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TA B L E O F C O N T E N T S
Figures
Figure 3.1. Map of Major U.S./NATO and Russian/CSTO Military Facilities
in Central Asia 33
Figure 3.2. The Northern Distribution Network 44
Figure 4.1. Central Asian Trade with Russia, Annual, 20012010 60
Figure 4.2. Gazprom Production and Central Asian Purchases,
20052009 65
Figure 4.3. Russian Investment in Central Asia, Annual, 20022009 66
Figure 5.1. Central Asian Trade with Russia and China, Annual,
20012010 86
Figure 5.2. Kyrgyz Trade with China and Russia, 20012010 87
Figure 5.3. Map of Major New Chinese Pipelines in Central Asia 93
Figure 6.1. Democracy Trends in Central Asia, 20012010 98
Figure 8.1. Control of Corruption, Central Asia, 20002009 135
Figure 8.2. Control of Corruption, Middle East, 20002009 135
Figure 8.3. The Manas Fuel Chain, Late 2010 147
Figure 9.1. Number of Documents Required for Import/Export,
2006 & 2011 154
Figure 9.2. Time Required for Import/Export, 2006 & 2011 154
Figure 9.3. Comparative Time Required for Import/Export,
2006 & 2011 155
Tables
Table 3.1. U.S. Assistance to Central Asia, FY2007 42
Table 8.1. Manas Primary Fuel Contracts 145
ix
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Though this book is a recent endeavor, I have accumulated enormous debts from
the individuals and organizations that have supported this project and its pre-
vious components. I am especially grateful to the Fellows Program of the Open
Society Foundations (OSF) for giving me the opportunity, as one of its inaugu-
ral Global Fellows (thanks to Lenny Benardo, Bipasha Ray, and Steve Hubbell),
to think through these issues, conduct research travel, and benefit from engaging
with its world-class network. I am also grateful to the Central Eurasia Project of
OSF, especially to Anthony Richter, who encouraged me to think about the
policy implications of my work on military bases and Western security engage-
ment in Central Asia. The OSF foundations in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan (thanks to
Kumar Bekbolotov and Zuhra Halimova), and Brussels greatly facilitated my
field research. Additional support was provided by Barnard College, including a
generous gift by the Tow family, and Columbia Universitys Harriman Institute,
including a Faculty Publication Grant, an educational exchange project with the
Turkmen Ministry of Education, funds for my visit to the ODIHR office in
Warsaw, and support through the 20102011 Core Project on Human Rights in
the Post-Communist World, which I co-directed with Jack Snyder. I am also
thankful to the members of the Columbia School of International and Public
Affairs Capstone Project that I supervised in Spring 2011, who produced an ex-
cellent study on the political implications of China-Turkmen energy relations.
Different chapters and arguments developed in the book were presented at
MIT, NYU, University of Toronto, Yale University, the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences, the Association for the Study of Nationalities, the Center for
Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., a National Committee
on American Foreign Policy roundtable at the Kennan Institute, and a joint
Columbia-Harvard conference on How Central is Central Asia? Overseas, I
received valuable feedback at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, the 9th
xi
xii Acknowledg ments
and 10th biannual SCO Academic Conferences in Shanghai (with thanks to Pro-
fessor Pan Guang and Li Lifan), Columbia Universitys Global Center Beijing,
the U.S. German Marshall Funds Transatlantic Center in Brussels, the University
of Londons School of Oriental and African Studies, Carnegie Moscow, the
American University of Central Asia, the OSCE Center in Dushanbe, as well as
the PONARS Eurasia workshops held in Istanbul, Moscow, Tbilisi, and Bishkek.
I thank Ali Borochoff-Porte, Sasha Smyslova, and Nadia Bulkin for their
research assistance and Sharone Tobias for her help in Beijing. I am especially
grateful for the invaluable contribution of Matthew Schaaf, now of Freedom
House, and his tremendous energy, dedication, and insights. He not only metic-
ulously researched many of these tricky topics, but drafted the maps, charts, and
Appendix 1 and copyedited portions of the manuscript. Dave McBride at Oxford
University Press provided sage advice and good-natured encouragement from
the projects beginning stages, while four external reviewers at OUP gave helpful
feedback at various critical points. Nicole supported me through the completion
of yet another book, which she too was initially surprised to hear about. She and
Greta make research travel worth finishing.
Portions of Russia and the Recent Evolution of the SCO from The Policy
Worlds Meets Academia: Designing U.S. Policy Toward Russia, edited by Timothy
Colton, Timothy Frye, and Robert Legvold (2010), are reprinted by permission of
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. An essay entitled Great Games,
Local Rules appeared in the Summer 2011 issue of the Cairo Review. As of January
2011, I have served on the Advisory Board of the Open Society Foundations Cen-
tral Eurasia Project, which funds the news site Eurasianet. Though I occasionally
consult with their staff reporters and editorial office, I was not a source for any of the
news stories that I cite. The book references leaked U.S. Embassy cables published
by Wikileaks; though the manner in which these documents were obtained remains
controversial, their scholarly value, now in the public domain, is undeniable.
Finally, my thinking has been greatly enriched and improved by colleagues who
have given feedback on the project and individual chapters. I thank Edil Baisalov,
Sam Charap, Ed Chow, Erica Downs, George Gavrilis, Jeff Goldstein, Cornelius
Graubner, Sam Greene, Jacqui Hale, Scott Horton, Deniz Kandiyoti, Stephanie
Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Andy Kuchins, Steve LeVine, Xiaobo Lu, Alexander Lukin,
Erica Marat, Kim Marten, Neil Melvin, Lincoln Mitchell, Rebecca Nadin, Cathy
Nepomnyashchy, Dan Nexon, Paul Quinn-Judge, Jenik Radon, Sean Roberts, Ed
Schatz, Jason Sharman, Matt Siegel, Andrew Small, Jack Snyder, Andrei Tsygankov,
David Trilling, Deirdre Tynan, Leslie Vinjamuri, Chris Walker, Cory Welt, Tom
Wood, and Zhao Huasheng. All errors in fact and judgment are entirely my own.
Alexander Cooley
New York, October 2011
INTRODUCTION
This was not a book that I planned to write. Though a long-time observer of
Central Asia, my previous work mostly looked at the region as a case when
exploring topics such as comparative imperial legacies, the politics surrounding
U.S. military bases or, in my joint work with Hendrik Spruyt, how countries
divide, share, and transfer their sovereignty.
This project originally started as a more limited attempt to make analytical
and practical sense of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a new regional
organization comprising China, Russia, and the Central Asian states, which in
the late 2000s appeared to be establishing itself as a rival to Western-led security
and economic organizations in Central Asia. But the onset of the global financial
crisis and the aftermath of the Russia-Georgia War underscored important dif-
ferences in the agendas of its two biggest members, China and Russia, and the
organizations development was halted.
Meanwhile, just a few months after my Base Politics book came out, the small
country of Kyrgyzstan, in seeming collusion with Russia, announced that it
would evict the U.S. military from its critical airbase at Manas, near the capital of
Bishkek. U.S. officials launched a furious, and ultimately successful, behind-the-
scenes efforts to reverse the decision, renegotiating an extended stay at an
increased price. Just one year later, the regime of Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek
Bakiyev, who had launched the U.S.-Russia bidding war, collapsed, prompting a
domestic backlash against the United States and an investigation into the base-
related service contracts and fuel deals that the U.S. military had reached with
the previous regime. My testimony for a U.S. Congressional investigation into
the fuel contracts at Manas rekindled my interest in the topic, but also empha-
sized that events in the region were moving with great speed.
Upon reflection, I realized that rather than understand specific developments
in Central Asia as cases of certain political phenomena, the regions dynamic
xiii
x iv Int roduc ti on
development, under the close engagement of the United States, Russia, and
China, held important new lessons for the broader study of contemporary world
politics. Central Asia had become a natural experiment for observing the dy-
namics of a multipolar world, including the decline of U.S. authority, the push-
back against Western attempts to promote democratization and human rights,
and the rise of China as an external donor and regional leader. Though each of
the great powers has sought something different from Central Asia, the cumula-
tive weight of their engagement empowered local governments and transformed
the international norms, rules, and institutions that had previously governed the
region. As such, I hope that this books attempt to grapple with some of these
issues will be of interest not only to students of Eurasia, but to those interested
in the emerging questions of world order and governance in this increasingly
post-Western world.
Great Games, Local Rules
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| 1 |
The New Great Power
Contest in Central Asia
The original Great Game also informed the emergence of the modern study
of so-called geopolitics. In his now famous 1904 article, British geographer Har-
old Mackinder observed that Russia occupied a position in the Eurasian heart-
land that served as the pivot region of the worlds politics, with its potentialities
in population, wheat, cotton, fuel, and metals so incalculably great.5 Mackinder
reasoned that if Russia, from this dominant geographical location, could expand
its railway network over Eurasian territory and use these resources to build a
maritime fleet, the empire of the world would then be in sight.6 Though the
extent to which Mackinders alarming analysis actually influenced British for-
eign policymakers is debated, his coining of the terms heartland and pivot
crystallized perceptions of Central Asias strategic importance.7 Then and now,
Central Asia has been viewed as an arena of high-stakes geopolitical sparring,
while its location at the crossroads of multiple empires has subjected it to a rich
array of pressures, influences, and cultures.8
But the Great Game metaphor also remains deeply blinding. The original Great
Game featured expanding empires trying to conquer and wrest physical control of
the regions territory from local rulers, warlords, and chieftains.13 Todays regional
suitors are nation-states, albeit powerful ones, that are attempting to influence
other sovereign states in an increasingly multipolar and complex world. More
important, the objects of todays competition are also established states;14 they
can be neither formally conquered nor dissolved by foreign powers, while their
sovereignty affords them a wide range of international privileges and opportunities
that their earlier counterparts lacked.15
Indeed, if we look more closely, rather than mirroring a previous era, the in-
ternational politics of todays Central Asia is characterized by the emergence of
distinctly novel, innovative, and even unique regional institutions and practices.
After a decade of military operations in Afghanistan, U.S. diplomacy in Central
Asia has been subordinated to the needs of the U.S. military, especially the pow-
erful regional command CENTCOM, which has emerged as an influential and,
at times, autonomous political and economic player. It is a region that has
spawned the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a seem-
ingly dynamic regional organization that rejects Western hegemony and values,
while claiming to promote a new type of international relations.
The region has also experienced rapid normative change; the Central Asian
governments commitments to protecting political rights and human rights
norms, first made when they entered the international community of states in
the 1990s, have been shredded in the name of counterterrorism, while these
same governments, with the backing of Moscow and Beijing, have effectively
redefined human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and groups
promoting democracy as agents of Western influence and regional security
threats. Finally, we have seen international practices such as development fi-
nancing and election monitoring, once exclusively controlled and administered
by Western-controlled bodies, undermined by the emergence of new organiza-
tions and donors that have demanded fewer intrusive conditions than their
Western counterparts. By constantly framing Central Asian politics in terms of
timeless imperial competition, we have overlooked the important changes in
world order and global governance that the region now visibly embodies.
identifies their tools of influence and assesses their impact on Central Asias
political institutions and practices.16 I advance three main arguments, each of
which departs from the classical Great Game framework.
efforts. Many of Russias Central Asian policies have been tactical reactions to
U.S. and Chinese initiatives or reflections of the broader state of its relations with
these great powers.
local elites borrowed foreign ideas about authority and legitimacy and fitted
them into indigenous traditions and practices.24 More cynically, the Central
Asian elites have pushed the practice even further, framing much of their own
suppression of all forms of political opposition as part of a wider set of interna-
tional counterterrorism efforts. They have also grafted or associated new for-
eign norms with existing local practices, such as appropriating the Russian idea
of sovereign democracy to oppose strict Western standards of democracy in
the name of respecting local cultures and political traditions.
During the 1990s, both small states depended on external funds from interna-
tional financial organizations and aid providers, though in Tajikistans case
most of these funds targeted national reconstruction and reconciliation fol-
lowing a devastating civil war from 1992 to 1997.27 Post9/11, these govern-
ments strengthened their security engagement with foreign powers, by
increasing military-to-military cooperation and by providing access to military
bases. In the Kyrgyz case, this has meant hosting the Manas Transit Center,
the vital staging facility for U.S. personnel going to Afghanistan, as well as a
Russian-CSTO base nearby at Kant. Similarly, Tajikistan has hosted military
facilities for Russia, France, and India, as well as the United States in the initial
stages of the Afghanistan campaign. Thus, both the Kyrgyz and Tajik govern-
ments have commodified their very territory to extract economic and political
benefits.
Moreover, both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have pushed the frontiers of con-
temporary clientelism by invoking their weakness and the threat posed by
Islamic militant movements in order to secure external military and economic
assistance. This is not to say that these countries did not face some security chal-
lenges, including their infiltration by Islamic militants from Afghanistan and the
surrounding region in 1999 and 2000.28 Rather, as other commentators have
observed of certain African states during the last decade,29 Kyrgyz and Tajik
elites have used their state weakness strategically, effectively dangling the
prospect of their own collapse to maintain foreign engagement, especially in the
face of growing international frustration with the poor state of their domestic
governance.
Two decades into the postCold War era, however, the United States now
finds its power and influence increasingly challenged by the emergence of rising
powers, new regional institutions, and alternative political values. Fareed Zakaria
has referred to the current era of international politics as the post-American
world, arguing that the rise of new self-confident powers, such as China, India,
and Brazil, is altering the power balance in international organizations;33 Parag
Khanna argues that the emergence of the United States, the European Union,
and China as global superpowers in a shrinking world heralds an age of compe-
tition more intense than any before.34 Robert Pape and Stephen Walt warn that
the unilateralism practiced by the United States has spawned new forms of soft-
balancing against the superpower, including the denial of access for military
bases in strategically important areas like Central Asia.35 Other scholars now
refer to the increasing connectivity among developing countries that bypasses
Western influence as a burgeoning world without the West.36 And a number of
studies now warn that Chinas global rise provides an alternative set of norms,
practices, and institutions that will erode the Wests global influence.37
The period under investigation in this book, 20012011, coincides with the
rise of the so-called post-American world and serves as a potentially instructive
laboratory for observing the emerging dynamics of a multipolar world. The find-
ings, so far at least, of this natural experiment are decidedly mixed for Western
policymakers. Though the United States has managed to lock in the necessary
security cooperation of the Central Asian states for its Afghanistan operations,
albeit after negotiating some political roadblocks along the way, it has achieved
this cooperation mainly by offering economic incentives from the Pentagons
formidable war chest. At the same time, the United States has lost much of its
soft power and its legitimacy as a global role model, while Russia and China
have eroded U.S. influence by rolling out their own organizations, practices, and
political justifications. To be sure, Moscow and Beijing face their own important
challenges and constraints, but the unquestioned global dominance and reputa-
tion once enjoyed by the United States have diminished strikingly over just a
few years.
Perhaps what is trickiest about the emerging multipolar order is that it
requires policymakers and strategists to frame their goals in more pragmatic and
expedient terms than in the past. One of the unfortunate, if understandable, leg-
acies of the Cold War is that it has accustomed us to think of geopolitical influ-
ence as a purely zero-sum endeavorthe influence of one external power upon
the politics of a target state necessarily entails a loss of influence for the other.
But the dynamics of a strategic triangle, and a multipolar world more broadly,
are far less clear than those of the bipolar Cold War. A regional gain for China,
such as the opening of a new pipeline that will transport Central Asian gas east-
ward, is not necessarily a loss for the United States and Russia, especially if it
The New Great Power Contest in Central A sia 13
Over the course of the 2000s, all of the Central Asian governments learned to
effectively court different patrons, to reduce demands for political reforms by
powerful Western states, and to justify their domestic actions by invoking the
radically transformed geopolitical situation. They entrenched a set of domestic
political and economic practices, or local rules, that set the terms of external
engagement and competition for influence. But what, exactly, are these local
rules and where do they come from? Are these practices rooted in the regions
distinct culture, ideology, or history? This chapter addresses these questions.
All of the Central Asian regimes have been aptly described as patrimonial.
In such polities, rulers maintain their positions of authority in return for distrib-
uting resources to a network of supportive political clients.1 Political competi-
tion takes place informally and at the elite level, rather than through elections or
the aggregation of interests via political parties. In the Central Asian cases, these
informal institutions are based on regional and subregional identities, such as
clans, and often operate in parallel to official state structures.2
The centrality of patronage politics is an enduring legacy of Soviet rule in the
region, but two decades of independence have provided Central Asian elites
with a new political context, opportunities, and resources with which to consol-
idate their authority. Over the course of their tenure, three important rules have
come to characterize Central Asian regimes: the promotion of regime survival;
the use of state resources for private gain; and the brokering between external
actors and local constituencies. After reviewing the origins of Central Asias pat-
rimonial institutions in the Soviet era and the relatively quiet transition period
of the 1990s, this chapter examines these rules in greater detail, setting the scene
for our analysis of the interaction between external powers and their Central
Asian counterparts.
16
L ocal R ul e s : How C e nt ral A s ian R eg im e s S ur v ive 17
presented himself as the most liberalizing of the new Central Asian state elites.17
Yet, for the most part, these Soviet patrimonial legacies and local party struc-
tures continued well into the independence period. The relative calm in the
region was punctured by a brutal civil war that broke out in 1992 in Tajikistan
between members of the Moscow-backed ruling clan and a coalition of Islamists,
nationalists, and Pamir-speaking ethnic groups. Tellingly, analysts have explained
the conflict as a result of the breakdown of Soviet-era patronage networks.18
Despite the endurance of these strong informal institutions, most foreign
ministries and international organizations placed the Central Asian states in the
category of post-Communist transitioning countries. Given that the Soviet
Union was in tatters and Communism had been discredited, international offi-
cials and policymakers simply assumed that the Central Asian states only op-
tion was to transform into pluralistic polities with market economies, as debates
at the time mostly revolved around the speed of reform and institutional design.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank became involved
in advising all of the Central Asian governments, first over their exit from the
Russian-based ruble zone, and then over designing and sequencing a set of mar-
ket-friendly reforms.19 Disengaging from the previously integrated Soviet eco-
nomic system also created sharp losses in industrial output throughout the
region, as enterprises struggled to cope as independent economic firms without
the centrally coordinated system of supply and distribution.20 The abandon-
ment of the ruble in favor of new national currencies generated widespread
macroeconomic chaos.21
The lack of robust great power interest encouraged a variety of smaller outside
actors to view Central Asian as a tabula rasa, a space ripe for new conquering in-
fluences and ideas. Western-sponsored foundations and organizations used the
window of transition to push for programs similar to those they had established
in other post-Communist spheres. Civil society actors and international donors
looked for partners to network with and promote exchanges, while the United
States and European powers dutifully funded projects to work on the technical
aspects of constructing new democratic institutions and introducing legal
reforms. At the same time, a variety of religious groupsranging from Turkish
nationalists to Wahhabi ideologues to Christian evangelistsalso perceived
Central Asia as a blank slate to promote their religious and normative agendas.22
weak and focused on muddling through its domestic reforms and economic
troubles, while China concentrated most of its diplomatic energies, from 1996
onward, on concluding border demarcation talks with the Central Asian states
and Russia in a forum known as the Shanghai Five. This organization was the
precursor to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the regional body inaugu-
rated in 2001 that facilitated Chinas more robust regional engagement over the
next decade. U.S. policymakers, inasmuch as they were interested in the post-
Communist sphere, were mostly focused on issues that did not involve the Cen-
tral Asian states, such as promoting NATO expansion. Washington did engage
with Kazakhstan in an effort to secure opportunities for U.S. energy companies
in the energy sector, especially the large Tengiz and Kashagan fields.24 The United
States also, with Russian cooperation, helped Kazakhstan to secure and give up
the nuclear weapons it had inherited from the Soviet Union.
During this time, Russia remained the most powerful actor in the region, but
more by default rather than choice. Most of these forms of engagement pragmat-
ically addressed problematic Soviet-era legacies. For instance, Russia reached
agreements to retain control over key Soviet-era defense assets, such as the Bai-
konur spaceport in Kazakhstan, while it also reached agreements with individual
states to jointly manage Central Asias external borders. Russias military pres-
ence declined during the transition period, save for Moscows almost reluctant
intervention in Tajikistans civil war (19921995). It would not be until Vladi-
mir Putins election to the Russian presidency that Moscow would develop a
more robust plan for defining and pursuing its Central Asian security interests.
For its part, by the end of the 1990s, the Western-led international commu-
nity was demonstrating a palpable fatigue at the seeming lack of progress on po-
litical and economic reforms. As the Central and Eastern European states were
rapidly undergoing political, economic, and social reforms in anticipation of
joining the European Union and NATO, Central Asia seemed distinctly stag-
nant, with entrenched rulers now fending off all major challenges to their state
authority.25
Washingtons long-term plans, fearing U.S. military encirclement after the Tal-
iban, Al-Qaeda, and its allies were routed from Afghanistan.
This renewed external interest proved a political boon for all of the Central
Asian leaders, though some chose to publicize their membership in the U.S.-led
coalition more loudly than others. The Central Asian elites not only profited
from this renewed external engagement and competition, but actively encour-
aged it. If they were to be the site of new geopolitical interest, they would have an
important say in establishing the ground rules and would profit from bargaining
simultaneously with Washington, Moscow, and Beijing. Unlike the 1990s, when
the Central Asian governments tended to couch their activities in terms of pre-
vailing international norms and practices, the intensification of U.S., Russian,
and Chinese engagement in the 2000s empowered local elites to tout their au-
thority, reject unwanted demands as infringements on their sovereignty, and
more aggressively leverage their geopolitical standing to serve their domestic
agendas.
of his election as president of the Uzbek Socialist Soviet Republic in 1990, Kari-
mov has never wavered from eliminating all political opponents, from liberal
opposition forces, to Uzbek nationalists to Islamic groups.33 He is more feared
than revered, with his regime defended by a brutal coercive apparatus, headed
by the National Security Service (SNB) that monitors internal security and col-
lects intelligence. According to the Moscow-based human rights organization
Memorial, Uzbekistan has jailed 10,000 political prisoners, a number that
exceeds political imprisonment in all of the other former Soviet states com-
bined.34 Unlike Nazarbayevs opening to the world, Karimov has kept the coun-
trys physical and economic borders tightly closed, with the state retaining tight
control of all-important areas of economic activity such as mining, gas, and
cotton. His daughter and possible successor, Gulnara Karimova, was described
in 2005 by one U.S. embassy cable as the most hated person in Uzbekistan,
forging a business empire over the last decade from her close political connec-
tions, while she spent time as Uzbek Ambassador to the United Nations in
Geneva and Spain.35
In Turkmenistan, an expansive desert country that borders Afghanistan and
Iran, its first president, Saparmurat Niyazov, matched Karimovs ruthlessness,
but further pushed the bounds of political megalomania by fashioning a bizarre
personality cult equal to that of Soviet Stalinism and Kim Jong-Ils North Korea.
Niyazov proclaimed himself Turkmenbashi, or father of the Turkmen, and
tried to remold Turkmen society in his image.36 He saturated the countrys
public spaces with portraits of himself, including erecting a rotating gold statue,
renamed months of the year after his relatives, closed down all links between his
country and the outside world in the name of preserving sovereignty, and man-
dated that all schools and civil service positions spend most of their time
studying the Ruhnama, his personal book of philosophical musings. Following
Niyazovs death in late 2006, President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov has
taken some steps to court international investment, but Turkmenistans political
space remains highly restricted, while its knowledge base and human capital
have been decimated by 20 years of isolation and capricious social engineering.
Finally, Tajikistan emerged from a brutal civil war (19921997), which cost
the lives of up to 100,000 and displaced over a million people, that pitted the
ruling national government and its representative clans, backed by Moscow and
Tashkent, against the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), a loose coalition of dem-
ocratic intelligentsia leaders, ethnic Gamiris and Parmis, and Islamists.37 Under a
UN-brokered cease-fire of 1997, President Emomali Rahmon reached a power-
sharing arrangement with the UTO and its largest faction, the Islamic Renais-
sance Party, promising 30 percent of parliamentary seats to the opposition. Since,
Rahmon has been reelected in 1999 and, more controversially, in 2006, and has
skillfully used externally sponsored state-building and reconciliation efforts to
24 Great Games, Local Rules
centralize and strengthen his rule, has extended his control over the countrys
former warlords, and has steadily co-opted and divided the opposition.38 Like
Nazarbayev, Rahmon has mastered the art of appealing to different international
partners. Though his resource base is considerably less than that of oil-rich
Kazakhstan, the large presence of international organizations, NGOs, and spe-
cial diplomatic missions in the capital, Dushanbe, has legitimized Rahmons rule,
while he has evoked the scepter of the civil war and potential destabilization to
justify his increasingly authoritarian tendencies.
Central Asian states, analysts also failed to appreciate that the planned economy
had operated very differently in practice than on paper, allowing for the devel-
opment of various networks of unsanctioned entrepreneurship, informal dis-
tributive networks, and criminal activity. In both the old planned context and
the new marketizing context, securing control of state institutions and admin-
istrative positions has been critical for leveraging them for personal gain. Mar-
ket reforms provided additional opportunities for graft and enrichment, as
valuable assets across the region were privatized at a fraction of their market
value to connected insiders and their supporters.44
Again, the specific forms of personal rent-seeking have varied across the
region, depending upon a particular countrys economic resources and develop-
ment profile. The energy-rich states have been the most obvious arenas for
reported collusion between international investors and domestic elites. The
most notorious of these, as Chapter 8 details, has been the so-called Giffen affair
in Kazakhstan, where an American consultant was accused of violating the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by arranging hundreds of millions of dollars in
bribes from U.S. energy companies to Kazakhstans ruling elite. More recently,
Chinese energy companies have also been at the center of several alleged corrup-
tion scandals as they have increasingly focused on controlling Kazakhstans oil
production. Turkmenistans energy transactions remain opaque, as Turkmen de-
liveries of gas to Russias network via Ukraine have been structured by murky
intermediary trading companies, while potential foreign investors report that
the countrys energy sector officials at all levels routinely demand bribes for
pay-to-play meetings and kickbacks.
In the non-oil-rich economies, predatory elites have found new and creative
ways to squeeze their own impoverished populations. In Kyrgyzstan during the
Bakiyev era (20052010), the newly privatized Kyrgyz electricity sector illegally
exported its production to Kazakhstan, even while parts of the country endured
blackouts, kept raising prices on domestic consumers, and embezzled new funds
supposedly earmarked for new plant construction.45 In Tajikistan, Tajik citizens
were pressured to fund President Rahmons attempt to build the massive Rogun
hydroelectric dam by volunteering portions of their salary in exchange for shares
in the still uncertain project.
And for all these states, the increase in international security engagement has
also offered new economic opportunities to secure funding and private goods.
The opening of the U.S. militarys so-called Northern Distribution Network to
transport goods and materials for the campaign in Afghanistan via Central Asia
has established a new web of contracting and commercial ties that are now
benefiting connected elites within these transit countries. In the case of Kyrgyz-
stan, the U.S. logistical base at Manas base became a source of rents and private
economic benefits for two ruling regimes and connected Kyrgyz insiders.
L ocal R ul e s : How C e nt ral A s ian R eg im e s S ur v ive 27
of the unofficial quid pro quo given to the ruling regimes of presidents Akayev
and Bakiyev to support U.S. operations.
Conclusion
The Central Asian states all practice a version of patrimonial politics. Though
they vary in their degree of authoritarianism, natural resource endowments, and
engagement with the international community, all follow a similar set of local
imperatives: they conflate internal and external security threats to further their
regime survival, they use state office for private gain; and they act as brokers
between their political clients and the international community. These local
rules all have their roots in the institutions, practices, and legacies of Soviet
times, but have been revived and recrafted since independence.
These local rules operated in both the 1990s and the 2000s. The critical differ-
ence between the two decades is that during the first decade of independence,
these legacies and local rules were camouflaged, as the Central Asian states were
assumed to be in transition and publicly affirmed their commitments to interna-
tional institutions and practices. In the 2000s, by contrast, the entry of the
United States, Russia, and China as external actors with geopolitical agendas
emboldened Central Asian elites to more aggressively assert their authority and
consolidate their power base. Their rule became more authoritarian, corruption
became more brazen, and all of these governments learned how to play their
external suitors off one another more effectively.
This analysis should not excuse or justify the individual policies or choices
made by these outside powers. Local rules are not immutable and are themselves
reproduced when outside governments, companies, and militaries defer to
them. However, as we shall see in the U.S. case, the multiple-principals problem
diminished U.S. credibility in demanding political reforms, as the Central Asian
governments leveraged the availability of alternative partners to pare down these
external demands. Over the course of the decade, Washington, like Moscow and
Beijing, learned to play by local rules.
| 3 |
Washingtons Central Asian
Detour to Afghanistan
from the Karshi-Khanabad base, demonstrating that external demands for de-
mocratization would not be tolerated, even at the expense of Afghanistan-related
security cooperation. Following the eviction, Central Asian elites would deliber-
ately frame the values and security issues in opposition to each other. When they
reestablished security cooperation in 2008 to open the northern supply net-
work, U.S. planners stopped pressing Central Asian regimes on political matters
and focused on security and economic ties.
against the IMU. In 2002, the United States provided $120 million in military
hardware and surveillance equipment to the Uzbek army and $82 million to
Uzbek security services, and agreed to pay $15 million in annual rent to lease the
K2 field. Much of this equipment was highly advanced surveillance technology,
sought more for reasons of organizational prestige and use in a domestic setting
than for its use on the battlefield.10 To round out the unofficial base rights
package, that same year the U.S. Export-Import bank granted the Uzbek govern-
ment $55 million in credits. Overall, U.S. military aid and economic assistance
to Uzbekistan topped $300 million in 2002, a nearly fourfold increase from 2001
levels.11
The new U.S.-Uzbek security partnership was formalized in March 2002 when
Presidents Bush and Karimov signed a Declaration on Strategic Partnership in
Washington. The Uzbek government committed to providing basing access and
overflight rights for OEF-led operations, while the U.S. side pledged to preserve
the security and territorial integrity of Uzbekistan. Though downplayed at the
time, the Uzbek regime also agreed to undertake domestic political reforms,
committing to ensuring respect for human rights and freedoms ... enhancing
the role of democratic and political institutions in the life of society; establishing
a genuine multiparty system . . . ensuring the independence of the media . . .
[and] improving the judicial and legal system.12 Some U.S. officials viewed these
Uzbek commitments as sincere, though others reasoned that these reform com-
mitments provided political cover to justify the deepening of security coopera-
tion between the countries.
Soon after the formalization of the relationship, it became clear that, rather
than upholding his pledge to democratize, Karimov intended to use his new
partnership with the United States to consolidate his stranglehold on power and
to conduct a sweeping campaign against political dissent. Already in January
2002, Karimov had extended his presidential term by decree to December 2007,
a move that was met with silence by U.S authorities. Later in the year, Uzbek
security services escalated their domestic crackdown, arresting hundreds of al-
leged militants on accusations of fomenting terrorism. A devastating report in
December 2002 by UN investigator Theo Van Boven documented widespread
mistreatment and torture in the Uzbek prison system.13 In the summer of 2004,
Washington rescinded $18 million in promised aid under the Freedom Support
Act, due to a finding by the U.S. Congress that Uzbekistan was not in compli-
ance with human rights standards; a few weeks later, the Department of Defense
(DOD) offered a supplemental package worth $21 million, suggesting in-
creasing schisms across the U.S. government on the direction of Uzbekistan
policy.14
Around this time, U.S.-Uzbek security cooperation expanded in more contro-
versial ways. The CIA and the U.S. military transferred prisoners and suspected
Wa shing tons Central A s ian Detour to A fghanistan 35
terrorists to the Uzbek security services, where they were interrogated and tor-
tured at so-called black site facilities (for more details, see Chapter 6). Former
British Ambassador to Uzbekistan Craig Murray, a controversial and outspoken
critic of the Karimov regime, also alleges that Uzbek intelligence and security
services exaggerated and even fabricated reports about militant activity in order
to maintain U.S. security engagement.15 Murrays embarrassing protests revealed
the extent to which the United States and its allies were operating according to
Tashkents local rules, including receiving intelligence that was routinely gath-
ered by the use of torture; but his outspoken actions also threatened to disrupt
the long-standing signals intelligencesharing agreements between the United
States and the United Kingdom. Murray was reprimanded and then removed
from his post in October 2004, but a steady stream of stories questioning the
scope and purpose of U.S.-Uzbek security cooperation continued to appear in
the Western media.16
However, from early on, most of these economic benefits would flow not
to the Kyrgyz general budget, but, in accordance with local rules of pa-
tronage and rent-seeking, to the Kyrgyz president, his family, and his inner
circle. At just $2 million a year, the initial formal rent paid by the United
States to the Kyrgyz authorities for the lease of Manas was relatively low.
However, one of the more curious aspects of the initial Manas accord was its
mandate that U.S. and coalition aircraft pay civil aviation fees (set by the In-
ternational Civil Aviation Organization) for military takeoffs and landings.
Given that the bulk flights were being conducted by heavy cargo and refuel-
ing planes, these sums could reach $7,000 per takeoff and landing, or several
hundred thousands of dollars a day.20 These fees were transferred to the Manas
Airport Authority, a technically public entity with close ties to the ruling
family. Kyrgyz and U.S. officials justified the fee structure on the grounds that
Manas was a civil aviation entity. Tellingly, however, former U.S. Ambassador
to Kyrgyzstan John OKeefe has observed that while the original fee struc-
ture could have been avoided, it was implemented in order to generate the
necessary economic incentive to ensure Kyrgyz cooperation with OEF.21 The
United States also paid an assortment of ad hoc parking and maintenance
fees.22
But by far the most lucrative, as well as secretive, economic aspect of the U.S.
basing presence involved the contracts for fuel procurement, which are valued
over the last decade at nearly $2 billion (see Figure 8.1, Chapter 8). Following
the collapse of the Akayev regime in 2005, U.S. and Kyrgyz investigations learned
that the bases main fuel subcontractors were controlled by President Akayevs
immediate family and had earned tens of millions of dollars in profits. Chapter 8
explores in greater detail the mysterious offshore companies, local contractors,
and behind-the-scenes collusion and graft that characterized fuel procurement
practices at the base over the last decade. The Manas fuel contracts also became
the subject of a U.S. Congressional investigation in 2010, and now represent one
of the most intriguing episodes of U.S. engagement with Central Asias local
rules.23
Unlike K2 and the U.S.-Uzbek security relationship, which were drawing sig-
nificant attention from the Western media and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), operations at the base at Manas went relatively unnoticed for the first
three years. Some Russian-language media would run occasional negative stories
about the base, alleging smuggling or other illicit activities, but for the most part
U.S. and Kyrgyz authorities succeeded in keeping Manas under the radar. Do-
mestically, few Kyrgyz politicians questioned the purpose of the base or criti-
cized its underlying legal and contractual arrangements. This depoliticization
would dramatically change following the tumultuous political events in the
spring of 2005.
Wa shing tons Central A s ian Detour to A fghanistan 37
Perceptions of U.S. Bids for Regime Change and a Greater Central Asia
Across Central Asia, conspiracy theories abound that an alliance made up of the
U.S. government, U.S. intelligence services, and pro-democracy NGOs, such as
the network of foundations affiliated with George Soros and the National Dem-
ocratic Institute, had conspired in an effort to bring about these regime changes.24
The enthusiasm with which Washington greeted these regime changes certainly
reinforced this perception, but the actual causes and external dynamics of these
political changes were more subtle. As Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik have
shown, transnational networks of NGOs, youth groups, and media personnel
actively learned from one another and diffused their lessons and techniques.25
Kyrgyz protestors emulated aspects of the Georgian and Ukrainian electoral rev-
olutions, just as Ukrainians and Georgians had learned from their predecessors
in Serbia in 2000.26 But the Kyrgyz case was more the case of a brittle regime
collapsing than a planned attempt at an overthrow.27 The new interim President
Bakiyev did not advocate for the same pro-Western shift that his counterparts in
Georgia and Ukraine had. Nevertheless, the classification of the Akayev regimes
collapse in March 2005 as the Tulip Revolution reinforced the view that his
ouster had the full support of the U.S. government. Statements by deposed Pres-
ident Akayev to that effect reinforced this impression, as did some misguided
public comments by USAID staffers and contractors who were eager to claim
that their civil society and media programming had demonstrable impact.28
The regional characterization of the Color Revolutions as part of a broader
U.S.-led geopolitical effort was compounded by the public rise of the so-called
Greater Central Asian Project (GCAP), set forth in a series of publications by
Johns Hopkins Professor Frederick Starr.29 In a series of papers published in
2005, Starr argued that the United States had a unique opportunity to develop a
38 Great Games, Local Rules
new regional organization that would promote economic and commercial links
between Afghanistan and the rest of Central Asia, deliver U.S. aid and economic
assistance, and quickly establish itself as a major regional institution. In order to
secure the cooperation of Central Asian governments with the GCAP, Starr ad-
vocated that the traditional U.S. demands for political reforms within the Cen-
tral Asian states be dropped. Though Starr acknowledged that Russia and China
might view the GCAP as a competitor to their own regional initiatives, he argued
that its overall positive impact on regional development might eventually win
them over. Not surprisingly, Russian and Chinese officials were not convinced,
as they interpreted the GCAP as an initiative designed to undermine Russian
and Chinese regional influence.
Russian and Chinese fears over U.S. plans and regional aspirations appeared
to be vindicated when, in early 2006, the U.S. State Department announced that
it was re-assigning the administration of its Central Asian diplomatic missions
from the Eurasian bureau, which included Russia and the other post-Soviet
states, to the South Asia Bureau.30 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had
planned to create the new Bureau for South and Central Asia in 2005 as part of
her transformational diplomacy initiative.31 Officially, the bureaucratic restruc-
turing was meant to foster increased cooperation among the countries of Cen-
tral Asia and South Asia as they work towards our shared goals of security,
prosperity, stability, and freedom and to build on the Central Asian states nat-
ural partnership with Afghanistan.32 The latter reference to the regions sup-
posed natural partnership with Afghanistan was particularly alarming to
Moscow and Beijing, as it signaled that U.S. officials intended to extend U.S.
Afghanistan-based influence northward. The bureaucratic change was followed
by several high-profile U.S.-led conferences that focused on strengthening eco-
nomic links between Afghanistan and Central Asia, including in the electricity
and power-generating sector.33
and police opened fire on the protesters in the early evening. The Uzbek govern-
ment claims that it killed 187 people, all of them terrorist or insurgents, while
human rights organizations estimate that 800 were killed, most of them inno-
cent civilians caught in waves of indiscriminate fire.34 Calls by international
human rights groups for an international investigation have been resolutely
rejected by Tashkent.
The Andijan events proved fateful for the U.S. basing presence in Uzbekistan.
U.S. reaction was mixed, with DOD supporting the Uzbek governments general
position that its crackdown was justified and had targeted terrorists. As more
details emerged of the scale of the shooting, most branches of the U.S. govern-
ment lined up against the Pentagon. At a U.S. government meeting on Andijan,
Rice reportedly asserted that human rights trumps security, while Rumsfeld
claims to have been the only one pushing for easing up on Tashkent.35 Soon, the
State Department supported the call from human rights organizations that
demanded an international investigation. Around the same time, a bipartisan
group of U.S. senators, led by Senator John McCain, launched an investigation
into Andijan, especially the issue of whether U.S. military hardware was used in
the crackdown; later in May, the group visited Tashkent, where it met with
Uzbek human rights groups and gave a critical press conference on the state of
human rights in the country.36 McCain also led a Senate group that initially
blocked the Uzbek governments reimbursement request for $23 million that it
claimed it was owed for its services after the eviction from K2.
U.S. criticism of Uzbekistan contrasted with the strong support shown to the
Uzbek government by Beijing and Moscow. At the SCO Astana Summit of 2005,
regional leaders denounced foreign meddling in internal affairs and issued a now
famous communiqu stating that foreign military bases in the region had served
their primary purpose and should be placed on a timetable for removal. In June
and July of 2005, it seemed clear that the U.S.-Uzbek security relationship had
neared its breaking point. Uzbek authorities demanded that the United States
start paying a significant rent for K2 and imposed a number of restrictions on U.S.
activities and flights, citing environmental concerns.37 The last straw for Tashkent
appears to have been the U.S. announcement of support for a UN proposal to
relocate refugees from Andijan who had been living in southern Kyrgyzstan to
Romania, rather than turn them over to Uzbek security services for interrogation.
On July 29, a messenger from the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered
notice to the U.S. Embassy that it was activating the termination clause of the K2
agreement and that U.S. forces had 180 days to leave the facility.
The aftermath of the K2 eviction appeared to support perceptions that the
geopolitical pendulum in the region had realigned from Washington to Russia
(and, to a lesser extent, Beijing).38 In November 2005, Uzbekistan joined the
Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, with President Karimov
40 Great Games, Local Rules
proclaiming at the signing ceremony that Russia had always been Uzbekistans
natural security partner. Soon after, Kyrgyz officials seized on the fact that Manas
remained the only official U.S. base left in the region and demanded a hundred-
fold increase in rent (see Chapter 7). In a memo to National Security Advisor
Stephen Hadley in early 2006, Rumsfeld lamented, We are getting run out
of Central Asia by the Russians. They are doing a considerably better job at
bullying those countries [than] the US is doing to counter their bullying.39
But the rift in U.S.-Uzbek relations was temporary, reflecting the immediate
threat to regime survival that Karimov felt in the wake of Andijan and the Color
Revolutions, rather than a fundamental realignment toward Moscow. Just a few
years later, U.S.-Uzbek military cooperation would flourish in a different form.
The more lasting impact of the K2 eviction was to caution U.S. officials to not
push Central Asian regimes too hard on democracy and human rights issues,
especially when important security cooperation and basing rights were at stake.
is a $1.5 billion pot (in FY 2006) for Reimbursement to Countries for United
States Expenses, designed to reimburse countries for logistical and military sup-
port for U.S. military operations, including the fees paid for the Manas Transit
Center. The report also notes, echoing an earlier assessment by a Washington
Post reporter who traveled in the region, that CENTCOM commanders freely
can move money from these accounts to fund regional exercises, training confer-
ences, and other collaborative events with target country militaries.42
To put these figures in context, in 2007 the total amount of unreported or
uncounted DOD military aid to the Central Asian states exceeded official
State Department security assistance by nearly three to one. Further, in FY 2007,
the U.S. government spent at least six times as much on supporting the Central
Asian militaries as it did on regional democratization (see Table 3.1).43
These spending patterns also suggest that U.S. regional command carries con-
siderable influence and regional decision-making power as an autonomous
actor. At times, tensions between the State Department and DOD personnel
have been acute. An Inspector General report of the U.S. Embassy in Bishkek
notes the strained relations between U.S. embassy staff and the personnel at the
Manas base in Kyrgyzstan.44 The sheer imbalance in numbersover 1,000
troops at Manas versus a couple of dozen at the Embassywould naturally tilt
the diplomatic balance from State to DOD, but Kyrgyz officials and press mem-
bers also note that base personnel tend to deal directly with their Kyrgyz coun-
terparts over matters such as base-related contracting, public relations, and
charitable programs, often excluding the Embassy from these communications.45
The issue is not one of direct bureaucratic competition; rather, each of these
entities reports to a different chain of command. Military personnel, including
basing commanders, report directly to the regional command at CENTCOM,
which treats the Central Asian states as part of their Afghanistan theater of oper-
ations. At the same time, such autonomous behavior and ground-level activity
has had the unintended consequence of undercutting the claim that the United
States is not interested in pursuing influence or playing the Great Game. While
the U.S. president and his close advisors might regularly proclaim that the United
States is not interested in competing with Russia for regional influence, CENT-
COMS military-to-military cooperation continues relatively unconstrained,
well beyond the purposes of keeping Afghanistans logistics and supply chains
running. For example, commanders at Manas revealed that in 2010 they had
participated in 40 military-to-military contacts with their Kyrgyz counterparts.46
In this light, one of the most important lessons learned by U.S. defense com-
manders is to avoid close scrutiny of U.S. military activities by not referring to
facilities as bases. Yet, a look at recent activities and proposed construction
suggests that the regional command continues to invest in base-like projects
and installations, particularly the establishment of a number of anti-terrorism
Table 3.1 U.S. Assistance to Central Asia, FY2007, Including Security Estimates and Official Government and Democracy Totals ($millions)
Security and Police Aid 10.96 60.67 38.30 23.19 5.86 0.85 144.81
Official U.S. Government Aid 7.59 165.59 54.41 46.72 19.84 35.21 329.36
Note: DOD figures include funds allocated for CENTCOM CIF, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, CTFP, counter-proliferation, officer education, officer exercises,
Section 1206, Section 1208, Warsaw Initiative Fund, CENTCOM JCET Training and EDA. Not all data were available for all categories, so estimates are probably lower than
actual totals.
training centers. In October 2009, U.S. and Kyrgyz officials opened a $9 mil-
lion training center in Tokmok for elite Kyrgyz Special Forces that, according
to U.S. Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Tatiana Gfoeller, had received extensive
training from U.S. forces.47 In early 2010 U.S. officials announced that they
would construct a major anti-terrorism center in Batken, Kyrgyzstan, that, after
the fall of the Bakiyev regime, was reslated for the southern city of Osh. In 2009,
a solicitation from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers describes a proposed
$510 million National Training Center for Karatog, Tajikistan, to include con-
struction of a garrison compound and training ranges.48 Other facilities in what
appears to be a mini-construction boom for the Pentagon include building
new border-crossing checkpoints in Turkmenistan, a second project in Kyrgyz-
stan, and an earmark for a $5 million project in Kazakhstan.49
Finally, a series of leaked U.S. Embassy cables reveal that U.S. and Turkmen
officials reached a divert agreement in 2006, which Ashgabat has insisted ever
since on keeping strictly informal, to permit the United States emergency use of
the Mary Northeast Military air base (Mary 2).50 Some Russian and Turkmen
dissident news sites even have alleged that the U.S. military is regularly using the
Mary 2 airfield as an actual supporting base for Afghanistan operations, though
there is no direct evidence of this in other sources.51 Regardless of the exact
status and use of Mary 2, a survey of the region reveals a web of low-profile and
informal arrangements that have extended U.S. military cooperation with the
Central Asian states into several areas well beyond formal basing arrangements.
ties to certain government actors and ruling regimes. Original NDN agreements
allowed only the transit of non-lethal supplies and materials and only one-way
transport (no return legs from Afghanistan).53
The NDN routes span thousands of miles across Eurasian landmass (see
Figure 3.2). The first route originates in the Baltic ports of Riga (Latvia), Tal-
linn (Estonia) and Klaipda (Lithuania), where cargo is off-loaded onto the old
Soviet rail network, then transits Russia and Kazakhstan, before entering
Uzbekistan, where it terminates at the Termez crossing on the Afghanistan bor-
der. A second main spur, known as NDN South, originates on the Black Sea
Georgian port of Poti, transits across Georgia and Azerbaijan by train, before it
is off-loaded onto ferries bound for Aktau, Kazakhstan. From there, trucks take
the shipments across Kazakhstan and into Uzbekistan once more. A third var-
iant route, known as the KKT route, relies on trucks to traverse Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, before crossing into northern Afghanistan, though
according to TRANSCOM officials, poor road conditions in Tajikistan seem to
Figure 3.2. The Northern Distribution Network Source: Gene Thorp/Washington Post
Wa shing tons Central A s ian Detour to A fghanistan 45
be reorienting the final leg back into Uzbekistan.54 Southern Uzbekistan, then,
has become a critical transit hub, with U.S. officials stating in summer 2011 that
five out of six NDN shipments traverse Uzbekistan.55
Since 2009, when agreements with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were finally
concluded, the increase in NDN traffic has been spectacular. At the end of 2009,
just 10 percent of cargos for U.S. and ISAF forces in Afghanistan were moving
through NDN. By the end of 2010, the NDN accounted for 30 percent of car-
gos; the United States was shipping 1,000 containers a week, with 98 percent of
these shipments passing through Uzbekistan.56 By the end of 2011, U.S. officials
hope that the NDN percentage will have increased to 75 percent, a shift that
seemed all the more important as U.S.-Pakistan relations deteriorated following
the U.S. killing of Osama Bin Laden in his Pakistani hideout in April 2011.57
To complement these efforts, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), in cooper-
ation with cargo companies, also created a virtual storefront in Uzbekistan to
encourage Uzbek vendors in the border town of Termez to supply additional
construction materials to U.S. forces in Afghanistan.58
In addition to the NDN routes traversing Uzbekistan, in 2008 and 2009 the
U.S. military tried to secure new routes through Turkmenistan, without much
success, and much to the frustration of U.S. defense officials and logisticians.
However, other areas of logistical cooperation between Washington and Ashga-
bat have been kept quiet, so as to not violate Turkmenistans public stance of
neutrality. Since 2002, Turkmenistan has been providing air flight rights and
blanket clearances for 1,600 flights a year; indeed, U.S. officials in 2009 pressed
Turkmen officials to increase this number.59 The United States also maintains a
small team to conduct refueling services at Ashgabat airport, though the refuel-
ing operation has been subject to holdup over payment disputes.60 Most intrigu-
ingly, according to U.S. logistical publications, Turkmenistan also is a transit
corridor for shipping aviation fuel, refined in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, to
Afghanistan.61 According to a leaked U.S. Embassy cable from 2009, the arrange-
ments surrounding these deliveries are not discussed in deference to Turkmen
desires to maintain some plausible deniability.62Further, the cable states that the
arrangement has not even been mentioned in NDN discussions in order to
keep the Turkmen Government from rethinking the support it already tacitly
provides.
The NDN also has established a new air hub in Uzbekistan to replace the
former logistical and staging role played by K2, though the new facility is
shrouded by various layers of commercial partners and third-party contracts. In
May 2009, President Karimov announced that the newly renovated interna-
tional cargo airport in the city of Navoi was being used for the transit of non-
lethal goods to NATO forces in Afghanistan.63 But, rather than deal directly with
the U.S. military, Uzbekistan opted to deal with the South Korean state-operated
46 Great Games, Local Rules
The reopening all these age-old transit routes across Afghanistan is the
single greatest achievement of U.S. foreign policy in the new millen-
nium. It was unintended, unrecognized, and, by most Americans, unac-
knowledged, even though they paid for it with the lives of loved ones
and with hard-earned tax money. Nonetheless, this development offers
the most promising solution to the U.S. present strategic dilemma and
the key to possible success in Afghanistan and the region.71
Wa shing tons Central A s ian Detour to A fghanistan 47
signal that they are willing to work with U.S. officials to find suitable business
arrangements. And the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed that Navois
profitability increased tenfold in 2009 compared to 2008 (pre-NDN agreement).76
One of the largest Uzbek commercial contractors, FMN Logistics, was a
former self-described contracting arm of Zeromax, the giant Uzbek conglom-
erate reportedly connected with Gulnara Karimova, President Karimovs daugh-
ter.77 FMN representatives now deny any connection between FMN and
Zeromax or Karimova, though the U.S. Embassy in Tashkent in leaked cables
also connected these entities.78
An even more secretive set of arrangements has characterized U.S.-Turkmen
logistical cooperation. From the very beginning of refueling operations in 2002,
the negotiations with the Turkmen government and civil aviation authorities
were problematical; according to U.S. officials, Turkmenistans billing of the
United States has not always reflected the arrangements agreed to.79 According
to an investigative report by Eurasianets Deirdre Tynan, U.S. officials actually
lost track of payments to the Turkmen government from 2002 to 2008 for air
base access, navigation fees, and refueling operations.80 The same report stated
that, according to a 2009 Air Force Notice to Air Men, payments sent to Turk-
menistan should be sent to a Deutsche Bank corresponding account, the same
one that had been used by Turkmen strongman Niyazov, according to German
press reports, to park about $3 billion in state revenue.
The increase in U.S. forces in Afghanistan in 2010 under the United States
surge strategy also increased the importance of NDN and all of the Central
Asian logistical partnerships cultivated by the U.S. military.81 But growing de-
pendency on the network also appears to be empowering Central Asian elites to
drive harder bargains and ratchet up political and economic demands. Politi-
cally, the Uzbek government has been using its critical role in the NDN to push
back against criticism of its human rights record. In a leaked cable from March
2009, U.S. Ambassador Richard Norland described how President Karimov
gave him a tongue-lashing when broaching the topic of human rights and then
implicitly threatened to suspend cooperation on NDN transit.82 Economically,
the Uzbek government twice increased transit fees for goods bound for Afghan-
istan in 2010, while in February 2011 Tashkent announced a significant hike in
NDN tariffs.83
On September 22, 2011, the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations
approved a waiver to lift restrictions, in place since 2004, on providing U.S. mil-
itary assistance to Uzbekistan. The DOD and diplomats engaged in NDN nego-
tiations had long sought for the waiver, which appeared to be yet another
concession made to Tashkent to obtain its cooperation on security matters. Tell-
ingly, the Senate made the waiver contingent on the DOD providing reports on
how Pentagon funds were being spent on NDN contracts, though these reports
Wa shing tons Central A s ian Detour to A fghanistan 49
will be classified.84 The Senate report on the foreign aid bill included the state-
ment, The committee is concerned with reports of pervasive corruption [in]
Uzbekistan and therefore expects to be informed of public and private entities
that receive support, directly or indirectly, from United States Government
funds used to pay the costs of Northern Distribution Network supply routes
through that country.
The rent seeking, hard bargaining, and allegations of corruption that have ac-
companied NDN expansion have created some inescapable paradoxes about
U.S. policy in Central Asia that conflict with the U.S. mission in neighboring
Afghanistan. On the one hand, most U.S. planners acknowledge that the greatest
obstacle to building an effective and legitimate state in Afghanistan is the prob-
lem of corruption that continues to erode the legitimacy of the Karzai govern-
ment and its political allies. At the same time, behind the scenes in neighboring
Central Asia, the deals established by the NDN seem to be doling out private
economic benefits and lucrative contracts to the Central Asian regimes to main-
tain their cooperation. Just as the United States has had to juggle its strategic
interests and values agenda with respect to Central Asias promotion of democ-
racy and human rights, it seems that maintaining U.S. operations in Afghanistan
necessitates tolerating and actively contributing to Central Asias corruption and
governance problems.
Conclusion
U.S. policy toward Central Asia in the 2000s became a function of supporting its
war effort in neighboring Afghanistan. Shortly after 9/11, the United States
established military bases and signed security cooperation agreements with all
of the Central Asian states that agreed to logistical support, flyover rights, and
security cooperation. In the earlier part of the decade, U.S. planners also engaged
with the Central Asian states on issues relating to democracy, governance, and
the rule of law. But, by the summer of 2005, the onset of the Color Revolutions,
the collapse of the Akayev regime in Kyrgyzstan, and events in Andijan had es-
calated regional fears that the U.S. democratization agenda threatened regime
stability. U.S. democracy NGOs, it seems, were as threatening to these regimes
as anything coming out Afghanistan.
The eviction from K2 was both a turning point and a learning moment for
U.S. officials. Uzbekistan terminated an important aspect of security coopera-
tion for domestic political purposes, and U.S. planners learned that pushing
Central Asian governments too hard for domestic political reforms might
threaten key U.S. security relationships. This perceived trade-off is one that Cen-
tral Asian rulers have eagerly framed and cultivated. These lessons later were
50 Great Games, Local Rules
applied to the design and operation of the NDN, as U.S. defense planners
decided to secure the cooperation of Central Asian elites for opening a new
series of supply routes by providing them with economic incentives, such as
logistical contracts and transit fees. U.S. authorities also refrained from publicly
criticizing the regions governance and political practices, which, as we shall see,
steadily deteriorated over the decade. Rather than challenge local rules, as some
officials had sought in the aftermath of Andijan, U.S. policymakers learned to
play by them.
| 4 |
Moscows Quest for a Privileged Role
Russian policy in Central Asia over the 2000s is often characterized as resur-
gent. In certain Western circles, some even refer to it as neo-imperial and con-
sistent with Moscows revisionist attempt to push back against the Western-led
international order.1 Perhaps the main challenge in analyzing Russian policy
toward Central Asia is that it lacks a single overriding strategic goal. Whereas
Washington and Beijing have instrumentalized their engagement with the Cen-
tral Asians states in pursuit of stabilizing an adjacent region, Moscow has pur-
sued a basket of different objectives, including cooperating on counterterrorism,
gaining access to Central Asian energy sources, promoting political stability,
building a common economic space, and protecting the rights of Russian
citizens abroad.
Above all, Moscow has sought regional primacy in Central Asia as a marker of
the great power status that it considers central to its foreign policy identity.2 Fol-
lowing the Russian-Georgian war, President Medvedev emphasized that Russia
sought to maintain a position of privileged influence in Central Asia and other
parts of the post-Soviet space.3 Unlike opening a pipeline or securing a contested
territory, however, concepts like privilege, status, and prestige are social rank-
ings, not material facts, and can only be judged in relation to other actors.4
Accordingly, Russias actual policies in Central Asia have been a function of its
prevailing relationship with other great powers, especially the United States, and
its broader efforts to assert its place within a multipolar world.5 For a brief period
following the beginning of Americas Global War on Terror (GWOT), Moscow
viewed partnering with the United States in Central Asia as a means of enhancing
its international status and regional position. However, as U.S.-Russian relations
deteriorated, Russia increasingly came to view its relations with the United
States in the region as competitive and zero-sum.
Russias lack of strategic coherence in Central Asia coexists with, or perhaps
even derives from, the fact that, of all the great powers, it easily possesses the
most extensive array of regional ties. Interconnections inherited from the
Soviet period, both in terms of physical infrastructure (pipelines, electricity grid,
51
52 Great Games, Local Rules
railways, and integrated defense networks) and human capital (education, tech-
nical training, common use of Russian, and ethnic Russians living abroad), have
served as powerful post-imperial bonds. Russian armed forces, intelligence ser-
vices, and internal security services all cooperate extensively with their Central
Asian counterparts and even train them, while economic links have been
reforged in the areas of energy and industry; most recently, millions of Central
Asians migrants have entered Russia in search of work, and the remittances that
they send back to Central Asia are a vital source of hard currency. Finally, Russia
also has a number of humanitarian or soft power levers in the area, which
include regional media and broadcasting, and educational scholarships, fund-
ing for pro-Russian institutions, cultural and language programming.6
Critically, Russias intensive reengagement with the region took place begin-
ning in 19992000, not following its formal disengagement in 1992. With
renewed interest in pursuing its great power status and more centralized leader-
ship in the Kremlin under President Vladimir Putin, Russian planners embarked
on a new campaign for regional influence. In this pursuit, Moscows main instru-
ments have been neither Soviet nor neo-imperial, but distinct attempts to
emulate other successful contemporary regional organizations. Ironically, these
new organizations, most notably the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) and EurAsEC/Customs Union, were modeled on rival Western bodies,
but in substance have been fashioned to promote Russian leadership in Eurasia.
Despite championing these new bodies, Moscow has proven less successful
when it has sought to monopolize relations with the Central Asian states, while
it has struggled to disentangle itself from intraregional rivalries and has proven
incapable of checking the regional rise of China.
But there was also an important geopolitical benefit to Russia: the U.S. cam-
paign could enable Russia to demonstrate its regional importance as a leading
power and U.S. partner. Either implicitly or explicitly, Russian officials envisioned
a grand bargain; in exchange for its regional assistance, Washington would con-
sult with and recognize Moscow as the mediator for U.S. relations with the Cen-
tral Asian states. At that point Russian public opinion was strongly supportive of
Russian-U.S. cooperation in Central Asia, with a large survey conducted in April
2002 finding that 74 percent of respondents believed that a U.S.-Russian alliance
in the struggle against international terrorism was a good thing, despite indica-
tions that they also believed that the relationship was one-sided and that the
United States had imposed its agenda.14 Interestingly enough, the same survey
found that only 17 percent of respondents believed that U.S. bases in Central Asia
were intended for the purpose of fighting the war in Afghanistan.15
During its first year in 2003, the CSTO displayed a somewhat schizophrenic
attitude on whether to view the West as a regional partner or a competitor, mir-
roring Russias inconsistent policy on the matter at the same time. For example,
in May 2003, the CSTOs Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha, a former secre-
tary of the Russian National Security Council and the countrys Border Guard,
dismissed concerns that the CSTO would clash with NATO, indicating that the
two organizations could cooperate because they faced common tasks and prob-
lems.28 But in an interview during the same month, Bordyuzha argued that the
U.S. military presence in Central Asia was generating a competitive security di-
lemma when he mused I do not quite understand the [American] rationale of
creating and upgrading bases in the immediate proximity of the borders of the
Collective Security Treaty or Russia... . So, naturally, a state (and this is theory)
must respond to any strengthening of military groups on any side by similarly
adequate efforts to ensure preemptively its security.29 Later, the organizations
public declarations would openly criticize U.S. policies, such as its support for
NATO expansion, its plans to deploy a missile defense system in East Europe,
and its support for the Georgian position during the August 2008 war.30
Without ever explicitly declaring itself as a balancer against NATO, the CSTO
seems to have evolved in direct reaction to the Western alliance. The competitive
spur over anti-terrorism following 9/11 was particularly important to Moscow.
Russian commentators increasingly viewed U.S. counterterrorism activities in
Central Asia as a cover for establishing a regional sphere of influence, claiming
that such cooperation eroded the use of Russian as a lingua franca, exposed Cen-
tral Asian officers to Western ideas in training programs, and threatened to
impose NATO standards for interoperability and weapons systems.31 In the
CSTOs first years, the organization focused on conducting high-profile anti-
terrorism exercises in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, while strongly backing domes-
tic crackdowns by Central Asian governments, especially Uzbekistan, made in
the name of anti-terrorism.
Moscow would later focus on developing the organizations Collective Rapid
Reaction Force (CRRF), an integrated group of 15,000 troops made up of
10,000 Russian troops, 3,0004,000 Kazakhstani troops, and one battalion from
each of the organizations other members. In the wake of the Russia-Georgia
War, Russian President Medvedev clarified that the CRRF would be just as
good as comparable NATO forces, with a sufficient number of units that would
be well trained and equipped.32 He continued that it was tasked with anti-
terrorism and counter-narcotics trafficking activities, but that it could also
counter regional aggression from an outside power.33 Uzbekistan has refused to
formally join the CRRF, as Tashkent harbored reservations about integrating
militaries, the potential for the organization to interfere in domestic disputes,
and Russian plans to build a CSTO base in southern Kyrgyzstan, near the Uzbek
58 Great Games, Local Rules
border.34 Indeed, just a year later the organizations credibility was severely
eroded by the ethnic violence that erupted in southern Kyrgyzstan, as Moscow
refused to intervene, despite interim President Roza Otunbayevas appeals for
Russian and CSTO peacekeepers.35 Just a few weeks earlier, the organization had
denounced the change of government in Kyrgyzstan as extra-constitutional;
Belaruss outspoken President Alexander Lukashenko, who granted asylum to
deposed Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, lambasted the organization for
failing to act to preserve the Kyrgyz regime. In the wake of these criticisms and
perceived inaction, CSTO officials clarified at an informal summit in Astana in
August 2011 that they would be empowered in the future to intervene in domes-
tic matters in order to restore constitutional system of a member state.36
Moscow also used the organization to provide the legal framework to estab-
lish new Russian military bases in the region.37 In 2003, Russia and Kyrgyzstan
concluded an agreement to open a Russian air base, under CSTO auspices, on
the site of an old Soviet airforce training center at Kant, just 30 kilometers from
Manas. In 2004, Moscow and Dushanbe concluded a series of agreements that
formalized the presence of the Russian 201st Motorized Division in Tajikistan,
in exchange for Moscow writing off Tajik debt and promising to invest in hydro-
power projects;38 in 2011 both sides announced that the agreement would be
extended for another 49 years, though the terms of the base payment or other
quid pro quo involved remained unclear. And after President Bakiyev back-
tracked in June 2009 on his promise to close the Manas base (see Chapter 7),
Moscow demanded that it open a second base in the southern city of Osh, an
apparent compensation for the geopolitical sleight.
In all of these cases, the actual functional purpose of these facilities is either
unclear or extremely vague. For example, Russian forces at Kant are officially
assigned to provide air support for counterterrorism operations and to control
the Central Asian airspace, which presumably does not include the dozens of
U.S. military aircraft that conduct daily operations within a few miles.39 Tellingly,
at the December 2011 CSTO summit, the organization adopted a preliminary
agreement prohibiting member states from allowing the stationing of non-
CSTO military troops and bases without mutual consent, effectively giving
Moscow a veto over future regional basing deals.40 Moscows seeming fixation
with bases in Central Asia derives from the fact that they are perceived as critical
symbols of Russias regional prestige, status, and enduring political presence in
the region.41
Ultimately, the endurance and deepening of the CSTO is less a result of its
success as an alliance or security group, but more a reflection of the fact that it
provides different distinct benefits to Russia and its Central Asian members. For
Russia, it has allowed Moscow to fashion the image of heading a NATO-style
alliance and has legally allowed it to reestablish a military presence in the region.
Moscows Quest for a Priv ileged R ole 59
But Russia has been unsuccessful in using the group to actually engage the West
or monopolize security relations with the Central Asian states. The organization
also has failed to back Moscows requests on some key issues, such as its request
to recognize the independence of the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia following the August 2008 Russia-Georgia War.
The Central Asian states view the CSTO primarily as a political forum that
placates Moscows self-image and regional ambitions; the organization also of-
fers selective benefits to the Central Asian militaries and security services (i.e.,
discount military equipment, training, integration), given that Russia foots
almost the entire bill. More cynically, the organization also serves as a useful tool
for promoting regime survival; its credibility was thus undermined, for some of
its members, by its inability to prevent the collapse of two governments in Kyr-
gyzstan.42 But, as the previous chapter demonstrated, while participating in the
CSTOs deepening structures, most of the Central Asian states also have main-
tained, if not strengthened, their bilateral relations with the United States. Inten-
sifying security cooperation with the great powers has not been mutually
exclusive.
The Rise of EurAsEC, the Customs Union, and the Eurasian Union
The CSTOs economic counterpart is the Eurasian Economic Community
(EurAsEC), comprising Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajiki-
stan. The group was founded in Astana in October 2000 as a successor to the
ineffective Central Asian Economic Cooperation Organization (1998) and the
Commonwealth of Independent States Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan (1996). EurAsECs goal is to promote a common economic space
60 Great Games, Local Rules
30
25
Trade Volume (in billions USD)
20
Russia
15
Russia
(Exports Only)
10
0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Figure 4.1 Central Asian Trade with Russia, Annual, 20012010 Source: International
Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS), 20012010
that includes a regional trade regime, common customs procedures, and unified
tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Moving beyond the purview of its predecessors,
EurAsEC has sought to establish a supranational system of governing rules and
regulatory bodies, including an Interstate Council, Secretariat, Parliamentary
Assembly, Integration Commission, and Community Court. In 2008, the orga-
nization formed the EurAsEC Customs Union Commission (CUC), modeled
loosely on the European Commission in Brussels, to coordinate the move to a
system of common duties and customs procedures (the Customs Union),
which went into effect in 2010 for Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.44
Just as the CSTO has modeled itself on NATO, the Customs Union is mim-
icking aspects of the European Union. On January 1, 2012, the group introduced
the single economic space, covering trade and investment and labor, In the
future, the economic body aspires to promote the integration of energy and
transportation policy, social and legal policies, and even adopt, in an EU-like
fashion, a unified currency.45 Russian policymakers and analysts now speak of
the organization as potentially becoming one of several competing global trade
blocs, such as the EU or ASEAN, giving Russia the leadership of a common eco-
nomic zone to complement its security area. In his first foreign policy speech
after announcing that he would once again run for the Russian presidency in
2012, Vladimir Putin declared his interest in fashioning a new Eurasian Union,
similar to the EU, that would deal with other regions from a position of strength.46
Like the CSTO, the EurAsEC is also competing, though perhaps less obvi-
ously, with a Western-backed organizationthe World Trade Organization.
Moscows Quest for a Priv ileged R ole 61
Keith Darden has argued that EurAsEC and its post-Soviet predecessors were
driven initially by the logic of reintegrating a regional economic space as an alter-
native to states joining the world economic institutions that promote free trade
and more liberal-based market exchange.47 All regional economic zones protect
domestic producers and offer them dedicated markets, but the high external tar-
iff rate of the Russian-led group, for Darden, makes it antithetical to the goals of
WTO membership.48 With Russias admission into the WTO finally concluded
in December 2011, it remains unclear how Moscow will reconcile its new WTO
obligations, such as its commitments to liberalize its market and end subsidies to
favored industries, with its politically driven Customs Union agenda.
Like the CSTO, the EurAsEC has evolved in fits and starts, often in reaction
to external events. For the first part of the decade, it appeared as if the organiza-
tion would become just the latest in a long list of failed regional attempts to rein-
tegrate the post-Soviet economic region. Though the organization has fostered
Russian-Central Asian trade, its impact on intra-Central Asian economic ac-
tivity was less pronounced. As with the CSTO, Uzbekistans membership in the
economic organization has been volatileafter joining in 2006 as part of its pro-
Russia shift, Tashkent withdrew again in November 2008, as Uzbek officials
refused to commit to adopt the groups stricter border and customs practices.
But the organizations plans to create the Customs Union received new impetus
during the 2008 world financial crisis, as Moscow feared the possible loss of re-
gional economic influence to the EU and China and their growing relations with
the post-Soviet states.49
on the common economic space, and in the future ... a common market and, I
think, ultimately the creation of the foundations for a shared currency zone.53
Not all Kazakh officials or commentators have welcomed the Customs Union.
Liberalizers viewed the move as locking Kazakhstan into Russias embrace and
potentially delaying its accession into the WTO, while some consumer groups
complained of the higher Russian tariffs, especially on imported cars, that the
country adopted as a result of the deal.54 On a political level, critics have accused
the CUC, which is officially a supranational body, of imposing a legal framework
that favors Russian businesses and regulators, without adequate input from
Kazakh associations.55 Moreover, the haste with which Moscow has imple-
mented various measures has left many technical and regulatory issues yet to be
worked out.56
For Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, members of EurAsEC but initially excluded
from the Customs Union, their relative economic weakness provides two incen-
tives for joining the Customs Union. First, the Customs Union provides an
updated vehicle to secure cheap, subsided Russian energy. Since independence,
Russia has used energy as a tool of influence, but found less space to do so as the
post-Soviet countries entered trade agreements with outside partners and orga-
nizations.57 By establishing a common space for tax-free Russian energy trans-
fers, the Customs Union resurrects Moscows ability to use energy as a foreign
policy tool. Second, access to the EurAsEC anti-crisis fund, currently envisioned
as a pool of $10 billion, three-quarters of which has been promised by Russia,
could potentially provide a more readily accessible and cheaper borrowing
source for the cash-strapped Central Asian countries than the International
Monetary Fund or international capital markets. Also, the conditions and mon-
itoring mechanisms of the EurAsEC fund appear underdeveloped and far less
stringent than those of other international donors.
The Kyrgyz case is especially significant, as it has been a member of the WTO
since 1998, and, through its growing low-cost trade with China, has become a
reexporting hub for Chinese products to the rest of the region.58 Kyrgyz officials
such as former President Otunbayeva and current President Almazbek Atam-
bayev have enthusiastically championed Kyrgyzstans entry, while others have
warned that Kyrgyzstans entry into the Russian-led economic group will sacri-
fice its thriving reexport business and hurt middle class consumers, all for access
to cheaper Russian energy.59 When in April 2010, as part of its move to the
exclusive Customs Union troika, Russia started taxing energy exports to Kyr-
gyzstan, it spiked fuel costs 15 percent overnight, which precipitated the pop-
ular demonstrations that triggered the collapse of President Bakiyevs regime.
Though the WTO accommodates several regional free trade blocks, including
the EU, WTO rules about admitting members affiliated with non-WTO re-
gional free trade agreements are unclear.60
Moscows Quest for a Priv ileged R ole 63
of gas, but were hemmed in by the old Central AsiaCenter Soviet pipeline net-
work, which exported Central Asian gas into Russia, via Ukraine. During the
1990s, Turkmenistan was forced to supply most of its gas to cash-strapped CIS
customers, which paid low prices and often relied on barter trade. Without alter-
native partners, save for a 10 billion cubic meters (bcm) pipeline to Iran built in
1998, Turkmen authorities had no choice but to accept these unfavorable terms.
Under Putin, the Kremlin sought to take advantage of its pipeline geography
and reorient Central Asian gas production for the benefit of supplying Gazprom.
This included a Russian proposal in 2000 to form a new regional gas alliance or
cartel among the Central Asian producers and Russia. Though this agreement
was never formalized, over the course of the decade the Central Asian producers,
especially Turkmenistan, became top-off suppliers to Gazprom. Russia used
its monopoly power to reexport Turkmen gas, which it was buying at a low price,
reselling it to its hard currencypaying European customers. Russian exports of
natural gas to the critical European market rose from 129 bcm in 2002 to 184
bcm in 2008, even though Russias overall net export volume remained relatively
constant, at about 195 bcm.74 However, Russias actual domestic production at
the time actually declined, meaning that Gazprom increasingly relied on gas pur-
chases from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan to make up for its
supply gap (see Figure 4.2). In an attempt to lock in Turkmen gas in 2007, Gaz-
prom finally offered European prices to Ashgabat and spent $11.7 billion buying
Central Asian gas, a massive increase in expenditure from the roughly $1 billion
it had spent in 2005.75 As the financial crisis took its toll and both prices and
demand for gas plummeted, Russia in 20082009 was actually losing money on
its resale of Central Asian gas.
600
500
Billion cubic meters
400
Gazprom Production
300
0
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Figure 4.2 Gazprom Production and Central Asian Purchases, 20052009 Source:
Gazprom, Gas Purchases and Gas and Oil Production, http://www.gazprom.com
66 Great Games, Local Rules
This peculiar and one-sided relationship also explains why, in the gas issue,
Russia aggressively opposed the construction of new pipelines that could allow
the Central Asian states to bypass the Russian-controlled network. For example,
the construction of a Transcaspian pipeline (such as the Nabucco pipeline)
would give Turkmenistan an alternate market for its production, undercutting
Russias pricing leverage. Eventually, as the next chapter shows, this is exactly
what happened, though the Russian transit monopoly was broken not by the
West, but by China, with the completion of a new pipeline to bring Turkmen gas
eastward.
$800
$700
$600
$500
USD (millions)
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
$400
Tajikistan
$300 Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
$200
$100
$0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Figure 4.3 Russian Investment in Central Asia, Annual, 20022009 Source: Federal State
Statistics Service of the Russian Federation, Russian Statistical Yearbook, 20022009
Moscows Quest for a Priv ileged R ole 67
The crisis devastated large portions of Russias economic activity in Central Asia.
As Figure 4.3 shows, from 2008 to 2009, Russian investment in Central Asia
dropped in every country, with the largest falls in Kazakhstan (-48 percent),
Kyrgyzstan (-48 percent) and Tajikistan (-35 percent). Total trade also plum-
meted across the region, except with Turkmenistan.
Despite its own economic difficulties, Moscow still tried to play the role of a
stabilizing regional hegemon by dispensing emergency loans to Belarus and
Kyrgyzstan, for which it demanded political quid pro quos. In the Kyrgyz case,
in February 2009, President Medvedev and President Bakiyev announced that
the Russian Federation would provide a $2 billion emergency relief package to
Kyrgyzstan, while the Kyrgyz president announced that he was closing the
Manas base (see Chapter 7). Just a few weeks later, Bakiyev pocketed the first
disbursements of the relief package, before renegotiating the stay of U.S. troops
at Manas and extracting a higher rent (see Chapter 7). Russia subsequently
canceled the promised foreign direct investment payment. Far from using the
crisis as an opportunity to consolidate regional influence, Russia was exposed
as greatly weakened in its ability to deal with even the most dependent of its
post-Soviet allies.
The crisis also halted several Russian commitments to invest in large-scale
energy and infrastructure projects in the region. In the spring of 2009, Tajik
President Imomali Rahmon demanded that Russia finally deliver on promises it
had made in 2004, as part of a bilateral basing and security accord, to provide $2
billion worth of investments in Tajik hydroelectric projects and infrastructure.
Rahmon was particularly upset that the Russian company Rusal had not fol-
lowed through to invest in the massive Rogun hydroelectric plant and that the
Kremlin has not provided assistance for the project due to the objections of
Uzbekistan, which strenuously opposes the construction plan.77
But nowhere was Russias influence and credibility more diminished during
the financial crisis than in its relations with Turkmenistan. When, in 2007,
Russia and Turkmenistan concluded a new deal to buy and transport Turkmen-
istani gas, Moscow seemed to have locked the Central Asian country into its
distribution network for the foreseeable future. The contract was of the take
or pay variety, standard for long-term natural gas deals, which mandates that
customers pay for agreed-upon gas shipments even if they do not receive them.
Under the terms of the deal, Gazprom had agreed to purchase 7080 bcm of gas
in 2009 at European prices of $300 dollars per one thousand cubic meters.
But, as a result of the financial crisis, energy prices and global energy demand
plummeted, including European demand. In spring 2009, Gazprom found itself
importing a surplus of unwanted gas on which it was losing money. On April 9,
2009, an explosion ruptured the main Turkmen-Russian gas pipeline, which the
Turkmen side claims was caused by Russia suddenly reducing the volume of
68 Great Games, Local Rules
Manas base after he had promised Moscow that he would close the base. Even
Uzbekistan, heavily touted by Russian commentators in 2005 and 2006 as a suc-
cessful case of pro-Moscow realignment, tacked heavily back into the Western
camp. By 2011 Uzbekistan had become the hub of U.S.-led logistics and resupply
efforts for Afghanistan and continued to provide basing rights at the Termez air-
field for German and authorized NATO forces. By the end of the decade, all of
the Central Asian militaries were cooperating in some form with the United
States, despite the deepening of security ties via the CSTO (and SCO).
of the Manas bidding war of 2009, Moscow did not consult with Tashkent
before securing a pledge from Kyrgyzstan to open a second base. Uzbekistan
complained that it had not been consulted on the decision and warned that it
could not accept a foreign military presence in southern Kyrgyzstan, especially a
force that might potentially intervene in any regional resource disputes.82
Moscows unite and rule problem could potentially be overcome if Russia
adopted a more traditional patron-client relationship of divide-and-rule with
selected states in the region, backing their local agendas in exchange for monop-
olizing their security or foreign policy.83 In Central Asia, this would probably
mean siding with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in its water disputes against Uzbeki-
stan, and placing military facilities in these countries that Tashkent would view
as threatening. Such a move would push Uzbekistan further into the Western
orbit, but, as some Russian security analysts now advocate, Tashkents exclusion
would yield greater policy consensus in CSTO decision making.84
CSTO and the Customs Union, which will provide it the legal framework to reas-
sert its regional primacy. These regional organizations both emulate and com-
pete with more established Western counterparts, such as NATO and the EU.
Russias policies toward Central Asia have reflected a variety of goals, but have
been motivated by its desire to establish a position of regional privilege or dom-
inant influence. Accordingly, Russias broader bilateral relations with the great
powers, especially the United States and, increasingly, China, have been impor-
tant drivers in the formulation of Moscows Central Asian policies and tactical
shifts. Periods of bilateral cooperation with the United States have translated
into better regional relations, whereas the deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations
from 2003 to 2008 was also reflected in perceptions of more intensified geopo-
litical competition in Central Asia.
The reset of Russia-U.S. relations initiated by the Obama administration in
2009 appears to have dampened some of this more competitive rhetoric and
geopolitical maneuvering in the region. Though U.S.-Russian relations have not
returned to the closeness, or the single-issue focus on terrorism that followed
9/11, they have improved, as Moscow has agreed to support the operations of
the Manas airbase, has opened new air corridors, and has expanded its participa-
tion in the NDN. On April 13, 2011, at a Russian Duma hearing on Central Asia,
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin declared that Russia does
not claim an exclusive role in Central Asia and it is open for cooperation, adding
that Russia cooperates with the West in that region, minding mutual interests.91
Such a statement would have been unthinkable in 2005 or 2006, at the height of
Russias regional security dilemma.
But Russias hand has also been forced. The rise of Chinas economic power,
NATOs increasing cooperation with the Central Asian countries, and the
impact of the global financial crisis would not prove themselves insurmountable
obstacles if Moscow wanted to impose undisputed hegemony in the region.
Some liberal Russian analysts talk of the need to abandon its fixation on Central
Asia altogether, viewing Moscows interest in the region as antithetical to a mod-
ernization agenda and more contemporary foreign policy sensibility. However,
this is unlikely to materialize, precisely because Russian officials believe that by
maintaining regional primacy, Moscow will be afforded its coveted Great
Power status and a seat in future international decision making in other issues
and areas.
Despite Moscows formidable array of hard and soft power instruments in the
region, its own future success in Central Asia will depend on designing a new
strategy that is more realistic, refined, and forward-looking. Ultimately, Moscow
will have to give up the aspiration that it can automatically represent the Central
Asian countries in the international arena and must formulate a positive agenda
for the region, one that is not constantly reacting to Western or Chinese initiatives.
Moscows Quest for a Priv ileged R ole 73
If Moscow chooses to promote and deepen institutions like the CSTO and Cus-
toms Union, but allows Central Asian states to also foster other external partner-
ships, Russia will surely be publicly acknowledged as the dominant regional player
for many more years to come. This may well satisfy Moscows desire to maintain
prestige and status. On the other hand, if Moscow, in an open-ended quest for re-
gional dominance, seeks to use its new institutions to lock-in Central Asian states
into a new Eurasian Union or otherwise press them to exclusively align them-
selves on economic, energy, or security matters, it risks suffering more embarrass-
ing public rebuffs, which will only further erode its own regional prestige and
credibility.
| 5 |
The SCO and Beijings Great Leap
Westward
Russias strongest competitor for regional influence lies not to its west, but to its
east. Chinas increasing sway in Central Asia is nothing short of remarkable,
though it is less frequently commented on than the U.S.-Russia regional Great
Game dynamics. Like the United States, China has engaged with Central Asia
with the primary aim of stabilizing an adjacent regionChinas own Western
province of Xinjiang. Beijing has sought to clamp down on the activities of
Uighur groups, enlist regional cooperation for its security agenda, and promote
economic links as a means of spurring regional economic development.
From this strategic starting point, Chinas engagement with Central Asia
swiftly has expanded and deepened, with Beijing proving itself the most nu-
anced and skilled of the great three powers in its regional diplomacy; over the
course of a decade, Beijing successfully transformed an area that it considered at
the start of the 2000s to comprise weakly governed states, lingering border dis-
putes, economic underdevelopment, and uncontrolled transnational threats
into a region of strategic partnership.1 At the same time, Beijing has tailored its
engagement to each of the Central Asian countries. Thus, in Kyrgyzstan, the
only fellow WTO member in Central Asia, China has established a major trade
and reexport hub to the rest of the region, while in Tajikistan, Beijing has focused
on upgrading electricity transmission and distribution and improving direct
road links. In Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the regions most important hydro-
carbon producers, China has carefully and deliberately cultivated partnerships
and has built major new pipelines that will provide oil and gas to the Chinese
market for many decades.
As in other parts of the developing world, China has sought to convince the
Central Asian states that it seeks win-win solutions, a harmonious region of
peace and prosperity, and non-interference in their domestic affairs, while it has
tirelessly sought to reassure Russia that it harbors no regional hegemonic ambi-
tions and continues to recognize Moscows claim to be the regions privileged
74
The SCO and Beijing s Great Leap We st ward 75
power. But upon closer examination, China has also countered both Washing-
ton and Moscow when its interests did not align on important security and eco-
nomic matters.2
Chinas main vehicle for achieving these regional goals has been a new re-
gional multilateral organization that it has founded and promoted. The Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) emerged in 2001 as the successor to the
Shanghai Five, a forum that had facilitated negotiations among Russia, the Cen-
tral Asian states, and China over delimiting disputed Sino-Soviet borders. Over
its first decade, the SCO was composed of six membersChina, Russia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistanbut Beijings agenda, re-
sources, and diplomatic energy have been the driving force behind its evolution.
Originally established as a forum for fostering security cooperation with its Cen-
tral Asian neighbors on Xinjiang-related issues, the organization has also
launched a number of non-security initiatives in the areas of economic coopera-
tion, development and project financing, education, and youth development. As
we will see, however, these have proven less successful, both because of other
member states concerns with Chinas relative economic power and because
local rules have checked many of Beijings more ambitious economic plans.
Chinas use of the SCO as its primary instrument of regional influence and
engagement offers important insights into the broader question of Chinas
growing role in world affairs. Over the last few years, scholars have debated
whether China is challenging the contemporary Western-led global order or is
playing by the rules established by the West.3 The SCO is an important case for
this debate, perhaps even a forward-looking indicator, as it is not an existing inter-
national body, but rather was founded by Beijing to promote its security and eco-
nomic interests in an adjacent region. It is one of Chinas most ambitious
contributions to global governance, embodying a new international relations
that rejects U.S. unilateralism and, according to its official mission statement, pro-
motes cooperation based on principles of sovereign non-interference and cultural
diversity.4 Accordingly, the success of the SCO, how the organization is treated by
its other member countries, and how it interacts with other multilateral organiza-
tions and external actors operating in the region are also important indicators of
the current scope and depth of Chinas growing global power and influence.
The multiethnic region, home to the Uighurs but also to 55 other recognized
ethnicities (including all the major Central Asian groups), remains Chinas
largest administrative division with an unsettled history.5 During the interwar
years, the territory rebelled from the Republic of China and bounced between
regional powers; the short-lived independent Islamic state known as the East
Turkestan Republic was mostly absorbed by China in 1934, while the northern
area became a de facto Soviet satellite from 19451949 as the Second East
Turkestan Republic, before it too was brought under Chinese Communist
control. Since, Beijing has ruled Xinjiang as an integral part of China, though its
ethnic diversity, Islamic establishment, and comparatively low level of develop-
ment have greatly complicated central attempts to maintain control. The region
was the site of regular violent clashes during the Cultural Revolution and a
renewed campaign of ethnic and religious violence in the 1990s.
In its efforts to develop and assimilate the region and its inhabitants, Beijing
promotes the official doctrine of the three inseparable ties, stressing that, the
Han Chinese cannot live without the minority groups, that the minority groups
cannot live without the Han Chinese, and [that] no one minority group can live
without the other minority groups.6 Much like the Soviet Unions policy of
modernization and nationalities, Chinese policy toward the Uighurs has as-
sumed that promoting rapid development and contacts with the center will
eventually change local ethnic and cultural identifications. Yet, despite state
building, massive economic subsidies and investment, educational affirmative
action and new bilingual policies, population transfers and careful monitoring
of regional administrators, much of the regions population has resisted assimila-
tion Beijings efforts.7 Most notably, the influx of Han, who in the 2000 census
had reached 40 percent of regions population, has exacerbated ethnic tensions,
as the Han have assumed prominent political and economic roles and now dom-
inate large cities such as Urumqi, while Beijings drive to develop Xinjiangs con-
siderable natural resources (minerals, oil, gas and water) have also been viewed
as exploitative by Uighur nationalists.
For its part, Beijing has never hesitated to use force in the area, targeting
a number of Uighur organizations with either nationalist or actual separatist
platforms. In 1998, Chinese authorities initiated the strike hard campaign,
which sought to clamp down decisively on the activities of Uighur move-
ments and their supporters. According to the Chinese governments figures,
over the 1990s East Turkestan Terrorist Forceswhich include the East
Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the East Turkistan Liberation Orga-
nization (ETLO), and the Uighur Liberation Organization (ULO), among
othersinstigated over 200 bombings and assassinations that killed 164
people and wounded 440 people.8 Some Western scholars remain skeptical
as to whether Uighur organizations such as the ETIM or the ETLO actually
The SCO and Beijing s Great Leap We st ward 77
grounds. Second, the organizations official documents are littered with refer-
ences to rejecting unilateral military solutions, a clear reference to the United
States, and promoting the democratization of international relations, multi-
polarity, and a new cooperative spirit. Some Western commentators have
interpreted the repeated references to the Shanghai Spirit as intentionally op-
posing the West or embodying authoritarian norms.15
Organizationally, the SCOs permanent bureaucracy is headquartered in Bei-
jing, not Shanghai, and its Secretary General is appointed for a three-year term,
rotating through the member states. Councils of the member states heads of
state and heads of government hold annual summits, while meetings of func-
tional ministries target specific issues for cooperation. SCO national coordina-
tors are tasked with domestically coordinating meetings and ensuring that SCO
decisions are transmitted and implemented by the relevant national agencies
and state organs. Distinct from these Secretariat-governed institutions is the Re-
gional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS), which, since 2004, has been based in
Tashkent and acts as a center for security cooperation, information pooling, and
exchange and monitoring of the SCOs Anti-Terrorism Treaty. Typically, officials
at RATS report directly to their respective ministries of Internal Security or
Defense, not the Secretariat in Beijing.
The result is that Beijing has a considerable and growing stake in the interna-
tional success of the organization, which, in turn, leads it to play up its accom-
plishments as a multilateral forum. As a result, even in cases in which the SCO as
an organization has not advanced a common policy or adopted Beijings pro-
posals, China has continued to refer to its bilateral engagements with the Central
Asian states as SCO projects or initiatives.18 Such labeling causes confusion
among regional observers and analysts, who often attribute Chinese accomplish-
ments to the SCOs regional mechanisms. Finally, Chinas interests in a successful
SCO have led the organization to prioritize securing recognition and partner-
ship from other international organizations and multilateral institutions.19
Later in 2002, the United Nations, supported by the United States, placed the
East Turkestan Islamic Movement on its list of terrorist organizations, while in
September 2002 the U.S. Treasury placed the group on its blacklist of terrorist
organizations. Beijing and Washington also expanded their working groups and
senior-level dialogues on South Asia and cooperated on intelligence sharing,
while the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations was allowed to open an office in
China.29 Within a few months, the issue of Uighur separatism was reframed from
a local sovereign affair within China to a frontline in the new global war on terror.30
At the same time, the very entry of the U.S. military into the Central Asian the-
ater also raised alarm throughout Chinese foreign and defense policy circles, espe-
cially after Russia initially endorsed the new U.S. basing presence. China feared
that the American presence could become permanent, thereby adding to the array
of US bases in Asia that encircle China, and that such a beachhead could be used
to choke off Chinese energy supplies, conduct surveillance operations in Western
China, and even provide a springboard for the U.S. government or its allies to
destabilize Xinjiang.31 Moreover, as in Moscow, Beijing viewed the establishment
of military bases in Central Asia as part of a dangerous broader unilateralist turn
in U.S. security policy under the Bush administration, something explicitly flagged
by and opposed in Chinas New Security Concept from the same time.32
The U.S. militarys entry into Central Asia also generated a greater sense of
urgency for Beijing to institutionalize the SCO. Just a few months earlier, in June
2001, the SCO had been formally inaugurated on the fifth anniversary of the
Shanghai Five, with Uzbekistan being admitted as a full member in the new or-
ganization. Rebecca Nadin has carefully documented how the SCOs initial
tepid response to 9/11, compared with the United States aggressive post9/11
regional security cooperation, greatly alarmed Beijing, as it sought to rescue the
organization from the brink of an early extinction.33 In the first half of 2002, Chi-
nese diplomats energetically scheduled a number of SCO coordination meet-
ings and summits, covering the topics of Afghanistan, border guards,
counterterrorism, and cultural and economic ties. At the pivotal June 2002 an-
nual summit in Saint Petersburg, the members signed an agreement establishing
the SCO regional antiterrorism structure (RATS) as well as the foundational
SCO Charter. Instructively, Article 2 of the Charter both affirmed members
state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference in each others internal
affairs, rejecting any regional unilateral superiority in military affairs.34
operations in the region. The Color Revolutions, particularly the so-called Tulip
Revolution of March 2005 that ousted long-standing Kyrgyz President Askar
Akayev, caused great concern in China, albeit for slightly different reasons from
those of Moscow. While Russia was convinced that these regime changes were
directed against Moscow and were intended to bring to power pro-Western gov-
ernments, China was concerned that such democratizing forces might spill over
and destabilize its Western province of Xinjiang, as well as potentially empowering
political dissidents and subversive groups in the rest of China.35 Chinese scholars
and think tanks devoted extraordinary attention to the political upheavals, fo-
cusing on issues such as economic inequality and poverty, the incendiary role of
the Western media, electoral opportunism among opposition parties and, as in
Russia, the undue influence of Western-backed NGOs.36 Beijing also dispatched
Chinese research teams composed of scholars and analysts to the sites of these
revolutions to assess the causes and their potential to be replicated.37 As in Russia,
these events refracted back onto domestic policy, as Chinese officials introduced
new regulations restricting the activities of domestic NGOs and the media.
By the summer of 2005, the onset of the Color Revolutions, regional fears of
regime change, and the United States increasingly vocal freedom agenda all
contributed to an air of intense geopolitical competition and concern about U.S.-
sponsored democratization. Chinese and Russian fears and countermeasures
were also embedded in official SCO documents, policies, and proclamations.
These factors converged in the run-up to the July 2005 SCO summit in Astana
and Uzbekistans eviction of U.S. forces shortly after (see Chapter 3). Some U.S.
officials, most notably Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, attributed the
eviction from K2 to pressure brought by China and Russia on Uzbekistan
through the SCO. The Astana episode also led to open speculation that the secu-
rity organization was now evolving into an anti-NATO military bloc.38 The bian-
nual joint military exercises (or Peace Missions), conducted by China and
Russia since 2003, also raised fears that the SCO would develop an advanced
operational capability.39 In academic circles, the SCOs Astana statement was
pointed to as an example of emerging soft-balancing or actions that do not
directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but that use nonmilitary tools to
delay, frustrate and undermine aggressive unilateral U.S. policies.40 Central Asia
was perceived as a front line in the geopolitical push-back against the Bush
administrations unilateralism.
The Astana declaration on U.S. bases, while supported by China, was brought
forward by Karimov and was endorsed by Russian President Putinit did not
originate in Beijing. All SCO members at the time feared growing regional insta-
bility and Western-sponsored interference. But Eurasian governments soon
learned the Color Revolutions playbook and adopted successful countermea-
sures to ensure that the model of election day regime change would not be
The SCO and Beijing s Great Leap We st ward 83
successfully used again.41 As it turned out, the 2005 Astana declaration marked
the peak of Sino-Russian security concerns and cooperative backlash against the
West, not the beginning of an anti-U.S. alliance.42
that SCO members and the West both have a common interest in defeating the
Taliban and ensuring the stability of Afghanistan. SCO summits on Afghanistan
have been critical of both U.S. goals and strategies and have provided a forum for
member states to emphasize the importance of a regional solution. In Novem-
ber 2005, the organization created the SCO-Afghanistan contact group; one ini-
tiative, following the 2007 summit in Moscow, explored establishing an
SCO-sponsored forum for promoting national reconciliation and dialogue,
modeled on the Tajikistan peace process of the 1990s.47
Yet, as even SCO officials admit, the lack of consensus within SCO mem-
bers about their own individual policies on Afghanistan has prevented the or-
ganization from developing a more robust or coherent set of proposals.48 For
example, since 2008, Russia has insisted that the CSTO, not the SCO, should
be NATOs regional partner in the region, while the Central Asian states, with
the exception of Uzbekistan, have balked at escalating their visible role in
Afghanistan. Even in China, there are reportedly differences between officials
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who are more supportive of cooperating
with international efforts, and the Peoples Liberation Army and security ser-
vices, who favor maintaining Chinas more hands-off policy. The lack of con-
sensus on Afghanistan means, in practice, that the organizations projects in
Afghanistan are limited to narcotics interdiction, a consensus issue, though
even here the credibility of the Central Asian states commitment to the cause
is in doubt.49
Moreover, though the United States and China both want a stable Afghan-
istan, their strategies on how to ensure regional stability diverge. Chinese
doubts about the capacity of the United States to reconstruct Afghanistan
and to oppose Taliban-supported Pashtun factions has led Beijing to adopt
more of a hedging strategy.50 Chinas deep and extensive relations with Paki-
stans security services and intelligence agencies, which have covertly assisted
the insurgency, also give Beijing an additional instrument of engagement. As
a result, providing indirect pay-offs to areas and actors that might be allied
with the Taliban is viewed as a more effective guarantee of Chinas invest-
ments and interests in the region, rather than exclusively supporting the
Western-backed regime in Kabul.51 Beijing fears that more active involvement
in Afghanistan would actually destabilize its efforts in Xinjiang and could
possibly attract undue attention to Chinese internal policies. The July 2009
Urumqi riots seemed to have convinced regional analysts and policymakers
not only that stability in the province remains tenuous, but that more publicly
active involvement by China in Afghanistan in support of U.S. operations
could boomerang back on it.52
Yet U.S. officials, especially those in the Obama administration, have persis-
tently tried to nudge Beijing toward playing a more active role, such as providing
The SCO and Beijing s Great Leap We st ward 85
35
30
Trade Volume (in billions USD)
25
20
China
15 Russia
10
0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Figure 5.1 Central Asian Trade with Russia and China, Annual, 20012010 Source:
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS), 20012010
The SCO and Beijing s Great Leap We st ward 87
6
Imports/Eports (billions USD)
4 from China
from Russia
3 to China
to Russia
2
0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Figure 5.2 Kyrgyz Trade with China and Russia, 20012010 Source: International
Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS), 20012010
analysts have been promoting the impression that the SCO already has become
a leading provider of public goods in Central Asia and that it actively facilitates
cooperation in areas such as infrastructure investment, communications net-
working, and transportation building.62 According to these commentators, such
integration not only deserves to be supported by the European Union as part of
its emerging Central Asia strategy, but necessitates that EU governments drop
any normative reservations and engage with the SCO in order to avoid exclusion
from the regions development planning.
Certain SCO initiatives that were announced but never implemented have
contributed to this impression. In 2005 the SCO established the Business Coun-
cil and an Interbank Association to coordinate regional investment among the
member countries national development banks. The association was envisioned
as the precursor to a regional development bank that has yet to materialize. A list
of 130 alleged SCO projects that the Council supervises are almost all preex-
isting Chinese bilateral and multilateral initiatives that have been given the
SCOs stamp of origin. These include the flagship trans-Central Asian highway
projects that the Asian Development Bank initiated in the 1990s through its
Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) program.
In fact, the original ADB program was started with seed money from Japan
back in the 1990s, supplemented by the EU, and is now being directed to suit
Chinese interests and infrastructural development.63 The so-called SCO invest-
ments of $1 billion that were disbursed in 20062007 were entirely financed by
Beijing. As one broader survey of Chinese infrastructure development across
Asia observes, Beijing is quite eager to present its new wave of highway, railway,
and airport construction as regional initiatives, supported by international orga-
nizations such as the ADB or ASEAN in the interests of multilateral integration,
even though Beijing has intricately planned these new routes and will dispropor-
tionately benefit from them.64
of Chinese companies in managing these various projects. But with its entry into
the area of project financing and assistance, it remains unclear how Chinese and
SCO initiatives will interface with more established regional financial institu-
tions such as the World Bank and the IMF. Beijings more favorable conditions
may undercut more traditional sources of financial assistance, as has been illus-
trated in certain African cases such as Angola. Indeed, a U.S official recounted
that U.S. negotiations with Tajikistan over a possible World Bank loan in 2006
were undercut by Chinas decision to allocate $600 million in concessionary
loans to the small Central Asian state.66 Finally, the lack of transparency in Chi-
nese loans, coupled with their lack of conditionality, raises the possibility that
these funds may be misused by local elites.
Just such a possibility is raised by a recent report by the Crisis Group that, as
part of a comprehensive study of the regions decaying infrastructure, which
warns that Chinese (and Russian) bilateral aid programs need stronger mecha-
nisms for oversight and accountability.67 The report brings up the instructive
example of the local management of the new Dushanbe-Chanak road in Tajiki-
stan. The project was built with a $280 million loan from China; soon after the
highways opening in 2009, however, high tolls were imposed.68 The company
operating the tollbooths and managing the roads maintenance is Innovative
Road Solution (IRS), a mysterious entity with no public history and offshore
registration in the British Virgin Islands. IRS officials themselves contradicted
the Tajik Minister of Transportations claim that the company won an open
tender. The estimated annual revenue from the road totals $48 million annually,
though the government has yet to disclose the ultimate owner of IRS, or the
total revenue flows and operating costs of the company.
But perhaps the most significant, and politically intriguing, energy project is
the new Central AsiaChina gas pipeline, completed in December 2009 and
designed to bring Turkmen gas to China. The pipeline represents the first major
gas pipeline completed since the Soviet collapse to completely bypass Russian
territory and the Gazprom-Transneft network. The pipeline originates in Turk-
menistan, traverses Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan (both of which will also deposit
gas into the network), before linking up with the newly constructed West-East
China pipeline to take this gas to the Chinese eastern coast.80 The original
agreement, to supply 30 bcm a year, was subsequently increased to 40 bcm and
then, in December 2011, again revised upward to 65 bcm. Of note, total Turk-
men gas production in 2009 was 72 bcm, though the Turkmen government
claims that it will expand its capacity to 200 bcm by 2030. Overall, the Central
Asian pipeline is projected to provide the majority of Chinas imported gas needs
over the next few decades. Even more impressive than these volumes of gas is the
speed and purpose with which Beijing planned and executed the pipeline. The
final agreement was reached in 2006, and production was finished on time in
just over three years.
Though Russian officials maintain a nonchalant public attitude toward the
opening of the pipeline, it is clear that Chinas aggressive entry into the Central
Asian gas arena has undercut Moscow. The opening of the Central AsiaChina
pipeline not only breaks the Russian gas transit monopoly, it also affords Ashga-
bat additional leverage in negotiations over price and volume with Moscow; the
possibility of securing additional supply from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and
Kazakhstan also provides additional leverage for Beijing in its negotiations with
Moscow for future Russian gas supplies.
For the United States, the Central AsiaChina pipeline, as well as its Kazakh-
stan oil counterpart, is a welcome development, consistent with U.S. energy
strategy of expanding global energy supply and promoting the sovereignty and
independence of the Central Asian states. Yet, there are some analysts who now
claim that Chinas rapid rise might also have some downsides. For example, if all
of Turkmenistans gas starts flowing eastward, there may not be enough left for
the Trans-Caspian projects, such as the long-proposed Nabucco pipeline to
Europe.81 Moreover, in a post-Afghanistan world, it is not clear whether China
would view the U.S.-supported construction of a new Turkmenistan-Afghani-
stan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline as a strategic competitor or a complement;
with its growing ties to Turkmenistan, including mounting Turkmen debt to
China, Beijing would certainly be in a position to influence such decisions. Chi-
nas entry has fundamentally rearranged the regional energy map, though so far
Washingtons traditional policy platitude of encouraging alternatives to Russian
routes still seems to be its operating principle.
The SCO and Beijing s Great Leap We st ward 95
External great power engagement provided the Central Asian states with the op-
portunity to strengthen their regimes and stress their local rules, much to the
detriment of the regions democratic development and human rights practices.
During the 1990s, a variety of international actors engaged with the Central
Asian regimes on democracy and so-called values issues.1 Outside observers
framed regional political developments in terms of the ongoing broader post-
Communist political transitions and referred to the human security commit-
ments that the countries had undertaken by joining the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and ratifying the major international
human rights conventions.2 But by the end of the 1990s, as many of their post-
Communist counterparts had implemented reforms and achieved sustained
democratic gains, Central Asian governments were consolidating state power
and had grown irritated with Western criticism of their political practices.
From 20012010, as U.S.-Russia-China regional engagement intensified, the
trend in the quality of democracy in the region clearly declined (see Figure 6.1).
According to the Freedom House composite scores for democracy, both Turk-
menistan and Uzbekistan began at high levels of authoritarianism and have only
gotten worse, while the quality of democratic institutions in Kazakhstan and
Kyrgyzstan, widely perceived as generally more open than their regional coun-
terparts, also steadily declined from the Partly Free to the Not Free cate-
gories. Of course, correlation is not necessarily causation, as these regimes may
have become more repressive even in the absence of external engagement. More-
over, throughout their post9/11 security engagement, the United States and
the European Union continued to fund democracy assistance programs, main-
tained a public commitment to support human rights in the region, and some-
times even exerted effective pressure on Central Asian governments on certain
individual cases and issues (such as improving election procedures in Kyrgyz-
stan or pressing Uzbek authorities to abolish the death penalty).3
97
98 Great Games, Local Rules
6.5 Kazakhstan
Democracy Score
Kyrgyzstan
6 Russia
Tajikistan
5.5 Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
5
4.5
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Figure 6.1 Democracy Trends in Central Asia, 20012010 Source: Freedom House,
Nations in Transit, 20012010. Note: Higher scores indicate lower levels of democracy.
Worst possible rating = 7.
Despite these good intentions and selected successes, the West also inad-
vertently contributed to the regions overall democratic erosions. External
engagement did not directly cause these trends, but rather played into the
hands of local elites, who over the decade became more adept at using exter-
nal agendas, including the concerns of intensifying geopolitical competition,
to solidify their domestic political standing. Three particular external-local
interactions had deleterious effects on the regions political rights. First, the
onset of the Wests Global War on Terror (GWOT) allowed Central Asian
regimes to blur the line between anti-terror campaigns and the targeting of
political opposition, as external actors equipped Central Asian security ser-
vices, mutually recognized each others designations of transnational
threats, and offered novel legal justifications for their cross-border rendi-
tions of terror suspects and extremists. Second, the Color Revolutions of
20032005 allowed Central Asian regimes to conflate democratization with
externally promoted regime change, thereby triggering a widespread regional
backlash against international actors engaged in democratic monitoring and
advocacy. Third, in reacting to the perceived threat to regime integrity posed
by so-called Western-style democracy and human rights appeals, the Central
Asian states grafted a set of alternative norms, practices, and institutions, sup-
ported by Moscow and Beijing, which stressed the importance of sovereignty
and cultural relativism; practices such as the rise of alternative election mon-
itors sent by the CIS and the SCO mimicked the form of their Western coun-
terparts, but opposed critical assessments of their elections, helping the
Central Asian governments to push back against Western criticisms and value
judgments.
Anti -Terrorism , Democrati zati on , and Human R ights 99
Regional Blacklisting
The now common practice of blacklisting reinforced this political logrolling.15
The United Nations first accepted blacklisting in Resolution 1267, adopted by
the Security Council in 1999, which created the Consolidated List of individuals
and entities associated with Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda, and the Taliban. That resolu-
tion was strengthened after September 11, 2001, when the Security Council
passed Resolution 1373, which established the Counter-Terrorism Committee
of the Security Council and encouraged states to create their own national lists
and to cooperate on other counterterrorism measures.16 The 1267 regime, in
particular, obligates states to freeze the assets of entities on the list and to bring
proceedings against those entities on the list within their jurisdiction. The
United States, Russia, and China all expanded their own national lists and
participated in these multilateral efforts to craft common lists.
Despite the acceptance of blacklisting as a legitimate anti-terror tool, its
domestic and international use over the last decade has raised a number of
Anti -Terrorism , Democrati zati on , and Human R ights 101
not, to which Bush tersely responded, We seek assurances that nobody will be
tortured.43 Of course, the State Departments own human rights reports from
the time detailed that prisoners were commonly tortured in Uzbekistan. Accord-
ing to a former major in the Uzbek National Security Service (SNB), Ikrom
Yakubov, American officials, who he assumed to be CIA agents, observed the
abuse of rendered prisoners in Uzbekistans prisons.44
Not only did the United States outsource the interrogation of Central Asian
terrorist suspects to Uzbekistan, but it further outsourced its own role in the
renditions by relying on private contractors for many, if not most, of the actual
rendition flights and prisoner transfers. The renditions to Uzbekistan likely
involved the participation of contractors, especially the controversial private se-
curity firm Blackwater, which was awarded over $1 billion worth of contracts by
the Bush administration. The company was tasked with routinely flying between
Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, and, according to Jeremy Scahills investigative
study, the Central Asian state was one of the key destinations for both U.S.
military and CIA renditions.45 Furthermore, according to an internal company
memo obtained by Der Spiegel, Blackwater was contracted by the CIA to fly
terror suspects from Guantanamo to a secret prison camp in Uzbekistan (in ad-
dition to Pakistan and Afghanistan), where the detainees faced special treat-
ment in detention.46 The magazine also claims that the Department of Defense
in 2003 cleared Presidential Airways and Aviation Worldwide, both owned by
Blackwaters owner and founder Eric Prince, to conduct rendition flights.
According to another investigative report, between 2004 and 2008 Presidential
Airways was awarded at least $192 million worth of contracts by the U.S. De-
partment of Defense; according to its 2007 terms of reference, the airline was
tasked to perform for CENTCOM passenger, cargo and combi Short Take-Off
and Landing air transportation services between locations in the Area of Re-
sponsibility of Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan and Uzbekistan.47
Though Uzbekistan was the most important regional destination for rendi-
tions, other flights within the region have been documented. Flight logs exam-
ined by the European Parliament also indicate that Baku and Ashgabat were
frequent regional destinations, with one particular aircraft, contracted to Pre-
mier Aircraft Management, logging 50 flights between Frankfurt and the capital
of Turkmenistan from June to November 2005.48
these SCO activities has been facilitating cooperation among regional security
services in detaining and transporting suspects. According to one critical Rus-
sian newspaper account, RATS main objective is helping special services of the
states-members to bypass the obstacles presented by national legislation and by
the norms of international law on giving up suspects.49 The convention essen-
tially prohibits member countries from offering political asylum or refugee
status to any individuals accused by another signatory country of extremism.
For example, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan have all been accused by
human rights organizations of forcibly returning to Uzbekistan refugees who
were accused of being involved in Andijan events, despite their internationally
recognized refugee status and pending asylum applications.50
Ascertaining the exact number of people transferred under the SCO treaty is
difficult, given that the treaty is usually not officially invoked by authorities, but
it appears as if the two most important directions of transfers have been from
Central Asia and Russia to China and from Russia to Uzbekistan.51 Over the
2000s, dozens of Uighurs appear to have been rendered from Russia, Kazakh-
stan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan to China, including the much-publicized case
of Huseyin Celil, a Uighur refugee with Canadian citizenship who was forcibly
transferred to China in 2006 while visiting relatives in Uzbekistan; he subse-
quently was sentenced to life imprisonment by a Chinese court.52 The renditions
from Russia to Central Asia, especially to Uzbekistan, appear to have intensified
around 2005, when Russia was courting Central Asian governments in its bid to
counter U.S. regional influence. In a March 2006 meeting at RATS, Russias FSB
director noted that Russia had transferred 19 suspects to Uzbekistan, all of them
accused of membership in the Islamic organization Hizb ut-Tahrir.53 Prior to
2005, the religious organization had been legal in Russia.54
The case of Alisher Usmanov dramatically illustrates this changing practice of
extraterritorial cooperation between Russian and Uzbek security services.55
Originally from Uzbekistan, Usmanov was awarded Russian citizenship in 1999
and worked as a Sharia teacher in a madrasah in Kazan. In 2000, when Hizb ut-
Tahrir was still legal, Usmanov attended meetings of the organization; Uzbek
authorities later demanded his extradition on the grounds of fomenting reli-
gious extremism. Russian prosecutors initially refused these requests on the
basis that Usmanov was a Russian citizen, but in April 2005, his citizenship was
revoked for allegedly submitting false documentation. In June 2005, Usmanov
was abducted in Kazan the morning of his scheduled release from a remand
prison and was flown directly to Uzbekistan in what the Head of Public Affairs of
the Uzbek National Security Council explained was part of a joint plan with the
Russian Federal Security Service to combat international terrorism.56 In
November 2005 he was convicted in Namangan of extremist activities and was
sentenced to eight years in prison.
Anti -Terrorism , Democrati zati on , and Human R ights 107
A leaked cable from the U.S. Embassy in Tajikistan in 2005 underscores both
how the role of Western NGOs in the Color Revolutions became perceived as
a security issue and how Central Asian rulers pragmatically invoked Russian
pressure to justify their new appetite for pushback.68 In a meeting of the U.S.
Ambassador to Tajikistan James Hoagland and the Tajik Ambassador to the
United States, Homrahon Zaripov, the Tajik official explained that the pressure
to clamp down on the activities of NGOs had come directly from Moscow,
both through the Russian media and via the Russian-infiltrated Tajik Ministry
of Interior. However, as if to emphasize Dushanbes political leeway, Zaripov
also stressed that Tajik President Rahmon had not acquiesced to Moscows
demand to evict the big three NGOsFreedom House, the National Demo-
cratic Institute, and Internewsand would hold their status in abeyance, pre-
sumably to use as future bargaining leverage in bilateral consultations. Zapitov
also recounted Rahmons meeting the previous month with George Soros,
founder of the Open Society Institute, which supports a foundation in Tajiki-
stan. The Tajik president warned that, although he had found no fault with
the organization so far, he was, prepared to shut down the Soros foundation
immediately if any irregularity came to his attention.
Conclusion
To be sure, the Central Asian governments all exhibited authoritarian tendencies
and repressive practices well before they became objects of geopolitical influ-
ence. However, external engagement with the United States, Russia, and China
provided local elites with new material, political, and normative opportunities to
consolidate their regimes and quash opposition. New security cooperation in
the name of terrorism by all three powers trained and equipped the security ser-
vices of these regimes, while creating the new normative environment of anti-
terrorism that allowed them to effectively erase distinctions between defending
state security and silencing legitimate political opposition. In the related field of
democracy promotion, the Central Asian governments, with the backing of
Moscow and Beijing, successfully recoded Western-backed NGOs and democ-
racy promotion actors as security threats and treated them as such, shutting
down major organizations and criticizing the authority of the OSCEs election-
monitoring division and values agenda. Finally, by grafting their own domestic
pushback against Western democratic standards onto Russias sovereign de-
mocracy concept, Central Asian elites mounted an ideological and normative
counteroffensive against the West, accusing Washington of promoting double
standards and hidden geopolitical agendas.
Anti -Terrorism , Democrati zati on , and Human R ights 115
As such, it was the interaction between external players and Central Asias
local rules that over the course of the decade contributed to the deterioration of
political rights across the region. Though the West did not intend for its values
agenda to be eroded in this fashion, it increasingly came to accept this new diffi-
cult environment as a permanent characteristic of the region and adjusted its
policies and expectations accordingly.
| 7 |
Geopolitical Competition and Political
Stability: Kyrgyzstans Base Bidding War
Even as Washington, Moscow, and Beijing have differed in their strategic goals
and in their support of democratization and political reform in Central Asia, all
the outside powers publicly agree that they have a common interest in pro-
moting political stability. But the term is overused and poorly defined, having
become inextricably entangled as a rationalization for upholding local rules. The
Central Asian regimes themselves justify their hard-line tactics and survival
strategies in such terms, playing to outside fears about the security threats posed
by looming state collapse, fragmentation, and militant Islam.1 Similarly, along
these lines, external actors have funded projects to develop state capacity or have
supported these regimes self-styled anti-terrorism efforts and political crack-
downs. Over the course of a decade, political stabilityinitially understood as
an outcomehas morphed into a reason to validate the political status quo.
The dramatic events of 2010 in Kyrgyzstan challenged the external consensus
about the fundamental durability of the Central Asian regimes and their patri-
monial structures. The sudden collapse of the Bakiyev government in Kyrgyz-
stan in April 2010 and the outbreak of mass ethnic violence two months later
emphasized the fragility of Kyrgyzstans political institutions. The regime col-
lapse was preceded by intensifying U.S.-Russia rivalry over the fate of the Manas
military base, leading some analysts to speculate that Moscow had deliberately
sought to take down Bakiyev to punish his disloyalty to Moscow.2
This chapter focuses more closely on the role played by external competition
in destabilizing the Kyrgyz government during the Bakiyev era (20052010).
On the surface, the Kyrgyz case appears to challenge some of the arguments
made in this book about the importance of local rules in structuring the inter-
actions among the great powers in Central Asia. But even in this dramatic, and
perhaps exceptional, case of geopolitical push and pull, a closer examination
reveals that local actors played a pivotal role in driving these external dynamics;
President Bakiyev and his ruling circle actively drummed up a bidding war
116
Geopoliti cal Competition and Politi cal Stab ilit y 117
completely isolated his country from almost all external contacts and influ-
ences.6 But in both cases, political systems have remained mostly unchallenged,
with Ashgabat witnessing the orderly transition of power from the rule of
Saparmurat Niyazov to Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov in late 2006.
By contrast, in Kyrgyzstan, we have witnessed sudden regime collapses in
2005 and 2010, as well as an explosive ethnic conflict in the south of the country
in June 2010 (and in the late Soviet era).7 Tajikistan began its independence
from a baseline of the extreme instability of civil war and moved toward greater
state consolidation following the 1997 settlement. Finally, Uzbekistan occupies
a position somewhere between these more and less stable country clusters. The
repression demonstrated by Tashkent in defense of the regime has chilled polit-
ical opposition and dissent, yet, as the events in Andijan showed, the legitimacy
and long-term sustainability of the government is more vulnerable than it is in
Astana and Ashgabat.8
If we accept that, in institutional composition, all of the Central Asian coun-
tries are characterized by similar local patrimonial rulesincluding the preva-
lence of informal politics, repression (mild to strong), institutional weakness,
corruption, and elite predationthen there must be other reasons that account
for why regimes and their accompanying patrimonial structures have endured
unchallenged in some cases, but not in others.
U.S. side expects to provide over $150 million in total assistance and compensation
over the next year, thereby allowing Bakiyev to claim that he extracted a great deal
of the $200 million that he demanded from the Americans. However, the actual
lease payment for Manas only rose from $2 million annually to $17 million, with the
compensation package bundling an array of various bilateral assistance programs
(many of them already in place), as well as more general base-related economic con-
tributions. To emphasize the U.S. point, the statement stressed that the base deal
was part of a larger, robust bilateral relationship between the United States and the
Kyrgyz Republic; it also pointed out that, since independence, the United States
had provided more than $850 million in total aid to the Central Asian state.21
The legal distinction between base-related rent and bilateral aid may have sat-
isfied the principals on the U.S. side, but the Kyrgyz government quickly soured
on its terms. For one, Kyrgyz negotiators claimed that they were promised more
liquid forms of assistance as part of the compensation package, in addition to
the $17 million in rent.22 Kyrgyz negotiators also resented that humanitarian
programs such as the Peace Corps were counted in what they viewed as the
basing rights package. Just a few months after supposedly signing the deal that
would resolve the issue for at least the next five years, the Kyrgyz government
was privately calling for another renegotiation.
Bishkeks resentment was fueled by a series of base-related accidents and
scandals that received large-scale media attention, especially in the Russian-
language press. In September 2006, a U.S. major deployed at Manas claimed to
have been kidnapped from a large department store in Bishkek and kept captive
for several days, though local Kyrgyz media claimed, instead, that she had faked
the story, while local police also cast doubt on her narrative. Then, on December
6, 2006, the base was thrown into the national media spotlight when U.S. ser-
viceman Zachary Hatfield shot and killed a fuel truck driver at the bases main
checkpoint. The victim, Alexander Ivanov, was an ethnic Russian, but a Kyrgyz
citizen, and long-time contractor at the base. Hatfield claimed that the driver
had threatened him with a knife (only a nail file was found on Ivanov) and the
incident soon spiraled into a media and public relations feeding frenzy.
The Manas bases public relations took a further hit after U.S. authorities
clumsily offered Ivanovs widow the small sum of $1,000 as compensation (it
was actually a symbolic payment but was mischaracterized in the press), and
Hatfield was shortly thereafter whisked from the country.23 Some U.S. and Kyr-
gyz observers claim that Moscow fueled the incident by paying for Ivanovas
legal representation and generating inflammatory media coverage about the
event. But U.S. officials, for their part, were slow to blunt the public relations
disaster for both the base and the Embassy, focusing, instead, on the narrow
questions of legal responsibility and the provisions of the United States Status
of Forces Agreement with the Kyrgyz government.
Geopoliti cal Competition and Politi cal Stab ilit y 123
U.S. officials that Russia was plotting to evict the United States from Manas to
punish it for its support of Georgia. According to one report, Moscow had asked
Uzbekistan at the fall 2008 meeting of the CIS to challenge the legal basis of
Manas in exchange for supporting to support Tashkents position on regional
water disputes with its upstream neighbors.27 At the same time, despite facing
what they termed enormous pressure from Moscow, Kyrgyz officials in their
bilateral meetings with U.S. representatives positioned themselves as willing to
buck the Kremlin if given adequate incentives. For example, shortly after Russia
reached an agreement with the Kyrgyz leadership in January 2009 to provide an
aid and investment package to Bishkek in exchange for closing Manas, Kyrgyz
Presidential Chief of Staff Danyar Usenov informed the U.S. Embassy that the
situation could still be saved if the U.S. increased its payments.28
So the plot to close Manas served both the interests of both Bishkek and Mos-
cow. At a joint press conference in Moscow in early February 2009, President
Bakiyev first announced in public that the small Central Asian state had taken the
decision to close down the U.S. air base, citing its domestic unpopularity. At the
same event, Medvedev announced that Russia would be granting a special emer-
gency assistance package to the Central Asian state, comprised of a $150 million
grant, a $300 million soft loan, and $1.7 billion in credits to invest in the Kambarata-
2 hydroelectric plant project. As part of the deal, Russia also assumed control of a
number of Kyrgyz defense industries, including a 48 percent controlling stake in
the Dastan torpedo manufacturing plant near Lake Issyk-Kul.29 Though Russian
and Kyrgyz officials denied that the aid package was in any way tied to the an-
nouncement on the closure on Manas, the quid pro quo was clearly implied, and
the move was interpreted as a significant geopolitical victory for Moscow. A few
days later, the Kyrgyz parliament supported Bakiyevs decision by voting to evict
the United States from Manas, with only one deputy voting against the move.
Maxim indicated that his support for the turnaround on Manas entailed
some risk, but said his background as a futures trader made him com-
fortable with risk. I saw that a deal was needed, and stepped in to set it
up, he said. He claimed the Russians were mad, and were trying to
punish Kyrgyzstan, but they were in a box, given Medvedevs statement
in February that the future of Manas was a sovereign decision of Kyr-
gyzstan.36
consequences. In late June the two sides announced the new deal, with the
increased rent and renaming of the facility, and, as Maksim had predicted, Mos-
cow had little choice but to publicly support the new agreement as Kyrgyzstans
sovereign right.
In an immediate reaction to the double-cross, Russian Defense Minister Ana-
toly Serdyukov and Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin were dispatched to Bish-
kek. Shortly after, Moscow announced that it would be opening a second base in
Kyrgyzstan in the southern Osh district, to be used by CSTO Rapid Reaction
forces. Though Kyrgyz officials commented that the new base was needed in the
fight against growing extremist activity in the Ferghana Valley, the timing of the
measure seems to suggest that the new base was, at least in part, Bishkeks con-
cession to Moscow for the Manas fiasco. Yet, even this face-saving announce-
ment quickly backfired, as Uzbekistan was not consulted on the proposal, and
Tashkent interpreted the base announcement as a possible hostile intervention
in its ongoing dispute with Kyrgyzstan over water rights.40
With the high-profile success and new revenues secured from the Manas bid-
ding war, Bakiyev mobilized his election campaign in July 2009 and handily won
re-election in a ballot deemed particularly problematic by OSCE observers.41
Tellingly, U.S. officials remained quiet, issuing a tepid statement a few days after
the poll, much to the dismay of the Kyrgyz political opposition. In fact, through-
out 2009 the political climate deteriorated, with journalists and political analysts
being beaten and harassed, and opposition politicians intimidated and arrested
on trumped-up charges. The political watchdog NGO Freedom House down-
graded Kyrgyzstan to Not Free from its previous designation as Partly Free.42
But reconciliation on the Kyrgyz issue was also on the agenda for President
Obama and Medvedevs warming relations. At their Moscow summit in early
July 2009, the two leaders cemented the reset of relations by announcing a new
bilateral accord allowing for the transit of American weapons and lethal cargo
through Russian territory and airspace. Following the reset and the expansion of
the Northern Distribution Network, Russia appeared to have abandoned its
attempts to overtly block U.S. access to Manas.
hours the security services and police folded, prompting Bakiyev to flee to his
home city of Osh. As he tried to regroup, a group of opposition figures declared
themselves the interim government. A few days later, following consultations
with the presidents of the United States, Russia, and Kazakhstan, Bakiyev left
Kyrgyzstan for exile in Belarus, hosted by President Alexander Lukashenko.
Much has been made of Russias active involvement in the toppling of Baki-
yev, with several Russian actors appearing eager to take credit, just as Western
NGOs had done following the collapse of Akayevs regime in March 2005.43
Moscows actions have been viewed as an incensed and direct response to the
Bakiyev regimes double-cross on the promised Manas closure in spring 2009.
However, as we have noted above, bilateral U.S.-Russian relations actually had
improved in the summer of 2009, while the two presidents had reached an un-
derstanding on the operations of Manas. Over the course of summer 2009, news
stories in the Russian media about Kyrgyzstan remained neutral in tone, down-
playing the significance of the Manas saga and highlighting the more coopera-
tive tone of the reset. A closer look also reveals a critical temporal gap between
Bakiyevs Manas gambit in spring 2009 and Moscows use of its soft-power
mechanism against the Kyrgyz president, which began in earnest in late 2009.
Various explanations have been advanced to explain this timing gap. Some
credit Moscow for taking its time to intensify its contacts with the Kyrgyz oppo-
sition in the fall of 2009 in anticipation of later instability. Another possibility is
that the Russian military and the Kremlin became increasingly concerned with
growing military-to-military cooperation between Kyrgyz security services and
CENTCOM, which went well beyond what was needed at Manas. In November
2009, Maksim requested that the United States fund the construction of an in-
ternational counterterrorism center in the remote southern Kyrgyz province of
Batken;44 just a month earlier, a U.S.-funded special forces training center in
Tokmok became operational.45 Still others claim that it was the visit of a
high-level Kyrgyz delegation to China in November 2009 that finally prompted
the Kremlin to concentrate its soft power against Bakiyev.
A less visible, but even more effective lever was Russias decision to intro-
duce a new export duty of 100 percent on fuel exports to Kyrgyzstan on April
1, 2010. Officially, the action to impose a $193.50/ton tax had been scheduled
to take place as part of the strengthening of the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan
Customs Union, but Moscow easily could have deferred the action or granted
an exemption. The more convincing explanation, as advanced by Bazarbai
Mambetov, head of the Kyrgyz Oil Traders Association, was that the Kremlin
wanted to end a scheme through which massive quantities of Russian jet fuel
for Manas were being falsely certified as for civilian use, thereby depriving Rus-
sian coffers of hundreds of millions of dollars in excise taxes.48 The punitive tax
immediately spiked inflation throughout Kyrgyzstan, especially on the costs of
energy and transported goods. The announcement of impending price in-
creases also was a major grievance that helped mobilize the anti-Bakiyev dem-
onstrations on April 6 in Naryn and Talas, which soon snowballed into a
broader anti-regime revolt.
Almost immediately, Kyrgyz attention turned to the fuel contracts that were
servicing the base and the role played by the mysterious Mina Corp. In June 2010,
the Pentagon rebid the tender for the Manas fuel contract (though this would be
won again by Mina), while high-level U.S. envoys such as Assistant Secretary of
State Robert Blake and National Security Council senior director for Russian and
Eurasian affairs Michael McFaul made several trips to Bishkek in an effort to
repair relations and the United States image. In July 2010, the United States
pledged $45 million to Kyrgyzstan at an international donors conference, in-
cluding paying for the cost of a new constitutional referendum and parliamentary
elections in October 2010. U.S. officials now adopted the public position of insist-
ing that Washington wanted to develop multiple contacts with the Central Asian
country and not focus exclusively on Manas. But the trials and tribulations of the
last few years seem to have severely damaged U.S. standing in Kyrgyzstan. Accord-
ing to the latest Gallup Survey, only 30 percent of Kyrgyz held a positive view of
the United States, though Russias numbers were even lower, at 23 percent.51
June 2010 in southern Kyrgyzstan at a level of ferocity not seen since late-Soviet
times.53 Interethnic violence had first broken out in May between factions loyal
to Bakiyev and Uzbek groups backing the interim government. After the June 9
clashes in the markets of Osh and Jalalabad, members of local communities im-
mediately mobilized into armed gangs along ethnic lines. Uzbek neighborhoods
were raided and torched by Kyrgyz gangs, while Uzbek homes and businesses in
mixed neighborhoods were also targeted. Law enforcement ceased to function,
and, according to some reports, some Kyrgyz security officials actually aided the
gang violence against Uzbek groups. There were also reports of widespread
sexual violence, as well as broad discrimination against Uzbeks in the adminis-
tration of relief supplies and medical attention to the injured.
On June 12 the interim government declared a state of emergency and
appealed to Russia to intervene militarily in the south to restore order, a request
that was denied by Moscow. One day later, authorities in Bishkek started calling
up reservists to send to the south, though these recruits general lack of training
and ethnic Kyrgyz background further signaled that the interim government
lacked both the capacity and credibility to adequately restore order. The Interna-
tional Commission investigation estimates that around 470 people were killed,
most of them Uzbeks, and 1,900 injured, while up to 400,000 residents, again
mostly Uzbeks, were displaced from their homes, with over 100,000 fleeing to
neighboring Uzbekistan.54 By the end of June a tense calm had returned to the
south, but the visible signs of the conflicts remained, with entire neighborhoods
abandoned and the two ethnic communities now effectively separated.
As with the last outbreak of Uzbek-Kyrgyz violence, the so-called Osh riots
of 1990, the cause of the violence seems to have been the lack of central au-
thority in the south. Bakiyevs main base of support was in the south; after his
collapse, the interim government in Bishkek had a tenuous hold on state institu-
tions there, especially the police and security services. Following the change in
government in Bishkek, Otunbayevas interim government disbanded the Baki-
yev era parliament, and the governance of the south reverted to the local mayors,
governors, and criminal networks, encouraging Uzbek factions to oppose Baki-
yev supporters in clashes that took ethnic dimensions.55 Supporters of the Otun-
bayeva government counter that the violence was clearly premeditated and
triggered by pro-Bakiyev factions. Vice-Prime Minister Azambek Atambayev ac-
cused Maksim Bakiyev of paying out $10 million to various gangs to instigate the
riots. But whatever havoc the Bakiyevs planned and spread through their allies
and cronies, the ferocity of the violence and the incapacity of state structures to
adequately protect minority communitiesas well as the numerous reports
that Kyrgyz security services actively partook in the violenceexposed the
weakness of the new government in Bishkek and the precarious state of political
order in the impoverished Central Asian state.
132 Great Games, Local Rules
Central Asia continues to face severe governance and corruption problems. Do-
mestically, patronage politics and informal networks channel unofficial eco-
nomic activity, while the use of state resources for personal profit by elites
remains a local rule throughout the region. Corruption is so pervasive within
Central Asian state institutions that some have referred to it as a sanctioned and
prevalent informal tool of administrative control, allowing rulers to blackmail
and effectively sanction subordinates who fall out of line.1 Moreover, the types
of external revenues that have flowed from the international economy and com-
munity into the Central Asian countriessecurity assistance, international aid,
rents from the sale of natural resourcesare also among the types of revenues
most susceptible to graft, misappropriation, and corruption on the part of ruling
regimes.2
The magnitude of the problem warrants some quick comparisons. Over the
last decade, international anti-corruption watchdogs, such as Transparency In-
ternational and Global Integrity, have consistently ranked the Central Asian
countries at the bottom of their global indices. Figure 8.1 presents a time-series
of the World Banks indicators on control of corruption, a bundle of available
corruption surveys. The Central Asian states rank in the bottom 10 percentile in
the world, with the exception of Kazakhstan, which, in recent years, has improved
modestly to rank in the bottom 20 percentile.
Figure 8.2 shows how unfavorably Central Asia compares even to the Middle
Eastern states that experienced the so-called Arab Spring. Even though public
discontent about corruption and accountability were important drivers of the
2010 anti-government protests in Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan, these countries
still rank considerably higher than their Central Asian counterparts, with only
Libya and Syria recently dipping below the 20-percentile mark. Interestingly,
Djibouti, which hosts the largest U.S. military base in Africa, scores considerably
better than its Central Asianbase hosting counterpart, Kyrgyzstan.
134
The P r i c e o f A c c e s s : C ont rac t s and C or r upti on 135
100
90
80
70
Percentile Rank
60 Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
50
Tajikistan
40
Turkmenistan
30 Uzbekistan
20
10
0
2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
100
90
80
Bahrain
70 Djibouti
Percentile Rank
60 Egypt
50 Iran
40 Jordan
30 Libya
Syria
20
Tunisia
10
0
2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
As with our study of democratization and human rights, this chapter does not
(and cannot) argue that U.S.-Russia-China competition and engagement have
been primarily responsible for causing Central Asias acute governance prob-
lems. However, in their pursuit of economic and security engagement with the
Central Asian states, external powers have had to bargain with and curry favor
with local elites in order to obtain and maintain access to the host country. This
chapter explores some of the specific arrangements that have structured and me-
diated these interactions, as well as how they have fed local graft and rent-seek-
ing; in both economic and security issues, local elites have actively evoked a
136 Great Games, Local Rules
routinely have used the potential interest of energy companies from rival coun-
tries as a tactic to augment their bargaining leverage and to demand private pay-
offs. The political context of these negotiations has also changed. In the 1990s,
Western companies were welcomed by the Caspian energy producers as the
bearers of desperately needed foreign investment and technical expertise, but
over the 2000s, the return of a resurgent Russia and the entry of China into the
Central Asian energy market created a competitive environment that has
empowered more aggressive negotiating behavior by Central Asian govern-
ments vis--vis Western companies.3
International maneuverings to secure oil concessions in Kazakhstan during
the last decade provide several instructive examples. In 2003, the Western mem-
bers of the Kashagan consortium exercised their right of first refusal to block the
Chinese companies CNOOC and Sinopec from buying BG Groups 17 percent
stake in the consortium. The announcement so incensed President Nazarbayev,
who had personally supported the deal and viewed Chinese entry as an impor-
tant geopolitical hedge, that within hours he retaliated by withdrawing the con-
sortiums pre-production exemption from paying Kazakhstans value added tax.4
CNPCs 2005 purchase of the Canadian company PetroKazakhstan, also tar-
geted by Russias Lukoil, was rife with behind-the-scenes interference by Russia
and China in Kazakh domestic politics.5 And, according to a leaked U.S. Em-
bassy cable, in a 2010 meeting with the U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan, an exec-
utive of KazMunaiGas described Chinese and Russian companies as circling the
countrys major concessions like vultures, hoping to pick up whatever pieces
might be left by Western partners if these deals imploded.6 Local elites skillfully
both leveraged and invoked these perceptions of external competition.
and structure their external transactions. For example, the Tajikistan Aluminum
Company (TALCO), Tajikistans largest enterprise with reported ties to the ruling
family, has used a web of offshore registries to conduct and hide its dealings;9 in
one set of court proceedings bought forth in the controlling legal domain of the
British Virgin Islands, TALCO alleges that a former manger conspired with the
Russian Rusal, the worlds largest aluminum company, to divert over $500 million
in profits between 1996 and 2004, stashing them in offshore bank accounts.10
Though data on the geographic origin of regional foreign direct investment
(FDI) is sparse and unreliable, some documented trends in Kazakhstan suggest
that offshore companies and financial intermediaries are becoming routine con-
duits for external investment. According to Kazakhstans National Bank, in 2010
total FDI from the British Virgin Islands (BVI) to Kazakhstan had reached $712.5
million, a total that actually surpassed Chinas official FDI in 2009 ($708.7 mil-
lion).11 In 2008, the total value of inflows from entities registered in the Cayman
Islands ($608.5 million) approached the $692.5 million of official Chinese FDI.
The Caymans and BVI are themselves among the leading sources of FDI to China
and destinations of Chinese FDI abroad, suggesting that a good proportion of
these offshore flows to Central Asia may actually originate in China.12
These offshore vehicles also have allowed external patrons to structure deals in
which local elites have been granted private benefits, while maintaining plausible
deniability about their own role in encouraging graft and corruption. Though, as
we shall see, there have been some instances of external actors making overt bribes
or direct payments to Central Asian officials, most of the personal profiteering has
been concealed within legitimate corporate entities and business transactions,
such as financial holding companies, intermediary trading companies, and con-
tractors with offshore registration. As such, within the broad parameters of con-
ducting legitimate international business transactions, these offshore tools have
allowed ruling elites the means to divert or siphon off state revenues for their own
private use. For example, an investigation of the structure of Turkmenistan-Russia
fuel deals by the NGO Global Witness found that much of the graft and kickbacks
was channeled through Itera, an intermediary trading company that for many
years exclusively handled Turkmenistans gas exports to Ukraine.13
president in 2006 seemed particularly ill-timed, coming just a month after the
Bush administration announced a high-profile new National Strategy to Inter-
nationalize Efforts Against Kleptocracy.23 In 2007, the U.S., Kazakh, and Swiss
governments agreed to use the $84 million case-related funds in the discovered
Swiss bank accounts for the benefit of underprivileged Kazakh children; the
World Bank sanctioned the deal, though Astana never admitted that these were
the personal accounts of the Kazakh president.24
The case itself took a number of curious twists and turns that revealed a com-
plicated web of U.S. private and state interests. Soon after his indictment, Giffens
lawyers mounted a novel public authority defense, claiming that his actions
had been authorized and encouraged by a number of U.S. government agencies,
including the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, the
State Department, and the White House, all of which were eager to obtain infor-
mation about the Central Asian country.25 The defense bogged down court pro-
ceedings for years, as lawyers and government attorneys argued over Giffens
right to access classified documents.26
To the surprise of many observers, the defense worked. In August 2010, Giffen
pleaded guilty to one misdemeanor of failing to disclose on a 1996 tax return that
he was a signatory to a Swiss account, and his lawyer, on behalf of Mercator, pled
guilty to one count of an FCPA violation for gifting speedboats worth $16,000
to a senior official.27 In a remarkable opinion, presiding Judge William Pauley
accepted Giffens claims to be an indispensable player advancing U.S. geopolitical
interests. Pauley thanked Giffen for his service to the United States and described
him as a conduit for secret communications to the Soviet Union and its leader-
ship during the Cold War, who later became a trusted adviser to Kazakhstans
president. 28 Giffen was sentenced to time already served (one night in jail).
The judges comments were striking, not only for actually allowing the na-
tional interest defense, for which there is no actual exemption in the FCPA stat-
ute, but also for his seeming conflation of the Soviet era, when Giffen facilitated
U.S.-Soviet business deals, and the 1990s, when the alleged crimes actually took
place. Thus, the decade-long saga drew to a close, with the Justice Department
closing the case with a whimper and other branches of the U.S. government
breathing a collective sigh of relief that the issue would cease to be raised at
future U.S.-Kazakh bilateral meetings.
men in Kazakhstan and has become one of the richest men in the world, control-
ling several energy and resources companies and managing Kazakhstans national
sovereign wealth fund, which controls up to 90 percent of the countrys prized
companies.
Charges of major acts of bribery and corruption in a number of energy deals
were leveled against Kulibayev by Mukhtar Ablyazov, the politically estranged
oligarch and former chairman of BTA, Kazakhstans largest bank, which was
forcibly nationalized in 2009. The most dramatic of these, published in February
2010 in a series of open letters in Kazakh opposition and independent newspa-
pers, alleged that Kulibayev made a personal profit of $166 million from CNPCs
2003 acquisition of the Kazakh governments 25 percent stake in Aktobe Mun-
aiGaz. The oil company was Kazakhstans fourth-largest producer and since
1997 had been 60 percent owned by CNPC, the first big deal made in the coun-
try by a Chinese energy company.
Investigative reports into the deal detail its elaborate structure.29 On May 28,
2003, Kazakh officials offered their 25 percent stake for the unit at $300 million,
but were unable to find any purchasers at the asking price. Just a day later, CNPC
bought the same stake for $150 million, a net company valuation of $600 mil-
lion, which seemed to be a fraction of the companys true worth. That very year,
CNPC-Aktobe MunaiGaz reported a profit of $240 million, while just two years
later, CNPC acquired the company PetroKazakhstan, which boasted only half of
the reserves of CNPC-Aktobe MunaiGaz, for over $4 billion.
Like the alleged Giffen deals, the transactions and the alleged personal pay-
ments were executed through a complex web of offshore companies and finan-
cial vehicles. In its purchase of Aktobe MunaiGaz, CNPC used a company titled
CNPC International Caspian Limited (CICL), which had been formed by one
of its subsidiaries in April 2003 and was registered in the British Virgin Islands.
CICLs start-up capital was just $100 and soon after its founding the company
sold a 49 percent stake (for $49) to Darley Investment Services, another BVI-
registered firm owned by Arvind Tiku, an Indian national and known business
partner of Kulibayev.30 Subsequently, CNPC loaned CICL the entire $150 mil-
lion required to purchase the 25 percent stake in Aktobe MunaiGaz. After the
sale, CNPC bought back 29 percent of Darleys stake for $25.9 million; over the
next two years, CNPC subsidiaries bought Darleys remaining 20 percent stake
in CICL for $140 million,31 netting Darley a total of $165.9 million from an
initial outlay of $49 after the companys founding.32
In response to the allegations, Kulibayev filed a libel lawsuit against the Kazakh
newspapers that had published Ablyazovs letter, while Kazakh officials seized all
the editions of five Kazakh newspapers. A Kazakh court also ordered the media to
stop publishing any information damaging to the dignity and honor of Kulibayev,
leading to an outcry among Kazakh journalists and media organizations.33
142 Great Games, Local Rules
investigation into the Pentagons fuel deals at Manas, observed, Real and per-
ceived corruption in the fuel contracts has now been linked to two revolutions
[in Kyrgyzstan] and seriously strained U.S.-Kyrgyz relations.39
Corporation also remained mysterious and opaque companies with unusual own-
ership structures and international ties. Notwithstanding the insistence of their
owners that the companies are not connected, Red Star and Mina share remark-
ably similar profiles. Both were registered offshore at the same address in Gibraltar
and both maintained official offices in a housing complex in London from 2004 to
2009 and shared offices in the Bishkek Hyatt.44 Neither company maintained a
web site or released details of its basic corporate structure, employees, share-
holders, or operations.45 The three founders of Mina are Douglas Edelman, a Cali-
fornia businessmen who had opened a hamburger restaurant in Bishkek in the
1990s, Erkin Bekbolotov, a Kyrgyz businessman, and retired U.S. Lieutenant
Colonel Chuck Squires. Intriguingly, Squires served as U.S. Defense Attach to
Bishkek in the late 1990s and 2000s, though he had left his post before 9/11.
Over the course of the U.S. militarys use of Manas, the DOD has paid Mina and
Red Star more than $1.5 billion in fuel contracts, most of them awarded as sole-
source tenders (see Table 8.1). After a one-year initial contract in 2003, bid openly
and competitively, Red Star exercised two consecutive extension options and then,
beginning in July 2006, was awarded five consecutive extensions with no competi-
tive bidding. Red Star then shifted its application as an incumbent to Mina, which
was awarded a one-year contract to deliver 156 million gallons of TS-1 that was
extended through June 2009. In 2009, DLA invoked reasons of national security to
avoid full and open competition procedures, awarding Mina yet another sole-
source one-year contract, with two additional options for one-year extensions.46
According to a representative of IOTC, a competitor to Red Star and Mina
that bid for these contracts, in 2007 Mina beat out IOTCs bid, which was 3 per-
cent lower, while DOD officials refused to make pricing information of the suc-
cessful bid available, even after multiple Freedom of Information Act requests.47
The favoritism and secrecy with which DLA treated Mina in Kyrgyzstan was
replicated with Red Star in Afghanistan, where the company was allowed to con-
struct and exclusively operate a pipeline that directly transported jet fuel to the
Bagram airbase, effectively locking in its role as monopoly supplier to the base.48
Mina officials have vigorously denied accusations that the fuel company and its
network of suppliers maintained ties to the Bakiyev family. The fuel deals were the
subject of an investigation by the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on
Security and Foreign Relations, Committee of Oversight, chaired by Representa-
tive John Tierney.49 Though the investigations final report of December 2010 dis-
covered no direct evidence of corruption or bribery involving Mina Corp and the
Bakiyevs, it found that the DOD had failed to properly oversee the political, dip-
lomatic, and geopolitical collateral consequences of its contracting arrangements,
and had turned a blind eye [along with the State Department] to glaring red flags
in the fuel contracts.50 The report cautions that its focus was narrow; House inves-
tigators did not conduct a forensic audit of the accounting documents that were
The P r i c e o f A c c e s s : C ont rac t s and C or r upti on 145
Total $1,857,226,943
sent to them by Mina, nor did they interview the Kyrgyz personnel who worked
for the companys main subcontractors.51 The report also notes that Minas princi-
pals were generally uncooperative with the investigation, failed to show up for
scheduled interviews, stated that they would invoke Fifth Amendment privileges
if compelled to testify, and sought immunity for any congressional testimony.52
146 Great Games, Local Rules
What the report did find was extensive behind-the-scenes collusion among
Mina, Red Star, and Russian officials to fabricate Russian export certificates.
Under Russian law, the export of fuel for external military use is prohibited and
would have required a special exemption and export license. When procuring
Russian fuel, subcontractors for Mina and Red Star had to certify that it was for
domestic civilian use, providing a supporting letter from the Kyrgyz Civil Avia-
tion Authority. In turn, Russian refineries would transmit this information to the
Russian Exporting Agency, which granted final approval. Minas principals argue
that, given the quantities of fuel involved, Russian authorities and Gazprom
senior officials must have known about the scheme, while DOD officials were
informed about the practice.53 Thus, even while the competitive bidding war
between Moscow and Washington over the fate of Manas heated up in early
2009, behind-the-scenes collusion between American and Russian traders,
authorities, and local officials kept ample fuel supplies flowing to the base.54
Fuel sourced from GazpromOil Aero refinery in Omsk and Mega Oil makes $70 to
other locations in Russia. $110 per ton of fuel
$670 + $110 Price for fuel from GazpromOil plus TZK Manas makes $140
Mega Oil transport from Russia to Kyrgyzstan to $180 per ton of fuel
$850 to $890 Price for fuel purchase from Mega Oil
TZK Manas
$1030
Price for fuel purchase from TZK Manas
Mina Corp.
$1263
U.S. Government Price U.S. Defense Logistics Agency pays for fuel to Mina Corp.
Figure 8.3 The Manas Fuel Chain, Late 2010 Source: Authors calculations based on
information from Manas Transit Center and Centralasia.ru, Korruptsionnye skhemy pri postavkakh
aviatopliva na aviabazu Manas v Kirgizii, February 8, 2011
148 Great Games, Local Rules
an actual license to transport fuel across the border until late September 2010, allow-
ing Mega a number of months to operate as the exclusive trading company.64
With the political controversy surrounding Mina, the future of the Kyrgyz
fuel contracts in 2011 remained uncertain. U.S. officials publicly discuss the pos-
itive impact that the new Kyrgyz-Russian joint venture is likely to have on the
Kyrgyz economy, and the DLA placed its first order with the Kyrgyz-Russian
joint venture in September 2011. However, it remains to be seen whether this
fuel supply arrangement will truly increase revenues to the general Kyrgyz
budget more than previous arrangements.
For two decades, international actors have viewed Central Asia as a distinct and
coherent region. External actors such as multilateral institutions, donors, and
NGOs have sought to promote greater regional integration and have poured
money into projects for common resource management, infrastructure upgrades,
and economic cooperation. These countless initiatives have yielded few lasting
successes, yet the international community remains fixated on developing these
regional ties.
Similarly, each of the great powers that we have studied has advanced its own
strategy, instruments, and institutions in support of Central Asian regionalism.
China has pushed for a greater role for the SCO, while Russia has promoted the
Moscow-led CSTO and EurAsECCustoms Union as mechanisms for integra-
tion. U.S. policymakers have promoted north-south linkages between the post-
Soviet states and Afghanistan and Pakistan and have argued that developing the
NDN could revive the trade routes of the ancient Silk Road. Such forays into
strategic regionalism certainly have strengthened bilateral ties between Mos-
cow, Beijing, Washington, and the Central Asian states, but they have not deep-
ened intraregional integration, nor have they addressed the areas most pressing
problems, such as the management of common resources.1
In fact, two decades after independence, Central Asia arguably displays few
tangible indicators of actual regional coherence. In the economic sphere, trade
between the Central Asian states, on the one hand, and Russia and China has
dramatically increased over the past decade, but these growing volumes have not
spurred similar increases within the region; a partial exception was the growth in
Kazakh-Kyrgyz trade and investment, but that was halted, and then reversed, in
2010 by the closure of the border following the collapse of the Bakiyev govern-
ment and Astanas accession into the Customs Union with Russia. The mobility
of people within the region is also severely restricted, as the vast majority of
labor migrants go to Russia in search of employment. Central Asian public
agencies still refuse to share information with each other, let alone coordinate
149
150 Great Games, Local Rules
(UNODC), and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia
and the Pacific (UNESCAP). Notwithstanding the best efforts of these organi-
zations and the individual efforts of China, the United States, and Russia, effec-
tive regional cooperation, integration, or even problem-solving mechanisms
remain weak. This has led scholars to label such regional initiatives as virtual
regionalism.2
However, when judged from the perspective of Central Asias ruling elites,
these virtual agreements play critical political functions. Most important, they
provide opportunities for Central Asian elites to acknowledge each others au-
thority, legitimacy, and territorial integrity, also known as juridical sovereignty.3
Not dissimilar to arguments made about post-colonial African leaders propen-
sity to enter symbolic regional agreements to compensate for their internal
weakness, the Central Asian rulers have used regional forums to reinforce exter-
nal support for the political status quo.4 A steady diet of regional summits and
cooperative initiatives also allow these leaders to regularly emphasize their
foreign policy profiles and agendas to a domestic audience and captive media.
Central Asias rulers themselves are highly selective about how their countries
fit into the broader region. For example, officials from Kazakhstan frequently
complain about being grouped with its relatively weaker and poorer neighbors,
while Uzbekistan consistently expresses a preference for addressing regional
problems through bilateral means, rather than multilateral or regional organiza-
tions. Turkmenistans long-standing policy of neutrality allows Ashgabat to
altogether avoid making formal commitments to outside powers, regional
forums, or international organizations. Even relatively minor associations can
carry important symbolic and cultural weight. For example, in 2002 the Kazakh-
stan Football Association left the Asian Football Confederation to join the more
prestigious Union of European Football Associations (UEFA). But other times,
especially when the topic is democratic standards, human rights practices, or
issues of transparency, Central Asian elites and diplomats quite willingly frame
their performance within an overall Central Asian regional standard, which on
these issues is consistently lower or more culturally specific than its Western
counterparts.
Central Asian elites also remain acutely aware of regional political develop-
ments and their potential demonstration effects. As we have seen with the
region-wide reaction against the Color Revolutions or the compromising of
human rights for the sake of counterterrorism, elites are extremely sensitive that
a development in a neighboring state may serve as an example that might under-
mine their own authority. Most recently, all of the Central Asian governments
(and Russia) expressed their concerns about the Kyrgyz interim governments
decision in 2010 to construct a parliamentary democracy, parroting Moscows
line that such efforts at political experimentation might destabilize the region.5
152 Great Games, Local Rules
Moreover, nearly every Russian, Chinese, and U.S.-led attempt to upgrade the
regions infrastructuresuch as constructing new transmission lines or investing
in a damis viewed as a ploy by the other great powers to strategically reorient
the region in a favorable fashion.12 For example, Moscow looks at U.S. proposals to
connect the Central Asian electricity transmission lines to Afghanistan and South
Asia with deep suspicion and was doubtful that the U.S. militarys construction of
a $37 million bridge in 2007 over the Panj river to link Tajikistan and Afghanistan
was conducted for the officially given reason of stimulating trade between the
countries.13 Political analysts in all three countries perceive foreign investment in
Kyrgyz and Tajik dam construction and hydropower projects as gambits to secure
control of regional water sources. In this highly charged political environment,
even seemingly technical issues carry strong geopolitical overtones. For example,
Chinese railways, similar to European ones, run on wider gauges than their Rus-
sian counterparts. As a result, Beijings plans to lay new Central Asian tracks for
high-speed rail connections using the Chinese standard are perceived by some
Russian observers as evidence of mounting Chinese colonization.14
sources.16 In practice, many of the areas proposed by the great powers to improve
cooperation are sectors monopolized by the Central Asian elites. For example,
SCO consultations to improve regional integration on issues such as electricity,
transportation, and telecommunications inevitably run into the fact that these
sectors are controlled by governing elites, or their families, who have no interest
in liberalizing them or otherwise ceding control over their revenue streams.
Borders as Tollbooths
A second barrier to regional economic cooperation is that Central Asian author-
ities, both ruling elites and security services, continue to profit handsomely from
borders and border crossings.
30
25
Documents
20 13 to import
Documents
13
12 10
15 9
Documents
9 9
10 7 to export
11 13
5 10 10 10
7 7 7
0
2006 2011 2006 2011 2006 2011 2006 2011
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan
Figure 9.1 Number of Documents Required for Import/Export, 2006 & 2011
Source: Doing Business Project Data, World Bank Group
200
180
160
Time to
140
76 104 import
120 83 83
67 92
Days
100 75 72
80
60 Time to
89 export
40 81 82 82 80 71
64 63
20
0
2006 2011 2006 2011 2006 2011 2006 2011
Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan
According to the World Bank, the Central Asian states continue to erect the
most cumbersome barriers to trade, compared to almost anywhere in the world.
As available data for the four Central Asian countries suggest (and with the in-
clusion of Turkmenistan, these findings would likely be strengthened), officially
clearing borders, whether importing or exporting, can take over 100 days and
requires a cumbersome stack of documentation (see Figures 9.1 and 9.2). Em-
pirically, none of the initiatives promoted by the great powers over the last
decade, be it the SCOs economic platform or the NDN, has notably improved
the time required for cross-border transactions. For example, during this time
Kyrgyzstan impressively halved its required number of formal documents, but
this did not alter average import/export times, which suggests that informal bar-
riers, not formal requirements, remain the core problem. Some modest gains
were demonstrated by Uzbekistan, where the average time required for import-
ing and exporting decreased by slightly over 10 percent from 2006 to 2011.
However, Uzbekistans baseline was extremely high, and within a global context,
as Figure 9.3 shows, Central Asia as a region performs significantly worse than
other developing areas, or even the other post-Communist states.
The World Bank data are supported by a number of studies that have tried to
measure border corruption and indirect fees in Central Asian regional transport.
A 2006 survey by the Asian Development Bank found that informal payments
and bribes added $1,2001,800 to the total cost of a truck transiting from Cen-
tral Asia to Moscow, along with eight additional days of transit time, while rail
transit could even double ideal world shipping costs and add up to 15 days in
180
160
140
120 85 Time to
79
100 import
Days
80 Time to
export
60
40 79 29 35
74 27 24
19 20
20
27 22 18 28 20
18
0
2006 2011 2006 2011 2006 2011 2006 2011
Central Asia Eastern Europe Latin Middle East
America and North
and the Africa
Carribean
Figure 9.3 Comparative Time Required for Import/Export, 2006 & 2011
Source: Doing Business Project Data, World Bank Group
156 Great Games, Local Rules
virtual as it is informal. In both the growing shuttle trade and drug trade, we
see activity by networks of state and non-state actors which act autonomously
or, in the case of some border guards, even defy official dictates to facilitate this
informal economic exchange.
an unofficial crossing used by 40,000 people every day, most of them visiting
the large market on the Kyrgyz side.29 At other border spots, such as the Bur-
gandiya crossing, traders and laborers routinely cross close to official check-
points and in full view of the guards.30 And reports from the 2,350 kilometer
Uzbek-Kazakh border suggest that smuggling is booming as traders and gangs
routinely set up new makeshift bridges and crossings along the frontier, while
Uzbek guards are paid to look away.31 In all of these cases, Uzbek border guards
have failed to implement the strict border policy dictated from above.
percent of total flows.36 Along these lines, a leaked U.S. Embassy cable from
Dushanbe in 2007 recounts how Tajik President Rahmon fired a Tajik senior
anti-narcotics officer for intercepting a car packed with 60 kilos of heroin that
was driven by Tajik state security services, including a distant relative of the
president.37
The Central Asian region follows a quite different pattern: rulers have proven
willing to support regional security initiatives that guard their regimes from
transnational threats and political opposition, but have proven reluctant to take
greater steps to institutionalize the movement of goods, capital, and people that
might undermine their control over resources and private revenue streams.
Though the international community continues to promote regional coopera-
tion in Central Asia, the preservation of national borders, as it turns out, is a key
part of the regions local rules.
| 10 |
The New Regional Contests of a
Multipolar World
After a period of calm and seclusion during the 1990s, Central Asia became
the site of a new contest that actively engaged three great powers, empow-
ered local governments to use this geopolitical environment for their domes-
tic benefit, and gave rise to novel institutions, practices, and norms in
international politics. In this final chapter, I begin by evaluating the record
of the Big Three in terms of their regional goals. Next, I examine the trials
and tribulations of European states and India in dealing with the region and
find similar patterns of contentious base politics, as well as tensions
between pursuing security cooperation and promoting a values agenda.
Finally, I consider some of the broader lessons that Central Asia holds for
the emergence of other regional orders, focusing on the nature of U.S. power,
the rise of China, and new regional efforts to counterbalance these external
suitors.
162
The Ne w R eg i onal C onte st s o f a Mul ti polar World 163
As U.S. foreign aid budgets increasingly get trimmed, money for activities
such as civil society promotion, anti-corruption initiatives, and media freedom
is also likely to dry up, especially as already limited funds are diverted to more
high-priority areas, such as the Arab Spring countries. Nor does Washingtons
influence over institutions like the IMF and World Bank matter as much in an
environment where Russia, China, and other country donors can more readily
provide aid-like funds without the same conditional demands. Perhaps the most
important mechanisms of U.S. soft power are educational programs and ex-
changes, but these, too, now find competition from other suitors such as China,
Russia, India, and Europe. In the wake of the impending U.S. drawdown from
Afghanistan, it is doubtful that this steady decline in overall U.S. regional influ-
ence will be reversed.
supplanted Moscow as the areas largest trading partner, constructed two new
major energy pipelines that bypassed Russian territory, and was upgrading the
areas infrastructure in a bid to reorient the region to interface with Xinjiang.
The fact that Chinese officials do not openly talk of wanting to exert influence
in Central Asia is consistent with Beijings low-key approach, but it should not
distract us from recognizing its transformative regional role.
Throughout this period, Beijing also proved the most geopolitically adept of
the three powers, understanding early on the importance of pivoting along both
axes of the strategic triangle. When the United States initially sought to partner
with Russia in the War on Terror, ushering in a possible grand bargain about
Central Asia, Chinese policymakers deftly forged ahead with the SCO agenda to
draw Russia back into its regional security institution, even while it offered to
support Washington in exchange for recognizing its own campaign in Xinjiang
as part of this global effort; when U.S.-Russian relations deteriorated in 2003
2005, Beijing was well positioned to support Russian attempts to counter U.S.
influence, without ever actually making any sacrifices in doing so. Chinas public
acknowledgement that the region is Russias privileged sphere and its commit-
ments to maintaining a strategic partnership helped to keep Russian sights
firmly fixed on the West. Not only has China faced few checks on its expansion
of influence, but, as in the case of its pipeline construction, many of these pro-
jects were supported by Washington as part of its efforts to diversify Central
Asias economic partnerships.
At the same time, Chinese officials have been loath to grant Washington any
major support for Afghanistan, meaning that as the countrys largest foreign in-
vestor, China effectively continues to free-ride on the U.S. security umbrella.
Beijing may push for a more elevated role for the SCO as the United States draws
down in Afghanistan, but it is most likely to call for people-to-people training,
reconstruction, and economic projects, without committing any kind of troop
presence. Looking further ahead, with its economic and energy interests now
secure, China may well be willing to maintain a low profile and free-ride on an
expanded Russian regional security presence, just as it has done with the United
States.
To be sure, China faces its own future challenges. For one, Russian policy-
makers are increasingly anxious about how to check and counter Chinas rise;
Moscow is particularly hesitant to support any broad SCO economic initiatives,
while the Central Asian states are also nervous that their economies will be
overrun by Chinese plans for more trade, greater investment, and even the pos-
sible internationalization of the renminbi. If it fails to sufficiently demonstrate
that it is acting for the broader good, and not just as a plunderer of the regions
natural resources and energy, China also potentially faces the prospect of a
mounting social backlash from disgruntled Central Asian publics or populist
The Ne w R eg i onal C onte st s o f a Mul ti polar World 167
politicians, as it has in parts of Africa. Finally, it is still unclear what will happen
if countries that have made commitments to China renege on the terms of their
deals or fail to pay off their debts. How China manages its growing influence in
Central Asia will be a good indicator of how Beijing views its changing role in
world politics and global governance.
its foreign ministry views Central Asia as an area of special interest and Ger-
man leadership.3 At the beginning of the Afghanistan campaign, Germany
established an air base at Termez in southern Uzbekistan, near the Afghan bor-
der, making it the first overseas German military base since World War II. The
facility hosts about 300 German troops, five Stallion CH-53 helicopters, and
nine C-130 transport planes. Berlin also has maintained somewhat of a privi-
leged status among Uzbekistans Western security partners; in the wake of
Andijan and the U.S. eviction from K2, Germany was the only NATO country
allowed to retain its basing rights.
But, like their U.S. counterparts, German officials have had to provide impor-
tant economic and political concessions to Uzbek authorities to maintain access
to Termez. According to a German parliamentary report that was released in
2011 (but was soon reclassified at the request of the Uzbek government), Berlin
has paid the government of Uzbekistan annually between 12.4 million euros (in
2005) and 15.2 million euros (in 2008) to lease the base.4 The German govern-
ment, according to a Spiegel report, also provides a number of additional indirect
payments by overpaying for construction projects, service contracts, and hotel
rooms in the city.5 In addition, Germany has trained Uzbek officers and has pro-
vided military hardware to Uzbek security services, while the German state de-
velopment agency GTZ remains one of the countrys most active external
donors, and German foundations are among the few foreign NGOs that
survived the sweeping purge of 20052007.6
Not coincidentally, Germany has been the most vociferous advocate of main-
taining Western engagement with Tashkent. Within the European Union, Berlin
led the campaign to repeal the sanctions regime that was imposed by Brussels in
the wake of Andijan. Even while the sanctions were in effect, Germany issued a
waiver to allow Zokirjon Almatov, the Uzbek Minister of Internal Affairs who
was involved in the planning of the Andijon crackdown, to receive medical treat-
ment in Hanover. German officials also successfully spearheaded the 2008
easing of the EUs travel ban and the 2009 overturn of its weapons sales ban.
It is unclear what practical benefits this political support has brought to Ger-
many. Though Berlin officials in public stress the importance of their security
cooperation, in private they have expressed mounting frustration with Tashkent.
According to a leaked U.S. cable, the German Ambassador to Uzbekistan in
2007 described the German-Uzbek counterterrorism relationship as stagnant,
with the Germans unable to independently assess the true Islamic or terrorist
threat in the country; the ambassador continued that Uzbeks welcomed Ger-
man equipment and money, including for Termez, but not German values such
as respect for human rights.7
Germany also headed the effort to formulate the EU strategy toward Central
Asia that was adopted during its EU presidency in 2007.8 The strategy brought
The Ne w R eg i onal C onte st s o f a Mul ti polar World 169
together a diverse set of goals; on the strategic side, the plan called for working
on energy production, counterterrorism and border management, and regional
cooperation, while the values side emphasized promoting rule of law initia-
tives and establishing regular human rights and civil society dialogues.9 Yet, the
strategy itself reads more like a checklist of wishes and does not attempt to
describe how to reconcile these objectives when they are in tension.
Maintaining momentum on the values questions has proven particularly
difficult for Brussels. European NGOs and Central Asian civil society leaders
have observed that by bracketing human rights meetings in a dedicated
forum, EU leaders do not have to stress the issue in their regular consulta-
tions with Central Asian leaders.10 But, as revealed in decisions over opening
energy dialogues with Turkmenistan or evaluating the sanctions regime in
Uzbekistan, Brusselss soft power remains weak in areas of the world that do
not aspire for membership and where EU conditionality mechanisms are not
in play.11 Perhaps what is most striking about EUCentral Asia relations is
how, over the decade, rather than promoting change in the targeted Central
Asian states, the EUs engagement with the region appears, instead, to have
magnified intra-EU tensions and exposed the limits of the EUs nascent for-
eign policy mechanisms. Most notably, the acrimonious intra-EU debates
about the Uzbekistan sanctions regime exposed lingering tensions among
Brussels policymakers on whether the EU should be a normative or strategic
actor.12
President Rafael Correa refused to renew the 10-year U.S. lease on the Manta
base, officially used by U.S. SOUTHCOM to conduct anti-drug trafficking oper-
ations. Recalling the Manas bidding war, U.S. officials this time appear to have
been outbid, as Correa reportedly offered a 30-year concession to run the air-
port and nearby port to Hutchison, a Hong-Kong based port operator in a $500
million deal, forcing the U.S. military to leave the facility in 2009.26 The case of
Bahrain shows great similarities to U.S. dilemmas in Uzbekistan, as U.S. officials,
concerned with maintaining a naval base for the Fifth Fleet, have tempered their
criticism of the regimes crackdown on anti-government protestors and human
rights abuses.27 And U.S.-Pakistani military relations have plummeted to an all-
time low following the assassination of Osama Bin Laden by U.S. Special forces
in Pakistan, reports that Pakistani intelligence services had aided insurgent at-
tacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan and an errant U.S. air strike on the Afghan
border on November 26, 2011 that resulted in the deaths of 24 Pakistani sol-
diers. In response, Islamabad halted the transit of NATO supplies, evicted the
United States from an air base used to launch Predator drone attacks, and has
been eager to play up its relations with China as a possible alternative to U.S.
security patronage. Throughout the world, as in Central Asia, the status of the
U.S. military presence and security partnership seems to be increasingly wielded
by host country governments to extract political and economic concessions
from Washington.
and Ghana.30 Similarly, as with the SCO, Chinas enthusiastic backing of the
BRICS group suggests that Beijing will continue to push much of its agenda
through new non-Western organizations, thereby also avoiding outright con-
frontation with the United States within existing global organizations.
In turn, Chinas entry as a global investor and aid donor is likely to undercut
Western donors and lending mechanisms. With alternative potential sources for
aid, assistance, and investment, the Western political leverage that derived from
controlling the purse strings of international financial institutions will continue
to be diminished. Though IMF and the World Bank will continue to be impor-
tant global actors, their monopoly over crisis financing and development lending
is over. As shown in Africa and Central Asia, countries in need of external fund-
ing and assistance have other options and will exercise them with greater
frequency.
how to shape and sequence the engagement agenda so that policymakers both
find areas of common interests and constructively push to amend certain organi-
zational practices that may be in clear conflict with international norms and
Western values (such as the SCOs consolidated blacklist of extremist organiza-
tions and individuals). Regional organizations and the values that they embody
are not staticboth ASEAN and the African Union have greatly evolved from
their origins, when they were criticized as clubs for dictators, into dynamic,
multifaceted organizations that promote regional deliberation, problem solving,
and broadly democratic values.42
Third, and finally, with so much attention paid to U.S. decline and diminished
resources, policymakers should not forget that the essence of multipolar politics,
for target states, is to pursue a variety of partnerships. The United States and the
West will always be attractive partners, if not always for the ideals that they rep-
resent, but, in more calculating terms, to prevent governments from becoming
locked into exclusive relationships with other regional patrons. Just as Uzbeki-
stan tacked back to the West after its initial post-Andijan rupture, so too will
other countries that face the prospect of being captured by a dominant regional
power such as Russia. The real question confronting U.S. policymakers is
whether they will, when approached by such countries, pare their demands and
compromise on their values agenda, as they have in the Central Asian cases, or
whether they will insist on pursuing engagement on a broad range of issues.
From this perspective, what Washington and Brussels say and do domestically
matters enormously for their ability to promote a diverse agenda of issues
abroad. In this search to craft policies toward and to influence distant regions,
how we act at home, now more than ever, reflects on both our global image and
our credibility to lead in this changing world.
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Appendix 1
Russia
Made it more difficult and costly to start and operate an NGO in Russia;
gave the authorities broad powers to audit and shut down NGOs.
179
Uzbekistan
180
2007 Law on the Guarantees of Activity of Nongovernmental
and Non-commercial Organizations
2009 Law on Introducing Changes and Additions to the Tax Code of the
Republic of Uzbekistan
Tax legislation tightened, making filing taxes more difficult and requiring
the recalculation of taxes for past years; caused the closing of about 20%
of NGOs.
Tajikistan
(continued)
181
2009 Law on State Registration of Legal Entities and Individual
Entrepreneurs
Required NGOs not registered under the legal form public associations
to re-register with local tax authorities.
Kazakhstan
Removed some tax exemptions that NGOs were previously able to claim,
making it more difficult for them to operate.
182
2006 Law on Introducing Amendments and Additions to Some Legisla-
tive Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning Mass Media
Kyrgyzstan
Turkmenistan
183
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Appendix 2
OSCE, SCO, and CIS Evaluations of Major Central Asian Elections, 20052008
SCO CIS OSCE
Kazakhstan carried out in compli- The state electoral bodies that organized elec- a number of significant shortcomings during
2005 Presidential ance with the Kazak tions in the Republic of Kazakhstan ensured the election campaign limited the possibility
constitution and the realization and protection of the electoral for a meaningful competition whereby all
relevant laws rights of citizens in the presidential elections of candidates could enjoy equal opportunities to
conducive to the Kazakhstan, International observers from the convey their views to the electorate
countrys further CIS concluded that Kazakhstans presidential Overall, despite some improvement in the ad-
development as well elections of 4 December 2005 were held in ministration of this election in the pre-election
as regional peace and accordance with the countrys legislation. We period, the election did not meet a number of
stability1 assess them as free, open, and legitimate.2 OSCE commitments and other international
185
2007 legitimate and free and in line with generally recognised democratic Despite some progress in the process during
Parliamentary open, and was in com- approaches to organising elections and with the the pre-election period and in certain aspects
pliance with election election legislation of the country of voting, the election did not meet a number
laws of the Republic of free and transparent and believe that they have of OSCE commitments, in particular with
Kazakhstan and interna- reflected the stable social and economic devel- regard to elements of the legal framework and
tional commitments opment of Kazakhstan, were the continuation of to the vote count and tabulation.6
some technical short- political reforms in the country and an important
comings revealed during factor for further democratisation of societys life
the election could not some shortcomings and violations were
significantly affect its exposed during the elections5
final results4
(continued)
SCO CIS OSCE
Kyrgyzstan complied with interna- legitimate, free and transparent while more competitive than previous
2005 tional standards the defects and mistakes committed dur- elections, fell short of OSCE commitments
Parliamentary conformed to the ing the preparations and arrangement of the and other international standards for dem-
republics constitution, elections have had no substantial effect on the ocratic elections in a number of important
laws, democratic norms expression of the free will by the voters areas. The conduct of the second round
and universal standards concern over illegal actions of some par- of elections demonstrated some technical
deepened democratic ticipants in the election campaign who had improvements over the first round, but
processes7 organized protests demanding a review of the significant shortcomings remained.9
voting results of the first round
approved the Kyrgyz authorities who, at this
turbulent period, demonstrated support,
186
2005 Presidential passed freely, open, proceeded in accordance with the law marked tangible progress by the Kyrgyz Re-
transparently and some individual violations in the election public towards meeting OSCE commitments,
legitimate10 campaign had taken place, but that they had as well as other international standards for dem-
not affected the free will of the voters and the ocratic elections. This was the case in particular
results of the voting during the pre-election period and the conduct
unhappy about the procedure of marking the of voting, although the quality of the election
voters11 day process deteriorated somewhat during the
counting of votes. Fundamental civil and po-
litical rights, such as freedom of expression and
freedom of assembly, were generally respected
throughout the election process.12
2007 recognized legitimacy of met the norms of the election legislation in failed to meet a number of OSCE commit-
Parliamentary the parliamentary elec- effect in the country, as well as commonly ments. This was despite respect for some
tion in Kyrgyzstan and accepted approaches to holding democratic commitments that underscore existing
its concurrence with the elections pluralism. If the progress evident during the
national legislation and free and transparent 2005 presidential election is to be under-
international standards flaws exposed in the course of monitoring of pinned, further efforts and political will are
absence of serious com- the election process were not of system nature necessary.15
plaints from representa- and did not affect the expression of will of the
tives of political parties voters14
and voters themselves
enabled ... observers to
praise the atmosphere of
187
Russia slight technical mis- elections were free, everybody had enough OSCE unable to monitor 2007 elections
2007 takes that did not affect opportunities to express his opinion because of delays and restrictions, especially
Parliamentary the election results were high level of organization of the elections and related to entry visas18
registered well-coordinated work17
legitimate, free, transpar-
ent and met Russian legal
requirements and interna-
tional commitments16
(continued)
SCO CIS OSCE
2008 Presidential calm, benevolent and free, open and transparent OSCE boycotted 2008 elections because
well-organised environ- the number of complaints on any violations They have imposed restrictions and
ment, which ensured during the elections is decreasing limitations which do not allow us to
free expression of the certain violations at different polling stations. deliver a professional job.21
voters will But these are isolated cases, which are of
legitimate, free, open technical nature and have no impact on Russian
and transparent, and citizens will expression and on the results of
basically conformed the voting. The elections in Russia were held
to requirements of the in compliance with legislation and the norms
national legislation of of democratic elections20
188
of the international law and includes all the were evident, particularly on election day.23
electoral institutions and procedures that are
required to hold democratic elections in the
republic22
(continued)
SCO CIS OSCE
2006 Presidential free, open and com- in line with the election law did not fully test democratic electoral
plied with Tajik laws election free, open and transparent practices as outlined in the 1990 OSCE
and its international irregularities observed were technical and Copenhagen Document, due to a lack of
obligations24 did not have a serious impact on the election genuine choice and meaningful pluralism,
results25 and revealed substantial shortcomings.
Despite the presence of five candidates and
some administrative improvements, the 6
November 2006 presidential election was
characterized by a marked absence of com-
190
Turkmenistan SCO not invited CIS not invited to 2007 Presidential elections27 Needs Assessment Mission Report only,
2007 Presidential no findings or conclusions; only present as
unofficial observers: absolutely not free and
fair28
Uzbekistan the elections were free, open and transparent30 Interim Report only, no conclusions
2007 Presidential held in correspon- proceeded in line with the countrys election To the press:
dence with universally legislation and universally recognized norms held in a strictly controlled political environ-
accepted international for holding democratic elections ment, leaving no room for real opposition,
election standards and a major factor in further democratization of and the election generally failed to meet
democratic norms social life in Uzbekistan31 many OSCE commitments for democratic
the observers did not elections32
reveal any violations of
provisions of the Law
On elections of Presi-
dent of Uzbekistan
191
1. Kazak President Pledges More Support for SCOXinhua General News Service, December 6, 2005.
2. Kazakhstan: Officials Declare Nazarbayev Winner of the Presidential ElectionRFE/RL, December 5, 2005.
(continued)
3. OSCE Final Report, February 21, 2006.
4. Shanghai Group Observers Say Kazakh Election LegitimateBBC Monitoring International Reports, August 19, 2007.
5. CIS Observers Satisfied with Democratic Polls in KazakhstanITAR-TASS, August 19, 2007.
7. SCO Observers Positive about Kyrgyz ElectionsInterfax News Agency, February 28, 2005.
10. SCO Observers: Kyrgyz Presidential Elections Free, Open, Transparent and LegitimateAKIPress, July 12, 2005.
13. Kyrgyzstan: President Bakiyevs Ak Jol Is the Leader of the Parliamentary RaceFerghana.ru Info Agency, December 17, 2007.
14. Kyrgyz Elections Not Fully Meet International NormsEUITAR-TASS, December 18, 2007.
16. SCO Observers Not Expose Violations at Duma ElectionsITAR-TASS, December 3, 2007.
17. CIS Observers Note Transparency of Russian Parliamentary PollsITAR-TASS, December 4, 2007.
18. ODIHR Unable to Observe Russian Duma ElectionsOSCE Press Release, November 16, 2007.
22. CIS Monitors Found Tajik Elections Legitimate and FreeITAR-TASS, February 28, 2005.
24. CIS, SCO Observers Positive on Tajik VoteXinhua General News Service, November 7, 2006.
25. CIS, SCO Observers Positive on Tajik VoteXinhua General News Service, November 7, 2006.
27. CIS Not to Send Observers to Turkmenistan Presidential ElectionsITAR-TASS, February 9, 2007.
28. Turkmenistan: Presidential Election Deemed Neither Free Nor FairRadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, February 12, 2007.
193
29. SCO Mission: Elections Were Free & TransparentUzbek Consulate, December 25, 2007.
30. CIS Mission: Elections Were Important for Further Democratization of Public Life in UzbekistanJahon Information Agency, December 26, 2007.
31. Uzbekistans Elections Labeled UndemocraticChristian Science Monitor, December 26, 2007.
32. Uzbekistans Elections Labeled UndemocraticChristian Science Monitor, December 26, 2007.
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NOTES
Chapter 1
1. For representative examples, see Philip Pan, Russia Is Said to Have Fueled Unrest in Kyr-
gyzstan, Washington Post, April 12, 2010; Ariel Cohen, Obamas Stake in the Second Kyr-
gyz Revolution, Wall Street Journal, April 12, 2010; Simon Tisdall, Kyrgyzstan: A Russian
Revolution? Guardian, April 8, 2011.
2. For overviews that draw on nineteenth-century accounts and travelogues, see Peter Hop-
kirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia (New York: Kodansha, 1990);
Karl E. Meyer and Shareen Blair Brysac, Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and the
Race for Empire in Central Asia, revised edition (New York: Basic, 2006).
3. Though, a closer examination of the historical record also casts doubt on how many of
these events and policies were actually set by British officials in London, as opposed to
being local reactions to sudden crises. See Gordon Martel, Documenting the Great Game:
World Policy and the Turbulent Frontier in the 1890s, The International History Review
2, no. 2 (April 1980), 288320. Also see the more skeptical treatment in Gerald Morgan,
Myth and Reality in the Great Game, Asian Affairs 4, no. 1 (1973), 5565.
4. See Hopkirks harrowing account of the massacre. Hopkirk, The Great Game, 243269.
5. H. J. Mackinder, The Geographical Pivot of History, The Geographical Journal 23, no. 4
(April 1904), 434436.
6. Mackinder, The Geographical Pivot of History, 436.
7. See Pascal Venier, The Geopolitical Pivot of History and Early Twentieth Century Polit-
ical Culture, The Geographic Journal 170, no. 2 (December 2004), 330336; Gearid
Tuathail, Putting Mackinder in His Place: Material Transformations and Myth, Political
Geography 11, no. 1 ( January 1992), 100118.
8. See Peter Golden, Central Asia in World History (New York: Oxford University Press,
2011). On the distinctly illiberal institutional legacies bequeathed by these competing
external powers, see Stephen Kotkin, Mongol Commonwealth: Exchange and Gover-
nance across the Post-Mongol Space, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History
8, no. 3 (Summer 2007).
9. For critical assessments of the analogy, see Nick Megoran, Revisiting the Pivot: The In-
fluence of Harold Mackinder on Analysis of Uzbekistans Foreign Policy, The Geographical
Journal 170, no. 4 (December 2004), 347358; Matthew Edwards, The New Great Game
and the New Great Gamers: Disciples of Mackinder and Kipling, Central Asian Survey 22,
no. 1 (March 2003), 83102.
195
196 Note s to Pag e s 4 9
10. See, especially, Brzezinskis use of the chessboard metaphor in reference to Eurasia. Zbig-
niew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Geostrategic Imperatives
(New York: Basic, 1997).
11. On the scramble for Caspian oil, see Lutz Kleveman, The New Great Game: Blood and Oil in
Central Asia (New York: Grove Press, 2003). A more nuanced account is provided in Steve
LeVine, The Oil and the Glory: The Pursuit of Empire and Fortune on the Caspian Seas (New
York: Random House, 2007). Chinas interest in Central Asian energy is assessed in Ste-
phen Blank, Eurasias Energy Triangle: China, Russia and the Central Asian States, Brown
Journal of World Affairs 12, no. 2 (2006), 523568. On post9/11 regional geopolitics, see
Richard Weitz, Averting a New Great Game in Central Asia, The Washington Quarterly 29,
no. 3 (Summer 2006), 155167; Rajan Menon, The New Great Game in Central Asia,
Survival 45, no. 2 (Summer 2003). For a more skeptical view, see Kathleen A. Collins and
William C. Wohlforth, Central Asia: Defying Great Games Expectations, in Strategic
Asia 20032004 (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003).
12. For accounts of the collapse of these Kyrgyz regimes, see Scott Radnitz, Weapons of the
Wealthy: Predatory Regimes and Elite-Led Protests in Central Asia. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 2010).
13. Edwards, The New Great Game and the New Great Gamers, 8990.
14. On the changing political systems of the region, see Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and
Regime Transition in Central Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Pauline
Jones Luong, ed., The Transformation of Central Asia: States and Societies from Soviet Rule to
Independence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); Gregory Gleason, Markets and
Politics in Central Asia: Structural Reform and Political Change (New York: Routledge,
2003).
15. On the end of territorial conquest as an international practice, see Tanisha M. Fazal, State
Death: The Politics of and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2007). On how rulers of weak states strategically use their
sovereignty, see Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1999).
16. On the difficulties of Western engagement with the region, see David Lewis, The Tempta-
tions of Tyranny in Central Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); Martha Brill
Olcott, Central Asias Second Chance (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Peace,
2005). For an overview of the foreign policy interests of major external powers, see Emilian
Kavalski, ed., The New Central Asia: The Regional Impact of International Actors (Singapore:
World Scientific, 2010).
17. Realists argue that the anarchic system forces states to consider not only the gains from
actions such as international cooperation, but how well they fare relative to their main
systemic competitors. See Joseph Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe, America, and
Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).
18. For a measured analysis of the strategic triangle, see Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Mos-
cow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics (Washington DC: Brookings, 2008); Kotkins review
essay of the book: Stephen Kotkin, The Unbalanced Triangle: What Chinese-Russian Re-
lations Mean for the United States, Foreign Affairs 88, no. 5 (September/October 2009),
130138. Also see Elizabeth Wishnick, Russia, China and the United States in Central Asia:
Prospects for Great Power Competition and Cooperation in Central Asia (Carlisle, PA: U.S.
Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2009).
19. Marcel de Haas, The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the OSCE: Two of a Kind?
Helsinki Monitor no. 3 (November 2007).
20. See David Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2010).
21. For applications of the multiple-principals framework to studies of the diminishing
authority of colonial trading companies, NGOs, and international organizations, see, respec-
tively, Julia Adams, Principals and Agents, Colonialists and Company Men: The Decay of
Note s to Pag e s 9 1 6 197
Colonial Control in the Dutch East Indies, American Sociological Review 61, no. 1 (February
1996); Alexander Cooley and James Ron, The NGO Scramble: Organizational Insecurity
and the Political Economy of Transnational Action, International Security 27, no. 1 (Summer
2002); Darren Hawkins et. al., eds., Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
22. On Kazakhstans geopolitical balancing act, see Sally Cummings, Kazakhstan: Power and
the Elite (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
23. See David Lewis, Reassessing the Role of OSCE Police Assistance Programming in Cen-
tral Asia, New York: Central Eurasia Project Working Paper Series, no. 4, April 2011.
24. Amitav Acharya, How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Insti-
tutional Change in ASEAN, International Organization 58, no. 2 (Spring 2004), 244.
25. See Edward Schatz, Access by Accident: Legitimacy Claims and Democracy Promotion in
Authoritarian Central Asia, International Political Science Review 27, no. 3 (2006), 263284.
26. See Luca Anceschi, Turkmenistans Foreign Policy: Positive Neutrality and the Consolidation of
the Turkmen Regime (New York: Routledge, 2008).
27. See the critical account in John Heathershaw, Post-Conflict Tajikistan: The Politics of Peace
(New York: Routledge, 2009).
28. On the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistans rise and regional incursions, see Ahmed Rashid,
Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
29. See Cedric Jourde, The International Relations of Small Neoauthoritarian States:
Islamism, Warlordism and the Framing of Stability, International Studies Quarterly 51, no.
2 ( June 2007).
30. Robert Keohane, The Big Influence of Small Allies, Foreign Policy, no. 2 (April 1971);
Keohane, Lilliputians Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics, International Or-
ganization 23, no. 2 (Spring 1969). On competitive clientalism in the Middle East during
the Cold War, see Rashid Khalidi, Sowing Crisis: the Cold War and American Dominance in
the Middle East (Boston: Beacon Press, 2009).
31. See Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); Stephen
Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).
32. See Thad Dunning, Conditioning the Effects of Aid: Cold War Politics, Donor Credibility
and Democracy in Africa, International Organization 54, no. 2 (Spring 2004), 409423.
33. Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008).
34. Parag Khanna, The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order (New York:
Random House, 2008).
35. See Robert Pape, Soft-Balancing Against the United States, International Security 30, no. 1
(Summer 2005); Stephen Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Pri-
macy (New York: Norton, 2005). For a response, see Stephen Brooks and William C.
Wohlforth, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Pri-
macy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
36. Nazneen Bartha, Ely Ratner, and Stephen Weber, A World Without the West, National
Interest no. 90 ( July/August 2007).
37. For representative examples, see Stefan A. Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How Chinas Au-
thoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-first Century (New York: Basic, 2010); Joshua
Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How Chinas Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, Sources and Limits
of Chinese Soft Power, Survival 48, no. 2 (Summer 2006), 1736.
Chapter 2
1. For representative introductions, see Scott Radnitz, Weapons of the Wealthy (Ithaca, NY: Cor-
nell University Press, 2010); Eric Sally Cummings, ed., Power and Change in Central Asia (New
York: Routledge, 2002); Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional Change and Political Continuity in
Central Asia: Power, Perceptions and Pacts (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
198 Note s to Pag e s 1 6 1 9
2. On the political importance of clans, see Kathleen Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transi-
tion in Central Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Edward Schatz,
Modern Clan Politics: The Power of Blood in Kazakhstan and Beyond (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 2004). For a critique, see Idil Tuncr-Kilavuz, Political and Social Net-
works in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan: Clan, Region and Beyond, Central Asian Survey 28,
no. 3 (September 2009), 323334.
3. On Russian imperial rule in Central Asia, see Alexander Morrison, Russian Rule in Samar-
kand 18681910: A Comparison with British India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008);
Seymour Becker, Russias Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 18651924
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968). On Soviet rule, see Edward Allworth,
Central Asia: 130 years of Russian Dominance (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994).
4. For theoretically informed application of the post-colonial approach, see Mark Beissinger
and Crawford Young, eds., Beyond State Crisis? Postcolonial Africa and Post-Soviet Eurasia in
Comparative Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).
5. I expand on this argument in more detail in Alexander Cooley, Logics of Hierarchy: The
Organization of Empires, States and Military Occupations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 2005).
6. See Nazif Shahrani, Muslim Central Asia: Soviet Developmental Legacies and Future
Challenges, in Mohiaddin Mesbahi, ed., Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet
Union (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1993), 5671. On imperial structure and
administration, see Alexander Motyl, Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse and Revival of
Empires (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
7. Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet
Union (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 160165.
8. Oksana Dmitrieva, Regional Development: The USSR and After (London: UCL Press,
1996), ix.
9. The definitive account of the origins and practice of Soviet nationalities can be found in
Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union,
19231939, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001). Also see Yuri Slezkine, The
USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particu-
larism, Slavic Review 53, no. 2 (Summer 1994), 414452; Nancy Lubin, Labour and Na-
tionality in Soviet Central Asia: An Uneasy Compromise (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1984).
10. On Central Asian cadre development, see Steven L. Burg, Muslim Cadres and Soviet
Political Development, World Politics 37, no. 1 (October 1984), 2447.
11. Luong, Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Central Asia.
12. See the now classic denouncement of these practices by Soviet anthropologist Sergei Polia-
kov, Everyday Islam: Religion and Tradition in Rural Central Asia (Armonk, NY: M. E.
Sharpe, 1993).
13. On patrimonialism and the Brezhnev era, see Philip Roeder, Red Sunset: The Failure of So-
viet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); John Willerton, Patronage and
Politics in the USSR (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
14. Gregory Gleason, Nationalism or Organized Crime? The Case of the Cotton Scandal in
the USSR, Corruption and Reform 5, no. 2 (1990), 87108; James Critchlow, Nationalism in
Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republics Road to Sovereignty (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), 3952.
15. See for example, Michael Rywkin, Moscows Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia (Armonk,
NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1990).
16. The underlying conditions behind the Osh riotslingering tensions over Uzbek represen-
tation in Kyrgyz administrative structures, a lack of central authority under the Perestroika
political experiment in decentralizationwould also be important enabling conditions
when ethnic violence erupted again in Osh and Jalalabad 20 years later, in June 2010.
17. Eric McGlinchey. Blood, Chaos and Dynasty: Islam and Patronage Politics in Central Asia
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011).
Note s to Pag e s 1 9 2 3 199
18. See Barnett Rubin, Russian Hegemony and State Breakdown in the Periphery: Causes and
Consequences of the Civil War in Tajikistan, in Barnett Rubin and Jack Snyder, eds., Post-
Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State-Building (New York: Routledge, 1998).
19. On IMF relations with the Central Asian and post-Communist states, see Andr Broom,
The Currency of Power: The IMF and Monetary Reform in Central Asia (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2010); Randall Stone, Lending Credibility: The International Monetary Fund and
the Post-Communist Transition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
20. See Richard Pomfret, The Economies of Central Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1995).
21. On the collapse of the ruble zone, see Rawi Abdelal, National Purpose and the World
Economy (Ithaca, NY Cornell University Press, 2002), 4559.
22. Fiona Adamson, Global Liberalism Versus Political Islam: Competing Ideological Frame-
works in International Politics, International Studies Review 7, no. 4 (2005), 547569.
23. For insightful overviews of U.S., Russian, and Chinese policy toward Kazakhstan and the
Central Asian states in the 1990s, see Robert Legvold, ed. Thinking Strategically: the Major
Powers. Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian Nexus (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of
Arts & Sciences, 2003).
24. On Central Asias energy politics in the 1990s, see Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon, eds., En-
ergy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).
25. On Central Asias stagnation during the 1990s, see Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asias Sec-
ond Chance (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2005). For a critical reflec-
tion on the transition paradigm, see Thomas Carothers, The End of the Transition
Paradigm, Journal of Democracy 13, no. 1 ( January 2002), 521.
26. On the theoretical underpinnings of survivorship politics, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, et al.,
The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003). For an application to the
Central Asian states, see McGlinchey, Blood, Chaos and Dynasty. On foreign policy and surviv-
alism, see Luca Anceschi, Integrating Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy Making: The
Cases of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Central Asian Survey 29, no. 2 (June 2010), 143158.
27. Erica Marat, The Military and the State in Central Asia: From Red Army to Independence
(New York: Routledge, 2009).
28. See Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise? Washington, DC: Carnegie En-
dowment for Peace, 2010; Bhavna Dave, Kazakhstan: Ethnicity, Language and Power (New
York: Routledge. 2007); Sally Cummings, Kazakhstan: Power and the Elite (New York: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2005).
29. See Edward Schatz, Transnational Image Making and Soft Authoritarian Kazakhstan,
Slavic Review 67, no. 1 (Spring 2008), 5062.
30. Kazakh President in German Hospital: Report, AFP, July 19, 2011.
31. Unrest in Kazakhstan: Thicker than Oil, The Economist, December 31, 2011.
32. On the dynamics of patronage politics and the collapse of Kyrgyz regimes, see McGlinchey,
Blood, Chaos and Dynasty; Radnitz, Weapons of the Wealthy.
33. On Uzbekistans independence, see Laura Adams, The Spectacular State: Culture and Na-
tional Identity in Uzbekistan (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010); Neil Melvin,
Uzbekistan: Transition to Authoritarianism on the Silk Route (New York: Routledge, 2000).
34. See English-language summary at: http://humanrightshouse.org/Articles/16130.html.
35. U.S. Embassy Cable, 05TASHKENT2473, Gulnora Karimova Looks to Improve Her
Image. U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, September 5, 2005, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/
09/05TASHKENT2473.html.
36. See International Crisis Group, Cracks in the Marble: Turkmenistans Failing Dictatorship, ICG
Asia Report no. 44, January 17, 2003; and International Crisis Group, Repression and Regres-
sion in Turkmenistan: A New International Strategy, ICG Asia Report no. 85, November 4, 2004.
37. See Barnett Rubin, Russian Hegemony and State Breakdown in the Periphery: Causes and
Consequences of the Civil War in Tajikistan, in Barnett R. Rubin and Jack Snyder, eds.,
Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State-Building (New York: Routledge, 1998).
200 Note s to Pag e s 2 4 3 1
38. See John Heathershaw, Post-Conflict Tajikistan: The Politics of Peacebuilding and the Emer-
gence of Legitimate Political Order (New York: Routledge, 2009); International Crisis
Group, Tajikistan: on the Road to Failure, ICG Asia Report no. 162. February 12, 2009;
Lena Jonson, Tajikistan in the New Central Asia: Geopolitics, Great Power Rivalry and Radical
Islam (London: I.B Taurus, 2006).
39. This case is forcefully made in Shahram Akbarzadeh, Uzbekistan and the United States:
Authoritarianism, Islamism and Washingtons Security Agenda (New York: ZED, 2005).
40. Alexander Cooley, Principles in the Pipeline: Managing Transatlantic Values and Interests
in Central Asia, International Affairs 84, no. 6 (November 2008), 11731188.
41. Robert Bates, When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2008), 52.
42. The classic analysis of these informal Central Asian networks is found in Nancy Lubin,
Labour and Nationality in Soviet Central Asia: An Uneasy Compromise (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1984).
43. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002),
133165; Michael McFaul, State Power, Institutional Change, and the Politics of Privat-
ization in Russia, World Politics 47, no. 2 ( January 1995), 210243. For an overview of
post-Communist transitions reforms and debates, see Timothy Frye, Building States and
Markets after Communism: the Perils of Polarized Democracy (New York: Cambridge, 2010).
44. See Kelly McMann, Market Reform as a Stimulus to Particularistic Politics, Comparative
Political Studies 42, no. 7 ( July 2009), 971994.
45. For details, see International Crisis Group, Central Asia: Decay and Decline, ICG Asia
Report no. 201. February 3, 2011, 1113.
46. See Jason Sharman, Offshore and the New International Political Economy, Review of
International Political Economy 17, no. 1 (February 2010), 119.
47. On allegations against the company, see Megan Murphy, Tajikistan Turns on Rusal after
TALCO Deal, Financial Times, November 28, 2008.
48. See International Crisis Group, Uzbekistan: Crisis and Uncertainty, ICG Asia Briefing
no. 67. August 22, 2007, 56.
49. Deirdre Tynan, Deconstructing Manas Fuel Suppliers Corporate Structure, Eurasianet,
April 19, 2010.
50. See Global Witness, Its a Gas- Funny Business in the Turkmen-Ukraine Gas Trade. Lon-
don and Washington DC, April 2006, http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/
library/its_a_gas_april_2006_lowres.pdf.
51. See Daniel Nexon, The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynas-
tic Empires & International Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
52. On multivocal signaling as a key component of successful state-building, see John F.
Padgett and Christopher Ansell, Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, The American
Journal of Sociology 98, no. 6 (May 1993), 12591319.
53. See Gregory Gleason, Fealty and Loyalty: Informal Authority Structures in Soviet Asia,
Soviet Studies 43, no. 1 (1991), 613628.
54. World Bank, Statistical Handbook: States of the Former USSR, Washington DC: World
Bank, 1992, 1415.
55. See Alexander Cooley, International Aid to the Former Soviet States: Agent of Change or
Guardian of the Status Quo? Problems of Post-Communism, 47, no. 4 (July/August 2000), 3444.
56. Audit Reveals Irregularities in Tajik Central Bank Deals, Reuters, April 19, 2009.
Chapter 3
1. See Thomas E. Ricks and Susan B. Glasser, US Operated Secret Alliance with Uzbekistan,
Washington Post, October 14, 2001.
2. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the
Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004), 531.
Note s to Pag e s 3 1 3 6 201
3. See Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 2002), 137186.
4. Draft Report of DEFSEC Meeting with President Karimov, October 5, 2001, http://
www.rumsfeld.com/library/ (accessed February 14, 2011). Supporting documents for
Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011).
5. Draft Report of DEFSEC Meeting with President Karimov.
6. The possible other fields include Kokaidv, Jizak, and Shakhrisabz, though the use of addi-
tional facilities in Uzbekistan has not been publicly acknowledged by either Uzbek or U.S.
officials. But these airfields are included in an inventory of Uzbek facilities used by the U.S.
military, as part of the Uzbek governments bill to the United States. Donald Rumsfeld to
Jim MacDougall: Congressional Amendment on Uzbekistan, October 18, 2005, http://
library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/401/To%20Jim%20MacDougall%20re%20Congres-
sional%20Amendment%20on%20Uzbekistan-%20Memo%20Attachment%2010-18-
2005.pdf (accessed February 8, 2011).
7. See Olga Oliker and David A. Shlapak, US Interests in Central Asia: Policy Priorities and
Military Roles (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Project Air Force, 2005), pp. 1119. Despite
some rumors that U.S. officials were interested in opening a base in Tajikistan, possibly at
Kulob, such a facility did not emerge. U.S. forces did briefly use Dushanbe airport in 2001
and 2002. See Lena Jonson, Tajikistan in the New Central Asia: Geopolitics Great Power Ri-
valry and Radical Islam (New York: I. B. Taurus, 2006), 5859.
8. Oliker and Shlapak, US Interests in Central Asia, 1119.
9. See the apt warning in Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, New Friends, New Fears
in Central Asia, Foreign Affairs 81, no. 2 (March/April 2002), 6170.
10. Authors communication with U.S. defense official involved in initial negotiations with
Uzbekistan.
11. Shahram Akbarzadeh, Uzbekistan and the United States: Authoritarianism, Islamism & Wash-
ingtons Security Agenda (New York: ZED, 2005), 75 and 78.
12. Robert Kaiser, Uzbek-US Declaration Kept Secret, Washington Post, July 1, 2002.
13. Zamira Eshanova, Uzbekistan: UN Rapporteur Says Use of Torture Is Systemic, Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), December 9, 2002.
14. The programs in question were the International Military Education and Training (IMET)
and Foreign Military Financing (FMF). The State Department reportedly reprogrammed
some of this aid so that only $8.5 million was actually withheld. See Jim Nichols, Uzbeki-
stans Closure of the Airbase at Karshi-Khanabad: Context and Implications. Congres-
sional Research Report for Congress, March 29, 2006.
15. Craig Murray, Murder in Samarkand (London: Mainstream Publishing, 2006).
16. Perhaps the most interesting item to appear was authored by influential conservative col-
umnist Bill Kristol. See Stephen Schwartz and William Kristol, Our Uzbek Problem,
Weekly Standard, May 30, 2005.
17. See Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asias Second Chance (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endow-
ment for International Peace, 2005), 124138.
18. Authors interviews with U.S. defense officials at Manas. January 2005.
19. Base briefing conducted at the Manas Transit Center, June 15, 2011.
20. Authors interviews with U.S. and Kyrgyz officials in Bishkek and Manas, Kyrgyzstan, Janu-
ary 2005.
21. Deborah Klepp, The US Needs a Base Where? How the US Established an Air Base in the
Kyrgyz Republic (unpublished essay, National Defense University, National War College,
2004), 34.
22. Authors interviews with U.S. officials in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, January 2005.
23. For the investigations final report, see Mystery at Manas: Strategic Blind Spots in the Depart-
ment of Defenses Fuel Contracts in Kyrgyzstan, Report of the Majority Staff, Subcommittee
on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform, U.S House of Representatives, Washington D.C., December 2010.
202 Note s to Pag e s 3 7 4 0
24. In fact, as Mitchell has shown in his comprehensive account of Georgias Rose Revolution,
U.S. officials were nervous at the prospect of losing long-standing President Eduard She-
vardnadze. See Lincoln Mitchell, Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgias
Revolution (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).
25. Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, International Diffusion and Postcommunist Revolu-
tions, Communist and Postcommunist Studies 39, no. 3 (September 2006), 283304.
26. On the importance of emulation or modularity in the diffusion of the Color Revolutions
paradigm, see Mark Beissinger, Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena:
The Diffusion of the Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions, Perspectives on Politics 5,
no. 2 ( June 2007), 259275. For a critique of the diffusion thesis that stresses the structural
similarities across these polities, see Lucan Way, The Real Causes of the Colored Revolu-
tions, Journal of Democracy 18, no. 2 ( July 2008), 5569.
27. See Radnitz, Weapons of the Wealthy.
28. See Craig Smith, US Helped to Prepare the Way for Kyrgyzstans Uprising, International
Herald Tribune, March 30, 2005.
29. See S. Fredrick Starr, A Greater Central Asia Partnership for Central Asia and Its Neigh-
bors, (Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins SAIS, Silk Route Paper. March 2005); and Starr,
A Partnership for Central Asia, Foreign Affairs 84, No. 4 ( JulyAugust 2005), 164178.
30. The Department of Defense had moved the Central Asian states under CENTCOM juris-
diction in 1999.
31. See the comments made by Secretary Rice on Transformational Diplomacy at George-
town University. January 18, 2006, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm
(accessed October 1, 2008).
32. U.S. State Department, The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. Washington, DC,
Office of the Spokesman, February 9, 2006.
33. At an Istanbul conference in June 2006 Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central
Asian Affairs Richard Boucher commented, Like the original Silk Road, good ideas dont
need policy-makers to make them happen, but we can help things along by helping create the
environment so that they can happen. That is what this conference is all about. At this con-
ference we hope that the government participants will establish a framework to develop to-
gether a regional power-transmission corridor linking Central and South Asia. See Richard
Boucher, Electricity Beyond Borders: A Central Asia Power Sector Reform. Remarks by
Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs. Istanbul. June 13, 2006. Available at:
http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pakistan/h06061303.html (accessed February 10, 2011).
34. See Human Rights Watch, Bullets Were Flying Like Rain: The Andjian Massacre (New York:
Human Rights Watch, June 2005).
35. Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 634.
36. For the text of the May 29, 2005, press conference, at http://uzbekistan.usembassy.gov/
pr-052905.html.
37. For more details, see Scott G. Frickenstein, Kicked Out of K2, Airforce Magazine 93, no. 9
(September 2010), 8892; and Alexander Cooley, Base Politics, Foreign Affairs 84, no. 6
(November/December 2005), 7992.
38. Russian-Uzbekistani economic ties were also growing at the time. See Matteo Fumagalli,
Alignment and Realignment in Central Asia: The Rationale and Implications of Uzbeki-
stans Rapprochement with Russia, International Political Science Review 28, no. 3 ( June
2007), 253271; and Pavel Baev, Russias Counter-Revolutionary Offensive in Central
Asia. PONARS Policy Memo no. 399, December 2005.
39. Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown, 636.
40. Protocol between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Min-
istry of Defense of the Republic of Uzbekistan, November 14, 2006, at http://www.state.
gov/documents/organization/85883.pdf.
41. Lora Lumpe, US Military Aid to Central Asia, 19992009: Security Trumps Human
Rights, Occasional Paper Series no. 1, Central Eurasia Project, October 2010, 2532.
Note s to Pag e s 4 1 4 5 203
42. See also Dana Priest, The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with Americas Military
(New York: W. W. Norton, 2004).
43. Lumpe, US Military Aid to Central Asia, 19992009, 35. Also worth noting is that,
even at the height of its concern about democratic rights violations and human rights
abuses in 2005 and 2006, the U.S. government allowed and expanded U.S. arms indus-
try sales to the Central Asian state, with total sales in FY 2008 having approached $400
million.
44. See Office of Inspector General, Report of Inspection: U.S. Embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyz-
stan. Report Number ISP-I-08-14A, February 2008.
45. Authors interviews in Bishkek, January 2008 and June 2009.
46. Base briefing conducted at the Manas Transit Center, June 15, 2011.
47. Deirdre Tynan, US Intends to Construct US Military Training Center in Batken. Eur-
asianet, March 3, 2010.
48. YDesign/Build Construction services for the National Training Center located in Kara-
tog, Tajikistan. Solicitation Number: W912ER-10-R-0065. Available at the Federal Busi-
ness Opportunities web site at: www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&;mode=form&id=4e
b45f294cbb4bcfb076afaf4f2e63c2&tab=core&_cview=0 (accessed June 13, 2011). The
solicitation description describes the facility accordingly: The garrison compound
includes administrative facilities, officer quarters and enlisted barracks, dining facility, and
other supporting facilities to provide a secure, fully operational compound. The range facil-
ities include weapons firing and qualification (rifle, pistol, crew-served weapons and explo-
sive/unexploded ordinance), Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) facilities,
vehicle operator training range, sniper/observer training and operations, repelling and fast
rope towers, and support facilities (for example: control towers, outdoor classrooms, sani-
tary facilities).
49. Deirdre Tynan, Pentagon Looks to Plant New Facilities in Central Asia, Eurasianet, June
8, 2010.
50. The use of Mary 2 appears to have been granted in October 2006 by President Niyazov,
who provided his oral agreement to allow any flight to land at the air base at any time.
The informal agreements over divert arrangements were extended by Niyazovs successor,
President Berdymukhamedov. See U.S. Embassy Cable 06ASHGABAT1093, President
Niyazov Backs Away from Formal Divert. U.S. Embassy in Ashgabat, October 20, 2006,
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/10/06ASHGABAT1093.html; and U.S. Embassy Cable
07ASHGABAT637, Turkmenistans President Tells CENTCOM Commander Mary
Emergency Divert to Remain Verbal Agreement. U.S. Embassy in Ashgabat, June 29,
2007, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/06/07ASHGABAT637.html.
51. For an overview, see Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, Is the U.S. Violating Turkmenistans Neu-
trality with the NDN? Eurasianet, August 1, 2010. Also see Victoria Panfilova, American
Airforce Lands in Turkmenistan, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, July 13, 2009.
52. Surface Transportation Challenges in Pakistan/Afghanistan, (presentation made by APL
Government Market). Available at: http://www.ndtahq.com/documents/SESSIONLen-
nonSilkRoad.pdf (accessed January 10, 2011).
53. Craig Whitlock, U.S. Turns to Other Routes to Supply Afghan War as Relations with Pak-
istan Fray, Washington Post, July 2, 2011.
54. Andrew Kuchins, Thomas M. Sanderson, and David A. Gordon, The Northern
Distribution Network and Afghanistan: Planning for the Future. (Washington, DC: Cen-
ter for International and Strategic Studies, December 2009), 10.
55. Whitlock, U.S. Turns to Other Routes to Supply Afghan War.
56. Joshua Kucera, Washington to Expand Traffic on Northern Supply Route, Eurasianet,
November 10, 2010.
57. Whitlock, U.S. Turns to Other Routes to Supply Afghan War.
58. See Jonathan Stack, Virtual Reality, Defense Logistics Agency Loglines, JanuaryFebruary
2010, 3435.
204 Note s to Pag e s 4 5 4 8
59. There was also a related billing dispute when Ashgabat suspended the use of the blanket
permission in response to the U.S. not paying $30,000 in charges for additional overflights
in 2007 and 2008. See U.S. Embassy Cable 09ASHGABAT560, Turkmenistan: Meredov
Addresses Overflight and Other Key issues with DAS Krol. U.S. Embassy in Ashgabat,
May 2, 2009, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09ASHGABAT560.html; and U.S.
Embassy Cable 09ASHGABAT992, Turkmenistan: Scenesetter for the Visit of CENT-
COM Commander General David Petraeus. U.S. Embassy in Ashgabat, August 5, 2009,
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09ASHGABAT992.html.
60. Deirdre Tynan, Ashgabat Hosts US Refueling, Resupply Operations, Eurasianet, July 7,
2009.
61. U.S. fuel procurement through Turkmenistan has been documented by a number of profes-
sional and fuel publications. For example, see Cpt. John Foust, Bulk Fuel Challenges in
Afghanistan, Quartermaster Professional Bulletin, Spring 2007, 2225. On the Central
Asian activities of Red Star, the main fuel supply contractor, see Aram Roston, Fueling the
Afghan War, The Nation, May 10, 2010.
62. U.S. Embassy Cable 09ASHGABAT992, Turkmenistan: Scenesetter for the Visit of
CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus.
63. Deirdre Tynan, Karimov Gives Washington the Air Base It Needs for Afghan Operations,
Eurasianet, May 10, 2009.
64. A New Cargo Terminal Opens in Navoi, Gazeta.uz, August 10, 2010.
65. Tynan, Karimov Gives Washington the Air Base It Needs for Afghan Operations.
66. See U.S. Embassy Cable 09TASHKENT669, Uzbekistan: TRANSCOM Delegation Dis-
cusses Transit with GOU. U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, May 7, 2009, http://wikileaks.org/
cable/2009/05/09TASHKENT669.html.
67. See U.S. Embassy Cable 09TASHKENT575, Uzbekistan: Scenesetter for US TRANSCOM
Commander General McNabb. Embassy in Tashkent, April 24, 2009, http://wikileaks.org/
cable/2009/04/09TASHKENT575.html; and U.S. Embassy Cable 09TASHKENT1245,
Uzbekistan: USCENTCOM on the Eve of Construction. Embassy in Tashkent, July 7, 2009,
http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TASHKENT1245.html
68. See TAO Global Solutions, Even Under Fire, Delivery Remains Priority for Hanjin
Global Logistics, news release, July 11, 2009, http://www.free-press-release.com/
news/200907/1247286771.html (accessed February 10, 2011).
69. Catherine Fitzpatrick, Uzbekistan Triples Air Cargo Through Navoi, Eurasianet, Novem-
ber 18, 2010.
70. Andrew Kuchins, Thomas M. Sanderson and David A. Gordon, Afghanistan: Building the
Missing Link in the Modern Silk Road, The Washington Quarterly 33, no. 2 (April 2010),
3347. Also see Kuchins, Sanderson, and Gordon, The Northern Distribution Network
and Afghanistan: Planning for the Future.
71. S. Fredrick Starr, Afghanistan Beyond the Fog of Nation Building, Silk Road Paper, Janu-
ary 2011, 13.
72. ISAF, Construction of Railway from Uzbekistan to Mazar-e-Sharif Begins, news release,
May 28, 2010, http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/construction-of-railway-
from-uzbekistan-to-mazar-e-sharif-begins.html (accessed February 2, 2011).
73. New Silk Road Eyed for Afghanistan, AFP, September 21, 2011.
74. Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Class Devia-
tion to Implement Temporary Authority to Acquire Products and Services Produced in Coun-
tries along a Major Route of Supply to Afghanistan, Washington, DC, November 12, 2009.
75. Deirdre Tynan, Documents Highlight Problems with Uzbek Corridor of Afghan Supply
Route, Eurasianet, June 28, 2010.
76. As reported in Deirdre Tynan, US Troop Surge Likely to Fuel Financial Bonanza for Cen-
tral Asian States, Eurasianet, January 19, 2010.
77. Joshua Kucera, NDN Operator: We Have No Connection to Gulnara Karimova, Eur-
asianet, December 7, 2010. For details on Karimovas business holdings and connections to
Note s to Pag e s 4 8 5 3 205
Zeromax, see International Crisis Group, Uzbekistan: Stagnation and Uncertainty, ICG
Asia Briefing no. 67, August 22, 2007, 56.
78. See U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, 10TASHKENT27, Uzbekistan: A to ZeroMax, January 1,
2010, http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10TASHKENT27.html.
79. Oliker and Shlapak, U.S. Interests in Central Asia, 18.
80. Deirdre Tynan, Pentagon Paid Airport Fees to Turkmenistan, But Cant Say How Much,
Eurasianet, July 12, 2010.
81. Tynan, US Troop Surge Likely to Fuel Financial Bonanza.
82. Quoted in Catherine Fitzpatrick, Uzbekistan Weekly Roundup. Eurasianet, December
20, 2010.
83. Deirdre Tynan, Did Karimov Tantrum Prompt NDN Transit Fee Hike? Eurasianet, Feb-
ruary 10, 2011. A TRANSCOM spokesperson, perhaps betraying an overtly nonchalant
attitude, responded to the increase by stating, Globally within the US Defense Transporta-
tion System, tariff adjustments are expected and part of the cost of doing business... .With
this in mind, a hike in fees in Uzbekistan has little effect on the United States moving com-
mercial-type cargo into Afghanistan.
84. Deirdre Tynan, U.S. Senate Wants Pentagon to be More Transparent on NDN Contracts,
Eurasianet, September 26, 2011.
Chapter 4
1. See, for instance, Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: Putins Russia and the Threat to the West
(New York: Palgrave, 2007).
2. On Russian fluctuating identity and foreign policy goals, see Andrei Tsygankov, Russias
Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity (New York: Rowman & Little-
field, 2010, 2nd edition); Ted Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics: Identities
and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).
3. Following the 2008 Georgia War, Russian President Medvedev laid out five principles to
guide Russias foreign policy, including, most controversially, that Russia would maintain a
region of privileged interests, a thinly veiled reference to institutionalizing Russian primacy
in the post-Soviet space. See New Russian World Order: The Five Principles, BBC News,
September 1, 2008.
4. On the importance of status, see Alistair Ian Johnston, Treating International Institutions
as Social Environments, International Studies Quarterly, 45, no. (2001), 487515.
5. See Andrei Tsygankov, Preserving Influence in a Changing World: Russias Grand
Strategy, Problems of Post-Communism 58, no.1 (March/April 2011), 2844; Celeste Wal-
lander, Russian Transimperialism and Its Implications, The Washington Quarterly 30, no.
2 (Spring 2007), 107122.
6. On Russian cultural and soft power, especially policies toward ethnic Russians in Central
Asia, see Marlne Laruelle, Russias Central Asia Policy and the Role of Russian Nation-
alism, Silk Road Paper. Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University/Central Asia-Cauca-
sus Institute, April 2008.
7. On these continuities, see Jeffery Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great
Power Politics (New York: Rowan & Littlefield, 2009); Robert Legvold, ed., Russian Foreign
Policy in the Twenty-First Century and the Shadow of the Past (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 2007).
8. See Bobo Lo, Vladimir Putin and the Evolution of Russian Foreign Policy (London: Royal
Institute for International Affairs and Blackwell, 2003).
9. National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, 2000, http://www.russiaeurope.
mid.ru/russiastrat2000.html.
10. Putin telegram to President Bush, September 11, 2001.
11. Statement by President Putin of Russia on the Terrorist Acts in the U.S., Moscow, Septem-
ber 12, 2001.
206 Note s to Pag e s 5 3 5 7
12. Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 112113. Reportedly, the Russian military even urged the
Northern Alliance to defeat the Taliban before U.S. forces arrived to establish a presence in
Afghanistan. Similarly, in early 2002, Putin supported the entry of 200 U.S. military troops
into Georgia to help the embattled Georgian government clear the Pankisi Gorge of mili-
tants who were using the area as a safe haven from which to mount operations in Chechnya
and the Russian North Caucasus.
13. Press Conference by President Bush and President Putin in Crawford, Texas, November
13, 2001. Putin further explained: If we look at the relationship between the Russian Fed-
eration and the United States from the old standpointdistrust and enmityits one
thing. If we are looking through the prism of partnership and alliance, we have nothing to
be afraid of. Transcript and audio available at: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/
international/bush-putin_11-13.html?print.
14. John OLoughlin, Gearid Tuathail and Vladimir Kolossov, ARisky Westward Turn?
Putins 9-11 Script and Ordinary Russians, Europe-Asia Studies 56. No. 1 ( January 2004),
334. 19
15. OLoughlin, Tuathail and Kolossov, A'Risky Westward Turn? 20. 48% of respondents
believed that U.S. bases in Central Asia were intended to expand the U.S. zone of influence,
31% that they would secure oil and gas interests, and 37% thought that they would enable
the U.S. to replace Russia as that countrys primary partner.
16. Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 119.
17. Tsygankov, Russias Foreign Policy, Chapter 6.
18. See Lincoln Mitchell, Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgias Revolution
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009).
19. See Michael McFaul, Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Color Rev-
olutions, International Security 32, no. 2 (Fall 2007), 4583
20. Jason Lyall, Great Games: Russia and the Emerging Security Dilemma in Central Asia,
Paper Delivered to the 100th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Associa-
tion, Washington, DC, September 2004.
21. Dmitri Trenin. Russia and Central Asia: Interests, Policies, and Prospects, in Eugene
Rumer, Dmitri Trenon, and Huasheng Zhao, eds., Central Asia: Views from Washington,
Moscow, and Beijing (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2007), 124.
22. See Lena Jonson, Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shaping of Russian Foreign Policy.
(New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 6378.
23. As quoted in Lena Jonson, Vladimir Putin and Central Asia, 69.
24. Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy, 271.
25. On the CSTOs institutional design and guiding regionalism, see Yuliya Nikitina, ODKB
i ShoS: Modeli Regionalizma v Sfere Bezopasnosti (Moscow: MGIMO and Navona,
2009).
26. See Alexander Nikitin, Post-Soviet Military Integration: The Collective Treaty Organiza-
tion and Its Relations with the EU and NATO, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 5, no.
1 (2007), 3544.
27. Authors interviews with NATO officials. Brussels, October 2009.
28. CIS Defence Body Questions NATO Expansion but Wants to Cooperate, Interfax News
Agency, May 23, 2003.
29. As quoted in Lyall, Great Games: Russia and the Emerging Security Dilemma in Central
Asia, 23.
30. See the various speeches by Secretary General on the CSTO web site, http://www.odkb.
gov.ru/start/index_engl_official_statements.htm.
31. A. l. Rekuta, The Collective Treaty Security Organization: Averting Security Threats in
Central Asia, Military Thought: A Russian Journal of Military Theory and Strategy, 15, no. 4
(2006), 19.
32. CSTO Creates Russia-based Collective Rapid Reaction Force, The Times of Central Asia,
February 11, 2009.
Note s to Pag e s 5 7 6 2 207
57. See Rawi Abdelal, Interpreting Interdependence: National Security and the Energy Trade
of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. In Robert Legvold and Celeste Wallander, eds., Swords and
Sustenance: The Economics of Security in Belarus and Ukraine (Cambridge, MA: American
Academy of Sciences, 2004).
58. Bartlomiej Kaminski and Gal Raballand, Entrepot for Chinese for Chinese Consumer
Goods in Central Asia: The Puzzle of Re-Exports Through Kyrgyz Bazaars, Eurasian Geog-
raphy and Economics 50, no. 5 (2009), 581590.
59. The author participated in a roundtable in New York with Kyrgyz President Otunbayeva in
September 2011 that revealed interesting splits among the Kyrgyz delegation on the Cus-
toms Union issue. President Otunbayeva strongly supported Kyrgyzstans entry, viewing
Russia as a natural market for Kyrgyz textile sector. On the other hand, Edil Baisalov, the
presidents former chief of staff, opposed the proposal, commenting that the increase in
tariffs would painfully hit middle classes and consumers, as had occurred in Kazakhstan.
60. Though some argue that Kyrgyzstan could adopt higher tariffs and offer alternative conces-
sions to compensate affected members such as China, the WTO Secretariat may be reluc-
tant to endorse the backtracking of one of its members on its most-favored national
commitments.
61. According to the International Crisis Group, in 20042008, the number of Central Asians
workers that left for Russia and Kazakhstan included 800,000 from Kyrgyzstan, 1,500,000
from Tajikistan, and 2,500,000 from Uzbekistan. See International Crisis Group, Central
Asian Migrants and the Economic Crisis, Asia Report no. 183, January 5, 2010, 1.
62. World Bank data in Migration and Remittances are based on officially logged data. The
true volume, including unaccounted for transfers and informal networks, is likely signifi-
cantly higher. Available at: http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXT-
DEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,contentMDK:21121930~menuPK:3145470~pagePK:
64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html.
63. ILO figure quoted in Edward Lemon, Central Asian Labor Migrants Facing an Uncertain
Year, Eurasianet, January 5, 2011.
64. Human Rights Watch, Are You Happy to Cheat Us? Exploitation of Migrant Construction
Workers in Russia, (New York: Human Rights Watch, February 2009).
65. Kazuhiro Kumo, ed., Sociology, Economics and the Politics of Central Asian Migrants in
Moscow. Tokyo: Hitotsubashi University, Institute of Economic Reseearch 78, http://
hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/rs/bitstream/10086/19068/1/DPb39.pdf.
66. Authors interviews with Tajik print journalists, Dushanbe, Tajikistan, May 2010.
67. Michael Schwartz, With a Russian in a Tajik Jail, Moscow Aims its Reprisal at Migrant
Workers, New York Times, November 16, 2011.
68. Fiona Hill, Russia Discovers Soft Power, Current History 30, no. 2 (October 2006), 341347.
69. See Kimberly Marten, Russian Efforts to Control Central Asia Oil: The Kumkol Case,
Post-Soviet Affairs 27, no. 1 (2007), 1837.
70. On the history and politics of the BTC, see Steve LeVine, The Oil and the Glory: the Pursuit
of Empire and Fortune on the Caspian Sea (New York: Random House, 2007).
71. Luong and Weinthal, Oil Is Not a Curse, 259298.
72. For overviews, see Chow, Edward C. and Leigh E. Hendrik. Central Asias Pipelines: Field
of Dreams and Reality, in Edward Chow et. al., Pipeline Politics in Asia: The Intersection of
Demand, Energy Markets, and Supply Routes, Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian
Research, Special Report no. 23, September 2010; Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan: Unful-
filled Promise? (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2010, revised), 148159.
73. For overviews of Gazprom strategy, see Rawi Abdelal, Sogomon Tarontsi, and Alexander
Jorov, Gazprom (A): Energy and Strategy in Russian History, Harvard Business School
Case Study no. 9-709-008, July 7, 2009; Rawi Abdelal, Sogomon Tarontsi, and Alexander
Jorov, Gazprom (B): Energy and Strategy in a New Era, Harvard Business School Case
Study no. 9-709-009, July 7, 2009; Jonathan Stern, The Future of Russian Gas and Gazprom
(London: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2005).
Note s to Pag e s 6 5 7 4 209
74. Anders Aslund, Gazprom: Challenged Giant in Need of Reform, in Anders Aslund, Ser-
gei Guriev, and Andrew Kuchins, eds., Russia after the Global Economic Crisis (Washington,
DC: Peterson Institute, 2010), 154155.
75. Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Liov, Putin i Gazprom: Nezavisimyy Ekspertnyy Doklad,
Moscow, 2008, 8, http://www.milov.info/cp/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/putin-i-gaz-
prom.pdf.
76. See Sergei Guriev and Aleh Tsyvinski, Challenges Facing the Russian Economy after the Cri-
sis, in Anders Aslund, Sergei Guriev and Andrew Kuchins, eds., Russia after the Global Eco-
nomic Crisis (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2010), 938.
77. Authors interviews with Tajik journalists and think tank policy analysts, Dushanbe, May
2010. Also see Bruce Pannier, Dushanbe Scraps Contract with Russias RusAl, RFE/RL
August 30, 2007.
78. Marat Gurt and Olzhas Auyezov, Pipeline Blast Halts Turkmen Gas Exports to Russia,
Reuters, April 9, 2009.
79. U.S. Embassy Cable 09ASHGABAT495, Turkmen President Is Mightily Annoyed with
Gazprom. U.S. Embassy in Ashgabat, April 20, 2009, http://wikileaks.org/
cable/2009/04/09ASHGABAT495.html.
80. Tajikistan Demands the Release of Freight Cars, RIA Novosti, March 24, 2010.
81. John C. K. Daly, Russia Wades into Central Asian Water Dispute, UPI, January 30, 2009.
82. See Alexander Cooley, Behind the Central Asian Curtain: The Limits of Russias Resur-
gence, Current History 108, no. 720 (October 2009), 325332.
83. On the logic of divide and rule politics in international hierarchies, see Daniel Neon and
Thomas Wright, Whats at Stake in the American Empire Debate, American Political Sci-
ence Review 101, no. 2 (May 2007), 253271.
84. Tellingly, a report issued by INSOR, an influential think tank chaired by President Medve-
dev, observed that Uzbekistans special position constituted a significant barrier to
achieving consensus in CSTO decision-making. INSOR, ODKB: Otvetstvennaya Bezo-
pastnost, August 2011, 2225, http://www.insor-russia.ru/files/ODKB-0709.pdf.
85. Lo, Axis of Convenience.
86. See Richard Weitz, Why China Snubs Russia Arms, The Diplomat, April 5, 2010; Stephen
Fidler, Russian Weapons Sales to China Fall, Financial Times, March 30, 2008.
87. For a nuanced overview of CSTO and SCO relations, see Yulia Nikitina, ODKB i ShOS:
Konkurentsiya Formatov v Sfere Bezopasnosti na Postsovetskom Prostranstve, October 7,
2009, http://www.mgimo.ru/news/experts/document122805.phtml.
88. Ivan Safranchuk, The Competition for Security Roles in Central Asia, Russia in Global
Affairs 6, no. 1 ( JanuaryMarch 2008), 166.
89. Raffaello Pantucci and Alexandros Peterson, Russias Eastern Anxieties, New York Times,
October 17, 2011.
90. Kotkin elaborates: Beijing flatters Moscow with rhetoric about their strategic partnership
and coddles it by promoting the illusion of a multipolar world. In many ways, the Chinese-
Russian relationship today resembles that which first emerged in the seventeenth century:
a rivalry for influence in Central Asia alongside attempts to expand bilateral commercial
ties, with China in the catbird seat. Stephen Kotkin, The Unbalanced Triangle: What
Chinese-Russian Relations Mean for the United States, Foreign Affairs 88, no. 5 (Septem-
ber/October 2009), 130138.
91. Russia Ready for Transparent Cooperation in Central Asia, ITAR-TASS Daily, April 13, 2011.
Chapter 5
1. There is some disagreement as to how planned this regional strategy was. See the contrast-
ing views of David Kerr, Strategic Regionalism: Central Asian and Russian Perspectives
on Chinas Strategic Re-emergence, International Affairs 86, no. 1 ( January 2010), 127
152; and Zhaos important observation that Chinas Central Asia policy has been ad hoc
210 Note s to Pag e s 7 4 7 9
and lacked overall strategic coherence. Huasheng Zhao, Central Asia in Chinas Diplo-
macy, in Eugene Rumer, et al., Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow and Beijing
(Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2007).
2. Consistent with Bobo Los formulation, Sino-Russian relations in Central Asia have been a
pragmatic axis of convenience rather than a fully blown strategic alliance against the West.
Bobo Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics (Washington, DC:
Brookings, 2008).
3. On China as a new world power that undercuts Western norms and influence, see Stefan A.
Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How Chinas Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-
first Century (New York: Basic, 2010); Joshua Kurlantzick, How Chinas Soft Power Is Trans-
forming the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). For a response, see Edward S.
Steinfeld, Playing Our Game: Why Chinas Rise Doesnt Threaten the West (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010).
4. See, for example, Xinhua News Agency, Current Circumstance Underlines Need to
Enhance the Shanghai Spirit. June 15, 2009.
5. See Michael Clarke, Xinjiang and Chinas Rise in Central AsiaA History (New York: Rout-
ledge, 2011); James Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2009).
6. As quoted in Xinhua News Agency, Full Text of White Paper on Development and Pro-
gress in Xinjiang, September 21, 2009.
7. On Beijings regional policies, administrative techniques, and local reactions see the essays in
S. Frederick Starr, ed. Xinjiang: Chinas Muslim Borderland (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2004).
8. Information Office of the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China, East Turkistan
Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity, January 21, 2002, http://news.xinhuanet.com/
english/2002-01/21/content_247082.htm.
9. On the decline of Uighur violence after 1997, see James Milward, Violent Separatism in
Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment. East-West Center Washington, Policy Paper 6, 2004,
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/PS006.pdf.
10. These included a May 1998 bus bombing in Osh, the March 2000 assassination of the
leader of the Uighur migr community in Kyrgyzstan, and a May 2000 attack on a Chinese
delegation visiting Kyrgyzstan. See Milward, Eurasian Crossroads, 1922.
11. Nicolas Bequelin, Staged Development in Xinjiang, The China Quarterly 178 ( July 2004),
358378.
12. See Gal Raballand and Agns Andrsy, Why Should Trade Between Central Asia and
China Continue to Expand? Asia Europe Journal 5, no. 2 (May 2007), 232251.
13. Sean R. Roberts, A Land of Borderlands: Implications of Xinjiangs Cross-Border Trans-
actions, in Starr, ed. Xinjiang: Chinas Muslim Borderland (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe,
2004), 220225.
14. See Article 2 of the Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, http://www.
sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=69.
15. See, for example, Thomas Ambrosio, Catching the Shanghai Spirit: How the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization Promotes Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia, Europe-Asia
Studies 60, no. 8 (October 2008), 13211344.
16. In 2009, Belarus and Sri Lanka were awarded the title of Special Dialogue Partners.
17. Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 19802000 (Princ-
eton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
18. See Nargis Kassenova makes a similar point in her survey of Chinese aid projects. See Nargis
Kassenova, China as an Emerging Donor in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, Paris, IFRI Russia/
NIS Center, January 2009, http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=5257&id_
provenance=97.
19. Authors interview at the SCO Secretariat, Beijing, China, October 2009.
20. See Stephen Aris, The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Tackling the Three Evils,
Europe-Asia Studies 61, no. 3 (May 2009), 457482; and Zhao Huasheng, Security
Note s to Pag e s 7 9 8 2 211
40. Robert A. Pape, Soft Balancing Against the United States, International Security 30, no. 1
(Summer 2005), 10. For a critical response, see Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth,
Hard Times for Soft Balancing, International Security 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005), 72108.
41. See Beissinger, Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena.
42. Also see Lo, Axis of Convenience, 91114.
43. For an extended analysis, see Elizabeth Wishnick, Russia, China and the United States in
Central Asia: Prospects for Great Power Competition and Cooperation in Central Asia (Carl-
isle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2009).
44. Authors interview with a Russian newspaper correspondent who covered the Dushanbe
summit, Moscow, September 2009.
45. At the same time, Chinese and Central Asian officials overwhelmingly express the view
that Russia was justified in intervening in Georgia and that Tbilisi initiated the conflict. The
legal question of recognition of the breakaway territories, however, is considered as a sepa-
rate matter.
46. Authors interviews with Chinese analysts and SCO officials, Beijing, China, October
2009. On the declaration, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-07/11/con-
tent_11693625.htm. Also see Alexander Cooley, Cooperation Gets Shanghaied: China,
Russia and the SCO, Foreign Affairs, December 14, 2009.
47. See the resulting report by Alexander Knyazev, ed., Afghanistan, SCO, Security and the Geo-
politics of Central Asia (Bishkek: Alexander Knyazev Public Foundation, 2008).
48. Authors interviews with members of the SCO Secretariat, Beijing, China, October 2009.
49. Gavrilis, The Dynamics of Interstate Boundaries, 114117; and Nancy Lubin, Whos Watch-
ing the Watchdogs? Journal of International Affairs 56, no. 2 (Spring 2003), 4356.
50. Small, Chinas Caution on Afghanistan-Pakistan.
51. Prior to 9/11, Beijing maintained regular contacts with Taliban, but these ties were subse-
quently downgraded. Authors e-mail communication with Andrew Small, September 28,
2011. In 2007, British officials raised the concern that the Taliban were obtaining Chinese
weapons, but these appear to have been reexported via Iran. See Paul Danahar, Taleban
Getting Chinese Arms, BBC News, September 7, 2007.
52. Authors communications with Chinese Central Asia and Afghanistan experts at the 9th
SCO Academic conference, Shanghai, China, July 2009.
53. Authors question and answer session following a presentation at the Shanghai Academy of
Social Sciences, Shanghai, China, October 23, 2009.
54. Remarks made by Zhao Huasheng at the forum 10 Years of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization, Washington, DC, Center for International and Strategic Studies, May 4,
2011.
55. On the Central Asian cross-border shuttle trade, see Cross-Border Trade Within the Central
Asian Regional Cooperation (World Bank, Washington, DC, 2007) http://www.carecinsti-
tute.org/uploads/docs/Cross-Border-Trade-CAREC.pdf.
56. See Bartlomiej Kaminski and Gal Raballand, Entrepot for Chinese for Chinese Con-
sumer Goods in Central Asia: The Puzzle of Re-Exports through Kyrgyz Bazaars, Eurasian
Geography and Economics 50, no. 5 (2009), 581590.
57. According to international development experts interviewed by the author in Tajikistan in
May 2009, China is the largest single investor in Tajikistans transportation and power-
generating infrastructure.
58. Sebastien Peyrouse, Economic Aspects of the Chinese-Central Asia Rapprochement,
Silk Road Paper, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC, September 2007, 1315.
59. See Go West, Young Chinaman: Chin and Central Asia, The Economist, January 6, 2007.
60. Ben Judah, Dragon Meets Bear: Reshaping Central Asia, Prospect, February 3, 2011.
61. See Kassenova, China as an Emerging Donor in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, 1516, and
David Trilling, A Chinese Road to the Future? Eurasianet, July 31, 2007.
62. For representative examples, see Oksana Antonenko, The EU Should Not Ignore the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Centre for European Reform Policy Brief, May
Note s to Pag e s 8 8 9 5 213
83. On differing modes of regional integration, see Alexander Cooley and Hendrik Spruyt,
Contracting States: Sovereign Transfers in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2009).
Chapter 6
1. See Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve (Washington, DC:
Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 1999).
2. See Vladimir D. Shkolnikov, Missing the Big Picture? Retrospective on OSCE Strategic
Thinking in Central Asia, Security and Human Rights no. 4 (2009), 294306.
3. For a nuanced assessment of U.S. democracy assistance to Kyrgyzstan, see Thomas Wood,
Democracy Promotion in Central Asia: The Case of Kyrgyzstan. Paper presented to the
Eleventh Annual Conference of the Central Asian Studies Society, East Lansing (October
2010). On the weaknesses of Eurasian civil society and its implications for U.S. assistance,
see Thomas W. Simmons, Eurasias Frontiers: Young States, Old Societies, Uncertain Futures
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2008). On the tension between promoting values
and interests, see Alexander Cooley, Principles in the Pipeline: Managing Transatlantic
Values and Interests in Central Asia, International Affairs 84, No. 6 (November 2008),
11731188.
4. Kazakhstan, unlike its neighbors, did not ratify the treaties until 2005. The treaties are the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); International Covenant on
Economic, Cultural and Social Right (ICESCR); Convention on Childrens Rights; Con-
vention on the Liquidation of all Forms of Racial Discrimination; Convention on the Elimi-
nation of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women; and the Convention Against Torture.
5. Eugheniy Zhovtis, Democratisation and Human Rights in Central Asia: Problems, Pros-
pects and the Role of the International Community, Centre for European Policy Studies
Policy Briefs, No. 134 ( July 2007).
6. International legal expert Beth Simmons attributes the ratification of these treaties to the
Central Asian elites wanting to avoid being singled out by the international community, a
practice she refers to as social camouflage. See Beth Simmons, Mobilizing for Human
Rights (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 8890.
7. David Lewis, Temptations of Tyranny (New York: Columbia University Press 2008); Irina
Chernykh and Rustam Burnashev, Conditions for Securitization of International Ter-
rorism in Central Asia, Connections: The Quarterly Journal 4, no. 1 (Spring 2005), 131142.
8. Kim Lane Sheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations
of 9/11, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law (May 2004), 10011083.
9. The units included a special Internal Affairs counterterrorism unit known as Bars, which
had commanders that were trained in crisis-response in Louisiana in a State Department
sponsored program. See C. J. Chivers and Thom Shanker, Uzbek Ministries Received U.S.
Aid, New York Times, June 18, 2005.
10. Seth Jones, Olga Oliker, et al., Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform? U.S. Security Assistance
to Repressive and Transitioning Regimes, Washington DC; RAND, 2006. The authors con-
cluded that Uzbekistan clearly presents the challenges of undertaking a reform effort in a
state where corruption and human rights violations are endemic and political reform is
feared as a threat to the state,10.
11. On coalitional dynamics and logrolling, see Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cor-
nell University Press, 1995), 1719.
12. U.S. and Chinese officials have also fallen out over other designations, most notably over
returning 23 Uighurs detained at Guantanomo Bay as well as the status of the East Turkes-
tan Liberation Organization, which Beijing considers to be a terrorist group.
13. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, China and Russia Issue a Joint Statement, De-
claring the Trend of the Boundary Line Between the Two Countries Has Been Completely
Determined, October 14, 2004, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t165266.htm.
Note s to Pag e s 1 0 0 1 0 3 215
14. Andrei Soldatov and Irina Boragan, The New Nobility: The Restoration of Russias Security
States and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB (New York: PublicAffairs, 2010), 224.
15. See Gavin Sullivan and Ben Hayes. Blacklisted: Targeted Sanctions, Preemptive Security, and
Fundamental Rights (Berlin: European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights,
2009).
16. For overviews of these UN regimes, see Rosemary Foot, The United Nations, Counter
Terrorism, and Human Rights: Institutional Adaptation and Embedded Ideas, Human
Rights Quarterly 29, no. 2 (May 2007), 489514.
17. See Eminent Jurist Panel, Assessing Damage, Urging Action: Report of the Eminent Jurists
Panel on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights. Geneva: International Com-
mission of Jurists, 2009, 114118.
18. Sullivan and Hayes, Blacklisted, 2639.
19. Kim Sheppele, Other Peoples PATRIOT Acts: Europes Response to September 11,
Loyola Law Review 50 (2004), 89148, 92.
20. Human Rights in China, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights: The Impact of the Shang-
hai Cooperation Organization (New York: HRIC, March 2011), 8586.
21. Martin Scheinin, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Eco-
nomic, and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development (New York: United Na-
tions, February 4, 2009), 10.
22. Human Rights Watch, Eurasia: Uphold Human Rights in Combating Terrorism: Shanghai
Cooperation Organization Must Not Punish Peaceful Dissent, New York: July 14, 2006.
23. Vladimir Bogdanov, Bezopasnost Po Spisku, Rossiskaya Gazeta, March 5, 2011.
24. See Kenneth Roth, The Law of War in the War on Terror, Foreign Affairs 83, no. 2 (March/
April 2004), 28.
25. See: http://projects.washingtonpost.com/guantanamo/search/. Most of the Russian citi-
zens appear to have been of Central Asian origin. Of these, all but one Tajik, one Russian,
and five Chinese nationals were released; two Uzbeks were repatriated to Ireland, while six
Chinese Uighurs were sent to the Pacific island of Palau, over the strong objections of the
Chinese government.
26. See Center for Constitutional Rights, Foreign Interrogators in Guantanamo Bay, avail-
able at: http://ccrjustice.org/files/Foreign%20Interrogators%20in%20Guantanamo%20
Bay_1.pdf (accessed April 11, 2011).
27. Center for Constitutional Rights, Foreign Interrogators in Guantanamo Bay, 2.
28. See Asams Combatant Status Review Tribunal Transcript, December 6, 2004. Available at:
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/672-zakirjan-asam/documents/4
(accessed September 12, 2011).
29. Raffi Khatchadourian, Terror at Jaslyk, The Nation, April 26, 2004.
30. This is one of the main arguments presented in Craig Murray, Murder in Samarkand (Lon-
don: Mainstream Publishing, 2006). Murray has questioned whether the acceptance of
such intelligence itself constituted a breach of the UKs commitment to the Convention
Against Torture.
31. For the text, see: The Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Extremism and
Separatism, May 7, 2009. Available at: http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=68
(accessed April 2, 2011).
32. SCO Convention on Combating Terrorism, Articles VII and VIII.
33. The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (RATS
SCO, Agentura.ru. Available at: http://www.agentura.ru/english/dossier/ratssco/
(accessed April 10, 2011).
34. The HRIC notes, Through the use of such blacklists, an SCO member state may bypass
the step of independently determining according to law whether an individual has com-
mitted an act of terrorism; rather, another countrys identification of the individual as a
terrorist will suffice. HRIC, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights: The Impact of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 87.
216 Note s to Pag e s 1 0 4 1 0 6
35. See Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: the Secret History of Americas Extraordinary
Renditions Program, New Yorker, February 14, 2005.
36. See Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the
Rule of Law, George Washington Law Review 75, no. 56 (2006), 13331368.
37. Dick Marty, Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-state Transfers of Detainees Involving
Council of Europe Member States, Report Prepared for the Council of Europe Parliamentary
Assembly, June 12, 2006.
38. Mayer, Outsourcing Torture.
39. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the
Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004), 531.
40. Marty, Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-state Transfers of Detainees Involving
Council of Europe Member States, 20.
41. See also Giovanni Claudio Fava, On the Flights Operated by the CIA in Europe, European
Parliament Temporary Committee on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA
for the Transport and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, Working Document 4, January 6, 2006.
42. Stephen Grey, Ghost Plane: The True Story of the CIA Torture Program (New York: St. Mar-
tins, 2006), 181. Murray estimates that from 2003 to 2004, CIA flights flew to Tashkent
often, usually twice a week. See Don Von Natta, Jr. US Recruits a Rough Ally to Be a
Jailer, New York Times, May 1, 2005.
43. Presidents Press Conference, The White House, March 16, 2005, http://www.white-
house.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050316-3.html.
44. Intelligence Officer Claims That CIA Was Complicit in Torture in Uzbekistan, The Scot-
land Herald, September 13, 2008.
45. Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the Worlds Most Powerful Mercenary Army (New
York: Nation, 2008), 326327.
46. Gabor Steingart, Merchants of Death: Memos Reveal Details of Blackwaters Targeted
Killings Program, Spiegel, August 24, 2009.
47. Deirdre Tynan, Airlines with Ties to Blackwater Has Long Record of Service in the
Region, Eurasianet, March 21, 2010.
48. Fava 2006, 6. Among the destinations reviewed from 32 monitored flight codes from 2001
to 2005 that were linked to the transportation of prisoners, 70 were to Azerbaijan, 52 to
Turkmenistan and 46 to Uzbekistan.
49. State Security Without Borders, [GB bez granits] Novaya Gazeta, August 21, 2008.
50. See HRIC, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights: The Impact of the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organization, 2011; Human Rights Watch, Saving its Secrets: Government Repression
in Andijan (New York: Human Rights Watch, May 2008); and Human Rights Watch,
Application No. 2947/06: Ismoilov and Others vs. Russia. July 24, 2007.
51. For a list of documented examples and a time line, see the Moscow-based Human Rights
Organization, Timeline of Illegal Expulsions of Refugees from Russia to their Countries
of their Origin, August 2008, http://hro.org/files/Timeline_ENG.doc.
52. For details of individual cases, see HRIC, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights; and
Statement by Dolkun Isa, Uighur Situation in Central Asian Countries. OSCE Human
Dimension Implementation Meeting, Warsaw September 25, 2007. On the Celil case, see
Madeline Earp, Prisoner Profile: Huseyin Celil, Human Rights in China. Available at:
http://hrichina.org/sites/default/files/oldsite/PDFs/CRF.4.2006/CRF-2006-4_Profile.
pdf (accessed July 3, 2011).
53. Soldatov and Boragan, The New Nobility, 224.
54. See Memorial Human Rights Center, Fabrication of Islamic Extremism Criminal Cases
in Russia: Campaign Continues, April 15, 2007.
55. For details, see Memorial Human Rights Center, Alisher Usmanov, who was abducted
from Kazan, was sentenced in Uzbekistan for 8 years, November 11, 2005.
56. Cpyetssluzhby byvshyevo soyuza na territorii Rossii, Novaya Gazeta, February 27,
2006.
Note s to Pag e s 1 0 7 1 1 3 217
57. For case facts and details, see European Court of Human Rights, Case of Iskanadarov vs. Russia,
Application no. 17185/05, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4ca1d1e52.pdf.
58. Borogan, State Security Without Borders.
59. Soldatov and Boragan, The New Nobility, 218219.
60. Irina Borogan, With Friends Like These, Who Needs Enemies, Ezhednevni Journal,
November 7, 2008.
61. The New Nobility, 225226.
62. For case background and details, see: European Court of Human Rights, Case of Ismoilov
and Others vs. Russia, Application no. 2947/06. April 24, 2008; Vitaliy Ponomarev, Ref-
ugees from Uzbekistan in the CIS (20052007) (Moscow: Memorial Human Rights
Center, September 2007).
63. See European Court of Human Rights, Muminov vs. Russia. Application no. 42502/06.
November 12, 2008.
64. Thomas Ambrosio, Authoritarian Backlash: Russian Resistance to Democratization in the
Former Soviet Union (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009).
65. See Michael McFaul, Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Color Rev-
olutions, International Security 32, no. 2 (2007), 4583; and Valerie Bunce and Sharon
Wolchik, International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions, Communist
and Postcommunist Studies 39, no. 3 (September 2006), 283304.
66. This paragraph draws extensively on: International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, Cen-
tral Asia: Human Rights Groups Facing Increasingly Restrictive Legislation. February 2006.
67. Figures from website (www.uzngo.info) as cited in U.S. Embassy Cable, 07TASHKENT1817,
Embassy in Tashkent. October 22, 2007, http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2007/10/
07TASHKENT1817.html.
68. U.S. Embassy Cable, 05DUSHANBE72, Embassy in Dushanbe, October 20, 2005,
http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2005/10/05DUSHANBE1702.html.
69. See Shkolnikov, Missing the Big Picture? 298301; Alexander Warkotsch, The OSCE as
an Agent of Socialization? International Norm Dynamics and Political Change in Central
Asia, Europe-Asia Studies 55, no. 5 ( July 2007), 829846.
70. Authors copy of the memorandum.
71. Wood, Democracy Promotion in Central Asia; Edward Schatz, The Soft Authoritarian
Tool Kit: Agenda Setting Power in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Comparative Politics 41,
no. 2 ( January 2009), 213.
72. Survey conducted on a 6-point scale, with 1 labeled the most valuable and 6 the least
valuable. These figures combine category 1 and 2 responses. See Nancy Lubin and Arustan
Joldastov, Snapshots from Central Asia: Is America Losing in Public Opinion? Problems
of Post-Communism 57, no. 3 (May/June 2010), 53.
73. Vladislav Surkov, Suvereniteteto politicheski sinonim konkurentnosposobnosti,
Moscow News, March 3, 2006.
74. Andrei Okara, Sovereign Democracy: A New Russian Idea or PR Project? Russia in
Global Affairs 5, no. 3 (2007), 820.
75. Nursultan Nazarbaev, Democracy Cannot Be Proclaimed, It Must Be Lived Through,
Geneva Diplomatic Magazine, January 2003, http://www.akorda.kz/ru/speeches/articles/
democracy_cannot_be_proclaimed_it_has_to_evolve_from.
76. Interview of the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev, with Interfax, Russian
Newspaper, and the TV station Vesti, undated, http://www.akorda.kz/ru/speeches/inter-
views/interveyu_prezidenta_kazaxstana_nwrswltana_nazarbaeva.
77. See the founding Declaration of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, June 15, 2001.
For a critique of the Shanghai Spirit, see Thomas Ambrosio, Catching the Shanghai
Spirit: How the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Promotes Authoritarian Norms,
Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 8 (September 2008), 13211344.
78. See, for example, the cable describing a 2008 meeting between Karimov and U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State Richard Boucher. U.S. Embassy Cable, 08Tashkent624, Karimov to
218 Note s to Pag e s 1 1 3 1 1 9
Boucher: Progress Possible, But Not Under Sanctions Embassy. Embassy in Tashkent,
June 5, 2008, http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08TASHKENT624.html.
79. Edward Schatz and Renan Levine, Framing, Public Diplomacy and Anti-Americanism in
Central Asia, International Studies Quarterly 54, no. 3 (September 2010), 855869.
80. Schatz and Levine, Framing, Public Diplomacy and Anti-Americanism in Central Asia,
866.
81. Rick Fawn, Battle over the Box: International Election Observation Missions, Political
Competition, and Retrenchment in the post-Soviet space, International Affairs 82, no. 6
(November 2006), 11331153.
82. Declaration by the Nine Heads of State, Appeal of the CIS Member States for the
OSCE Partners, adopted in Astana, 526th Plenary Meeting of the PC, September 23,
2004, PC.Jour/562/Corr.1, available at: http://www.belarusembassy.org/news/
digests/pr092004.html.
83. See SCO Mission: Elections Were Free & Transparent, Uzbek Consulate, December 25,
2007; and CIS Mission: Elections Were Important For Further Democratization of
Public Life In Uzbekistan, Jahon Information Agency, December 26, 2007.
84. OSCE, OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report, April 23,
2008, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/uzbekistan/31600.
85. Judith Kelley, The More the Merrier? The Effects of Having Multiple International Elec-
tion Monitoring Organizations, Perspectives on Politics 7, no. 1 (2009), 5963.
86. On the importance of this standard and the question of credibility, see Susan Hyde, The
Pseudo-Democrats Dilemma: Why Election Observation Became and International Norm
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).
87. See the 2010 ODIHR Handbook, at: http://www.osce.org/files/documents/5/e/68439.
pdf
Chapter 7
1. See David Lewis, The Temptations of Tyranny in Central Asia (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 2008).
2. See, for instance, Philip Pan, Russia Is Said to Have Fueled Unrest in Kyrgyzstan, Wash-
ington Post, April 12, 2010; and Ariel Cohen, Obamas Stake in the Second Kyrgyz Revo-
lution, Wall Street Journal, April 12, 2010.
3. Samuel Huntington. Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1968).
4. For a review, see Ken Hurwitz, Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability, Compar-
ative Politics 5, no. 3 (April 1973), 449463.
5. Keith M. Dowding and Richard Kimber, The Meaning and Use of Political Stability,
European Journal of Political Research 1, no. 3 (September 1983), 229243.
6. On the Kazakh case, see Edward Schatz, Access by Accident: Legitimacy Claims and De-
mocracy Promotion in Authoritarian Central Asia, International Review of Political Science
27, no. 3 (2006), 263284. On Turkmenistan see Luca Anceschi, Turkmenistans Foreign
Policy: Positive Neutrality and the Consolidation of the Turkmen Regime (London: Routledge,
2008).
7. See Scott Radnitz, Weapons of the Wealthy: Predatory Regimes and Elite-Led Protests in Cen-
tral Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press).
8. On patronage and repression in Uzbekistan, see Eric McGlinchey, Chaos, Violence, Dynasty:
Politics and Islam in Central Asia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011).
9. See Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth: Business and State Labor Remittance and
Oil Economies, International Organization 43, no. 1 (December 1989), 101145.
10. See, respectively, Barnett Rubins account of the breakdown of Soviet-era patronage net-
works and the onset of the Tajik Civil War and Eric McGlincheys account of Kyrgyzstans
shift from foreign aid dependence, during the first decade of Akayevs tenure, to a more
Note s to Pag e s 1 1 9 1 2 3 219
27. U.S. Embassy Cable 08BISHKEK1002, U.S under Enormous Pressure from Russia.
U.S. Embassy in Bishkek. October 2, 2008, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/
08BISHKEK1002.html.
28. U.S. Embassy Cable 09BISHKEK744, Russia Offers Kyrgyzstan $2.5 billion to Shut
Down Manas Airbase. U.S. Embassy in Bishkek. July 9, 2009, http://www.wikileaks.org/
cable/2009/07/09BISHKEK744.html.
29. U.S. Embassy Cable 09MOSCOW1827, The GORs Secret Visit to Kyrgyzstan.
U.S. Embassy in Moscow, July 15, 2009, http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/
09MOSCOW1827.html.
30. U.S. Embassy Cable 09BISHKEK108, What Does Bakiyev Really Want for the Base?
Maybe Only $450 Million. U.S. Embassy in Bishkek, February 5, 2009, http:// wikileaks.
org/cable/2009/02/09BISHKEK108.html.
31. U.S. Embassy Cable 09BISHKEK131, Manas, Moscow, and Money: A Proposal.
U.S. Embassy in Bishkek, February 12, 2009, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/
09BISHKEK131.html.
32. U.S. Embassy Cable 09BISHKEK131.
33. For details on the final negotiations, see U.S. Embassy Cable 09BISHKEK299, Kyrgyz-
stan: Provisional Agreement Reached to Continue Operations at Manas. U.S. Embassy in
Bishkek, April 4, 2009, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09BISHKEK299.html.
34. Deirdre Tynan, Corruption Crackdown Intensifies in Bishkek, Eurasianet, November 2,
2010.
35. U.S. Embassy Cable 09BISHKEK157, (C) Kyrgyz Presidents Son Alleges Interests in the
U.S.-Manas Deal. U.S. Embassy in Bishkek, February 23, 2009, http://wikileaks.org/
cable/2009/02/09BISHKEK157.html.
36. U.S. Embassy Cable 09BISHKEK744, Kyrgyzstan: Dinner at Maxims. U.S. Embassy in
Bishkek, July 9, 2009, http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09BISHKEK744.html.
37. U.S. Embassy Cable 09BISHKEK744.
38. U.S. Embassy Cable 09BISHKEK1065, Lunch with Max: Soup to Nuts. U.S. Embassy in
Bishkek, September 22, 2009, http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09BISHKEK
1065.htm.
39. Mystery at Manas: Strategic Blind Spots in the Department of Defenses Fuel Contracts in
Kyrgyzstan, Report of the Majority Staff, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign
Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Report. (Washington, D.C.: December
2010), 30.
40. See Uzbekistan Throws Temper Tantrum over New Russian Base in Kyrgyzstan, Eur-
asianet, August 3, 2009.
41. OSCE, Kyrgyz Republic Presidential Election OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation
Mission Final Report, July 23, 2009, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/kyrgyz-
stan/39923.
42. See Erica Marat, Kyrgyzstan, Nations in Transit 2009 (New York: FreedomHouse, 2009),
284299.
43. On the Tulip Revolution and international actors, see David Lewis, Dynamics of Regime
Change: Domestic and International Factors in the Tulip Revolution, Central Asian Sur-
vey 27, no. 34 (September 2008), 265277.
44. See U.S. Embassy Cable 09BISHKEK1201, Kyrgyzstan Proposes Joint Counterterrorism
Center in the South. U.S. Embassy in Bishkek, November 16, 2009, http://wikileaks.org/
cable/2009/11/09BISHKEK1201.html.
45. Deirdre Tynan, U.S. Intends to Construct Military Training Center at Batken, Eurasianet,
March 3, 2010.
46. A helpful list has been compiled by Ryskelde Satke. Russian Media Offensive, Pre and
Post-Crisis Kyrgyzstan, http://agonist.org/20101129/russian_media_offensive_pre_
post_crisis_kyrgyzstan
47. Otets i Syn, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 2, 2009.
Note s to Pag e s 1 2 9 1 3 8 221
48. See Mystery at Manas, 46; and David Trilling and Chinghiz Umetov, Is Putin Punishing
Bakiyev? Eurasianet, April 5, 2010.
49. See Eugene Huskey, If You Want to Understand Kyrgyzstan, Read This, Salon, April 9,
2010.
50. Authors interviews with Kyrgyz Interim Government officials, Bishkek, May 2010.
51. Steve Crabtree, U.S. Approval Gains Intact in Most CIS Countries, Gallup, March 9,
2011, http://www.gallup.com/poll/146528/Approval-Gains-Intact-CIS-Countries.aspx.
52. Authors interviews with Kyrgyz Interim Government officials, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, May
2010.
53. Detailed accounts of the historical origins and proximate causes of the violence are given
in: Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission, Report of the Independent International Commis-
sion of Inquiry into the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, http://www.kic.org/
images/stories/kic_report_english_final.pdf; Neil Melvin, Promoting a Stable and Mul-
tiethnic Kyrgyzstan: Overcoming the Causes and Legacies of Violence, Central Eurasia
Working Paper Series, No. 3. March 2011; and International Crisis Group, The Pogroms
in Kyrgyzstan, ICG Asia Report no. 193, August 23, 2010.
54. Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission, Report of the Independent International Commission
of Inquiry into the Events in Southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010.
55. Eric McGlinchey, Exploring Regime Instability and Ethnic Violence in Kyrgyzstan, Asia
Policy no. 12 ( July 2011), 7998.
Chapter 8
1. See Keith Darden, The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Informal Institution,
Politics & Society 36, no. 1 (March 2008), 3560.
2. For an overview of the so-called resource curse arguments and literature, see Michael L.
Ross, The Political Economy of the Resource Curse, World Politics 51, no. 2 (1999), 297
322. For an examination of the issue in Central Asia, see Svetlana Tsalik, ed., Caspian Oil
Windfalls: Who Will Benefit? (New York: Open Society Institute, 2003). On the institution-
alization of international aid, corruption, and patrimonialism in Africa, see Nicolas van de
Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 19791999 (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2001).
3. See Edward C. Chow and Leigh E. Hendrik, Central Asias Pipelines: Field of Dreams and
Reality, in Ed Chow et al., Pipeline Politics in Asia: The Intersection of Demand, Energy Mar-
kets, and Supply Routes (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, September 2010).
4. See Kazakhstan Ends Tax Break after China Cut from Project, Platts Oilgram News, May
19, 2003.
5. See Kimberly Marten, Russian Efforts to Control Kazakhstans Oil: The Kumkol Case,
Post-Soviet Affairs 27, no. 1 (2007), 1837.
6. As quoted in Gazprom, CNPC Circle Kazakhstans Oil Fields Like Vultures, Leak Shows,
Bloomberg, December 1, 2010.
7. David Chaikin and J. C. Sharman, Corruption and Money Laundering: A Symbiotic Conver-
gence (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 1.
8. On the contours and politics of the offshore realm, see Ronen Palan, Richard Murphy, and
Christian Chavagneux, Tax Havens: How Globalization Really Works (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2010); Jason Sharman, Offshore and the New International Political
Economy, Review of International Political Economy 17, no. 1 ( January 2010), 119.
9. John Heathershaw, Tajikistan Amidst Globalization: State Failure or State Transforma-
tion? Central Asian Survey 30, no. 1 (March 2011), 147168.
10. Megan Murphy, Tajikistan Turns on Rusal after TALCO Deal, Financial Times, November
28, 2008.
11. Data from National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan, as of June 22, 2011, accessed at
http://www.nationalbank.kz/?docid=680.
222 Note s to Pag e s 1 3 8 1 4 1
12. See Jason C. Sharman, Chinese Capital Flows and Offshore Centers, Pacific Review, (forth-
coming 2013); William Vlsek, Byways and Highways of Direct Investment: China and the
Offshore World, Journal of Chinese Current Affairs 39, no. 4 (2010), 112114.
13. See Global Witness, Its a Gas: Funny Business in the Turkmen-Ukraine Gas Trade, Lon-
don and Washington, DC, April 2006. According to a leaked U.S. Embassy cable, Itera also
allegedly gifted Turkmenistans new president a 60 million euro luxury yacht. See U.S.
Embassy Cables: President of Turkmenistan Wanted Abramovich-style Yacht, The
Guardian, December 2, 2010.
14. The most detailed investigative analysis of Giffens role can be found in Steve LeVine, The
Oil and the Glory: the Pursuit of Empire and Fortune on the Caspian Sea (New York: Random
House, 2007).
15. Seymour Hersh, The Price of Oil: What was Mobil up to in Kazakhstan and Russia? The
New Yorker, July 9, 2001, 51. Giffen was also the model for the shady middleman played by
Tim Blake Nelson in the popular movie Syriana (2005).
16. Hersh, The Price of Oil, 51; and LeVine, Oil and the Glory, 288289.
17. For a fascinating account of this investigative trail, see Levine, Oil and the Glory, 374377;
and Steve Levine and Bill Powell, Following the Monday; Behind the Case That Wont Go
Away. New Clues on the Trial of Oil and Cash, Newsweek, July 24, 2000.
18. United States of America v. James H. Giffen, United States District Court, Southern District
of New York, 473 F.3d. April 2, 2003. All case material accessed at: http://www.justice.
gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/giffen-etal.html. LeVine notes that the cash payments
were greater as they included bonuses paid by European companies, but these were not
illegal at the time according to European bribery laws. LeVine Oil and the Glory, 375.
19. United States of America v. James H. Giffen, at paragraph 32.
20. United States of America v. James H. Giffen, at paragraphs 1517.
21. Kenneth Gilpin, Former Mobil Executive Pleads Guilty to Tax Evasion, New York Times,
June 13, 2003.
22. Jeff Gerth, U.S. Businessman Is Accused of Oil Bribes to Kazakhstan, New York Times,
April 1, 2003.
23. Ron Stodghill, Oil, Cash and Corruption, New York Times, November 5, 2006; and
Nursultan Nazarbayev in Kazakhgate Cover-up, Kommersant, September 26, 2006.
24. See U.S. Embassy Cable, 07ASTANA1430, Kazakhstan Economic and Energy Update,
April 29May 12, 2007. U.S. Embassy in Astana, May 28, 2007, http://wikileaks.org/
cable/2007/05/07ASTANA1430.html.
25. See Bribery Case Hinges on National Security, Washington Times, December 17, 2005;
and Stodghill, Oil, Cash and Corruption.
26. See Elizabeth Spahn, Discovering Secrets: Act of State Defenses to Bribery Cases, Hofstra
Law Review 38, no. 1 (2009) 163210.
27. U.S. Department of Justice, New York Merchant Bank Pleads Guilty to FCPA Violation;
Bank Chairman Pleads Guilty to Failing to Disclose Control of Foreign Bank Account,
August 6, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/August/10-crm-909.html.
28. David Glovin, Cold War Patriot Defense Helps Oil Man Beat U.S. Bribe Charge, Bloom-
berg, December 16, 2010.
29. See Guy Chazan, Kazakh Spat Casts Light on China Deals: Exiled Banker Alleges Chinese
Oil Firm Routed $166 Million to Associate of Top Oil Executive, as Part of 2003 State Sell,
Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2010. Also see Steve LeVines blog commentary on the case
after a personal review of these documents. Steve LeVine, China, $165 Million and
Kazakhstans Second Son-in-Law, Oil and Glory (weblog), March 27, 2010, http://
stevelevine.info/2010/03/china-165-million-and-kazakhstans-second-son-in-law-2.
30. Mukhamedhzan Adil, Baksheesh Dlya Zyatya? Respublika, January 22, 2010, http://
www.respublika-kaz.biz/news/polit_process/3626/
31. CNPC Pays $140-mil for Control of Caspian Unit, Platts Oilgram News, October 13,
2005.
Note s to Pag e s 1 4 1 1 4 4 223
32. Chazan, Kazakh Spat Casts Light on China Deals; Levine, China, $165 Million and
Kazakhstans Second Son-in-Law. Also see Ablyazovs open letter to Chinese officials,
Naydite i Nakazhite Vzyatkodatele! Respublika, February 1, 2010, http://respublika-kz.
info/news/politics/7371.
33. See Kazakh Newspapers Seized for Alleging Corruption by Presidents Son-In-Law, RFE/
RL, February 2, 2010.
34. As laid out in Ablyazovs Letter to the Chair of the UK Parliamentary Committee on For-
eign Affairs. HR 217: Letter to the Chair from Mukhtar Ablyazov, March 9, 2010, at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmfaff/memo/
human/m21702.htm.
35. CNPC Says It Complied with Laws in 2003 Kazakh Deal, Reuters, March 12, 2010.
36. I am thankful to Steve Levine for his insights on this point.
37. See Alexander Cooley Manas Hysteria: Why the United States Cant Keep Buying Off
Kyrgyz Leaders to Keep its Vital Base Open, Foreign Policy, April 12, 2010.
38. Authors briefing with base officials at the Manas Transit Center, Kyrgyzstan, June 15,
2011.
39. Mystery at Manas: Strategic Blind Spots in the Department of Defenses Fuel Contracts in
Kyrgyzstan. Washington D.C.: Report of the Majority Staff, Subcommittee on National Se-
curity and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government, December 2010, ii.
40. Mystery at Manas, 1112.
41. David Cloud, Pentagons Fuel Deal Is Lesson in Risks of Graft-Prone Regions, New York
Times, November 15, 2005.
42. Aram Roston, A Crooked Alliance in the War on Terror? NBC News, October 30, 2006.
According to reports by their U.S. banks, Manas and Aalam are tied to transactions with
arms traffickers, Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) and a myriad of suspicious U.S. shell
companies associated with the Akaev Organization.
43. Mystery at Manas, 2628. Under Bakiyev, units of Manas International Services were
renamed Aircraft Petrol Management (APM) and then Aero Fuels Service (AFS), both
managed by a new company, Kyrgyz Aviation Services (KAS). In 2007, Red Star broke the
duopoly of the suppliers by setting up, through KAS, a direct supply off-loading header
around the perimeter of the base. Soon after Aalam and MIS were phased out and the
supply subcontract was managed by a new company, Manas Aerofuels, which was 50%
owned by an employee of Mina and Red Star, and 50% owned by a subsidiary of the Rus-
sian giant Gazprom (apparently unbeknown to DLA-Energy). In 2008, Mina apparently
advanced money to Manas Aerofuels to purchase the storage facilities surrounding the
base, while it also formed two additional supply companies.
44. See Deirdre Tynan, Deconstructing Manas Fuel Suppliers Corporate Structures, Eur-
asianet, May 3, 2010. Interestingly, these offices shared the same address as Iraq Today, a
newspaper that briefly circulated after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.
45. In 2007 Minas net current assets were valued at just 8,390 UK pounds, while in 2009 the
total number of Mina shares was 20,002 shares, which were valued at 20,002 pounds. See
Tynan, Deconstructing Manas Fuel Suppliers Corporate Structures.
46. Mystery at Manas, 1213.
47. Authors personal communications with Ronald Uscher, lawyer to IOTC. Also see Aram
Roston, Fueling the Afghan War, The Nation, April 21, 2010.
48. Department of the Army, Memorandum of Understanding Between Red Star Enterprises
Limited, Joint Logistics Command, and Task Force Cincinnatus, Bagram Airfield, Afghan-
istan, unspecified date. Agreement signed and dated by [redacted parties] September 19,
October 3 and October 23, 2007.
49. The author testified on April 22, 2010, at the Subcommittee on Security and Foreign Rela-
tions, Committee of Oversights first hearing. Testimony at http://democrats.oversight.
house.gov/images/stories/subcommittees/NS_Subcommittee/4.22.2010_Crisis_in_
Kyrgyzstan/Cooley_Testimony.pdf.
224 Note s to Pag e s 1 4 4 1 5 1
50. John Tierney, Letter Presenting Final Report, in Mystery at Manas, ii.
51. Mystery at Manas, 23.
52. Mystery at Manas, 3.
53. Chuck Squires described the fuel certification scheme that flouted Russian law in the fol-
lowing manner: We got one over on em. I am an old Cold Warrior, Im proud of it, we
beat the Russians, and we did it for four or five years. Obviously it was not without their
knowledge. If they looked at the volumes, they had to know where this was all going. But
they were making money and they were all happy, Mystery at Manas, 45.
54. This contrast between officially contested high politics and behind the scenes smuggling
networks parallels Andreass observations of the dynamics of the siege of Sarajevo. See
Peter Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sara-
jevo (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).
55. Andrew E. Kramer, Kyrgyzstan Opens an Inquiry into Fuel Sales to a U.S. Base, New York
Times, May 4, 2010.
56. Roston, Fueling the Afghan War.
57. Otunbayeva Pledges to End Corrupt Fuel Deliveries to Transit Center, Interfax, January
24, 2011.
58. Scott Horton, Base Politics and Fuel Contracts: The United States-Kyrgyzstan Relation-
ship in Flux. Prepared remarks for the conference How Central Is Central Asia? Third
Annual Russia/Eurasia Davis Center-Harriman Institute Forum, Columbia University,
New York, October 25, 2010.
59. See Andrew Higgins, Kyrgyz Contracts Fly under the Radar, Washington Post, November
1, 2010; Richard Orange, Kyrgyz President Accuses U.S. Fuel Supplier of Trying to Cor-
rupt Her Son, The Telegraph, January 24, 2011.
60. Glenn Kessler and Andrew Higgins, U.S. Will Give a Share of the Fuel Contract to Kyrgyz-
stan, Clinton Says, Washington Post, December 3, 2010.
61. Deirdre Tynan, Is Manas Fuel Supplier Pulling Out? Eurasianet, June 23, 2011.
62. See Centralasia.ru, Korruptsionnye skhemy pri postavkakh aviatopliva na aviabazu Manas
v Kirgizii, February 8, 2011.
63. $1,268 represents the authors best calculations for final purchase price per metric ton.
According to the Manas Transit Center web site, DLA paid Mina $3.73 per gallon for fuel.
The weight of aviation fuel varies by quality and temperature. According to ExxonMobil,
Russian TS-1 jet fuel has a density of 0.70 kg/liter, World Jet Fuel Specifications, at http://
www.exxonmobil.com/AviationGlobal/Files/WorldJetFuelSpecifications2005.pdf, 21.
64. Centralasia.ru, Korruptsionnye skhemy pri postavkakh aviatopliva. In 2010, TKZ pur-
chased a total of 23,000 tons of fuel, with only 7,000 tons purchased directly from the
Russian supplier GazpromAero, while 16,000 were purchased from Mega Oil.
Chapter 9
1. On strategic regionalism, see David Kerr, Strategic Regionalism: Central Asian and Rus-
sian Perspectives on Chinas Strategic Re-emergence, International Affairs 86, no. 1 ( Janu-
ary 2010), 127152.
2. Roy Allison, Virtual Regionalism, Regional Structures and Regime Security in Central
Asia Central Asian Survey 27, no. 2 ( June 2008), 185202. On the social construction of
regions and their boundaries more broadly, see Rick Fawn, ed., Globalising the Regional:
Regionalising the Global (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Peter J. Katzen-
stein, A World of Regions: Europe and Asia in the American Imperium (Ithaca. NY: Cornell
University Press, 2005).
3. On types of sovereignty, see Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1999).
4. On so-called juridical sovereignty and African states, see Peter Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty,
International Relations and the Third World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
Note s to Pag e s 1 5 1 1 5 6 225
5. Authors interviews with members of the Kyrgyz interim government, Bishkek, May 2010.
6. For overviews, see Alexander Cooley, Logics of Hierarchy: The Organization of Empires,
States and Military Occupations (Ithaca, NY Cornell University Press, 2005); Oksana Dmi-
trieva, Regional Development: The USSR and After (London: UCL Press, 1996); Boris
Rumer, Central Asia: A Tragic Experiment (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990).
7. Gregory Gleason, Russia and the Politics of the Central Asian Electricity Grid, Problems
of Post-Communism 50, no. 3 (May/June 2003), 4252.
8. For an overview of the water issue, see Samuel Chan, Pyrrhic Victory in the Tournament
of Shadows: Central Asias Quest for Water Security, Asian Security 6, no. 2 (2010), 121
145. On the social and political problems of the cotton sector, see Deniz Kandiyoti, ed., The
Cotton Sector in Central Asia: Economic Policy and Developmental Changes. London: Pro-
ceedings of a conference held at the School of African and Oriental Studies, 2008. On re-
lated regional environmental challenges, see Erica Weinthal, State Making and
Environmental Cooperation: Linking Domestic and International Politics in Central Asia
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002).
9. Indeed, as Weinthal (2002) argues, even in supposedly more successful cases of regional
cooperation, such as designing a response to the catastrophic disappearance of the Aral
Sea, Central Asian officials crafted a set of ad hoc regional arrangements, funded by the in-
ternational community, that required the redistribution of international assistance to local
elites, along traditional patronage lines, to buy their participation. The end result was polit-
ically efficient, but environmentally inefficient.
10. See Crisis Group, Central Asia: Decay and Decline, Crisis Group Asia Report no. 201,
Brussels, February 21, 2011.
11. U.S. Embassy Cable 09TASHKENT1577, Uzbek Rail: Red Hot Wheels to Afghani-
stan. U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, November 12, 2009, http://wikileaks.org/
cable/2009/11/09TASHKENT1577.html.
12. See Stephen Blank, Infrastructural Policy and National Strategies in Central Asia: The
Russian Example, Central Asian Survey 23, 34 (2004), 225248.
13. Luke Harding, U.S. Opens Route to Afghanistan Through Russias Backyard, The
Guardian, March 29, 2009.
14. See The New Silk Road, Newsweek, May 10, 2010.
15. For overviews on state-centered approaches to regional integration, see Alexander Cooley
and Hendrik Spruyt, Contracting States: Sovereign Transfers in International Relations (Princ-
eton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration:
Europe and Beyond (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Andrew Moravcsik,
The Choice for Europe: State Power and Social Purpose from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
16. For further elaboration, see Kathleen Collins, Economic and Security Regionalism among
Patrimonial Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of Central Asia, Europe-Asia Studies 61, no.
2 (March 2009), 249281.
17. Asian Development Bank, Central Asia: Increasing Gains from Trade Through Cooperation in
Regional Trade Policy, Transport and Customs Transit. Manila, 2006. Figures 3.2 and 3.3,
2930.
18. United States Chamber of Commerce, Survey of Investment Climate, Transport & Trade
Facilitation. Prepared for the Eurasian Business Platform, February 2008, http://www.
uschamber.com/sites/default/files/international/files/amchamsurvey.pdf.
19. Other Eurasian countries in the sample were Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and
Ukraine. No other Central Asian countries were included.
20. Malika Rakhmanova, Complex Customs and Transportation Procedures Breeding
Ground for Corruption, Says Expert, ASIA-Plus, June 17, 2008. Unofficial payments to the
regions customs services varied somewhat, with Uzbek customs officers demanding on
average $248, Kyrgyz customs officers $179, Kazakh customs officers and Tajik customs
officers $59.
226 Note s to Pag e s 1 5 6 1 5 9
21. IMF and Central Asian figures from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2006. Wash-
ington, DC, 2006. Chinese figures from Peoples Republic of China, Ministry of Commerce,
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/statistic/lanmubb/chinaeuropeancoun-
try/200702/20070204345877.html.
22. Richard Orange, Russia Worries That Customs Union Outpost Is Smugglers Paradise
Eurasianet, February 7, 2011.
23. Stanislav Zhukov and Oksana Reznikova, Tsentralnaya Aziya i Kitay: Ekonomicheskoe
Vzaimodeystvie v Usloviyakh Globalizatsii [Central Asia and China: Economic Interactions
Under Globalization] (Moscow: MGIMO, 2009), 54.
24. See World Bank, Cross-Border Trade Within the Central Asia Regional Cooperation. Report
prepared for the Asian Development Banks CAREC, August 2007, http://www.carecinsti-
tute.org/uploads/docs/Cross-Border-Trade-CAREC.pdf.
25. World Bank 2007; and Torgovyy Koridor Mezhdu Kazakhstanom i Kitaem Otkryt,
Kazinform, March 28, 2006. Day traders are permitted to purchase up to $1,000 worth of
goods not exceeding 50 kilograms.
26. Tellingly, the Kazakh administration of the new center was reassigned to Kazakh national
railways two months before its opening, after the Kazakh Chief of Customs was implicated
in a $130 million smuggling network. Khorgos Border Trade Center to Open Friday,
Central Asian Economic Newswire, November 29, 2011.
27. Nick Megoran, Gal Raballand, and Jerome Bouyjou, Performance, Representation and
the Economics of Border Control in Uzbekistan, Geopolitics 10, no. 4 (2005), 712740.
28. Megoran, Raballand, and Bouyjou, Performance, Representation and the Economics of
Border Control in Uzbekistan, 719721.
29. Gavrilis, Dynamics of Interstate Boundaries, 147.
30. Gavrilis, Dynamics of Interstate Boundaries, 147148.
31. Daur Dosybiev, Smugglers Paradise on Kazak-Uzbek Border, Institute for War & Peace
Reporting, September 7, 2010, http://iwpr.net/report-news/smugglers-paradise-kazak-
uzbek-border.
32. See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Illicit Drug Trends in Central Asia. Tash-
kent: UNODC, April 2008, 8. According to the UNODC, China is also increasingly be-
coming a destination for opiate trafficking.
33. Quoted in Nancy Lubin, Whos Watching the Watchdogs? Journal of International Affairs
56, no. 2 (Spring 2003), 47.
34. Gavrilis, Dynamics of Interstate Boundaries, 116.
35. See Erica Marat, The State-Crime Nexus in Central Asia: State Weakness, Organized
Crime and Corruption in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Washington, DC: Central Asia-Cau-
casus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, October 2006, http://www.silkroadstudies.
org/new/docs/Silkroadpapers/0610EMarat.pdf.
36. See UNODC, Illicit Drug Trends in Central Asia, 6.
37. U.S. Embassy Cable 07DUSHANBE1420, Tajik President Fires Senior Anti-Narcotics
Officer to Protect a Relative. U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe, October 4, 2007, http://www.
wikileaks.ch/cable/2007/10/07DUSHANBE1420.html.
38. George Gavrilis, Beyond the Border Management Program for Central Asia (BOMCA):
EUCAM EU-Central Asia Monitoring Report, Brussels: No. 9 (November 2009); and
George Camm, Tajikistan Soldiers: What Have They Done with Americas Dogs? Eur-
asianet, August 25, 2011.
39. Nancy Lubin, Alex Klaits, and Igor Barsegian, Narcotics Interdiction in Afghanistan and
Central Asia: Challenge for US Assistance. New York: Report Prepared for the Open
Society Institute, 2002, 13.
40. See Nicole J. Jackson, The Trafficking of Narcotics, Arms and Humans in Post-Soviet
Central Asia, Central Asian Survey 24, no. 1 (March 2005), 3952.
41. See Peter Andreas and Kelly Greenhill, eds., Sex, Drugs and Body Counts: The Politics of
Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010.
Note s to Pag e s 1 5 9 1 7 0 227
42. See Nargis Hamroboyeva, UNODC Renovates Border Post in Tajikistan with Funds Sup-
plied by the US Government, Asia-Plus, Tajikistan News, May 17, 2005; and Victoria Pan-
filova, Pogranichnyy Kambek, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 13, 2010.
43. See the descriptions in U.S. Embassy Cable 09ASHGABAT992, Turkmenistan, Sceneset-
ter for the Visit of CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus. U.S. Embassy in Ash-
gabat, August 5, 2009, at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09ASHGABAT992.html.
44. See U.S. Embassy Cable 10MOSCOW226, Scenesetter for February 4 U.S.-Bilateral Pres-
idential Drug-Trafficking Working Group Meeting. U.S. Embassy in Moscow, January 29,
2009, at http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10MOSCOW226.html.
45. See Alexander Cooley, The Kyrgyz Crisis and the Political Logic of Central Asias Weak
Security Mechanisms, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 140, May 2011, http://www.gwu.
edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pepm_140.pdf.
Chapter 10
1. U.S. Embassy Cable 09BISHKEK1147, Door to Manas May be Opening for the French. U.S.
Embassy in Bishkek, October 23, 2010, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09BISHKE
K1147.html.
2. Authors interviews with French diplomatic officials, Dushanbe, May 2010. Also see David
Trilling, French Air Detachment in Dushanbe Quietly Carries Out Afghan Mission, Eur-
asianet, May 18, 2009.
3. Authors communications with German Foreign Ministry officials, Berlin, March 2010.
4. Deirdre Tynan, Veil Is Lifted on German Payments for Termez Base, Eurasianet, March
24, 2011.
5. Christian Neef, Germanys Favorite Despot, SpiegelOnline, August 2, 2006, http://www.
spiegel.de/international/28 spiegel/0,1518,429712,00.html.
6. Alexander Cooley Principles in the Pipeline, International Affairs, 84, no. 6 (November
December 2008), 11781180.
7. U.S. Embassy Cable 07TASHKENT093, Germans Discuss Stagnant CT Relationship
with Uzbeks. U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, May 8, 2007, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/
05/07TASHKENT913.html.
8. Council of the European Union, European Union and Central Asia: Strategy for a New
Partnership, Brussels: October 2010, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUp-
load/EU_CtrlAsia_EN-RU.pdf.
9. For overviews, see Neil Melvin, Bhavna Dave. and Michael Denison, eds. Engaging Central
Asia: The European Unions New Strategy in the Heart of Eurasia (Washington. DC: Brook-
ings, 2008). For an initial evaluation, see Neil Melvin and Jos Boonstra, The EU Strategy
for Central Asia @ Year One, EUCAM Monitoring Report, no. 1 (October 2008), http://
www.fride.org/publication/512/the-eu-strategy-for-central-asia:-year-one.
10. Authors personal communications with NGO leaders in Brussels.
11. On the flaws in the EUs sanctions regime against Uzbekistan, see Andrea Schmitz, Whose
Conditionality? The Failure of EU Sanctions Against Uzbekistan. CACI Analyst, Novem-
ber 11, 2009, http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5216.
12. I am thankful to Jacqui Hale for her insights on this point.
13. See Scott Moore, Peril and Promise: A Survey of Indias Strategic Relationship with Cen-
tral Asia, Central Asian Survey 26, no. 2 (September 2007), 279291.
14. See especially Emilian Kavalski, India and Central Asia: Mythmaking and International Rela-
tions of a Rising Power (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010).
15. See, for instance, Nirmala Joshi, ed., Reconnecting India and Central Asia, CACI Paper,
2010, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/publications/Joshi.html; Sreeram Cau-
lia, Indias Central Asian Struggle, The International Indian ( June 2008), 2223.
16. International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics 2010, Washington, DC, 2010.
17. See, for instance, optimistic press reports like Rahul Bedi, IAF to Station MiG-29s in Tajiki-
stan, The Tribune, April 22, 2006, http://www.tribuneindia.com/2006/20060422/main6.htm.
228 Note s to Pag e s 1 7 0 1 7 4
18. Authors interviews with Western diplomats and defense officials, Dushanbe, May 2010. As
one US cable from New Delhi aptly framed this base speculation, India has compelling
national security concerns in Central Asia, but its lack of capacityunlike the Chinese and
Russianslikely compels it to leak aspirational fiction about plans for airbases in order to
keep rivals guessing. U.S. Embassy Cable 07NEWDELHI3521, Indian Views of Central
Asia: Airbase Hopes and Fears of Chinese Influence and Islamic Extremism. U.S. Embassy
in New Delhi, August 3, 2007, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/08/07NEWDELHI3521.
html. Also see the US cable that describes the Indian Ambassadors coy description about
Indian motives at Ayni. U.S. Embassy Cable 06DUSHANBE 776, India Looks to Revive
Silk Road Heritage, Not Great Game. U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe, April 26, 2006, http://
wikileaks.org/cable/2006/04/06DUSHANBE776.html.
19. See Archis Mohan, Tajik Cold Water on Base Space, The Calcutta Telegraph, January 2,
2011. For analysis, see Roman Muzalevsky, India Fails to Gain a Military Foothold in
Tajikistan, CACI Analyst, February 2, 2011.
20. For the new commands mission statement, objectives and activities, see http://www.afri-
com.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp. The most comprehesive account of Chinas rise in Africa is
found in Deborah Brautigam, The Dragons Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
21. Angola Overtakes Saudi Arabia as Biggest Oil Supplier to China, Bloomberg, April 21,
2008.
22. See, for instance, Council on Foreign Relations, Toward an Angola Strategy: Prioritizing
US-Angola Relations. May 2007, http://www.cfr.org/energy-security/toward-angola-
strategy/p13155.
23. See Maggie Fick, US Millions Fund Sudan Army: Worry over Abuses, Associate Press, July
2, 2011.
24. On local negative reactions to AFRICOM, see A. Carl LeVan, The Political Economy of
African Responses to the U.S. Africa Command, Africa Today 57, no. 1 (Fall 2010), 323.
25. See Andrew Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
26. A few months following the February 2008 announcement, Hutchison withdrew from the
deal, citing the Ecuadorian governments changing of contractual terms. Following Chinas
2009 energy deal with Ecuador, reports resurfaced that Quito was courting Chinese invest-
ment to develop the facility as a commercial airport. See Eduardo Garcia, Oil-Hungry
China Moves to Strengthen Ecuador Ties, Reuters, July 13, 2009.
27. See Alexander Cooley and Daniel Nexon, Bahrains Base Politics: The Arab Spring and
Americas Military Bases, Foreign Affairs.com, April 5, 2011.
28. See Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 19291939 (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1976).
29. This point is sometimes overlooked in discussions of leadership and world orders, as in
Ikenberrys otherwise comprehensive assessment of the state of the U.S.-led order. See G.
John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American
World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).
30. Julie Jiang and Jonathan Sinton, Overseas Investments by Chinese Oil Companies: Assess-
ing the Drivers and Impacts, International Energy Agency Information Paper. (February
2011), 41, http://www.iea.org/papers/2011/overseas_china.pdf.
31. FreedomHouse, Freedom in the World 2011, http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/
File/fiw/FIW_2011_Booklet.pdf.
32. Though, see Levitsy and Ways important account of the postCold War rise of competi-
tive authoritarian regimes; Steven A. Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritari-
anism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010),
1620.
33. Randa Habib, Jordan, Morocco Could Boost GCC Monarchy Club, AFP, May 11, 2011.
34. Jim Lobe, U.S. Keeps Quiet over Repression [Bahrain] IPS, April 13, 2011.
Note s to Pag e s 1 7 5 1 7 7 229
35. Acharya refers to this regional adaptation of Western political norms as constitutive local-
ization. See Amitav Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).
36. Comments by Kenneth Roth, Executive Director of Human Rights Watch. New York:
Columbia University forum on Religion and Human Rights Pragmatism, September 24,
2011.
37. Tunisian Minister Ridicules EU Aid Effort, Euractiv.com, February 18, 2011.
38. See Egypt Drops Plans for IMF Loan among Popular Distrust, BBC News, June 25, 2011;
and Ty McCormick, Egypt Looks to Gulf Monarchies to Finance Budget Deficit, Foreign
Policy, June 29, 2011.
39. Following a meeting with the foreign minister of Egypt on September 28, 2011, U.S. Secre-
tary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton criticized the proposed conditioning of the aid
package in the following terms, We will be working very hard with the Congress to con-
vince the Congress that that is not the best approach to take. We believe that the longstand-
ing relationship between the United States and Egypt is of paramount importance to both
of us. We support the democratic transition, and we dont want to do anything that in any
way draws into question our relationship or our support. See Emily Cadei, State Dept.
Pushes Back Against Senate Aid to Arab Spring Countries, Congressional Quarterly Online
News, September 30, 2011.
40. Though certain sound partial recommendations are now being made. See, for example,
Bruce W. Jentleson and Steven Weber, The End of Arrogance: America in the Global Compe-
tition of Ideas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).
41. Bruce W. Jentleson, Beware the Duck Test, The Washington Quarterly, 34, no. 3 (Summer
2011), 137149.
42. Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter?
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INDEX
Note: Page numbers in italics indicate figures; those with a t indicate tables.
243
244 Ind e x
and NATO, 5657, 6869, 72, 160, 207n33 Defense Logistics Agency (U.S.), 45, 143, 144,
Rapid Reaction Force of, 5758, 127, 165, 147
207n33 Defense Support Agency Center (DESC), 47
and SCO, 7071 democratization, 8, 10, 111114, 116
Uzbekistan in, 3940 counterbalances to, 174175
Color Revolutions, 4, 8, 30, 111 funding of, 41, 42t, 97
backlash from, 98, 151 and human rights, 39, 40, 50, 98, 168169,
and counterterrorism programs, 2425, 179t 214n4
diffusion of, 3738, 202n26 of international relations, 78, 151
election monitoring during , 110, 113 measures of, 9798, 98
Nazarbayev on, 112 NGOs role in, 14, 24, 37, 49, 109110. See also
and NGOs, 14, 10810, 179183t Color Revolutions
Russian response to, 5455, 70, 108111, 113 Deutsche Bank, 27, 48
and United States, 54, 82 Djibouti, 134, 135
Combatant Command Initiative Fund, 40 DLA Energy, 126, 146
Committee to Protect Journalists, 183n1 drone flights, 31, 104, 173
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), drug trade, 150151, 158160
53, 150 in Afghanistan, 84, 123, 158, 160
counterterrorist efforts of, 101 in Ecuador, 173
Customs Union of, 59 Dushanbe airport (Tajikistan), 33, 167, 170,
election monitoring by, 113114, 185191t 201n7
security concerns of, 5556 Dushanbe-Chanak road, 89
Turkmen gas exports to, 65 Dushanbe Summit, 83
Convention on Immunities and Privileges Dzhumanbekov, Dzhenisbek, 101
(2005), 103
Correa, Rafael, 173 East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM),
corruption, 14, 2527, 3235, 4749 7677, 8081
abetting of, 135137, 148 as terrorist organization, 81, 100, 210n10
and administrative control, 134 East Turkestan Liberation Organization
and elite predation, 123, 125 (ETLO), 7677, 214n12
indicators of, 134, 135 Economic Cooperation Organization, 150
and organized crime, 117, 123, 158159 Ecuador, 92, 172173
and red tape, 153156, 154, 155 Edelman, Douglas, 144
and smuggling , 1718, 64, 156160 Egypt, 104, 132134, 135, 175
Soviet legacy of, 1718 election monitoring , 8, 110114, 127, 185191t
World Banks indicators of, 134, 135. See also during Color Revolutions, 110, 113
drug trade; patronage system UN guidelines for, 114
cotton cultivation, 17, 18, 23, 69, 152, 225n8 elites
counterterrorism, 116, 159, 163 as brokers, 2729
CSTOs efforts at, 24, 5758, 72, 101, 127, 160, as gatekeepers, 2729
165 predation by, 2527, 63, 118119, 123, 134
and human rights, 98115, 151 and price of access, 136137, 148. See also
and international law, 102, 104, 106, 107 patronage system
logrolling effects of, 99100 Emba Test Site (Kazakhstan), 33
SCOs efforts at, 24, 7781, 101, 103, 106 Estonia, 44, 54
UNs efforts of, 101. See also 9/11 attacks; ethnic violence
terrorism in Kyrgyzstan, 14, 18, 58, 116, 130131, 160,
CSTO. See Collective Security Treaty 198n16
Organization in Xinjiang , 83, 84
Customs Union, 129 Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), 52,
of EurAsEC, 52, 6062, 7273, 149150, 164, 5962, 60
165 anti-crisis fund of, 8990
Customs Union of, 52, 6062, 7273,
Darden, Keith, 61 149150, 164, 165
Darley Investment Services, 141, 142 European Bank for Reconstruction and
Dastan torpedo plant (Kyrgyzstan), Development (EBRD), 89, 150
33, 124 European Convention of Human Rights, 107
246 Ind e x
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), Greater Central Asian Project (GCAP), 3738,
107108 46
European Union (EU), 6, 12, 160 Great Game, 313, 5253, 7274, 162169
Central Asian strategies of, 88, 95, 150, 163, as abetting corruption, 135137, 148
167169 and military cooperation, 41
counternarcotics efforts of, 159 Great Western Development Project, 77
and EurAsEC, 60, 61, 72 Greece, 219n19
and WTO, 62 Grey, Stephen, 104
extraordinary rendition. See rendition Guantanamo Bay prison, 102, 112113, 214n12
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 174
Farkhor base (Tajikistan), 170 GWOT. See Global War on Terror
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 81, 143
financial crisis (20082009) Hale, Jacqui, 227n12
and China, 86, 89, 92, 173174 Hanjin Group, 46
and migrant workers, 63 Hasam, Zakirjan, 102
and Russia, 3, 59, 60, 6568, 71, 72, 123 Hatfield, Zachary, 122
FMN Logistics, 48 Hizb ut-Tahrir (organization), 100, 106
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (U.S.), 26, 139, Hoagland, James, 110
140 human rights, 5, 8, 109, 110
Foreign Military Financing (FMF), 163, 210n14 and counterterrorism efforts, 98115, 151
France and democratization, 39, 40, 50, 98, 163,
African colonies of, 6 168169, 214n4
and Dushanbe Airport, 33, 167 European Convention of, 107108
and Manas Transit Center, 167 Geneva Conventions on, 102
and Tajikistan, 11, 28, 132 in Kyrgyzstan, 35
Fravel, Taylor, 7980 and torture, 3435, 102, 104107
Freedom House (organization), 109, 127 and U.S. arms sales, 163, 203n43
Democracy Scores of, 9798, 98, 174 U.S. State Department reports on, 183n1
website of, 183n1 in Uzbekistan, 25, 3435, 3940, 49, 106, 123,
163. See also specific organizations
Ganci-Manas. See Manas Transit Center Human Rights Watch, 101, 175, 183n1
Gazprom, 59, 6468, 65, 164 Huntington, Samuel, 117
and Manas fuel contracts, 146147, 147, Hutchinson company, 173, 228n26
223n43
Gazpromneft-Aero Kyrgyzstan, 147 Iden, Mark, 126
Gazprom-Transneft network, 94 Ikenberry, John, 228n29
Geneva Conventions, 102. See also human rights IMF. See International Monetary Fund
Georgia, 70 IMU. See Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
and Northern Distribution Network, 44 independence transition paradigm, 1819
Rose Revolution in, 30, 37, 5455, 113 India, 12
Russias war with, 51, 57, 59, 83, 123, 124 foreign policies of, 164, 169171, 228n18
Germany, 27, 48, 167169 pipelines in, 94, 170
Termez base of, 33, 44, 47, 69, 168 and SCO, 78
Gfoeller, Tatiana, 43, 125, 129 Tajik base of, 11, 132
Ghana, 173 Indonesia, 175
Giffen, James H., 26, 139140, 148, 222n15 Innovative Road Solution (IRS), 89
Glaziyev, Sergei, 61 Interbank Association, of SCO, 88
Global Integrity, 134 International Energy Agency, 90
Global War on Terror (GWOT), 7, 2021 International Labor Organization (ILO), 63
and China, 100 International Military Education and Training
and human rights, 98 (IMET), 210n14
and Russia, 51, 53, 56, 72 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 13, 19, 118
and SCO, 8081 alternatives to, 174
and Uzbekistan, 24, 31. See also terrorism and black marketeering , 156
Global Witness (organization), 27, 138, 219n12 versus SCO, 77
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 18 and Tajik corruption, 27, 28
graft. See corruption U.S. influence with, 164
Ind e x 247
International Organization on Migration (IOM), oil industry of, 710, 19, 20, 64, 119,
159 136142
Iran, 158, 167 pipelines in, 9192, 93
corruption indicators for, 135 railway system of, 226n26
regional influence of, 174 Russian Customs Union with, 129
and SCO, 78 Russian military bases in, 33
Turkmen pipeline to, 65 Russian population of, 22
Iraq, 54, 175 as SCO member, 75
ISAF forces, 45, 167 trade barriers of, 153156, 154, 155
Iskandarov, Mahmadruzi, 107 uranium mines of, 91
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), 24, 38, U.S. assistance paid to, 42t
56, 157 Uzbek refugees in, 106
Al-Qaeda ties with, 31 and WTO, 62
and Russia, 56 KazMunaiGas, 92, 137
U.S. assistance against, 3234, 102 Kelley, Judith, 114
Islamic movements, 11, 19, 24, 3134, 38 Khanna, Parag , 12
and Al-Qaeda, 31, 80, 100 Kim Jong-Il, 23
and smuggling , 159 Kipling, Rudyard, 3
Islamic Renaissance Party, 23 Kokand Khanate, 3
Itera company, 138, 222n13 Korea, 11, 23, 4546, 167
Ivanov, Alexander, 122 Kosovo crisis, 7778
Ivanov, Sergei, 56 Kotkin, Stephen, 71, 209n90
Kozyrev, Andrey, 52
Japan, 32, 47, 88, 167 Kuchins, Andrew, 46
Jentleson, Bruce, 176 Kulibayev, Timur, 140142
Jordan, 134, 135, 174 Kuwait, 175
Kyrgyz Aviation Services, 223n43
K2. See Karshi-Khanabad base Kyrgyz Oil Traders Association, 129
Kant Air Base (Kyrgyzstan), 11, 33, 58, 120 Kyrgyzstan, 1011, 33, 51, 56, 116133
Kapustin Yar Test Site (Kazakhstan), 33 Chinese trade with, 80, 86, 87, 156, 157
Karasin, Grigory, 72 corruption indicators for, 134, 135
Karimov, Islam, 10 as CSTO member, 5658
and human rights, 48 democracy trends in, 97, 98, 112, 113,
and Navoi Air Base, 4546 130, 151
regime of, 2224 drug trade in, 158, 160
as Russian ally, 3940 ethnic violence in, 14, 18, 58, 116, 130131,
as U.S. ally, 3135 160, 198n16
Karimova, Gulnara, 27, 48 and EurAsEC, 5961, 8990
Karshi-Khanabad base (Uzbekistan), 3135, 33 foreign direct investment in, 66, 67, 123
U.S. eviction from, 39, 49, 82, 120, 163, 168 human rights in, 35
Kashagan consortium, 137 migrant workers from, 6364, 123, 208n61
Kassenova, Nargis, 210n18 NGOs in, 109, 128, 183t
Kazakhgate, 139140 and Northern Distribution Network, 44,
Kazakhstan, 4, 33 4445
Chinese trade with, 87, 156, 157, 173 Russian emergency aid to, 67, 124, 165
corruption indicators for, 134, 135 Russian military bases in, 11, 33, 58, 127
as CSTO member, 5658 Russian population of, 35
democracy trends in, 97, 98, 111, 112, 214n4 Russian trade with, 86, 87
economy of, 2122 as SCO member, 75
as EurAsEC member, 5961 Special Forces of, 43
football league of, 151 trade barriers of, 153156, 154, 155
foreign direct investment in, 66, 67, 119 transition to independence of, 1819
NGOs in, 109, 182183t Tulip Revolution in, 4, 22, 3031, 37, 49, 82
and Northern Distribution Network, 44, Uighurs in, 77, 79
4445 U.S. assistance paid to, 41, 42t
nuclear weapons of, 20 Uzbek refugees in, 101, 106, 131
oil exports of, 6, 65, 68, 92, 94 as WTO member, 62, 74
248 Ind e x
Termez airfield (Uzbekistan), 33, 44, 47, 69, Union of European Football Associations
168 (UEFA), 151
terrorism, 7 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
blacklisting of, 81, 100101, 103, 177, 215n34 during Cold War, 11, 12, 140, 219n19,
and Color Revolutions, 2425, 179t 224n53
and Guantanamo Bay prison, 102, 112113, collapse of, 11
214n12 legacies of, 1719, 150, 152. See also Russia
in Kyrgyzstan, 77 unite and rule strategy, 6970
and Muslim militants, 11, 19 United Nations, 150151
in Uzbekistan, 24, 31. See also counterterrorism efforts of, 101
counterterrorism; Global War on Terror election monitors code of, 114
Texaco Corporation, 139 Office on Drugs and Crime, 150151, 158
Tierney, John, report of, 126, 142144 United Russia (political party), 112
Tiku, Arvind, 141 United Tajik Opposition (UTO), 23
TKZ Manas (fuel company), 147, 147148 Urumqi, 76, 83, 84
Toiganbayev, Adil, 143 U.S. Agency for International Development
torture (USAID), 30, 42t, 172, 183n1
Bush policy on, 104105 Usenov, Danyar, 124
international laws on, 102, 104, 106, 107 U.S. Export-Import bank, 34
in Uzbek prisons, 3435, 102, 104105. See Usmanov, Alisher, 106
also human rights Uzbekistan, 4, 10, 33
trade barriers, 154, 154156, 155 Andijan riots in, 25, 3840, 4750, 99109,
Transparency International, 134 118, 163
Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), corruption indicators for, 135
4446, 205n83 as CSTO member, 5658
Tulip Revolution (Kyrgyzstan), 4, 22, 3031, 37, democracy trends in, 97, 98, 99, 111, 113
49, 82 as EurAsEC member, 61
Tunisia, 132134, 135, 175 EU sanctions against, 169
Turkey, 11, 86, 167, 175, 219n19 gas exports of, 65
Turkmenistan, 4, 23, 33, 169, 173 human rights in, 25, 3435, 3940, 49, 106,
corruption in, 26, 48, 135 123, 163
democracy trends in, 97, 98, 112 Karimov regime of, 2223
drug trade in, 158 migrant workers from, 6364, 208n61
economic development of, 7, 10 natural gas industry of, 6465
foreign direct investment in, 66, 67, 119 NGOs in, 109, 180181t
natural gas exports of, 6, 27, 6468, 92, 94, and Northern Distribution Network, 44,
138, 164, 170 4445, 84, 168
neutrality of, 10, 45, 150, 151 railway system of, 152, 153
NGOs in, 183t refugees from, 101, 106
and Northern Distribution Network, 44 Regional Anti-Terrorism Center in, 78, 81, 101,
trade barriers of, 155 103, 106
U.S. assistance paid to, 41, 42t renditions to, 3435, 102, 104105
U.S. informal agreements with, 43 and Russia, 25, 3940, 55, 56, 66
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India as SCO member, 75, 81
(TAPI) pipeline, 94 trade barriers of, 153158, 154, 155
Tynan, Deirdre, 48 Uighurs in, 106
U.S. assistance paid to, 34, 41, 42t
Uighur Liberation Organization, 7677 U.S. military bases in, 3035, 33, 69, 163,
Uighurs 201n6
at Guantanamo Bay prison, 214n12 water management issues of, 69, 124, 127.
in Kyrgyzstan, 77, 79 See also Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
in Uzbekistan, 106
in Xinjiang , 6, 14, 7477, 83, 84, 100, 165 Venezuela, 173
Ukraine Virgin Islands, 138, 141
gas imports of, 138 virtual regionalism, 151, 157
Orange Revolution in, 30, 37, 55, 109, 111
pipelines in, 65 Wahhabi Islam, 19
Unified Energy System (UES), 59 Walt, Stephen, 12
252 Ind e x
water management issues, 6970, 124, 127, 152, Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, 77
225n9 Xinjiang province, 81
Weinthal, Erica, 225n9 economic development of, 77, 85, 166
Wen Jiabao, 85 ethnic violence in, 83, 84
Williams, Brian, 139 and Tulip Revolution, 82
Wolchik, Sharon, 37 Uighur separatism in, 6, 14, 7477, 83, 84, 100,
World Bank, 13, 118, 150 165
alternatives to, 174
on Central Asian trade, 19, 77, 154, 155156, Yakubov, Ikrom, 105
155 Yanukovych, Viktor, 55
corruption indicators of, 134, 135 Yeltsin, Boris, 1920, 112
and Nazarbayev, 140 Yemen, 174
versus SCO, 77 Yushchenko, Viktor, 55
U.S. influence with, 164
World Trade Organization (WTO), 60 Zakaria, Fareed, 12
China as memeber of, 74 Zaripov, Homrahon, 110
and Kazakhstan, 62 Zeromax conglomerate, 27
Kyrgyzstan as member of, 62, 74 Zhanaozen riots (Kazakhstan), 22
Russia as member of, 61 Zhao, Huasheng , 85