held different religious
beliefs and acted in accordance with different moral codes. This suggested to him that morality is a matter of social 'convention'
rather than being grounded in 'nature' [a]. But while this might rule out the possibility of an absolute ethic applicable to all
societies, some degree of objectivity is preserved in so far as a particular standard is accepted and shared by the individual
members of a given community.
CRITICAL SUMMARY
Protagoras was perhaps the greatest of the Sophists, and, despite the alleged errors of his thought, was admired greatly by Plato.
While there can be no doubt that Protagoras said that man is the measure of all things, there has been considerable argument as to
whether (1) he was referring to societies rather than to individual men, and (2) he intended it to apply in ethics as well as to
knowledge. A reasonable compromise position would be that in his epistemology it is indeed the individual man who is the
measure but in his ethics it is the society which sets the standard. His ethical relativism, however, is consistent with objectivism in
so far as a particular relativist standard is shared by all individual members of that community; and it may therefore be called
'cultural' relativism. Protagoras was thus actually rather traditional, stressing the need for commitment to the values and beliefs of
one's own society. Nevertheless, while individual relativism in perception might be compatible with communal or cultural
relativism in ethics, there could still be a tension if his statement about the possibility of 'contrary arguments' on every topic were
taken literally.
RATIONALISM
Born in Athens, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete (a midwife), Socrates was a bold and courageous thinker. He grew up in
comfortable circumstances which allowed him to serve in the Peloponnesian War as a 'hoplite' (armed infantryman). Having
become dedicated to the study of philosophy he came to regard material goods as of no importance. Although he used some of the
debating techniques of the Sophists, he rejected their relativism and sought for what he regarded as genuine truth and knowledge.
(The priestesses of the Oracle at Delphi had said there was no one wiser, but Socrates took this to mean that he was wise only in so
far as he recognised his own ignorance [a]) Paradoxically, Socrates was accused by the conservative authorities of having
corrupted the youth of Athens, and was sentenced to death. True to his moral principles he accepted the verdict and drank the
customary poison.
ETHICS
[2] [gen. 2] [See Plato, early dialogues.] Although his approach seems to have much in common with that of the Sophists (with
whom he had many discussions), Socrates was highly critical of their relativism particularly in ethics [a]. The universal
definitions he was primarily concerned with were therefore ethical virtue, the good, happiness. Thus he argued in favour of the
identification of an objective virtue with knowledge. By this he meant that if a person knows what is right he will do the right
thing [b]. And the right thing is the one which will promote what is in that person's best interest, namely the achieving of genuine
'happiness', that is, 'well-being' (eudaimonia) regardless of worldly consequences [c]. Socrates thus genuinely believed that virtue
can be taught [d] (though Plato makes Socrates question this towards the end of the Meno). Indeed this belief is implicit in
Socrates' use of the word 'philosophy' (philosophia love of wisdom, wisdom being regarded here as a kind of skill leading to
insight).
CRITICAL SUMMARY
What we know of Socrates comes to us almost entirely through the dialogues of his pupil Plato and the writings of the historian
Xenophon; he wrote nothing himself. There has been much controversy as to how much of what is in Plato was really Socrates'
philosophy. Was he just a popular teacher of ethics, or was he also the author of genuinely original views on metaphysics? A
compromise view (Aristotle's) was that Socrates made important contributions to philosophical method but that he was not the
originator of the Theory of Forms. It is probable that Socrates' own philosophy consisted in what was put into his mouth by Plato
in his earliest dialogues.
The two fundamental claims of Socrates' thought, which undoubtedly justify the place he holds in the history of philosophy as a
radical innovator, are (1) that there are universal definitions or essences which can be discovered by the dialectical method; and (2)
that men knowing the good will inevitably do good actions. However, whether knowledge is objective in this sense and what
constitutes a universal definition or essence are issues which many later philosophers (particularly in the twentieth century)
have discussed at length. As to the second claim, it can be argued that Socrates failed to appreciate the problem of weakness of will
(moral weakness) (akrasia) [a] that many individuals do in fact often do what they know to be wrong.
DEMOCRITUS
(c. 460 370/ 60? B.C.)
ATOMISTIC MATERIALISM
The founder of the Atomist school of philosophy was probably Democritus's contemporary Leucippus, but it was left to
Democritus to develop the theory. Both philosophers came from Abdera. Virtually nothing remains of the writings of Leucippus;
and most of Democritus's surviving works are confined to ethics. We owe our knowledge of Atomism to a few of his other
fragments but principally to the commentaries of Aristotle (especially his On Democritus [fr. 208], quoted by Simplicius, and
in On Generation and Corruption, 316ff.). From a strictly historical point of view Democritus should not be classified as a
Presocratic, but philosophically Atomism relates to the cosmology of the Eleatics rather than to the ethics of Socrates.
KNOWLEDGE/ PSYCHOLOGY
[2] Democritus's views on knowledge were developed largely in response to the Sophists. He accepted the 'effluence' theory but
thought of these particles as atoms or images given off by objects [a]. Before they enter the sense organs they are distorted by the
air. He tried to account for perception in terms of the motion of these images or differences in their surface texture. ['Secondary']
qualities such as colour and smell (as against the actual physical properties of the atoms themselves) are therefore all subjective or
'conventional' [nomos], and so we cannot know objects as they really are [b]. Even 'mind' cannot give us the truth, as what might
be supposed to be 'mental', including the 'soul', itself consists of atoms [c] and can come into contact only with the atoms given off
by objects. On the body's death the soul atoms disperse [d].
ETHICS HEDONISM
[3] Democritus's ethics too was directed against the Sophists. The end of conduct is happiness (eudaimonia), by which he meant
not sensual pleasure but 'well-being' [a]. This is to be acquired by attending to balance or harmony a weighing up of the various
pleasures. In this way, he said, we can achieve physical health and a certain calmness or 'cheerfulness' (euthumie) in the soul [b].
CRITICAL SUMMARY
Zeno had tried to show that things can be divided up ad infinitum. Democritus said that atoms cannot be split. If by this he meant
that we cannot even imagine atoms as divisible, then it is difficult to see how atoms could be said to have parts and be of different
shapes and sizes. To recognise an atom as being large would surely allow us to break it up into something smaller in our thought.
Some commentators have suggested that what the Atomists were rejecting was Zeno's claim that anything which has a size cannot
be a genuine unit; and that they may well have believed the atoms to be theoretically but not physically divisible. A thing could be
supposed to have parts without being broken down into them. According to Aristotle, however, the Atomists did not accept
divisibility in either sense. Another problem with atomism is that the atoms are said to be eternal, but no explanation for their
motion was put forward. There is also a difficulty in their ethics. The Atomists' view of the material world is that it is rather like a
machine and that everything that happens is determined and predictable. If as they supposed the human 'mind' is equally to
be understood in such materialist terms, then it might be argued that there could be no room in their system for freedom of
choice[a]. This would seem to be inconsistent with exhortations that one should follow a particular kind of life so as to achieve
cheerfulness.