Aranes vs Judge Occiano
FACTS: Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charged respondent Judge
Occiano with grossignorance of the law. Occiano is the presiding judge in
Court of Balatan, CamarinesSur. However, he solemnized the marriage of
Aranes and Dominador Orobia onFebruary 17, 2000 at the couples
residence in Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outsid ehis territorial
jurisdiction and without the requisite of marriage license.It appeared in the
records that petitioner and Orobia filed their application of
marriagelicense on January 5, 2000 and was stamped that it will be issued
on January 17, 2000 but neither of them claimed it. In addition, no record
also appeared with the Office ofthe Civil Registrar General for the alleged
marriage.Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony, he carefully
examined the documents andfirst refused to conduct the marriage and
advised them to reset the date considering theabsence of the marriage
license. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, theinflux of
visitors and fear that the postponement of the wedding might aggravate
the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from stroke, he
solemnized the marriageon the assurance of the couple that they will
provide the license that sameafternoon. Occiano denies that he told the
couple that their marriage is valid
ISSUE: Whether Judge Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without
a dulyissued marriage license and conducting it outside his territorial
jurisdiction.
HELD: The court held that the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge
is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of
solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur
therefore is contrary to law and subjectshim to administrative liability. His
act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law forhe allegedly
solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he
cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of
theMunicipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00
pesos with aSTERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offense in the future will bedealt with more severely.
Lim Tanhu vs Ramolete
FACTS: Private respondent Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee
Hoon Lim PoChuan, who was a partner and practically the owner who has
controllinginterest of Glory Commercial Company and a Chinese Citizen
until hisdeath. Defendant Antonio Lim Tanhu and Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua
were partners in name but they were mere employees of Po Chuan and we
renaturalized Filipino Citizens. Tan Put filed complaint against spouses-
petitonerLim Tanhu and Dy Ochay including their son Tech Chuan and the
otherspouses-petitoner Ng Sua and Co Oyo including also their son Eng
ChongLeonardo, that through fraud and machination took actual and
activemanagement of the partnership and that she alleged entitlement to
share notonly in the capital and profits of the partnership but also in the
otherassets, both real and personal, acquired by the partnership with fund
s of the latterduring its lifetime."According to the petitioners, Ang Siok Tin
is the legitimate wife, still living,and with whom Tee Hoon had four
legitimate children, a twin born in 1942,and two others born in 1949 and
1965, all presently residing in Hong Kong.Tee Hoon died in 1966 and as a
result of which the partnership was dissolvedand what corresponded to
him were all given to his legitimate wife andchildren.Tan Put prior of her
alleged marriage with Tee Hoon on 1949, was engaged inthe drugstore
business; that not long after her marriage, upon the suggestion ofthe latter
sold her drugstore for P125,000.00 which amount she gave to herhusband
as investment in Glory Commercial Co. sometime in 1950; that afterthe
investment of the above-stated amount in the partnership its
businessflourished and it embarked in the import business and also
engaged in thewholesale and retail trade of cement and GI sheets and
under huge profits.Defendants interpose that Tan Put knew and was are
that she was merely thecommon-law wife of Tee Hoon. Tan Put and Tee
Hoon were childless but theformer had a foster child, Antonio Nunez.
ISSUE:Whether Tan Put, as she alleged being married with Tee Hoon, can
claim from the company of the latters share.
HELD: Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the
contracting parties that they take each other as husband and wife "shall be
set forth in aninstrument" signed by the parties as well as by their
witnesses and the personsolemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the
primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage
contract. While a marriage may also be proved by other competent
evidence, the absence of the contract mustfirst be satisfactorily explained.
Surely, the certification of the person whoallegedly solemnized a marriage
is not admissible evidence of such marriageunless proof of loss of the
contract or of any other satisfactory reason for itsnon-production is first
presented to the court. In the case at bar, the purportedcertification issued
by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Bishop, PhilippineIndependent Church, Cebu
City, is not, therefore, competent evidence, there being absolutely no
showing as to unavailability of the marriage contract and,indeed, as to the
authenticity of the signature of said certifier, the juratallegedly signed by a
second assistant provincial fiscal not being authorized bylaw, since it is not
part of the functions of his office. Besides, inasmuch as the bishop did not
testify, the same is hearsay.An agreement with Tee Hoon was shown and
signed by Tan Put that shereceived P40,000 for her subsistence when they
terminated their relationship ofcommon-law marriage and promised not to
interfere with each others affairs since they are incompatible and not in
the position to keep living together permanently. Hence, this
document not only proves that her relation was that of a common-law
wife but had also settled property interests in the payment ofP40,000.IN
VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted. All proceedingsheld
in respondent court in its Civil Case No. 12328 subsequent to the order
ofdismissal of October 21, 1974 are hereby annulled and set aside,
particularly the ex-parte proceedings against petitioners and the decision
on December 20,1974. Respondent court is hereby ordered to enter an
order extending theeffects of its order of dismissal of the action dated
October 21, 1974 to herein petitioners Antonio Lim Tanhu, Dy Ochay,
Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and CoOyo. And respondent court is hereby
permanently enjoined from taking anyfurther action in said civil case gave
and except as herein indicated. Costs against private respondent.
Republic vs. CA and Castro GR No. 103047, September 12, 1994
FACTS: Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil
marriage with Edwin Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and
it was only upon Castro found out that she was pregnant that they decided
to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4 months.
Thereafter, they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by
her brother with the consent of Cardenas. The baby was brought in the US
and in Castros earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted to put in
order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a
declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that
there was no marriage license issued prior to the celebration of their
marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted
to by Castro is sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued
to the parties prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
HELD: The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by
the Civil Registrar unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion
sufficiently prove that the office did not issue a marriage license to the
contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro is not
supported by any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition
because of the peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas
was duly served with notice of the proceedings, which he chose to ignore.
Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established
the absence of the subject marriage license.
Garcia vs. Recio
Facts: Article 26; The respondent, Rederick Recio, a Filipino was married to
Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived together
as husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family court
issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992,
respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace
Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, inCabanatuan City. In their application
for marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino.
Since October 1995, they lived separately, and in 1996 while in Australia,
their conjugal assets were divided. In 1998, petitioner filed Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that
she learned of the respondents former marriage only in November. On the
other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of his prior marriage
in 1993, before they were married. Respondent also contended that his
first marriage was dissolved by a divorce a decree obtained in Australia in
1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.
The trial court declared that the first marriage was dissolved on the ground
of the divorce issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the Philippines.
Hence, this petition was forwarded before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry Grace Garcia.
Ruling: In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of
the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in
case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by two
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with
their respective laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign
divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. In this case, the
divorce decree between the respondent and Samson appears to be
authentic, issued by an Australian family court. Although, appearance is
not sufficient, and compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged
foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was admitted on account
of petitioners failure to object properly because he objected to the fact
that it was not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not
to its admissibility. Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree,
which was validly admitted as evidence, adequately established his legal
capacity to marry under Australian law. Even after the divorce becomes
absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes, still restrict
remarriage. Respondent also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing
the foreign law governing his status. Together with other evidences
submitted, they dont absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry.
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera 174 SCRA 653
Facts: Article 26; On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino
citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were
married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started
auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in
Malate, Manila. Thereafter, marital discord set in, followed by a separation
de facto between them. After about three and a half years of marriage,
private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in
Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they
had been living apart since April 1982. On January 15, 1986, Schoneberg
Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to
petitioner. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal
separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila on January 23, 1983. More than five months after the
issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to
said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as
early as 1982 and with yet another man named James Chua sometime in
1983". On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order,
seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion
to quash.
Issue: Whether or not the criminal cases filed by the German ex-spouse
may prosper.
Ruling: Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery
cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the
offended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the
offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at
the time of the filing of the criminal action. Hence, Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still
subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our
civil law on the matter of status of persons. Private respondent, being no
longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the
time he filed suit.
Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr. 139 SCRA 139
Facts: Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in
Hongkong in 1972. They established residence in the Philippines and had
two children. In 1982, the wife sued for divorce in Nevada, U.S.A., on the
ground f incompatibility. She later married Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada
in 1983. Upton sued her before RTC, Branch LXV in Pasay City asking that
she be ordered to render an accounting of her business, which Upton
alleged to be conjugal property. He also prayed that he be declared with a
right to manage the conjugal property. The defendant wife moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of action was barred
by a previous judgment in the divorce proceedings wherein he had
acknowledged that the couple had no community property.
Issue: Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted by U.S. court,
between Filipina wife and American husband held binding upon the latter.
Ruling: The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada Divorce of the parties.
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any
states of the U.S. The decree is binding on Upton as an American citizen.
Hence, he cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any state of the United
States. It is true that owing to the nationality principle under article 15 of
the civil code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from the standards of
American law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the
husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as
petitioner husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is
also estopped by his own representation before the Nevada court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. He should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
Republic vs. Orbecido 472 SCRA 114
Facts: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros Villanueva
were married in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were blessed with a son and a
daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the U. S. bringing along their son
and after a few years she was naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his son who was
living with his wife in the States that his wife had remarried after
obtaining. her divorce decree. Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority
to remarry with the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code.
Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition of the respondent and allowed
him to remarry. The Solicitor Generals motion for reconsideration was
denied. In view of that, petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari
of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. Herein petitioner raised the
issue of the applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case.
Issue: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26(2).
Ruling: Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case where at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the
marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later
on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently
obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she
remarried an American citizen while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the
2nd par. of Art. 26 does not apply to the instant case. The reckoning point
is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.In this case,
when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an Americancitizen, there was still
a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As
fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid
divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus
Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his wifes
naturalization he is still barred from remarrying. Respondent Orbecido who
has the burden of proof, failed to submit competent evidence showing his
allegations that his naturalized American wife had obtained a divorce
decree and had remarried.
Ninal vs. Bayadog 328 SCRA 122
FACTS: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26,
1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners.
Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24,
1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year
and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any
marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived
together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license.
Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death,
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage
license.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of
the nullity of Pepitos marriage after his death?
HELD: The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the
marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they instituted
an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from
the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage
with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had
started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact
remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the
source of rights. It can be questioned even after the death of one of the
parties and any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
Manzano vs. Sanchez
FACTS: Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David
Manzano having been married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel
Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22, 1993, her
husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before
respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both
contracting parties were separated thus, respondent Judge ought to
know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he
officiated the marriage of David and Payao, he knew that the two had been
living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested in their
joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never cohabit or
communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels.
ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting
parties who both have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they
have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of Family Code.
HELD: Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal
impediment to marry each other. Considering that both parties has a
subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they are
both separated is an impediment that would make their subsequent
marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary
cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not severe the
tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez
demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and
bigamous marriage.
Cosca vs. Palaypayon
237 SCRA 249
FACTS: The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer
1), Edmundo B. Peralta (Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and
Apollo Villamora (Process Server). Respondents are Judge Lucio
Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of
court II. All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without
the requisite of a marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able
to get married just by paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano
P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie
Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater
& Margarita Nacario; Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a consequence,
the marriage contracts of the following couples did not reflect any
marriage license number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the
marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization
reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be
submitted by the parties which happens usually several days after the
marriage ceremony.
Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under
Article 34 of the Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license
requirement. According to him, he gave strict instructions to complainant
Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the
same with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve
the problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the marriage by
securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy
of which was then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages
were not illegally solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their
marriage contracts and the date and place of marriage are not included. It
was alleged that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of
complainant Sambo. The alleged marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias &
Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not celebrated by him
since he refused to solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license
and that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated even without
the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties to avoid
embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the marriage
contract.
An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.
HELD: Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a marriage
license along with the other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and
Pompeo Ariola including the photographs taken showed that it was really
Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that
they were advised by judge to return after 10 days after the solemnization
and bring with them their marriage license. They already started living
together as husband and wife even without the formal requisite. With
respect to the photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated
solemnization of marriage and not a real one. However, considering that
there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the
signing of the marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that it is
hard to believe that it was simulated.
On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized
marriage between Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34
of the Civil Code so the marriage license was dispensed with considering
that the contracting parties executed a joint affidavit that they have been
living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already. However,
it was shown in the marriage contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs
2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together for 6
years already before they got married as what is stated in the joint
affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when they
started living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon should have
been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting
parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to avoid the
marriage license requirement.
Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of
any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the
validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.
Mariategui vs. CA
GR NO. 57062, January 24, 1992
FACTS: Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and
contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa
Estate while he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children with his first wife
Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del
Rosario, Urbano and Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero,
Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed
Espina. Ireneo on the other hand had a son named Ruperto. On the other
hand, Lupos second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a
daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo got married for the third time in 1930
with Felipa Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina.
Jacinto testified that his parents got married before a Justice of the Peace
of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife,
and were known in the community to be such.
Lupos descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated themselves Lot NO. 163 of
the Muntinlupa Estate and was subjected to a voluntary registration
proceedings and a decree ordering the registration of the lot was issued.
The siblings in the third marriage prayed for inclusion in the partition of
the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of
extrajudicial partition dated Dec. 1967.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of
a marriage license.
HELD: Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and
Felipas marriage, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these
facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does
not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are
present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken
place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a
woman, deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there
being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that
things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the
ordinary habits of life.
Hence, Felipas children are legitimate and therefore have successional
rights.
Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CA
FACTS: Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the
celebration of their wedding, they proceed to the house of defendants
mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them during their first
night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to
have their honeymoon in a private place, they went to Baguio but Ginas
relatives went with them. Again, there was no sexual intercourse since the
defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping on a
rocking chair at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they
slept together in the same bed but no attempt of sexual intercourse
between them. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical
examination to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result
of the physical examination of Gina was disclosed, while that of the
husband was kept confidential even the medicine prescribed. There were
allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain
his residency status here in the country. Gina does not want to reconcile
with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared void on the ground of
psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to
have their marriage annulled because he loves her very much, he has no
defect on his part and is physically and psychologically capable and since
their relationship is still young, they can still overcome their differences.
Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination and the
result was there is not evidence of impotency and he is capable of
erection.
ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsois refusal to have sexual intercourse with his
wife constitutes psychological incapacity.
HELD: The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to
the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance tot the marriage within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his
or her essential marital obligations and the refusal is senseless and
constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential
marital obligations under the Family Code is to procreate children thus
constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity
and wholeness of the marriage.
Leouel Santos vs. CA
FACTS: Leouel, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo.
The two got married in 1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly
thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple lived with Julias parents at
the J. Bedia Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was
named as Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a
number of things aside from the interference of Julias parents into their
family affairs.
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouels pleas to
dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, she called her husband
and promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July
1989 but she never did. Leouel got a chance to visit US where he
underwent a training program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or
somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article
36 of the Family Code. He argued that failure of Julia to return home or to
communicate with him for more than 5 years are circumstances that show
her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.
ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
HELD: The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personal disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate,
in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can
always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
Wherefore, his petition was denied.
Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano
GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004
FACTS: Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of
nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the
ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-law
relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter,
Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then
gave birth on November 16, 1987.
In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a
month of their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return
by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money
for two months and after that he stopped giving financial support. She
wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from
her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor
their child.
Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to
him remained unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte
motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The motion
was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition,
was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days
to file his answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from
publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer the case to the prosecutor
for investigation.
ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligation.
HELD: The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as basic autonomous social institution and marriage
as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the validity of the marriage.
Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was
never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness.
Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it would
have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or
clinically identified Toshios illness. This could have been done through an
expert witness. It is essential that a person show incapability of doing
marital obligation due to some psychological, not physical illness. Hence,
Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.
Choa vs. Choa
FACTS: Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981. They have 2
children namely Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. In 1993, Alfonso filed an
annulment of his marriage to Leni. Afterwards, he filed an amended
complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on
psychological incapacity. The case went to trial and the trial court further
held that Alfonso presented quantum evidence that Leni needs to
controvert for the dismissal of the case.
Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and
deportation which shows latters psychological incapacity because
according to him it clearly showed that his wife not only wanted him
behind bars but also to banish outside the country.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Leni on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
HELD: The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the trial
of the case do not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of
his wife. The evidence was insufficient and shows grave abuse of
discretion bordering on absurdity. Alfonso testified and complained about
three aspects of Lenis personality namely lack of attention to children,
immaturity, and lack of an intention of procreative sexuality and none of
these three, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a
refusal or a neglect in the performance of marital obligations. A mere
showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not
constitute psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, the testimonial evidence from other witnesses failed to
identify and prove root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. It
just established that the spouses had an incompatibility or a defect that
could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. The totality
of evidence presented was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity more so without any medical, psychiatric or
psychological examination.
DEBEL VS. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
Facts: David Debel met Sharon Corpuz while he was working in the
advertising business of his father. The acquaintance led to courtship and
romantic relations, culminating into marriage before the City Court of
Pasay on September 28, 1966. On May 20, 1967, the civil marriage was
ratified in a church wedding. The union produced four children. The
petitioner avers that during the marriage Sharon turned out to be an
irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had an illicit affair with
several men and then later to a Jordanian national named Ibrahim. Sharon
was once confined for psychiatric treatment but she didnt stop her illicit
relationship with the Jordanian national whom she married and whom she
had two children. Ibrahim left Sharon so she returned back to the
petitioner who had accepted her back. However on December 9, 1995,
Sharon abandoned the petitioner and joined Ibrahim in Jordan with their
two children. After giving up all hope for reconciliation, petitioner filed on
April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity. The RTC granted the nullity of the
marriage. It was appealed in the CA which set aside the decision of RTC
and ordered dismissal of the case. Hence, the instant petition was filed to
the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not private respondents sexual infidelity or perversion
and abandonment fall within the term of psychological incapacity.
Held: In this case private respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and
abandonment can hardly qualify as mental or psychological illness to such
extent that she could not have known the obligation she was assuming. It
appears that private respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at
the inception of the marriage; in fact, the record disclosed that there was a
blissful marital union. It must be shown that the acts are a manifestation of
a disordered personality which makes respondent completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of marital state, not merely due to her
youth, immaturity or sexual promiscuity.
ABUNADO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts: On September 18, 1967, petitioner Salvador married Narcisa Arceo.
In 1988 Narcisa left for Japan to work but returned to the Philippines in
1992 when she learned that her husband was having anextra-marital affair
and has left their home. Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting
with FeCorazon Plato. She also discovered that on January 10, 1989
Salvador contracted a second marriage withZenaida Bias.On January 19,
1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa. On May 18,
1995, a casefor bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and
Zenaida.On May 18, 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner Salvador
Abunado of bigamy. On appeal, the Courtof Appeals affirmed with
modification the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for annulment is a prejudicial question
to the proceedings in the bigamy case.
Held: No. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the
crime had already been consummated. Petitioners assertion wouldonly
delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could
simply file a petition todeclare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in thecriminal case.The
outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to Narcisa
had no bearing upon thedetermination of petitioners innocence or guilt in
the criminal case for bigamy. All that is required for the charge of bigamy
to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage iscontracted.A marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall
be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this
case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his
firstmarriage was void ab initio, the point is both the first and the second
marriage were subsisting before thefirst marriage was annulled.The
petition is denied.
Morigo vs. People
FACTS: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They
lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various
exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990.
Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for
divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married
Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of
nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was
then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment
since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy
case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete
was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in
good faith.
ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his
marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from
the bigamy case.
HELD: Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that
there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a
solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract.
The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his
marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence,
he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
Wiegel vs. Sempio-Dy
FACTS: Karl Wiegel was married to Lilia Wiegel on July 1978. Lilia was
married with a certain Eduardo Maxion in 1972. Karl then filed a petition
in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with Lilia on the ground of latters former marriage. Having
been allegedly force to enter into a marital union, she contents that the
first marriage is null and void. Lilia likewise alleged that Karl was married
to another woman before their marriage.
ISSUE: Whether Karls marriage with Lilia is void.
HELD: It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was
vitiated with force because it will not be void but merely voidable. Such
marriage is valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it
is clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly married to her first
husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is no
need of introducing evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for then such
marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration before he can
remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilias marriage are regarded void under the
law.
Domingo vs. CA
FACTS: Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of
property. She did not know that Domingo had been previously married to
Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous marriage
when the latter filed a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she
came home from Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she
discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and had been
disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto. The
latter claims that because their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration
of such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand,
Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the
purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation
and distribution of properties acquired during the marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be
filed for purposes of remarriage.
HELD: The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for
purposed of remarriage. However, it is also necessary for the protection of
the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his or her partner
was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said person is
freed from being charged with bigamy.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment
shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the
delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Soledads prayer for
separation of property will simply be the necessary consequence of the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence, the
petitioners suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary
civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family
Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the
regime of property relations governing them.
Valdes vs. RTC
FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and
begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of
nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which
was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody
of their mother while the other 3 siblings are free to choose which they
prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the
procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions without
marriage. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint
affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-
ownership.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the
cause thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the
rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party
who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.
People vs. Aragon
FACTS: Proceso Rosima contracted marriage with Gorrea. While his
marriage with the latter subsist, he contracted a canonical marriage with
Faicol. Gorrea is staying in Cebu while Faicol is in Iloilo. He was a traveling
salesman thus, he commuted between Iloilo and Cebu. When Gorrea died,
he brought Faicol to Cebu where the latter worked as teacher-nurse. She
later on suffered injuries in her eyes caused by physical maltreatment of
Rosima and was sent to Iloilo to undergo treatment. While she was in
Iloilo, Rosima contracted a third marriage with Maglasang. CFI-Cebu found
him guilty of bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the third marriage is null and void.
HELD: The action was instituted upon the complaint of the second wife
whose marriage with Rosima was not renewed after the death of the first
wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last
marriage was a valid one and prosecution against Rosima for contracting
marriage cannot prosper.
Mercado vs. Tan

337 SCRA 122

FACTS: Dr. Vicent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in
1976 before he contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the
latter claims she did not know. Tan filed bigamy against Mercado and after
a month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage
against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared marriage between Mercado
and Oliva null and void.

ISSUE: Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the

declaration of nullity of the former marriage.

HELD: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary

before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a
subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is
guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statute as void.

In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Oliva right after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the
crime had already been consummated. He contracted second marriage
without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that the first
marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a bigamy charge.