Building Trust

The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science
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Nurturing Collaborative Relations: Building Trust in Interorganizational Collaboration

Siv Vangen and Chris Huxham
Journal of Applied Behavioral Science 2003; 39; 5
DOI: 10.1177/0021886303039001001
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10.1177/0021886303253179
THE
Vangen,
JOURNAL
HuxhamOF
ARTICLE / NURTURING
APPLIED BEHAVIORAL
COLLABORATIVE
SCIENCEMarch
RELATIONS
2003
Nurturing Collaborative Relations

Building Trust in Interorganizational Collaboration
Siv Vangen
Open University Business School
Chris Huxham
University of Strathclyde Graduate School of Business
Many organizations aspire to gain collaborative advantage by working in partnerships

across organizational, sectoral, and even national boundaries. Such collaborations, how-
ever, are difficult to manage, and the likelihood of disappointing outputs is high. To create
advantage, practitioners need to engage in a continuous process of nurturing the collabo-
rative processes. One issue that appears significant in the nurturing process is trust. This
article incorporates a synthesis of research on trust with research on other aspects of col-
laboration. It develops a trust-building loop and examines its validity to inform practice.
It argues that trust building is problematic and that management of trust implies both the
ability to cope in situations where trust is lacking and the ability to build trust in situations
where this is possible. It summarizes pragmatic implications in a tool for thinking about
and addressing trust management in different collaborative situations.
Keywords: collaboration; collaborative advantage; trust; alliances; interorganizational

relations
Working collaboratively across organizational, sectoral, and even national bound-

aries is now a popular component of organizational life. Collaborative responses to
social problems, for example, are now fairly common throughout the world (e.g.,
Axinn & Axinn, 1997; Hardy & Phillips, 1998; Mandell, 2001). The aim is usually to
deal more effectively with major issues that sit in the organizations inter-organizational
THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE, Vol. 39 No. 1, March 2003 5-31
DOI: 10.1177/0021886303253179
2003 NTL Institute

6 THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE March 2003
domain (Trist, 1983) and that cannot be tackled by any organization acting alone.
Increasingly, therefore, the cooperation between public, private, and voluntary sector
organizations for the benefit of the public at large is demanded (Glaister, 1999; Hud-
son, Hardy, Henwood, & Wistow, 1999). Similarly, corporate demands have led to a
large number of organizations being engaged in international joint ventures, strategic
alliances, or other forms of interorganizational relations (e.g., Fryxell, Dooley, &
Vryza, 2002; Inkpen & Li, 1999). Although being initiated for different reasons
(Spekman, Forbes, Isabella, & MacAvoy, 1998), here, too, the usual general aspiration
is the achievement of some form of collaborative advantage (Huxham, 1996). Evi-
dence suggests, however, that collaboration imposes huge demands on those entering
into it (Gould, Ebers, & Clinchy, 1999; Huxham & Vangen, 2000c) and that the likeli-
hood of disappointing outputs and failures is high (Bleeke & Ernst, 1993; Medcof,
1997; Reuer, 1998).
Much research has been directed at gaining an understanding of the challenges fac-
ing those involved in interorganizational collaboration. Contributions are based on a
wide range of theoretical perspectives including corporate, social, economical, institu-
tional, and political (Gray & Wood, 1991) and cover a range of collaborative relations
including, for example, public-private partnerships, industrial networks, and strategic
alliances (Child & Faulkner, 1998; Genefke & McDonald, 2001). Some focus on the
management of collaborative processes in general (Kanter, 1994), and others focus
specifically on improving the chances of success (Dacin, Hitt, & Levitas, 1997; Das &
Teng, 1998; Gray, 1985). Some have concluded that considerable efforts are required
to nurture collaborative relations through their early stages (Carley & Christie, 1992;
Wistow & Hardy, 1991). Our own research suggests, as we have argued elsewhere, that
the typically ambiguous, complex, and dynamic structure of collaborations presents
challenges that require practitioners to engage in a continuous process of nurturing
(Huxham & Vangen, 2000c).
Collaboration gives rise to a variety of issues causing concern and anxiety for man-
agers (Huxham & Vangen, 1996), and hence a range of different factors is integral to
the success of collaboration. The issue of trust in particular has been reported repeat-
edly to be significant and hence important in the nurturing of collaborative processes.
Indeed, literatures across the fields of psychology, economics, sociology, and organi-
zational sciences focus on trust in the contexts of both intra- and interorganizational
collaboration. These contributions offer a host of extremely diverse conceptualiza-
tions and interpretations, and several recent contributions have aimed to provide an
overview of, and synthesize theories on, trust (see, for example, Kramer & Tyler, 1996;
Lane & Bachmann, 1998; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Sitkin, Rousseau, Burt,
& Camerer, 1998).
The many participants with whom we have worked are too numerous to mention, but we would like to regis-
ter our thanks to them all.
Dr. Siv Vangen is a lecturer in management at The Open University Business School.
Dr. Chris Huxham is a professor of management at the University of Strathclyde Graduate School of
Business.

Vangen, Huxham / NURTURING COLLABORATIVE RELATIONS 7
Although some contributions take a managerial perspective and begin to address

the implications of trust issues on management practice, few do so while considering
specifically the theory and hence complexity of interorganizational collaborations.
Our own focus is on the provision of practice-oriented theory into the management of
trust in interorganizational collaborations, which is in contrast to most other contribu-
tions. The article aims to achieve this through the synthesis of research on trust in
interorganizational collaboration with research on other aspects of collaboration. The
article thus contributes to practice-oriented theory on collaboration (Gray, 1989;
Huxham, 1996; Osborn & Hagedoorn, 1997; Waddock, 1989) with a particular focus
on how to manage and build trust in this context.
METHODOLOGY
This research forms part of a program that has been ongoing since the late 1980s
and that is concerned with the development of practice-oriented theory into the man-
agement of interorganizational collaboration (see, e.g., Huxham, 1993, 1996; Huxham
& Vangen, 1996, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2001; Vangen, 1995, 1998; Vangen &
Huxham, 1998, in press). It has involved us as researchers in intervening in a large
number of collaborations concerned with a wide variety of issues including health
issues, economic area regeneration, and poverty alleviation. During these interven-
tions, the expressed experiences, views, action-centered dilemmas, and actual actions
of participants have been recorded as research data in a variety of ways including
detailed notes, flipcharts, cognitive and cause maps, and video and tape recordings.
This amounts to a vast quantity of data on many different aspects of collaboration.
Theory development has been emergent, firmly grounded in, and produced induc-
tively from the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). In this article, we draw specifically on
some of the theory developed via this program, as outlined below.
One key theoretical thrust of this research program has been the development of
themes in collaboration (Huxham & Vangen, 1996; Vangen, 1998)these are in
vivo labels (Glaser, 1992; Strauss & Corbin, 1998) given to a broad grouping of issues
raised repeatedly by practitioners as causing anxiety or reward in collaboration. The
collaboration themes as such represent generic collaboration issues typically of con-
cern to practitioners and have therefore guided our focus in the development of
practice-oriented theory. The theme labels include aims and objectives, accountabil-
ity, commitment and determination, compromise, appropriate working processes,
communication, democracy and inclusiveness (membership), trust, and power. A
research aim has been, and continues to be, to develop a deeper understanding of the
issues underlying each of the themes as well as the interrelationship between them. In
this article, our main focus is on developing conceptualizations on trust, as described
below.
In contrast to other themes on collaboration, the literature on trust is very diverse
and voluminous. This rendered inappropriate our normal approach, which is to
develop theory from naturally occurring data only (Marshall & Rossman, 1989). Here,
we considered the literature as an additional source of data from which insight about

the management of trust could be drawn inductively. Furthermore, an initial scan of

this literature suggested that power (e.g., Calton & Lad, 1995; Lane & Bachmann,
1998) and control (e.g., Das & Teng, 1998; Gulati, 1998; Sitkin et al., 1998) are con-
cepts perceived as being closely related to trust, so specific considerations of these
should be part of our analysis in as far as they related directly to trust. As such, we
explicitly integrated literature on trust with data sources from our own research and
with the collaboration theory developed and published previously as part of the overall
research program. Using this approach, we developed theory on the management of
trust in collaboration via three distinct yet interlinked activities in a developmental and
iterative process, as described below.
A first activity was a thorough scanning of the literature on trust in collaboration. A
highly methodological analytical method was adopted with the view to seeking insight
about the management of trust in interorganizational collaboration that could aid the
development of practice-oriented theory. During the review, several hundred state-
ments, concepts, and ideas identified as having possible implications for practice were
captured onto post-it notes and grouped into clusters of similar issues. Following sev-
eral iterations, five large clusters were identified. These were labeled expectation
forming, risk, trust, cyclical development, and trust building. Figure 1 shows examples
in each of these clusters. We conceptualized and summarized these insights in a
modelthe trust-building loopthat suggests that trust building is a cyclical process
and that with each positive outcome, trust builds on itself incrementally, over time, in a
virtuous circle (this is discussed below, in the section headed The Cyclical Aspect of
Trust Building). Our working definition of trust, as such, is embedded in this trust-
building loop.
A second activity entailed a thorough scanning of our own empirical data of actual
statements made by practitioners during interventions with the aim of isolating state-
ments including the words trust, power, and control. Statements made in the same
breath as those on trust, power, and control also were identified to explore possible
links and gain a better understanding of context. In a similar fashion to that illustrated
in Figure 1, all statements were then grouped into clusters of similar ideas, which
helped to provide an initial understanding of the key issue as perceived by practitio-
ners. Many of these actual statements as well as snapshots of stories as told by practi-
tioners are used as examples throughout the article. This analysis showed that although
practitioners do not provide much spontaneous elaboration on trust, the majority
argues that trust is an essential ingredient for successful collaboration and usually that
they perceive a lack of trust in their own collaborative situations.
Although the literature touches on issues that may hamper trust buildingfor
example, the extent to which a contract helps or hinders trust buildingthe analysis of
practitioners views was particularly helpful in identifying factors that hamper trust
building. It was concluded that trust cannot be built in isolation of any other key vari-
ables and that trust building requires investment of time and careful consideration of
other key issues including the management of purpose, power imbalances, credit shar-
ing, the need for leadership while not allowing anyone to take over, and so on (this is
discussed below in the section headed Trust in the Practice of Collaboration). The third
analytical activity undertaken therefore was concerned specifically with how to facili-

Trust Trust building Risk Expectation Cyclical
forming development
(examples) (examples) (examples) (examples) (examples)
trust is a means of coping communication and proactive trust is a mechanism to trust is about developing trust develops gradually as
with uncertainty (Butler & Gill, information exchange form yet reduce risk (Lane & Bachmann, commitmentof giving and the parties move from one
1995) another tactic to boost trust 1998) taking in the future on the stage to another (Lewicki &
among partners (Das & Teng, promise that something will be Bunker, 1996)
trust is one of three primary 1998) risk can be seen as an forthcoming in return (Vansina
control mechanisms which opportunity to build trust et al, 1998) I trust because you trust
govern economic transactions the building of trust requires (Lyson & Metha, 1996) (McAllister, 1995)
between firms (Bradach & a willingness to communicate trust enables actors to
Eccles, 1989) over a range of issues (Webb, most definitions of trust mutually establish specific where trust does not exist, it
1991) regard risk as the core of expectations about their may emerge from formal and
trust is an enabling conditions trust (Das & Teng, 1998) future behaviours (Lane and informal processes of
which facilitates the formation making adaptations according Backmann, 1998) transacting (Ring, 1997)
of ongoing networks (Ring, to the partnership is an a type of expectation that
1997) effective way to develop trust alleviates the fear that ones prior alliances between firms trust begets trust (Creed &
(Das & Teng, 1998) exchange partners will act is likely to produce trust Miles, 1996)
a certain minimum level of opportunistically (Gulati, 1991) (Zucker, 1986)
interfirm trust is build trust through ambiguous when one trusting act is
indispensable for any strategic goals with modest trust is a risky investment as trust is based on reciprocated by another,
alliance to be formed and to expectations rather than clear it extrapolates from available expectations embedded in the gradually a durable basis for
function (Das & Teng, 1998) goals with high expectations info (Luhmann, 1979) history of trust (Calton & Lad, co-operation can be erected
(Butler & Gill, 1997) 1995) (Axelrod, 1984)
some trust is required to in order to develop trust, one
initiate collaboration (Webb, building up trust implies an needs to take a risk first a trust relationship is only through ongoing interaction,
1991) investment in the time (Strickland, 1958 in Das & possible if specific firms can learn about each
dimension of relationships Teng, 1998) expectations can be formed in other and develop trust
trust counteracts fear of (Murakami and Rohlen, 92) one hand and fulfilled on the (Shapiro, 1987)
opportunistic behaviour other (Koenig & van Wijk,
(Gulati, 1998) communication helps to build 1993) inter-firm trust is
trust because it provides the incrementally built as firms
basis for continued interaction ones belief and expectation repeatedly interact (Gulati,
(Leifer & Mills, 1996) about the likelihood of having a 1992)
desirable action performed by
the trustee (Das and Teng,
1998)
FIGURE 1: Managing Trust: Sample Insight From the Literature

9
tate trust building in a cyclical process while paying attention to issues that tend to
hamper trust building. We picked up on practitioners views on trust building and
examined the value of the trust-building loop as a pragmatic tool. Our vehicle for this
analysis was previous conceptualizations pertaining to structural features of collabo-
ration and related dynamics, leadership, management of purpose, and power (Huxham
& Vangen, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c; Vangen & Huxham, in press). We also drew heavily
on other researchers conceptualizations, in particular with regard to power. This
resulted in the identification of some lessons for the management of trust that can help
influence effectiveness in the practice of collaboration as discussed below in the sec-
tion headed The Cyclical Trust-Building Process in Practice.
The process of building these conceptualizations into a coherent set of arguments
has involved cycling through these activities while drafting and redrafting the article,
circulating drafts for comment, presenting the arguments at academic conferences,
and using them with practitioners in action research interventions. The arguments to
be presented below thus have been subjected to wide-ranging scrutiny and refined
accordingly. The remainder of this article reflects this process. It begins with the con-
ceptualizations that draw explicitly on the literature on trust, followed by conceptual-
izations based on practitioners perceptions. The last section builds further on these
two sections and interacts simultaneously with the theory on collaboration with the
aim to make a specific contribution to this theory about the management of trust.
THE CYCLICAL ASPECT OF TRUST BUILDING
This section is concerned with the identification of lessons for the management of
trust drawn from the literature on trust in interorganizational collaboration. The litera-
ture suggests that three conceptualizations concerned with expectation forming, risk
taking, and vulnerability are particularly relevant and fundamental to the management
of trust, as discussed below.
Theories on trust are based on the notion of interdependence between the party who
trusts and the party who is trusted (Dasgupta, 1988; Luhmann, 1979). Therefore, it is
argued that trust is best understood in terms of the ability to form expectations about
aims and partnersfuture behaviors in relation to those aims. A necessary condition for
trust is thus that expectations can be formed on one hand and fulfilled on the other
(Barber, 1983; Butler & Gill, 1995; Gulati, 1995; Hardy, Phillips, & Lawrence, 1998;
Koenig & van Wijk, 1993; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; Sitkin et al.,
1998). The ability to form expectations can be interpreted from both future-oriented
and historical perspectives. Thus, creation of trust can be rooted either in anticipation
that something will be forthcoming (Brigham & Corbett, 1996; Butler & Gill, 1995;
Lane & Bachmann, 1996; Lyson & Mehta, 1996; Vansina, Taillieu, & Schruijer, 1998)
or on common past satisfactory experiences (Calton & Lad, 1995; Das & Teng, 1998;
Gulati, 1995; Koenig & van Wijk, 1993; Luhmann, 1979; Zucker, 1986).
When trust is rooted in anticipation, it is argued that developing understanding of
partners expectations is crucial at the formation stage of the partnership (Butler &

Gill, 1995; Vansina et al., 1998). Future-based trust as such is gained through agree-
ments, made in the early stages of a collaboration, in which trust serves as a substitute
for formal contracts (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Gulati, 1995). In the language of game
theory, trust based on previous experiences may be seen as deriving from a repeated
game (Axelrod, 1984; Miller, 1992). This type of trust, deriving out of repeated inter-
actions over time between those who trust and those who are trusted, has been referred
to as relational trust (Rousseau et al., 1998), affective trust (McAllister, 1995), and
identity-based trust (Coleman, 1990). Historically rooted trust also can be based on
a potential partners reputation in the market place (Ring, 1997) or on other social
structures (Burt & Knez, 1996). This kind of trust, which is based on credible infor-
mation regarding the intentions or competence of another (Barber, 1983), has been
described as calculus-based (Rousseau et al., 1998).
The concept of risk (Coleman, 1990; Das & Teng, 1998; Granovetter, 1985; Ring,
1997, Rotter, 1967; Rousseau et al., 1998) or, more specifically, the fear that a partner
will act opportunistically (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992, 1994) is seen as central to the
notion of trust. Closely associated with this is the notion of vulnerability, which relates
to the trustor being dependent on the trustee to deliver (Gambetta, 1988; Mishra,
1996). The act of trusting is the willingness to assume that a partner will bear the vul-
nerability stemming from the acceptance of risk. In economic transactions, for exam-
ple, sanctions may be put in place to guard against opportunistic behavior. Deterrence-
based trust is described as a form of trust that may derive when such sanctions have
been put in place (Rousseau et al., 1998).
On one hand, it is argued that the creation of trust implies taking a risk (Lewis &
Weigert, 1985; Luhmann, 1988), whereas on the other hand, the existence of trust is
seen as a mechanism to reduce the risk of opportunistic behavior (Bradach & Eccles,
1989; Lane & Bachmann, 1996; Lyson & Metha 1996; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992).
Thus, trust and risk form a reciprocal relationship. Trust leads to risk taking, and pro-
viding that initial expectations materialize, risk taking in turn buttresses a sense of trust
(Coleman, 1990; Das & Teng, 1998). Collaborations are argued to be particularly risky
ventures (Butler & Gill, 1995; Das & Teng, 1998), so some trust is required to initiate
them (Webb, 1991).
Taken together, the above arguments about expectations, risk, and vulnerability
imply that trust building must be a cyclic process. Each time partners act together, they
take a risk and form expectations about the intended outcome and the way others will
contribute to achieving it. Each time an outcome meets expectations, trusting attitudes
are reinforced. The outcome becomes part of the history of the relationship, increasing
the chance that partners will have positive expectations about joint actions in the
future. The increased trust reduces the sense of risk for these future actions.
Many authors have reached similar conclusions. For example, Gulati (1995) and
Lewicki and Bunker (1996) stress the incremental development of trust as parties
repeatedly interact. Ring (1997) suggests that even if trust does not already exist, it
may emerge from formal and informal processes of transacting. Butler and Gill (1995)
see trust increasing through a cycle of learning. ReciprocityI trust because you
trustis also seen as an element in the cycle (Das & Teng 1998; McAllister 1995). As

Reinforce trusting Gain underpinnings

attitudes for more ambitious
collaboration
Aim for realistic (initially
modest) but successful
outcomes
form expectations about have enough trust, be

the future of the willing to be vulnerable
collaboration based on and take a risk to
reputation or past behavior initiate the collaboration
or contracts and
agreements
FIGURE 2: The Cyclical Trust-Building Loop
demonstrated by Axelrod (1984), when one trusting act is reciprocated by another,

gradually a durable basis for cooperation can be erected (in Calton and Lad, 1995,
p. 282).
Getting started in the cyclic process in situations where there is no history of trust
clearly implies that the parties must be willing to take a risk and become vulnerable to
the actions of the other partner(s) (Mayer et al., 1995). This means having enough
trust to take the act of faith required to initiate the cycle. The parties also must be able to
form expectations about outcomes. The more modest the outcomes expected and the
lower the level of risk, the greater the chance that expectations will be met. There is
therefore a strong case for initiating collaboration through modest, low-risk initiatives
(Das & Teng, 1998; Webb, 1991). More ambitious ventures can then be undertaken as
trusting attitudes develop. To ensure that the virtuous circle is sustained, the outcomes
aimed for need to be realistic relative to the level of trust between (and to the capabili-
ties and capacities of) the participating organizations. This line of argument is cap-
tured in the trust-building loop in Figure 2.
TRUST IN THE PRACTICE OF COLLABORATION
The summary of the literature above concluded that the management of trust in
interorganizational collaboration requires trust to be built in a cyclical process. In this
section, we develop this argument on the basis of practitioners commentary about
trust and related issues.

Perceptions About Power, Control, and Lack of Trust
The notion of trust clearly provides a conceptual handle to which practitioners

involved in collaborative initiatives relate. Statements such as, Trust and respect is
important if collaboration is to be successful and enjoyable and Communication and
trust are very important are typical and indicate that the existence of trust between the
parties involved is seen as an important success factor. This view mirrors that held by
other researchers of interfirm collaborations who repeatedly conclude that trust is an
essential ingredient of success (Child, 2001; Das & Teng 1998; Koenig & van Wijk
1993; Lane & Bachmann 1998; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992, 1994; Walsh, Wang, & Xin,
1999). Practitioners, however, often perceive a lack of trustor at least an inadequate
level of itin their own collaborative relationships. Words such as hostility, fighting,
and mistrust are frequently used.
Issues concerned with power relationships seem to be significant contributors to
mistrust and to the hampering of trust building. Practitioners argue for the need to deal
with power differences so as to minimize interagency hostility and mistrust, and they
use phrases such as power games, power plays, and power struggles, which sug-
gest that power issues are frequently seen to be problematic. For example, the manager
of a regeneration partnership commented that two major public agencies were contin-
uously fighting over which should take the lead in the partnership. She implied that
they were fighting for control of its territory, presumably driven by glory-seeking
motivations. Practitioners often comment about glory seeking and perceive the claim-
ing of credit for collaborative achievements to be a manifestation of power. They also
view such behavior as a hindrance to trust building, arguing that claiming the credit
for pieces of work implies lack of trust and (we need to) deal with glory seekers so as
to build trust between members.
A director of a not-for-profit organization who related the story of how she had con-
vened and led a major collaborative initiative involving many organizations from the
different sectors in a deprived locality of her city exemplified these issues. She
described the painstaking process through which she had gradually brought reluctant
public agencies on board and then commented that because the initiative had become
successfully established, they were taking over. Furthermore, because the subject of
the initiative recently had become the target of government policy, it was being hailed
as an example of good practice, and these agencies were now claiming the credit.
Clearly, this does not provide a good basis of trust for future relationships.
The need for public sector organizations to have their involvement in a collabora-
tion acknowledged might be pertinent to their ability to secure future funding on which
their survival may depend. In contrast, in the private sector, the concern is usually
directed at the extent to which individual organizationsaims are met via the collabora-
tion, so taking credit for joint achievement may not be so much of an issue. However,
the relationships between power, control, and trust are similar. In their comparative
case studies of four United StatesChina joint ventures for example, Yan and Gray
(1994) found that a partners bargaining power is positively related to the partners
management control in the joint venture. Similarly, they found a positive relationship
between control and performance, but significantly, they also found that trust would

moderate this. Thus, a high level of mutual trust between the partners could lead to
both partners needs being satisfied, even if one partner is dominant.
Similarly, in the public sector, the issues of credit recognition and territory con-
trol are closely tied and often a matter of real significance to those involved. For
small, single-issue organizations commonly found in the not-for-profit sector, there is
always a concern about losing control over the way in which their own organization
may proceed in dealing with its sphere of activity. At the extreme, if their issue area
becomes central to the collaboration, their external funding may be transferred from
them to the collaboration. The very existence of the collaboration may thus become a
threat to the existence of the organization. Control in this context appears typically to
be exercised through aiming to influenceor even sabotageother organizations
and the collaborations agendas (Eden & Huxham, 2001). The organization is depend-
ent on ownership of the issue for its survivalits context based bargaining power
(Yan & Gray, 1994) as such is low because it has a very high stake in the issue and few
or no alternatives available to it. The concern with its own survival (Sharfman, Gray, &
Yan, 1991) necessitates the need to take control to gain recognition for credit and retain
the legitimate right to address the issue.
For larger, public agencies, the issue often arises out of overlapping agendas and a
need to justify their existence. For example, where agencies have overlapping or iden-
tical physical boundaries, we have seen many examples of one organization apparently
taking control through taking a strong lead in the creation of an overarching plan for
the area and then aiming to influence the behavior of the others in line with the plan.
Interestingly, managers in these leading organizations rarely seem to recognize that
their actions could be interpreted in any way other than collaboratively, so their power
apparently is often manifested perfunctorily. Those in the influenced organizations
are, not surprisingly, often much more aware of the power struggle. Our data include
many statements about the difficulties associated with management control and about
willingness or not to let others take control over shared issues. Some have argued that
trust building is dependent on discouragement of touchiness about each others
territories.
In the absence of trust, similar concerns about imbalance in partners management
control can be found in the private sector. The positive link between level of control and
performance naturally means that managers are concerned and only willing to relax
control in situations where trust is high (Yan & Gray, 1994). Such practice-oriented
notions of control through influencing, and its relationship to trust, take a rather differ-
ent focus to those that derive from research based in economic exchange where trust is
seen as a component ofor substitute forcontrol mechanisms such as contracts that
govern economic transactions (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Fryxell et al., 2002; Gulati,
1995; Inkpen & Li, 1999). This may be, in part, because government policies through-
out the world increasingly are leading to contractual relationships between public
agencies and private organizations (Coulson, 1998), including those in the not-for-
profit sector. In socially oriented collaborations, setting up a contractual relationship is
not generally an option that is considered feasible. Participants therefore are forced to
focus on softer control mechanisms to manage the power relationships. Notions of
trust as a lubricant for collaborative transactions (Das & Teng, 1998; Dasgupta, 1988;

Oliver, 1997; Ring, 1997) and as a complement or supplement to control (Beamish,

1988; Das & Teng, 1998) more closely relate to this.
Perceptions About Building Trust
Many authors write about trust as though it were a precondition for successful col-
laboration (e.g., Cullen, Johnson, & Sakano, 2000; Das & Teng, 1998; Kumar, 1996;
Lane & Bachmann, 1998). Indeed, Rule and Keown (1998) argue that the develop-
ment of trust is one of the most important alliance competencies (p. 3). This presents a
practical dilemma to those considering setting up a collaboration where there is no his-
tory of relationship between (at least some of) the participating organizations or where
previous relationships have not engendered mutual trust. The discussion above sug-
gests that this will frequently be the case. A central issue that practice-oriented theory
must address, therefore, is how trust can be built and sustained.
Practitionersviews relate to all the collaboration themes and include the following:
have clarity of purpose and objectives,

deal with power differences,
have leadership but do not allow anyone to take over,
allow time to build up understanding,
share workload fairly,
resolve different levels of commitment,
have equal ownership and no point scoring,
accept that partnerships evolve over time,
and so on. Other researchers capture similar points (see, for example, Butler & Gill,
1995; Child, 2001; Das & Teng, 1998; Lyson & Metha, 1996; Ring, 1997). Emphasis
tends to be put on the importance of communication in particular and the need to com-
municate and share information on a range of issues (Cullen et al., 2000; Das & Teng,
1998; Webb, 1991).
Although the above suggestions provide good reminders of the variables that con-
tribute to trust building, they do not provide much in the way of pragmatic help because
each piece of advice brings with it its own collection of difficulties in implementation.
It may be argued that a pragmatic way forward is to get started without first dealing
with all aspects of trust building. This probably means aiming for modest but achiev-
able outcomes, in the first instance, becoming more ambitious only as success breeds a
greater level of trust. This supports the argument captured in the trust building loop in
Figure 2.
Over the past 5 years, we have had many opportunities to discuss the trust-building
loop with practitioners and other researchers interested in this topic. Both researchers
and practitioners have found it conceptually appealing. For researchers, it provides a
neat synthesis and summary of relevant literature, and for practitioners it provides a
visual, albeit too simplistic, suggestion for how to address trust development. There
are practical difficulties associated both with initiating the loop and maintaining the
necessary stability to sustain it. A fundamental flaw in the trust-building loop as either

a descriptive or a prescriptive tool is that it implies that successful action, alone, is

enough to develop trust. It thus implicitly denies the relevance ofor at least down-
grades the importance ofthe broader processes that practitioners view as central to
trust building. A more realistic approach to the management of trust would entail the
facilitation of the cyclical trust-building process while bearing other related nurturing
activities in mind.
THE CYCLICAL TRUST-BUILDING PROCESS IN PRACTICE
In this section, we develop the trust-building loops contribution as a conceptual

and pragmatic tool. Our vehicle to achieving this is to discuss the loop in the light of
collaboration theory developed and published as part of the wider research program, as
mentioned in the Methodology section. In particular, the structural features of collabo-
ration and related dynamics, leadership, management of purpose, and power are con-
sidered. We conclude by summarizing the resulting lessons for the management of
trust that may help influence effectiveness in the practice of collaboration.
Undoubtedly, the trust-building loop aligns itself well with a small wins
approach (Bryson, 1988) within which trust can be built through mutual experience of
advantage gained via successful implementation of low-risk initiatives. Trust can be
developed over time moving gradually toward initiatives where partners are willing to
take greater risks because a high level of trust is present. When risk and uncertainty
levels are high, a strategy involving incremental increases in resource commitments
may indeed be the preferred strategy (Das & Teng, 1998). In many situations, however,
the collaborative advantage aimed for requires the collaborating organizations to be
more ambitious and hence adopt a higher risk approach to their collaboration. The
small-wins approach may, for example, be in contradiction with the need to address
major social issues rapidly or meet the requirements of external funding bodies for
demonstrable output. Political masters, for example, often push hard for major
changes because the demands of electoral systems require clear and rapid indications
of action. Frequently, this requires organizations with a history of mistrust between
them to work together. Therefore, organizations may not have the luxury of time
required to build trust via the small-wins strategy, and moreover, they may be forced to
find ways of coping with lack of trust. In managing trust, therefore, there is a need to
assess the specifics of each collaborative situation with regard to level of associated
risk, level of trust existing between the partners, and whether trust can be built
incrementally via a small-wins approach or whether a more rapid and comprehensive
approach to trust development is required to pursue collaborative advantage. Each sit-
uation dictates different implications for initiating and sustaining the trust-building
loop.
Initiating the Trust-Building Loop
Initiation of the trust-building cycle requires practitioners to have both the ability to
form expectations about the future outcomes of the collaboration and a willingness to

take a risk. Their capacity to do this rests in their ability to form agreements about the
purpose of the collaboration, to be clear about their investment in the collaboration and
what they expect in return (Gray, 1989; Mattesich & Monsey, 1992). In turn, this
affects their ability to assess the likelihood that their partners will behave in ways that
seem appropriate to the furtherance of that purpose.
Forming Expectations
Identifying partners. Two structural featuresambiguity and complexitythat

tend to characterize collaborations (Huxham & Vangen, 2000a) can act as barriers to
the initiation of trust building. Many researchers have argued that explicit member-
ship in which the parties know and agree on who is involved and in what capacity is a
key definitional element of collaboration (McCann, 1983; Nathan & Mitroff, 1991;
Roberts & Bradley 1991). A rather surprising characteristic, therefore, of the reality of
many situations is the ambiguity about who the partners are. Typically, there are differ-
ences in views about who the central members are and what their roles or membership
status are with respect to the collaboration.
This lack of clarity often is exacerbated by the complexity that surrounds collabora-
tions (Gulati, 1998; Osborn & Hagedoorn, 1997). Collaborations are often character-
ized by complex hierarchieswhich may be several layers deepin which one col-
laboration is a member of another. For example, health promotion collaborations are
often members of regeneration collaborations, and both may be members of
antipoverty collaborationsand vice versa. Similarly, large multinational companies
may have formed dozens of joint ventures with different partners to gain access to, for
example, the Chinese domestic market (Li, Tsui, Xin, & Hambrick, 1999). Frequently,
therefore, the same individuals are present at meetings of many collaborations. Stew-
art and Snape (1996) refer to this complexity of interlocking collaborations as plural-
ism. Additional complexities can arise out of concerns to be democratic and account-
able as well as to tackle a wide range of related problem areas. For example,
collaborations are sometimes designed with multiple layers of committees and steer-
ing groups or boards and often initiate (or co-opt) a range of cross-organizational
working groups to tackle different aspects of the collaboration agenda. Often, the latter
include individuals and organizations that are not formally a part of the collaboration
but that nevertheless influence the decision making in the partner organizations
(Vangen & Huxham, in press; see also Gulati, 1998). When alliances entail the cre-
ation of new entities, individuals often end up with conflicting identities (Gulati,
1998).
In practice, therefore, even if practitioners feel confident that they can identify the
partners involved in the collaboration, it can be difficult to be certain about what orga-
nization, collaboration, or other constituency (if any) they and others represent. Sim-
ply identifying with whom to build trust therefore can be very difficult and time
consuming.
Agreeing on collaboration aims. Working out with whom trust should be built is not
the only challenge in getting started in the trust-building loop. Practitioners continu-

ously raise concerns over the establishment of joint purpose. Typically, they argue that
clear and agreed aims are important in providing clarity about why the collaboration
exists, why different individuals and organizations are part of it, what their roles are
within it, and, most important, what they expect each other to do in furtherance of
them. They also, however, frequently express frustration at not having been able, in
practice, to reach such clarity and agreement. Paradoxically, the very principle of col-
laboration is central to this challenge. It usually is the bringing together of the comple-
mentary resources that provides the potential for collaborative advantage (Gould et al.,
1999; Huxham, 1996; Spekman et al., 1998). The different resources are, however, the
result of differences in organizational purpose. Although partners ostensibly may
agree on a broad label for the collaborations purposeat least to the extent that they
are willing to be involvedthey each have different reasons for being there. For exam-
ple, in United StatesChinese joint ventures, the Chinese partner typically may be
seeking foreign capital and technological and managerial expertise, whereas the U.S.
partner seeks access to the vast Chinese domestic market. These highly different goals,
it has been argued, may contribute to a range of problems between the two manage-
ment teams (Walsh et al., 1999). Yet, organizations with similar aims are unlikely to
need to collaborate unless pooling of financial resources is the driving force. This
means that, commonly, some organizations have much less interest in collaborating
than others and are thus less willing to commit to aims that have significant resource
implications. Some partners look to the collaboration to help satisfy goals and interests
that are relevant only to their organization, and individuals also may be looking to sat-
isfy personal agendas this way. These organizational and individual agendas are fre-
quently hidden.
It is precisely this multiplicity of (sometimes conflicting) goals that renders the
negotiation of agreement on aims difficult. Indeed, as argued by Lawrence, Phillips,
and Hardy (1999), the required negotiation can be a highly political, contentious and
sometimes a divisive activity, and so participants have to decide on the extent to which
agreement on goals should be the subject of substantial discussion. On one hand, it is
helpful to have the goals explicitly stated so that all participants know what the others
are aiming to achieve and to give a collective sense of direction. On the other hand,
opening up discussion can emphasize a range of incompatibilities and even conflict
between the different goals. Even if agreement can be reached, this can often require
seemingly endless discussion and negotiation during which participants may feel that
their territories are being infringed upon, which in turn tends to have a negative impact
on trust building. Paradoxically, although such competition may facilitate collabo-
ration, if managers come to view other organizations as direct competitors, the neces-
sary trust is unlikely to develop (Sharfman et al., 1991, p. 184). Different organizations
may naturally strive to take control to protect their own agenda and to influence other
organizations and the collaborations agenda. In relation to trust building, therefore,
the implication is that a significant amount of trust is required simply to engage in a
discussion about the future expectations of the collaboration.
The pragmatic solution to both reaching agreement on aims and identifying with
whom to build trust is frequently to get started on some action with relevant partners
without fully negotiating and agreeing on the aims and dealing with all other aspects of

trust building. This is feasible in situations in which collaboration can be initiated via
modest, low-risk initiatives, which in turn also allows trust building to take place
incrementally and over time.
Managing Risk
Gradually, as trust develops it becomes a means for dealing with risk. In situations
in which the small-wins approach is not feasible, however, the risk associated with the
collaboration has to be managed as an integral part of trust building. Risk, in this con-
text (as discussed in The Cyclical Aspect of Trust Building section), usually is associ-
ated with the notions of opportunistic behavior and vulnerability. Practitioners per-
ceptions of opportunistic behavior and vulnerability (as discussed in the Trust in the
Practice of Collaboration section) typically relate to the fear that members will take
advantage of collaborative efforts by, for example, unfairly claming ownership and
taking credit for joint efforts. If the aim to build trust is taken seriously, however, then
risk management in this context cannot be concerned with guarding against opportu-
nistic behavior and vulnerability (e.g., via sanctions set out in contractual agreements).
Instead, risk management must be concerned with ensuring that any future collabora-
tive advantage can realistically be envisaged and is shared. Consequently, risk man-
agement suggests an upfront negotiation of the collaborative aims, to clarify potential
partners expectations as well as their willingness and ability to enact the agreed col-
laborative agenda. Given the ambiguity and complexity associated with reaching
agreement on aims as outlined above, this clearly is not straightforward.
The difficulty of making appropriate judgments about personal and organizational
goals, hidden agendas, territory control, and power bases implies that particular effort
is required both in terms of understanding the various aims and agendas of potential
partners (Vangen, Huxham, & Eden, 1994) as well as the structure of the collaboration
(Huxham & Vangen, 2000a) with its inherent sources of power, authority, and ability
to influence and enact the collaborative agenda. For example, the traditional view of
power focusing on formal authority and dependency (e.g., Emerson, 1962; Hardy &
Clegg, 1996; Thompson, 1956) would suggest that the structure of a collaboration
determines relevant sources of influence pertaining to the agenda. However, as collab-
oration structures are complex and typically lack the authority of a formal hierarchy,
assessing what the various sources of power are and where they lie may be very diffi-
cult indeed. Similarly, collaborative agendas are shaped and implemented not only by
individuals but also via the structure and processes of the collaboration (Huxham &
Vangen, 2000b). Therefore, the difficulty relates not only to judging who has the abil-
ity to influence and enact the agenda but also with how to interpret different events and
actions of others. Our research suggests that efforts aimed at understanding the com-
plexity of goals agreement and collaboration structure can provide vital clues about
power relationships and ways of making things happen, and hence with whom to net-
work and build trust. Moreover, these efforts also can provide valuable insight into
possible outcomes of the collaboration, how the associated risk can be managed, and
whether, if choice exists, it is worth taking. Such activities are, however, extremely
resource intensive and time consuming, and their management requires a great deal of

skill and sensitivity. Therefore, this type of risk management is only recommended
where trust cannot be built incrementally.
Sustaining the Trust-Building Loop
Managing Dynamics
Despite the difficulties pertaining to the initiation of the trust-building loop as out-
lined above, many collaborations are initiated, so it must be presumed that expecta-
tions can be formed on the basis that either a minimal level of trust is present and/or
there is a willingness to bear the associated risk. Sustaining the trust-building loop then
requires the participants to work together, gradually becoming more ambitious, over
time, in their joint endeavors. Unfortunately, a third structural feature of collabora-
tionsdynamics (Huxham & Vangen, 2000a)often leads to discontinuities in the
virtuous circle.
The natural evolution of collaborations leads to changes in their purpose, if only
because the initial joint purpose has been successfully addressed. Changes in the envi-
ronmental context such as new government policies or pressures from competitors
additionally promote not only totally new initiatives but also changes to the purposes
of existing ones (Gray & Yan, 1990; Huxham & Vangen, 2000a; Sharfman et al.,
1991). Government policies frequently lead to changes in the nature of public sector
collaborations. In the United Kingdom, for example, policies in the last decade alone
have led to a new set of local government organizations and several incarnations of
health service organizations. Similarly, international joint ventures often are deliber-
ately transitory with their termination involving an ownership reallocation among
existing parent firms (Reuer, 1998).
The complex structures described above therefore are relatively transitory. Organi-
zations come and go either in response to changing purpose or because they, them-
selves, have changed. Not infrequently, key organizations cease to exist, and new rela-
tionships are developed to address particular issues. Individual representatives also
come and go as they take on new roles within their organizations or move in or out of
them altogether. Although all organizations continuously evolve (Dawson, 1992;
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), the nature of collaboration is such that they can change
from one shape to another frequently, rapidly, and sometimes imperceptibly. One
antipoverty community collaboration with which we worked had three entirely differ-
ent incarnations over a 5-year period, beginning as a working group of an alliance of
about 100 organizations and ending as a partnership between two organizations. Main-
taining stability over time in the membership of collaborations thus is rarely possible.
Coming to terms with the issues of perceived (or actual) power imbalance, credit, and
territory control, however, is likely to require many cycles of the trust-building loop.
One partnership manager with whom we have worked commented, after two and a
half years we are now beginning to get the hang of how to make this partnership work.
Our observations would suggest that this time period is typical unless partners have a
history of working together or are very mature in their ability to handle collaborative
situations (Nocon, 1989; Webb, 1991).

Partnership managers in the public sector also typically comment that when spe-
cific funding comes to an end, new government initiatives begin to encroach on exist-
ing partnershipsterritories, and new funding possibilities frequently mean a change of
direction and possibly a change of membership. In a similar vein, Yan and Gray (1994)
noted that typical changes in the performance of a joint venture over time will alter the
balance of the partners bargaining powerfor example, as each party learns from
having worked in collaborationand this may then affect the structure of control and
the trust relationship between the partners. Other researchers discuss issues involved
in sustaining collaborations beyond discontinuities of this type (Cropper, 1996; Gray
& Yan, 1990). The conditions required to sustain the trust-building loop long enough
to reachand then work witha comfortable level of trust do not often pertain. Hard-
earned agreements (Gray & Hay, 1986) and trusting relationships disappear as mem-
bers leave the collaboration, requiring remaining members to keep things afloat
despite fractures in the trust-building cycle. Equally, the arrival of new members often
disturbs the equilibrium, and new efforts are required to fast track them into the loop
(Vangen & Huxham, in press). Sustaining the trust-building loop thus requires contin-
uous attention to the dynamics of collaboration and the implications on trust from
changes in individuals representing the collaborating organizations.
Managing Power Imbalances
Even when careful and continuous attention is paid to trust building, the inherent
fragility of the loop is evident (Ring, 1997). Alongside the issues relating to the
dynamic nature of collaboration, power issues in particular seem to challenge efforts
aimed at sustaining the loop. As discussed in the previous section, practitioners fre-
quently claim that power issues are problematic, arguing, for example, that larger
organizations are more powerful than smaller ones and that such imbalance in power
dictates behaviors that get in the way of trust building. In a similar vein, other research-
ers have argued that the maintenance of trust requires a resolution of unequal power
(Calton & Lad, 1995).
Another paradox of collaboration, however, is that although the process of collabo-
ration creates dependency between the partners, inevitably some will be more central
to the enactment of the collaborative agenda than are others (Vangen & Huxham, in
press). This frequently leads to perceptions about power imbalances between those
viewed as principal versus those viewed as subsidiary members. Perceptions of
power inequality, however, frequently are exaggerated and at odds with reality. The
interdependence between members means that power cannot be entirely unilateral,
and at the minimal level, any member at least can resort to the threat of exit. So
although the dependency renders individual members unable to enact the collaborative
agenda on their own, typically any member has enough power to block the progress of
the collaboration.
Individuals often act as if their perceptions of power imbalances are real. Typically,
those representing smaller organizations perceive themselves to be vulnerable and
may take steps to exercise control over and protect their own organizations agendas.
Some are more skilled than others in recognizing their unique source of power and

knowing when and how to influence and control the collaborative agenda. For exam-
ple, our observations suggest that some are skilled at influencing joint decisions, for
example, by preparing texts and documents for active use during meetings to deliber-
ately manipulate and shape the direction of the collaborative agenda (Vangen &
Huxham, in press). Although some would view such actions as being against the spirit
of collaboration, the intended effect may be genuinely to help the collaboration move
forward. Yet the active preparation and use of documentation may render others feel-
ing left behind and reluctant to trust. Phillips and Hardy (1997), for example, argue
that the act of creating and disseminating texts is . . . a highly political act and under-
lies the most fundamental struggle for power and control (p. 171). Although dis-
course may be used in such ways to deliberately hide power rather than to create trust
(Phillips & Hardy, 1997), individuals with relatively little tangible power still can
influence events through their knowledge of the substantive issues over which collabo-
ration occurs.
Power in collaboration as such typically is fragmented, yet sustaining the trust-
building loop long enough to achieve collaborative advantage usually requires finding
ways of ensuring that shared power is maximized. However, as power differences
come into play, participants frequently are left feeling vulnerable and reluctant to trust.
An appreciation of the inevitability of power imbalances as well as the ability to inter-
pret any actions that members take in response to them may help prevent loss of trust.
Furthermore, an understanding of the way in which balances of power tend to change
during the life of a collaboration and indeed whether and how power imbalances can
and should be deliberately shifted seems essential in sustaining the trust gained. This,
however, requires a great deal of sophistication in managing trust in practice.
Nurturing the Collaborative Relationships
Issues pertaining to the identification of partners, complexity and multiplicity of

aims, risk and vulnerability, complexity and dynamics of collaborative structures, and
power imbalances clearly all pose serious management challenges for building and
sustaining trust. If not managed effectively, any one of these issues can prevent trust
from developing or even cause loss of trust. Ideally, therefore, all these issues need to
be managed simultaneously and, due to the dynamic nature of collaboration, in a con-
tinuous manner. Failing to do so may cause the trust loop to fracture, hindering the
achievement of collaborative advantage.
Therefore, even in situations in which collaboration is well under way and a good
degree of trust is present, continuous effort is required to sustain sufficient levels of
trust. Given the fragility of the trust loop, practitioners who wish to build and maintain
a high degree of trust need to pay relentless attention to trust-building activities. In
doing so, they need to explicitly consider their management of communication, power
imbalances and credit recognition, joint ownership, varying levels of commitment,
conflicting views on aims and agendas, and so onand they need to be prepared to
continuously nurture the collaborative relationship in this way because the game will
be continuously changing.

Managing Trust Building in Practice
The above discussions have sought to explain many of the practical difficulties
associated with initiating and sustaining the trust-building loop in practice. Clearly
managing trust is challenging and entails dealing with many paradoxes inherent in col-
laborative activities. Inevitably, therefore, any guidance for practice cannot be precise.
Yet, in the matrix in Figure 3, we have sought to capture apparent essential implica-
tions for practice. The aim is to provide an aid to thinking about and addressing trust
management in different collaborative situations rather than to provide a precise tool.
It was argued above that an assessment of the specifics of each collaborative situa-
tion with regard to level of associated risk, level of trust existing between the partners,
and whether trust can be managed via the small-wins approach is required. In Figure 3,
therefore, the vertical axis is labeled to differentiate between modest low-risk and
ambitious high-risk collaborations, distinguishing accordingly between trust manage-
ment activities in situations in which a small-wins approach is feasible (bottom half)
and situations in which a more comprehensive approach to trust management is
required due to the high level of risk associated with the collaboration (top half). Simi-
larly, the horizontal axis is labeled to differentiate between collaborative situations in
which trust is weak and situations in which trust is present, distinguishing as such
between trust management activities in situations requiring the initiation of trust build-
ing (left side) and situations requiring trust to be sustained (right side). Such an initial
assessment can provide practitioners with clues about how to prioritize trust manage-
ment activities.
Collaborative working arrangements may not be as clear-cut as those conveyed in
the figure, and due to the dynamic nature of collaboration also, practitioners typically
will find themselves moving from one situation to another during their involvement
with any collaboration. Also, in multiple-partner situations, practitioners may be act-
ing in different quadrants with different partners at the same time. Frequently, a bal-
ancing act between activities targeted at coping with lack of trust and those targeted
at building trust may indeed be required. Nevertheless, each quadrant provides
reminders of activities to be emphasized in each situation with the aim of managing
trust development and maintenance in an effective and efficient manner. Each situation
dictates different implications for initiating and sustaining the trust-building loop, as
summarized below.
The bottom-left quadrant illustrates a situation in which trust is weak but it is possi-
ble to initiate collaboration and aim to build trust gradually via the small-wins
approach. The arguments developed above suggest that the object in this situation
would be to get started on some actions with relevant partners without having to deal
with all aspects of trust building. The strategy for dealing with multiple and possibly
conflicting aims within a typically complex and ambiguous collaborative structure
would be to identify some (not necessarily all) relevant partners and address some
modest but joint actions without fully negotiating aims. Initiating trust building in this
situation nevertheless requires a willingness to take a risk and trust enough to get
started.

Managing Trust: Summary Implications for Practice
FIGURE 3:
24
The top-left quadrant illustrates a situation in which trust is weak and in addition,
the collaborative advantage aimed for requires the collaborating organizations to be
more ambitious, and hence adopt a higher risk approach, to their collaboration. The
need to be more ambitious renders the small-wins approach to trust building inappro-
priate. The arguments developed above suggest that the primary aim in this situation
would be to manage the risk associated with the collaboration as an integral part of
trust building. To build trust, this risk management has to be concerned with assessing
the potential for achieving genuine collaborative advantage and whether the associ-
ated risk can be managed and (given choice) is worth taking. In practice, this tends to
mean that an upfront negotiation of the collaborative aims is required to clarify poten-
tial partners expectations as well as their willingness and ability to enact an agreed on
collaborative agenda.
It is argued that efforts aimed at understanding the complexity of goals agreement
and collaboration structure can help understand power relationships and partnersabil-
ity to influence and enact the collaborative agenda. This in turn can provide vital clues
regarding with whom to network and build trust. As a result, valuable insight into pos-
sible outcomes and whether and how the associated risk can be managed can be
gained. Initiating trust building in this situation thus requires a willingness to invest a
great deal of energy and resources simply to get started in the trust-building cycle.
The bottom-right quadrant illustrates a situation in which trust is present and the
trust-building cycle has been initiated via the small-wins approach. The arguments
developed above suggest that the primary aim of trust management in this situation is
to manage instability so as to sustain the trust-building loop long enough to reach and
then work with a sufficient level of trust. Sustaining the loop requires participants to
pay continuous attention to the dynamics of collaboration and its inevitable implica-
tions on trust management. In practice, this tends to mean keeping abreast with
changes in individuals representing the collaborating organizations so as to maintain
momentum when trusted members leave and find ways of fast tracking new members
into the trust-building cycle. The dynamics also typically require members to recog-
nize the inevitable affect on power imbalances on members actions and to understand
its impact on trust relationships and consequent help or hindrances in terms of maxi-
mizing shared power.
The top-right quadrant illustrates a situation in which trust is indeed present and the
collaborative advantage aimed for requires the collaborating organizations to be ambi-
tious in their search for collaborative advantage. In ideal situations, a high level of trust
would be a means for dealing with the risk associated with the collaboration. Even in
such situations when collaboration is well under way and a good degree of trust is pres-
ent, however, continuous effort is required to sustain sufficient levels of trust.
Although nurturing is part of trust management in all situations, it is argued that the
primary aim in this situation is to keep nurturing the trusting relationships to maintain a
high level of trust as a basis for achieving collaborative advantage. In practice, practi-
tioners who wish to maintain a high degree of trust need to keep nurturing the collabo-
rative relationship because the game will be continuously changing.

CONCLUSION
The theory on the management of trust in interorganizational collaboration pre-

sented in this article aims to reflect the management challenge (Li et al., 1999;
Spekman et al., 1998) that practitioners face. It developed from initial conceptualiza-
tion of a trust-building loop capturing pragmatic lessons elicited from the literature on
trust in collaboration. The loop coveys trust building as a cyclical process within which
positive outcomes form the basis for trust development and with each consecutive pos-
itive outcome trust builds on itself incrementally, over time, in a virtuous circle. We
argue that there is a tension between the ideology that trust is needed for collaboration
to be successful (e.g., Cullen et al., 2000; Dasgupta, 1988; Das & Teng, 1998; Oliver,
1997; Ring, 1997) and the pragmatic difficulties pertaining to trust building itself and
the frequent need to initiate and enact collaborative agendas in situations where trust is
lacking. Practitioners perceptions suggest that unequal power relations and the need
to protect individual organizations interests by manipulating and controlling collabo-
rative agendas are inevitable difficulties pertaining to the collaborative processes and
that these issues in particular tend to hamper trust building.
We see the theory contributing to the management of collaboration at two levels.
First, the theory suggests that successful management of trust implies both the ability
to cope in situations where trust is lacking and the ability to build trust in situations
where this is possible. This is in contrast to much previous literature, which argues that
the presence of trust is essential for collaboration to be successful. Given the reality of
many collaborative situations, practitioners inevitably will find themselves in situa-
tions where trust at best is insufficient. Indeed, although practitioners tend to say that
trust is a vital ingredient for success, they also argue that their lack of trust in each other
is mutual but their only choice in as far as the collaboration is concerned is to get on
with it. Although other researchers have argued differently (e.g., Creed & Miles, 1996;
Cullen et al., 2000), our observations do not suggest that such lack of trust inevitably
leads to failure. As a manager involved in a public service leadership initiative com-
mented, collaboration frequently entails the suppression of hatred in pursuit of
money.
It may be argued that the key to success lies in the ability to predict others behavior
and that trust management is about managing the risk and vulnerability inherent in the
collaborative situation. The act of collaborating will increase partners ability to pre-
dict outcomes and how others may actso enabling them to assess uncertainty and
reduce fear of opportunistic behavior regardless of whether trust exists. Sharfman et al.
(1991) argued similarly that the advantages of sharing resources such as technology,
engineering expertise, and quality management outweigh (at least to some extent) the
disadvantages stemming from mistrust (p. 185).
Second, the theory clarifies different implications for initiating and sustaining the
trust-building loop across different situations. It argues that the small-wins approach
(Bryson, 1988) to trust building within which trust is built incrementally via successful
implementation of modest collaborative initiatives is the preferred strategy. In situa-
tions requiring the collaborating organizations to be more ambitious, managing the
associated risk is seen as an integral component to trust building and to coping with

lack of trust. Trust management therefore requires the assessment of each collabora-
tive situation with regard to level of associated risk, level of trust existing between the
partners, and whether trust can be built incrementally via a small-wins approach or
whether a more rapid and comprehensive approach to trust development is required to
pursue collaborative advantage. The discussions of issues pertaining to initiating and
sustaining trust in each situation provide practitioners with vital conceptual handles
with which to grasp the challenges that managing trust implies. The examples of the
type of activities that can help build and sustain trust in each situation provide vital
cues to practitioners about how to manage these challenges. It is argued that the facili-
tation of the cyclical trust-building process requires careful and continuous attention
to a range of nurturing activities.
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The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science

Nurturing Collaborative Relations: Building Trust in Interorganizational Collaboration

The online version of this article can be found at:

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Citations (this article cites 45 articles hosted on the

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Nurturing Collaborative Relations

Many organizations aspire to gain collaborative advantage by working in partnerships

Keywords: collaboration; collaborative advantage; trust; alliances; interorganizational

Working collaboratively across organizational, sectoral, and even national bound-

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Although some contributions take a managerial perspective and begin to address

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the management of trust could be drawn inductively. Furthermore, an initial scan of

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FIGURE 1: Managing Trust: Sample Insight From the Literature

THE CYCLICAL ASPECT OF TRUST BUILDING

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Reinforce trusting Gain underpinnings

form expectations about have enough trust, be

demonstrated by Axelrod (1984), when one trusting act is reciprocated by another,

TRUST IN THE PRACTICE OF COLLABORATION

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Perceptions About Power, Control, and Lack of Trust

The notion of trust clearly provides a conceptual handle to which practitioners

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Oliver, 1997; Ring, 1997) and as a complement or supplement to control (Beamish,

Perceptions About Building Trust

have clarity of purpose and objectives,

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a descriptive or a prescriptive tool is that it implies that successful action, alone, is

THE CYCLICAL TRUST-BUILDING PROCESS IN PRACTICE

In this section, we develop the trust-building loops contribution as a conceptual

Initiating the Trust-Building Loop

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Identifying partners. Two structural featuresambiguity and complexitythat

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Sustaining the Trust-Building Loop

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Managing Power Imbalances

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Nurturing the Collaborative Relationships

Issues pertaining to the identification of partners, complexity and multiplicity of

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Managing Trust Building in Practice

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The theory on the management of trust in interorganizational collaboration pre-

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Axelrod, R. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books.

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