Griswold v.

Connecticut
Dissent. Justice Stewart and Justice Black. Although the law is silly,
Brief Fact Summary. Appellants were charged with violating a statute it is not unconstitutional. The citizens of Connecticut should use their
preventing the distribution of advice to married couples regarding the
rights under the 9th and 10th Amendment to convince their elected
prevention of conception. Appellants claimed that the statute violated
the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. representatives to repeal it if the law does not conform to their
community standards.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The right of a married couple to privacy is
protected by the Constitution.
Concurrence. Justice Goldberg, the Chief Justice, and Justice
Brennan. The right to privacy in marriage is so basic and fundamental
Facts. Appellant Griswold, Executive Director of the Planned that to allow it to be infringed because it is not specifically addressed
Parenthood League of Connecticut and Appellant Buxton, a licensed
in the first eight amendments is to give the 9th Amendment no effect.
physician who served as Medical Director for the League at its Center
in New Haven, were arrested and charged with giving information, Justice Harlan. The relevant statute violates the Due Process Clause
instruction, and medical advice to married persons on means of of the 14th Amendment because if violates the basic values implicit in
preventing conception. Appellants were found guilty as accessories
the concept of ordered liberty.
and fined $100 each. Appellants appealed on the theory that the
accessory statute as applied violated the 14th Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Appellants claimed standing based on
Discussion. The right to privacy in marriage is not specifically
their professional relationship with the married people they advised.
protected in either the Bill of Rights or the Constitution. Nonetheless,
it is a right so firmly rooted in tradition that its protection is mandated
Issue. Does the Constitution provide for a privacy right for married
by various Constitutional Amendments, including the 1st, 9th and 14th
couples?
Amendments.

Held. The First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is

protected from governmental intrusion, which although not expressly
included in the Amendment, is necessary to make the express
guarantees meaningful. The association of marriage is a privacy right
older than the Bill of Rights, and the States effort to control marital
activities in this case is unnecessarily broad and therefore impinges
on protected Constitutional freedoms.
People v. State of Alabama, ex rel. Patterson

Brief Fact Summary. The National Association for the Advancement

of Colored People (NAACP/Petitioner) was ordered to produce a
membership list by the state court.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Freedom of association to promote beliefs

is insured by the Fourteenth Amendment and is protected by
adherence to strict scrutiny of any regulatory interference.

Facts. Petitioner was ordered by a court to provide a full membership

list, including names and addresses. Although Petitioner agreed to
provide a list of its officers and paid staff members, it asserts that this
list is protected and that it may assert the personal privacy interests of
each of its members. Additionally, Petitioner claims that disclosure will
serve as a restriction on lawful association of members that can only
be justified by a compelling state interest.

Issue. Can the state compel disclosure of the membership list of the
NAACP?

Held. No. Disclosure of the list will subject members to adverse

consequences including economic, physical and other forms of public
hostility. In essence, this will limit Petitioners members ability to
advocate their beliefs, and it will dissuade others from joining the
organization for fear of retribution.

Discussion. An association may assert the rights of its membership

when the rights of the individual members are tightly interrelated to the
interest of the association.
Chapter 29 Velez v. De Vera: Velez v. De Vera:* Succession to the
IBP Presidency The Facts In AC No. 6697, Complainant Zoilo Antonio
Velez sought the suspension or disbarment of Respondent Atty.
Leonard de Vera
(1) for misrepresentation through his concealment of the suspension
order rendered against him by the State Bar of California; and
(2) for violation of the rotation rule enunciated in Administrative
Matter No. 491.
The first ground concerned an administrative case filed against
Atty. de Vera before the State Bar of California. The action arose from
an insurance case he had handled involving Julius Wills III, who had
figured in an automobile accident in 1986. To settle the case amicably,
Atty. de Vera received -- on his clients behalf -- a $12,000 check,
which he then deposited in his personal account. Because of his
irregular deposit of his client's funds, respondent was suspended from
the practice of law for three years, upon the recommendation of the
hearing referee. The case was not decided on the merits, because
Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar. Later, his resignation
was accepted by the Supreme Court of California.
On the second ground, complainant averred that respondents
transfer of membership from the Pasay, Paraaque, Las Pias and
Muntinlupa (PPLM) IBP Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter
was a circumvention of the rotation rule. Allegedly, Atty. de Vera made
the transfer for the sole purpose of becoming IBP national president.
Complainant stressed that respondent neither resided in Agusan del
Sur nor held office there.
A companion case, Bar Matter No. 1227, referred to the letter-
request of respondent, asking the Supreme Court to schedule his
oath-taking as IBP national president. On the other hand, AM No. 05-
5-15-SC referred to the letter-report of IBP National President Jose
Anselmo I. Cadiz, furnishing the Court with the May 13, 2005, IBP
Resolution removing Atty. de Vera from the latters positions as IBP
board member and executive vice-president, for committing acts
inimical to the board and the IBP in general.
The controversy in these two consolidated cases started when the
IBP board[1] approved the withdrawal of a Petition[2] docketed at the
Supreme Court as Integrated Bar of the Philippines et al v. Senate of
the Philippines et al. - SC-R165108. Subsequently, during the plenary
session held at the 10th National IBP Convention,[3] respondent
allegedly made some untruthful statements, innuendos, and blatant
lies in connection with the IBP board's Resolution to withdraw the
Petition
On May 12, 2005, IBP Governor Romulo A. Rivera wrote to IBP
National President Cadiz, praying for the removal of the IBP board
membership of Atty. de Vera, who had allegedly committed acts
inimical to the board and the IBP in general. The following day,[4]
during its 20th regular meeting, the IBP board resolved by a twothirds
vote to remove respondent from his positions as a member of the
board of governors and as the executive vice-president (EVP) of the
IBP. On June 13, 2005, the IBP board took note of the vacancy in the
EVP position, brought about by the removal of Atty. de Vera. In his
stead, IBP Governor Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally elected
and declared as EVP. On June 20, 2005, Atty. Santiago voluntarily
relinquished that position. Thus, on June 25, 2005, during its last
regular meeting, the IBP board elected a new EVP in the person of
IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar. On June 28, 2005, IBP
National President Cadiz requested the Supreme Court's approval of
Atty. Salazar's election and assumption of office as national president,
in the event that Atty. de Vera would be disbarred or suspended from
the practice of law; or should his removal from his positions as
member of the 2003-2005 board of governors and as EVP of the IBP
be approved by the Court. Protesting the election of both Atty.
Santiago and Atty. Salazar, respondent also denied having committed
acts inimical to the IBP and its board. He maintained that his removal
from his two positions had been done without due notice and due
process.
The Issues The issues were as follows: 1. Whether the judgment in
AC No. 6052 constituted a bar to the filing of AC 6697 2. Whether, in
the course of his practice of law, Respondent Atty. de Vera committed
malpractice amounting to moral turpitude in the State Bar of California
and in the Philippines 3. Whether on May 13, 2005, the board of
governors validly removed respondent from his positions as governor
and EVP of the IBP 4. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected
as EVP on June 25, 2005, and whether he could consequently
assume the presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007
The Court's Ruling
First Issue: Res Judicata Res Judicata The Court unanimously held in
a per curiam Decision that AC No. 6052 did not constitute a bar to the
filing of AC No. 6697. The two administrative cases involved different
subject matters and causes of action. In AC No. 6052, the subject
matter was the qualification of Atty. de Vera to run for the position of
IBP governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present Administrative
Complaint, the subject matter was his privilege to practice law. The
two aforementioned cases did not seek the same relief. In the first
case, the complainants sought to prevent respondent from assuming
his post as IBP governor for Eastern Mindanao; the cause of action
referred to his alleged violation of IBP bylaws. In the second case,
what was principally sought was his suspension or disbarment; the
primary cause of action was his alleged violation of the Lawyer's Oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Second Issue: Moral Turpitude Moral Turpitude In resolving the
second issue, the Court cited Maquera, [5] according to which a
judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign
jurisdiction may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the
Philippines, only if the basis of the foreign courts action included any
of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in our jurisdiction. The
Court opined that by insisting that he was authorized by his clients
father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera was
impliedly admitting his use of the Willis funds for his own personal use.
Undoubtedly, his unauthorized use of his clients funds was highly
unethical. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is
emphatic about this matter. The conduct of Atty. de Vera -- holding on
to the money of his client without the latters acquiescence -- was
indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It was clear that by
depositing the $12,000 check in his own bank account and using it for
his own benefit, respondent was guilty of malpractice, gross
misconduct, and unethical behavior. He violated his oath to conduct
himself with all good fidelity to his client. Nevertheless, the Court
decreed that, where any lesser penalty could accomplish the end
desired, disbarment should not be decreed. Considering the amount
involved in this case, the Court considered the penalty of suspension
for two years appropriate. The Court found that the transfer by Atty.
de Vera of his membership to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter was
within his rights. He could not be deemed to be guilty of unethical
conduct or behavior. Neither the Code of Professional Responsibility
nor the Lawyers Oath punished lawyers for aspiring to be the IBP
national president or prohibited them from doing perfectly legal acts in
accomplishing that goal.
Third Issue: Validity of the Removal Validity of the Removal The
Court ruled that the constitutional provision on due process
safeguarded life, liberty and property. The position of EVP of the IBP,
however, was not a property within the constitutional sense. Further,
there was no right to security of tenure over that position, as all that
was required to remove any member of the board of governors for
cause was a resolution adopted by two thirds of the remaining board
members. Furthermore, in administrative proceedings, the essence of
due process was simply the opportunity to explain ones side. The
cross-examination of witnesses was not indispensable to due process.
Neither was an actual hearing always essential, especially under the
factual milieu of this case. Atty. de Veras actuations during the IBP
National Convention in question had been witnessed by all the
members of the board, upon whose shoulders the determination of the
cause for removal of an IBP governor was placed, subject to the
approval of the Supreme Court. Atty. de Vera received a copy of the
Complaint against him; indeed, he was present in the meeting when
the matter was taken up. From the transcript of stenographic notes of
the meeting on May 13, 2005, in which he was removed, it was patent
that he had been given a fair opportunity to defend himself against the
accusations of Atty. Rivera. Under the IBP rules, the expulsion of an
IBP governor was done via a Resolution adopted by two thirds of the
remaining members. The phrase remaining members excluded the
complainant and the respondent. Of the 7 remaining members
qualified to vote, 5 voted for expulsion, while 2 voted against it. The
five votes still added up to the two thirds vote required for expulsion.
Removal for Cause Removal for Cause Conflicts and disagreements
of varying degrees of intensity are inherent in the internal life of an
organization. Like that of any other organization, however, the
effectiveness of the IBP would be diluted if the conflicts are brought
outside its governing body. The impression would be that the IBP,
which speaks through its board of governors, does not and cannot
authoritatively speak for its members. Its prestige and reputation with
lawyers, as well as with the general public, would diminish accordingly.
Because of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity,
no fault was attributed to the expulsion from the board of Atty. de Vera,
who had insisted on bringing to the public his disagreement with a
policy/resolution approved by the majority after due discussion. The
cause for expulsion was legal, because the effectiveness of the board
as a governing body was being lessened.
Fourth Issue: Validity of Governor Salazar's Validity of Governor
Salazar's Election as EVP Election as EVP The removal of Atty. de
Vera from his membership in the board of governors ipso facto meant
also his removal as EVP. The IBP board had shown no grave abuse highest position. Therefore, in electing Atty. Salazar as EVP and thus
of discretion; thus, the Court found no reason to interfere in the ensuring a succession in the leadership of the IBP, its board of
resolution to remove him. The board had specific and sufficient governors acted in accordance with its bylaws.
guidelines in its rules and bylaws on how to fill the vacancies left by
the removal of Atty. de Vera. The 2003-2005 IBP board of governors
election of a new EVP, who would assume the presidency for the term
2005-2007, was well within the authority and prerogative granted to
the board by the IBP bylaws. According to Article VII, specifically
Section 47, [t]he EVP shall automatically become president for the
next succeeding term. The phrase for the next succeeding term
necessarily implied that the EVP who should succeed Atty. Cadiz as
IBP president for the next succeeding term (2005-2007) should come
from the members of the 2003-2005 IBP board of governors.
Accordingly, the election of Governor Santiago, and later of Governor
Salazar upon the formers relinquishment of her EVP position, was
valid. In Bar Matter 491, the Court said that it was the position of EVP
that was actually rotated among the nine regional governors. The
rotation with respect to the presidency was merely the result of the
automatic succession rule of the IBP. Thus, the rotation rule pertained
in particular to the position of EVP; the automatic succession rule, to
the presidency. Intrinsic to the IBP bylaws was the principle that one
who was to assume the highest position in its hierarchy must have
been exposed to the demands and responsibilities of national
leadership. By electing the replacement EVP from among the
members of the 2003-2005 board of governors, the IBP stood to
benefit from the experience of the 2003-2005 EVP, who would have
served in a national capacity prior to the latters assumption of the
HURLEY et al. v. IRISH AMERICAN GAY, LESBIAN AND BISEXUAL
GROUP OF BOSTON et al.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS
No. 94-749. Argued April 25, 1995 -- Decided June 19, 1995
Petitioner South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, an
unincorporated association of individuals elected from
various veterans groups, was authorized by the city of
Boston to organize and conduct the St. Patrick's Day
Evacuation Day Parade. The Council refused a place in the
1993 event to respondent GLIB, an organization formed for
the purpose of marching in the parade in order to express
its members' pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay,
lesbian, and bisexual individuals, to show that there are
such individuals in the community, and to support the like
men and women who sought to march in the New York St.
Patrick's Day parade. GLIB and some of its members filed
this suit in state court, alleging that the denial of their
application to march violated, inter alia, a state law
prohibiting discrimination on account of sexual orientation
in places of public accommodation. In finding such a
violation and ordering the Council to include GLIB in the
parade, the trial court, among other things, concluded that
the parade had no common theme other than the
involvement of the participants, and that, given the
Council's lack of selectivity in choosing parade participants
and its failure to circumscribe the marchers' messages, the
parade lacked any expressive purpose, such that GLIB's
inclusion therein would not violate the Council's First
Amendment rights. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts affirmed.
Held: The state courts' application of the Massachusetts
public accommodations law to require private citizens who
organize a parade to include among the marchers a group
imparting a message that the organizers do not wish to
convey violates the First Amendment. Pp. 8-24.
(a) Confronted with the state courts' conclusion that the
factual characteristics of petitioners' activity place it within
the realm of non expressive conduct, this Court has a
constitutional duty to conduct an independent examination
of the record as a whole, without deference to those courts,
to assure that their judgment does not constitute a
forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.
See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
285. Pp. 8-10.
(b) The selection of contingents to make a parade is
entitled to First Amendment protection. Parades such as
petitioners' are a form of protected expression because
they include marchers who are making some sort of
collective point, not just to each other but to bystanders
along the way. Cf.,e.g., Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111,
112. Moreover, such protection is not limited to a parade's
banners and songs, but extends to symbolic acts.
See, e.g., West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 632, 642. Although the Council has been rather
lenient in admitting participants to its parade, a private
speaker does not forfeit constitutional protection simply by
combining multifarious voices, by failing to edit their
themes to isolate a specific message as the exclusive
subject matter of the speech, or by failing to generate, as
an original matter, each item featured in the
communication. Thus, petitioners are entitled to protection
under the First Amendment. GLIB's participation as a unit
in the parade was equally expressive, since the
organization was formed to celebrate its members' sexual
identities and for related purposes. Pp. 10-13.
(c) The Massachusetts law does not, as a general matter,
violate the First orFourteenth Amendments. Its provisions
are well within a legislature's power to enact when it has
reason to believe that a given group is being discriminated
against. And the statute does not, on its face, target speech
or discriminate on the basis of its content. Pp. 13-14.
did not like from the communication it chose to make, and
that is enough to invoke its right as a private speaker to
shape its expression by speaking on one subject while
remaining silent on another, free from state interference.
The constitutional violation is not saved by Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. ___. The
Council is a speaker in its own right; a parade does not
consist of individual, unrelated segments that happen to be
transmitted together for individual selection by members of
the audience; and there is no assertion here that some
speakers will be destroyed in the absence of the
Massachusetts law. Nor has any other legitimate interest
been identified in support of applying that law in the way
done by the state courts to expressive activity like the
parade

(d) The state court's application, however, had the effect of

declaring the sponsors' speech itself to be the public
accommodation. Since every participating parade unit
affects the message conveyed by the private organizers,
the state courts' peculiar application of the Massachusetts
law essentially forced the Council to alter the parade's
expressive content and thereby violated the
fundamental First Amendment rule that a speaker has the
autonomy to choose the content of his own message and,
conversely, to decide what not to say. Petitioners' claim to
the benefit of this principle is sound, since the Council
selects the expressive units of the parade from potential
participants and clearly decided to exclude a message it
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale
require the Petitioner to accept Respondent was an abridgment of the
Petitioners freedom of expression.
Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Dale (Respondent), was an
eagle scout whose membership in the boy scouts was revoked when
the Petitioners, the Boy Scouts of America (Petitioner), learned that Dissent. Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens) dissented, noting
he was a homosexual.
that by allowing the Petitioner to revoke the Respondents
Synopsis of Rule of Law. While individuals are given a right to freely membership, the Supreme Court was allowing the organization to
associate, associations are not forced to include members whose prevail over the anti-discrimination laws of the state.
beliefs may affect its own ability to express the message it wishes to
convey.

Discussion. An organization cannot be compelled to accept a

Facts. The Respondent, a life-long boy scout, was an assistant scout member whose beliefs do not align with the tenants upon, which the
master in New Jersey, when the Petitioner learned of his
organization stands. To do so would violate the First Amendment
homosexuality and revoked his membership. The Respondent
brought suit to enjoin the action and the New Jersey court, under its constitutional rights of the entire organization and its members, who
public accommodations law, required the Petitioner to admit the also align themselves with the principals on which the organization
Respondent.
stands.
Issue. This case questions whether an organization can be compelled
to accept a member whose activities and beliefs may be against the
very nature of the organization.

Held. Reversed.
The court found that, while the Petitioners laws and oaths do not
mention sexuality, the purpose of the organization to foster morally
straight and clean membership would be disregarded if the
Petitioner was forced to accept the Respondent. Further, the First
Amendment Rights of the association would be violated if it were
forced, under the guise of law, to send a message that it accepted
homosexual conduct when, on its own assertions, it did not. The
Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) held that to
MANOTOK REALTY, INC. and MANOTOK ESTATE
CORPORATION
vs.
CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 123346, December 14, 2007
FACTS:
The Petition involved properties covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 994 which in turn encompasses 1,342 hectares of the
Maysilo Estate. The vast tract of land stretches over three (3) cities
within Metropolitan Manila, comprising an area larger than the
sovereign states of Monaco and the Vatican.
CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT) sought to recover from
Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok Estate Corporation (Manotoks) the
possession of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate. CLTs claim was anchored
on Transfer Certificate of Title derived from Estelita Hipolito. Hipolitos
title emanated from Jose Dimson whose title appears to have been
sourced from OCT No. 994.
For their part, the Manotoks challenged the validity of the title relied
on by CLT, claiming that Dimsons title, the proximate source of CLTs
title, was irregularly issued and, hence, the same and subsequent
titles flowing therefrom are likewise void. The Manotoks asserted their
ownership over Lot 26 and claimed that they derived it from several
awardees and/or vendees of the National Housing Authority. The
Manotok title likewise traced as its primary source OCT No. 994.
The trial court ruled for CLT. Manotoks appeal to the CA was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the title issued in the name of CLT valid.
HELD:
It is evident from all three titlesCLTs, Hipolitos and Dimsonsthat
the properties they purport to cover were " originally registered on 19
April 1917 in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Rizal." These titles could be affirmed only if it can be proven
that OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April 1917 had actually existed.
CLT were given the opportunity to submit such proof but it did not.
The established legal principle in actions for annulment or
reconveyance of title is that a party seeking it should establish not
merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing
evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his. In an action to
recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on
the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's
claim.
Considering that CLT clearly failed to meet the burden of proof
reposed in them as plaintiffs in the action for annulment of title and
recovery of possession, there is a case to be made for ordering the
dismissal of their original complaints before the trial court.
As it appears on the record, OCT No. 994, the mother title was
received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917
based from the issuance of the decree of registration on 17 April 1917.
Obviously, April 19, 1917 is not the date of inscription or the date of
transcription of the decree into the Original Certificate of Title. Thus,
such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date
when the title took effect. It appears that the transcription of the decree
was done on the date it was received by the Register of Deeds of Rizal
on May 3, 1917.
There is a marked distinction between the entry of the decree and the
entry of the certificate of title; the entry of the decree is made by the
chief clerk of the land registration and the entry of the certificate of title
is made by the register of deeds. The certificate of title is issued in
pursuance of the decree of registration. It was stressed that what
stands as the certificate of the title is the transcript of the decree of
registration made by the registrar of deeds in the registry.
Moreover, it is only after the transcription of the decree by the register
of deeds that the certificate of title is to take effect.
Hence, any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated 17 April
1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that CLT titles
made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 casts
doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent
OCT. This error alone is, in fact, sufficient to invalidate the CLT claims
over the subject property if singular reliance is placed by them on the
dates appearing on their respective titles.

The Court hereby constitutes a Special Division of the Court of

Appeals to hear the case on remand.
In ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail,
the Special Division is directed to make further determinations based
on the evidence already on record and such other evidence as may
be presented at the proceedings before it.

WHEREFORE, the instant cases are hereby REMANDED to the

Special Division of the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
Estate of Salud Jimenez vs. Philippine Export Processing Zone
[GR 137285, 16 January 2001] Second Division, De Leon Jr. (J): 4
concur Facts: On 15 May 1981, Philippine Export Processing Zone
(PEZA), then called as the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA),
initiated before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite expropriation
proceedings on 3 parcels of irrigated riceland in Rosario, Cavite. One
of the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) of the San Francisco de Malabon
Estate, with an approximate area of 29,008 square meters, is
registered in the name of Salud Jimenez (TCT T-113498 of the
Registry of Deeds of Cavite). More than 10 years later, the said trial
court in an Order dated 11 July 1991 upheld the right of PEZA to
expropriate, among others, Lot 1406 (A and B). Reconsideration of the
said order was sought by the Estate of Salud Jimenez contending that
said lot would only be transferred to a private corporation, Philippine
Vinyl Corp., and hence would not be utilized for a public purpose. In
an Order dated 25 October 1991, the trial court reconsidered the Order
dated 11 July 1991 and released Lot 1406-A from expropriation while
the expropriation of Lot 1406-B was maintained. Finding the said order
unacceptable, PEZA interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, the Estate and PEZA entered into a compromise
agreement, dated 4 January 1993. The compromise agreement
provides "(1) That plaintiff agrees to withdraw its appeal from the
Order of the Honorable Court dated October 25, 1991 which released
lot 1406-A from the expropriation proceedings. On the other hand,
defendant Estate of Salud Jimenez agrees to waive, quitclaim and
forfeit its claim for damages and loss of income which it sustained by
reason of the possession of said lot by plaintiff from 1981 up to the
present. (2) That the parties agree that defendant Estate of Salud
Jimenez shall transfer lot 1406-B with an area of 13,118 square
meters which forms part of the lot registered under TCT No. 113498
of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite to the name of the plaintiff and the
same shall be swapped and exchanged with lot 434 with an area of
14,167 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
14772 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite which lot will be transferred
to the name of Estate of Salud Jimenez. (3) That the swap
arrangement recognizes the fact that the lot 1406-B covered by TCT
No. T-113498 of the estate of defendant Salud Jimenez is considered
expropriated in favor of the government based on Order of the
Honorable Court dated July 11, 1991. However, instead of being paid
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 20 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) the just
compensation for said lot, the estate of said defendant shall be paid
with lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772. (4) That the parties agree
that they will abide by the terms of the foregoing agreement in good
faith and the Decision to be rendered based on this Compromise
Agreement is immediately final and executory." The Court of Appeals
remanded the case to the trial court for the approval of the said
compromise agreement entered into between the parties, consequent
with the withdrawal of the appeal with the Court of Appeals. In the
Order dated 23 August 1993, the trial court approved the compromise
agreement. However, PEZA failed to transfer the title of Lot 434 to the
Estate inasmuch as it was not the registered owner of the covering
TCT T-14772 but Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. Thus, on 13 March
1997, the Estate filed a "Motion to Partially Annul the Order dated
August 23, 1993." In the Order dated 4 August 1997, the trial court
annulled the said compromise agreement entered into between the
parties and directed PEZA to peacefully turn over Lot 1406- A to the
Estate. Disagreeing with the said Order of the trial court, respondent
PEZA moved for its reconsideration, which was denied in an order
dated 3 November 1997. On 4 December 1997, the trial court, at the
instance of the Estate, corrected the Orders dated 4 August 1997 and
3 November 1997 by declaring that it is Lot 1406-B and not Lot 1406-
A that should be surrendered and returned to the Estate. On 27
November 1997, PEZA interposed before the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to nullify the Orders dated
4 August 1997 and 3 November 1997 of the trial court. Acting on the
petition, the Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated 25 March 1998,
partially granted the petition by setting aside the order of the trial court
regarding "the peaceful turn over to the Estate of Salud Jimenez of Lot
1406- B" and instead ordered the trial judge to "proceed with the
hearing of the expropriation proceedings regarding the determination
of just compensation over Lot 1406-B." The Estate sought
reconsideration of the Decision dated 25 March 1998. However, the
appellate court in a Resolution dated 14 January 1999 denied the
Estate's motion for reconsideration. The Estate filed a petition for construction of terminal facilities, structures and approaches thereto."
review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. The authority is broad enough to give PEZA substantial leeway in
deciding for what public use the expropriated property would be
Issue: Whether the purpose of the expropriation by PEZA is of utilized. Pursuant to this broad authority, PEZA leased a portion of the
public use. lot to commercial banks while the rest was made a transportation
terminal. Said public purposes were even reaffirmed by Republic Act
Held: This is an expropriation case which involves two (2) orders: an 7916, a law amending PEZA's original charter. As reiterated in various
expropriation order and an order fixing just compensation. Once the case, the "public use" requirement for a valid exercise of the power of
first order becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken, the authority eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by
to expropriate and its public use cannot anymore be questioned. changing conditions. The term "public use" has acquired a more
Contrary to the Estate's contention, the incorporation of the Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 21 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
expropriation order in the compromise agreement did not subject said comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term signifying
order to rescission but instead constituted an admission by the Estate strict use or employment by the public has been added the broader
of PEZA's authority to expropriate the subject parcel of land and the notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. What ultimately
public purpose for which it was expropriated. This is evident from emerged is a concept of public use which is just as broad as "public
paragraph three (3) of the compromise agreement which states that welfare."
the "swap arrangement recognizes the fact that Lot 1406-B covered
by TCT T-113498 of the estate of defendant Salud Jimenez is
considered expropriated in favor of the government based on the
Order of the Honorable Court dated 11 July 1991." It is crystal clear
from the contents of the agreement that the parties limited the
compromise agreement to the matter of just compensation to the
Estate. Said expropriation order is not closely intertwined with the
issue of payment such that failure to pay by PEZA will also nullify the
right of PEZA to expropriate. No statement to this effect was
mentioned in the agreement. The Order was mentioned in the
agreement only to clarify what was subject to payment. Since the
compromise agreement was only about the mode of payment by
swapping of lots and not about the right and purpose to expropriate
the subject Lot 1406-B, only the originally agreed form of
compensation that is by cash payment, was rescinded. PEZA has the
legal authority to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B and that the same
was for a valid public purpose. PEZA expropriated the subject parcel
of land pursuant to Proclamation 1980 dated 30 May 1980 issued by
former President Ferdinand Marcos. Meanwhile, the power of eminent
domain of respondent is contained in its original charter, Presidential
Decree 66. Accordingly, subject Lot 1406-B was expropriated "for the

ORTEGA vs. CEBU City
G.R. No. 181583 - 84 October 2, 2009
CASE: These are consolidated petitions for review on
certiorari filed by petitioners Ciriaco and Arminda Ortega (Spouses
Ortega) and petitioner City of Cebu (Cebu City) assailing the Decision
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in the similarly consolidated petition
FACTS:
Spouses Ciriaco and Arminda Ortega are the registered
owners of a parcel of land situated in Hipodromo, Cebu City.
ne-half of the above described land is occupied by squatters.
On September 24, 1990, [the Spouses Ortega] filed an
ejectment case against the squatters before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Cebu City, which rendered
decision in favor of [the spouses Ortega]. The case eventually
reached the Supreme Court, which affirmed the decision of
the MTCC. The decision of the MTCC became final and
executory, and a writ of execution was issued on February 1,
1994.
On May 23, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of [Cebu
City] enacted City Ordinance No. 1519, giving authority to the
City Mayor to expropriate one-half (1/2) portion (2,856 square
meters) of [the spouses Ortegas] land (which is occupied by
the squatters), and appropriating for that purpose. The
amount will be charged against Continuing Appropriation,
repurchase of lots for various projects. The value of the land
was determined by the Cebu City Appraisal Committee in
Resolution No. 19, series of 1994, dated April 15, 1994.
Pursuant to said ordinance, [Cebu City] filed a Complaint for
Eminent Domain [before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 23, Cebu City] against [the spouses Ortega].
On March 13, 1998, the [RTC] issued an order declaring that
[Cebu City] has the lawful right to take the property subject of
the instant case, for public use or purpose described in the
complaint upon payment of just compensation.
Based on the recommendation of the appointed
Commissioners (one of whom was the City Assessor of [Cebu
City], the [RTC] issued another Order dated May 21, 1999,
fixing the value of the land subject to expropriation at ELEVEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P11,000.00) per square meter and
ordering [Cebu City] to pay [Spouses Ortega] the sum of
THIRTY ONE MILLION AND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTEEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P31,416,000.00) as just compensation
for the expropriated portion of Lot No. 310-B.
The Decision of the [RTC] became final and executory
because of [Cebu Citys] failure to perfect an appeal on time,
and a Writ of Execution was issued on September 17, 1999
to enforce the courts judgment. Upon motion of [the Spouses
Ortega], the [RTC] issued an Order dated March 11, 2002 for
execution or garnishment.
[Cebu City] filed an Omnibus Motion to Stay Execution,
Modification of Judgment and Withdrawal of the Case,
contending that the price set by the [RTC] as just
compensation to be paid to [the Spouses Ortega] is way
beyond the reach of its intended beneficiaries for its socialized
housing program. The motion was denied by the [RTC]. [Cebu
Citys] Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied.
 By virtue of the Order of the [RTC], dated July 2, 2003 Sheriff decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination
Benigno B. Reas[,] Jr. served a Notice of Garnishment to shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be
Philippine Postal Bank, P. del Rosario and Junquera Branch precluded from looking into the just-ness of the decreed
Cebu City, garnishing [Cebu Citys] bank deposit therein. compensation.

Cebu City] filed the instant Petition for Certiorari before [the
CA]. Cebu City] filed before the [RTC] a Motion to Dissolve,
Quash or Recall the Writ of Garnishment, contending that
Account No. 101-8918-334 mentioned in Ordinance No. 1519
is not actually an existing bank account and that the
garnishment of [Cebu Citys] bank account with Philippine
Postal Bank was illegal, because government funds and
properties may not be seized under writ of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgment, on obvious reason of
public policy. The [RTC] issued an Order dated March 8,
2004, denying said motion. [Cebu Citys] Motion for
Reconsideration was also denied. The Spouses Ortega] filed
an Ex-Parte Motion to Direct the New Manager of Philippine
Postal Bank to Release to the Sheriff the Garnished Amount,
which was granted by the [RTC]. [Cebu City] filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the same was denied.

ISSUE: WON the determination of just compensation is

a judicial prerogative.

RULING: It is well settle in jurisprudence that the determination

of just compensation is a judicial prerogative.

The determination of just compensation in eminent

domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the
legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims
a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property
may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statue,
Republic of the Philippines vs. Vda. De Castellvi (G.R. No. L-20620) -
Digest
Facts:
In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), entered into a lease agreement over a land in Pampanga with
Castellvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castellvi gave notice to
terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused because of the
permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00
that were erected and already established on the property. She then
instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however,
the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in
question.
Issue: Whether or not the compensation should be determined as of
1947 or 1959.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the taking should not be reckoned as of
1947, and that just compensation should not be determined on the
basis of the value of the property that year .
The requisites for taking are:
1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;
4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected; and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as
to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the
property.
Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. It is clear, therefore, that the
taking of Castellvis property for purposes of eminent domain cannot
be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the republic
commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof.
Requisite number 2 is not present according to the Supreme Court,
momentary when applied to possession or occupancy of real
property should be construed to mean a limited period -- not
indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a period
of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the property,
under the lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that
the Republic, through AFP, constructed some installations of a
permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the lant
was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from
year to year by consent of the owner of the land. By express provision
of the lease agreement the republic, as lessee, undertook to return the
premises in substantially the same condition as at the time the
property was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention
of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as may be inferred
from the construction of permanent improvements. But this intention
cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease contract.
The 5th requirement is also lacking. In the instant case the entry of the
Republic into the property and its utilization of the same for public use
did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property. Cstellvi remained as owner, and was continuously
recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal of the
lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease
contract whereby the Republic undertook to return the property to
Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi
deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the
Republic was bound to pay, and had been paing, Castellvi the agreed
monthly rentals until the time when it filed the complaint for eminent
domain on June 26, 1959.

It is clear, therefore, that the taking of Castellvis property for

purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken
place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property
as lessee thereof, and that the just compensation to be paid for the
Castellvis property should not be determined on the basis of the value
of the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit an error
when it held that the taking of the property under expropriation
commenced with the filing of the complaint in this case.

Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is to

be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The
Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought
to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of
the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
THE CITY OF MANILA,vs.CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, ET
AL.
Facts: On Dec. 11 1916 presented a petition in the CFI of Manila
praying that certain lands used by the Chinese Community as their
cemetery be expropriated for an extension of Rizal Avenue. The
Comunidad de Chinos de Manila alleged that if expropriation would
take effect, it would disturb the resting places of the dead, and would
require a large sum of money to transfer the bodies; furthermore, the
expropriation was unnecessary as a public improvement. Plaintiffs
theory however is that once it has established the fact, under the
law, that it has authority to expropriate land, it may expropriate any
land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such
proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that
neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the
advisible purpose of purpose of the expropriation or ask any
questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are
mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings,
and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by
the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.
Issue: If the City of Manila may expropriate the lands used as
cemetery for extending Rizal Avenue.
Held: Under Section 2429 of Act No. 2711 (Charter of the City of
Manila), the city has the authority to expropriate private lands for
public purposes. However, said charter contains no procedure by
which the authority may be carried not effect, and how eminent
domain may be exercised. The Court then opines that the power of
the court is not limited to determining WON a law exists permitting
the plaintiff to expropriate. The right of expropriation is not inherent in
municipal corporations, and before it can exercise such some law
must exist to confer such power. When the courts determine the
question, they must find only that a law exists for such a reason, and
that the right or authority being exercised is in accordance with the
law. In the present case, there are two conditions imposed upon the
authority conceded to the City of Manila: 1, the land must be private,
and 2,the purpose must be public. If the court upon trial finds that
neither exists or either fails, it cannot be contended that the right is
being exercised in accordance with law.
The necessity for taking property under the right of eminent domain
is not a judicial question. The legislature, in providing for the exercise
of the power of eminent domain, may directly determine the
necessity of appropriating private property for a particular
improvement for public use, and may select the exact location of the
improvement. The questions of utility of proposed improvement, the
extent of public necessity for its construction, the expediency f
constructing it, the suitableness of its location and the necessity of
taking the land for its site are all questions exclusive for the
legislature to determine. The taking of private property for any use
which is not required by the necessities or convenience of the
inhabitants of the state, is an unreasonable exercise of the right of
eminent domain, and beyond the power of the legislature to
delegate.
WON the cemetery is private or public is immaterial. The Court
opines that it is difficult to believe that even the legislature would
adopt a law providing expressly that such places under such
circumstances should be violated. To disturb the mortal remains of
those endeared to us in life becomes sometimes the sad duty of the
living, but except in cases of necessity or for laudable purposes, the
sanctity of the grave should be maintained. In the present case,
even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in
question, the record shows no proof of the necessity of opening the
same through the cemetery. The record shows that the adjoining and
adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which
should answer every purpose of the plaintiff.
Masikip v. City of Pasig
- the power of eminent domain is not inherent in LGU and must be
expressly provided for by statute
FACTS:
Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land,
which the City of Pasig sought to expropriate a portion thereof for the
sports development and recreational activities of the residents of
Barangay Caniogan. This was in January 1994. Masikip refused.
On March 23, 1994, City of Pasig sought again to expropriate said
portion of land for the alleged purpose that it was in line with the
program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities
to deserving poor sectors of our community.
Petitioner protested, so City of Pasig filed with the trial court a
complaint for expropriation. The Motion to Dismiss filed by Masikip
was dismissed by the rial court on the ground that there was genuine
necessity to expropriate the property. Case was elevated to the
Court of Appeals, which dismissed petition for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property
HELD:
Eminent domain is the right of a government to take and appropriate
private property to the public use, whenever the public exigency
requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a
reasonably compensation therefor. It is the power of the State or its
instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is
inseparable from sovereignty and inherent in government.
This power is lodged in the legislative branch of government. It
delegates the power thereof to the LGUs, other public entities and
public utility corporations, subject only to constitutional limitations.
LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise
it only when expressly authorized by statute.
Sec. 19, LGC: LGU may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for
public use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and
landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.
Provided:
(1) power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid
and definite offer has been previously made to the owner and such
offer was not accepted;
(2) LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon the
filing of expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with
the proper court of at least 15% fair market value of the property
based on the current tax declaration; and
(3) amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined
by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the
taking of the property
There is already an established sports development and recreational
activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City. Evidently, there is no
genuine necessity to justify the expropriation. The records show
that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council
which became the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 4,
authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary
is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private,
non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan.
De Knecht vs. Bautista [GR L-51078, 30 October 1980] First
Division, Fernandez (J): 4 concur Facts: In 1970, the government
through the Department of Public Works and Communications (now
Ministy of Public Highways [MPH]) prepared a plan to extend Epifanio
de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) to Roxas Boulevard. The proposed
extension, an adjunct of another road-building program, the Manila
Cavite Coastal Road Project, would pass through Cuneta Avenue up
to Roxas Boulevard. The route was designed to be a straight one,
taking into account the direction of EDSA. Preparatory to the
implementation of the aforesaid plan, or on 13 December 1974, then
Secretary Baltazar Aquino of the Department of Public Highways
directed the City Engineer of Pasay City not to issue temporary or
permanent permits for the construction and/or improvement of
buildings and other structures located within the proposed extension
through Cuneta Avenue. Shortly thereafter the Department of Public
Highways decided to make the proposed extension go through
Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets which are lined with old
substantial houses. Upon petition of the residents therein to the
President of the Philippines for the implementation of the original plan,
the President referred the matter to the Human Settlements
Commission. The Commission submitted its report recommending the
reversion to the original plan passing through Cuneta Avenue.
Notwithstanding said recommendation, the MPH insisted on
implementing the plan to make the extension of EDSA go through
Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. In February 1979, the
government filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch
III, Pasay City (Judge Pedro JL. Bautista presiding; Civil Case 7001-
P), a complaint for expropriation against the owners of the houses
standing along Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets, among them
Cristina de Knecht. De Knecht filed a motion to dismiss dated 9 March
1979. An urgent motion dated 28 March 1979 for preliminary injunction
was also filed. In June 1979 the Republic of the Philippines filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of possession of the property sought
to be expropriated on the ground that said Republic had made the
required deposit with the Philippine National Bank. Judge Bautista
issued a writ of possession dated 14 June 1979 authorizing the
Republic of the Philippines to take and enter upon the possession of
the properties sought so be condemned. De Knecht filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court, praying that
judgment be rendered annulling the order for immediate possession
issued by respondent court in the expropriation proceedings and
commanding the Republic to desist from further proceedings in the
expropriation action or the order for immediate possession issued in
said action.
Issue: Whether the expropriation of the residential lots in Fernando
Rein and Del Pan Streets is genuinely Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 23
) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) necessary, in light of similar acceptable
lots along Cuneta Avenue which were subject of the original plan.
Held: There is no question as to the right of the Republic of the
Philippines to take private property for public use upon the payment of
just compensation. Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution of the
Philippines provides that "Private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation." It is recognized, however, that the
government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose what private
property should be taken. A landowner is covered by the mantle of
protection due process affords. It is a mandate of reason. It frowns on
arbitrariness, it is the antithesis of any governmental act that smacks
of whim or caprice. It negates state power to act in an oppressive
manner. It is, as had been stressed so often, the embodiment of the
sporting idea off air play. In that sense, it stands as a guaranty of
justice. That is the standard that must be met by any governmental
agency in the exercise of whatever competence is entrusted to it. As
was so emphatically stressed by the present Chief Justice, Acts of
Congress, as well as those of the Executive, can deny due process
only under pain of nullity. Herein, it is a fact that the Department of
Public Highways originally establish the extension of EDSA along
Cuneta Avenue. It is to be presumed that the Department of Public
Highways made studies before deciding on Cuneta Avenue. It is
indeed odd why suddenly the proposed extension of EDSA to Roxas
Boulevard was changed to go through Fernando Rein Del Pan
Streets which the Solicitor General concedes "the Del Pan
Fernando Rein Streets line follows northward and inward direction
While admitting "that both lines, Cuneta Avenue and Del Pan
Fernando Rein Streets lines, meet satisfactorily planning and design
criteria and therefore are both acceptable", the Solicitor General
justifies the change to Del Pan Fernando Rein Streets on the
ground that the government "wanted to minimize the social impact
factor or problem involved." It is doubtful whether the extension of
EDSA along Cuneta Avenue can be objected to on the ground of
social impact. The improvements and buildings along Cuneta Avenue
to be affected by the extension are mostly motels. Even granting,
arguendo, that more people will be affected, the Human Settlements
Commission has suggested coordinative efforts of said Commission
with the National Housing Authority and other government agencies in
the relocation and resettlement of those adversely affected. From the
facts of record and recommendations of the Human Settlements
Commission, it is clear that the choice of Fernando Rein Del Pan
Streets as the line through which the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue
should be extended to Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and should not
receive judicial approval.
 Republic vs. de Knecht [GR 87335, 12 February 1990] First
Division, Gancayco (J): 3 concur Facts: On 20 February 1979 the
Republic of the Philippines filed in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Rizal in Pasay City an expropriation proceedings against the owners
of the houses standing along Fernando ReinDel Pan streets among
them Cristina De Knecht together with Concepcion Cabarrus, and
some 15 other defendants (Civil Case 7001-P). On 19 March 1979, de
Knecht filed a motion to dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction, pendency
of appeal with the President of the Philippines, prematureness of
complaint and arbitrary and erroneous valuation of the properties. On
29 March 1979 de Knecht filed an ex parte urgent motion for the
issuance by the trial court of a restraining order to restrain the Republic
from proceeding with the taking of immediate possession and control
of the property sought to be condemned. In June 1979, the Republic
filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession of the property
to be expropriated on the ground that it had made the required deposit
with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) of 10% of the amount of
compensation stated in the complaint. In an order dated 14 June 1979
the lower court issued a writ of possession authorizing the Republic to
enter into and take possession of the properties sought to be
condemned, and created a Committee of three to determine the just
compensation for the lands involved in the proceedings. On 16 July
1979, de Knecht filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and
prohibition (GR No. L-51078) and directed against the order of the
lower court dated 14 June 1979 praying that the Republic be
commanded to desist from further proceeding in the expropriation
action and from implementing said order. On 30 October 1980, the
Supreme Court rendered a decision, granting the petition for certiorari
and prohibition and setting aside the 14 June 1979 order of the Judge
Bautista. Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 24 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
On 8 August 1981, Maria Del Carmen Roxas Vda. de Elizalde,
Francisco Elizalde and Antonio Roxas moved to dismiss the
expropriation action in compliance with the dispositive portion of the
aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court which had become final and
in order to avoid further damage to latter who were denied possession
of their properties. The Republic filed a manifestation on 7 September
1981 stating, among others, that it had no objection to the said motion
to dismiss as it was in accordance with the aforestated decision.
However, on 2 September 1983, the Republic filed a motion to dismiss
said case due to the enactment of the Batas Pambansa 340
expropriating the same properties and for the same purpose. The
lower court in an order of 2 September 1983 dismissed the case by
reason of the enactment of the said law. The motion for
reconsideration thereof was denied in the order of the lower court
dated 18 December 1986. De Knecht appealed from said order to the
Court of Appeals wherein in due course a decision was rendered on
28 December 1988, setting aside the order appealed from and
dismissing the expropriation proceedings. The Republic filed the
petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether an expropriation proceeding that was determined by
a final judgment of the Supreme Court may be the subject of a
subsequent legislation for expropriation.
Held: While it is true that said final judgment of the Supreme Court on
the subject becomes the law of the case between the parties, it is
equally true that the right of the Republic to take private properties for
public use upon the payment of the just compensation is so provided
in the Constitution and our laws. Such expropriation proceedings may
be undertaken by the Republic not only by voluntary negotiation with
the land owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by
legislation. When on 17 February 1983 the Batasang Pambansa
passed BP 340 expropriating the very properties subject of the present
proceedings, and for the same purpose, it appears that it was based
on supervening events that occurred after the decision of the Supreme
Court was rendered in De Knecht in 1980 justifying the expropriation
through the Fernando ReinDel Pan Streets. The social impact factor
which persuaded the Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary
had disappeared. All residents in the area have been relocated and
duly compensated. 80% of the EDSA outfall and 30% of the EDSA
extension had been completed. Only De Knecht remains as the
solitary obstacle to this project that will solve not only the drainage and
flood control problem but also minimize the traffic bottleneck in the
area. Moreover, the decision, is no obstacle to the legislative arm of
the Government in thereafter making its own independent assessment
of the circumstances then prevailing as to the propriety of undertaking
the expropriation of the properties in question and thereafter by
enacting the corresponding legislation as it did in this case. The Court
agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting BP 340. Thus the
anterior decision of this Court must yield to this subsequent legislative
fiat.
Republic v. Gingoyon indeed any right to remuneration due to these two entities arising from
NAIA 3, they have not yet been established by the courts of the land.
Facts:
It must be emphasized that the conclusive ruling in the Resolution
This case is a motion for reconsideration for a previous decision of the dated 21 January 2004 in Agan v. PIATCO (Agan 2004) is that
SC. In the assailed decision of the SC, it ruled that PIATCO should be PIATCO, as builder of the facilities, must first be justly compensated
justly compensated before the Government can take over the NAIA in accordance with law and equity for the Government to take over the
Terminal 3. Now, the Government is arguing that PIATCO should not facilities. It is on that premise that the Court adjudicated this case in
be paid because it has pending obligations with its 19 December 2005 Decision.
Takenaka Corporation (Takenaka) and Asahikosan (Asahikosan) While the Government refers to a judgment rendered by
Corporation for services rendered by the said corporations in building a London court in favor of Takenaka and Asahikosan against
the Terminal. It argues that the said corporations still has pending liens PIATCO in the amount of US$82 Million, it should be noted that this
on the Terminal. The situation the Republic now faces is that if any foreign judgment is not yet binding on Philippine courts. It is
part of its Php3,002,125,000 deposit is released directly to PIATCO, entrenched in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure that
and PIATCO, as in the past, does not wish to settle its obligations a foreign judgment on the mere strength of its promulgation is not yet
directly to Takenaka, Asahikosan and Fraport, the Republic may end conclusive, as it can be annulled on the grounds of want of jurisdiction,
up having expropriated a terminal with liens and claims far in excess want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
of its actual value, the liens remain unextinguished, and PIATCO on fact. It is likewise recognized in Philippine jurisprudence and
the other hand, ends up with the Php3,0002,125,000 in its pockets international law that a foreign judgment may be barred from
gratuitously. recognition if it runs counter to public policy.
Issue: Assuming that PIATCO indeed has corresponding obligations to other
parties relating to NAIA 3, the Court does not see how such
Should the Government pay PIATCO just compensation before taking obligations, yet unproven, could serve to overturn the Decision
over the Terminal? mandating that the Government first pay PIATCO the amount of 3.02
Billion Pesos before it may acquire physical possession over the
Held:
facilities. This directive enjoining payment is in accordance with
Yes.The Court is wont to reverse its previous rulings based on factual Republic Act No. 8974, and under the mechanism established by the
premises that are not yet conclusive or judicially established. law the amount to be initially paid is that which is provisionally
Certainly, whatever claims or purported determined as just compensation. The provisional character of this
liens Takenaka and Asahikosan against PIATCO or over the NAIA 3 payment means that it is not yet final, yet sufficient under the law to
have not been judicially established. entitle the Government to the writ of possession over the expropriated
Neither Takenaka norAsahikosan are parties to the present action, property.
and thus have not presented any claim which could be acted upon by There are other judicial avenues outside of this Motion for
this Court. The earlier adjudications in Aganv. PIATCO made no Reconsideration wherein all other claims relating to the airport
mention of either Takenaka or Asahikosan, and certainly made no facilities may be ventilated, proved and determined. Since such claims
declaration as to their rights to any form of compensation. If there is involve factual issues, they must first be established by the
appropriate trier of facts before they can be accorded any respect by
or binding force on this Court.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES
RODOLFO ZABALA and LILIA BAYLON, Respondents.
FACTS:
On October 27, 1994, plaintiff-appellant National Power Corporation
(Napocor) filed a complaint for Eminent Domain against defendants-
appellees Sps. R. Zabala & L. Baylon, before the RTC, Balanga City,
Bataan alleging that Spouses Zabala and Baylon own parcels of land
located in Balanga City, Bataan and that it urgently needed an
easement of right of way over the affected areas for its 230 KV Limay-
Hermosa Transmission Lines. The Commissioners submitted their
Report/ Recommendation fixing the just compensation at P150.00 per
square meter. Napocor prayed that the report be recommitted to the
commissioners for the modification of the report and the substantiation
of the same with reliable and competent documentary evidence based
on the value of the property at the time of its taking. The
Commissioners submitted their Final Report fixing the just
compensation at P500.00 per square meter.
On June 28, 2004, the RTC rendered its Partial Decision and ordered
Napocor to pay Php150.00 per square meter for the 6,820 square
meters determined as of the date of the taking of the property.
Napocor appealed to the CA arguing that the Commissioners reports
are not supported by documentary evidence. Napocor argued that the
RTC did not apply Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395 which limits its liability
to easement fee of not more than 10% of the market value of the
property traversed by its transmission lines. CA affirmed the RTCs
Partial Decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in fixing the amount of
Php150.00 per square meter as the fair market value of the
property subject of the easement right of way of Napocor?
HELD: The petition is partially meritorious.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: just compensation
Sec. 3A of RA No. 6395 cannot restrict the constitutional power of the
courts to determine just compensation. The payment of just
compensation for private property taken for public use is guaranteed
no less by our Constitution and is included in the Bill of Rights. As
such, no legislative enactments or executive issuances can prevent
the courts from determining whether the right of the property owners
to just compensation has been violated. It is a judicial function that
cannot be usurped by any other branch or official of the government.
Statutes and executive issuances fixing or providing for the method of
computing just compensation are not binding on courts and, at best,
are treated as mere guidelines in ascertaining the amount thereof.
The Supreme Court has held in a long line of cases that since the high-
tension electric current passing through the transmission lines will
perpetually deprive the property owners of the normal use of their land,
it is only just and proper to require Napocor to recompense them for
the full market value of their property.
REMEDIAL LAW: commissioners report
The just compensation of P150.00 per square meter as fixed by the
RTC is not supported by evidence. Just compensation cannot be
arrived at arbitrarily. Several factors must be considered, such as, but
not limited to, acquisition cost, current market value of like properties,
tax value of the condemned property, its size, shape, and location. But
before these factors can be considered and given weight, the same
must be supported by documentary evidence.
Under Section 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the trial court may
accept or reject, whether in whole or in part, the commissioners report
which is merely advisory and recommendatory in character. It may
also recommit the report or set aside the same and appoint new
commissioners. In this case, however, in spite of the insufficient and
flawed reports of the Commissioners and Napocors objections
thereto, the RTC eventually adopted the same. It shrugged off
Napocors protestations and limited itself to the reports submitted by
the Commissioners.
Lastly, it should be borne in mind that just compensation should be
computed based on the fair value of the subject property at the time
of its taking or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. Since
in this case the filing of the eminent domain case came ahead of the
taking, just compensation should be based on the fair market value of
spouses Zabalas property at the time of the filing of Napocors
Complaint on October 27, 1994 or thereabouts.
Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Case is REMANDED to the
RTC for the proper determination of just compensation.
 SEBASTIAN COSCULLUELA vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, represented by NATIONAL IRRIGATION
ADMINISTRATION

FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint with the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo to expropriate two parcels of land in the
municipality of Barotac, Iloilo owned by petitioner Sebastian
Cosculluela and one Mita Lumampao, for the construction of the canal
network of the Barotac Irrigation Project.
The trial court rendered a decision granting the expropriation
and ordered the public respondent to pay Lumampao, the sum of
P20,000 and Cosculluela, the sum of P200,000.00.
The Republic contends that the funds of the National Irrigation
Authority (NIA) are government funds and therefore, cannot be
disbursed without a government appropriation.

ISSUE: WON the Republic is exempt from paying the just

compensation demanded by the petitioner in view of non-
disbursement of funds without prior public appropriation.

HELD: NO.
One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is
that no person shall be deprived of his private property without due
process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of
due process is that there must be just compensation whenever private
property is taken for public use.
Just compensation means not only the correct determination
of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment
of the land within a reasonable time from its taking.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE NATIONAL
IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION (NIA) v. RURAL BANK OF
KABACAN, INC., et al. G.R. No. 185124, 15 January 2012,
SECOND DIVISION (Sereno, J.)
In the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil has no value
separate from that of the expropriated land because real properties
are characteristically indivisible; hence, the ownership of the land
extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it.
FACTS:
The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Kabacan (RTC) a complaint for expropriation of a portion
of three parcels of land covering a total of 14,497.91 square meters
for its Malitubog-Marigadao irrigation project. The committee formed
by the RTC pegged the fair market value of the land at Php 65.00 per
square meter. It also added to its computation the value of soil
excavated from portions of two lots. RTC adopted the findings of the
committee despite the objections of NIA to the inclusion of the value
of the excavated soil in the computation of the value of the land.
NIA, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed to the Court
of Appeals (CA) which affirmed with modification the RTCs decision.
CA deleted the value of the soil in determination of compensation but
affirmed RTCs valuation of the improvements made on the properties.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the value of the excavated soil should be included in
the computation of just compensation
HELD:
Petition DENIED.
There is no legal basis to separate the value of the excavated soil from
that of the expropriated properties, contrary to what the trial court did.
In the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil has no value
separate from that of the expropriated land. Just compensation
ordinarily refers to the value of the land to compensate for what the
owner actually loses. Such value could only be that which prevailed at
the time of the taking.
In National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, et al. The SC held that rights
over lands are indivisible. This conclusion is drawn from Article 437 of
the Civil Code which provides: The owner of a parcel of land is the
owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct
thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which he
may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to
special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable
requirements of aerial navigation. Thus, the ownership of land
extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it.
Hence, the CA correctly modified the trial courts Decision when it
ruled it is preposterous that NIA will be made to pay not only for the
value of the land but also for the soil excavated from such land when
such excavation is a necessary phase in the building of irrigation
projects. That NIA will make use of the excavated soil is of no moment
and is of no concern to the landowner who has been paid the fair
market value of his land. As pointed out by the OSG, the law does not
limit the use of the expropriated land to the surface area only. To
sanction the payment of the excavated soil is to allow the landowners
to recover more than the value of the land at the time when it was
taken, which is the true measure of the damages, or just
compensation, and would discourage the construction of important
public improvements.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by
SECRETARY NASSER C. PANGANDAMAN, Petitioner,
vs.SPOUSES DIOSDADO STA. ROMANA and RESURRECCION O.
RAMOS, represented by AURORA STA. ROMANA,
PURIFICACION C. DAEZ, represented by EFREN D. VILLALUZ
and ROSAURO D. VILLALUZ, and SPOUSES LEANDRO C.
SEVILLA and MILAGROS C. DAEZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 183290* July 9, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated March
27, 2008 and the Resolution3 dated June 12, 2008 rendered by the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 93132 and 93240 which
affirmed the Decision4 dated October 18, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 33 (RTC) in AGR. Case No.
1163-G,5 fixing the just compensation for respondents 21.2192-
hectare (ha.) land at P2,576,829.94 or P121,438.60/ha., and ordering
the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to pay the said amount in the
manner provided by law.
FACTS:
Respondents, spouses Diosdado Sta. Romana and Resurreccion O.
Ramos, represented by Aurora Sta. Romana, Purificacion C. Daez,
represented by Efren D. Villaluz and Rosauro D. Villaluz, and spouses
Leandro C. Sevilla and Milagros C. Daez, are the owners of a 27.5307-
ha. agricultural land situated in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-66211.6 Petitioner, the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), compulsorily acquired a
21.2192-ha. portion (subject land) of respondents property pursuant
to the governments Operation Land Transfer Program under
Presidential Decree No. 27, otherwise known as the "Tenants
Emancipation Decree," as amended. On November 29, 1995, the
DAR caused the generation of emancipation patents (EPs) in favor of
the farmer-beneficiaries and in 1996, the LBP fixed the value of the
subject land at P361,181.8710 using the formula under Executive
Order No. 22812 and DAR Administrative Order No. 13, series of
1994,13 i.e., LV = (2.5 x AGP x P35.00) x (1.06)n14 .Under this
formula. Respondents filed a Petition for Approval and Appraisal of
Just Compensation before the RTC, docketed as AGR. Case No.
1163-G, averring that: (a) the LBP valuation was grossly inadequate
considering the subject lands proximity to subdivision lots and
commercial establishments; and (b) the fair market value of the
subject land should be fixed in the amount of at least P300,000.00/ha.
as some beneficiaries were even selling their lands to subdivision
developers at the price of P1,000,000.00/ha.
On the other hand, the LBP insisted on the correctness of the
valuation, having been computed in accordance with the formula
under EO 228 which governs the determination of just compensation
due a landowner whose property was seized under PD 27. The RTC
appointed 2 commissioners for the purpose. On August 27, 2004, the
commissioners submitted their report, recommending the amount of
P300,000.00/ha. as reasonable compensation for the subject land.19
ISSUE:
Whether or not just compensation should be determined and paid for
the subject land acquired.
HELD:
Yes. Just compensation for the subject land acquired under PD 27 has
yet to be paid, just compensation should be determined and the
process concluded under RA 6657, with PD 27 and EO 228 having
mere suppletory effects. This means that PD 27 and EO 228 only
apply when there are gaps in RA 6657; where RA 6657 is sufficient,
PD 27 and EO 228 are superseded. For purposes of determining just
compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is
determined by its character and its price at the time of taking.46 In
addition, the factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657,47 i.e.,
(a) the acquisition cost of the land, (b) the current value of like
properties, (c) the nature and actual use of the property, and the
income therefrom, (d) the owner's sworn valuation, (e) the tax
declarations, (f) the assessment made by government assessors, (g)
the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers, and by the government to the property, and (h) the non-
payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing
institution on the said land, if any , must be equally considered. The
Court has gone over the records and observed that the only factors
considered by the RTC in determining the just compensation for the
subject land were (a) the acquisition price of a 5.5825-ha. landholding
situated in the same locality paid to the owner on November 17,
1997,48 and (b) the market value of the subject land declared by the
respondents, without a showing that the other factors under Section
17 of RA 6657 , as amended, were even taken into account or,
otherwise, found to be inapplicable , contrary to what the law requires.
Consequently, the CA erred in upholding the RTCs valuation as
having been made in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657, as
amended.

The petition is DENIED insofar as it seeks to sustain the

valuation of the 21.2192-hectare portion of respondents' property
made by the Land Bank of the Philippines. The Decision dated March
27, 2008 and the Resolution dated June 12, 2008 rendered by the
Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP Nos. 93132 and 93240 upholding the
said valuation which did not consider the factors enumerated under
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
National Power Corporation vs Gutierrez GR 60077 18 January
1991
The nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay
Posted by Rachel Chan in Case Digests, Constitutional Law II Leave transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of
a comment the land for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its
ordinary use.
Facts: National Power Corporation a gocc vested with ED power
initiated negotiations for ight of easement to construct transmission
lines to several lots. The commissioners appointed recommended
1.xx easement fee for Guiterrez lot. This was countered by Gutierrez For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled
with 10.xx as disturbance compensation. Court countered with 5.xx. to a just compensation.
Lower court granted 10.xx this was appealed and was reduced to 5.xx.
Still not satisfied NPC appealed to CA.

NPC contend that full ownership is retained by the private respondents

and they are not totally deprived of the use of the land. They can
continue planting the same agricultural crops, except those that would
result in contact with the wires. On this premise, petitioner submits that
if full market value is required, then full transfer of ownership is only
the logical equivalent.

Issue: Whether or not full compensation should be paid on the ground

of deprivation of use of Gutierrez property?

Decision: While it is true that plaintiff are (sic) only after a right-of-way
easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of their
proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon
defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher than
three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-tension
current conveyed through said transmission lines, danger to life and
limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot altogether be
discounted, and to cap it all plaintiff only pays the fee to defendants
once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on said
affected portion of their property.
 CABAHUG vs. NPC (CASE DIGEST)
FACTS: The Spouses Cabahug are the owners of two parcels of land
situated in Barangay Capokpok, Tabango, Leyte, registered in their
names under TCT Nos. T-9813 and T-1599 of the Leyte provincial
registry. They were among the defendants in Special Civil Action No.
0019-PN, a suit for expropriation earlier filed by NPC before the RTC,
in connection with its Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project. The suit
was later dismissed when NPC opted to settle with the landowners by
paying an easement fee equivalent to 10% of value of their property
in accordance with Section 3-A of Republic Act (RA) No. 6395. On 9
November 1996, Jesus Cabahug executed two documents
denominated as Right of Way Grant in favor of NPC. . For and in
consideration of the easement fees, Cabahug granted NPC a
continuous easement of right of way for the latters transmissions lines
and their appurtenances over 24,939 and 4,750 square meters of the
parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. T-9813 and T-1599, respectively.
By said grant, Jesus Cabahug agreed not to construct any building or
structure whatsoever, nor plant in any area within the Right of Way
that will adversely affect or obstruct the transmission line of NPC,
except agricultural crops, the growth of which will not exceed three
meters high. Under paragraph 4 of the grant, however, Jesus
Cabahug reserved the option to seek additional compensation for
easement fee, based on the Supreme Courts 18 January 1991
Decision in G.R. No. 60077, entitled National Power Corporation v.
Spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit, et al. (Gutierrez).
On 21 September 1998, the Spouses Cabahug filed the complaint for
the payment of just compensation, damages and attorneys fees
against NPC before the RTC. In its answer, NPC averred that it
already paid the full easement fee mandated under Section 3-A of RA
6395 and that the reservation in the grant referred to additional
compensation for easement fee, not the full just compensation sought
by the Spouses Cabahug. The RTC rendered a Decision dated 14
March 2000, brushing aside NPCs reliance on Section 3-A of RA
6395. Aggrieved by the foregoing decision, the NPC perfected the
appeal before the CA which, on 16 May 2007, rendered the herein
assailed decision, reversing and setting aside the RTCs appealed
decision. On motion for reconsideration, the same was denied by the
CA. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON petitioners are entitled to full just compensation.
RULING: The rule is settled that a contract constitutes the law
between the parties who are bound by its stipulations which, when
couched in clear and plain language, should be applied according to
their literal tenor. Courts cannot supply material stipulations, read into
the contract words it does not contain or, for that matter, read into it
any other intention that would contradict its plain import. Neither can
they rewrite contracts because they operate harshly or inequitably as
to one of the parties, or alter them for the benefit of one party and to
the detriment of the other, or by construction, relieve one of the parties
from the terms which he voluntarily consented to, or impose on him
those which he did not.The power of eminent domain may be
exercised although title is not transferred to the expropriator in an
easement of right of way. Just compensation which should be neither
more nor less than the money equivalent of the property is, moreover,
due where the nature and effect of the easement is to impose
limitations against the use of the land for an indefinite period and
deprive the landowner its ordinary use. It has been ruled that the
owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the land
if, as here, the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely
deprive the owner of his proprietary rights through the imposition of
conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment and disposal of
the property or through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent
with the exercise of the attributes of ownership, or when the
introduction of structures or objects which, by their nature, create or
increase the probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life and
property found on the land is necessary. Measured not by the takers
gain but the owners loss, just compensation is defined as the full and
fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator.The determination of just compensation in eminent
domain proceedings is a judicial function and no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail
over the court's findings. Any valuation for just compensation laid
down in the statutes may serve only as a guiding principle or one of
the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute
the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and
how to arrive at such amount. Hence, Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395, as
amended, is not binding upon this Court.
United States v. Causby
Brief Fact Summary. Respondents claim that their property was
taken, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, by the regular army
and navy aircraft flights over their house and chicken farm.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The airspace is a public highway, but if the
landowner is to have the full enjoyment of his land, he must have
exclusive control over the immediate reaches of the enveloping
atmosphere.
Facts. Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of
Greensboro, North Carolina. Respondents property contained a
house and a chicken farm. The end of one of the runways of the airport
was 2,220 feet from Respondents property, and the glide path passed
over the property at 83 feet, which is 67 feet above the house, 63 feet
above the barn, and 18 feet above the highest tree. The use by the
United States of this airport is pursuant to a lease beginning June 1,
1942, and ending June 30, 1942, with provisions for renewal until June
30, 1967, or six months after the end of the national emergency,
whichever is earlier. The United States four motored bombers make
loud noises when flying above the property, and have very bright
lights. Respondents chicken farm production had to stop, because
150 chickens were killed by flying into walls from fright. In the Court of
Claims, it was found that the United States had taken an easement
over the property on June 1, 1942, and that the val
ue of the property depreciation as the result of the easement was
$2,000.00. The United States petitioned for certiorari, which was
granted.
Issue. Has the Respondents property been taken within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment?
Held. Yes. But the case is remanded for a determination of the value
of the easement and whether the easement was permanent or
temporary.
The court noted the common law doctrine of ownership of land
extending to the sky above the land. However, the court notes that an
act of Congress had given the United States exclusive national
sovereignty over the air space. The court noted that common sense
made the common law doctrine inapplicable.
However, the court found that the common law doctrine did not control
the present case. The United States had conceded in oral argument
that if flights over the Respondents property rendered it uninhabitable
then there would be a taking compensable under the Fifth
Amendment. The measure of the value of the property taken is the
owners loss, not the takers gain.
The airspace is a public highway. But it is obvious that if the landowner
is to have the full enjoyment of his land, he must have exclusive control
of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. If this were
not true then landowners could not build buildings, plant trees or run
fences.
The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is
part of the public domain. The court does not set the precise limits of
the line of demarcation. Flights over private land are not a taking,
unless, like here, they are so low and frequent as to be a direct and
immediate interference with the enjoyment of the land. The Court of
Claims must, upon remand, determine the value of the easement and
whether it is a temporary or permanent easement.
Dissent. The dissent would reverse the decision of the Court of
Claims and hold that there has been no taking within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment. This is because of the modern nature of the
airplane, and the desire to avoid confusion.
Discussion. The national emergency, World War II, meant that the
airport, which was not previously used by large planes, would be the
home to large bombers. The use of the airspace above Respondents
home and farm was not a problem previously, because the flights were
sporadic and not nearly as loud as the bombers.
CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the
City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as
Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the
City Council of Manila, et.al vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO,
JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation
(MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels,
motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria
Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly
accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a
Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court
impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon.
Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of
the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the
Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its
prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor,
the said Ordinance is entitled
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR
OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF
AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN
THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of
respondent).
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging
that the following errors were committed by the lower court in its
ruling:
(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or
otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police
power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes
P.D. 499 which allows operators of all kinds of commercial
establishments, except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court
did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and
therefore null and void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of
decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only
be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact
and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its
police power, an enactment of the City Council acting as agent of
Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the
LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the
exercise of such delegated power.
A. The Ordinance contravenes
the Constitution
The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of
delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general
laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with
utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and
equal protection of the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity
of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty
and property.
Requisites for the valid exercise
of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale
for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation
of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be
evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable
relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and
the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the
guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those
pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily
invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure
shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights a
violation of the due process clause.
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and
protection of the social and moral values of the community. Granting
for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are
within the scope of the City Councils police powers, the means
employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and
unduly oppressive.
The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the
communitys social ills can be achieved through means less
restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable
restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down
and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses
allowed under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the
accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of
the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote
the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself
eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication
nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per
se offensive to the moral welfare of the community. While a motel
may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that
reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-
repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked
assumption.
If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution,
fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable
regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any
violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise
its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations;
and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there
are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for
the achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself,
infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a persons fundamental
right to liberty and property.
Modality employed is
unlawful taking
It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that
it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond
regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property
without just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the
private property rights of individuals.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A
possessory taking occurs when the government confiscates or
physically occupies property. A regulatory taking occurs when the
governments regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable
use of the property.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that
government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with
reasonable expectations for use. When the owner of real property
has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in
the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property
economically idle, he has suffered a taking.
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the prohibited
establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to
wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of
the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of
business allowable within the area. The directive to wind up
business operations amounts to a closure of the establishment, a
permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory.
Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an
allowed business, the structure which housed the previous
business will be left empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that the
Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property
in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of
the Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed businessesare
confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of
subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also
equivalent to a taking of private property.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning
ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police
power, which limits a wholesome property to a use which can not
reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property
without just compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor
intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed
without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the
principles of justice as we know them. The police powers of local
government units which have always received broad and liberal
interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.
Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted power to close down establishments. Ordinances such
as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending
upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the
unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by
which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The
Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial
enforcement could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance does not
specify the standards to ascertain which establishments tend to
disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely
affect the social and moral welfare of the community.
The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of
comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out
its provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated
establishments without infringing the due process clause. These
lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from
carrying on their business.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal
Protection Clause
In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions between
motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments
providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public.
No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension
houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The
classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a
just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business
and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of
this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less
noxious if located outside the area.
The standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is
also discriminatory as prostitutionone of the hinted ills the
Ordinance aims to banishis not a profession exclusive to women.
Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in
prostitution. Thus, the discrimination is invalid.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant
to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter
merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not
prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments,
the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to
regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still
withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether
the establishment, operation and maintenance of such
establishments.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under
the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances
without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se,
or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property
and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity.
It can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property,
health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be
a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted
for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its
summary abatement without judicial intervention.
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs
counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC,
the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area
into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and
operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except
warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop,
gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral
establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to
have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the
council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or
repugnant to the general law.
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and
property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally
infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit
that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to
be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact
the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Petition Denied.
RUTTER vs. ESTEBAN
G.R. No. L-3708; May 18, 1953; 93 Phil. 68
Ponente: Bautista Angelo
Doctrine: Inherent powers of the State; Police Power; The national
economy
FACTS:
In August 20, 1941, Rutter sold to Esteban 2 parcels of land in
Manila. Esteban paid 3/4ths of the purchase price and they
constituted a mortgage over one of the parcels to secure the
payment of the balance.
However, the war broke out and somehow, Esteban was not able to
pay the balance of the purchase price on the due date and so, on
August 2, 1949, Rutter instituted an action to recover the balance
with the CFI.
Esteban admitted the averments of the complaint but as a defense,
he claimed that his obligation was a pre-war obligation covered by
the moratorium embodied in R.A. No. 342.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 342 provides that all debts and other
monetary obligations contracted before December 8, 1941, any
provision in the contract creating the same or any subsequent
aggreement affecting such obligation to the contrary notwithstanding,
shall not due and demandable for a period of eight (8) years from
and after settlement of the war damage claim of the debtor by the
Philippine War Damage Commission.
The CFI ruled in favor of the debtor Esteban. This brings us to the
sole issue raised by petitioner on appeal
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 342, which declared a moratorium on
certain pre-war obligations, is unconstitutional for violation of the
Constitutional provision prohibiting the impairment of the obligation of
contracts.
HELD:
Yes. R.A. No. 342 is unconstitutional.
Statutes declaring a moratorium on obligations are generally
constitutional
Statutes declaring a moratorium on obligations are not new: For
some 1,400 years western civilization has made use of extraordinary
devices for saving the credit structure, devices generally known as
moratoria. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of
obligations decreed by the state through the medium of the courts or
the legislature. Its essence is the application of the sovereign power.
Such laws were often passed during or after times of financial
distress such as wars and disasters. Similar laws were passed in
some US states after the civil war and they have been declared
constitutional. Some laws however, were declared unconstitutional
where the period of moratorium prescribed is indefinite or
unreasonable.
The argument that moratorium laws impair the obligation of contracts
does not hold water. It is justified as a valid exercise of the state of
it's police power.
 become demandable as early as 1941. And the injustice is more
patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even required to pay
In the US case, Home Building and Loan Association vs. Blaisdell, it interest during the operation of the relief.
was held that:

The court also noted that the reconstruction is paying off and that the
The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its Philippines is headed to better times. Hence the Supreme Court
continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding declared R.A. No. 342 unreasonable and oppressive and hence, null
interference with contracts. . . . and void and without effect.

xxx Disposition:
Esteban was ordered to pay the balance with interest at the rate of
Similarly, where the protective power of the State is exercised in a 7% per annum with 12% attorneys fees.
manner otherwise appropriate in the regulation of a business it is no
objection that the performance of existing contracts may be
frustrated by the prohibition of injurious practices. . . .

. . . . The question is not whether the legislative action affects

contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the
legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken
are reasonable and appropriate to that end.

Thus the true test of constitutionality of a moratorium statute

lies in the determination of the period of a suspension of the
remedy. It is required that such suspension be definite and
reasonable, otherwise it would be violative of the constitution.

R.A. No. 342 is unconstitutional for being unreasonable

The moratorium law, enacted in 1948, came on the heels of
executive orders likewise declaring moratoriums. With its 8 year
moratorium period, it is clearly unreasonable for creditors who have
to observe a vigil of 12 years to collect on debts which have
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 90294 September 24, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RlCARDO RIO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ray Anthony F. Fajarito for accused-appellant.
PADILLA, J.:p
Convicted of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch CXLVI * of Makati, Metro Manila, in
Criminal Case No. 12042, accused-appellant Ricardo Rio interposed
his appeal and as a consequence, the clerk of court of said regional
trial court branch forwarded the records of the case to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court, however, forwarded the records of the
case to the Supreme Court in view of the penalty imposed upon the
accused.
On 29 December 1989, the accused-appellant Ricardo Rio, in two
(2) letters dated 14 December 1989, addressed to Division Clerk of
Court Fermin J. Garma and to Assistant Clerk of Court Tomasita M.
Dris, manifested his intention to withdraw the appeal due to his
poverty. 1
The Court resolved in a resolution dated 22 June 1990 to require the
Solicitor General to comment on the appellant's manifestation to
withdraw the appeal.
In the Comment filed by the Solicitor General, the action
recommended was for the Court to ascertain from the accused-
appellant, through the clerk of court of the trial court, whether he
desired the appointment of a counselde oficio on appeal, in view of
the reasons stated by him for the withdrawal of his appeal, and
inasmuch as poverty should not preclude anyone from pursuing a
cause. It was also recommended that the clerk of court of the trial
court be required by the Court to submit the response of the
accused-appellant along with a certificate of compliance with the
duty imposed on him 2 by Section 13, of Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
Sec. 13. Appointment of counsel de oficio for
accused on appeal. It shall be the duty of the
clerk of the trial court upon the presentation of a
notice of appeal in a criminal case, to ascertain from
the appellant, if he is confined in prison, whether he
desires the Intermediate Appellate Court or the
Supreme Court to appoint a counsel to defend
him de oficio and to transmit with the record, upon a
form to be prepared by the clerk of the appellate
court, a certificate of compliance with this duty and
of the response of the appellant to his inquiry.
The branch clerk of the trial court, in a letter addressed to the
Assistant Clerk of Court of the Second Division, this Court, in
compliance with the resolution of this Court, dated 16 April 1990,
adopting the suggestions of the Solicitor General, which required him
to comply with his duty mandated in Section 13, Rule 122 of the
Rules of Court, submitted the reply of the accused-appellant
informing the Court that he was no longer interested in pursuing his
appeal and had, in fact, withdrawn his appeal. 3
Upon recommendation of the Solicitor General, however, the Court
in a resolution dated 1 October 1990, denied the appellant's motion
withdrawing the appeal and appointed a counsel de oficio for the
accused-appellant for, as correctly observed by the Solicitor General,
all the letters of the accused-appellant reveal that the only reason
offered by him for the withdrawal of his appeal is his inability to retain
the services of a counsel de parte on account of his poverty, a
reason which should not preclude anyone from seeking justice in any
forum. 4
It seems that the accused-appellant was unaware that this Court can
appoint a counsel de oficio to prosecute his appeal pursuant to
Section 13 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court and the constitutional
mandate provided in Section 11 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which reads as follows:
Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial
bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be
denied to any person by reason of poverty.
This constitutional provision imposes a duty on the judicial branch of
the government which can cannot be taken lightly. "The
Constitution", as aptly stated in one case, "is a law for rulers and for
people equally in war and in peace and covers with the shield of its
protection all classes of men at all times and under all
circumstances." 5
Paraphrasing Mr. Justice Malcolm, "Two (2) of the basic privileges of
the accused in a criminal prosecution are the right to the assistance
of counsel and the right to a preliminary examination. President
Mckinley made the first a part of the Organic Law in his Instructions
to the Commission by imposing the inviolable rule that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused 'shall enjoy the right ... to have assistance
of counsel for the defense' ". 6 Today said right is enshrined in the
1987 Constitution for, as Judge Cooley says, this is "perhaps the
privilege most important to the person accused of crime." 7
"In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be
given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard
would be of little meaning if it does not include the right to be heard
by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no
skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure,
and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty
but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And
this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or
uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by
counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional
right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is
not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have
an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of
an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de
oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor, or grant him a
reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own." 8
This right to a counsel de oficio does not cease upon the conviction
of an accused by a trial court. It continues, even during appeal, such
that the duty of the court to assign a counsel de oficio persists where
an accused interposes an intent to appeal. Even in a case, such as
the one at bar, where the accused had signified his intent to
withdraw his appeal, the court is required to inquire into the reason
for the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason for the withdrawal
to be poverty, as in this case, the court must assign a counsel de
oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the duty to protect the rights of
the accused subsists and perhaps, with greater reason. After all,
"those who have less in life must have more in law." 9 Justice should
never be limited to those who have the means. It is for everyone,
whether rich or poor. Its scales should always be balanced and
should never equivocate or cogitate in order to favor one party over
another.
It is with this thought in mind that we charge clerks of court of trial
courts to be more circumspect with the duty imposed on them by law
(Section 13, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court) so that courts will be
above reproach and that never (if possible) will an innocent person
be sentenced for a crime he has not committed nor the guilty allowed
to go scot-free.
In this spirit, the Court ordered the appointment of a counsel de oficio
for the accused-appellant and for said counsel and the Solicitor
General to file their respective briefs, upon submission of which the
case would be deemed submitted for decision.
From the records of the case, it is established that the accused-
appellant was charged with the crime of rape in a verified complaint
filed by complainant Wilma Phua Rio, duly subscribed before 3rd
Assistant Fiscal Rodolfo M. Alejandro of the province of Rizal, which
reads as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of March, 1984, in the
Municipality of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by
means of force and intimidation did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the undersigned Wilma Phua against
her will. 10
On 26 June 1985, at the arraignment, the accused-appellant,
assisted by Atty. Leonido Manalo of the Makati CLAO office, as
counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty to the offense
charged. 11 The evidence for the prosecution adduced at the trial
established the following facts:
During the months of February and March 1984, complainant Wilma
Phua, then only 13 years of age, was living with her mother and
three (3) sisters in a house in Barangay Bayanan, Municipality of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. At a distance of about three (3) meters
from this house is another house with a toilet and bath also owned
by complainant's mother but which was uninhabited at that time. The
accused, complainant's uncle, being the younger brother of
complainant's mother, was staying in their house, free of board and
lodging, although he helped in the household chores. The children
used the bathroom in the uninhabited house because the amenities
in the inhabited house were used only by the adults. 12
At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 24 March 1984, classes
having closed for vacation and while Maria Zena Phua Rio was in the
house occupied by her family, her daughter Wilma (complainant)
asked her for the key to the comfort room of the uninhabited house
because she had to answer a call of nature. After having delivered
the key to Wilma, the latter proceeded to the other house, entered
the comfort room, and seeing that nobody was around and that her
uncle was washing dishes in their house, proceeded to answer
nature's call without taking the precaution of locking the comfort
room from inside. 13
After relieving herself but before she could raise her panty, the
accused entered the bathroom with his body already exposed, held
Wilma's hands, and ordered her in a loud voice to lie down and when
she resisted, the accused got mad and ordered her to lie down. After
she lay down on her back, the accused put himself on top of her and
tried to insert his private organ into her private part. Wilma kept
pushing the accused away and calling for her mother; however,
since the accused was heavier than she, the accused succeeded in
overpowering her, inserting his penis into her vagina and having
sexual intercourse with her. After satisfying his lust, the accused
released Wilma and allowed her to leave the bathroom. 14
Outside the bathroom door, complainant met her mother Maria Zena
who, meanwhile, had proceeded to the said other house after
sensing that an inordinate length of time had passed and her
daughter, complainant herein, had not returned from the bathroom.
Maria Zena, upon noticing that Wilma was speechless, trembling and
looking fearful, suspected something remiss so she tried to open the
door of the bathroom. Unable to open it the first time because it was
locked from inside, Maria Zena waited a few minutes before pushing
the door again. This time she was successful in finding her brother,
the herein accused-appellant in the process of raising his pants.
Maria Zena was ignored by her brother when she asked him the
reason for his presence inside the bathroom. 15
Still suspecting that the accused has done something to her
daughter, Maria Zena continued her inquisition of her brother for
several days but to no avail. Finally, on 9 April 1984, the accused
was asked to leave the house and move out by his sister Maria
Zena. 16
Only after the departure of the accused did Wilma report to her
mother the fact that she had been raped by the accused four (4)
times between the months of February and March of that year
(1984). After receiving such information, Maria Zena wanted her
daughter to immediately undergo physical examination; however,
Wilma, apparently traumatized by her experience, was too weak to
go with her for such examination and frequently suffered from
fainting spells. It was only on 30 April 1984 that Maria Zena was able
to bring Wilma to the police to report the matter and to file the
complaint. After the report to the police, they were referred to the
P.C. Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame where Wilma underwent
physical examination. 17
Dr. Dario Gajardo, the physician who conducted the internal
examination of Wilma, submitted a report of his examination dated 6
May 1984. The medical report showed, among others, the following
findings:
There is a scanty growth of pubic hair. Labia majora
are full, convex and gaping which pale brown,
slightly hypertrophied labia minora presenting in
between. On separating the same is disclosed an
elastic, fleshly-type hymen with deep lacerations at
3, 8 and 9 o'clock. ... 18
The medical report also showed that "there was (sic) no external
signs of recent application of any form of trauma." 19 All these
findings led him to conclude that Wilma is "in a non-virgin state
physicially." 20 Later, on the witness stand, Dr. Gajardo would further
testify that Wilma, on inquiry, revealed that the first rape happened in
the month of February 1984, but that he could not tell the
approximate period or age of the lacerations. 21
Armed with this medical report, Maria Zena and Wilma went back to
the police where a sworn statement of Wilma was taken and the
complaint for rape against the accused was filed before Third
Assistant Fiscal Rodolfo M. Alejandro on 12 May 1984. 22
The evidence for the defense consisted of the testimony of the
accused himself and his brother, Amado Rio. The accused's defense
was anchored on alibi and he substantially testified as follows: that
contrary to the statements made by the witnesses for the
prosecution, he was not asked to leave their house in April 1984, the
truth being that he left in the month of January 1984 or about a
month before the alleged first rape on Wilma was committed
because, contrary to an alleged employment agreement between
brother and sister, his sister, Maria Zena, had not paid him any
salary as helper in their house; that from the month of January 1984,
up to 24 March 1984 when the rape charged in the complaint was
allegedly committed, he was in their hometown in Kambalo,
Cahidiocan, province of Romblon; that at the time of his arrest, he
was informed of the criminal charge of rape on his niece filed against
him in court; that from January 1984 up to the time of his arrest on 6
May 1984, he had stayed in the house of his uncle, Francisco Rio,
and had never left the place during the whole period.
The accused vehemently denied the rape and conjectured that his
sister could have fabricated the charge because he left her house
due to her non-payment of his salary as helper. The brother of the
accused in the person of Amado Rio corroborated the defense of
alibi of the accused. 23
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented Nemesia B. Merca, the
Election Registrar of the Municipality of Muntinlupa, who brought with
her a Voter's Affidavit which was executed on 31 March 1984 by one
Ricardo Rio and was subscribed and sworn to on 31 March 1984
before Tessie Balbas, Chairman of Voting Center No. 37-A of
Bayanan, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. On cross-examination,
Registrar Merca admitted that she does not know the accused
personally but that the xerox copy of the Voter's Affidavit that she
brought to court was copied from a book containing about 60 voter's
affidavits of said precinct. 24
After comparing the signature appealing in the Voter's Affidavit with
the penmanship appearing on a letter 25 dated 12 December 1985
written by the accused to his brother, Amado Rio and on the
envelope of said letter, 26 the trial court ruled that the writing
characteristics on the presented documents are the same, especially
the rounded dot over the letter "i" appearing in the afore-mentioned
mentioned documents. It was, therefore, satisfied that the Voter's
Affidavit was indeed prepared by the accused in Bayanan,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, on 31 March 1984, before Tessie Balbas
and that this piece of evidence completely belies the defense of the
accused as corroborated by his brother, Amado, that he was in
Romblon continuously from the month of January 1984 up to the
time that he was arrested on 6 May 1984. 27
Thus, the trial court found the accused-appellant guilty of the crime
of rape. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the above-named accused
guilty of the crime charged in the information beyond
reasonable doubt the Court hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the
accessory penalties of the law, to indemnify Wilma
Phua in the sum of P15,000.00, Philippine currency,
and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
The theory of the defense at the trial level was grounded on alibi.
The accused claimed that at the time of the alleged commission of
the crime of rape he was in Romblon. This claim was corroborated
by the accused's brother, Amado Rio. However, this claim was, as
aforestated, rebutted by the prosecution's submission of the voter's
affidavit executed by the accused in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila on 31
March 1984 when appellant claimed he was in Romblon.
Upon careful examination of the voter's affidavit, the Court is
convinced, as the trial court, that the affidavit was indeed executed
by the accused himself and the date appearing therein must be
presumed correct and genuine.
Alibi is inherently a weak defense, easy of fabrication especially
between parents and children, husband and wife, and other relatives
and even among those not related to each other. For such defense
to prosper, the accused must prove that it was not possible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 28
In the present case, where nothing supports the alibi except the
testimony of a relative, in this case the accused's brother Amado, it
deserves but scant consideration. 29 Moreover, the Court notes the
fact that while the accused-appellant had another brother and sister
living in Manila besides the complainant's mother, those two never
came to his aid. Were the accused the innocent man he claims to be,
these siblings would have readily helped in his defense. The
testimony of his other brother Amado alone cannot raise the
necessary doubt to acquit him as against the evidence presented by
the prosecution.
Furthermore, it would be hard to believe that a female, especially a
twelve-year old child, would undergo the expense, trouble and
inconvenience of a public trial, not to mention suffer the scandal,
embarrassment and humiliation such action inevitably invites, as wen
as allow an examination of her private parts if her motive were not to
bring to justice the person who had abused her. A victim of rape will
not come out in the open if her motive were not to obtain justice. 30
It is harder still to believe that the mother of a child of twelve will
abuse her child and make her undergo the trauma of a public trial
only to punish someone, let alone a brother, for leaving her without
the services of an unpaid helper were it not with the aim to seek
justice for her child. Nobody in his right mind could possibly wish to
stamp his child falsely with the stigma that follows a rape.
On appeal, appellant's counsel de oficio changed the theory of the
defense. The new theory presented by counsel de oficio is that
Wilma Phua consented when accused-appellant had sexual
intercourse with her on 24 March 1984. It was stressed by counsel
de oficio that the rape occurred on 24 March 1984 and that,
allegedly, it was the fourth time accused had abused complainant.
This allegation as well as the fact that complainant failed to lock the
door to the bathroom could only have been due to the fact that there
was consent. The charge was filed, according to defense counsel de
oficio, only because the complainant's mother caught them. 31
This theory of the defense on appeal that there had been consent
from the complainant, fails to generate doubt as to the accused's
guilt, for it would be an incredulous situation indeed to believe that
one, so young and as yet uninitiated to the ways of the world, would
permit the occurrence of an incestuous relationship with an uncle, a
brother of her very own mother.
The Court notes the sudden swift in the theory of the defense from degree of professional responsibility owed to his client. 38 The ethics
one of total denial of the incident in question, by way of alibi, to one of the profession require that counsel display warm zeal and great
of participation, that is, with the alleged consent of the complainant. dedication to duty irrespective of the client's capacity to pay him his
This new version could only be attributed by the Court to the fact that fees.39 Any attempted presentation of a case without adequate
counsel on appeal is different from the counsel in the trial court. preparation distracts the administration of justice and discredits the
Although the Solicitor General has suggested that this sudden shift Bar. 40
be interpreted as an afterthought by the accused or a desperate
effort to get himself acquitted, 32 the Court deems it more likely that Returning to the case at bar, even if we consider the sudden shift of
this shift was caused by counsel de oficio's preparation of the defense theory as warranted (which we do not), the Court is just as
appellant's brief without examining the entire records of the case. If convinced, beyond reasonable doubt, that the accused-appellant is
the appointed counsel for the accused, on appeal, had read the guilty of the crime as charged. His conviction must be sustained.
records and transcripts of the case thoroughly, he would not have
changed the theory of the defense for such a shift can never speak
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding the accused-
well of the credibility of the defense. Moreover, the rule in civil appellant Ricardo Rio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
procedure, which applies equally in criminal cases, is that a party rape and sentencing him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all
may not shift his theory on appeal. If the counsel de oficio had been
the accessory penalties of the law, is hereby AFFIRMED. The Court,
more conscientious, he would have known that the sudden shift
however, increases the amount of indemnity to be paid by the
would be violative of aforementioned procedural rule and detrimental
accused-appellant to Wilma Phua to thirty thousand pesos
to the cause of the accused-appellant (his client).
(P30,000.00) in line with prevailing jurisprudence on this matter.
Costs against accused-appellant.
The Court hereby admonishes members of the Bar to be more
conscious of their duties as advocates of their clients' causes,
SO ORDERED.
whether acting de parte or de oficio, for "public interest requires that
an attorney exert his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or
defense of his client's cause." 33 Lawyers are an indispensable part
of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. 34 And
a lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only
protects the interests of his client; he also serves the ends of justice,
does honor to the Bar and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession. This is so because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it correlative duties not only to
the client but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. 35

While a lawyer is not supposed to know all the laws, 36 he is

expected to take such reasonable precaution in the discharge of his
duty to his client and for his professional guidance as will not make
him, who is sworn to uphold the law, a transgressor of its precepts. 37

The fact that he merely volunteered his services or the circumstance

that he was a counsel de oficio neither diminishes nor alters the
SANTOS VS NORTHWEST
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
G.R. No. 101538 June 23, 1992
AUGUSTO BENEDICTO SANTOS III, represented by his father
and legal guardian, Augusto Benedicto Santos vs. NORTHWEST
ORIENT AIRLINES and CA
FACTS: The petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines.
Private respondent Northwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign
corporation with principal office in Minnesota, U.S.A. and licensed to
do business and maintain a branch office in the Philippines.
On October 21, 1986, the petitioner purchased from NOA a round-
trip ticket in San Francisco. U.S.A., for his flight from San Francisco
to Manila via Tokyo and back. The scheduled departure date from
Tokyo was December 20, 1986. No date was specified for his return
to San Francisco.
On December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in at the NOA
counter in the San Francisco airport for his scheduled departure to
Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and re-confirmation, he was
informed that he had no reservation for his flight from Tokyo to
Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed.On March 12, 1987, the
petitioner sued NOA for damages in the RTC of Makati. On April 13,
1987, NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, citing Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, reading as
follows:Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the
option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his
principal place of business, or where he has a place of business
through which the contract has been made, or before the court at the
place of destination.The private respondent contended that the
Philippines was not its domicile nor was this its principal place of
business. Neither was the petitioners ticket issued in this country nor
was his destination Manila but San Francisco in the United States.
Lower court granted the dismissal, CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON the Philippines has jurisdiction over the case. (Issue
raised by the party is WON the provision of the Warsaw convention
was constitutional)
HELD: No jurisdiction (the provision is constitutional)
The Convention is a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the
Philippine government and, as such, has the force and effect of law
in this country. The petitioners allegations are not convincing
enough to overcome this presumption. Apparently, the Convention
considered the four places designated in Article 28 the most
convenient forums for the litigation of any claim that may arise
between the airline and its passenger, as distinguished from all other
places.
NOTES:
WON Warsaw convention applies.
Convention applies to all international transportation of persons
performed by aircraft for hire. Whether the transportation is
international is determined by the contract of the parties, which in
the case of passengers is the ticket. When the contract of carriage
provides for the transportation of the passenger between certain
designated terminals within the territories of two High Contracting
Parties, the provisions of the Convention automatically apply and
exclusively govern the rights and liabilities of the airline and its
passenger.
WON MNL or SFO was the destination.
The place of destination, within the meaning of the Warsaw
Convention, is determined by the terms of the contract of carriage or,
specifically in this case, the ticket between the passenger and the
carrier. Examination of the petitioners ticket shows that his ultimate
destination is San Francisco. Although the date of the return flight
was left open, the contract of carriage between the parties indicates
that NOA was bound to transport the petitioner to San Francisco
from Manila. Manila should therefore be considered merely an
agreed stopping place and not the destination.WON Northwest has
domicile in the Philippines
Notably, the domicile of the carrier is only one of the places where
the complaint is allowed to be filed under Article 28(1). By specifying
the three other places, to wit, the principal place of business of the
carrier, its place of business where the contract was made, and the
place of destination, the article clearly meant that these three other
places were not comprehended in the term domicile.
Escobedo v. Illinois
Brief Fact Summary. The petitioner Danny Escobedo asked to speak
with his lawyer while in police custody but before being formally
charged and was denied.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Not allowing someone to speak with an
attorney, and not advising them of their right to remain silent after they
have been arrested and before they have been interrogated is a denial
of assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
result will place obstacles in the way of legitimate methods of criminal
law enforcement. Also, he thought Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504
(1958) demanded a different result.
Justice Potter Stewart believed that the right to assistance of counsel
should not arise until indictment or arraignment, and that this contrary
result would cause problems for fair administration of criminal justice.
Justice Byron White expressed the opinion that this result would make
statements made to police inadmissible without the accused waiving
their right to counsel. He believed this would effectively render the
voluntariness test of the Fourteenth Amendment useless, and make
law enforcement more difficult.

Facts. After being arrested and taken into police custody as a suspect
in the murder of his brother-in-law, the petitioner asked to speak to his
attorney. His attorney arrived at police headquarters soon after the
petitioner did and was not allowed to speak to his client as the officers
said they had not completed questioning. The petitioner also was not
warned of his right to remain silent before the interrogation. He was
convicted of murder and the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed. He
was then granted certiorari.
Issue. If a suspect has been taken into police custody and
interrogated by police without their request to see an attorney being
honored, nor being advised of their right to remain silent, have they
been denied effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment?
Discussion. This case caused a lot of confusion for scholars, as
some believed it had widespread application, and others thought it
only applied to the specific facts here. There is a great deal of
language within it that is very hostile to confessions, but at other
points it says that proper investigative efforts are appropriate. It
mentions that a subject asserting their rights should not be
something the system is afraid of, but that it would render
interrogation much less effective. This case is really best understood
as the precursor to the warnings that would arise from

Held. Yes. Reverse the petitioners conviction and remand the case.
The Sixth Amendment protects the right to effective assistance of
counsel. Here, because the police investigation focused on the
accused as a suspect rather than a less specific investigation, refusing
to allow an accused to speak with his attorney is a denial of this Sixth
Amendment right. The incriminating statements he made must thus
not be admitted into evidence.
A law enforcement system that relies too much on the confession is
more subject to abuses than one that depends on evidence obtained
through skillful investigation. The result here recognizes this idea.

Dissent. Justice John Marshall Harlan dissented on grounds that this

Miranda v. Arizona
Brief Fact Summary. The defendants offered incriminating evidence
during police interrogations without prior notification of their rights
under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution (the
Constitution).
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Government authorities need to inform
individuals of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights prior to an
interrogation following an arrest.
Facts. The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court)
consolidated four separate cases with issues regarding the
admissibility of evidence obtained during police interrogations.
The first Defendant, Ernesto Miranda (Mr. Miranda), was arrested for
kidnapping and rape. Mr. Miranda was an immigrant, and although the
officers did not notify Mr. Miranda of his rights, he signed a confession
after two hours of investigation. The signed statement included a
statement that Mr. Miranda was aware of his rights.
The second Defendant, Michael Vignera (Mr. Vignera), was arrested
for robbery. Mr. Vignera orally admitted to the robbery to the first
officer after the arrest, and he was held in detention for eight hours
before he made an admission to an assistant district attorney. There
was no evidence that he was notified of his Fifth Amendment
constitutional rights.
The third Defendant, Carl Calvin Westover (Mr. Westover), was
arrested for two robberies. Mr. Westover was questioned over
fourteen hours by local police, and then was handed to Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, who were able to get signed
confessions from Mr. Westover. The authorities did not notify Mr.
Westover of his Fifth Amendment constitutional rights.
The fourth Defendant, Roy Allen Stewart (Mr. Stewart), was
arrested, along with members of his family (although there was no
evidence of any wrongdoing by his family) for a series of purse
snatches. There was no evidence that Mr. Stewart was notified of his
rights. After nine interrogations, Mr. Stewart admitted to the crimes.
Issue. Whether the government is required to notify the arrested
defendants of their Fifth Amendment constitutional rights against self-
incrimination before they interrogate the defendants?
Held. The government needs to notify arrested individuals of their
Fifth Amendment constitutional rights, specifically: their right to remain
silent; an explanation that anything they say could be used against
them in court; their right to counsel; and their right to have counsel
appointed to represent them if necessary. Without this notification,
anything admitted by an arrestee in an interrogation will not be
admissible in court.
Dissent. Justice Tom Clark (J. Clark) argued that the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution
would apply to interrogations. There is not enough evidence to
demonstrate a need to apply a new rule as the majority finds here.
The second dissent written by Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan) also
argues that the Due Process Clauses should apply. J. Harlan further
argues that the Fifth Amendment rule against self-incrimination was
never intended to forbid any and all pressures against self-
incrimination.
Justice Byron White (J. White) argued that there is no historical
support for broadening the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution to
include the rights that the majority extends in their decision. The
majority is making new law with their holding.
Discussion. The majority notes that once an individual chooses to
remain silent or asks to first see an attorney, any interrogation should
cease. Further, the individual has the right to stop the interrogation at
any time, and the government will not be allowed to argue for an
exception to the notification rule.
Dickerson v. United States Discussion. The decision clearly affirms Miranda, elevating it to a
status of a constitutional requirement that can not be overturned by
Brief Fact Summary. The petitioner, Charles Thomas Dickerson (the simple Congressional law.
petitioner), made a statement regarding a bank robbery to the
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) without receiving his Miranda
rights. A federal law was in place that allowed the admission of
statements if they were voluntarily made.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Congress cannot overrule the Miranda v.

Arizona decision because it was a decision based on the United States
Constitution (Constitution) rather than simply court-made law.

Facts. The petitioner made a statement at the FBI field office

concerning a bank robbery wherein he was a suspect. The
government agents did not notify the petitioner of his rights outlined in
Miranda. The state relied on a federal law, 18 U.S.C. Section: 3501,
that allowed the admission of statements as long as the suspect was
making them voluntarily. The District Court suppressed the statement,
but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (the
Fourth Circuit) allowed the statements into evidence.

Issue. The issue is whether Congress can overrule the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment constitutional protections outlined in Miranda.

Held. The protections outlined in Miranda, are protections mandated

by the Constitution. Therefore Congress, through a federal law, can
not overrule Miranda. The United States Supreme Court is not willing
to overrule Miranda, and therefore the statements should be
suppressed.

Dissent. The dissent believes that the Congressional law is not

unconstitutional, and that Miranda should not be interpreted as a
constitutional decision.