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Revolutionary Russia

ISSN: 0954-6545 (Print) 1743-7873 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/frvr20

Collegiality in the Peoples Commissariats,


1917-1920

Lara Cook

To cite this article: Lara Cook (2013) Collegiality in the Peoples Commissariats, 1917-1920,
Revolutionary Russia, 26:1, 1-31, DOI: 10.1080/09546545.2013.787805

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546545.2013.787805

Published online: 26 Jun 2013.

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Revolutionary Russia, 2013
Vol. 26, No. 1, 1 31, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546545.2013.787805

Lara Cook

COLLEGIALITY IN THE PEOPLES


COMMISSARIATS, 19171920

Impulses towards collective decision-making in industrial and military administration in the


early years of Soviet power have been well documented by historians. The equivalent
expression in state administration, however, has not received the same attention. This
article uses evidence from the Soviet state and party archives, memoir material and published
legislation and congress records to demonstrate the collegial modus operandi of the early
Soviet central state institutions, the Peoples Commissariats. It argues that the collegium rep-
resented a revolutionary innovation by the Soviet leadership and was a key aspect of the
organisational culture cultivated at this time inside the state apparatus.

Collegial administration: the specific distinctive mark of the proletariat, distinguish-


ing it from all other social classes. . .the most democratic principle of organization.1
(L. Kritsman, official communist historian, 1926)

It was highlighted in the reasoning on the direction of the departments that the
method must be collegial. The Peoples Commissar would only be a chairman of
the commission.2
(A.G. Shliapnikov, former Peoples Commissar for Labour, 1922)

Bolshevik leaders had hoped to build a new kind of government based on their ideologi-
cal conceptions of a socialist revolutionary state. Practical concerns constrained them
from fully establishing this state. Instead they were forced to carry over much of the
imperial state structure to keep the country running. Soviet scholars carried on the Bol-
shevik dream of a new state order and attempted to downplay this link and present the
Soviet government as built from scratch. Current historiography on the Soviet state
apparatus, though, tends to focus on continuity across the revolutionary divide.3
While it is certainly true that there was significant continuity between the Imperial
and Soviet states in structure, personnel, bureaucratic practice and material culture, the
focus on what remained the same has led scholars to overlook fleeting but significant
new aspects of the post-revolutionary administration. This article will argue that, in
the first year or so after the October Revolution, the Soviet leadership experimented
with a new, revolutionary form of collegial government. During the radical experiment
of the collegium system, the sole authority of a single minister leading a department
found in the Imperial and Provisional Government was replaced by a collegial body
responsible collectively for policy-making and general administration. The significance

R 2013 Taylor & Francis


2 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

of these collegial bodies was twofold. First, the Bolsheviks, in these earliest years of
Soviet power, felt that there was something more revolutionary about getting rid of
dictatorial ministers and replacing them with a group of equally empowered individuals.
Second, the collegia allowed the Soviet leadership to bring specialists and representatives
of the broader population, albeit to a limited extent, into government administration, a
key feature of pre-revolutionary Bolshevik ideology on the state.
The collegium system emerged from November 1917 onwards and was stronger
and longer lasting in Commissariats with less urgent jurisdictions, such as Social
Welfare, Education, Nationalities and Labour. In the Transport and Military Commissar-
iats, on the other hand, the collegial principle was eroded much more quickly. Although
not clearly defined in early Soviet legislation, in practice collegiality moulded day-to-day
activity of Sovnarkom and many Commissariats, with frequent appeals to higher auth-
orities when collegium members felt a Commissar had acted in an un-collegial manner.
Nevertheless, even in those Commissariats where collegiality had been strong from the
earliest days after the October Revolution, it gradually came to be viewed by some as a
hindrance to clear, decisive decision-making and implementation. By late 1920 the col-
legial principle in state administration had fallen foul of the same urges to centralise,
improve efficiency and impose hierarchical authority that had earlier destroyed the
post-revolutionary democratic, collective ethos which had existed in the factories and
military.
In his pioneering 1979 work Lenins Government: Sovnarkom 1917 22, T. H. Rigby
wrote that The early history of the commissariat boards still awaits systematic
study.4 Beyond recent work by James Heinzen, there has been little Russian or
Western scholarship on this subject in the subsequent three decades to address the
gap.5 Even amongst specialist scholarship on the early Soviet state, the functioning
and significance of the Commissariat collegia has been overlooked.6 Most historians
whose work has touched on the operation of the collegia in Vladimir Lenins government
have dismissed them as merely consultative bodies.7 Many of the scholars who have
studied the early Soviet state take a view of continuity over change.8 Even Rigby,
who conceded that a different model of government emerged in the shape of commis-
sions, did not recognize the critical import of the collegia.9 This article argues that the
collegia system was an important de-bureaucratisation and proletarianisation of the
Soviet state. While Fitzpatricks study of the Commissariat of Enlightenment emphasises
that the work of this institution was led not simply by the Commissar,
A. V. Lunacharskii, but by the collective effort of the whole collegium, in more
recent scholarship only the work of Alexander Rabinowitch has acknowledged the
use of the collegial method in the early Soviet state apparatus.10 The only scholars to
directly examine collective decision-making as a feature of the commissariat collegia
in detail, however, were Soviet jurist I. L. Davitnidze11 and historian M. Gribanov.12
Gribanovs work was concerned more with the theory rather than the practice of col-
legiality in the early Soviet government. His article is steeped in Stalinist rhetoric and
relies far too heavily on evidence drawn only from the uncritical repetition of the
speeches and writings of Lenin and Stalin. Davitnidzes 1972 work was primarily con-
cerned with collegiality versus one-man management in contemporary Soviet govern-
ment institutions, but he did provide a chapter on the creation and early history of
the collegia of the Peoples Commissariats. In this chapter he recognised that in the
COLLEGIALITY IN THE PEOPLES COMMISSARIATS 3

first years of Soviet power the collegia represented an attempt to create a decision-
making system of collective bodies infused with revolutionary spirit.13
To draw an accurate picture of the collegia is not an easy task if one relies, like
Davitnidze, solely on official legislation. Davitnidze himself acknowledged that legisla-
tive acts of this time did not define sufficiently clearly the respective legal positions of the
Peoples Commissar and the collegium. Certainly, from formal government decrees and
the 1918 RSFSR Constitution, it is not immediately obvious that there had been a move
away from ministerial government. However, from other evidence, including internal
state papers of Sovnarkom and the Commissariats and memoirs, a clearer picture of
the Commissariat collegia emerges.

The height of collegiality: the functioning of the collegia of the


Peoples Commissariats, 1917 1918
It seems that the idea of the collegia originated even before the October Revolution.
While there is little surviving evidence of pre-revolutionary practical plans for the estab-
lishment of the Soviet government institutions beyond Lenins State and Revolution, it is
clear that on the eve of October the Bolsheviks were leaning towards collective decision-
making bodies. Lenins fragmentary Sheet of Jottings from 24 October 1917 outlined a
plan for the revolutionary government which featured Commissions of Peoples
Commissars.14
By 26 October 1917 in the crazy whirlpool of Smolny, the revolutionaries busily
replaced and reorganised the old network of administration. Lev Trotsky described how
the Bolshevik Central Committee:

. . .was deciding the problems of the new government in Russia here. . .the evening
session was to create a cabinet of ministers. Ministers? What a sadly compromised
word! It stunk of the high bureaucratic career, the crowning of some parliamentary
ambition. It was decided to call the new government the Soviet of Peoples Com-
missars: that at least had a fresher ring to it.15

Vladimir Dmitrievich Bonch-Bruevich, Head of the Sovnarkom Chancellery, concurred


with Trotskys account, writing in his memoirs that it was necessary to set up commis-
sions for the administration of the country. . .the commissariats. The chairmen of these
we will name Peoples Commissars. The collegium of chairmen will be the Council of
Peoples Commissars.16
According to Lenins wife Nadezhda Krupskaia, Lenin had envisaged a new type of
minister from observing her work in the revolutionary underground before October:

An image was drawn before Vladimir Ilichs eyes of the Peoples Commissar, a new
type of minister, organizer and leader of this or that branch of state work, closely
connected to the masses, a type being forged in the fire of revolution. Vladimir Ilich
thought intensely about new forms of administration. He thought about how to
organize a type of apparatus which would be alien to the spirit of bureaucratism,
which would rely on the masses, to organize them to help its work, to be able
to cultivate in its work a new type of worker.17
4 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

Krupskaia described how, during the pre-revolutionary weeks when Lenin was in hiding,
she discussed her work in the Vyborg region with her husband. She worked to promote
education in factories, to help self-organised schools of workers and recalled that Ilich
said that here was the type of work which would take shape in our state apparatus, our
future ministries: commissions of workers, standing in the thick of it, well acquainted
with daily life.18
The collegia emerged in haphazard fashion soon after the formation of the Workers
and Peasants Government, from November to December 1917, as the nuclei of the
Commissariats. Initially they varied in size, composition, mode of operation and effec-
tive powers. No uniform legislation was enacted during the Lenin era and it seems that
the political and administrative role of individual collegium members continued to vary,
largely as a result of their individual capacities and attitudes, and their relationship to top
government leaders.
Nevertheless, by spring 1918 the collegia of the seventeen Commissariats had been
firmly established. They were settled in their new premises in Moscow and frequent,
regular sittings of the collegia had begun.19 The collegium of Naval Affairs, for
example, was a comparatively small body with only four collegium members: Trotsky
as Peoples Commissar, and F. F. Raskolnikov, I. I. Bakhramev, and S. E. Saks as colle-
gium members. Although Trotskys work address at this time was on Nizhny Pereulok,
the rest of the collegium lived and worked together at the Hotel Red Fleet on Tverskaia
Ulitsa. The collegium sat here daily, in room 9, at 11 a.m.20 The collegium of the
Peoples Commissariat of Posts and Telegraphs was larger, with eight members including
the Peoples Commissar V. N. Podbelskii, deputy commissar V. N. Zalezhskii, and
A. A. Semenov, L. E. Kronik, V. L. Verderskii, Iu. A. Volskii, I. V. Rabchinskii and
M. M. Klemer. All worked together in the Commissariat building at 15a Bolshaia Dmi-
trovka from 11 a.m. to 2 p.m. daily and then attended the daily sitting of the collegium
from 2 to 4 p.m.21
The collegia included elected representatives from mass organisations relevant to
the collegiums jurisdiction. The collegium of the Commissariat of Labour, for
example, included representatives of the Trade Union movement.22 The collegium of
the Peoples Commissariat of Enlightenment was composed of representatives of
various artistic, literary and educational, as well as soviet and city organisations.23
The collegium of the Peoples Commissariat of Transport was made up of candidates
nominated by the Railway Mens Union.24 The Peoples Commissariat of Internal
Affairs pioneered the scheme of bringing in representatives from the localities to
serve in its collegium.25
While Davitnidze argued that the collegia were staffed solely by Bolsheviks and
(until July 1918) Left Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs), it was not necessary to be a Bol-
shevik or Left SR to be a collegium member at this time. The Peoples Commissariat of
Finance, for example, had a collegium of eight in spring 1918. It was chaired by Peoples
Commissar I. Ia. Zhilin with D. P. Bogolepov as deputy commissar, and six other
members including Aleksandr Pavlovich Makarov who was not a member of the
Party, but had been employed in a bank for a long time and was qualified in this
way.26 Thus, the collegia enabled the Soviet leaders to include not just party
members, but both specialists and representatives of the masses in state administration.
Bolshevik leaders cited three related purposes for including representatives of the
labouring masses in state administration. First, ordinary workers and peasants would
COLLEGIALITY IN THE PEOPLES COMMISSARIATS 5

eventually replace the imperial holdover specialists and administrators who continued to
dominate numerically in the Soviet state apparatus. This goal was consistent with Lenins
view, expressed in State and Revolution, that any cook could become an official.27 Second,
Lenin also believed that increasing ordinary peoples representation in, and supervision
of, the state apparatus would reduce the evils of bureaucratism in the government.
Third, involvement of representatives of the masses, both workers and peasants,
would also help to establish a connection between government and people and demon-
strate to the masses that their interests were being met at the highest level of
government.
One good example of these purposes was the composition of the collegium of the
Commissariat of Labour. By March 1918 the fusion between Soviet and trade union
organs and functions had progressed far. Most of the officials of the Peoples Commis-
sariat of Labour (i.e. collegium members), as well as the regional and local representa-
tives (labour commissars), were nominated by the trade unions.28 In fact, V. V. Shmidt,
the Commissar for Labour, who owed his appointment to the All-Russian Central
Council of Trade Unions, revealed that the whole collegium of the Peoples Commissar-
iat of Labour was composed of representatives from this body.29 He recognised the
fusion between Soviet and trade union institutions, stating that:

The role of the Commissariat. . .must be to give obligatory effect to the recommen-
dations and plans worked out in the trade unions. Moreover, not only must the com-
missariat not interfere with the rights of the unions, but even the organs of the
commissariat should as far as possible be formed by the unions themselves. Here
at the centre we act consistently on this principle.30

The All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions asserted without hesitation that the
work of the Peoples Commissariat of Labour was one and the same as that of the
trade unions:

It [the Commissariat] works on the basis of what the trade unions proclaim in their
daily work and what they lay down in the regular decisions and resolutions adopted
at congresses. These decisions are accepted by the Commissariat of Labour, which,
as the organ of state power, carries them into effect.31

This merging of mass organisations with the state apparatus through the collegia was
intended to help connect state and society, and thus increase stability.
This election of representatives of mass organisations into the collegia of the com-
missariats is indicated in the RSFSR Constitution of July 1918. As article 44 stated, Sov-
narkom only confirmed the proposed collegium members. Chapter Eight of the
Constitution is the only official text to deal generally with the relationships between Sov-
narkom, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) and the Commissariats,
and also within the Commissariats, the Peoples Commissar and the collegium. Articles
42 to 44 declared that eighteen Peoples Commissariats were formed, that members of
the Council of Peoples Commissars head the Peoples Commissariats; and that Under
the chairmanship of every Peoples Commissar a collegium is constituted whose
members are confirmed by the Council of Peoples Commissars. Article 45 outlined
that the Peoples Commissar had the personal right to take decisions on all matters
6 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

that come within the competence of his Commissariat. However, in the event of a dis-
agreement with a decision of the Peoples Commissar the collegium could, without sus-
pending the implementation of the decision, appeal against it to the Council of Peoples
Commissars or the Presidium of the VTsIK. The same right of appeal also belonged to
individual members of the collegium. Finally, Article 47 indicated that both the Peoples
Commissar and all collegium members were fully responsible before Sovnarkom and
the VTsIK for the commissariats decisions. 32
At first glance the Constitution shows that the Commissar was the boss in the
commissariat and that the collegium had no real authority; the commissar had the
right to take decisions personally on all questions in the jurisdiction of the Commissariat,
and the collegium could only appeal to Sovnarkom or the VTsIK if they disagreed.
Closer analysis of the relevant articles of the Constitution, however, reveals that the
image of the dominant commissar may not be so straightforward. Article 44 stated
that the Peoples Commissar was the chairman of the collegium, rather than the
leader or head. Thus, he was not necessarily granted greater rights than other
members in decision-making, but simply had responsibility for running sittings.
Article 47 stated that collegium members, as well as the Peoples Commissar, were
fully responsible for the activity of the commissariat. This passage demonstrates that
the collegium members were not just backstage advisers, but could appeal against
decisions they did not agree with. They must have been involved in decision-making
if they were to be held accountable for the commissariats activity.
Rather than the Commissar acting as boss of the collegium, as in ministerial gov-
ernment, he was instead the representative of the collegium at Sovnarkom meetings. It
was necessary to keep this post stable for the sake of consistency and continuity of gov-
ernment.33 He also acted as chairman of the collegium sittings to ensure that they ran
effectively. He had the right to make decisions personally, to prevent the work of the
commissariat on controversial issues grinding to a halt, but was not expected to do
this as normal procedure. The right of appeal of the collegium members was set up
in law as a guarantee of collegiality in decision-making.
There are further indications in other early Soviet legislation that collegiality, rather
than one-man management, was the intended form of relations in the commissariats.
One of the first acts of Soviet power, the Decree on the All-Russian Congress of
Soviets to Form the Workers and Peasants Government of 27 October 1917 supports
this view. It states:

The management of individual branches of state activity is entrusted to commissions


whose members shall ensure the fulfilment of the programme announced by the
Congress, and shall work in close contact with mass organisations of men and
women workers, sailors, soldiers, peasants and office employees. Governmental
authority is vested in a collegium of the chairmen of these commissions, the
Council of Peoples Commissars.34

At this early stage the new titles of Peoples Commissar and Commissariats with their
collegia were not yet settled. However, the initial idea of collective authority and
responsibility, in this case by commissions and whose chairman would represent
them in the Sovnarkom, itself a collegial organ, is made plain. The legislation does
not indicate when and why the title of these bodies changed from commissions to
COLLEGIALITY IN THE PEOPLES COMMISSARIATS 7

collegia, but both terms express the same idea of collective decision-making. According
to the memoirs of a contemporary state activist the terms were synonymous.35 Perhaps
the use of the term commission (with its connotation of transience) was a result of the
Bolshevik notion that the necessity for state institutions would be short-lived. Soon after
they seized power, the Bolsheviks realised that this was unrealistic and it is possible that
the commissions were renamed as collegia to reflect this more long-term status.
A further hint of the equality of the Peoples Commissar and collegium members
is revealed by the decrees on pay of those working in state institutions. According to
these decrees the commissar and collegium members received the same salary
eight hundred rubles per month in June 1918, which was increased to twelve
hundred rubles per month in September 1918.36 If pay can be taken to be an indication
of status at this time then the commissar was not a superior to his fellow collegium
members.37
Due to particularly dire practicalities, however, it was necessary to limit collegiality
and increase the authority of the commissar in certain departments. The decree of 23
March 1918, On the centralisation of management and protection of routes and
raising their transport capacity, often known as the railroad decree, reinstated min-
isterial government in the Transport Commissariat. The decree opened with a state-
ment of the difficult circumstances of dislocation and hunger which had made its
promulgation necessary. The decree then explained that many local oblast and central
organisations, trying to improve the situation, each interfere in the technical adminis-
tration of the railway apparatus and by this completely ruin it.38 The decree then set
out amended rules for the running of the Transport Commissariat to deal with these
problems. The collegium members retained the right to appeal against decisions of
the Commissar to Sovnarkom and the Central Executive Committee, but the power
of the Commissar was increased: The collegium. . .of the Commissariat of Transport
does not interfere directly in the orders of the Commissar of Transport who is supplied
with unlimited authority in the area of transport.39 This clause granted more power to
the Commissar of Transport to make unilateral decisions and the collegium was
demoted. The railroad decree also contained a provision for the appointment of
special commissars with unlimited dictatorial authority on the main railroad lines.
These commissars were to be empowered to undertake at their discretion any measures
they deemed necessary to restore order, including execution.40
The decree caused uproar among many Bolsheviks and Left SRs, as well as among
Mensheviks and SRs. Both Iulii Martov and Nikolai Bukharin flatly rejected it, holding it
to be a violation of the principles of democracy and Soviet power. Lenin denied that
there was any contradiction in principle between soviet- that is, socialist- democracy
and the application of dictatorial power by single individuals.41 This legislation was
linked to serious conflicts which paralysed the Transport Commissariat and its relation-
ship with the railway union. In January 1918 Lenin managed to disband the All-Russian
Executive Committee of the Union of Railway Workers (Vikzhel), the Menshevik-SR-
led railroad workers union, and replaced it with a Bolshevik-controlled union, known as
Vikzheldor, although the Mensheviks retained some influence in this new union.42 The
Mensheviks and SRs refused to comply with the commissariat, and as a result the
workers and engineers who supported them were removed from the collegia of the rail-
ways. The Mensheviks suspected that the dictatorial approach expressed in the decree of
March 1918 was designed to prevent them regaining leadership of the railroad union and
8 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

having significant influence in the Commissariat of Transport. One Menshevik, summing


up the key changes in the Soviet regime since October, wrote: where there is dictator-
ship of the class, there can be no dictatorship of a single individual; in other words, the
dictatorship of single individuals dooms the dictatorship of the class.43
Thus, in certain commissariats, those directly involved in the administration of
urgent affairs, the ideological luxury of the collegial system was short-lived. There
is concrete evidence that this was the case in the above example of the Transport Com-
missariat, and it seems likely that this pattern was repeated elsewhere in Army, Navy,
and Food Procurement Commissariats. Nevertheless, beyond the picture created by
official legislation there is considerable evidence from other sources to suggest that col-
legiality was a crucial principle in many parts of the early Soviet state apparatus. Memoir
material illustrates the prevailing collegial spirit in many Commissariats at this time. In
his memoirs A. G. Shliapnikov clearly indicated that the practice of collegiality and col-
lective decision-making was established as the intended form of administration at the
Second Congress of Soviets, the day after the Bolshevik seizure of power. Shliapnikov
recalls, It was highlighted in the reasoning on the direction of the departments that
the method must be collegial. The Peoples Commissar would only be a chairman of
the commission.44
Stanislav Pestkovskii, a member of the collegium of the Commissariat of National-
ities (of which Joseph Stalin was Peoples Commissar) clearly illustrates the collegiums
lack of subordination to the Commissar who chaired it:

. . .all members of the collegium on the National Question were in opposition to


Stalin, frequently leaving their Peoples Commissar in the minority. . . At times
he would lose patience, but he never made it evident during the sessions. On
these occasions, when in consequence of our endless discussions his patience was
exhausted, he would suddenly disappear, doing it with extraordinary skill: just
for a moment he would disappear from the room and hide in one of the recesses
of the Smolny, and later the Kremlin. It was impossible to find him. In the beginning
we used to wait for him. But finally we would adjourn. I would remain alone in our
common office, patiently awaiting his return, but to no avail. . . I would go for a long
walk through the endless corridors of the Smolny and the Kremlin in search of
Stalin. I would find him in the most unexpected places. A couple of times I
found him in the apartment of the sailor, Comrade Vorontsov, in the kitchen,
where Stalin was lying on a divan smoking a pipe and thinking over his thesis.45

Trotsky commented that:

. . .the collegium of the Commissariat of Nationalities. . .indulged in the practice of


marshalling arguments to counter Stalins contentions and of putting questions to
him to which he could not find answers. He had power. But that power was
utterly insufficient for compulsion; he had to convince or persuade. Stalin could
not cope with that situation.46

Archival evidence further corroborates this picture of the Commissariat collegia. The
minutes and addenda of Sovnarkom demonstrate that Stalin was not the only Peoples
Commissar to be held prisoner by a collegium. In January 1918, M. Elizarov appealed
COLLEGIALITY IN THE PEOPLES COMMISSARIATS 9

to Sovnarkom to allow him to relinquish the authority and post of Peoples Commissar
of Transport due to serious conflict in the collegium, which left him helpless:

To Sovnarkom, in view of the current situation, in which my joint work with the
majority of the collegium (Bubnov, Neimant, Nevskii) has become impossible,
and learning of the circumstance that this majority of the collegium is in close
contact with the Bolshevik fraction of the railway congress and therefore it has
the advantage over my leadership of the railway commissariat, I relinquish the
duty of Peoples Commissar of Transport and ask the Sovnarkom to free me
from the position entrusted to me.47

The language of the correspondence of the Peoples Commissariats also demonstrates


the prevalence of this collegial ethos. The inter-departmental papers from this early
period almost without fail refer to decisions of the collegium, not of the commissar.
For example, the Deputy Peoples Commissar for the Workers and Peasants Inspecto-
rate wrote in a telegram to a local section of the commissariat that special sections were
to be created in this institution in accordance with the decision of the collegium.48 In
correspondence between the Peoples Commissariats and Sovnarkom the usual wording
to propose legislation was the collegium. . .presents its decree for confirmation by Sov-
narkom (i.e. not just the Commissar).49 Finally, further evidence of the necessity for
collective decision-making comes from September 1918, when a reprimand was sent
to the Peoples Commissariats of Finance and State Control because a decision had
been made as a conclusion of certain employees of the Commissariat, instead of con-
clusion by the whole collegium.50
A key indication of the strength of the collegium vis-a-vis the Commissar was the
frequency of appeals against unilateral decisions, and the seriousness with which appeals
were dealt. In the Constitution this right of appeal may seem like a small nod to colle-
giality which may not have held much weight. In practice, however, this right of appeal
was not an empty threat. It was frequently wielded by collegium members. These
appeals were taken seriously by Sovnarkom, dealt with urgently, and decisions often
went in favour of the collegium.
For example, on 15 November 1917, the case of frictions in the collegium of the
Peoples Commissariat of Posts and Telegraphs between Peoples Commissar Avilov and
the collegium was put before Sovnarkom. A commission of three Sovnarkom members
was appointed to resolve it. They made an impartial report to Sovnarkom the following
day and instructed the collegium on how to liquidate the conflict.51 In January 1918
conflict broke out in the collegium of the Commissariat of Justice, where the Left SR
I. N. Shteinberg was Peoples Commissar, and the Bolshevik P. I. Stuchka was
Deputy Commissar. Stuchka announced a protest at the Sovnarkom sitting against the
Decree on Law, which had been passed the previous day. Shteinberg had presented
the project decree to Sovnarkom as if it had been accepted unanimously by the
Justice collegium, but in reality agreement had not been reached. In response, Sovnar-
kom proposed to Stuchka and others having principal objections to the decree On Law
to bring statements to the following days Sovnarkom sitting where they subjected the
decree to reconsideration.52
Similar conflicts broke out in spring 1918 in other commissariats. Trotsky reported
on the difficulties and frictions in the Commissariat of Foodstuffs in February 1918 in
10 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

connection with the petition of comrades Manuilsky and Maliutin,53 which led to the
resignation of the Peoples Commissar for Foodstuffs.54 Another major conflict over
policy broke out between the members of the collegium of the Peoples Commissariat
of State Control on 25 March 1918. Sovnarkom instructed that the members of the
collegium situated in conflict must send, urgently, all materials for consideration of
the question to Sovnarkom.55 It is clear that the collegia frequently exercised their
right, as detailed in the Constitution, to appeal against decisions of the Commissar if
they felt that the decision had not been taken in an appropriately collegial manner. It
must have proved a big incentive, if the commissar needed it, to engage fully in collegial
decision-making with the other collegium members.
In the first year or so of Soviet power the collegial form of administration was domi-
nant in the work of many of the Peoples Commissariats, as well as its better-documen-
ted expression in workers control of industrial administration and democratic military
organisation.56 From spring 1918, however, Lenin began to challenge the continued use
of collegiality, although, at this early stage, only in economic administration. In speeches
and writings in March and April 1918 Lenin argued for the crucial importance of col-
legiality in destroying the old and creating the new apparatus in the early months of
Soviet power, but now proposed moves towards limited use of one-man management.
In his polemics with the defenders of collegiality, the Left Communists, who opposed
the turn away from the norms of revolutionary democracy in the direction of a hierarchy
of dictatorial individuals, Lenin now argued that conditions had ripened for the estab-
lishment of strict discipline and responsibility, for orders by sole-authority leaders in
organs of soviet power.57
Scholars have convincingly demonstrated how, despite the best efforts of the Left
Communists, Left SRs and Mensheviks, collegiality in industrial and military admin-
istration eroded over the course of 1918.58 The introduction of the principle of one-
man management into the administration of the Peoples Commissariats, however, did
not progress quite as quickly. In December 1918, in his Draft Regulation on the
Administration of Soviet Institutions, Lenin still highlighted the importance of colle-
gial administration in government decision-making, although he qualified this with a
call for more precise responsibility for individuals in implementation of decisions.59
Lenin repeated this sentiment in his speech to the Second All-Russian Congress of
Soviets of the National Economy on 25 December 1918, where he stated: The mili-
tary situation bestows on us special responsibilities and difficult tasks. Collegial admin-
istration is essential with the participation of the trade unions. The collegia are
essential, but collegia must not turn into a hindrance in practical business.60 Over
the course of 1919, however, the erosion of the principle of collegiality finally
spread from industrial and military administration to the Commissariat collegia, as
will be discussed below.

A case study: the conflict in the Commissariat of Labour,


September 1918
Somebody among us has rendered a crime against Soviet power, either the colle-
gium or the commissar.
(A.M. Stopani, collegium member of the Commissariat of Labour, 30 August 1918)
COLLEGIALITY IN THE PEOPLES COMMISSARIATS 11

The examples of conflict within the commissariat collegia outlined above are instructive
as it is difficult to judge whether a body is collegial or not when all the members agree
on the issues at hand. The best opportunity to observe where authority lies in practice is
when agreement breaks down. One such case will now be examined in detail to demon-
strate that the collegium was much more than simply an advisory body under the
commissar.
In September 1918 a conflict erupted between the Peoples Commissar for Labour
and the other members of the Commissariats collegium. This conflict forced Soviet
leaders to consider more precisely the nature of the relationship between commissar
and collegium, which was ill-defined in legislation. The Commissariat of Labour was
among those named in the initial decree on the formation of the Workers and Peasants
Government. It had not existed in the imperial bureaucracy, but was formed as a Min-
istry by the Provisional Government in 1917. Aleksander Shliapnikov was appointed
Peoples Commissar for Labour. He was a natural choice for this role from his previous
experience in the labour movement, a former steel worker and long-time Bolshevik
party member.61 Shliapnikov initially faced problems in taking control of the old Min-
istry of Labour, where carry-over officials obstructed his efforts.62 However, the Com-
missariats internal records, and the testimony of its Commissar, show that despite the
bureaucratic sabotage it was among the first to be successfully up and running.63
The minutes of the sittings of the commissariat collegium show that initially it was a
healthy, collegial body. By no means did Shliapnikov simply make a decision and report it
to the collegium. Here intense, sometimes fiery debate was conducted by the collegium
members on all major policy issues. Decisions were then made on majority vote. The
commissar found himself out-voted on a number of occasions. One example was the
June 1918 discussion of the establishment of the amount of leave for workers. Two
sides emerged in the debate, one led by Shliapnikov and A. N. Paderin, and the
other by V. P. Nogin, M. P. Tomskii and V. V. Shmidt. Shliapnikovs side argued that
two weeks leave per year for all workers would suffice. The other side argued that
this was not enough, and that workers in more physically demanding and dangerous
jobs should be granted extra leave. Eventually Nogins side won the debate, the
minutes recording that Shliapnikov hotly protests against separate agreements; only
the enemies of the working class gain through this. They are provocational tactics!64
However, Shliapnikov proved such a competent organiser and statesman that he
became one of the major figures in the Soviet government in its first year. Sovnarkom
entrusted to him a wide variety of other jobs during this period, including organisation of
other state organs and participation in various government commissions. In late May
1918 the Party Central Committee entrusted him with the crucial task of food procure-
ment. Lenin wrote to him: It is essential that you be temporarily employed on food
supply (while retaining the rank of Peoples Commissar for Labour). . . I think you
ought to go to the Kuban to help pump grain out from there.65
Shliapnikov agreed to do his duty. The records of the Commissariat show that he
participated in his last collegium sitting on 1 June 1918 and would not attend again
until 29 August. Further letters to Shliapnikov confirm that he had left Moscow and
was in Tsaritsyn by 11 June.66 Deputy Peoples Commissar Nogin and collegium
member Shmidt were left to take over Shliapnikovs duties in Sovnarkom. In the Com-
missars three-month absence the collegium continued to run affairs and formulate
policy smoothly. Nogin was also a prominent old Bolshevik.67 He had initially been
12 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

made Peoples Commissar for Commerce and Industry, but had been among those Party
left-wingers who resigned over the failure to build a wider coalition government.
Despite this Nogin remained an important state activist and was nominated to the Com-
missariat of Labour collegium by Shliapnikov himself, and confirmed by Sovnarkom on 8
April 1918.68
After Shliapnikovs departure the collegium continued its regular sittings, approxi-
mately two evenings a week (generally lasting from around 4 p.m. until 7 p.m.), sometimes
more often, to discuss all major policy decisions. Nogin was named as chairman of the col-
legium and signed the minutes as such. There were twelve collegium members (V. P. Nogin,
A. M. Anikst, M. P. Tomskii, V. V. Shmidt, A. N. Paderin, I. I. Khodorovskii, V. A. Radus-
Zenkovich, E. Bumazhnyi, Ia. I. Gindin, A. M. Stopani, D. Puzanov and B. Kushner) but
sometimes the number of persons present rose to as many as twenty when experts or repre-
sentatives were invited to give reports and advice on topical issues.69
One important piece of legislation drafted by the Labour collegium at this time and
sent to Sovnarkom for confirmation was the Decree of 27 July 1918 prohibiting relatives
of officials and employees from working in the same state departments.70 This was
intended to address nepotism and corruption in state institutions and increase efficiency.
It was the activity surrounding the implementation of this decree within the Commis-
sariat of Labour itself which would eventually lead to the fierce battle between the col-
legium members and Shliapnikov.
On 2 August 1918 the collegium turned to the implementation of this decree,
which it had been responsible for producing, in relation to its own staff. Eleven colle-
gium members were present, but Nogin was a notable absence. Instead Kushner acted as
chairman. The collegium considered the questionnaires filled out by commissariat staff
concerning family ties within the institution. The minutes reveal that In principle it was
recognised that employees related by blood or marriage to colleagues and responsible
workers of the institution, not serving as irreplaceable specialists in the Commissariat
of Labour, are subject to dismissal, in accordance with the decree of Sovnarkom.71
The collegium decided to dismiss responsible workers with two weeks notice, and
technical workers with one months notice and a pay advance. They listed:

. . .employees subject to dismissal from the Commissariat of Labour: within two


weeks without a pay advance: a) Head of the Housekeeping department,
Comrade Kovalenko, related to the Peoples Commissar for Labour,
A. G. Shliapnikov by marriage (not an irreplaceable specialist) b) Comrade Tiuter-
eva, bookkeeper of the Peoples Commissariat of Labour, related to the Peoples
Commissar of Labour by blood (also not an irreplaceable specialist). With a pay
advance of one month: Employee of the accountancy department Kuznetsov
(father), as a relative of an official of the same department, Kuznetsov
(son). . .Comrade Radus-Zenkovich, although related by marriage to Deputy
Peoples Commissar of Labour V. P. Nogin, is not subject to dismissal as he is an
irreplaceable specialist.72

The collegium also instructed the Labour Market department of the Commissariat to
present its completed questionnaires and dismiss those relatives, in accordance with
the decree, in a three-day period. The remaining dismissals were worked out the follow-
ing week in the sitting of 13 August when the collegium decided, concerning staff of the
COLLEGIALITY IN THE PEOPLES COMMISSARIATS 13

Statistical Department, of the brother and sister Shishkins, to dismiss A. A. Shishkina, a


machinist, and keep V. N. Shishkin who was recognised, as a statistician, as irreplaceable
and therefore must remain in employment.73 This appeared to be the end of the matter.
However, when Shliapnikov returned from his food procurement duties to re-join the
collegium of the Peoples Commissariat of Labour two weeks later the issue of the dis-
missal of his relatives came to a head.
The explosive sitting of 29 August 1918, Shliapnikovs first after his return to
Moscow, saw the beginning of the revolt of the collegium against Shliapnikovs overrid-
ing of their decision. The meeting opened with Shliapnikov announcing the agenda.
However, affairs were immediately hijacked by Radus-Zenkovich (the brother-in-law
of Nogin who had kept his job as an irreplaceable specialist) who requested the
floor to make the following announcement:

. . .apparently the decree on relatives has been abolished in the Commissariat of


Labour, as Comrades Kovalenko and Tiutereva, dismissed according to this
decree, are again employed in the Commissariat without the consent (vedoma) of
the Collegium. Today a meeting was held of department heads at which it was
decided that there cannot be joint work if the decisions of the collegium are
evaded so. The legal decision of the collegium was abolished by the commissar.74

Nogin waded in with support. He stated bluntly: the collegium has the right to appeal
in the plenum. The Commissar does not possess the right to rescind decisions of the
Deputy Commissar.75 Shliapnikov, initially irritated, replied that:

. . .the Heads of Departments must be only Heads of Departments, and not inter-
fere in the conduct of the collegium. I possess the right to cancel a decision of the
collegium and that includes decisions of my Deputy. This I cancel with the authority
(vedoma) of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee. If you are not sat-
isfied with my actions, you can appeal.76

At this point tensions escalated. The surviving minutes are edited. At least one page is
missing. When we return to the action Shliapnikov is still on the offensive, arguing that
Comrade Kovalenko was invited by the collegium of the Commissariat of Labour, but I
do not see members confirmed by Sovnarkom here.77 This infuriated the collegium
further. Nogin protested that all these members were confirmed by Sovnarkom in
your absence.78
Stopani joined the quarrel. He remonstrated that:

. . .this was said not only by department heads, but by members of the collegium.
Bumazhny, Puzanov, R-Zenkovich, Deputy Comrade Khodorovskii, comrades
Anikst and Nogin are members. The decision concerning the decree on relatives
was carried by a legal composition of the collegium. The collegium wished to bring
to execution the decree, as we are the initiators of the decree and must firmly
defend the reputation of Soviet power. The decision of the collegium is fully legal.79

Shliapnikov, finding himself isolated in the collegium, could only repeat his claim that I
did this with the authority of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee. If you
14 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

like you can make an appeal. Make a written statement, bring it here and I will pass it to
Sovnarkom along with the minutes of the collegium.80 Nogin, however, would not
accept this solution and pushed for a vote to continue the debate. Another collegium
member, Gindin, supported him.81
Shliapnikov again attempted to stifle further debate and carry on with normal gov-
ernment business. He stated firmly, Further debate I cannot permit, but the collegium
would not accept this. Instead Nogin proposed to interrupt the sitting of the collegium
in advance of elucidation by Sovnarkom. In such a situation it is impossible to work
together. His proposal was put to the vote and carried by a majority of six for, one
(only Shliapnikov) against. Eleven were recorded as present so four collegium
members must have abstained. The sitting of the collegium, by a majority of votes,
was broken off.82
The following day a collegium sitting was held in which Shliapnikov again attempted
to compel the collegium to continue business as usual. However, the question of
whether the work of the collegium can take place under normal conditions arose
immediately.83 Shliapnikov stated that the appointment of a special commission for
clearing up what occurred in the sitting of the collegium on 29 August will be
decided in the VTsIK.84 Nogin and the collegium were still spoiling for a fight,
having made a formal complaint to Sovnarkom and the presidium of the VTsIK the pre-
vious evening. He talked with Sverdlov and learned that Sovnarkom had not made any
final decisions on the matter.85
Some collegium members were more inclined to calm the situation and try to carry
out commissariat business. A. M. Anikst proposed to consider the present meeting of
the collegium as legal and normal in order to decide questions together with the repre-
sentative from the Trade Unions and to elucidate the future work of the collegium.86
Nogin, however, continued to obstruct normal working relations in the collegium.
He tried to drag the Trade Unions into the fray to support his case, proposing to
the representative of the Trade Unions to give his opinion regarding the current
situation.87
Trade Union representative Shmidt remained diplomatic. He argued that as the
issue of the conflict had not been sent to the presidium of the Trade Unions, he
could not definitively give his opinion as representative of the Trade Unions. Instead,
he proposed either to discuss the point on the agenda and carry a certain decision,
or completely not discuss it until the clearing up of the question of the normal work
of the collegium.88 It seemed that the majority of collegium members were not
willing to carry out work as normal. Most preferred to wait for Sovnarkoms decision.
Nogin proposed to hold a collegium sitting the following morning, Saturday, 31 August
1918. This is plenty of time to clear it up, he added.89
This proposal was supported by the other infuriated members of the collegium.
Radus-Zenkovich remarked: We have many urgent questions to decide. This confirms
the impossibility of work in the current conditions.90 Nogin again tried to bring the
authority of the Trade Unions into the conflict: In view of the fact that the Trade
Union does not yet have an opinion, and we want to work together with the Trade
Unions, I propose to Comrade Shmidt to explain the question in the presidium of
the Trade Unions on who has the right to cancel the decisions of the collegium.
When there is an answer we will decide all questions jointly. The sitting closed with
COLLEGIALITY IN THE PEOPLES COMMISSARIATS 15

Stopanis ominous statement: Somebody among us has rendered a crime against Soviet
power, either the collegium or the commissar.91
The planned sitting opened at 1.30 p.m. on Saturday, 31 August despite the attempt
on Lenins life the previous evening. Although all members unanimously decided to
send to Nadezhda Konstantinova, to Lenin, deep condolences and wishes for a quick
recovery, even this shock was not enough to bring the collegium members and Shliap-
nikov together. The initial disruption in Sovnarkoms work due to Lenins shooting
meant that the question of the conflict in the Labour collegium had not yet been
dealt with. The arguments dragged out for a further sitting despite Shliapnikovs
attempts to eschew the conflict and continue normal work. Shmidt returned to this
sitting with the formal decision of the Trade Unions on the conflict. It was not favourable
to either side. He announced that:

. . .the All-Russian Trade Union carried a resolution concerning the conflict in the
Peoples Commissariat of Labour. This resolution says that this is a small practical
disagreement and it is impossible to create such disorganisation due to such a small
question. It recommends the appointment of a commission from the VTsIK to sort
out the question of the relationship of the Commissar to the members of the col-
legium. The Trade Union proposes to consider the conflict exhausted and that it
believes that it is necessary to begin considering agenda items without further
delay.92

Tomskii then waded into the debate to urge the continuation of the work of the com-
missariat. He acknowledged that this was a serious moment and also very annoying
but that the question of tariff policy was urgent as it involved the issue of millions of
rubles by the state treasury. He added, the question of relatives can be cleared up by
the investigative commission of the presidium of the VTsIK and State Control.93
However, the more militant members of the collegium were still not satisfied to let
the issue lie. Radus-Zenkovich again stated that the collegium cannot work in gener-
al. . . In such conditions the possibility of work is absolutely excluded. . .the question
of decisions by the collegium is not provided for in the Soviet Constitution: whether
the commissar decides all, or that the collegium must be able to work collegially.94
Tomskii appealed to the poorly defined formal legislation on this issue:

But we wrote the Soviet Constitution! In point 45 this question was decided. This
point says that in the case of divergence of the collegium it is not possible to cancel
the position of the commissar. We are not lawyers, but in our understanding it
breaks the Soviet Constitution. On the question of the dismissal of relatives there
should not emerge such a conflict, but the whole course of events shows that
there is still serious disagreement. . . In my personal opinion it is necessary to con-
sider the question exhausted, for Kovalenko95 to tender his resignation, and the
question will be exhausted.96

Point 45 of the Constitution was then read aloud and debate escalated further, despite
Shliapnikovs repeated attempts to stop it. Nogin, speaking on behalf of the hardliners of
the collegium, refused to continue working and reiterated the need to pass the conflict
of the Commissariat of Labour onto the VTsIK and Sovnarkom for consideration.97
16 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

Tomskii still occupied the middle ground. He implored that despite the difficult issue it
is impossible to suspend the work of the collegium.98 Nogin, convinced of the correct-
ness of his own position, refused to compromise and allow the collegium to continue
functioning until a decision had been passed by higher authorities:

I talked to Lenin regarding Shliapnikovs interpretation, that he acted with the


consent of the presidium of the VTsIK. He said to me that if the VTsIK cancelled
the decision, this was incorrect: this is clearly unlawful action.99

Shliapnikov again attempted to defend his actions to reinstate dismissed staff members,
but he was drowned out by further recriminations from Bumazhnyi, Gulan, Tomskii and
Stopani. Nogin and the hardliners got their way and the collegium did not meet again
until 5 September, after the matter of the conflict had been considered in Sovnarkom.
Nogin attended the Sovnarkom sitting on 4 September in person to make the case for the
collegium. Shliapnikov was not afforded this same opportunity.100 Nogins Deposition
to Sovnarkom on this affair explained his version of events and his perception of the
rights of the collegium versus the Commissar. He stated that Shliapnikovs suspension
of his order was a breach of my rights as Deputy Peoples Commissar and added
that when he raised this point with the Commissar: My remark to Comrade Shliapnikov
concerning the incorrectness of his behaviour remained without an answer.101 Nogin
explained that when he again complained about the return of the dismissed persons
at the collegium sitting, Shliapnikov claimed that this was done in accordance with
an order of the presidium of the VTsIK. Nogin, unsatisfied with this explanation,
chased the issue through the channels of state authority to V. A. Avanesov, a member
of the VTsIK Presidium. Avanesov stated that although a written order had not been
composed by Ia. M. Sverdlov, Chairman of the VTsIK, he had allowed Comrade Shliap-
nikov, in advance of the reconsideration of the decree, to take back into employment
those staff dismissed by the collegium. However, when challenged on the issue, Sverdlov
himself announced that he had given no such order on the return of the dismissed
persons, but that Shliapnikov told him that in his opinion the collegium itself would
allow the dismissed persons to return to employment.102
Besides his annoyance at Shliapnikovs illegal cancellation of the collegiums
decision, Nogin also felt that the Commissar had acted in an insulting and inappropriate
manner towards the collegium members by expressing doubt that before him sat the
collegium. Nogin indicated to Comrade Shliapnikov that:

. . .the collegium had been confirmed by Sovnarkom and therefore is legally auth-
orised [pravomochno]. In answer to this Comrade Shliapnikov asked the Secretary
to present to him the named list of the collegium. When I said to him, Aleksandr
Gavrilovich, how can you speak so shamelessly?, he, pointing me to the door, said
Victor Pavlovich, please.103

Nogin closed his statement by pointing out that thanks to the activities of Comrade
Shliapnikov, at the present time such conditions have taken shape in the Commissariat
that planned and quiet work is unthinkable.104 As a result, almost all responsible staff
will leave the commissariat if Comrade Shliapnikov remains as Peoples Commissar of
Labour.105
COLLEGIALITY IN THE PEOPLES COMMISSARIATS 17

Nogins anger was abated after his performance in Sovnarkom. As mentioned above,
the collegium met the following day, 5 September, and considered workers tariffs and
other pressing issues. The minutes of this sitting, unusually, do not record any person as
chairman. The next collegium sitting was two weeks later. The sittings then continued at
regular intervals until early October with debate and discussion proceeding as normal.
Shliapnikov did chair the remainder of these sittings, but it was Nogins proposals which
were mainly accepted by the collegium.106
Behind the scenes the higher authorities were considering this complicated matter and
working towards a solution. Where and how this solution was worked out, and its final
outcome, are indicative of the locus of power in the Soviet government at this time.
Both Nogin and Shliapnikov, in their remonstrances to higher authorities, made reference
to the state institutions Sovnarkom and the VTsIK as the legitimate bodies to solve the
conflict. However, after Nogins deposition in Sovnarkom the crux of the matter seems
to have been actually worked out in the Party Central Committee. On 16 September
1918 the sitting of the Central Committee (unusually, with Nogin present) decided to
appoint Comrade Shmidt as Peoples Commissar for Labour.107
This decision was not enacted immediately, however, and the matter lay for another
fortnight before formal changes were executed. In the Central Committee sitting of 2
October the conflict in the Commissariat of Labour was discussed further: It was
decided that neither Shliapnikov, nor Nogin can remain in the Commissariat of
Labour.108 Sverdlovs proposal, which indicated that Shliapnikov was not right in his
relations towards the collegium and to the responsible workers of the Commissariat,
but that on the other hand also the collegium itself acted incorrectly, was accepted.109
Next, distribution of cadres was discussed and it was decided to send Comrade Shliap-
nikov to the disposal of Trotsky on the Southern Front.110 These decisions of the
Central Committee on the departure of Shliapnikov and Nogin from the Commissariat
of Labour, and the appointment of Shmidt as the new Peoples Commissar, were con-
firmed six days later at the Sovnarkom sitting on 8 October 1918. Again, Nogin was
present at this sitting, but Shliapnikov, now clearly out of favour, was not.111
Shmidt seamlessly took over the duties of the Commissar for Labour and the col-
legium continued its work without disruption. In his first sitting as Commissar on 12
October 1918 Shmidt was named as chairman, but in all the subsequent minutes no
person was singled out in this role.112 This implies that collegial spirit was triumphant
and that Shmidt, having previously been one of the collegium members, avoided any
pretension of supremacy over the others. This argument is supported by the re-confir-
mation of the collegium by Sovnarkom in early November, which listed Shmidts name
not separately, but alongside those of his counterparts in the collegium.113
As for the fate of the two major protagonists in this conflict, it seems Nogin fared
better than Shliapnikov. Nogin secured a prestigious job in the Supreme Soviet of the
National Economy (VSNKh or Vesenkha) and continued to participate regularly in Sov-
narkom sittings and activity the following year.114 Shliapnikov, on the other hand,
although not officially condemned, was sent to almost political exile organising supplies
in the far-flung reaches of the country. A letter from Lenin reveals he was working in
Astrakhan in December 1918.115
Naturally, this complex series of events was affected by individual personalities, per-
sonal relationships and the particular circumstances of the time. However, it is possible
to consider some interesting conclusions. This case study suggests that an internal
18 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

political culture of collegiality existed in at least part of the Soviet state apparatus in
1918. Although not precisely defined by the law, the relations, in practice, between
the commissar and collegium were characterised by equality and collective decision-
making. In this particular dispute the sympathy of the higher authorities lay with the
collegium. The leadership felt that the Commissar had acted inappropriately in his
relations with the collegium by overturning its decision, and in the manner in which
he did this. The conflict came to be about more than just the issue of employment of
relatives. It grew into a significant consideration of the correct relationship between
commissar and collegium. This example is, of course, a single case study, and further
research is necessary to discover if, and for how long, the collegiality seen here is repre-
sentative of elsewhere in the Soviet state apparatus.

The decline of collegiality in the Peoples Commissariats, 1919


1920
By the start of 1919, as the Civil War intensified, the attention of the more practical-
minded Soviet leaders turned from centralising industrial and military administration, to
work on simplifying and improving the efficiency of the state apparatus. A reduction in
the size of the Commissariat collegia was carried out. For example, the collegium of the
Commissariat of Nationalities up to February 1918 had consisted of eight people, rising
to 16 people in July 1918. However, in September that year the number of collegium
members was reduced to 10 persons by Sovnarkom. Just over a year later, in December
1919, a further simplification of the state apparatus was carried out and the collegium
was reduced to just four people.116
Even at this stage of the Civil War, however, the collegial principle remained strong
in the party. In 1919, in opposition to bureaucratic excesses of the party leadership, the
Democratic Centralist faction emerged (including N. Osinskii, T. V. Sapronov and
V. M. Smirnov). The role of opposition to the introduction of one-man management
now fell to this minority of extreme idealists, who held to the anti-authoritarian prin-
ciples enunciated in the spring of 1918. These left-wing diehards set themselves deter-
minedly against the bureaucratic and dictatorial expedients which the Civil War impelled
most of the leadership to adopt. The Democratic Centralists kept alive a tradition of
struggle for the democratic aspect of the 1917 programme, but their objective of admin-
istrative democracy in government and economy ultimately proved chimerical in the
face of practical pressures for centralisation.
In December 1919, the 7th Congress of Soviets passed, as a routine matter, a res-
olution endorsing collegial management.117 However, Lenin, supported by Trotsky, was
preparing a stronger stand. They developed the argument that collegiality had been
important and necessary in the destruction of the old regime and the drawing of the
masses into construction of the new, but no longer suited current conditions which
required efficiency above all. In January 1920 Lenin defended the introduction of
one-man management as necessary for the next phase of Soviet building, stating that
the transition to practical work is connected with individual authority.118 Lenin
argued that the current debate on collegiality versus one-man management was being
conducted on too abstract a basis and ignored the urgent practical tasks of the
present time:
COLLEGIALITY IN THE PEOPLES COMMISSARIATS 19

Collegiality. . .gives huge waste of forces and does not allow speed and accountabil-
ity in work demanded by the conditions of centralized, large-scale industry. If you
take the defenders of collegiality, you see in their resolutions unmeasured, abstract
formulations that each member of a collegium must have sole responsibility for
execution of tasks. . . But each of you who has practical experience knows that in
reality this only applies to one of every hundred cases!119

Not all of the Bolsheviks were willing so quickly to sacrifice revolutionary principle for
practical efficiency. The Communist Fraction of the All-Russian Central Council of
Trade Unions considered the idea of one-man management as a breach of the basis of
workers democracy. At the 3rd All-Russian Congress of Economic Work Councils in
January 1920, V. P. Miliutin stood as a supporter of collegiality, arguing that it guaran-
teed the participation of workers in state administration. Lenins arguments did not per-
suade the majority of this Congress, which took a resolution confirming, as a rule, the
collegial form of administration.120
Throughout early 1920 the discussion developed further, drawing in a wide circle of
party, trade union and economic workers. V. V. Osinskii, T. V. Sapronov,
V. N. Maksimovskii, V. M. Smirnov, A. I. Rykov. M. P. Tomskii, A. S. Bubnov and
others all came out in defence of the principle of collegiality. Discussions in Moscow
spread south, mainly to the Ukraine, where supporters of collegiality found fruitful
ground for successful agitation against one-man management. At the Guberniia Party
Conference, the Kharkov Party Organisation took a resolution against one-man manage-
ment which was accepted by an overwhelming majority of votes.121 This pro-collegiality
trend was replicated by a significant number of delegates at the All-Ukrainian Party
Conference in 1920. Discussions of this topic unfolded at the conference in the
debates surrounding Stalins report On the next tasks of economic building. Here
T. V. Sapronov, V. Ia. Chubar and others stood against one-man management and
voting was split down the middle.122 Meanwhile, back in Moscow supporters of colle-
giality relied on the Moscow Guberniia Committee RKP(b) which was composed of
I. I. Minkov, V. G. Sorin, S. I. Polidorov and others, and on the Fraction of the Pre-
sidium of the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions.123
Before the 9th Party Congress of April 1920, Lenin launched an offensive on the
principle of collegiality, first at the 3rd All-Russian Congress of Workers of Water
Transport124 and then at the sitting of the Communist Fraction of the All-Russian
Central Council of Trade Unions of 15 March 1920,125 where disagreement reached
its height of intensity. In both cases Lenins theses were defeated. The Democratic Cen-
tralists were rallying and on 28 March 1920 the thesis On Collegiality and One Man
Management by Osinskii, Sapronov and Maksimovskii was published in Ekonomicheskaia
Zhizn.126
The Democratic Centralists held to the original anti-bureaucratic line. They were
dedicated to the observance of revolutionary principle in opposition to the expedience
promoted by Lenin and Trotsky. They spoke out on many occasions to protest the trend
towards centralisation and hierarchical authority in the party, the army, and industry,
and by early 1920 the state apparatus. Their ideals were local autonomy and adminis-
tration of every sort of activity by elected collegia. At the 9th Party Congress in
April 1920, Osinskii spoke against Trotskys scheme of militarisation as a violation of
basic revolutionary principles of democracy and collective decision-making:
20 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

There is no doubt that the collegium is an essential higher-level school of adminis-


tration. . . The collegium is the proper means to prepare workers for the most
responsible work and for completely taking over the state apparatus. . . Comrade
Lenin reproaches us here on the grounds that we approach the question of individual
authority vs. the collegial principle not in a practical way but purely in principle. . .
In the developed socialist system, when the division of labour and skill has been
abolished, the collegial principle will be essential for people to be able to replace
each other continuously in the organs of administration. . . We must not put the
question of the collegial principle vs. individual authority on a purely technical
plain and seek the absolute technical advantages of one form or another of admin-
istration. . . We must approach the matter from the social-political side. Then we
can reach concrete conclusions, including some less favourable to individual author-
ity. . .if you reduce the collegial principle to nothing in our institutions, bear in mind
that this signifies the downfall of the whole system of democratic centralism. . .we
will conduct an unyielding struggle against the principle of individual authority. . .
The ultimate tendency leads to setting up one-man rule in every link of the Soviet
apparatus. . . This means that once we take this path and go far enough on it, we will
collapse under the weight of bureaucracy. . .127

Osinskii described how the revolutionary principle of collegiality made for a revolution-
ary, socialist form of administration. The collegial system enabled, as Osinskii pointed
out, the realisation of the crucial principle of participation of the masses in adminis-
tration, as set out by Lenin in State and Revolution. At the 9th Party Congress in
April 1920, however, supporters of collegiality proved to be in the minority. The
theses of the Democratic Centralists were subjected to harsh criticism by Lenin, who
labelled them a complete theoretical distortion and argued that the collegial principle
was utopian, impractical and injurious.128 Trotsky backed up Lenins contention that
the collegial principle represented an outgrown phase of the revolution:

Collegial management. . .is an entirely natural reaction of a young, revolutionary,


recently oppressed class, which rejects the individual command of yesterdays
masters, bosses, commanders. . . But this is not the last word in building the
state economy of the working class.129

Thus, the 9th Party Congress was the beginning of the end of collegiality in state insti-
tutions, as well as the death knell for collective economic administration. Despite the
theses of the Democratic Centralists (Osinskii, Sapronov and V. N. Maksimovskii)
On the Collegial Principle and One Man Management, which argued that the collegial
principle was the strongest weapon against the growth of departmentalism and bureau-
cratic deadening of the Soviet apparatus, the thesis in favour of one-man management
was accepted as the resolution.130 The opposition made a last attempt to defend the
principle of collegiality with their proposed corrections to this resolution in favour of
reduced collegiality written by Rykov, and signed by Tomskii, Osinskii, Miliutin and
others. However, they were defeated when a majority of 314 delegates against 124
with eight abstainers voted it down.131
Following the defeat of the principle of collegiality at the 9th Party Congress in
April 1920, Sovnarkom established a commission to work on simplifying the state
COLLEGIALITY IN THE PEOPLES COMMISSARIATS 21

apparatus and thus reducing the role and authority of the Commisariat collegia in order
to improve their work.132 For many of those working towards improved efficiency in
the state apparatus, the blame for problems in the work of the commissariats lay in
that there were no properly defined limits to each workers responsibility.133 Krupskaia
bemoaned the fact that the question of collegiality and one-man management arose
because of the lack of delineation of the functions of the Commissar from the functions
of the collegium, the lack of delineation of the responsibility of the collegium of the
responsibility of the Commissar.134 She was included in the commission to reduce col-
legiality and increase efficiency in the Commissariats and recalled:

. . .when the question was raised of the necessity to increase the responsibility of
Peoples Commissars. . .having previously lain responsibility with the collegia. . .the
question of one-man management emerged. Ilich immediately included me as a
member of the commission which was set up to consider the question of the intro-
duction of one-man management into the commissariats, and said: It is necessary to
be vigilant, in order that one-man management. . .does not weaken the connection
with the masses.135

There was some disagreement among commission members over how to put these ideas
into practice. Krupskaia explained that:

When the question of collegiality and one-man management was considered in Sov-
narkom, one, amongst others, completely monstrous project was presented. It pro-
posed to abolish not only the collegium, but also the heads of departments, and keep
only the commissar and the technical staff, to whom the commissar would have to
give out direct tasks.136

Krupskaia herself took a softer line, arguing that it was necessary to create careful div-
ision of labour in the commissariat. . .with all staff collectively involved in order to
improve work.137 Ultimately, of course, the changes introduced undermined the collec-
tive authority of the collegia. The Commissariat collegia reverted to the status of advi-
sory councils under the control of the Commissar. By the time of the first USSR
constitution in January 1924 the move away from the collegial principle in the
supreme central state organs was clear. The constitution allowed for collegiality in
the process of consideration, but emphasised one-man management in taking and
executing decisions in the Peoples Commissariats. A key change detailed in the new
constitution was the process of composing the collegia. Members were no longer
elected from below and confirmed by Sovnarkom, as in the 1918 RSFSR Constitution.
Instead, now Sovnarkom appointed all collegium members from above.138 Effectively,
by the end of 1920, the pre-revolutionary ministerial set-up was reintroduced, as ideol-
ogy was sacrificed for efficiency.

Conclusions
In the earliest months of Soviet power there was a genuine attempt to reject the past and
to open a new era of administration marked by the collegial principle at the highest levels
22 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

of the state bureaucracy. The purpose of collegia was to revolutionise and de-bureaucra-
tise the state. It corresponded with the project to create a new type of state, a state in the
process of withering away, with mass involvement in administration based on the prin-
ciples of direct, participatory democracy. As outlined above, it involved drawing in
elected representatives of mass organisations as well as various experts into the collegia.
The period of the dominance of the collegia, however, was very brief. It was already
being questioned, in theory, by mid-1918 and had been dismantled, in practice, by
late 1920. The problems of efficient management of the state apparatus and economy
which beset the regime under the exigencies of civil war contributed to the decline
of collegiality, although it is doubtful whether even in more favourable circumstances
the system would have proved workable as the system suffered inherent problems.
It seems that the collegia system did not allow for decisive, clear decision-making
that corresponded to the wider interests of the state. First, it required the Commissar to
constantly defend his position, and to ward off attacks. Stalins frustration with the situ-
ation in the Commissariat of Nationalities well illustrates this problem. Elizarovs offer
of resignation, Avilovs conflict with his collegium, and the resignation of the Commissar
for Foodstuffs suggests that the system was impractical. It allowed all kinds of consider-
ations to intrude into the decision-making of the commissariats. Strong collegia
members were determined to assert themselves. Ideological divisions (e.g. the hardli-
ners in the Commissariat of Labour) quickly made themselves evident. It would be
naive to believe that in these collegial bodies everybody was dispassionately considering
the merit of proposals in the most objective manner.
In a wider sense, the internal weaknesses inside the collegia were an obstacle to the
efficient working of government as a whole, and in the demarcation of spheres of respon-
sibility. The collegia system influenced the relationship of the higher bodies (Sovnarkom,
VTsIK) and the commissariats, with factional disputes inside the collegia being carried
into Sovnarkom for arbitration or resolution. Finally, the divisions within the collegia
provided the basis for other interests to advance their case, including divergent interests
within the commissariat itself or interests outside the commissariat. This article provides
clear illustrations of this trend: the trade unions pressing their case within the collegia of
the Commissariat of Labour and the railway workers pressing their demands on the
Commissariat of Transport. The debate in the Commissariat of Labour on leave for
workers suggests a division between those who took the commissariats perspective
(Shliapnikov) and those who took a trade unionist perspective (Nogin).
The collegial system assumed that all would address objectively the question of the
general good, but in reality it showed that individual, group and sectional interests
came to the fore very quickly. Thus, it might be argued that the collegial model of
administration was flawed from the outset. It revealed a naive understanding of the
way decision-making is conducted in any organisation and the inexperience of most of
those involved in administration. The attempt to implement collegiality in the state
bureaucracy reflected certain ideological assumptions about how administration
would be different under socialism, and a perhaps utopian belief that democratic prin-
ciples could and should be applied wherever possible.
Indeed, most scholars who have examined collegial leadership have been inclined to
stress its limitations, and even its obsolescence as a mode of governance in complex
modern societies.139 Max Weber, for example, concluded that collegiality is fundamen-
tally at odds with the principles of rational bureaucratic organisation, arguing that it
COLLEGIALITY IN THE PEOPLES COMMISSARIATS 23

unavoidably diminishes the promptness of decision, the unity of leadership, the clear
responsibility of the individual, and the absolute disregard of external influence and
the maintenance of internal discipline.140 Therefore, according to Weber, while colle-
giality in purely advisory bodies may be expected to persist indefinitely, the collegial
sharing of decisional authority is anachronistic and must give way to the technical super-
iority of monocratic organisation.141
Nevertheless, some scholars have argued in defence of collegial systems. Bernard
Silberman, working from the Japanese case, has shown that the collegial approach to
power management is useful when powerful bureaucratic or patriarchal elites confront
unprecedented problems.142 Thomas Baylis has also provided a positive interpretation
of collegial government, while acknowledging that they tend to take more time to reach
decisions. He refuted Webers assertion that collegial decision-making is obsolete in
modern government, arguing instead that collegial leadership remains fully consistent
with modern bureaucracy in a number of settings. . .where bureaucracies are strong,
favour a technocratic style and are intimately associated with interest groups in
decision-making through neo-corporatist arrangements.143 He also points to some posi-
tive effects of collective decision-making: a greater range of information and a larger
number of options are apt to be considered in the groups deliberations, and the
decisions reached may be more widely accepted and efficiently executed.144 Yet, as
Weber puts it: Collegiality is a means of limiting monocratic authority rather than pro-
moting efficiency.145 This certainly seems to have been the case in theory and in practice
in the early Commissariat collegia. The revolutionary, utopian desire to move away
from the ministerial system of centralised, hierarchical control by single individuals ulti-
mately proved too inefficient in the prevailing urgent conditions. The collegiality
observed here in the Commissariat collegia should be viewed in conjunction with
those other democratic, utopian ventures of the immediate post-Revolutionary honey-
moon period (democratic administration in the military and workers control in indus-
try) which were gradually sacrificed by the Bolshevik leadership in the face of the
pressure of practical realities.
In light of the recently reignited debate on the transition from the early revolution-
ary democracy of 1917 1918 to the hierarchical, centralised one-party dictatorship that
followed, and the respective roles of ideology versus circumstance in the develop-
ment of the Bolshevik regime, this research suggests evidence towards the latter. It
seems that it was developing circumstances and responses to them rather than a pre-
conceived Bolshevik ideology of dictatorial methods that led Soviet leaders to abandon
the experiment of collective decision-making in the state apparatus.146 While Lenin
cloaked his changing views on collegiality in the ideological rhetoric of the phases of
socialist building, it seems that the pragmatic necessity to improve government effi-
ciency and performance was the real driving force behind the Bolshevik leaderships
move away from the early utopian, democratic spirit of the revolution and one of its
defining principles: collegiality.

Notes
1. L. Kritsman, Geroicheskii period velikoi russkoi revoliutsii (1926), quoted in Daniels, The
Conscience of the Revolution, 108.
24 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

2. Shliapnikov, Vospominaniia, Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia, 26.


3. For example see Heinzen, Inventing a Soviet Countryside and Rowney and Huskey,
Russian Bureaucracy and the State Officialdom.
4. Rigby, Lenins Government, 245.
5. Heinzen, Inventing a Soviet Countryside, 9.
6. Gimpelson, Formirovanie sovetskogo politicheskoi sistemy; Gimpelson, Rabochii klass v
upravlenii sovetskim gosudarstvom; Gimpelson, Stanovlenie i evoliutsiia sovetskogo gosu-
darstvennogo apparata upravleniia; Gorodetskii, Rozhdenie sovetskogo gosudarstva; Goro-
detskii, ed., Stroitelstvo sovetskogo gosudarstva:, Iroshnikov, K voprosu o slome
burzhuaznoi gosudarstvennoi mashiny v Rossii, pp. 54 55 in Tokarev, Problemy
Gosudarstvennogo stroitelstva; Iroshnikov, Osushchestvlenie mechty. V.I. Lenin i gosudarstv
sovetov; Iroshnikov, Sozdanie sovetskogo tsentralnogo gosudarstvennogo apparata; Kore-
nevskaia, Stanovlenie vysshikh organov sovetskogo gosudarstvennogo upravleniia; Carr,
The Bolshevik Revolution 1917 23; Pietsch, Revolution und Staat; Hough and
Fainsod, How the Soviet Union is Governed.
7. Uldricks, Diplomacy and Ideology; Makarova, Narodnyi Komissariat po delam natsional-
nostei RSFSR; Rees, State Control in Soviet Russia 1920 34.
8. Orlovsky, State Building in the Civil War Era,198; Heinzen, Inventing a Soviet Coun-
tryside, 16 22. This continuity view is also seen in Rowney and Huskey, Russian
Bureaucracy and the State Officialdom, 23.
9. Rigby, Lenins Government, 12.
10. See Fitzpatrick, The Commissariat of Enlightenment; Rabinowitch, The Bolsheviks in
Power, 19.
11. Davitnidze, Kollegii ministerstv.
12. Gribanov, K istorii razvitiia edinonachaliia i kollegialnosti v narodnyk komissaria-
takh, 61 69.
13. Davitnidze, Kollegii ministerstv, 33.
14. Quoted in Rigby, Lenins Government, 45.
15. Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution, 322.
16. Quoted in Rigby, Lenins Government, 4.
17. Krupskaia, Vospominaniia o Lenine, 338 39.
18. Krupskaia, Vospominaniia o Lenine, 339 40.
19. Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsialno-Politicheskoi Istorii (RGASPI) f. 5
(Lenins Secretariat), op. 1, d. 1806, l. 69.
20. RGASPI f. 5, op. 1, d. 1806, l. 34.
21. RGASPI f. 5, op. 1, d. 1806, l. 36.
22. Shliapnikov in Vospominaniia, 28.
23. Dekrety sovetskoi vlasti (hereafter DSV), vol. 1, 59 63 (Decree on Education).
24. See Decree on Commissariat of Paths of Communication, DSV, vol. 2, 18 19.
25. See minutes of Central Committee sitting December 1918 RGASPI f. 17 (Central
Committee of the Russian Communist Party, Bolsheviks), op. 3, d. 7, l. 2: On
the work of the collegia and commissariats, to revive the work of the collegia by
the introduction to them of outstanding local workers from corresponding sections
of local soviets. . .Recognise that the work undertaken in this direction by Internal
Affairs is correct.
26. RGASPI f. 5 (Lenins Secretariat), op. 1, d. 1806, l. 25.
27. Lenin, State and Revolution, 37.
28. Vestnik Narodnogo Komissariata Truda nos. 2 3 (1918): 27 28.
COLLEGIALITY IN THE PEOPLES COMMISSARIATS 25

29. Sorenson, The Life and Death of Soviet Trade Unionism, 79.
30. Vtoroi Vserossiiskii sezd professionalnykh soiuzov, 16 25 ianvaria 1919g., Stenografi-
cheskii otchet, 10.
31. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 112.
32. DSV, vol. 2, 556 57.
33. The Decree on the Title of Peoples Commissar of 27 July 1918 reads: the title of
Peoples Commissar belongs to one person only, confirmed by the VTsIK and appear-
ing as a member of Sovnarkom, and nobody else can appropriate this title. This
decree suggests that multiple members of the collegium had been sharing the title
between them. Multiple representatives of commissariats turning up at the sittings
of Sovnarkom had disrupted the continuity of its work. This testifies to the spirit
of collegiality and equality within the commissariats. DSV, vol. 3, 101.
34. DSV, vol. 1, 20 21.
35. See Shliapnikovs recollections on the setting up of the Commissariat of Labour: To
the Commission for Labour, or the collegium as it is now called, were appointed the
following persons. In Vospominaniia, 26.
36. DSV, vol, 2, p. 489 and vol. 3, 310.
37. Although the Bolsheviks claimed to want to equalise pay among all levels of employ-
ees and workers, in fact within a short period they had begun to develop very
complex wage scales and ranks in government institutions. See the chart on
Tariffs of Pay of the Work of Employees of Central State Institutions in Gosudarst-
vennyi Arkhiv Rossiskoi Federatsii (GARF) f. 4085 (RSFSR Rabkrin 1917 23),
op. 1, d. 8, ll. 1 6.
38. DSV, vol. 2, 18.
39. DSV, vol. 2, 18 19.
40. Brovkin, The Mensheviks After October, 91 94.
41. Ibid., 91 94.
42. Ibid., 91 94.
43. Ibid., 91 94.
44. Shliapnikov, Vospominaniia, 26.
45. Pestkovskii cited in Trotsky, On Stalin, 255 62.
46. Trotsky, On Stalin, 255 62.
47. Sovnarkom sitting of 7 January 1918 in Amiantov, ed., Protokoly zasedanii Soveta Nar-
odnikh Komissarov RSFSR, 191.
48. GARF f. r 4085, op. 1, d. 10, l. 184.
49. RGASPI f. 5, op. 1, d. 2663, l. 19.
50. GARF f. 130 (RSFSR Sovnarkom 1917 23), op. 2, d. 11, l. 9.
51. Amiantov, ed., Protokoly, 21 24.
52. Amiantov, ed., Protokoly, 221.
53. Ibid., 339.
54. Ibid., 184.
55. GARF f. 130, op. 2, d.1 (2), l. 191. On 1 April Sovnarkom transferred this ques-
tion to a commission of representatives from the commissariats of Internal Affairs,
Labour and Finance entrusted to work out the question and present a report on it
in Sovnarkom. The following day Sovnarkom, having heard the report of this com-
mission, proposed to Transfer this issue to a commission made up of five members
of the VTsIK. Entrust the commission to present the assessment of the
26 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

organisation of state control, and to send the project for implementation to the
collegium.
56. For collegiality in Red Army see Collins, The Russian Red Guard of 1917 and
Lenins Utopia; Erickson, The Origins of the Red Army; Erickson, Some Military
and Political Aspects of the Militia Army Controversy; Footman, Civil War in
Russia; Schapiro, The Birth of the Soviet Army. On Workers Control see:
Avrich, The Bolshevik Revolution and Workers Control in Russian Industry;
Brinton, The Bolsheviks and Workers Control; Chauvrier, Controle ouvrier et autoges-
tion sauvage en Russie; Farber, Before Stalinism; Gimpelson, On Workers Control
after the Passage of the Decree Nationalizing Industry; Goodey, Factory Commit-
tees and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in 1918; Husband, Workers Control
and Centralization in the Russian Revolution; Kaplan, Bolshevik Ideology and the
Ethics of Soviet Labour; Perrins, Rabkrin and Workers Control in Russia, 1917
34; Rosenberg, Workers and Workers Control in the Russian Revolution; Scha-
piro, The Origin of the Communist Autocracy.
57. Lenin, Sochineniia, 3rd ed., XXII, 41.
58. Daniels, Conscience of the Revolution, 104 10.
59. Lenin, Sochineniia, vol. XXIII, 430.
60. Lenin, Sochineniia, vol. XXIII, 447 48.
61. For background biographical information on Shliapnikov see Holmes, Soviet Rewrit-
ing of 1917: The Case of Alexander Shliapnikov.
62. See Reed, Ten Days that Shook the World, 232 and Shliapnikov memoir article below.
63. Shliapnikov, Vospominaniia, 28: Of all the government institutions the Peoples
Commissariat of Labour was organised first. See also GARF f. 382 (RSFSR
Peoples Commissariat of Labour), op. 1, dd. 10 1.
64. GARF f. 382, op. 1, d. 19, l. 113 2.
65. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 44, 95.
66. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 42, 63 66, 98, 128, 143, vol. 36, 520 23.
67. For background biographical information on Nogin see Arkhangelskii, Nogin: zhizn
zamechatelnikh lyudei.
68. GARF f. 130, op. 2, d. 1 (2), l. 233.
69. GARF f. 382, op. 1, d. 19, ll.. 111 68.
70. DSV, vol 3, 104 06.
71. GARF f. 382, op. 1, d 19, l. 88.
72. GARF f. 382, op. 1, d 19, ll. 92 88.
73. GARF f. 382, op. 1, d. 9, l. 85
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. GARF f. 382, op. 1, d. 3, l. 65.
77. Ibid., l. 66.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. GARF f. 382, op. 1, d. 9, l. 65.
83. Ibid., l. 64
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
COLLEGIALITY IN THE PEOPLES COMMISSARIATS 27

86. Ibid., l. 64.


87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid., l. 64 ob.
91. Ibid., l. 64 ob.
92. Ibid., l. 57.
93. Ibid., l. 56.
94. Ibid., l. 55.
95. One of the relatives reinstated illegally to the Commissariat staff by Shliapnikov.
96. Ibid., l. 56.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid., l. 51.
99. Ibid., l. 51.
100. GARF f. 130, op. 2, d. 11, l .15.
101. GARF f. 130, op. 2, d. 11, l. 15
102. GARF f. 130, op. 2, d. 11, l. 15
103. GARF f. 130, op. 2, d. 11, l. 15.
104. Ibid.
105. GARF f. 130, op. 2, d. 11, l. 15.
106. GARF f. 382, op. 1, d. 9, ll. 51 40.
107. RGASPI f. 17, op. 2, d. 2, ll. 1 2.
108. Ibid., l. 2.
109. RGASPI f. 17, op. 2, d. 3, l. 1.
110. Ibid., l. 2.
111. RGASPI f. 19 (Sovnarkom and STO RSFSR), op. 1, d. 205, l. 1. The Sovnarkom
minutes read: 4. Announcement of Nogin on his leaving the collegium of the
Peoples Commissariat of labour in view of his entering Vesenkha. 5. Appointment
as Peoples Commissar for Labour (instead of Shliapnikov) of Comrade Shmidt. Sver-
dlov suggested it, send for confirmation to VTsIK. 6. Appointment of Radus-Zenko-
vich as Deputy Peoples Commissar for Labour.
112. GARF f. 382, op. 1, d. 9, ll. 45 10.
113. Ibid., l. 20.
114. See Nogin still participating in Sovnarkom sittings in May and June 1919: RGASPI
f. 130, op. 3, dd. 39, 40, 42, 47.
115. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 44, 170. However, even in this remote location Shliapnikov
still managed to get himself into a conflict with fellow organisers in the Gubkom of the
CP of Astrakhan (Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 44, 170).The Central Committee got
wind of this and on 19 December Shliapnikovs new conflict was discussed at its
sitting: From communications with Trotsky it emerges that a conflict has arisen
between Shliapnikov and Bosh from one side, and Zaks from the other. It has
emerged that Bosh has already left for Moscow so that the conflict has been liquidated.
Concerning the future, it was decided that in the case of the emergence of conflict to
allow Trotsky to decide the question and summon Shliapnikov from Astrakhan through
the CC. In the end, however, this was not necessary and Shliapnikov remained in Astra-
khan until at least February 1919. (Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 44, 193). Further cor-
respondence reveals that Shliapnikov was back in Moscow by April 1921 at the latest
(Lenin, CW, vol. 45, 114), but that Lenin was dissuaded from appointing him to certain
28 REVOLUTIONARY RUSSIA

positions in the government because of his heavy-handedness. In one note of this period
Lenin wrote, in relation to a government appointment, that Shliapnikov will not
do. . .great tact is essential (Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 45, 253).
116. DSV, vol.7, 48 49.
117. Daniels, Conscience of the Revolution, 108.
118. V. . Lenin, speech to 3rd All-Russian Congress of Economic Work Councils, January
1920 in Lenin, Sochineniia, vol. XXV, 17.
119. Lenin, Speech to the 3rd All-Russian Congress of Economic Work Councils, January
1920, in Lenin, Sochineniia, vol. XXV, 17 19.
120. Ibid.
121. V. I. Lenin, Sochineniia, 5th ed., vol. XXXX, 378.
122. Ibid., 378.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid.
126. Ekonomicheskaia Zhizn, no. 63, 28 March 1920, 3.
127. Deviaty sezd RKP(b). Protokoly, 115 27.
128. Deviaty sezd RKP(b), 150 55.
129. Trotsky, Dictatorship vs Democracy, 115, 161.
130. Deviaty sezd, 410 11.
131. Ibid., 204.
132. Krupskaia, Sistema Teilora i organizatsiia raboty sovetskikh uchrezhdenii, 140 5.
133. Ibid., 140 141.
134. Ibid.
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid., 140 45.
138. 1924 USSR Constitution, articles 56 and 57 in Unger, Constitutional Development in the
USSR, 70.
139. Baylis, Governing by Committee, 3.
140. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, 392 407.
141. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, 392 407. Baylis, Governing by
Committee, 156. This negative characterisation of collegiality in modern political
systems seems to be confirmed by the rarity of collegial government in practice.
Baylis highlights that in modern history, Switzerland is the only nation in which
both formal and de facto collegial leadership have persisted. . .over an extended
and uninterrupted period of time, now some 140 years (Baylis, 21). While
Bayliss case study of collegial leadership in the Swiss political system demonstrates
that it is not impossible for a system of this type to survive, it also highlights specific
features that allow it to occur: the political culture and social peculiarities of Swit-
zerland provide a highly favourable setting for collegial government: in particular the
cross-cutting pluralism of language, religion and class, and its strong institutional tra-
ditions. Moreover, its relative economic success (i.e. its leading position in inter-
national finance and large foreign investment) make collegiality possible as the
affluent Swiss are able to tolerate inefficiencies in policy-making. If these are the
necessary conditions for successful collegial administration, then it seems that its
chances of survival in the conditions of the early Soviet period were very slim.
Baylis, Governing by Committee, 32 33.
COLLEGIALITY IN THE PEOPLES COMMISSARIATS 29

142. Cited in Rowney, Transition to Technocracy, 10.


143. Baylis, Governing by Committee, 156.
144. Ibid., 156.
145. Weber, Theory of Social and Economic Organizations, 329 41.
146. For an outline of the debate see Smith, Year One in Petrograd.

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