Draw Points Okok

SAFETY IN MINES RESEARCH ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
SIMRAC
DRAFT
FINAL REPORT
VOLUME 1
MAIN REPORT
Title. Investigation into Drawpoints, Tips, Orepasses and

Chutes.
TR Stacey and AH Swart
Author/s
Research
Agency Steffen, Robertson and Kirsten
Project No 0TH 303
Date March 1997
INVESTIGATION INTO DRAWPOINTS, TIPS,

OREPASSES AND CHUTES
DRAFT FINAL REPORT
REPORT 223742/2 MARCH 1997
DRAFT FINAL REPORT

REPORT 223742/2 Steffen, Robertson
and Kirsten
265 Oxford Road
ILLOVO
Johannesburg NORTHLANDS
2196 Johannesburg
MARCH 1997
Fax : (011) 880-
8086
P O Box 55291
CONTENTS
Section Description Page
VOLUME 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i-V1
I INTRODUCTION 1
2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE 4
2.1 Drawpoints
4
8
2.3 Ore passes 9
2.3. I Problems experienced in passes 11
2.3.2 Factors influencing the performance of passes 13
2.4 Chutes 27
3 ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT REPORTS

28
3.1 Accidents at drawpoint locations . 28
3. 1. 1 Classifications of accidents 29
3. 1.2 Causes of accidents 31
3. 1.3 Experience of workers involved in accidents 31
3. 1.4 Nature of injuries 34
3.2 Accidents at tip locations 34

3.2. I Classifications of accidents 35
3 2.2 Causes of accidents 35
3.2.3 Experience of workers involved in accidents 38
3.2.4 Nature of injuries 38
Accidents at orepass locations 40

3.3.2 Causes of accidents 42
3.3 4 Nature of injuries

3.4 Accidents at chute locations 42
3.4.2 Causes of accidents 45
3 4.4 Nature of injuries 48

3.5 Discussion 48
4 INFORMATION ON MINES VISITED
51
4. 1 Mine No. 1 52
4.2 Mine No. 2 54
4.3 Mine No. 3 55
4.4 Mine No. 4 57
4.5 Mine No. 5 59
4.6 Mine No. 6 61
4.7 Mine No. 7 63
4.8 Mine No. 8 65
4.9 Mine No. 9 68
4.10 Mine No. 10 70
4.11 Mine No. 11 71
5 MINE PRACTICES 73
74
5.1 Environmental issues 75
78
78
5.2 Design
79
79
5.3 Mine procedures . 80
84
5.3. I Ad hoc preparation . .
5.3.2 Date of documents
5.3.3 Format of documents
5.3.4 Logic of preparation
5.3.5 Vagueness of statements
5.3.6 Suggested format for procedures documents . 85

5.4 Worker involvement in procedures 88
5.5 Induction and training 90
5.6 Attitudes towards procedures and safety 92

5.7 Relationship between procedures and accidents . 93
Summary of latent failure aspects 95
6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 95
REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 104

VOLUME 2
APPENDICES
SIN,RAC RESEARCH PROPOSAL

B PERFORMANCE OF PASSES lORMATION
CHECKLISTS FROM MINE VISITS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The subject of this report is an investigation into the ore handling systems commonly
used on shallow mines in South Africa. These include the following:
drawpoints - as the name implies, the location where the ore is drawn or extracted;
tips - from the drawpoint the ore is transported to the tip, which is the point at which it
is tipped into the ore pass. In some mines stope tips are used and the ore is scraped into
the tips; ore passes - these allow the ore to be transported from the level at which it is
tipped to a lower level at which it may be crushed or loaded for removal from the
mine; chutes - these are used to control the flow of ore from the ore passes into an
underground crusher, or into trains or skips for removal from the mine.
This investigation, which is aimed at addressing the safety issues, is being carried out
in terms of Mine Safety Research (SIMRAC) Project 0TH 303' "Investigation into
drawpoints, tips, ore passes and chutes". The primary output from this investigation is
the following:
identification of various ore and waste types handled; identification of various ore
and waste handling arrangements; identification of hazards associated with ore and
waste handling; identification of Inethods of reducing hazards, and recommendations
of most practical solutions, and training requirements tr personnel.
This report is the final output of the investigation, and deals with a review of
international and South African literature on the subjects, and a review of reports of
accidents which have occurred in South African mines. There is very little literature
dealing with drawpoints, tips and chutes, but a satisfactory amount covering passes.
The literature review carried out deals substantially with design aspects, which are
closely linked to safety, as well as the identification of problem areas.
ii
Records obtained from the South African Mines Reportable Accidents Statistics System
(SAMRASS) of the Department of Minerals and Energy for shallow mines (including
platinum mines, but excluding gold and coal mines) indicate that, in the period I
January 1988 to 30 June 1995, a total of 651 underground reportable accidents occurred
at the locations of drawpoints, tips, orepasses and chutes. 53 of these accidents resulted
in fatalities.
The review of literature and analysis of accident statistics has formed the basis for the
development of detailed checklists which have been completed during mine visits to
obtain specific mine information.
The conclusions and recommendations fronl the research follow. The primary
objectives of the research project have been addressed as follows:
Identification of various ore and waste types handled on shallow mines
Mine visits to a representative cross section of mines were carried out and the
information gained from these visits is summarised in Section 4. Details of the
checklists completed during the visits are contained in Appendix C.
Identification of various ore and waste handling arrangements on shallow mines
The information gained from the mine visits is summarised in Section 4. Details of the
Identification of hazards associated with ore and waste handling on shallow
mines
The hazards were identified from an analysis of SAMRASS data. This analysis is dealt
with in detail in Section 3. Additional information which was obtained during mine
visits is contained in Section 4. The main hazards identified were fall and handling of
material
iii
(including rolling rock and mineral) and fall of ground. The major causes of accidents
were classified as failure to comply with standards/instructions and lack of
caution/alertness.
Identification of methods of reducing hazards, and recommendations of most

practical solutions, and training requirements for personnel on shallow mines
Recommendations arising from this research project can be covered under the headings
design, procedures, training and management.
Design
Good design promotes good operation and will therefore enhance safety. Good design
of a component can be said to have been achieved when the actual performance of that
component in service meets or exceeds the specified performance for both production
output and operating life.
It is strongly recommended that detailed attention should be given to design, with the
aim of achieving the "right design" and avoiding ad hoc design modifications. The
method of achieving this will be deternlined by management, but a recommended
method would be to use an approach commonly used on large civil engineering
projects in which designs are subjected to thorough review by independent review
panels. This approach involves:
detailed specification and documentation of performance requirements. This

will detail at least the following
required production capacity; characteristics of material to be handled, for

example block sizes, block shapes, grading, water conditions; required
operating life of the component, planned repair or maintenance intervals;
planned repair or maintenance methods; access requirements and facilities for

repair and maintenance; operating principles, for example, whether a pass will
be controlled or uncontrolled, maximum and minimum levels of rock in the
pass, maximum standing times between drawing from the pass, etc. (This will
provide information on which proactive drafting of operating, maintenance and
safety procedures can be based).
By drawing up detailed specifications in advance of any design work, the identification

of potential problems will be well considered and the problems well defined.
Internal review, by a frmally constituted internal review panel (minimum of 3

persons), of all stages of the design process, including critical review of the
design criteria and performance specification documents.
External review, by a formally constituted external review panel (minimum of

3 persons), of all stages of the design process, including critical review of the
design criteria and performance specification documents. Independent means
independent of the mine and mining house. Panel members should be chosen
on the basis of their established records.
Internal and independent auditing to ensure that operating methods comply
with the principles on which the design was based
Through internal and external review a broader range of experience is brou a ht to bear
on the problell and the likelihood of identifying design deficiencies is greater.
Procedures
Althouah the study has indicated that there is not necessarily a correlation (for
drawpoints, tips, passes and chutes) between safety and the availability of standard
procedures, it is considered that a good quality set of "rules" will promote good
operation and safety. Codes of practice may in any case be required in terms of the
Mine Health and Safety Act. The research has shown that existing procedures on mines
are generally not logically prepared and appear to be reactive. It is recommended that
procedures should be proactively prepared in a standard logical format, minimising the
written word, and using a visual format as far as possible. They should be formally
reviewed on a routine basis, and updated as necessary. A suggested content is given in
the report. To achieve succint documents with maximum clarity, it is recommended
that draft procedures should be edited by a person experienced in the writing of
standard procedures.
Training
Induction training was provided on all mines visited, and thereafter on most mines "on
the job" training was the norm. Formal training was only provided in specific
situations. It is recommended that training should be formalised to ensure that workers
are taught:
to recognise hazards; to understand the procedures,

and to understand why they must coinply with procedures.
Trainers should be taught to train to ensure that the communication is maximised.
Proficiency testing should be carried out after the completion of a training programme,
and certifcates could be issued to record successful performance. Testing is essential to
Ineasure whether the training is being absorbed by the respective personnel. Routine
audit checks can be carried out to Inonitor that the training has on-going effectiveness.
Formal training should address the main causes of accidents, which are failure to
comply with standards and instructions, and lack of caution/alertness. It should also
instill a greater understanding of safety and the requirements of safe operating
practices.
VI
Management
Management is responsible for establishing the safety culture, formulating the

procedures, ensuring that the procedures are adhered to, and setting the example. To
achieve this, safety must have a very high profile. It is recommended that safety should
be a corporate responsibility at corporate director level; safety departments should
have the same status and authority as production departments; management personnel
must comply absolutely with all the procedures in order to set the example.
From the above recommendations, it is considered that the greatest benefit to safety
will accrue from formalised and appropriate training The next major benefit will be
from managefnent, who will be responsible for implementing the training, and
monitoring the success of the training programmes and the improvement in the safety
culture. The procedures form a basis for control of safety and a basis on which to
monitor adherence to safe practices. The design benefit is somewhat intangible, but a
well designed mine will result in a safe and efficient operation.
Recommendations for further research
The general conclusions which have arisen from the research presented in this report
are similar to those derived from other research projects (OTH202 and GEN213). It is
therefore recommended that further generalised research is not warranted. It is
considered that substantial benefit will be derived from training. It is therefore
recommended that specific research should be directed towards the following:
identification of the most appropriate training materials and methods; development

of appropriate training materials and methods for specific aspects such as hazard
recognition; development of methods for testing the effectiveness of the training;
development of specific training courses fr trainers.
SIMRAC PROJECT 0TH 303
DRAFT FINAL REPORT
I INTRODUCTION
The subject of this report is an investigation into the ore handling systems commonly
used on shallow mines in South Africa. This includes the following:
drawpoints - as the name implies, the location where the ore is drawn or extracted;
tips - from the drawpoint the ore is transported to the tip, which is the point at which it
is tipped into the ore pass. In some mines stope tips are used and the ore is scraped into
the tips; ore passes - these allow the ore to be transported from the level at which it is
tipped to a lower level at which it may be crushed or loaded for removal from the mine;
chutes - these are used to control the flow of ore from the ore passes into an
underground crusher, or into trains or skips for removal from the mine.
This rock flow systelll is shown diagrammatically in Fi aure I

2
3
pAss
ROC
K
Records obtained from the South African Mines Reportable Accidents Statistics
System of the Department of Minerals and Energy for shallow mines (including
platinum mines, but excluding gold and coal mines) indicate that, in the period I
January 1988 to 30 June 1 995, a total of 651 underground reportable accidents
SIMRAC Project 0TH 303 March 1997
4
occurred at the locations of drawpoints, tips, orepasses and chutes. 53 of these

accidents resulted in fatalities.
This investigation, which is aimed at addressing the safety issues, is being carried out
in terms of Mine Safety Research (SIMRAC) Project 0TH 303: "Investigation into
drawpoints, tips, ore passes and chutes". A copy of the proposal for this project,
defining the proposed scope of the research work, is included in Appendix A for
completeness.
The primary output from this investigation will be the following
identification of various ore and waste types handled; identification of various ore
and waste handling arrangements; identification of hazards associated with ore and
waste handling; identification of methods of reducing hazards, and recommendations
of most practical solutions, and training requirements for personnel.
In the investigation, which deals specifically with shallow mines, occurrences in the
deep level gold mines have been excluded in general. However, some aspects from the
gold mines, which have relevance to shallow mines, have been included. Since many
of the platinum mining operations are, or have been, shallow, and are in the same
geological environment as the chrome mines, they have been included in the
investigation.
The potential impacts which are expected to result from the present investigation are
improved safty through better design and operating understanding, and a basis for
appropriate training of design and operating personnel
This report is the final output of the investigation, and deals with a review of
international and South African literature on the subjects, and a review of reports of
accidents which
have occurred in South African mines.

5
The review of literature and analysis of accident statistics has formed the basis for the
development of detailed checklists which have been completed during mine visits to
obtain specific mine information.
2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The tur components of the ore handling system will be dealt with in the order in
which they occur in the system. It should be noted that the waste handling system is
usually indentical to the ore handling system, and will therefore be included in the
investigation. The literature review deals substantially with design aspects, which are
closely linked to safety, as well as with the identification of problem areas. It should be
noted that poor design and construction leads to more frequent failures and a greater
requirement for repair, maintenance and clearing of blockages, all of which may
expose workers to hazardous conditions. Good design therefre promotes safer
conditions. Actual accident occurrences in South African mines, and their causes, are
dealt with in the next chapter.
Not all mines use all four components of the rock handling system, and in some cases,
one or more of the components may be present at one or more locations in the rock
"stream".
The review has been kept general and reference has not been made to specific
publications. Particular publications have been referenced, but the body of literature
that has been reviewed is identified in the bibliography.
2. 1 Drawpoints
Not all shallow mines in South Africa make use of drawpoints for the extraction of
rock. For example, the shallow chrome and Olatinum mines tend to use scraper
systems to move the rock from the stope face to the strike gulley, and also along the
strike gulley to the

6
SIMRAC Pr(iect 0TH 303 March 1997

tip/stope orepass. In such cases there is no drawpoint. Scrapers are also used in the
scraper gulleys in the conventional block cave mining in the Kimberley Mines.
The layout of drawpoints, the geometry of drawpoints, and the support requirements
for stability of drawpoints vary for different mining methods and different ground
conditions. The stress conditions to which the drawpoints will be subjected also
depend on the mining

method.
Figure 2 illustrates three different mining methods and the corresponding drawpoint
layouts.
There is little information published in the literature dealing specifically with drawpoint
design. Some information is available as part of publications dealing with a mining
method. It would appear that drawpoint design is Inost critical in mines using block
caving or panel caving methods. The reason for this is that the extraction level
development takes place ahead of mining extraction, and the drawpoints are subjected
to a range of stresses during their life, as follows.
initial stresses during development abutment stresses as the cave front moves
over the drawpoint stress conditions during normal draw operations stress
concentrations due to arch loading from local hang-ups stress relaxation if larger
hang-ups occur across several drawpoints, and sudden redevelopment of stress when
hang-ups are cleared stress conditions after completion of extraction.
In addition to these rock mass imposed conditions, the drawpoints must withstand the
effects of mechanical action during ore extraction and secondary blasting. Support
u
installed in operatin(' block cave mines can ran e from no support, through rock
reinforcement with rockbolts to support with heavy steel arches and massive concrete.
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The stability of the layouts, and the reduction in the number of hang-ups, can be
optimised by correct spacing of drawpoints, by correct sizing of the pillars between the
drawpoints, by correct geometry of the drawbells, by complete undercutting, by correct
draw control, and by installation of support appropriate for the full range of stress
conditions to be expected. Mine design is also very important to achieve the best
fragmentation. Fragmentation size is a critical aspect, since it determines the freedom
of the draw, in contrast, the likely frequency of hangups, and hence the requirements for
secondary blasting. All of these aspects are dealt with by Laubscher (1994). If the
correct design procedures are implemented, the hazards associated with drawpoint
instability and repair, and with hang-up clearance will be minimised.
Similar consideration of the range of stress conditions is required for mining methods
such as sub-level open stoping and shrinkage stoping, in which the drawpoints, located
at the base of the open stope, must selve their purpose throughout the life of the stope.
In such cases, support which is appropriate to rnaintain stability for this full period, and
not just to suit conditions at the time of development, must be installed. This will
minimise the risk of rock-falls and the requirement for barring down and repair during
operation, and hence will improve safety. The stability of' the open stopes is important
since failure of blocks from the roof and sidewalls of stopes may involve large
fragmentation which causes hangups at the drawpoints.
In mining methods such as sub-level caving, and blast hole open stoping as practised at
Finsch Mine, the drilling drives also serve as drawpoints or loading drives. Compared
with the drawpoints in block cave mining, the drawpoints are not subjected to the same
range in stress conditions, nor require the same life - since the mining face is
retreating, the drawpoint "brow" is also retreating, a new "brow" is formed after each
blast and the support is required to be effective for a shoner period. In such situations
the rock support must be appropriate to maintain rock stability and to withstand
mechanical and secondary blasting damage Thc design of the layout hnust be such that

10
the spacing of adjacent drillin(' drives provides pillars of adequate integrity, but also
allows efficient drilling and blasting.
No publications dealing specifically with tips were found in the literature search.
Mention is made of tips in publications dealing with various mines, however.
It is expected that three types of tips will be encountered in shallow South African
mines.
These are.
stope tips associated with the use of scrapers, and located in the centre gulleys
at their intersections with strike gulleys in narrow reef panel mining operations.
These occur in the shallow chrome and platinum Inines. They are temporary in
that their life is limited to that of the centre gulley. The tips are usually
controlled, and have a steel grid over their entrance. Hammers are used to
break up oversized rocks.
tips into main passes using rail mounted tramming These are usually associated
with the above, loading material from the stope passes and transfering it to the
main tips located in the haulages adjacent to the hoisting shaft. These tips
accommodate bottom or side tipping muck cars. They are usually protected by
safty baniers in the haulage and gates or chains across their entrance (across
the tracks), and usually contain unidirectional bars at their top.
tips in mechanised mining operations, in which material is dumped by LHD or
truck. In sonle cases tipping takes place onto a grizzley to control the maximum
size of blocks, and there may be a rock breaker located at the tip for this
purpose. In other cases, if the passes can accommodate the maxilnum rock
block size, tipping may take place directly into the pass. Bumper blocks are
11
usually provided to prevent the mechanised equipment from falling into the tip.
This is the case at El Teniente Mine in Chile, Wessels, Assmang and other
mines in South Africa where the passes are large enough to pose a hazard to the
LHD's used. A circular concrete bumper wall approxilnately 750 mm high is
constructed around the exposed length of the pass. In other cases the size of the
pass at the tip is limited to ensure that there is no risk of the mechanised
equipment falling into the pass. This is the case at Mt Isa Mine in Australia, as
shown in Figure 3 (Myers and Dolan, 1982), where a stel lined tip ring
controls the size of the pass at the tip. No bumper block is necessary. The
design of the tip at Finsch Mine, in which a grizzley is used, is also illustrated
in Figure 3 (Lea and Boucher, 1994). In the original design, tipping over a 1m
high bumper wall resulted in large blocks falling 3m onto the grizzley, causing
daniage to the grizzley bars and hitches. In the revised design there is no
bumper block and the level of the grizzley has been raised to floor level,
reducing the impact loading. If no grizzley is used, the tip ring usually needs to
be steel lined to counter wear where the tipping impact takes place. This is
illustrated in Figure 3 for Mt Isa Mine.
2.3 Ore passes
Ore passes are a key elelnent of any mine's operations, but it may be stated that usually
less attention is given to their design compared with the design of other elements of the
mine. Design in this context, includes location, orientation, size, shape, length, method
of excavation, support, system geometry, and operating principles. Other factors, such
as storage capacity and required operating life, may also be important in certain
circumstances.
The literature on ore passes is reasonably extensive, and much of it contains

descriptions offhilures of passes and systems. These failures often have associated
SIMRAC 0TH 303 March 1997

12
hazards, including the operation of the passes, and the repair or rehabilitation of the
failed passes. In the review, the following will be dealt with.
problems experienced in passes factors influencing the performance of passes
ORE PASS
APPROACH
RAIL
S
RING
SECTION
MOUNT ISA MINE
DESIGN
NEW DESIGN
13
TIP - FINSCH MINE
FIG NQ
TIP LAYOUTS 3

Il
2.3 1 Problems experienced in passes
Problems are defined as any occurrences which cause the pass to operate at less than
the designed performance level. Most of the problems are potentially associated with
hazards, either during operation or during implementation of measures to overcome the
problems.
The following summarises problems which are commonly reported in the literature:
Hang-ups
These may occur anywhere along the length of the pass. They prevent the flow
of rock and hence stop production from the pass. The stability of a hang-up is
uncertain, and the procedures involved in clearing the hang-up can therefore be
hazardous. These procedures will be dealt with in a further section below. The
consequences of the sudden clearing of the hang-up can also be hazardous.
Hang-ups are mainly due to arching of material within the pass, which may
have several causes:
blocks of rock too large for the size of the pass. These may be from the
ore or waste tipped into the pass, or blocks resulting from collapses or
scaling within the pass due to the geological structure, the presence of
weaker rock horizons or zones, or to overstressing.
foreign material such as steel supports and timber. In this regard, grout
flows into the pass can also promote hang-ups.
compaction of rock material, which occurs when passes are not "moving" and
particularly when there is a significant alnount of fine material, and
when this material is wet. This "sticky" material may hang up itself, and
may also stick to the sides of the pass, reducing the size of the pass and

15
hence facilitating the formation of conventional arching hang-ups. This

behaviour is Inore likely to occur in the vicinity of changes in direction
in
the pass.
Blockages
Blockages usually occur at the chute beneath the pass. The cross sectional area
of the chute is smaller than that of the pass and hence all of the above causes of
hang-ups are also relevant for blockages. Blockages can lead to run-aways,
which are dealt with below.
Collapses
These may occur within the pass and are a function of the geological structure
and the geological materials present. These, on their own, may lead to
collapses. Scaling due to high stresses, and wear of the pass, both of which are
dealt with below, can interact with the geological structure and lead to
subsequent collapses. Collapsed material may itself block the pass and cause a
hang-up, or, with continuing collapse, a large opening may result which can
lead to major instability and blockage of the pass.
Scaling
Under conditions in which the stresses in the walls of the pass exceed the
strength of the rock, stress scaling from the walls can occur. This does not
necessarily require high stresses, but silnply that the stress exceeds strength, as
might occur in horizons or zones of weak rock. Scaling is aggravated by the
abrading effect of the rock falling down the pass, and will also interact with the

16
geological material and structure. A collapse and blockage can ultimately

result.
Wear
Wear involves the abrasion of the surfaces of the pass and the plucking out of
rock blocks from the surfaces of the pass, and includes impact. Wear leads to
enlargement of the pass and ultimately to geological structural collapse. It is
enhanced in weak rock material and in the presence of stress scaling. It is
usually greatest on the footwall surface of the pass, but may not be when
interaction with weak rock and stress scaling occurs.
Run-aways
Run-aways are the uncontrolled flow of the contents of the pass past the control
chute, and include mud rushes. They are associated with excess water, and
often also with "sticky" material and compaction conditions.
2.3.2 Factors influencing the performance of passes
There is some information dealing with the performance of passes in shallow mines
from a failure point of view (there is a greater alnount of corresponding information for
the deep level gold mines, but in most cases the causes are the high stress levels, which
are not usually relevant to shallow mines). Fron1 the information available for massive
mining operations, it is not usual for passes to carry as much as a million tons of rock
before requiring rehabilitation work. Infrmation obtained from the literature on the
performance of passes is summarised in Appendix B. From this information it is
possible to identify several factors which have an influence on pass perfornl,ance
Location of passes

17
The quality of the rock iTiass in which the pass is located may have the most
significant effect on the performance of the pass This is shown in many
published

18
cases in which failure of a pass or system occurs preferentially in the weaker

rock areas. An example, from a gold mine (Minney, 1990), is the formation,
from an ore pass, of a cavity with a volume of 7000 m 3, associated with the
intersection of major geological structures.
Passes should therefore be located in the best quality rock mass possible.
However, the location of passes is often dictated by other factors such as
proximity to the shaft system or to the extraction area, and there is little scope
for choice of location. When weak rock material or rock masses cannot be
avoided, the lining of passes is likely to be necessary. Examples of this are the
pass system in the soft footwall at Broken Hill Mine (Caddy, 1982) and in the
blocky norite at Premier Mine (Bartlett et al, 1992). Pass support is dealt with
separately below.
If stress is a fhctor affecting the stability of the pass, then the location of the
pass with respect to the orientation of the stress may be appropriate. For
example, in hi('h stress conditions, to locate it in a stress shadow area, or, under
low stress conditions, to locate it in an area that provides well-confined
conditions.
Orientation of passes with respect to geological structure
It has been found that, in passes in the same rock mass quality, failure occurs
more readily for some orientations with respect to the geological structure than
for others. In stratified rock masses, for example, passes intersecting the strata
at acute angles are less stable than passes orientated normal to the plane of the
strata. A corresponding effect on the behaviour of passes in non-stratified rock
can be expected when continuous joint sets are present.

19
Except in cases in which particular geological structure, such as faulting, plays a

malor role, the presence of weak materials is likely to be of greater significance
than the effect of the orientation of the pass
Orientation of passes with respect to stress
Whereas stress effects are probably the greatest cause of problems in passes in
the deep level gold mines, and warrant consideration of pass orientation with
respect to the stress orientations, the same considerations are probably not
necessary nor possible in shallower mines.
Size of pass
The size of the pass compared with the maximum size of block to be handled is
a very important factor with regard to the possibility of hang-ups and
blockages. Fron1 studies carried out, and einpirical evidence, it has been shown
that if the ratio of pass diameter to block size is less than 3, hang-ups are almost
certain to occur. If the ratio is greater than 5 they are almost certain not to
occur. It has even been suggested that a ratio of 10 should be adopted to ensure
free flow. Model studies carried out by Gold Fields indicated that the
corresponding values were and 6,0. The tables summarising pass performance,
which are presented in Appendix B, give examples of passes in which the ratio
is small and hang-ups occur frequently.
Hang-ups also occur when the rock being passed contains a significant
proportion of fines material such that, with water present, a cohesive arch is
formed. The required size of pass to avoid a hang-up of this form depends on
the cohesion developed in the material, and could be considerable. The "sticky"
material factor is dealt with separately below.

20
Inclination of pass
The inclination of the pass has an effct on the flovv' characteristics, the
possibility of hanging up, wear of the pass surfaces, wear of impact points and
compaction
of fine material
If the pass is very steep, when empty, blocks of rock may travel down the pass
at high speed, bouncing against the walls and possibly causing damage. Caddy
(1982) describes the results of model testing carried out to determine these
effects for Broken Hill, South Africa. High speed impacts may also cause
damage at bends and branch intersections. High speed impact on the material in
controlled passes causes compaction which promotes hang-ups. Experiments
carried out by Gold Fields on controlled passes showed that hang-ups were less
likely to occur when the inclination of the pass was reduced from the vertical.
If the inclination is insufficient, however, material will not flow satisfactorily,
leading to hang-ups and blockages. This is particularly the case when the
material being passed contains wet fines, and in such cases inclinations in
excess of 700 may be required. Owing to the lower compaction in inclined
passes, the energy required to clear hang-ups is usually less than that required
in vertical passes.
There are two other factors of relevance regarding the inclination of passes:
in inclined passes the material tends to slide down the footwall

surface and this surface will wear preferentially
the shallower the inclination of the pass the greater the length of
that pass (see below).

21
Length of passes
Experience indicates that the longer the pass, the more likely it is to have
problems This is due to the greater extent of rock mass traversed, the greater
a
velocities that material being passed can attain before being arrested, and the
reater difficulty of access in the event of a hang-up or blockage and 'When
rehabilitation is required.
Most passes which have not experienced problems are less than 50 m in length.
This is illustrated by experience fronl Anglo American gold mines (Emmerich,
1992), in which 88% of bored and 56% of conventionally excavated passes
which developed problems were greater than 50 m in length. At El Teniente
Mine in Chile, which uses a block caving mining method, successful ore pass
systems have a length between control stations of approximately 60 m. In the
LHD mining area, where block sizes are greater, the distance between
production level and tramming level is about 70 m. Two passes lead from
adjacent drifts to a branch just above a pickhammer chamber, below which is a
single pass to the tramming level. The maximum individual len ath of pass is
therefore about 40 m.
Method of excavation
Raise boring produces a smooth pass surface which should promote flow and
reduce the possibility of hang-ups. Conversely, however, this smoothness
allows the material to flow at a faster rate which can lead to greater compaction
and wear problems In such cases, footwall roughening has been carried out to
prevent the Inovement of Inaterial "en masse". This has the additional benefit
of increasing the size of the pass, which reduces the possibility of hang-ups.
Claims of better performance from passes excavated by drill and blast methods,

22
which do appear in the literature, are possibly explained by the larger size of
the pass rather than the rougher surface or method of excavation This is
probably the case in the experience in An alo American gold Illines (Emmerich,
1992), in which more problems were experienced with raise bored passes.
"Sticky" material
The following problems may occur when "sticky" Inaterial is present (also
referred to as "pa agin att or cohesive a uglomeration), all of which could lead to
the frmation of hang-ups
compaction of the material occurs when wet "sticky" material dries out in
the pass compaction of material due to the impact from the fall of the
material is more likely
"sticky" material may adhere to the sides of the pass, reducing its effective
size. This often occurs at bends and branch intersections the presence of sticky
material can cause small particles to adhere together to form, effectively, much
larger particles. These may be sufficiently large to exceed the size ratio required
to prevent hang-ups.
In addition to the above, when sticky material is present there is a greater

probability of occurrence of run-aways and mud rushes, which can be very
hazardous.
The data in Tables I and 2 in Appendix B indicate that problems with sticky or
cohesive material occur in many mines. A review of pass problems in Anglo
Alnerican gold mines (Emmerich, 1992) showed that sticky ore accounted for
30% of all problems experienced in passes in those mines.

23
Pass system geometry
In the sections above on length and inclination of passes, the geometry factor
has been dealt with to a large extent. However, in addition to optimising these,
the
q ase locations
are geometries of bends and branch intersections are importa' subject to wear,
impact, and slowing of material flow, erefore more likely locations for hang-
ups. A recommendation from the literature is that the angles of bends should
not be less than 1 200 to promote free flow. The relative sizes of branches and
main passes Illust also be chosen carefully to ensure that constriction does not
occur, particularly if both branches are in use at the same time

24
Operating methods
If a pass is kept full, the material in the pass provides confinement to the sides
of the pass. This is particularly applicable to reducing wear in areas of poor
geological structure, and to reducing scaling in high stress conditions. A full
pass also prevents wear and damage due to impact from blocks falling at high
velocity. At Creighton Mine in Canada it was found that rapid and continuous
deterioration of highly stressed unsupported passes occurred when they were
kept empty (Morrison et al, 1992). This suggested that the lack of wall
confinement and impact wear are critical factors in orepass stability.
The retention of material in a pass increases the probability of a hang-up

occurring, particularly if sticky material is present. To reduce this possibility it
is important that the material is drawn regularly so that the rock column is kept
moving. The balance between retention for storage, retention for stability
purposes and retention for a period which results in a hang-up can be fine. At
Finsch Mine (Lea and Boucher, 1994), passes were planned as large buffer
stockpiles of ore. In practice, because of compaction and resulting hang-ups, the
level has had to be reduced to 40% of the planned capacity and, during wet
conditions, to only 10% of the planned capacity.
Passes which are filled for their storage capacity, and then drawn empty on a
regular basis, may be considered to be equivalent to their being operated empty.
This situation is probably the case at El Teniente Mine in Chile where a full
pass is drawn empty to provide a flill train load
Clearing of hang-ups and blockages
When a hang-up occurs, the first problem is to determine its location. This may
be easy if there is some visibility of the blockage from an access point (eg
Figure 4). Accesses to passes have been found to be very useful at Finsch Mine
(Lea and Boucher, 1994). They have allowed the inside of the box fronts to be
inspected and have allowed explosives to be placed in physical contact with
blockages, thus making the explosive more effective and requiring smaller
charges. In cases of more remote hang-ups, it is necessary to use devices such
as helium balloons or remote TV calnera inspection. Once the hang-up has
been detected there are several ways reported in the literature in which it can be
cleared:
when the hang-up is sufficiently close to a point of access, explosives (bombs)

can be placed using a blasting stick (slat, sapling, lath) at the hang-up
(Figures 4 and 5). The concussion from the blast is depended on, since
it is not always possible to place the explosive in contact with the hang-
up. The use of blasting to clear hang-ups damages the walls of the pass
and, in addition potentially to leading to collapses and locations of
further hang-ups, may reduce the life of the pass.
when the hang-up is too distant for this, but there is a direct line of sight of
the blockage from an access point, slugshots (ba)listic discs) can be
used (Lindroth and Anderson, 1982). The pass usually has to be entered
to set up this operation, which is hazardous, but it is reported that
slugshotting is usually successtll. The hang-up Inust have a "square"
face to aim at for the greatest chance of success. If an oblique face is
present, the slug is likely to deflect without clearing the blockage. If the
hangup is due to the presence of sticky material, slugshotting may
exacerbate the problem and consolidate the blockage fitrther.
26
ACCESS
HANG- UP
COHESIVE
AGGLOMERATION, RAISE, RAMP
" STICKY" MATERIAL,
BLOCKAGE, HANG-UP

DIAGRAMMATIC ILLUSTRATION FIG
OF PASS ACCESS FOR INSPECTION AND NQ
CLEARING OF HANG-UPS AND
BLOCKAGES
STADRAFT 87- 1736
BLOCKAGE
HANG- UP
BOMB
OF BOMBS FIG
USE TO CLEAR BLOCKAGES NQ
STA-DRAFT
the use of "sputniks" is an alternative to slugshotting, and has been
found to be successful with hangups due to sticky material. The
"sputnik" is a compressed air driven, explosive carrying device which
jets its way up the pass to the hangup. Special guide vanes control its
stability.
29
Access points also provide the possibility of clearing build up of sticky

material from the pass using a scraper, or mobile water and air injection
systems. They also facilitate the use of slugshots and sputniks.
boreholes can be drilled from the top of the pass through the rock material in
the pass using raise bore equipment. Explosives are then pulled up
against the blockage using a rope lowered down through the hole. This
method carries a high risk to the equipment since it could be dragged
down if the blockage releases during drilling. In addition, if the hole
deflects into the solid, the rods 'may be damaged.
percussion holes can be drilled from upper or lower levels, through the
rock mass, to intersect the pass at the hang-up location. Explosives are
then placed at the hang-up location, usually using a rope by means of
which the charge is pulled up against or into the hang-up.
in the case of hang-ups due to cohesive arches (sticky material
situation), they may be cleared by undermining the blockage using high
pressure water and air. This may also require the drilling of boreholes to
intersect the hang-up location.
In sorne cases, permanent installations are Inade at locations of

expected hang-ups. These consist of boreholes in which pipes are
grouted, exiting into the passes at key locations They provide a
permanent means of injecting high pressure water to promote flow of
the material in the pass in the event of hang-ups.
The use of water in passes can be dangerous since it may lead to
mudrushes. Use of water must therefore be carefully controlled and

must be under the specific permission and control of the responsible
person.

30
Support of passes
The risk of deterioration of passes leading to hang-ups and blockages and the
hazards associated with them can generally be reduced by implementing
support of some kind. This can take the form of rock reinforcement or the
installation of a shotcrete, concrete or steel lining, or a combination of these
measures. The requirement for support is not automatic, but will depend on
numerous factors, some of which are:
geotechnical factors: the rock mass quality, the geological structure, the in situ
stress conditions, and the rock material strength construction factors: the
method of excavation (raise bore or blast), the shape of the pass, the orientation
of the pass, and the time taken for excavation planning factors: the desired life
of the pass, the tonnage to be handled, the strategic importance of the pass, the
time between excavation and usage, the time of excavation relative to the
mining operations (for example, will the pass be influenced by large stress
changes?)
Determination of the stability of the pass and the geotechnical requirement for
rock support is usually based on rock mass classification (McCracken and
Stacey,
1989). Rock reinforcement, usually in the form of rockbolts, has been used
frequently, but, from most reports, not with a great deal of success. Particularly
in blocky rock and scaling rock situations, wear of the pass causes the rock in
between the bolts to fll out. This leaves the bolts much less effective,
protruding, and ultimately of no value An example of this is Premier Mine
(Bartlett et al,
1 992), where rock reinforcement was found to be generally ineffective, and the

31
decision has been taken to concrete line all production ore passes.
Conventional rigid rockbolts have been found to be inappropriate for pass

support, since the impact of material flowing down the pass sets up vibrations
of the bolt which destroys the bonding of the bolt. Fibreglass bolts, which can
wear at the same rate as the walls of the pass and so do not protrude to allow
impact from flowing material, have been found to be effective at Salvador
Mine in Chile. In the same way, wire rope reinforcement is not subject to
vibration and, with wear of the pass walls, the exposed ropes hang down the
sides of the pass and do not pose an impact problem. In fact, in this condition
they will provide a measure of protection against further wear of the rock
surface. Rock reinforcement should be installed in upwards inclined holes so
that any impact from material flowing down the pass does not contact the
support at an acute angle.
The installation of linings or liners may be required in certain circumstances.

In weak rock, or in fissile, scaling or closely jointed blocky rock, a lining may
be the only way of supporting the rock and preventing uncontrolled in the size
of the pass. An example of this is the pass system at Broken Hill Mine, South
Africa (Caddy, 1982). Different types of linings have been used. In cases in
which the material being passed is not abrasive, and therefore wear is not a
problem, conventional concrete as a lining material may suffice. When wear is
a problem, special types of concrete have been used. These include corundum
and andesite lava based shotcretes and concretes and steel fibre reinforced
concrete. These concretes have higher strengths or are tougher than
conventional concrete, which ITIay provide an added benefit. In non-vertical
passes, a greater thickness of lining on the footwall, to accommodate wear,
increases the life and stability of the pass.

32
Precast concrete pipes, both in full circle form and as segments, have been
used successfully for lining of passes. Specia! systems have been developed
for their installation and, once in place, the annulus between the pipe and the
rock is backfilled with concrete (Anon, 1993a and 1993b).
Steel liners, in the form of complete "tubes", as steel rails set in concrete, or as
a combination of both, have frequently been used for pass support, usually in
situations in which wear is a significant problem. Special replaceable
manganese steel "bricks" were installed at Broken Hill Mine to counter wear.
The use of steel may be localised at areas of particular wear such as tipping
points and bends, where wear and impact are severe. It should be noted that
these steel items represent "freign material" which, when worn and loosened,
can be the cause of hang-ups.
Rehabilitation of failed passes
Rehabilitation of passes is required to stabilise unsafe conditions and to
minimise conditions which could lead to the formation of hang-ups and
blockages. It can be considered to fall into three categories.
obtain access to the pass and install rock reinforcement support, and possibly
shotcrete, to the surface of the enlarged pass opening. The enlarged
pass then continues to be used for its purpose.
install a steel tube, or concrete pipe, which will constitute the new pass and
backfill around this with concrete and waste rock. A variation on this is
to fill the pass cavity with concrete and waste rock, and then to rebore
the pass through this concrete. These methods have both proved to be
successful.

33
A further alternative, in the case in which the pass cannot be cleared of

material blocking it, is to grout the material and then rebore a hole
through the ('routed mass. This has been attempted, but the attempt
was not successful. The main problem was the inability to obtain
satisfactory grout penetration into the material in the pass.
replacement of the pass by reboring or redeveloping a new pass, and waste filling or
abandoning the old pass.
Rehabilitation can be very time consuming and hazardous. At Salvador Mine

in Chile, the time required for pass rehabilitation has been from 10 to 72 days
per pass. At Thabazimbi, two passes took 90 and 150 days respectively to
rehabilitate.
2.4 Chutes
Chutes are the final component of the gravity rock flow system in a mine (the ore
chute described by Caddy ( 1982) is simply an inclined pass, designed to allow
material to flow continuously from the tipping point to the storage silo, initialy by
bouncing and rolling, but subsequently by sliding, without the requirement for flow
control). Rock is loaded from the chutes into trains, skips, crushers etc. A chute
represents a constriction in the rock flow systenl, and therefore design to ensure free
flow and to minimise adherence of sticky material is important.
The literature on chute design is mainly related to the use of conveyors, and some of
these references are included in the bibliography. No papers were found which deal
directly with the design of chutes for underground mining situations. It is probable
that mines and mining houses have developed their own chute designs, involving the
cross-sectional size and shape, the inclination, the type of surface, and the associated

34
civil and mechanical structures, to suit their own conditions This design information
does not appear to be publicly available.
Some of the problems associated with chutes at Finsch Minc are described by Lea and
Boucher ( 1994) These were particularly related to the presence of water and the formation of
a cohesive agglomeration (referred to by them as "pagging"). This situation can lead to
blockages which involve the build up of mud in the system and can result in hazardous mud
rushes. At Finsch, such a build up caused the failure of the top of the 4m x 4m feed chute,
leading to the collapse of some of the boxfront civil and mechanical structures. As a result of
this occurrence the design of the structural steelwork on all boxfronts was improved to
increase the strength of the steelwork.
3 ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT REPORTS
One of the primary outputs included in the project proposal was the identification of
hazards associated with ore and waste handling. To address this issue, accident reports
for the period I January 1988 to 30 June 1995 were obtained from the South African
Mines Reportable Accidents Statistics System of the Department of Minerals and
Energy. The output from this system, which has been analysed, has included all
g
reportable accidents in shallow mines, excludin ('Old and coal mines, which have
occurred at the locations of drawpoints, tips, orepasses and chutes. The decision was
taken to include platinum mines in the analyses, since these mines are often shallow,
and are very similar in geological enviromnent and mining Inethod to many of the
chrome mines.
3. 1 Accidents at drawpoint locations
A total of 58 accidents was recorded at drawpoint locations during the seven and a
half year period, which includes 9 fatalities A review of' the types of accidents and

35
their causes revealed that not all of these accidents are specific to drawpoints and can
therefore be excluded from consideration. For example, some of the accidents which
can be excluded are those due to servicing of equipment, to burning and scalding and
splinters in eyes etc Based on this subjective assessment of the reported accidents, 48
were considered to be directly related to the drawpoint location. These have been
analysed and it has been found to be Instructive to present the results with respect to
four aspects: reported classifications of the accidents reported causes of the
accidents the years of experience of workers involved in the accidents the nature of
the injuries sustained
These will be dealt with in turn.
3.1.1 Classifications of accidents
The accident reports indicate classifications of accidents such as "Fall of

material/rolling rock", "Fall of ground: gravity: hanging", "Inundation: engulfed by",
"Handling mineral:
rolling", "Rolling rock (not fall of ground)" etc. For presentation of the 48 accidents,
these have been grouped into four categories:
Fall of ground. gravity, hangingwall and sidewall
Fall of material/rolling rock; handling minerals: loading/rolling

Inundation: engulfed by
Miscellaneous
The distribution of the accidents in these classifications is shown in Figure 6. It can be

seen that the great majority of them fall into the second grouping. In spite of this large
number, only one fatality resulted in this grouping.

36
The second nnost common classification is "thll of ground" and, of the I l accidents
which occurred, 2 resulted in fatalities. Falls of ground in drawpoints therefore
represent a serious Issue
Three of the accidents in the third grouping - inundation/engulfing - occurred in a

single event, and this type of accident is not coniion. However, all four accidents in
this category resulted in fatalities, indicating that it is a most serious issue.

SNOIIVD()IINIOdlWV(IIVSINa(IK)OVHOSNOIJVOIdISSV"IDdONOILA81ISI(I
ON1110 ONI(IVO"I
S"IVgNlYNONI"ICINVH
9t
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'TIV\(IIS(INVONIONVH
CINfO9dO'IIVd
9
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Sun"IV,LVd S MOd V IV 0
31
The miscellaneous grouping includes accidents which were subjectively interpreted as

being specific to drawpoints, but they might not be.
3.1.2 Causes of accidents
The accident reports contain descriptions of the causes of the accidents such as
"Failure to comply with instructions", "Lack of caution/alertness", "Failure to use
safety devices" etc. The distribution of the 48 accidents with respect to the allocated
causes is presented in Figure 7. It can be seen that the major causes of accidents are
inadequate examination/inspection, lack of caution/alefiness and failure to comply
with standards. These causes were also associated with 5 fatalities. The occurrence of
accidents as a result of these causes is disturbing since it might imply:
workers are not perceptive of hazards in their surroundings, possibly as a result of

lack of training, lack of interest, lack of visibility, fatigue etc workers ignore hazards
possibly due to lack of the above perceptions, bravado, disobedience of instructions
and standards, becoming blase to their surroundings etc.
It is sobering to note that, if adequate examination and inspection had been carried
out, alertness and caution had been practised, safty devices had been used, and
standards and instructions complied with, 33 injuries and 7 fatalities might have been
avoided.
3. 1.3 Experience of workers involved in accidents
The distribution of years of experience of' workers involved in drawpoint accidents is

shown in Figure 8. It might be expected that new workers would be involved in a
significant number of accidents through their inexperience. This does appear to be
somewhat the case, but the concerning data are the numbers of experienced workers,
with 2 to 3 years on the job, involved in almost half of the total accidents.
SNOIIVOO"IINIOd/WV(IIVSINa(11DDVdOSaSfVOdONOIIf1811SI(I
HLNI10N V(INVSINIOdh'\VCI01OldIOdS ON
L
SINgCIIOOV 0
SIJ11VJVd H
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE OF WORKERS
FIGURE 8
DISTRIBUTION OF EXPERIENCE OF WORKERS
INVOLVED IN ACCIDENTS AT DRAWPOINT LOCATIONS
34
This could imply that they lack motivation or have become blase about their
surroundings. The distribution of worker years of experience on the mines is not
known - it may be that the majority of workers are in the 2 to 3 year experience
category, which could explain the relatively larger accident numbers. This was not the
case for the mines visited (see Section 4).
Only two of the workers who died in accidents had less than a year's experience. Eight
out of the 10 fatals had more than 2,5 years of experience and some far more than this.
3.1.4 Nature of injuries
Of the total number of injuries of 49 (excludes the 9 fatalities), as many as 42

involved injuries to the hands, including fingers, arms, legs (knee and below) and feet,
including ankles and toes (72% of the total number of accidents considered).
3.2 Accidents at tip locations
The accident records at tip locations include centre gulley and tip location, vertical
shaft station tip location and inclined shaft station tip location. It is expected that the
recorded accidents include all accidents which occurred at these locations and not
only the accidents which were associated with the actual tips. However, it may be
argued that most activities at these locations are associated in some way with the
tipping process. 332 accidents fr all underground mines, excluding gold and coal
mines, were reported. These reports were examined and some of the accidents
excluded subjectively as not being associated with the tips (for example
burning/scalding, servicing equipment etc). This reduced the total number of relevant
accidents to 288, and these were analysed further, as for the drawpoints above.
SIMRAC Proiect 0TH 303 March 1997
35
3.2. I Classifications of accidents
In the tip locations a greater number of classification descriptions occur than for the
drawpoints. However, some of these have been consolidated, with the result that all
accidents have been grouped into six classifications:
vehicle related accidents, including loco's, LHD's and skips/conveyances scraper

winch related accidents slip and fall, fall off, fall into fall of material, rolling rock;
handling mineral/material: rolling, pulling, lifting etc fall of ground: gravity, hanging
and sidewall miscellaneous (including splinters, inundation etc).
The distribution of the 288 accidents in these six groupings is shown in Figure 9. The
accidents have been differentiated between platinum and other mines, and between the
centre gulley and tip and the inclined and vertical shaft station tip locations. These
results show the relatively large numbers of accidents at the centre gulley and tip
location for all types of mines. By far the most accidents resulted from the fall of
material and the handling of material (almost half of the total), but no fatalities
resulted in this classification. The remaining accidents are reasonably evenly spread
amongst the other four main classifications: 34 vehicle accidents (6 fatalities), 45
scraper winch related accidents (6 fatalities), 32 slip and fall accidents (4 fatalities, all
falling into excavations), and 29 fall of ground accidents (4 fatalities)
The recorded causes of accidents have been grouped as shown in Figure 10. More
than half of the accidents are reported to be due to failure to comply with standards or
instructions, and Inost of these accidents occurred on platinum mines. The reason for
this is not clear, but the implication could be that the workers are not well informed as
to what the standards are and/or that the standards are not being applied by the more
senior staff.
This cause is reported to have resulted in 10 fatalities during the review period.
SNOIIVOO"IdlIJV,-LNaaIODV 0SNOIIVDIdISSVr-IDdONOIJf1811SI(I
dlJNOIJVJSJAYHS
6 dlJNOIJVJSJAVHS
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dlJ"11fO Nao d11(INV11A"I"If) IN
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01

50
Failure to comply with standards is not a disproportionate cause of accidents in the other
mines.
As for the drawpoint locations, many accidents occur due to lack of

caution and alertness, and inadequate examination or inspection,
which are causes possibly related to lack of training or lack of
information. These two causes resulted in 7 fatalities.
3.2.3Experience of workers involved in accidents
The distribution of years of experience of workers involved in

accidents at tip locations is shown in Figure I l. As for the drawpoint
locations, it can be seen that the two to three year experience group
is involved in the most accidents. This is true for platinum and other
mines. In this case, however, as can be expected, the inexperienced
workers are involved in a large number of accidents - the
combination of the first two columns, which includes all the
accidents for workers in their first year of experience, totals almost
the same as the accident numbers in the 2 to 3 year experience
group.
13 out of the total number of fatalities of 21 were in the experience group

between I and
3 years (7 between 2 and 3 years). 5 had experience of less than a year.
259 of the total nunlber of reported accidents at tip locations in the

period I January 1988 to 30 June 1995 involved injuries to the arms, hands,
fingers, legs (knee and below), ankles, tet and toes (78%) The corresponding number
fr the selected 288 accidents is 228 (79%)

Project
PLATINUM
NON
-PLATINUM
FIGURE 11
52
DISTRIBUTION OF EXPERIENCE OF WORKERS INVOLVED IN
ACCIDENTS
AT TIP LOCATIONS
Accidents at orepass locations
A review of the reported statistics for accidents which occurred at boxhole and pass
locations indicates that a total of 143 selected accidents can be allocated specifically
to these areas From the summary records it is not possible to differentiate between the
boxhole and the pass accidents, but it is suspected that many of the accidents are
associated with boxhole development. None of the accidents could be identified
specifically as being associated with any of the orepass problems identified in Section
2 above Therefore, whilst the hazards associated with pass hang-ups and blockages,
for example, are possibly very significant, the records do not appear to indicate that
accidents related to such hazards have materialised.
A total of 1 9 fatalities was reported at boxho[e and pass locations during the review
period, which confirms the hazards associated with working in steeply dipping
excavations
3 3 1 Classifications of accidents
The distribution of the classification of the selected accidents is shown in Figure 12.
Only tour classification groupings were considered to be significant in the
boxhole/pass category The miscellaneous grouping includes a number of
classifications (lack of illumination, lack of systems/facilities, lack of training lack of
standards/proceures, failure to supply safty devices, failure to use safety devices),
each of which only involved a small number of accidents It can be seen that fall of
material/materials handling and fall of ground are still major causes of accidents
Compared with the drawpoint and tip accidents above, fall of a round accidents are
much more significant This, and the relative increase in slip and fall accidents, are
probably the result of the sub-vertical excavation and the increased risk of fall of
material and workers in this confined environment. The trends are similar for both
platinum and non-platinum nunes

SNOIIVO()I'VIOHX08~SSVd 0 0NO~
ZI
55
3 3 2 Causes of accidents
As shown in the distribution of accident causes in Figure 13, the sanie three most
common causes are as for the drawpoints and tips above failure to comply with
standards/instructions, inadequate examination/inspection, and lack of
caution/alertness. For the passes, as for the drawpoints, inadequate
examination/inspection has assumed the most significant position.
Experience of workers involved in accidents
The same trend as indicated above for the drawpoints and tips is evident for the
passes/boxholes - workers in the 2 to 3 year experience bracket are involved in the
most accidents The distribution is shown in Figure 14
10 of the 19 workers who were killed were in the 2 to 3 year experience group, with 6
in the less than I year group and 3 in the ( T reater than 10 year group.
3.3.4 Nature of inj uries
In the boxhole/pass area, 89 of the selected accidents involved legs (knee and below),
ankles, feet, toes, arnis, hands and fingers This represents 62% of the number of
accidents considered, which is a lower percentage than for the drawpoints (72%) and
tips (79%) This might indicate that the boxhole/pass location is one in which Inore
serious accidents are likely to be incurred
Accidents at chute locations
The data on chute accidents retrieved from the South African Mines Reportable
Accidents Statistics System include a large number of accidents which occurred on
surface and which are associated with conveyor chutes Of the four locations being
dealt with, chutes

56
Prolect

SNOIIVDO"INIOHXO WSSVdIVS N30 dOSaSfV3dO
SgNIJ'NJ'NfNIJV1d-NON SANIJNJ/NfNLLV"ld
09 0 OZ
.
NOIIDdSNI/N011VNIAVXg
SNOIIDAHISNI/sQV(INVIS
0 HIIA\A"IdVNO01
S I N g C I I O D V
'HINIJON O HI (INV ONISSV 9 SSSVd01 JON gA()8VS
'IVJV *

(S6/9/088 I I)

*SIIIFIVIVd SNOIIVDO"IaFIOHX08 SSVdaO dOaSf1V3

IV 0ya8WfN
45 are perhaps the least well defined Some of
the accidents recorded may really be unrelated to chute construction or operation In
the analysis of underground records which is carried out here, reports which appear to
be unrelated to chutes, including those dealing with conveyor chutes, have been
excluded as far as possible - an attempt has been made to limit the data to the rock
transport system in underground mines. If the number chosen still includes
inappropriate cases, then this is conservative, and the implication is that there are
fewer "real" chute accidents.
The result of the review was to identify a total of only 50 accidents which might be
associated specifically with chutes. Included in this number are 4 fatalities.
Classifications of accidents
The major group of accidents, as shown in Figure 1 5, is that which includes fall of
rock and materials and materials handlin(' The two a roups involvin cr conveyances and
cy
fallin appear somewhat unlikely with regard to chutes specifically. It was in these
two groups that 3 of the fatalities occurred, and the fourth fatality (miscellaneous)
could well also have fallen into one of these two groups
Again, as shown in Figure 16, failure to comply with standards and instructions, and
lack of caution/alefiness are recorded as the mam causes of accidents. Unlike the
drawpoint, tip and pass locations dealt with above, however, inadequate
examination/inspection is not a significant cause and accounted for only one of the 50
accidents
SNOIIVOOTI AHOIV 0SNOIJVOI,nSSVFIO 0NOI n
'YHJO
X)fJS
SNOIIV301 do
91
64
Experience of workers involved in accidents
The distribution shown in Figure 17 shows the same pattern as for the other locations
the greatest number of accidents occur in the 2 to 3 year experience group, closely
followed by the group with less than a year of experience.
35 of the 50 accidents involved legs (knee and below), ankles, feet, toes, arms, hands and
fingers This is 70 % of the total
Discussion
The purpose of the above review of accident reports has been to identify the main
causes of accidents and hence the areas in which emphasis needs to be placed to
reduce the numbers of accidents. A second aim was to try to diffrentiate between
those accidents which IXIight result fronl design issues and those which result from
other causes. The reported causes include categories such as inadequate
fencing/guarding, lack of standards/procedures, failure to supply safety devices, lack
of systems/facilities, which might be considered to be dependent on design and
specification These categories did not account for a large number of accidents Other
causes, such as falls of ground, falling into excavations, and being struck by
conveyances might involve a design aspect since, fr example, falls of ground
accidents might be reduced by improved rock support design and specification [t
could be interpreted that many of the IXIore serious accidents (including nulnerous
fatalities), such as those resulting from falls of ground and falling into excavations,
could be avoided with increased attention to design aspects However, design will
always be only part of the cause, and even with perfect designs, accidents will occur
through lack of caution, inadequate examination, and failure to comply with standards
(which are design related), which are the most common recorded causes of accidents
Hence, while attention must be given to desion aspects, the Inajor reduction

49
fHO
SV
(IG6/9/0
88
I I) SINaDDVSJNaODV
dO
~
66
f
< 0,5 0,5 - 1 ,0 1,0 -2,0 2,0 - 3 ,0 3,0 - 5,0 5,0-10,0 > 10,0
FIGURE 17
DISTRIBUTION OF EXPERIENCE OF WORKERS INVOLVED IN
ACCIDENTS
AT CHUTE LOCATIONS
In accidents is likely to result from improved compliance with standards, and
increased awareness of satty issues and the hazards inherent in mining. This is likely
to be achieved through improved training and education so that workers understand
the reasons for the standards, are more informed of the dangers, know what to look
out for, and understand the necessity for using safety devices and following safety
procedures.
The classification involving the largest number of accidents is that which includes
niaterials handling, whether it be rock, other materials or equipment. These accidents
were generally of a less serious nature, and few fatalities resulted. Most injuries
affected limbs below the knee and elbow Attention to this area, for example by using
suitable protective clothing, could reduce the number of accidents substantially. As an
illustration of this, 67 of the accidents considered involved toes - 67 accidents (more
than 10% of the total considered) which could presumably have been avoided or
reduced in severity if steel toe-capped boots had provided protection
Falls of ground were the cause of a large number of accidents, with a relatively high
proportion of serious Injuries and fatalities Falling, particularly into excavations,
represented a sinaller number of accidents, but included a high proportion of
fatalities. This was clearly related to the sub-vefiical excavations - tips and passes.

The conclusions from the interpretations above are essentially consistent with those
arising from SIMRAC Projects OTH003 (Peake and Ritchie, 1994) and GAP055
(Ashworth and Peake, 1994) which indicate that drawpomts, tips, passes and chutes
are not "special cases
SAMRASS is a very useful systell and provides a lot of good data. It is of concern,
however, that the causes of so many of the accidents fall into the category of "failure
to comply with standards and instructions" The records are not given in such a way
that the underlving reasons f,r non-compliance, w'hich are probably the key issues as
far as Improving sattv IS concerned, can be determined This is a definite weakness
of the
68
system In addition, since the system only deals with reportable accidents, information
on incidents which could have caused accidents is not available. Such information is
considered to be very valuable. Possible remedies to these weaknesses would be to
respecify the reporting for:nat to ensure that the required underlying data are
captured, and to require that incidents above a certain magnitude are reported - for
example, requiring that incident reports be submitted for all rockfalls exceeding I
cubic metre in volume.
4 INFORMATION ON MINES VISITED
Eleven mines were visited to obtain infonnation on actual practice with regard to
drawpoints, tips, passes and chutes. The mines were selected to ensure that they
represented a cross section of different types of minerals, different geological
environments, different mining methods and different mining house ownership. Most
of the mines visited were trackless operations, only three out of the eleven being
tracked. All the mines except one can be considered as massive orebody operations,
the exception being a tabular mine. Massive orebodies and trackless operations
generally have a larger fragment size than is the case with the South African tabular
mining operations.
Based on the review of literature, and the analysis of the accident statistics, a detailed
checklist was drawn up of inforination that would be requested from the mines. A
copy of this was sent to each mine when confirminig the arran a ements for the mine
visit. Mines therefore had this information prior to the visit The checklist was
completed, as far as possible, for each of the mines, to provide a summarised record
of the data obtained Many of the mines were very cooperative completing the
checklists ahead of the visits, and in addition supplied tilfiher infrmation such as
codes of practice, recomlnended procedures, mine standards etc

The various ore and waste types handled and the ore and waste handling arrangements
were identified for all mines as required in terms of the project primary outputs
The purpose of the mine visits was to obtain documentary information as well as
Impressions, perceptions and opinions from interaction with the mine personnel.
Much of the information obtained fell into the latter categories, which tend to be
rather subjective. In Section 5.8 an attempt has been made to quantify some of the
subjective information. The accident information in Section 3 has quantified the
hazards associated with the four components, based on SAMRASS data.
The following sections provide a summary of the information on each mine, as well as
summarised conditions for each of the fur components - drawpoints, tips, passes and
chutes The more detailed information included in the information checklists has been
included in Appendix C
4. 1 Mine No. I
Type of mine Chrome

Ore type Chromitite
Waste Type Pyroxenite

Orebody geometry Tabular
Mining method' The particular mine visited mined using breast and up dip stoping
of the tabular orebody, with removal of blasted ore by means of
face scrapers, strike gully scrapers and centre gully scrapers,
into a stope orepass containino a orizzley in the centre gully
Thence via a footwall drive chute into loco driven hoppers to
the main tip, which also contains a grizzley, and shaft orepass
The ore and waste are transported to surface by belt conveyor
There are no drawpoints in this minino method
The tllowill(' summanses information on the other three components

70
Tips No problems are experienced in tips Regular, minor blockages occur and are
cleared manually using a tip hook and hammer. Large blocks of waste are
retained in development ends for secondary blasting so that no large material
accumulates at the tips
In the period Janua:y 1988 to June 1995, 12 reportable accidents, classified as

tip accidents, occurred at this group of mines All of these except one were
1990 or earlier. Data provided by the mine show that, in the period September
1993 to August 1996, 46 injuries occurred at tips, all of them being dressing
station cases. It is interesting to note that 'more than 600 0 of these occurred on
the night shift.
Passes On the particular mine visited, orepass hangups occur approximately once
per month due to sticky ore. The hangups are cleared using cone
packs, or bombs attached to bomb sticks
Mud rushes have occurred in the past. They are avoided by drawing
the pass empty if the ore IS wet
No accidents associated with passes, reportable or dressing station

cases, have occurred on this group of mines since at least January
1988.
Chutes Chutes are present at the base of the stope orepasses and the main passes onto
the belt Blockages due to "large rocks" occur in the former at the base
of the pass where the dimensions reduce at the chute. These blockages
are removed using a pinch bar or occasionally (about once per month),
by blasting with a bomb

In the group of Inines only one reportable accident associated with
chutes has occurred since January 1988 Three dressin(' station cases
occurred between Septembel 1993 and August 1996
Mine No. 2
Type of mine. Manganese

Ore type Manganese
Waste Type Banded ironstone
Orebody geometry. Tabular
Mining method. Ore is extracted by typical bord and pillar mining, with the
bords
approximately the same size as the pillars. Most development
takes place within the orebody and stoping creates the
openings normal to the development resulting in the formation
of the pillars. The ore is loaded in the development ends,
which, for the purposes of this research project, can be
considered as advancing drawpoints, into low profile loaders
which dump it into low profile dump haulers. There are two
mining sections, each with four tips and four silos. In one
section tips are equipped with grizzleys. A mobile rock breaker
is used to break up large rocks and to clear the grizzleys. The
other section uses tips without grizzleys. Haulers transfer the
ore to the tips which feed into silos, through finger chutes onto
a plate feder and then into the primary crusher. Belt
conveyors transfr the ore from there to the secondary crusher,
to the underground storage silos and then to surface. Each silo
is approximately 25m long, inclined at about 70 0 , and
decreases in section from approximately 8m x 8m at the tip

72
level to about 294m x 2,4111 at the finger chute control level

just above the plate feeder and primalY crusher
The fllowinu summarises the information on the four components
Drawpoints The height of the development openings is typically 4, 8m to 5m, but can
be as high as 8m Bord width and pillar width are the saine, and pillars can
range from 6m x 6m to 8m x 8m The roof is well supported using
fully grouted rockbolts on a pattern
No problems are experienced in tips.
Passes: Blockages occur about once per week due to a build up of fines just above the
chute. This is usually cleared by washing down the fines from the
chute end. Blasting with a bomb is only occasionally required to clear
a pass (about twice per year). This is carried out either with a bomb
stick from below or with a pipe from above Visibility from the tip is
good owing to the size and limited len ath of the pass
Chutes No problems have been experienced with the finger chutes.
No reportable accidents have been recorded at any of the above locations at this mine
since at least January 1988
4.3 Mine No. 3 Iron ore

Haemetite
Type of mine Dolomite, shale, banded ironstone, and occasional dolerite
Ore type. Tabular
Waste Types Sublevel cavina Opencast minin u
is also practised, and
Orebody geometry preparations had been made tur block caving At the time of the
Mining Inethod

Visit, underground minin taken not to proceed with the block cave. The inforlnation
u
had been suspended, and below and contained in Appendix C refers to the sublevel
the decision had been caving opet at 10 1 1
Ore is removed from drawpoints using LHD's and tipped
directly into the ore pass approximately 90m in length. The
pass is inclined at 75 0-800 and the tipping points are at 10m
level intervals down the pass. The tipping points create a cut
into the footwall of the pass. These "steps" reduce the energy
of the ore running down the pass. The pass feeds directly into a
chute and plate feeder which loads into loco driven hoppers.
Information on the tur components is as follows
Drawpoints In the sublevel caving Inethod, drawpoints are located in the ore. They
are temporary (life of approximately I month), with the brow retreating
as production blasting takes place No drawpoint hangups have
occurred due to the fineness of the ore
In the period January 1988 to June 1995 only two reportable accidents
were associated with drawpoints A non-reportable accident occurred
when a fhll of ground occurred onto an LHD. The driver jumped out
into the sidewall, injuring his elbow
No problems are experienced at tips Only one reportable accident

(December 1989) is recorded in SAMRASS for the period January
1988 to June 1995
Passes No pass hangups have occurred
Chutes Chutes at underground passes have experienced no problenls. Blockage

74
a
of the chute at the base of the pass from the open pit has occurred re
u\arly duc to the presence of water and "sticky" ore This clogs the back
of the chute The use of compressed air is sometimes successful in
Prolect

75
loosening this material, but usually blasting is required. In the wet season this
can be 2 to 3 times per shift
No reportable accidents associated with chutes have occurred since 1987.
4.4 Mine No. 4
Type of IXIine Diamond

Ore type Kimberlite
Waste Types Norite and a abbro
Orebody geometry Massive

Minin( method Block cavitw with an offset herringbone layout, using LHDs to
load from drawpoints and tip into passes. Initial passes are
short, with 6m dianneter, feeding to a grizzly with a
rockbreaker at a tower level Below the grizzly, passes are 4m
diameter down to the chutes on the haulage level
This is a mine which has all four coinponents in a "classic" sense.
Drawpoints Drawpoint openings are large to accommodate the 5 yd LHD t s. They are
all within the kimberlite ore, which is often of poor quality, and therefore are
heaviliy suppofted to achieve the required 4 year, 100 million ton draw lit.
Drawpoint stability is good Repair is carried out approximately once per year
Drawpoint hangups occur frequently resulting in a drawpoint

availability of Special drilling rias are available for reni0te
drilling and blasting of the larae blocks causing the hangups.
At drawpoint locations five reportable accidents were recorded in the

period January 1988 to June 1995, and two have occurred in 1996.

Blockages at tips are infrequent, and caused by overfilling. They are
cleared by the impact breaker
No reportable accidents have been recorded at tips on this in the period

since at least January 1988
Passes Instability of the norite country rock in which the passes are located
has necessitated support of the passes. Inadequacy of rock support
resulted in decision to concrete line all passes
Hangups occur infrequently - one in 4 to 6 months, caused by sticky

material. Blasting is the method of clearing the hangup.
In the period January 1988 to June 1995, 9 reportable pass accidents

were recorded Three of these were fatals. Although not clear from the
SAMRASS records, it is probable that niost of the accidents occurred
during construction - associated with the support and concrete lining of
the passes. As a consequence of the accidents, the mine has revised its
operating procedures so that work in passes and shafts is not permitted
beneath platforms, only beneath cured concrete plugs
Chutes Blockages of chutes occur daily due to the constriction at the chute and
the presence of large rocks These are usually cleared with the use of a
pinch bar, and blasting is used as a last resort.
Seven reportable accidents were recorded in the period January 1988

to June 1995 One additional non-reportable accident has occurred to
the pinch bar user in the subsequent period
SIMRAC 0TH March 1997

77
Mine No, 5
Type of mine. Copper

Ore type Anorthosite, biotite diorite, hypersthene diorite and
hypersthenite, leuco norite and norite
Waste Types. Gneiss and granite, with some quartzite and schist
Orebody geometry: Massive pod-like, with lenticular wings at one mine
Mining method: Vertical crater retreat shrinkage stoping. At one mine, after final
draw down, the stopes are immediately filled with cemented
hydraulic backfill. Stopes are normally on a 20m x 20m pattern
or 20m wide across the width of the narrower orebodies. Drill
drives are developed at 50111 level intervals. The drawpoints
are located in the country rock (granite and gneiss) at the base
of the stopes. Loading is by 5 yd and 8 yd LHD I s which tip
into passes equipped with 80 cm grizzleys The ore is loaded
from chutes on the main tramming levels into loco driven
discharge hoppers which dump into the main tip.
Information on the four cotnponents is as follows.
Drawpoints Owing to the good quality of the rock, drawpoint stability is good. A high
horizontal stress field is present in the area, and support is required to

combat stress induced spallirw Stress effects are generally
predominant over geological structure at depths greater than about
5001n.
Drawpoint hangups are brought down by blasting. At one mine hangups

occur frequently requiring about 6 secondary blasts per drawpoint per day.
At the other mine this figure is only I or 2
Three repofiable accidents associated with drawpoints have been recorded

78
for this group of Inines in the period January 1988 to June 1995
Blockages occur due to oversized rocks. These are removed back to a

blasting bay for breaking up Secondary blasting does not take place on
the tip.
No reportable accidents associated with tips have occurred since

January
1988 at least
Passes Passes are raise bored to 1,8m diameter at inclinations of 60 0 to 800 . One
that was viewed showed classical dog earing due to the hi ah horizontal
stress field. This stress spalling is not reported to be a problem as it
can be in the deep level ('Old mines. The pass diameter is small in
relation to the maximum fragment size of 800mm controlled by the
grizzley, and hangups occur regularly, particularly where two passes
intersect. Fines caused by backfill contatnination of' the ore also
contributes to the hangups. If the ore is wet and sticky the practice is
to tip small quantities, and then transfer this immediately through the
chute into the hoppers. This practice is dama' r ill" to the chutes, but
prevents the hangups and mininlises the occurrence of mudrushes
Since .lanuagy 1 988 only one reportable accident, in 1992, has been
recorded (boxhole or orepass)
Chutes Chute blockages are frequent, being cleared with a pinch bar If this is not successful,
a bomb is used

79
Mudrushcs occur approaxnnatcly once per week on one mine,
associated with the backfill contamination They are avoided as far as
possible by the practice described above The mine IS very sensitive to
mudrushes as a major event involving 70 000 tons of backfill from a
stope occurred some years ago, severely affecting production for 6
months.
No reportable chute accidents have been recorded since at least January

1988.
46 Mine No. 6 Serpentinite, lava and talcitic lava
Massive, in the form of lenses which dip steeply at 60 0 to 700 .
Type of mine Sub level caving Main tramming levels are spaced at 60m
Ore type intavals, and there are four production crosscut interlevels
Waste Types spaced 1 5m apart. Ore is loaded in the drawpoints using
Orebody mechanical loaders into side tipping tracked mounted cars
geometry:
These tram the ore to tips (in the footwall drive) which feed
Mining method.
into the orepass. These orepasses are connected with the
tramming haulage below from where the ore is trammed to the
Asbestos
main tip above the incline shaft. The ore is then conveyed to
Chrysotile asbestos in
serpentinite host rock surface by means of a complicated network of conveyor belts
in inclined shafts and/or skips in vertical
Information on the four components is as follows
Drawpoints Production crosscuts are small (2 8m x 2,6m) and are supported as

required Support that is used includes shepherds' crooks, 7m anchors,
anchors between osscuts, bullnose strapping, wire mesh and lacing
and steel arches Owing to the retreat method with the ring blasting,
"brows"

80
have a limited life requirement Repair of about 2 drifts per year is
required, using shepherds' crooks, wire mesh and rope lacing.
Hangups occur daily owing to large rocks reporting in the mouth of

the drawpoint. Secondary blasting using hand placed mud blasts is
used to clear the hangups.
No reportable drawpoint accidents have occurred since at least

January 1988 In the year July 1995 to June 1996, 8 non-reportable
accidents occurred in drawpoint locations
Footwall drive tips are l , 5m x 2,4m and contain grizzleys with a

350mm x 350mm grid. Blockages occur regularly due to large sized
rocks. These are cleared manually using hammers and tip hooks
Haulage tips are 5m x 4m and contain no a rizzley.
Since January 1988 only one reportable accident has been recorded at
tip locations (in 1993) In the year July 1995 to June 1996, 5 non-
reportable accidents occurred at tips.
Passes. Short 15m long l , 5m x 2,4m passes connect from the footwall drives to
the main passes goin(' down to the haulaae level. No pass hangups have
been experienced
Five reportable accidents (boxhole or orepass) have been recorded for

the period January 1988 to June 1995, including one fatal In the
subsequent year one non-reponable pass accident has occurred

81
Chute blockages occur daily to wed('in a of larae rocks These are cleared using
a pinch bar Blasting is not used to clear chute blockages.
Mudrushes do not occur
From the SAMRASS records 6 chute accidents occurred in the period

January 1988 to June 1995, including 2 fatalities. In the subsequent
year
8 non-reportable accidents have occurred.
47 Mine No. 7 Block caving with scraper drifts in three mines, and localised
sublevel caving in one area. Block cave drawpoints are spaced
Type of mine at 2, 3m along the scraper drift. Drift and drawpoints are
Ore type heavily supported with mass concrete 0,8m to 2,0m thick.
Waste Types Production is by winch operated scraper through a 1,0m x 1,2m
Orebody Chinaman box directly into Granbies which transfr the ore to
geolnetry:
the main tips. Tips have hydraulically operated cover doors for
Mining method.
Diamond safety and ventilation purposes.
Kimberlite
Granite, o neiss, Ventersdorp In the sub-level cave section, loading is by 3 yd and 3,5 yd
lava, schist LHD's which transfer the ore directly to the tips. The tips have
Massive hydraulically operated covers
Drawpoints In the block caves, the drawpoints may be subjected to severe
conditions. Rehabilitation involves complete concrete replacement, reinforced
with lacing 10 the brow Drawpoint hangups are common, the frequency
depending on the maturity of the cave At maturity, the fragnentation is
fine and hangups are less frequent Drawpoint dimensions are 1, 1 18m
x 1,08m Hangups are blasted with charges on sticks. If drilling is
required it is carried out with a drifter mounted on the scraper. This

82
drilling must be carried out remotely owing to the possible presence
of pentolite boosters from the VCR mining above the block cave.
In the sub-level cave section drawpoints are supported with standard

tunnel support. Heavy support is required in the schist rock, but is the
standard support for tunnels in the schist. Hangups are dealt with by
secondary blastin u
In the period JanualY 1988 to June 1995, 9 reportable accidents were

recorded at drawpoint locations, of which 6 were fatalities. Four of
these were the result of a mudrush associated with sub-level caving
activities in progress at the time More recent data obtained from the
mine up to September 1996, show that 26 accidents have occurred at
block cave drawpoint locations. 25 of these were dressing cases, and I
reportable.
Tip blockages are not cotmnon. Chinalmn boxes accommodate the

same size of fragmentation as can pass through the drawpoints and I-
H) tip apertures are designed to allow only nytnageable sized rocks.
Over sized rocks are blasted within the drift or drive before handling.
Only one tip related accident, which occurred in 1988, is recorded in

the S AMR ASS records for JanualY 1988 to June 1995 In the more
recent data supplied by the mine tr the 199 1 to September, only two
accidents at tips were recorded, one being a dressin u case and one a
loss of shift case
Passes Passes are located in the very stable count\N rock Compaction blockages

83
are common and result when the deadboxes at the bottom of the
passes build up with material, reducing the dimensions. They are
usually cleared using a compressed air blowpipe, and occasionally
with a light explosive pack.
No reportable pass accidents were recorded in the period January 1988

to June 1995. The records supplied by the mine indicate one
reportable and one fatal in the period 199 1 to September 1996 and 10
dressing cases. Since there were no accidents in the period since June
1995, the two serious accidents must be included at other locations in
the SAMRASS records
Chutes Chute blockages occasionally result when damp ground is handled and these
are cleared by means of a compressed air blowpipe. No reportable
chute accidents were recorded in the January 1988 to June 1995
period. The mine data for the period 1991 to September 1996 records
13 dressing cases One fatal was recorded due to premature detonation
when blasting a blockage at the crusher This 'may perhaps be
classified as a chute accident
4.8 Mine No. 8 Minina method

Diamond
Type of mine Kimberlite
Ore type Dolomite, dolomitic limestone, liniestone, basalt
Waste Types Massive
()rebody
geometry The mine was initially an opencast operation, converting to
underground blasthole stoping, or mechanised benching.
Drilling and loading drives initially hole into the pit Loading is
from

84
underground by 8 yd, 12 T capacity LHD's into 6m diameter
vertical orepasses 370m in length. Tips contain a 6 hole grizzly
with l , 3m x l , 3m apertures. Oversized rocks are broken by
an ilnpact breaker installed at the tip. Each pass has two tips
per loading level. At the bottom of each pass through a chain
controlled box front is an apron feeder which moves the ore to
the mineral sizer. Below this is a 30m deep surge pass, with a
600T capacity, from which the ore is fed through a boxfront
onto the conveyor system
The fur components are as follows
Drawpoints. Support installed varies according to rock conditions. Large rocks

causing hangups or too large to load are drilled, for secondary blasting,
using a reinote rig. Hangups are frequent owing to the opening into the
pit and the occurrence of sloughed rock fronl the pit walls.
No reportable accidents at drawpoints were recorded in the period January

1988 to June 1995
Blockages are frequent due to oversized rocks, but are quickly cleared
by the impact breaker
Two tip related accidents, both fatalities, were recorded in 1989. No

further reportable accidents occurred up to at least June 1995
Passes With 6m diameter passes it was believed that hangups would be rare and

85
it was planned that passes would provide considerable storage
capacity. In practice this has not proved to be the case Pass hangups
are cornmon
Irrespective of whether the ground is wet or dry C01npaction in the long
vefiical passes occurs with the tipping of 1 2T at a time. The presence
of groundwater In some of the passes, and the tendency of kimberlite
to deteriorate and swell, contributes to the problem. Clearing of
hangups was attempted using bombs on wooden saplings, inserted
through inspection holes in the boxfront This was not satisfactory and
caused dainage to the boxfronts. Access ramps to the back of each pass
were subsequently excavated. These allow the back of the box to be
inspected, facilitate blasting of blockages at this point without
damaging the boxfronts so severely, and provide access for the placing
of explosives for dealing with hangups at higher levels in the pass. The
access ramps are large enough to accommodate a 3,5 yd LHD, which
can be used for loading out spilled material, and fr tipping sufficient
material into the box after the pass has been emptied, to prevent
impact damage.
In the period January 1988 to June 1995 seven reportable accidents

were recorded at boxhole or orepass locations Three of these were due
to carbon monoxide ('assin a
Chutes As covered above, blockages occur at the base of the pass in the feed chutes.
A Inajor mudrush occurred severely damaging the boxfront and
associated structures, repairs taking 6 months to complete. This
potential problem has been overcome by sealing wet passes, and by
pass mana a ement, taking particular care during the wet season. The

86
back accesses to the passes have also facilitated the clearing of chute
blockages.
For the period JanualY 1988 to June 1995, the SAMRASS records
include 5 reportable underground accidents associated with chutes.
From the descriptions of the accidents it is probable that possibly three
of these are direct chute accidents
49 Mine No. 9 Antimony
Quartz carbonate, talc carbonate

Type of Chlorite, phyllite, talc carbonate, schist
mine:
Massive
Ore type.
Sub-level stoping Rock is loaded from drawpoints using
Waste Types
compressed air operated mechanical loaders, into side-release
Orebody
loco driven hoppers. These tip into grizzly controlled 3m x 5m
geometry Mining
tips, with aperture size 0, 5m x 0,6m The tips feed into the
method.
main orepass system, to the bott011 of the vertical shaft, into
skips and then to surface
Conditions at the fur con1ponents are
Drawpoints Drawpoints are small and support requirements are limited to occasional
split sets Stability is good and repair is not required during the
approximately 6 months life of the drawpoint Drawpoint hangups are
common, about twice per day, and are cleared using mudblasts or
bombs.
In the period January 1988 to June 1995, eight reportable accidents

were recorded at drawpoint locations From 1992 to July 1996, a total

87
of 20 accidents have occurred including the reportables. The record
has Improved since 1993, bein a 8, 5, 2 and zero for 1993 onwards.
Blockages occur due to large rocks These are cleared manually by

hammer and tip hooks It is estimated that clearance of such blockages
occupies approximately one hour of the shift
No reportable tip accidents were recorded in the period January 1988 to
June 1995 In the past 5 years ten non-reportable accidents have occurred
Passes. 1,8m x 1,8m and 1,8m diameter passes have been excavated. They are 60m in
length from level to level, with a dog-leg geometry. Compaction
occurred at the bottom of each leg where control chutes were installed
on each main level, and chutes were damaged. These were
subsequently reinoved and ore allowed to pass uncontrolled to the
bottom. The orepasses tend to operate empty and hangups do not
occur.
Waste is finer than the ore and contains schist material. Waste passes
are operated full, waste being hoisted on one day per week. The waste
tends to block or hangup after about two days due to the presence of
fine Inaterial and compaction. Blasting is used to clear the passes.
Scaling of passes has occurred, and one pass is now 10m x 6m at the
lower levels. Scaling results in large slabs reporting in the pass
causing blockages

88
SAMRASS records include 3 accidents at boxhole or orepass locations
for the period January 1988 to June 1995, one being a fatality.
Chutes Chute blockages occur approximately once per week owing to large rocks
They are cleared with tip hooks and a compressed air blowpipe.
No blasting is used to clear blocka u es
Three reportable accidents were recorded at chute locations for the

January 1988 to June 1995 period From the descriptions only two of
these are really related to chutes
4. 10 Mine No. 10 Massive stratiform and strata-bound

Initially blasthole stoping, but currently cut-and-fill. Loading in
Type of mine the stopes is with 5 yd and 8 yd LHD t s into 25T haul trucks
Ore type which transfer the ore to the main tips For short tramming
distances LHD t s will transport the ore to tips on various levels.
Waste Types. These tips are 0,9m and 1.2m circular openings which feed into
Orebody the main ore passes (referred to as ore chutes). Each tip has a
geometry: Mining dust plug with a hanging open/close switch which is operated by
method the LHD driver. The ore chutes are 2m in diameter, inclined at
between 400 and 500 and lined with manganese steel blocks.
Base metal Initially these were over the lower two thirds of the chutes, but
Massive sulphide, it has been found that lining over the lower third is sufficient.
mineralised schist, Each leg of the ore chutes, over one level (approximately 35m
amphibole magnetite, vertically), is offset at a small angle from the previous and next
quartz magnetite and leg, and discharges into a deadbox.
ferruginised quartzite The chutes are always operated empty.
Gneiss and schist

89
There are two ore chute controlled by finger chutes, and the rock levels in the passes are
systems, which each feed always :naintained above a certain level to protect the fingers
into 2,4m diameter lined The tip is used by the 25T haul trucks, and grizzly size is
vertical orepasses 70m in approximately 1,0m x 1,0m Below the tips are steel lined 5, 5m
a
length These feed into a diameter ore silos, which supply the main crusher.
rizzly and main tip with
an impact breaker. Flow Drawpoints only existed in the initial blasthole stoping, and
from the passes above is
therefore only three of the four components are effective at this

mine
These have been described above Oversized rocks on the tips are dealt
with by the impact breakers
Passes: Hangups are not a problem in passes. The rock is dry and runs freely down
the ore chutes, which are maintained empty. Only two hangups have
occurred in the past 5 years, caused by a blockage resulting from
buckling of a liner rin('
Chutes. No blockages occur at chutes
No accidents of any kind have occurred at tips or passes in the past five years. The
only reportable accident in the SAMRASS records for the period January 1988 to
June 1995 is a minor chute accident in 1993
4 1 1 Mine No. I l
Type of mine: Manganese

Ore type. Manuanese

90
Waste Type Banded ironstone, lava
Orebody geometry Tabular
Minina method Bord and pillar Development takes place entirely within the
orebody, and stoping creates the openings normal to the
development resulting in the formation of the pillars The ore is
loaded in the development ends, which, for the purposes of this
research project, can be considered as advancing drawpoints.
[AHD's and front end loaders are used to dump the ore into 20T
and 25T low profile dump haulers The haulers transfer the ore
Protect
directly to the crushers or to tips. The tips have 220mm size

control and feed into short orepasses. The tips feed onto
conveyor belts and/or into locos with hoppers which transfer
the ore to the underground crusher The crushed ore passes via
a conveyor belt to surface or to the main orepass system, into
skips and then to surface.
The following summarises the information on the four components:
Drawpoints Two Inines are involved at this location On one the average height of the
development openings is 3, 2m. Bord width is 8m and pillar
dimensions are 8m x 12m. The initial extraction percentage is 70%
and, after pillar reclamation, is 80% - a 4m wide opening is driven
through the pillars, leaving final pillars with dimensions of 8m x 4m.
The roof is well supported using fully grouted rock-bolts on a pattern.

91
On the other mine the mining hei('ht is 4m, bord width is 8m, initial
pillars are 6m x 12m and final pillars 6m x 4m This gives initial and
final extractions of 74% and 84%.
No problems are experienced in tips, oversized rocks being dealt with

by the ilnpact breaker
Three repofiable accidents, including one fatality, were recorded in the

period January 1988 to June 1995 In the past 5 years seven
nonreportable accidents have occurred
Passes Blockages occur about once per month due to large rocks and a build up
of tines just above the chute This is usually cleared by washing out of
the fines Blastin u with a bomb is only occasionally required to clear a
pass.
Protect
Three non-reportable accidents associated with passes have occurred in

the past 5 years.
Chutes Three types of chutes are in use. Blockages occur about once per week,
and are cleared by barring and blasting.
Three reportable accidents are recorded for the period January 1988 to
June 1995, including one fatality This was due to a mudrush which
caused the victim to fall into the shaft Nine non-reportable accidents
have occurred in the past 5 years

92
5 MINE PRACTICES
In this section 'mine practices relevant to drawpoints, tips, passes and chutes will be
dealt with. Different mines have different terminology to define their "practices",
including standards, procedures, rules, codes of practice etc. In the following, the
term "procedure" will be used to cover ail of these.
In tertns of the concepts of active failures and latent failures used by Simpson et al ( 1
996), only latent failures are considered. These include attitudes to safety, training,
organisation and working methods, rules and procedures, attitudes to rules and
procedures, design, organisin(' for safety, and maintenance. Active failures involve
errors made by those with hands-on control of the system/equipment (active failures
are human error) Visits to the mines did not involve study of active failure aspects
Some comment will be made, however, on environmental issues such as illumination,
heat and dust.
The fllowing latent filure aspects will be dealt with in some detail in this report -
design, mine procedures, worker involvement in procedures, induction and training,
attitudes towards procedures and safety, and the relationship between procedures and
accidents.
Environmental issues
Specific questions were included on the checklist regarding lighting, heat conditions
and dust at the four component locations In most cases drawpoints tend not to be lit.
For LHD and other loader operations, the machines have their own powerful
headlights, which provides the operator with good visibility. In the scraper drift block
cave operation, and the face scraper operation, the winch operators control powerful

93
spotlights to assist visibility. On only two mines, both involving small sized
drawpoints, was illumination by cap lamps only.
Illumination at tips (other than the centre gulley tip) and at chutes was by permanent
li ahting installations on all mines. These varied from 100 watt type globes, to
fluorescent li a htin a and on the bi oc er operations, to spotli a htill('
Heat conditions at all tnines was pleasant at all fur component locations.
Dust control was ef}cted with installed water spray facilities on sorne mines, by
wetting down of the rock, and by special ventilation facilities Dust was not observed
to be a current problem on any of the mines visited. During the visit to one of the
mines a temporary problem developed and visibility was vety poor. Activities were
suspended due to this, pending rectification of the problem (the suspension of
activities was not due to our presence).
It should be noted that on at least two of the mines dust provd to be a major problem
shortly after the mining operation commenced For example, on one of these mines, to
overcome the dust problem passes have been dedicated to one production level. This
was achieved by the construction of' concrete sealing plugs in the passes on the lower
production level and the double handling of rock The planned multi-level tipping
capability was thus eliminated
The accident statistics reviewed in Section 3 above do not indicate that environmental
fhctors play any significant role in the causing of accidents at drawpoints, tips, passes
and chutes. These factors are very rarely given as causes. Lack of adequate
illumination may be a contributory cause in the "lack of caution/alertness' l category,
particularly in the drawpoint locations where falls of ground will be more likely to

94
occur. With proper training, however, this should not be a significant factor. It may be
concluded that, if the mines visited are representative of the industry, environmental
conditions at drawpoints, tips, passes and chutes are satisfactory.
5.2 Design
Unsatisfactoty designs lead to premature failure of the facility or equipment, or failure

to perform to fuli requirements under operational conditions. Such conditions increase
the potential tr active fhilures - equipment breakdowns, fhilures, blockages etc.
require repair or rehabilitation action which can be hazardous
An excellent example of a design not meeting its performance expectation is the

design of orepasses in one of the mines visited These were designed to have a large
diameter, and with this diameter hangups were expected to be rare. In addition, they
were planned to provide a storage capacity In practice hangups have been common,
one taking more than a year to clear Operational changes, different from those
envisaged, have had to be implemented to avoid the problems as far as possible
Consequently, storage potential is only 40% of the expected capacity, and this reduces
to 10% in wet conditions. Back accesses to the passes had to be excavated Clearing of
hangups is potentially a very hazardous operation Hence, an unsatisfactory desi( r n has
led to significant safety implications To achieve the same level of safty, if possible, as
would have been the case if the facility worked perfectly as per design, many rules
and procedures have to be Introduced which increase the potential tar latent failures.
A till-ther example is that of the dust problem retrred to in the section above. In that case
the system did not work as desi u ned, necessitatin(' modifications which introduce a
greater potential risk to satty of mine workers

95
With regard to the safe operation of the four components drawpoints, tips, passes and
chutes, design includes Inany aspects other than the design of the components
themselves. For example the mine layout design, the ventilation design, the size of
the tunnels, the support of the tunnels, the design of the loading equipment, the
lighting design, the mining method design, and probably many other factors all have
an influence on the safe operation of a drawpoint.
It is therefore ilnportant that attention is paid equally to all aspects of design.
For the mines visited, of the fur components, the fewest problems occurred with
tips. Blockage of tips was rarely a problem, tip and grizzley life was good, and repairs
were handled routinely. With regard to the other three components, however:
in almost all mines with drawpoints, drawpoint hangups occurred. Hangups require
secondary blasting with bombs on saplings, possibly with hangup drilling and
blasting, and possibly with mudpacks These operations introduce hazards additional to
those involved in the normal operation of the drawpoint. Numerous accidents
associated with secondary blasting are recorded. Some hangups must be expected
from a practical point of view, but the question to be asked is whether a different tnine
geometty, or a different blast design, or even a different mining method may have
reduced the occurrence of hangups orepass hangups were common Ill most of the
mines visited In some cases these were due to large rocks, but most often the adverse
factors were the presence of fines and water - the sticky ore problem It is to be noted
that these two components are also a requirement for mudrushes, which have been
responsible for a large number of mining fatalities. In son-ne cases compaction,
caused by significant fall of the rock, compounded this problem It is possible that in
some

96
cases the problems are due to fundamental errors In pass design, or simply the
result of overlooking some of the key factors that should have been taken into
account. Activities involved in the clearing of pass hangups can be extremely
hazardous.
almost all operations encountered blockages in chutes. In some cases this may be
difficult to differentiate from pass hangups, since the blockages occur usually
at the base of the pass where it leads into the chute. There is a constriction at
this point and rock block sizes which Inay be satisfactory in relation to the
pass size, may be too large in relation the the chute size, leading to blockages.
The most common cause of the blockages, however, was the presence of fine
material, often wet or with water present. This clo u ued the back of the box,
progressively reducing the dimension available fr rock flow Clearing of
chute blockages required the use ot'a pinch bar (numerous accidents
associated with this operation are recorded) or, frequently, blasting On one of
c
the mines 2 or 3 blasts per shift had been required A ain, blasting is a
hazardous activity on its own, but it also daina o es the installation, leading to
the requirement for repair, which involves flifiher hazardous activities
It would appear that the design of this area is a prilne candidate for improvement.
This Inay include fndamental design, and design of built-in installations for safe,
effective clearing of blockages, should they still occur
A point that emerged from three of the Inines visited was criticism of designs that
enlanated from the mining house head offices In all three cases, facilities designed at
head offices had been found to be unsatisfact01Y and had been replaced with facilities
redesi a ned on the mine It is common that desi a ns for a new mine or extension will be
carried out by a project department at head office, possibly with little input from the
mine personnel The project staff' will base their designs on previous similar work and
their own experience fn such cases "local" knowled a e is missinu from the input The

97
project team will probably have been disbanded by the time that the facilities are in
operation and hence
Pro,eet
fedback, if any, from the mine will possibly not reach the designers. There is
therefore the possibility that the same unsatisfactory designs will again be produced,
from experience, fr the next mine, under the mistaken belief that they are proven
designs that have been used on several mines before
If the design is "right", the mining operation will work smoothly, and hazards to
health and safety will be minimised. Unfofiunately the "right design" is an intangible
benefit. The benefits of good design are rarely appreciated properly, probably being
accepted as normal under those circwnstances, but the penalties of poor design will
haunt the mine for ny,ny years, perhaps even for its whole life. In mine design, unlike
mechanical design, there is usually no opportunity for prototype design and then final
design, learning from mistakes made in the prototype There is only one chance, and
therefore the first and only design needs to be as right as possible. Mining companies
should therefore ensure that the right amount of effort is committed to planning and
design activities
53 Mine procedures
The mines visited were all very cooperative in providing copies of all mine
procedures which had any relevance to drawpoints, tips, passes and chutes. From a
review and coinparison of these documents, several points can be made

98
5 3. 1 Ad hoc preparation
In most cases the documents gave the impression of being ad hoc documents -
documents that were prepared in reaction to an incident which had occurred, rather
than being prepared proactively An example of this was two almost identical
procedures, differing only with regard to the specific locations to which they are
applicable. There may have been good reason fr this, but the result is that there IS
more paper to read, and hence less
chance of the procedures being remembered and adhered to as required.
5.3.2 Date of documents
Many of the documents are old, sonle dated as far back as the mid-1980's. In quite a
nu:nber of cases documents were undated and in some cases unsigned. In no case was
the impression gained from the documents obtained from the mines visited that
documents are reviewed and updated, if necessary, on a routine basis. A formal policy
of, say, an annual review, is believed to be required in this regard if the documents are
to remain current and meaningful. It was quite clear that, at the time of the mine
visits, several of the mines
were in the process of revising their documents, probably in response to the
requirements of the Mine Health and Safty Act In this regard, of the docunlents
supplied, in only one case did a code of practice take into account specifically a risk
assessment. The risk assessment retrred to constituted a summa:y of fall of ground
accidents (l fatal, 4 reportables and 2 lost time in a 6 year period). The conclusion
drawn was that the risk of fall of around accidents is small and "suggests that
measures being taken are indeed the right ones and that they are effective". This is not
considered to be a valid application of the risk assessment process.

99
5 3.3 Format of docu men ts
The documents are all in written form, mainly in the En cyl,ish lanouage, in Afrikaans
in a number of cases, and only on one mine was there any document in an African
language. In only a very few cases were there useful sketches to illustrate the
requirements of the standard or procedure (engineering type plans and sections are not
regarded to be useful sketches for workers except for higher level staff) The
possibility of workers fully understanding a detailed document not written in their
own language is slim. In addition, many of the workers are possibly illiterate or have
only liniited reading skills. The possibility of their understandin a and complying with
any detailed written document will be remote
Prolect
Many of' the documents are lengthy, often 5 or 6 typed pages, and sometimes filore. It
is well known that people do not read, and hence the likelihood of procedures being
followed satisfactorily is probably related to their length. In some cases procedures
are so brief as to be equally unsatisfactory. The format needs to be such that the
required message is conveyed as succinctly and unambiguously as possible.
The review of accident statistics contained in Section 3 of this report indicates that
"failure to comply with standards and instructions" is probably the most common
cause of accidents It is possible that this is because workers are not sufficiently
familiar with these standards and instructions, or cannot comprehend them, perhaps
because of their format. It is considered that good visual material would be much more
understandable for most workers, and could enhance compliance with standards and
procedures considerably. As an example of such material, Figures 1 8 and 19 show
material from the document "Safe Working in Tunnelling" (Anon 1989) This material

100
o
was originally produced to enhance worker safety durin tunnellin(' in Germany,
where all workers are literate and there is only a sinale common
5.3.4 Logic of preparation
There appeared to be a general lack of logic, and perhaps lack of clarity in thinking, in
the formulation of the docunlents This is understandable if their preparation is ad hoc
in response to the occurrence of particular incidents Examples to illustrate this
opinion follow The use of these examples should not be interpreted by readers as
pointed criticism, since they are taken out of context of the mining company's
complete docutlent set
Example I On one of the mines clauses from two sequentially numbered procedures
read
Protect

e rock fall o
falling being
crushed
Figure 18
Unsafe practices (coloured in red)
e working from a primarily lined zone
use working platform separate
working areas
Sa fe practices (colou red in oreen)

103
"Any blasting done to a hang-up in a drawpoint, or orepass is classified as

'bombing'. A]] other blasting is classified as mud blasting.'
"Any blasting done to dislodge a hang-up in a drawpoint, box-hole or orepass

is classified as 'Secondary Blasting'.
The two procedures appear to have been written without reference to each
other.
ExalT1ple 2 A "Recommended procedure for ore extraction from drawpoint"

deals with bombin(' and mud blastin(' in drawpoints and general instructions
for drawpoints.
However, it also contains several clauses and sub-clauses dealing with tips. In
addition to lengthening the written procedure unnecessarily, it would not be
possible to find these particular tip instructions by reference to the contents list
of this procedure, nor by refrence to a listing of all procedures. It would only
be found by reading laboriously through the set of procedures
Example 3: One Inining company has at least four procedures dealing with
secondary blasting. C,01nparative clauses from these procedures are:
unless the sirens are turned on five minutes prior to detonation and turned off
five minutes after the blast
the sirens will be turned on for at least one minute before the explosives are
detonated
"The siren must be turned on 5 minutes prior to blasting and 5 minutes thereafter"

Prolect 303
105
the sirens will be turned on for at least two minutes before the bomb is
detonated electrically"
The only one of these clauses which is unambiguous is the first one. The third
one is altogether ambiguous, and the other two only define the length of the
siren period, not the time between the end ofthis period and the time of the
detonation. These comments may seem pedantic, but the point is that, from
the procedures, different workers will have different interpretations, and
different interpretations will increase the potential for accidents
Exalnple 4: In a standard Inining instruction entitled "Underground Ventilation

Standards", two of the clause headings are "Water blasts" and "Blasting of big
rocks in stoping cross cuts"
These aspects may have relevance to ventilation, but this is not indicated, and the
content of the clauses is not appropriate to the standard
The latter clause dealing with blasting is one of at least three sections of
different standard instructions dealing with seconda:y blasting This again
highlights the potential for ambiguity and the possibility of diffrent
interpretations.
Exalnple 5. A procedure included the statement "This procedure includes and

replaces However, a copy of which had a revision date three years
later, was amon a st the set of procedures received from the mine.
535 Vagueness of statements

106
Many of the procedures reviewed contain vaaue statements and requirements which,
although well-intentioned, are ,meaningless from an implementation point of view.
Examples are
t
limit is not 'I DO not drive the
machine too fast ' This is meaningless if a speed defined, and if machines do not have
speedometers.
"All tips must be well lit." Unless the lighting requirements are defined in terms of
lux, or a certain wattage of liaht bulb and numbers of bulbs, "well lit" is
completely open to interpretation
"Stand well clear as a mudrush could either smother you or cause you to fall
into the orepass if you are not tied with a safty belt Il This statement is flawed
in a number of ways
Non-definite words are used For example a statement might be should wear
safety glasses. " which implies that the mineworker has an option.
Statemerus must aiways be very definite, since there should be no option (if there is an
option, this must be stated). Thus is required to wear safety glasses.." or "..wearing of
safety glasses is obli a atow. " or may not carlY out this task unless he is wearing safety
glasses" are examples of definite wording
5 3.6 Suggested format for procedures documents
In this section su aaestions on overall aproach, preparation and content are made in the
form of what is considered to be an unbiased, outside opinion It is hoped that readers
will understand this to be constructive suuuestions and not criticism of existing
documents

107
o
The perceived ultimate ail1 for a IVIine is to have a set of lo ically compiled,
succinct and comprehensible procedures which will enhance health and safety on the
mine. There is no reason whv a mine should be thought of as diffrent from a nuclear
power station for example The procedures are there to enswe that everything works
sinoothly and safely
and that risks are Illinlmised
A suggested approach is to view the set of procedures as a technical book, and plan
the content accordingly, starting with a logically drawn up table of contents. This will
highlight what should be grouped together to minimise duplication of material, and
what should appear separately. For example, it is possible that one "chapter" could
deal with Blasting. Sub-sections could be Production blasting, Development blasting
and Secondary blasting. Secondary blasting could include further sub-sections such as
Blasting of hangups in drawpoints, Blasting of large rocks in drawpoints (or
elsewhere), Blasting of hangups in passes, Blasting of blockages in chutes etc. The
actual contents and the division of the topics will depend on the mine and its own
requirements. This stage can be viewed as the plannin( sta ff e
The actual drafting of the procedures should be carried out by knowledgeable

persons, including input from appropriate persons in the safety and training
departments. It would be appropriate to have these drafts edited by an experienced
standards writer or technical editor in order to minimise the volume and Inaximise the
comprehensibility. It is expected that mining houses could have suitable persons to
fillfil this function on their staff.
Of the mines visited, those belongin a to one particular mining house were superior
with regard to layout, content and organisation of their procedures. There was some
uniformity of approach, but it is suspected that this was due to the moving of senior

108
staff from one mine to another in the group rather than a particular group policy (it
was surprising that there appeared to be no guiding hand from head office, ie from the
ultimate top mana (rement, with reoard to procedures) Based on the content of these
procedures, the follovvin u is the su a uested content
Header
Title clearly stated, revision number and date, previous revisions and their dates, person

109
responsible fr revision, review dates and responsible person (to indicate that, if no
revision was carried out, this decision was based on a routine review), procedure
number, other associated or relevant procedure numbers, filing information,
distribution details.
Objective
Effectively the justification for the procedure and the expected result.
Relevant Leaal Clauses
Clauses from Acts and Regulations that are relevant to the procedure or perhaps the
reason for the procedure These should be included in their full wording.
It is probable that this section should be provided in Appendix form, since it is for
reference, and should not detract from the readability of the procedure.
Written procedure
Succinctly written, comprehensible and instructive procedure, prepared according to

the table ofcontents drawn up as described above. Illustrative drawings or cartoons
should be used
Visual summa
Those procedures that affect lower level workers should be produced in a visual
format such that the procedure is absolutely clear without the requirement to read
anything, and is not language dependent The procedures must be connpletely
comprehensible to illiterate individuals

110
Review panel
Names and signatures of persons involved in the preparation and review of the procedure.
This would include representative frotn mine management, mine operating personnel, loss
control personnel, safety representatives, representatives of labour, and training personnel.
Approval
Nalne and signature of responsible person/s and date
Appendices
Worker involvement in procedures
In the letters that were sent to [nines to make arrangements for the mine visits, discussions were
requested with the following personnel
nmning technical personnel knowledgeable with regard to the design and

operation of the four components:
personnel involved directly in the operation of the connponents, mine
safety officers and representatives, workers' safety representatives
In addition, for each of the four components, a question on the checklist (see Section 3
above) concerned the input of workers to standards
The purpose of the proposed discussions and the question on the checklist was to elicit
a
exactly the information re arding the extent to which workers are involved in the
formulation of procedu res

111
With regard to discussions with workers' safety representatives, not one of the mines
visited provided this facility as requested. It is probable that, had the discussions been
insisted upon, they would have been arranged. However, the approach was not to
insist, since it was believed that, if a positive working relationship existed between
management and these representatives, management would have been very keen to
demonstrate this during the visits. The conclusion drawn is that there is not
satisfactory input from and cooperation with workers' safety representatives in the
mining industry at this stage.
With regard to the questions on the checklist, the most coinnlon answers was,
"Through the Health and Safety Cominittee. In discussion, however, it was clear that
worker involvement in procedures is not established properly yet.
The situation in weneral seemed to be, Il ln the past there was no input from workers.
We have some input through the Health and Safety Con-imittee and safety meetings,
but it should be Inore We are working on it and it will be much filore in the future."
Some the procedures and codes of practice were signed by representatives of the
Health and Safety Committee in an approval role, or the Health and Safety
Representatives in an acknowledgement role This indicates that on some of the mines
there is already some formal input to these documents
No hostility towards the involvelnent of workers in the preparation of procedures was

noticed The attitude can perhaps best be described as being resigned to the
requirement not in the ne( r ative sense, but rather from the point of view that the
process will be much more involved and will take longer and require more eflrt On
none of the mines visited was the impression oained of a very positive and proactive
approach, such as, "We are required to do this It presents us with a u reat opportunity,
so let's grab it and make it work as soon as possible for the benefit of the mine and the
staff.'

112
It is concluded that the process of involvement of labour on the Inines in the

preparation of procedures has a long way to go and that it Wilf be an evolutionary
process.
Induction and training
The questions in the checklist included one on the training received by workers, a
second regarding the ability of workers to identify hazards, and a third on the
communication of standards to workers.
In almost all cases, training was on-the-job training In some cases with regard to
specific job tunctions, some training was provided, usually a week or two weeks,
followed by onthe-job training Almost all the mines provided induction training to
new workers and refresher induction to workers returning from leave Most of the
training received appears to be on-the-job trainma
Answers to the question on the ability of workers to identify hazards varied from good
to poor
The communication of standards to workers was through the training received, as

well as through safety meetings with safety representatives, usually held once per
month, and often brief daily talks underground
On-the-job training could involve some formal instruction, or simply mean that the
worker picks up the job requirements from his fellow workers It is suspected that the
latter is more commonly the case The problems with this approach are

113
there IS no definition of what should be taught (effctively no syllabus); it assumes

that fllow workers (and supervisors) know the full requirements of the iol) (the
hazards, the techniques, the safety standards, etc), and are capable of teaching or
passin u on this knowled r e Such people are not trained to

114
con-ununicate knowledge, once a person knows something, he thinks it is

obvious or simple and that everyone knows it. An experienced worker Inay therefore
assume that a new worker has knowledge that he does not in fact have; workers may
have the attitude that "I had to pick things up the hard way, so you will have to as
well", and deliberately be unhelpful to new workers - perhaps even tell them the
wrong ways to do things, training takes time, and will reduce the time that an
experienced worker can devote to his own activity. He may be reluctant to "waste"
this time, in particular if it affects his production target; if existing workers do not
con-nply with standards and instructions, the on-the-job training will perpetuate bad
practices, there is no check on whether workers have picked up the required
information and techniques - there is no test of proficiency
The accident statistics dealt with in Section 3 are important in relation to the training
received by workers, their knowledge of the standards, and their ability to identify
hazards As mentioned previously, probably the most common cause of accidents is
the group covering failure to cotnply with standards and instructions. This group must
be closely associated with training or lack of it Two of the other cause categories, lack
of caution/alertness and inadequate examination/inspection, must also be closely
related to training The actual injuries sustained (reportable as well as non-reportable)
are also instructive in this regard Many injuries, such as forei a n matter in eyes, will
often be the result of non-compliance with standards, which require the wearing of
safety glasses while performing certain functions The implication from, the accident
statistics is that the required message has not been conveyed by training and/or has
not been conveyed with sufficient conviction or explanation why the standards are
needed.
It must be concluded that the training that workers receive is inadequate to achieve
high levels of underground safetv

115
56 Attitudes towards procedures and safety
Procedures and safety are both included in this section, since dealing with them
separately would probably involve a lot of repetition.
It is considered that a number of comtnents which arise directly out of the mine visits
are appropriate to include here
at one mine it was observed that new safty equipment was being used by
workers on the day of the visit It is not known whether this was to replace old, worn
equipment, or whether the equipment had not previously been issued. If this was the
effect of the visit, then there has been a direct benefit from the research project
However, the important issue is whether managelnent was allowing activites to
proceed without safety equipment, contrary to their own procedures; on only one
mine visit was ( T iven any satty instruction given at all in the Safety Depaltment.
This was in the use of a self rescuer, and took the form of a demonstration, without a
test of comprehension. The impression was gained that on none of the mines visited
did safety personnel have a high status level; in the eyes of workers, visitors are
probably associated with management or at least with the level of personnel
accompanying them underground. It is most important therefore, that visitors are seen
to obey all the procedures. From subsequent review of procedures documents, it is
known that procedures were contravened, and seen to be contravened on several
occasions This m,ay be considered as setting a poor example to the workforce - ' 'If
the managers don't have to do it, why should P'
From the visits to all the mines, and the discussions held there, there is no doubt about
the oenuine concern and committment of the manauement of the mines to safety.
However, the impression was ('ained that this is a committment in spirit (very
genuine), but that in practice the committment miuht not be quite so stron u

116
mine procedures have been dealt with in some detail in Section 5.2 above. It is
considered that a minet s failure to prepare, maintain, review, update and communicate
a quality set of procedures indicates a lack of committment in practice, what is the
status of the safety depafiment, if such a department exists? If production has superior
status to safety, it implies that contravention of procedures would be condoned to
ensure that production is not affected. Production performance is demanded by
corporate management, but does corporate management pay as much attention to the
requirement for safety performance? If a safety department is given little or no
authority by management, this Inust be an indication of lack of committment in
practice; the accident statistics indicate a major cause of accidents to be "failure to
comply with standards and instructions'
A conclusion from this is that workers are allowed to disregard procedures, and that
there is a lack of connmittment by management to impose the motivation, discipline
and perhaps penalties required to ensure that procedures are complied with
Relationship between procedures and accidents
Readers of this report from the mines visited may be sensitive to the content and feel
F
that criticism has been levelled at them Assurance is ( iven to readers that the
intention has not been to criticise, but rather to produce constructive comment which
will contribute to improvement in safty
The mines visited are a enerally safe mines There appears to be no relationship
between formally written procedures and accidents for these mines In fact, the mines
which have no written procedures for operation of drawpoints, tips, passes or chutes
have the best safety record of all the mines these components t

117
It is interesting to consider what contributes to such good safety records on the

mines. This can only be done from the point of view of the tur components
considered, since detailed inforlnation obtained was confined mainly to these
components, with some additional peripheral information. The following points are
considered to be the most important
the workforce is stable on most of the Inines. Most of the workers have been
employed by the filines for more than 5 years. The implications of this are that:
workers know their jobs, the procedures applicable, the requirements etc; if
procedures have been well learnt initially and are well known by a stable
workforce, the itnportance of formal written procedures is reduced; on-the-
job training, with all its drawbacks, tends not to be applicable; worker
continuity is probably greater than management continuity, and if workers
know the requirements, one could say that Inanagement is somewhat
irrelevant to safe practices This is perhaps an aim - that workers should
ensure, and be responsible for, their own safety.
on the mine with the best safty record there was a clear and visual awareness of
the com:nittment to safety
on this mine the impression was gained that the design was "right". The mining had
been well defined, the mining method well researched, and research testing
carried out for the orepass system betre the design was finalised. The
consequence is a mine which operates smoothly accordina to the design.
for the four components involved in this study, on some of the mines very few
workers are involved For example, on the safest mine, no workers are involved at

tips (except an impact breaker operator behind a shield), none on passes, and very
tw on chutes The smaller the number of workers, the fewer accidents will
occur The small number of workers involved is further indication of good design
requiring no non-routine repairs, rehabilitation or clearing of blockages.
5.8 Summary of latent failure aspects
As mentioned above, much of the information collected during the mine visits was
subjective Further, since a range of mines with different orebody geometries, mining
methods, conditions, procedures etc was visited, the amount of information available
in each particular category is limited Rigorous quantification of the problems is
therefore not possible However, a subjective quantification of some of the latent
failure aspects has been attempted, and is presented in Figure 20. In preparing this
figure, replies obtained from the I I mines visited have been assigned values to arrive
at a quantification.
With regard to the adequacy of design and the adequacy of written procedures, a
yes/no approach was adopted - if adequate a unit value was used, if inadequate a zero
value was used. With regard to the adequacy of worker involvement in procedures
and the adequacy of formal training, subjective values between zero and unity were
allocated.
It can be seen from Figure 20 that the quantification shows very poor performance
compared with the ideal, which is the maximum value. The I I mines visited are
considered to be broadly representative of the higher quality side of the mining
industry, and therefre the interpretation in Figure 20 is probably conservatively
representative of the industry - most other mines will perform more poorly than this
interpretation.
119
6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The prima{Y objectives of the research project have been addressed as follows
Maximum Performance Attainable
100
FIGURE 20
SUBJECTIVE QUANTIFICATION OF SOME LATENT FAILURE ASPECTS

120
Identification of various ore and waste types handled on shallow mines
Mine visits to a representative cross section of mines were carried out and the
information gained from these visits is sun-unarised in Section 4 above Details of the
Identification of various ore and waste handling arrangements on shallow mines
The infrmation gained from the mine visits is summarised in Section 4 above. Details
of the checklists completed during the visits are contained in Appendix C
Identification of hazards associated with ore and waste handling on shallow mines
The hazards were identified from an analysis of SAMRASS data. This analysis is dealt
with in detaii in Section 3 above Additional inforlnation which was obtained during
mine visits is contained in Section 4 above The main hazards identified were fall and
handling of material (including rolling rock and mineral) and fall of ground. The major
causes of accidents were classified as failure to comply with standards/instructions and
lack of caution/alertness
Identification of methods of reducing hazards, and recommendations of most

practical solutions, and training requirements for personnel on shallow mines
Recommendations arising from( this research project will be dealt with under the
headings desi( r n, procedures, trainin(' and mana u ement However, before presenting
the recommendations, it is appropriate to refer to the output of two other SIMRAC
Projects, nainely OTH202 (Investi u ation into the causes of transport and tramming
accidents on mines other than coal, gold and platinum, Simpson et al, 1996) and
GEN213 (Improve the safety of workers by investi a ating the reasons why accepted
safety and work standards are not complied With on mines, Talbot et al, 1996) These
documents were received after

121
98
the present report had been formulated in draft form
It is remarkable how similar the thinking was in the current research compared with
that in the other two projects. The majority of the recommendations from the OTH202
and
GEN213 reports are considered to be directly applicable to the present project as well.
Design
Good design promotes good operation and will therefre enhance safety. Good design
of a component can be said to have been achieved when the actual performance of
that component in service meets or exceeds the specified performance for both
production output and operating life.
It is strongly recommended that detailed attention should be given to design, with the
aim of achieving the "ri('hl design" and avoidirw ad hoc design modifications. The
method of achieving this will be determined by manage:nent, but a recommended
method would be to use an approach commonly used on large civil engineering
projects in which designs are subjected to thorough review by independent review
panels This approach involves:
detailed specification and docwnentation of performance requirements. This
will detail at least the followin o
required production capacity, characteristics of material to be handled, fr

T
exaniple block sizes, block shapes, ( radin( water conditions, required
operating life of the component, planned repair or maintenance intervals,
planned repair or maintenance methods; access requirements and facilities for

repair and operating principles, for example, whether a pass will be
controlled or
SIMRAC Protect
uncontrolled, maximum and minimum levels of rock in the pass,

maximum standing times between drawing from the pass, etc. (This
will provide information on which proactive drafting of operating,
maintenance and safety procedures can be based)
By drawing up detailed specifications in advance of any design work, the

identification of potential problems will be well considered and the problems
well defined.
Internal review, by a formally constituted internal review panel (minimum of 3

design criteria and performance specification documents
External review, by a formally constituted external review panel (minimum of 3

design criteria and performance specification documents. Independent means
independent of the mine and mining house Panel members should be chosen
on the basis of their established records
Internal and independent auditing to ensure that operating methods comply

with the principles on which the design was based
Throu('h internal and external review a broader range of experience is brought to bear
on the problem and the likelihood of identifying design deficiencies is greater
0TH 303 March 1997

123
Procedu res
Although the study has indicated that there is not necessarily a correlation (for drawpollts,
tips, passes and chutes) between safety and the availability of standard procedures, It IS
considered that a good quality set of "rules" will pron10te good operation
IOO
and safty Codes of practice Il'l,ay In any case be required in terms of the Mine
Health and Safty Act The research has shown that existing procedures on mines are
generally not logically prepared and appear to be reactive. It is recommended that
procedures should be proactively prepared in a standard lo a ical trmat, minimising
the written word, and using a visual format as far as possible. They should be
formally reviewed on a routine basis, and updated as necessary. A suggested content
is the following:
Header
Title clearly stated, revision number and date, previous revisions and their dates,
person responsible fr revision, review dates and responsible person (to indicate that,
if no revision was carried out, this decision was based on a routine review), procedure
number, other associated or relevant procedure numbers, filino information,
distribution details.
(Objective
The justification for the procedure and the expected result
Relevant Le a al Clauses
Clauses from Acts and Re u ulations that are relevant to the procedure or perhaps the
reason for the procedure These should be included in their full wording. It is probable
that this section should be provided in Appendix frm, since it is for reference, and
should not detract fronl the readability of the procedure

Written procedure
Succhlctly written, comprehensible and instructive procedure, prepared according to

the tableofcontents drawn up as described above Illustrative drawinas or cartoons
should be used
SfM RAC Pro,eet
Visual summary
Those procedures that affect lower level workers should be produced in a visual
format such that the procedure is absolutely clear without the requirement to read
anything, and is not language dependent. The procedures must be completely
comprehensible to
illiterate individuals.
Review panel
Names and signatures of persons involved in the preparation and review of the procedure.
This would include representatives from mine management, mine operating personnel, loss
control personnel, safty representatives, representatives of labour, training personnel, and
possibly external reviewers.
Approval
Name and signature of responsible person/s and date.
Appendices
The recommended format is detailed to a greater extent in the text of the report,
Section 5 -3 .6.. To achieve succint docililents with maximum clarity, it is
recommended that draft procedures should be edited by a person experienced in the
writing of standard procedures
0TH 303 March 1997
125
Training
Induction trainirw was provided on all mines visited, and thereafter on most mines
"on the job" traililll(' was the norm Formal traininu was only provided in specific
situations. It IS recommended that training should be formalised to ensure that
workers are taught.

126
to reco u nise hazards to understand the procedures, and

to understand why they must comply with procedures
Trainers should be taught to train to ensure that the communication is maximised.
Proficiency testing should be carried out after the completion of a training

programme, and certifcates could be issued to record successful performance. Testing
is essential to measure whether the training is being absorbed by the respective
personnel. Routine audit checks can be carried out to monitor that the training has on-
going effectiveness.
The formal training identified above should address the main causes of accidents,
which are failure to comply with standards and instructions, and lack of
caution/alertness. It should also instill a greater understanding of safety and the
requirements of safe operating practices
Management
Management is responsible for establishing the safety culture, formulating the

procedures, ensuring that the procedures are adhered to, and setting the example. To
achieve this, safety must have a very high profile It is recommended that safety should
be a corporate responsibility at corporate director level, safty depafiments should
have the same status and authority as production departments, management personnel
must comply absolutely with all the procedures in order to set the example
From the above recomlX)endations, it is considered that the wreatest benefit to safety
will accrue from formalised and appropriate training The next major benefit will be
u a
from mana ement, who will be responsible fr implementin(' the trainin and
monitoring the success of the training programmes and the improvement in the safety

127
culture The procedures frm a basis for control of safety and a basis on which to
Inonitor adherence
to saf practices The desi a n benefit is somewhat intangible, but a well designed mine will
result in a saf and efficient operation
Recommendations for further research
The general conclusions which have arisen from the research presented in this report
are Inuch the same as have been derived from the research projects OTH202 and
GEN213. It is therefore recomllended that further generalised research is not
warranted. It is considered that substantial benefit will be derived from training. It is
therefore reco:nmended that specific research should be directed towards the
following:
identification of the most appropriate training Inaterials and methods;
development of appropriate training materials and methods for specific aspects such
as hazard reco a nition, development of methods for testing the effctiveness of the
training, development of' specific trainma courses for trainers
T R STACEY Pr Eng A H SWART

Steffen, Robertson and Kirsten

128
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SAFETY IN MINES RESEARCH ADVISORY

Title. Investigation into Drawpoints, Tips, Orepasses and

Date March 1997

INVESTIGATION INTO DRAWPOINTS, TIPS,

DRAFT FINAL REPORT

REPORT 223742/2 MARCH 1997

INVESTIGATION INTO DRAWPOINTS, TIPS,

OREPASSES AND CHUTES

DRAFT FINAL REPORT

Section Description Page

2.3. I Problems experienced in passes 11

2.3.2 Factors influencing the performance of passes 13

3 ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT REPORTS

3. 1.2 Causes of accidents 31

3. 1.3 Experience of workers involved in accidents 31

3. 1.4 Nature of injuries 34

3.2 Accidents at tip locations 34

3 2.2 Causes of accidents 35

3.2.3 Experience of workers involved in accidents 38

3.2.4 Nature of injuries 38

Accidents at orepass locations 40

3.3. I Classifications of accidents 40

3.3.3 Experience of workers involved in accidents 42

3.3 4 Nature of injuries

3.4. I Classifications of accidents 45

3.4.2 Causes of accidents 45

3.4.3 Experience of workers involved in accidents 48

3 4.4 Nature of injuries 48

5.3.3 Format of documents

5.3.4 Logic of preparation

5.3.5 Vagueness of statements

5.3.6 Suggested format for procedures documents . 85

5.5 Induction and training 90

5.6 Attitudes towards procedures and safety 92

REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 104

SIN,RAC RESEARCH PROPOSAL

objectives of the research project have been addressed as follows:

Identification of various ore and waste types handled on shallow mines

Identification of various ore and waste handling arrangements on shallow mines

Identification of methods of reducing hazards, and recommendations of most

detailed specification and documentation of performance requirements. This

required production capacity; characteristics of material to be handled, for

planned repair or maintenance methods; access requirements and facilities for

By drawing up detailed specifications in advance of any design work, the identification

Internal review, by a frmally constituted internal review panel (minimum of 3

External review, by a formally constituted external review panel (minimum of

to recognise hazards; to understand the procedures,

Management is responsible for establishing the safety culture, formulating the

identification of the most appropriate training materials and methods; development

SIMRAC PROJECT 0TH 303

INVESTIGATION INTO DRAWPOINTS, TIPS,

OREPASSES AND CHUTES

DRAFT FINAL REPORT

This rock flow systelll is shown diagrammatically in Fi aure I

occurred at the locations of drawpoints, tips, orepasses and chutes. 53 of these

have occurred in South African mines.

SIMRAC Project 0TH 303 March 1997

SIMRAC Pr(iect 0TH 303 March 1997

depend on the mining

SIMRAC Project 0TH 303 March 1997

SIMRAC Project 0TH 303 March 1997

2.3 Ore passes

The literature on ore passes is reasonably extensive, and much of it contains