RULE 131 SECTION 1 BURDEN OF PROOF

Jimenez vs. NLRC 256 S 84

This petition for certiorari seeks the annulment of the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
dated , as well as its resolution, dated , denying petitioners motion for reconsideration,1 which assailed decision affirmed with
modifications the adverse decision of the labor arbiter against herein petitioners.
On June 29, 1990, herein private respondents Pedro and Fredelito Juanatas, father and son, filed a claim for unpaid
wages/commissions, separation pay and damages against JJ s Trucking and/or Dr. Bernardo Jimenez. Said respondents, as
complainants therein, alleged that in December, 1987, they were hired by herein petitioner Bernardo Jimenez as driver! mechanic
and helper, respectively, in his trucking firm, JJ Trucking. They were assigned to a ten-wheeler truck to haul soft drinks of Coca-
Cola Bottling Company and paid on commission basis, initially fixed at 17% but later increased to 20% in 1988.
Private respondents further alleged that for the years 1988 and 1989 they received only a partial commission of P84,000.00 from
petitioners total gross income of almost P1,000,000.00 for the said two years. Consequently, with their commission for that period
being computed at 20% of said income, there was an unpaid balance to them of P106,211.86; that until March, 1990 when their
services were illegally terminated, they were further entitled to P15,050.309 which, excluding the partial payment of P7,000.00,
added up to a grand total of P114,261.86 due and payable to them; and that petitioners refusal to pay their aforestated
commission was a ploy to unjustly terminate them.
Disputing the complaint, petitioners contend that respondent Fredelito Juanatas was not an employee of the firm but was merely
a helper of his father Pedro; that all commissions for 1988 and 1989, as well as those up to March, 1990, were duly paid; and that
the truck driven by respondent Pedro Juanatas was sold to one Winston Flores in 1991 and, therefore, private respondents were
not illegally dismissed.2
After hearings duly conducted, and with the submission of the parties position/supporting papers, Labor Arbiter Roque B. de
Guzman rendered a decision dated , with this decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby issued ordering respondents JJs Trucking and/or Dr. Bernardo Jimenez to pay jointly and
severally complainant Pedro Juanatas a separation pay of FIFTEEN THOUSAND FIFTY (P15,050.00) PESOS, plus attorneys
fee equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the award.
The complaint of Fredelito Juanatas is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.3
On appeal filed by private respondents, the NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter and disposed as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Decision of is hereby MODIFIED, to wit:
1. Complainant Fredelito Juanatas is hereby declared respondents employee and shares in (the) commission and separation pay
awarded to complainant Pedro Juanatas, his father.
2. Respondent JJs Trucking and Dr. Bernardo Jimenez are jointly and severally liable to pay complainants their unpaid
commissions in the total amount of Eighty Four Thousand Three Hundred Eighty Seven Pesos and 05/100 (P84,387.05).
3. The award of attorneys fees is reduced accordingly to eight thousand four hundred thirty eight pesos and 70/100 (P8,438.70).
4. The other findings stand affirmed.4
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied thereafter in public respondents resolution dated August 8,
1994,5 petitioners have come to us in this recourse, raising for resolution the issues as to whether or not respondent NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling (a) that private respondents were not paid their commissions in full, and (b) that
respondent Fredelito Juanatas was an employee of JJs Trucking.
The review of labor cases elevated to us on certiorari is confined to questions ofjurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. 6 As a
rule, this Court does not review supposed errors in the decision of the NLRC which raise factual issues, because factual findings
of agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions are accorded not only respect but even finality,7 aside from the consideration that
the Court is essentially not a trier of facts. However, in the case at bar, a review of the records thereof with an assessment of the
facts is necessary since the factual findings of the NLRC and the labor arbiter are at odds with each other.8
On the first issue, we find no reason to disturb the findings of respondent NLRC that the entire amount of commissions was not
paid, this by reason of the evident failure of herein petitioners to present evidence thatfull payment thereof has been made. It is a
basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegations. Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who
asserts an affirmative allegation, the plaintiff or complainant has to prove his affirmative allegation, in the complaint and the
defendant or respondent has to prove the affirmative allegations in his affirmative defenses and counterclaim. Considering that
petitioners herein assert that the disputed commissions have been paid, they have the bounden duty to prove that fact.
As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it.9 Even where the plaintiff must allege non-payment, the
general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment. 10 The
debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by payment.11
When the existence of a debt is fully established by the evidence contained in the record, the burden of proving that it has been
extinguished by payment devolves upon the debtor who offers such a defense to the claim of the creditor. 12 Where the debtor
introduces some evidence of payment, the burden of going forward with the evidence - as distinct from the general burden of
proof - shifts to the creditor, who is then under a duty of producing some evidence to show non-payment.13
In the instant case, the right of respondent Pedro Juanatas to be paid a commission equivalent to 17%, later increased to 20%, of
the gross income is not disputed by petitioners. Although private respondents admit receipt of partial payment, petitioners still
have to present proof of full payment. Where the defendant sued for a debt admits that the debt was originally owed, and pleads
payment in whole or in part, it is incumbent upon him to prove such payment. That a plaintiff admits that some payments have
been made does not change the burden of proof. The defendant still has the burden of establishing payments beyond those
admitted by plaintiff.14
The testimony of petitioners which merely denied the claim of private respondents, unsupported by documentary evidence, is not
sufficient to establish payment. Although petitioners submitted a notebook showing the alleged vales of private respondents for
the year 1990,15 the same is inadmissible and cannot be given probative value considering that it is not properly accomplished,
is undated and unsigned, and is thus uncertain as to its origin and authenticity.16
The positive testimony of a creditor may be sufficient of itself to show non-payment, even when met by indefinite testimony of the
debtor. Similarly, the testimony of the debtor may also be sufficient to show payment, but, where his testimony is contradicted by
the other party or by a disinterested witness, the issue may be determined against the debtor since he has the burden of proof.
The testimony of the debtor creating merely an inference of payment will not be regarded as conclusive on that issue.17
Hence, for failure to present evidence to prove payment, petitioners defaulted in their defense and in effect admitted the
allegations of private respondents.
With respect to the second issue, however, we agree with petitioners that the NLRC erred in holding that the son, Fredelito, was
an employee of petitioners.
We have consistently ruled that in determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the elements that are
generally considered are the following: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the
power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employees conduct,18 with the control test assuming primacy in the overall
consideration.
In the case at bar, the aforementioned elements are not present. The agreement was between petitioner JJs Trucking and
respondent Pedro Juanatas. The hiring of a helper was discretionary on the part of Pedro. Under their contract, should he employ
a helper, he would be responsible for the latters compensation. With or without a helper, respondent Pedro Juanatas was entitled
to the same percentage of commission. Respondent Fredelito Juanatas was hired by his father, Pedro, and the compensation he
received was paid by his father out of the latters commission. Further, Fredelito was not subject to the control and supervision of
and dismissal by petitioners but of and by his father.
Even the Solicitor General, in his comment, agreed with the finding of the labor arbiter that Fredelito was not an employee of
petitioners, to wit:
Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that said private respondent is an employee of JJs Trucking on
the ground that, citing Article 281 of the Labor Code, Fredelitos functions as helper was (sic) necessary and desirable to
respondents trucking business.
In the first place, Article 281 of the Labor Code does not refer to the basic factors that must underlie every existing employer-
employee relationship, the absence of any of which will negate such existence. It refers instead to the qualifications of (A)n
employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period and who, as a consequence, shall be considered a regular
employee. Secondly, the test in determining the existence of an employee-employer relationship is not the necessity and/or
desirability of ones functions in relation to an employers business, but (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the
payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the employees conduct. The latter is the most
important element (Singer Sewing Machine Company vs. Drilon, 193 SCRA 270, 275; Deferia vs. NLRC, 194 SCRA 531, 525;
Ecal vs. NLRC, 224, 228; Hijos De F. Escano, Inc. vs. NLRC, 224 SCRA 781, 785). The aforequoted pertinent findings of the
Labor Arbiter indicate (that) the foregoing requirements do not exist between petitioner and private respondent Fredelito
Juanatas. Thus, the labor arbiter stated that respondent Fredelito Juanatas was never hired by petitioners. Instead the formers
services were availed of by respondent Pedro Juanatas his father, who, at the same time, supervised and controlled his work and
paid his commissions. Respondent NLRCs ruling did not traverse these findings of the labor arbiter.19
WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
MODIFICATION that paragraph 1 thereof, declaring Fredelito Juanatas an employee of petitioners and entitled to share in the
award for commission and separation pay, is hereby DELETED.

Mallari vs. CA 265 S 456

Given credence by respondent Court of Appeals is the following narration of the factual antecedents of this case by the People.
Sometime on December 27, 1990, at around 2:30 p.m., Pat Manipon and Pfc. Esguerra, who were both then assigned at the
Capas Police Station, received reliable information that appellant Diosdado Mallari, who has a standing warrant of arrest in
connection with Criminal Case No. 471 for homicide in 1989, was seen at Sitio 14, Sta. Rita, Capas, Tarlac (tsn, April 18, 1991,
pp. 3-4; June 27, 1991, p.3).
Immediately upon receipt of such information, Pfc. Manipon, accompanied by Pat. Esguerra and Pat. Narciso Simbulan, with
personal knowledge of the existence of a standing warrant of arrest against appellant in connection with Criminal Case No. 471
for Homicide, immediately proceeded to Sitio 14, Sta. Rita, Capas, Tarlac. Upon reaching the place, the arresting officers
surrounded the house of appellant, arrested him and told him to remain stationary. Thereupon, the arresting officers searched
him and found a homemade gun (paltik) with one M-16 live ammunition (tsn, , pp. 5-6, 8; , pp. 3-5, 7).
Appellant was handcuffed and brought to the Capas Police Station where he was endorsed to the chief investigator while the
homemade gun and live ammunition were endorsed to the property custodian. The incident was then entered in the police blotter
after which the spot and investigation reports were prepared (tsn, June, , p. 5, 10; , p. 6).[1]
After investigation, the petitioner was charged with the crime of Illegal Posession of Firearms and Ammunition, and pleaded not
guilty on arraignment. Trial on the merits ensued, after which, the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac convicted petitioner of the
crime charged, as follows:
WHEREFORE, accused Diosdado Mallari is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Posession of
Firearms and Ammunitions and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of seventeen years, four months and
one day as minimum to eighteen years and eight months as maximum.
Accused, who is a detention prisoner is given full credit for the period of his preventive imprisonment, after compliance with
Article 29 of the Revised penal Code.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming in toto the abovequoted
decision of the trial court. In its decision, the Court of Appeals held that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Pfc.
Manipon and Pat Esguerra unequivocally proved that the handgun (paltik) and the live M-16 ammunition were recovered from the
person of the appellant (herein petitioner).[3] The Court of Appeals further held that the search conducted on the petitioner and
the seizure of the subject firearm and ammunition were done on the occasion of a lawful arrest as there was then an outstanding
warrant for petitioners arrest in Criminal Case No. 471.[4] It likewise found that petitioner was arrested while committing the crime
of illegal possession of firearms in the presence of the police authorities. Thus, anent petitioners insistence that there was no
standing warrant for his arrest, thereby making the search and seizure invalid, the Court of Appeals stated that, under the
prevailing factual milieu, even in the absence of a warrant, still appellants arrest would fall squarely within the context of Rule
113, Sec. 5 (b), Rules of Court x x x[5] which cites the instances when a warrantless arrest may be valid.
In seeking the reversal of his conviction, petitioner questions the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that at the time of his
arrest, there was a standing warrant against him in Criminal Case No. 471. Petitioner posits that the absence of the requisite
warrant is fatal and renders the search and seizure unlawful. Corrolarily, the handgun and ammunition seized from him are
inadmissible in evidence. Petitioner also contends that it was error for the Court of Appeals to conclude that the search and
seizure could be validly effected as it was done on the occasion of a lawful warrantless arrest, particularly, while in the act of
committing the crime of illegal possession of firearms in the presence of the arresting officers. Finally, petitioner claims that even
assuming that the handgun and ammunition had in fact been found in his possession, the prosecution failed to prove that he had
no license therefor and absent this essential element of the crime of illegal possession of firearms, it was manifest error for the
Court of Appeals to uphold his conviction.
The threshold issue is factual: whether or not there indeed existed a standing warrant for the arrest of the petitioner. At the outset,
this Court reiterates the general rule that when supported by substantial evidence, factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.[6] A careful scrunity of the records of the case at bench leads this Court
to concur with the Court of Appeals in its finding that when the petitioner was arrested, there was then a standing warrant of
arrest against him in connection with Criminal Case No. 471. This fact is manifest from the testimonies of the arresting officers
which the defense failed to rebut during trial.
Pfc. Danilo Manipon: COURT:
Q When you arrested Diosdado Mallari Mr. Witness, were you carrying a warrant of arrest Alright you proceeded to Sitio 14 because of the warrant of arrest issued by this court to to
then? apprehend Diosdado Mallari in Criminal Case No. 471, is that correct?
A No, sir. A Yes, maam.[7] [Underscoring supplied]
Q Neither you did not have with you a seize and search warrant and despite the fact that Pat. Jose Esguerra:
you have no search and seize warrant you have still pursued in getting the ammunition you Q Do you have with you at the time when you arrested or when you seized the gun and the
have just mentioned, the home made gun and the live bullet? live ammunition, a search and seize warrant?
A Yes, sir. A None, your honor.
COURT: COURT:
You are referring to what case? Q Did you have with you the warrant of arrest you mentioned with respect to CR. No. 471?
A Homicide, maam, Criminal Case No. 471. A When we went to him, we did not have a warrant of arrest because we were in a hurry but
COURT: when we returned, we reached the warrant officer, you honor.
Alright. Q Where did you return?
Q Was the seizure of the home made gun related to the warrant of arrest being issued by A When we returned to the Capas Police Station there was the warrant officer already, your
this honorable court with respect to criminal case No. 471? Honor.
COURT: Proceed.
Will you clarify, I heard him saying that he did not have a warrant of arrest, is that correct? ATTY. DULDULAO:
A Yes, maam. Q You said you did not bring the warrant of arrest when you arrested the the accused how
COURT: did you come to know that Diosdado Mallari was indeed the accused despite the fact that
What about with respect to Criminal Case No. 471 you do not have a warrant of arrest you did not bring with you the warrant of arrest then?
issued by this court? A When we went there, sir, we did not have a warrant of arrest because we were in a hurry if
A There was, maam, I know that there was a warrant of arrest issued, that is why we we will wait our warrant officer, we may not reach Diosdado Mallari, but we know that he has
proceeded to Sitio 14, maam. a standing warrant of arrest. [8] [Underscoring provided]
Further bolstering the arresting officers testimonies is the absence of any motive on their part to falsely testify against the
petitioner. And it has been repeatedly held that without proof of such motive, law enforcers are presumed to have regularly
performed their duties.[9] Thus, absent strong and convincing proof to the contrary, this Court is bound by the presumption that
the arresting officers were aware of the legal mandates in effecting an arrest and strictly complied with the same.
At this juncture, the Court would like to stress that this is not a case of a warrantless arrest but merely an instance of an arrest
effected by the police authorities without having the warrant in their possession at that precise moment. Finding as it does, this
Court deems it unnecessary to delve into the applicability of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and on the merits of both
the petitioners and the Office of the Solicitor Generals arguments with respect thereto. The applicable provision is not Section 5,
Rule 118 of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests, but Section 7, Rule 113 which provides as follows:
Sec. 8. Method of Arrest by officer by virtue of warrant. -- When making an arrest by virtue of a warrant the officer shall inform the
person to be arrested of the cause of the arrest and the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest, except when he flees
or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity so to inform him or when the giving of such information will imperil the
arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person arrested
so requires, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable. [Underscoring supplied]
The abovequoted rule clearly allows a police officer to effect arrest without the warrant in his possession at the time of the
arrest. Thus, appellants arrest being lawful, the search and seizure made incidental thereto is likewise valid, albeit conducted
without a warrant.[10] In the case of People v. Acol,[11] where the unlicensed firearms were found when the police team
apprehended the accused for robbery and not for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, this Court held that the
unlicensed firearms may be seized without the necessity of obtaining a search warrant. Expounding thereon, it stated that:
` x x x The illegality of the search is independent from the illegal possession of prohibited arms. The illegality of the search did not
make legal an illegal possession of firearms. When, in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the
offending police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded
from performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty and the taking of the corpus delicti.[12]
Finally, petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving that he did not have the requisite license
for the firearm and ammunition found in his possession. Anent this contention, the Office of the Solicitor General does not even
attempt to point out any evidence on record of petitioners non-possession of a license or permit for there really is no such
evidence. It relies on the theory that as the firearm involved is a homemade gun or paltik and is illegal per se, it could not have
been the subject of license.[13] This, according to the Solicitor General, dispenses with the necessity of proving that petitioner
had no license to possess the firearm. This is where the prosecutions case fails and miserably so. This Court has ruled that:
We do not agree with the contention of the Solicitor General that since a paltik is a homemade gun, is illegally manufactures as
recognized in People vs. Fajardo, and cannot be issued a license or permit, it is no longer necessary to prove that it is
unlicensed. This appears to be at first blush, a very logical proposition. We cannot, however, yield to it because Fajardo did not
say that paltiks can in no case be issued a license or permit and that proof that a firearm is a paltik with proof that it is unlicensed.
[14]
In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof, viz: (a) the
existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding
license or permit to possess the same.[15] The latter is a negative fact which constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of
illegal possession, and it is the duty of the prosecution not only to allege it but also to prove it beyond reasonable doubt. [16] In
the case at bench, the testimony of a representative of, a certification from the PNP (FEU) that petitioner was not a licensee of
the said firearm would have sufficed for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the crime of
illegal possession.[17] The absence of the foregoing is fatal to the prosecutions case and renders petitioners conviction
erroneous.
True that in the case of People vs. Mesal[18], this Court dispensed with a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit
(FEU) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) to establish the alleged lack of license or permit on the part of the accused-
appellant to possess the M-14 rifle found in his possession. This was, however, premised on the fact that:
The records reveal that the allegation was successfully substantiated by other evidence which firmly and undisputably
established that accused-appellant did not have and could not possibly have, the requisite license or authority to possess the M-
14 rifle concerned. Technical Sgt. Alfredo Romasanta, Supply Officer of the PC-INP 253rd PC Company, testified that the rifle
concerned is the type of weapon which only military men are authorized to possess x x x.[19]
The above enunciated doctrine is not applicable to this case. The records are bereft of any evidence similar to that offered by the
prosecution in Mesal to prove that the petitioner did not have and could not possibly have the requisite license or authority to
possess the paltik and the M-16 live ammunition.
In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Diosdado Mallari is hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence and ordered immediately released unless there are other
legal grounds for his continued detention.

RULE 131 SECTION 3 DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTIONS

Lozano vs. De Los Santos 274 S 45

This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Angeles City which
ordered the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Mabalacat and Magalang, Pampanga to dismiss Civil Case No. 1214 for lack of
jurisdiction.
The facts are undisputed. On December 19, 1995, petitioner Reynaldo M. Lozano filed Civil Case No. 1214 for damages
against respondent Antonio Anda before theMunicipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Mabalacat and Magalang,
Pampanga. Petitioner alleged that he was the president of the Kapatirang Mabalacat-Angeles Jeepney Drivers' Association, Inc.
(KAMAJDA) while respondent Anda was the president of the Samahang Angeles-Mabalacat Jeepney Operators' and Drivers'
Association, Inc. (SAMAJODA); in August 1995, upon the request of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mabalacat, Pampanga, petitioner
and private respondent agreed to consolidate their respective associations and form the Unified Mabalacat-Angeles Jeepney
Operators' and Drivers' Association, Inc. (UMAJODA); petitioner and private respondent also agreed to elect one set of officers
who shall be given the sole authority to collect the daily dues from the members of the consolidated association; elections were
held on October 29, 1995 and both petitioner and private respondent ran for president; petitioner won; private respondent
protested and, alleging fraud, refused to recognize the results of the election; private respondent also refused to abide by their
agreement and continued collecting the dues from the members of his association despite several demands to desist. Petitioner
was thus constrained to file the complaint to restrain private respondent from collecting the dues and to order him to pay
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 and attorney's fees of P500.00.[1]

Private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, claiming that jurisdiction was lodged with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The MCTC denied the motion on February 9, 1996.[2] It denied reconsideration on
March 8, 1996.[3]

Private respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Angeles City.[4] The trial court
found the dispute to be intracorporate, hence, subject to the jurisdiction of the SEC, and ordered the MCTC to dismiss Civil Case
No. 1214 accordingly.[5] It denied reconsideration on May 31, 1996.[6]

Hence this petition. Petitioner claims that:

"THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION AND SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
HAS JURISDICTION OVER A CASE OF DAMAGES BETWEEN HEADS/PRESIDENTS OF TWO (2) ASSOCIATIONS WHO
INTENDED TO CONSOLIDATE/MERGE THEIR ASSOCIATIONS BUT NOT YET [SIC] APPROVED AND REGISTERED WITH
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION."[7]

The jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is set forth in Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-
A. Section 5 reads as follows:
"Section 5. x x x [T]he Securities and Exchange Commission [has] original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
involving:
(a) Devices or schemes employed by or any acts of the board of directors, business associates, its officers or partners,
amounting to fraud and misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public and/or of the stockholders,
partners, members of associations or organizations registered with the Commission.
(b) Controversies arising out of intracorporate or partnership relations, between and among stockholders, members or
associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members,
or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the state insofar as it concerns their
individual franchise or right to exist as such entity.
(c) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers or managers of such corporations, partnerships or
associations.
(d) Petitions of corporations, partnerships or associations to be declared in the state of suspension of payments in cases where
the corporation, partnership or association possesses sufficient property to cover all its debts but foresees the impossibility of
meeting them when they respect very fall due or in cases where the corporation, partnership or association has no sufficient
assets to cover its liabilities, but is under the management of a Rehabilitation Receiver or Management Committee created
pursuant to this Decree."

The grant of jurisdiction to the SEC must be viewed in the light of its nature and function under the law.[8] This jurisdiction is
determined by a concurrence of two elements: (1) the status or relationship of the parties; and (2) the nature of the question that
is the subject of their controversy.[9]

The first element requires that the controversy must arise out of intracorporate or partnership relations between and among
stockholders, members, or associates; between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they
are stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and between such corporation, partnership or association and the State
in so far as it concerns their individual franchises.[10] The second element requires that the dispute among the parties be
intrinsically connected with the regulation of the corporation, partnership or association or deal with the internal affairs of the
corporation, partnership or association.[11] After all, the principal function of the SEC is the supervision and control of
corporations, partnerships and associations with the end in view that investments in these entities may be encouraged and
protected, and their activities pursued for the promotion of economic development.[12]

There is no intracorporate nor partnership relation between petitioner and private respondent. The controversy between
them arose out of their plan to consolidate their respective jeepney drivers' and operators' associations into a single common
association. This unified association was, however, still a proposal. It had not been approved by the SEC, neither had its officers
and members submitted their articles of consolidation in accordance with Sections 78 and 79 of the Corporation
Code. Consolidation becomes effective not upon mere agreement of the members but only upon issuance of the certificate of
consolidation by the SEC.[13] When the SEC, upon processing and examining the articles of consolidation, is satisfied that the
consolidation of the corporations is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Corporation Code and existing laws, it issues a
certificate of consolidation which makes the reorganization official.[14] The new consolidated corporation comes into existence
and the constituent corporations dissolve and cease to exist.[15]

The KAMAJDA and SAMAJODA to which petitioner and private respondent belong are duly registered with the SEC, but
these associations are two separate entities. The dispute between petitioner and private respondent is not within the KAMAJDA
nor the SAMAJODA. It is between members of separate and distinct associations. Petitioner and private respondent have no
intracorporate relation much less do they have an intracorporate dispute. The SEC therefore has no jurisdiction over the
complaint.

The doctrine of corporation by estoppel[16] advanced by private respondent cannot override jurisdictional
requirements. Jurisdiction is fixed by law and is not subject to the agreement of the parties.[17] It cannot be acquired through or
waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties, neither can it be conferred by the acquiescence of the
court.[18]

Corporation by estoppel is founded on principles of equity and is designed to prevent injustice and unfairness. [19] It applies
when persons assume to form a corporation and exercise corporate functions and enter into business relations with third
persons. Where there is no third person involved and the conflict arises only among those assuming the form of a corporation,
who therefore know that it has not been registered, there is no corporation by estoppel.[20]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and the decision dated April 18, 1996 and the order dated May 31, 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Angeles City are set aside. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Mabalacat and Magalang,
Pampanga is ordered to proceed with dispatch in resolving Civil Case No. 1214. No costs.

LRT vs. Natividad 397 S 75

The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 April 2000
and 10 October 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 60720, entitled "Marjorie Navidad and Heirs of the Late Nicanor Navidad
vs. Rodolfo Roman, et. al.," which has modified the decision of 11 August 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 266, Pasig
City, exonerating Prudent Security Agency (Prudent) from liability and finding Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and Rodolfo
Roman liable for damages on account of the death of Nicanor Navidad.
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven oclock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT
station after purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT
tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation
between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or
who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell,
an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed
instantaneously.
On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for
damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent
for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and
Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of
its security guards.
The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer
contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. On 11 August 1998, the trial court
rendered its decision; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants Prudent Security and Junelito
Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following:
"a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00;
2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;
3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00;
"b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;
"c) Attorneys fees of P20,000;
"d) Costs of suit.
"The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack of merit.
"The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise dismissed."1
Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court promulgated its now assailed decision
exonerating Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and
severally liable thusly:
"WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED, by exonerating the appellants from any liability for the death of
Nicanor Navidad, Jr. Instead, appellees Rodolfo Roman and the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) are held liable for his death
and are hereby directed to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-appellees, the following amounts:
a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;
b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;
c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and
e) P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees."2
The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage
theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare
and getting the corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link
the security agency to the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim
and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned and
managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present
expert evidence to establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train.
The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000.
In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged errors on the part of the appellate court; viz:
"I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY
THE TRIAL COURT

"II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR
THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.

"III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN
EMPLOYEE OF LRTA."3

Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the factual findings of the trial court by holding them
liable on the basis of a sweeping conclusion that the presumption of negligence on the part of a common carrier was not
overcome. Petitioners would insist that Escartins assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act
of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented. The LRTA would add that the appellate courts conclusion on the
existence of an employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA lacked basis because Roman himself had testified
being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA.
Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a contract of carriage was deemed created from the
moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and
protection under a contractual relation, and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of
Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is
burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers.4 The Civil Code, governing the
liability of a common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers, provides:
"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using
the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."
"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the
formers employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of
the common carriers.
"This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of their employees."
"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of
other passengers or of strangers, if the common carriers employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission."
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard
for all circumstances.5 Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the
course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the
contract of carriage.6 The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the
negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the
common carriers employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. 7 In
case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and 8 by simple proof of injury, the
passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts
upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.9 In the absence of satisfactory
explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show,
the presumption would be that it has been at fault,10 an exception from the general rule that negligence must be proved.11
The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that
contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment
to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or
an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the
contract of carriage.
Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 12 and
related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180,13 of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employers liability is
negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the
basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and
supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been shown. Absent such a showing, one might ask further, how then
must the liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It
would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one
resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 219414 of the Civil Code can well apply.15 In fine, a liability
for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract.16 Stated differently, when an act which
constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed
between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.17
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor Navidad, this Court is concluded by
the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that "there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason
that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x x x." This finding of the appellate court is not without
substantial justification in our own review of the records of the case.
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also
be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation
between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.
The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a
right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.18 It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist
with compensatory damages.19
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of
nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No costs.

Del San Transport Lines vs. C&A Const. Inc. 412 S 524
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court are the June 14, 2002 decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59034, which reversed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 46, in Civil Case
No. 95-75565, and its November 7, 2002 resolution[3] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The undisputed facts reveal that respondent C & A Construction, Inc. was engaged by the National Housing Authority (NHA)
to construct a deflector wall at the Vitas Reclamation Area in Vitas, Tondo, Manila.[4] The project was completed in 1994 but it
was not formally turned over to NHA.

On October 9, 1994, M/V Delsan Express, a ship owned and operated by petitioner Delsan Transport Lines, Inc., anchored
at the Navotas Fish Port for the purpose of installing a cargo pump and clearing the cargo oil tank. At around 12:00 midnight of
October 20, 1994, Captain Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express received a report from his radio head operator in
Japan[5] that a typhoon was going to hit Manila[6] in about eight (8) hours.[7] At approximately 8:35 in the morning of October 21,
1994, Capt. Jusep tried to seek shelter at the North Harbor but could not enter the area because it was already congested. [8] At
10:00 a.m., Capt. Jusep decided to drop anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth, 4 miles away from a Napocor power barge. At that
time, the waves were already reaching 8 to 10 feet high. Capt. Jusep ordered his crew to go full ahead to counter the wind which
was dragging the ship towards the Napocor power barge. To avoid collision, Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel.[9] He
succeeded in avoiding the power barge, but when the engine was re-started and the ship was maneuvered full astern, it hit the
deflector wall constructed by respondent.[10] The damage caused by the incident amounted to P456,198.24.[11]

Respondent demanded payment of the damage from petitioner but the latter refused to pay. Consequently, respondent filed
a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 46, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 95-75565. In
its answer, petitioner claimed that the damage was caused by a fortuitous event.[12]

On February 13, 1998, the complaint filed by respondent was dismissed. The trial court ruled that petitioner was not guilty of
negligence because it had taken all the necessary precautions to avoid the accident. Applying the emergency rule, it absolved
petitioner of liability because the latter had no opportunity to adequately weigh the best solution to a threatening situation. It
further held that even if the maneuver chosen by petitioner was a wrong move, it cannot be held liable as the cause of the
damage sustained by respondent was typhoon Katring, which is an act of God.[13]
 On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was reversed and set aside. [14] It found Capt. Jusep guilty
of negligence in deciding to transfer the vessel to the North Harbor only at 8:35 a.m. of October 21, 1994 and thus held petitioner
liable for damages.

Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition contending that Capt. Jusep was not negligent in waiting until 8:35 in the morning
of October 21, 1994 before transferring the vessel to the North Harbor inasmuch as it was not shown that had the transfer been
made earlier, the vessel could have sought shelter.[15] It further claimed that it cannot be held vicariously liable under Article
2180 of the Civil Code because respondent failed to allege in the complaint that petitioner was negligent in the selection and
supervision of its employees.[16] Granting that Capt. Jusep was indeed guilty of negligence, petitioner is not liable because it
exercised due diligence in the selection of Capt. Jusep who is a duly licensed and competent Master Mariner.[17]

The issues to be resolved in this petition are as follows (1) Whether or not Capt. Jusep was negligent; (2) If yes, whether or
not petitioner is solidarily liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the quasi-delict committed by Capt. Jusep?

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict. The test for determining the existence of negligence in a particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use the reasonable care and caution which an ordinary
prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.[18]

In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that Capt. Jusep was negligent in deciding to transfer the
vessel only at 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994. As early as 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, he received a report from
his radio head operator in Japan[19] that a typhoon was going to hit Manila[20] after 8 hours.[21]This, notwithstanding, he did
nothing, until 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994, when he decided to seek shelter at the North Harbor, which unfortunately
was already congested. The finding of negligence cannot be rebutted upon proof that the ship could not have sought refuge at
the North Harbor even if the transfer was done earlier. It is not the speculative success or failure of a decision that determines the
existence of negligence in the present case, but the failure to take immediate and appropriate action under the
circumstances. Capt. Jusep, despite knowledge that the typhoon was to hit Manila in 8 hours, complacently waited for the lapse
of more than 8 hours thinking that the typhoon might change direction.[22] He cannot claim that he waited for the sun to rise
instead of moving the vessel at midnight immediately after receiving the report because of the difficulty of traveling at night. The
hour of 8:35 a.m. is way past sunrise. Furthermore, he did not transfer as soon as the sun rose because, according to him, it was
not very cloudy[23] and there was no weather disturbance yet.[24]

When he ignored the weather report notwithstanding reasonable foresight of harm, Capt. Jusep showed an inexcusable lack
of care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have observed in the same situation.[25] Had he moved the vessel
earlier, he could have had greater chances of finding a space at the North Harbor considering that the Navotas Port where they
docked was very near North Harbor.[26] Even if the latter was already congested, he would still have time to seek refuge in other
ports.

The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule. Under this rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger,
and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
danger in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence.[27] Clearly, the emergency rule is not applicable to the
instant case because the danger where Capt. Jusep found himself was caused by his own negligence.

Anent the second issue, we find petitioner vicariously liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep. Under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code an employer may be held solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee. Thus
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed in Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxxxxxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxxxxxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris
tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa
in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the
presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of his employee. [28]

There is no question that petitioner, who is the owner/operator of M/V Delsan Express, is also the employer of Capt. Jusep
who at the time of the incident acted within the scope of his duty. The defense raised by petitioner was that it exercised due
diligence in the selection of Capt. Jusep because the latter is a licensed and competent Master Mariner. It should be stressed,
however, that the required diligence of a good father of a family pertains not only to the selection, but also to the supervision of
employees. It is not enough that the employees chosen be competent and qualified, inasmuch as the employer is still required to
exercise due diligence in supervising its employees.

In Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[29] it was held that due diligence in supervision requires the formulation of rules and
regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions as well as actual implementation and
monitoring of consistent compliance with the rules. Corollarily, in Ramos v. Court of Appeals,[30] the Court stressed that once
negligence on the part of the employees is shown, the burden of proving that he observed the diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees shifts to the employer.

In the case at bar, however, petitioner presented no evidence that it formulated rules/guidelines for the proper performance
of functions of its employees and that it strictly implemented and monitored compliance therewith. Failing to discharge the
burden, petitioner should therefore be held liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep.

So also, petitioner cannot disclaim liability on the basis of respondents failure to allege in its complaint that the former did not
exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. In Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos,[31] it
was held that it is not necessary to state that petitioner was negligent in the supervision or selection of its employees, inasmuch
as its negligence is presumed by operation of law. Allegations of negligence against the employee and that of an employer-
employee relation in the complaint are enough to make out a case of quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.[32]

Considering that petitioner did not assail the damages awarded by the trial court, we find no reason to alter the same. The
interest imposed should, however, be modified. In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[33] it was held that the rate of
interest on obligations not constituting a loan or forbearance of money is six percent (6%) per annum. If the purchase price can
be established with certainty at the time of the filing of the complaint, the six percent (6%) interest should be computed from the
date the complaint was filed until finality of the decision. After the judgment becomes final and executory until the obligation is
satisfied, the amount due shall earn interest at 12% per year, the interim period being deemed equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.[34]

Accordingly, the amount of P456,198.27 due the respondent shall earn 6% interest per annum from October 3, 1995 until
the finality of this decision. If the adjudged principal and the interest (or any part thereof) remain unpaid thereafter, the interest
rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from the time the judgment becomes final and executory until it is fully
satisfied.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED. The June 14, 2002 decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59034 ordering petitioner Delsan Transport Lines, Inc., to pay respondent C & A Construction, Inc.,
damages in the amount of P456,198.27, plus P30,000.00 as attorneys fees, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
award of P456,198.27 shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from October 3, 1995, until finality of this decision, and
12% per annum thereafter on the principal and interest (or any part thereof) until full payment.

People vs. De Guzman 229 S 795

Accused-appellant has been in the watch list of the police authorities as a prohibited drug peddler. On two (2) occasions, they
tried to entrap him without any success. The third time, however, his luck ran out.
The third attempt happened on September 23, 1991. PO3 Arnaldo Manzon and Patrolman Eduardo Chiapoco of the Western
Police District (WPD) decided to conduct the buy-bust operation against the accused-appellant along Coral and R. A. Reyes
Streets, Tondo, Manila. Manzon acted as the poseur-buyer, with Chiapoco as the apprehending officer. 1
The buy-bust operation was conducted at seven thirty (7:30) in the evening. Pat. Manzon posed as a Metro Manila aide. Together
with a confidential informant, he casually approached accused de Guzman and asked if he could "score" (buy) a deck of "shabu."
Accused de Guzman informed him that a deck would cost fifty pesos (P50.00). Manzon then handed the accused a previously
marked P50.00 bill (Exhibit "D"). In exchange, the accused gave him an aluminum foil containing crystalline granules. Manzon
scrutinized the contents of the foil and then executed the pre-arranged signal to his companion, Patrolman Chiapoco. The
accused was forthwith arrested by Pat. Chiapoco. The accused was frisked and the search yielded four (4) aluminum, foils
containing white crystalline granules. 2 They escorted the accused to the WPD Narcotics Office and was turned over to
Investigator Pat. Vicente Rodriguez. The latter, in turn, marked the seized articles and requested for its chemical analysis by the
WPD Criminal Investigation Laboratory Division. 3 Accordingly, Patrolmen Manzon and Chiapoco executed a Joint Affidavit of
Apprehension (Exhibit "E") relating in detail the events leading to the arrest of de Guzman. 4 The chemical analysis report
(Exhibit "C") confirmed that the five (5) aluminum foils contained methylamphetamine hydrochloride. 5
Consequently, an Information was filed against Carlos de Guzman y Panaligan for violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic
Act 6425, as amended. It reads:
That on or about September 23, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not being authorized
by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport and distribute any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly sell or offer for sale one (1) deck of aluminum foil containing METHAMPHETAMINE HCl (shabu),
which is a regulated drug.
Contrary to law. 6
After the prosecution rested its case, the defense presented its own version of the incident. The accused claimed that he,
together with his three-year old son, went to his mother's house located at #770 Coral Street, Tondo, Manila, to ask for food. On
the way, he passed by and talked for a while with their barangay chairman, Manolito Cabigting. Thereafter, accused proceeded to
his mother's house. While waiting outside her mother's carinderia, accused claimed that, for no apparent reason, he was
suddenly apprehended by some police officers and brought by force to the police precinct. He was subsequently charged with
illegal sale of "shabu." 7 In the meantime, Cabigting went up to his house. Intending to take a bath, he got a towel and a change
of clothes. Suddenly, he heard a commotion outside the street. When he looked out of the window, he saw the accused inside a
tricycle escorted by police authorities. Later, he found out from the people outside that the accused was apprehended for drug-
pushing. 8
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 16, 9 rendered a decision finding the accused, Carlos de Guzman y
Panaligan, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of unlawfully selling methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," in
violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic
Act 6425, as amended, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) and to pay the cost.
Hence this appeal.
Accused-appellant contends:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE POLICEMEN
WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION AND IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED ON THE BASIS
THEREOF.
Accused-appellant faults the trial court for favoring the arresting officers with the disputable presumption of regularity in the
performance of their
official duty. He urges that this presumption no longer subsist for certain irregularities were committed by the two officers in the
discharge of their duty, i.e., (1) Chiapoco did not read the Joint Affidavit of Apprehension before signing it; and (2) the police
bungled its two (2) previous operations against him.
A disputable presumption has been as a species of evidence that may be accepted and acted on where there is no other
evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one which may be overcome by other evidence. 10One such
disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official act or duty has been regularly performed. 11 Presumption of this nature is
indulged by the law for the following fundamental reasons: first, innocence, and not wrong-doing, is to be presumed; second, an
official oath will not be violated; and third, a republican form of government cannot survive long unless a limit is placed upon
controversies and certain trust and confidence reposed in each governmental department or agent by every other such
department or agent, at least to the extent of such presumption. 12 Thus, this presumption evidences a rule of convenient public
policy universally applied and without which great distress would spring in the affairs of men. 13
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.
The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus,
unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the
presumption and in case of doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its
lawfulness. 14
In the light of these baseline propositions, we hold that the trial court correctly gave the apprehending officers the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duty. The failure of Pat. Chiapoco to read the joint Affidavit of Apprehension before signing it
is of de minimis importance. This irregularity happened after the buy-bust operation has already been concluded and where
accused-appellant was caught in flagrante delicto. On the other hand, the two (2) failed attempts of the police authorities to arrest
accused-appellant happened long before the September 23, 1991 buy-bust operation. Evidently, they do not provide any
evidence that any irregularity was committed by the police authorities while conducting the September 23, 1991 buy-bust
operation against the accused-appellant. Moreover, the record is not clear that the two (2) previous attempts to bag the accused-
appellant floundered because the police blundered. It is not unusual for the police authorities to mount well-studied operations
against criminals but circumstances beyond their control and factors beyond their foresight supervene to frustrate them. The wily
ways of criminals are many and not infrequently they are able to momentarily elude the long arm of the law. These temporary
setbacks of the police authorities, however, do not provide any justification to deprive them of the disputable presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty.
In the case at bench, what is clearly established is that the drug pushing activities of the accused-appellant have long before
been brought to the attention of the police authorities and that accused-appellant had been the subject of a continuing
surveillance. There is not an iota of evidence that the police authorities who apprehended accused-appellant had any ill-motive
against him. The records clearly show that accused-appellant was finally caught in flagrante delicto selling "shabu", a regulated
drug, without authority. He was rightfully convicted.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court hereby affirms the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant Carlos de Guzman y
Panaligan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

People vs. Navaja 220 S 624

Facts:
1. The Accused Alexander Navaja was convicted of the crime of selling a prohibited drug, 'shabu' under RA 6425. The authorities
set up a buy bust operation but he managed to elude arrest after the transaction. Accused was subsequently arrested during a
hearing of the Habeas Corpus case filed by his mother, about a year after.

2. In his appeal the accused contended that the court erred in convicting him as only one of the witnesses among 5 (of the
policemen who accosted him) were presented by the prosecution.

Issue: Whether or not the non-presentation of the other witnesses gave rise to the presumption of suppression of
evidence

HELD:

The non-presentation of the corroborative witnesses did not constitute suppression of evidence and such would not be fatal the
prosecution's case. The rule is settled that the adverse presumption is not applicable when ---
1) suppression is not willful
2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative or cumulative
3) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties
4) the suppresion is an exercise of privilege

Moreover, the Court has consistently held in drugs cases that absent any proof to the contrary, law enforcers are presumed to
have regularly performed their duty. The accused has also failed to present proof of an ulterior motive on the part of the police
officers.

People vs. Castaeda 252 S 247

Accused-appellant Fernando Castaneda y Sales was charged with and convicted of Robbery with Rape by the Regional Trial
Court of Capas, Tarlac. 1 He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay private complainant
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P200.00 representing the stolen money. 2

The Information for Robbery with Rape filed against the accused-appellant states: "That on or about June 12, 1992, in the
Municipality of Concepcion, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, Accused Fernando
S. Castaneda armed with a knife, and with intent to gain and by means of violence and intimidation on the person, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take from Eugenia Sese, who was then in her house the sum of P200.00, belonging to
said Eugenia Sese by poking a knife at complainants throat, to the damage and prejudice of the aforesaid Eugenia Sese, in the
sum of P200.00, that on the occasion of the said robbery, herein accused, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said Eugenia Sese, against her will.

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty and underwent trial.

The evidence shows that private complainant Eugenia Sese is a married woman, a mother of three (3) minor children, and a
vegetable vendor. She resides with her family in Barangay Sta. Maria, Concepcion Tarlac. She was usually left at home with her
children as her husband pastured ducks in the province of Isabela. 4

The crime at bar happened in the evening of June 12, 1992. Private complainant was at home with her children. The moon was
then bright and her house was lighted with three (3) kerosene lamps. At about 10:00 p.m., she exposed ampalaya leaves to
dewdrop outside her house. The leaves must be peddled fresh in the market the following day. She was hanging the last bundle
when she noticed, at a distance of five (5) meters, a person walking towards her house.

Private complainant sensed danger. She was alone as her husband was in Isabela. Her children were asleep. Her neighbors
were some twenty (20) meters away. She shouted. In no time, the intruder grabbed private complainant, pulled back her hair with
his left hand, and poked a knife at her neck with his right hand. He demanded money. She told him there was none. He reiterated
his demand and out of fear, private respondent indicated that her money was inside the "aparador" in her house. The man forcibly
dragged her to the house.
Inside the house, private complainant was made to open the "aparador." With the light of the three (3) lamps, she clearly saw the
face of the man through the mirror of the "aparadors" upper portion. 5 She handed her money to him, two hundred pesos
(P200.00) in all. The measly amount disappointed the man. He led her outside the house and at knife point, ordered her to pull
down her pants. She refused and pleaded: "Huwag naman, may mga anak ako, may asawa ako, maawa ka naman." 6 The man
responded by pressing harder the knife at her throat, and ordering her to perform sexually perverted acts. After a while, the man
was able to penetrate her womanhood. 7

His lust sated, the man warned her: "Do not tell anybody about this incident, if you report the matter to anybody, I will come back
and kill you." 8 He disappeared into the darkness. Private respondent woke up her children and sought help from Mariano
Apolinar and his wife, Apong Gunding. The house of Apolinar is forty (40) to forty-five (45) meters away from her house. She
recounted her ordeal to them but sealed her lips about the threat. Apolinar, in turn, summoned Barangay Captain Ponciano
Cunanan and Councilman Rodolfo Manaloto. She retold her story to the barangay officials, who decided to report the matter to
the police authorities.

It was 11:00 p.m. The barangay officials walked with to the police headquarters in Concepcion, Tarlac. On their way, she saw a
man wearing red shorts and white striped shirt passing in front of a lighted house near the boundary of barangays San Jose and
Sta. Maria. She recognized the man as the one who robbed and raped her. She pointed him to Mariano Apolinar. 9 They
confronted the man who turned out to be Accused-Appellant. He was invited to the police station and clamped in jail.

The following morning, June 13, 1991, private complainant went to the Concepcion Municipal Station and again identified
accused-appellant as the culprit. Chief of Police Benito Sicat prepared the necessary Police Blotter Report. 10 Dr. Ramiro
Rodriguez of the Concepcion District Hospital examined private complainant. His report showed that her organ suffered
"superficial abrasion at 9 position, congestion at 3 position." 11 Three days after, private complainant executed a sworn statement
narrating her revolting experience. In that statement, she again identified Accused-Appellant. 12

Accused-appellant is a farmer working for Fernando Garcia. 13 He told a different story. He claimed that when the offense was
committed he was at a different place. On June 12, 1992, he allegedly attended the birthday party of Garcias son held at the
latters house in Barangay San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac. He arrived there at 5:00 p.m. He cleaned the house, served "pulutan"
to the guests, and then joined their beer drinking. The party ended at 12:00 p.m.

Due to intoxication, he walked farther than his house and reached the bridge that separates Barangay San Jose from Barangay
Sta. Maria. 14 He was trying to breath fresh air when the barangay officials accosted him. He met the private complainant for the
first time and was surprised when she implicated him in the crime. He, however, overheard that the authorities were supposed to
arrest a person named Llarves. After he identified himself, they forced him to go to the police station.

Fernando Garcia and his brother-in-law Eduardo Garcia corroborated accused-appellants alibi. They affirmed that on June 12,
1992, Accused-appellant served "pulutan" to their guests and joined them in drinking beer grande. 15 They added that accused-
appellant stayed at the birthday party from 5:00 p.m. until the television stations signed-off. Eduardo declared that he and
accused-appellant left the party together. 16

Rodolfo David, a barangay tanod at Barangay Sta. Maria, was one of those who responded to the private Respondent. He
claimed that private complainant told him that she could not identify the person who robbed and molested her. She described the
criminal to be tall, thin, with a tie around his head, and that the suspect belonged to the Llarves family. 17

PO3 Leoncio Cuaresma testified that he investigated the private complainant. 18 At the investigation, private complainant stated
that the weapon used by the criminal was a fan knife, or a "balisong."

As aforestated, the trial court convicted the Accused-Appellant. In this appeal, Accused-appellant contends:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED- APPELLANT, FERNANDO CASTANEDA OF THE CRIME OF
ROBBERY WITH RAPE DESPITE FAILURE ON THE PART OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE BEYOND DOUBT
REASONABLE THE IDENTITY OF THE REAL CULPRIT.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION AND IN
DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE."

We affirm the judgment of conviction.

Accused-appellant argues that his identity as the perpetrator of the crime was not established beyond reasonable doubt. He
claims that private complainant did not immediately point to him as the culprit upon seeing him at the bridge dividing barangays
San Jose and Sta. Maria. She let him passed by and it was only as he was twenty (20) meters away, that she looked back at him
and said, "It seems that is the person who raped me." 19

The argument lies on a faulty factual basis. Contrary to accused-appellants claim, the records show that immediately upon
seeing a man coming to their direction, private complainant recognized him as the criminal and pointed him to Apolinar, and then
to the barangay officials. Thus, she testified.

From her testimony, it is clear that on sight, private complainant immediately identified and pointed accused-appellant to Apolinar
as the man who robbed and raped her. It is true that accused-appellant had already passed by private complainant when she
pointed him to the barangay officials. But this happened because the barangay captain and his companions were walking ahead
of private complainant and Apolinar. Moreover, it was not only during their chance encounter that private complainant identified
the Accused-Appellant. An hour after the incident, she again identified Accused-Appellant. She once more identified accused-
appellant at the Concepcion Police Headquarters the next day.

We have no doubt that private complainant had a good look at the physical features of Accused-Appellant. Private complainant
had an early look at accused-appellant while he was walking on the way towards the formers house. While the robbery was
being committed, the lights coming from the three (3) kerosene lamps made it possible for private complainant to see accused-
appellants face and clothes through the mirror of the "aparador" in the house. During the rape, private complainant was close to
accused-appellant as is physically possible, for a man and a woman cannot be physically closer to each other than during a
sexual act. 21 There is, therefore, no reason to doubt the accuracy of private complainants visual perception of accused-
appellant as the criminal. Nor is there any reason to doubt her honesty of intention for there is no showing that she identified
accused-appellant due to a corrupt motive.

Be that as it may, Accused-appellant still contends that he was misidentified as barangay tanod David testified that the culprit was
described by private complainant as tall, slim, and a Llarves. Allegedly, this description was given in the presence of barangay
officials who were not called as witnesses by the prosecution. He charges the prosecution with suppression of evidence.

The contention cannot succeed. The rule on suppression of evidence cannot be invoked by accused-appellant where the same
evidence is available to him. In the case at bar, Accused-appellant could have subpoenaed the barangay officials who allegedly
heard the description of the culprit given by the private complainant. These barangay officials were not under the control of
private complainant, a lowly housewife in barangay Sta. Maria, Concepcion, Tarlac. It is far fetched to accuse her and the
prosecution of suppressing their testimonies.

Moreover, their testimonies could only be corroborative. In People v. Lorenzo, 22 we held that the presumption laid down in
Section 5(e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that "evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced" does not apply
when the testimony of the witness not produced would only be corroborative.

Accused-appellant also argues that if he was the criminal, he should not have immediately returned to the situs of the crime. 23

Again, we are not persuaded. Although flight from the scene is an indication of guilt, the act of returning to the situs of the crime
does not a converso indicate innocence. It is no longer strange for smart criminals to return to the scene of the crime to stunt
suspicion. As we observed in People v. Ocampo, 24 the fact that this form of reverse psychology does not happen as often as
flight, does not mean that it can never take place. Moreover, Accused-appellant was too inebriated at that time. He had been
drinking beer for six (6) hours. In that state of drunkenness, Accused-appellant cannot be expected to be lucid and logical in his
movements.

Accused-appellant further capitalizes on private complainants failure to put up any resistance at the time "she was sexually
abused, when she noticed that the accused-appellant was no longer holding the knife which was previously poked at her neck."
25 He avers that "she could have taken advantage of that opportunity to run to her neighbor and asked for help as what she did
when [he] left her." 26

The records show that private complainant explained why she failed to run after accused-appellant laid down his knife. She
declared

"Q When Fernando Castaneda tries to insert his organ to you by releasing the knife from his right hand, why dont you run away
from him.?

A How could I run. My hair was being forcibly pulled and I could not even move, sir." 27

Moreover, the knife was still within the reach of accused-appellant and it would have been sheer folly for her to think of escaping
unhurt and to leave her minor children at his mercy.

Accused-appellant also faults the prosecution for failure to present the knife and the stolen two hundred pesos (P200.00). He
contends that their non-presentation" produces no other conclusion that [he was] not the one who robbed and raped the private
complainant." 28 He also raises the inconsistent statement of private complainant on the kind of knife used, i.e. whether it was a
fan knife or a "balisong."
The contentions merit scant consideration. The non- presentation of the two hundred pesos (P200.00) and the knife used by
accused-appellant in intimidating private complainant is not fatal to the prosecutions cause. The testimony of private complainant
in this regard is credible and the failure of the authorities to recover the money and the knife and to present them as evidence
cannot exculpate Accused-Appellant. Similarly, whether accused-appellant used a fan knife or a "balisong" in threatening private
complainant has no legal significance. To be sure, there is little difference between a fan knife and a "balisong." The fact that
counts is that private complainant was threatened with a knife and its erroneous description does not erase the force and
intimidation used by accused-appellant in committing the crime at bar.

Finally, we reject accused-appellants defense of alibi. It is his burden not only to prove that he was not at the scene of the crime
when it happened but also that it was impossible for him to be there at the time of the commission of the offense. By accused-
appellants own admission, he was within the vicinity of the crime on that fateful night. He was drunk, walked farther than his
house, and crossed the bridge to breath fresh air. Likewise, Barangay San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac where accused-appellant
allegedly spent seven (7) hours of the night of June 12, 1992, in Garcias house is just three (3) kilometers away from the scene
of the crime. It would only take fifteen (15) minutes by tricycle for accused-appellant to slip away from the house of Garcia and
commit the crime. It was, thus, impossible for the accused-appellant to slip away from the house of Garcia and commit the crime
without rousing suspicion from his companions who were also intoxicated.

IN VIEW HEREOF, the judgment of the trial court, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with
Rape, is AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against Accused-Appellant.

People vs. Simbulan 214 S 537

The criminal prosecution in this case was initiated by an information, dated September 17, 1988, charging herein accused-
appellants Irene D. Simbulan, alias "Nene," and Elvira S. Sugui alias "Elvie," as conspirators in the sale and delivery of .17 gram
of methyl amphetamine hydrochloride, "shabu" in common parlance, which is a regulated drug, 1 in violation or Section 21(b),
Article IV, in relation to Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425.
At the arraignment, both appellants, duly assisted by their counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter,
trial on the merits ensued wherein the prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, viz.: S/Sgt. Rosalinda F. Directo, 1st Lt. Reuben
Sindac, Sgt. Jaime Sapon and Capt. Lina Sarmiento.
A painstaking scrutiny of the transcripts of the testimonial evidence and documentary exhibits of the prosecution confirms the
findings in the decision of the court a quo 2 correctly summarized therein as follows:
In the morning of September 14, 1988, at around 9:00 a.m., a male informant came to the office of the 13th
Narcotics Regional Unit of the NARCOM and relayed to Lt. Reuben Sindac the information that @ NENE and @
ELVIE were engaged in the selling of shabu or methamphetamine hydrochloride at Masangkay St., Makati, Metro
Manila. Finding this information to be viable (to use his own word), Lt. Sindac submitted to Lt. Col. Raval of the
NARCOM a pre-operation report. Lt. Col. Raval approved the said pre-operation report and directed Lt. Sindac to
constitute a team and conduct a buy-bust operation. For the purpose he gave Lt. Sindac money for gasoline and
P500.00 in five P100 bills as buy-money.
The five P100 bills bear the serial numbers WF 210212 (Exh. D), UM 242970 (Exh. G), WP 787691 (Exh. E). SZ
832140 (Exh. C), and UXZ 65475 (Exh. F) Lt. Sindac marked each of them by shading the letter O in Bangko
Sentral, and had them xeroxed.
The team constituted by Lt. Sindac was made up of himself, as the team leader, Sgt. Rosalinda Directo, Sgt.
Jaime Sapon, Sgt. Cesar Dalonos and C1C Carlos Olina. Lt. Sindac designated Sgt. Directo as the Poseur-buyer
and the rest as back-ups. Thus, he gave to Sgt. Directo the five P100 bills (Exhs. C to G).
In the same morning the team of Lt. Sindac, together with the informant, left Camp Crame for Masangkay St.,
Makati, Metro Manila. They reached this target area at around 10:30 a.m. After a short briefing, Sgt. Directo and
the informant proceeded to the house of @ NENE, which is one of two houses located inside a compound. At the
same instance, Lt. Sindac and the other members of the team posted themselves at strategic points from where
they could watch Sgt. Directo and the informant carry out their assigned task.
Upon reaching the house of @ NENE the informant knocked on the door and when @ NENE opened the door
and came out, he introduced Sgt. Directo as a person wanting to buy shabu. Thereupon, @ NENE asked Sgt.
Directo how much, shabu she wanted to buy. When Sgt. Directo replied that she wanted to buy 1/2 gram of
shabu, @ NENE said that the price would be P500.00, to which Sgt. Directo agreed. Forthwith, @ NENE went
back inside the house. After a while she emerged from the same door, this time with another woman. @ NENE
introduced this woman to Sgt. Directo as ELVIE. Having done this, @ NENE told Sgt. Directo to give the P500.00
to Elvie, which Sgt. Directo did. Almost simultaneously @ NENE handed to Sgt. Directo a transparent plastic bag
containing what appeared to be shabu. Upon her receipt thereof, Sgt. Directo raised her right hand which was the
pre-arranged signal to her co-team members that she had already concluded the purchase of shabu.
Immediately, Lt. Sindac and Sgt. Dalonos approached the four, NENE, ELVIE, Sgt. Directo and the informant, and
introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. Sgt. Sapon also moved in but he stopped just outside the fence and
acted as back-up to Lt. Sindac, Sgt. Directo and Dalonos. Sgt. Directo then retrieved the 5 P100 bills she had
earlier given to ELVIE from the right front pocket of the latter's shorts where she saw ELVIE had placed the
money.
 From the target area, Lt. Sindac and his team members brought @ NENE, who was later identified to be accused
Irene Simbulan, and ELVIE, who turned out to be accused Elvira Sugui, to their headquarters in Camp Crame.
They also brought there Erlinda Sugui, the sister of Elvira Sugui; whom they found in possession of shabu.
Upon reaching their Headquarters, Sgt. Directo marked the transparent plastic bag earlier given to her by @
NENE, that contained what appeared to be shabu (Exh. K), with the letter "A", prepared her "Affidavit of Poseur-
Buyer" (Exh. A), and thereafter turned over the same to Lt. Sindac. She also prepared the "Receipt for Property
Seized" (Exh. L). On the other hand, Lt. Sindac and his other team members executed their "Joint Affidavit of
Arrest" (Exh. B).
By cover of a letter dated September 15, 1988 (Exh. J), the NARCOM sent the suspected shabu (Exh. K) that
was given by @ NENE to Sgt. Directo to the PC Crime Laboratory Service for appropriate laboratory
examinations. As requested in the said letter (Exh. J), Capt. Lina C. Sarmiento, a forensic chemist, examined the
said specimen and found it positive for "methamphetamine hydrochloride", a regulated drug. (Exhs. H and M).
Expectedly, the defense presented a different version, which we have culled from the decision of the trial court. 3 Appellant Irene
Simbulan testified that in the morning of September 14, 1988, while she was cooking in the house of appeallant Sugui, a certain
Angel, whom she had known for about two (2) years, came and told her "Kung maaari, ikuha mo ako ng shabu." Angel used to
frequent her house but this was the first time that he asked for "shabu" from her. She allegedly replied, "Alam mo ng wala rito
bakit dito ka pa pumunta sa amin." Angel, however, insisted on his request saying that he needed shabu as he was going to a
birthday party, hence she relented and said "Mayroon dito pero hindi sa akin. Kung gusto mo bayaran mo na lang sa akin." Angel
agreed, so she gave him the shabu and Angel gave her P500.00. After he had left, she went to the other house of appellant
Sugui, in the same compound and gave the latter the P500.00 she received from Angel as her payment for a wrist watch. She
then went back to her cooking.
Later, without asking for permission, four (4) or five (5) persons entered her house and said "Walang tatakbo." They asked her to
bring out the marked money, and she replied that the money was with appellant Sugui. She and the aforesaid persons then went
to appellant Sugui's house and the latter asked said appellant to bring out the marked money. Sugui replied, "Anong marked
money, wala naman akong pera kundi ito lang nasa pitaka ko." Thereupon, that intruders took the wallet of Sugui and, upon
seeing the money in it, said, "Ito ang pera." The aforesaid persons thereafter brought her and Sugui to Camp Crame where they
were detained. investigated and made to sign a "Reciept for Property Seized" 4which listed the 1/2 gram of shabu and the serial
numbers of the five P100.00 bills indicated as "marked money."
Elvira Sugui, for her part, testified that on September 14, 1988, at about 10:00 A.M., she was in her house talking to her friend
whom she only knows as "Baby." Baby came to invite her to go with her to Syvel's and while they were talking, appellant
Simbulan came in with the three (3) arresting officers. The latter were looking for the P500.00 which Simbulan had earlier given
her as payment for a wrist watch. The arresting officers took her wallet and then told her to go with them to Camp Crame. Out of
fear, she, together with her sister Erlinda. and Simbulan, went along with them to Camp Crame. There, Lt. Sindac and Sgt.
Dalonos told them that they could go home if they could each produce P10,000.00. As they were unable to do so, Lt. Sindac and
Sgt. Dalonos continued to detain them.
Teresita Castillo. in corroboration of the testimony of appellant Sugui, testified that she was in the house of the latter at about
10:00 o'clock in the morning of September 14, 1988. She went there to deliver a Syvel's credit card to Sugui., While she was
there; appellant Simbulan came in, gave some money to Sugui as payment for a wrist watch and then left. About fifteen minutes
later, Simbulan came back with three (3) persons, one of them a female. They were looking for money and Simbulan pointed to
Sugui. Sugui told them that the money that Simbulan had given her was in her wallet. The said persons got the wallet of Sugui
and took out from it five (5) P100.00 bills, after which they brought her to their jeep.
After evaluating the contradicting versions, the trial court rendered judgment finding both appellants guilty of the crime charged,
with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused, Elvira Sugui y Sunga and Irene Simbulan y
Dolor, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged in the information, and hereby sentences them to
suffer the penalty of life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, and each of them to pay a fine of thirty thousand
pesos (P30,000.00). 5
Appellants are now before us seeking the reversal of the said judgment, ascribing the following errors to the court below: (1) That
it erred in not acquitting both accused-appellants on reasonable doubt; and (2) That it committed an error amounting to grave
abuse of discretion in finding accused-appellant Elvira Sugui, in conspiracy with accused-appellant Irene Simbulan, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article III of Republic Art No. 6425, as amended, in relation to Section 21, Article IV. 6
Evidently, the errors assigned turn on the issue of credibility. Accordingly, we have perforce to once again reiterate the
entrenched rule that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed
by the trial judge, who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in the light of the declarant's demeanor, conduct
and attitude at the trial and is thereby placed in a more competent position to discriminate between the true and the
false. 7 Appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the testimony of witnesses unless
it be clearly shown that the latter court had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily the facts and circumstances of significance in the
case. 8 In the case at bar, we find nothing which would warrant deviation from the general rule.
The narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses are worthy of credit. They are police officers who are presumed to
have performed their duties in a regular manner, there being no evidence to the contrary, 9 and more so since there is nothing in
the record which would indicate that they were actuated by improper motives. 10
Furthermore, the testimonies of the apprehending officers were straightforward and consistent. As expressly observed by the trial
court in its decision
. . ., in the course of their testimonies, the Court was intently observing the prosecution witnesses, particularly
Sgt. Directo and Lt. Sindac, and the Court was impressed by their candidness and straightforward manner of
testifying, which in the mind of the Court indicated that they had testified truthfully. As a matter of fact, Lt. Sindac,
who is only 27 years (old) had impressed the Court that he is a professional whose only concern is to do his job
and to do it well. . . . 11
It is argued by appellants that the failure of the prosecution to present the civilian informer was a fatal omission. We do not agree.
The poseur-buyer, S/Sgt. Directo, who dealt directly with appellants in the purchase of the regulated drug was presented in the
trial. Hence, the testimony of the informer, if it were given, would at best be corroborative or cumulative. The rule is well settled
that each party has the prerogative to determine which witnesses to present and to dispense with the testimony of persons who
will only give corroboration. 12 The non-presentation of a mere corroborative witness does not amount to suppression of
evidence. 13
Moreover, if the defense believed that the testimony of the informer was important to their case, there was nothing to prevent
them from compelling the latter's presence and availing of his testimony in court by Compulsory process. 14 The informer was
known to the defense. It would have been simple enough to have him produced by a subpoena for examination as a defense
witness. This, appellants inexplicably failed or declined to do.
The allegation of appellants that the marked money used were not properly marked in accordance with accepted standard
procedures, that is, by application of fluorescent powder, does not deserve even a passing consideration. How the buy-bust
money should have been marked was of no significance in establishing the guilt of appellants. What is material is the proof that
the drug transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. 15 In fact, even the absence of the
marked money or its non- presentation in court would not create a hiatus in the prosecution's evidence. 16
Appellants further argue that even assuming that they were truly engaged in the illicit trade, they would not have sold drugs right
on their doorstep and to a total stranger. The said argument cannot be upheld, just as it has been so often raised in other cases
and just as often struck down by this Court.
Drug pushers have become increasingly casual about isolated transactions. They have come to consider the sale of drugs as
ordinary transactions and the buyers as ordinary users. 17 Drug pushing when done on a small scale belongs to that class of
crimes which may be committed at any time and at any place. After the offer to buy is accepted and the exchange is made, the
illegal transaction is completed in a few minutes. The fact that the parties are in a public place and in the presence of other
people may not always discourage them from pursuing their illegal trade as such factors may even serve to camouflage the
same. Hence, the court has sustained the conviction of drug pushers caught selling illegal drugs in a billiard hall, in front of a
store, along a street, and in front of a house. 18 Even the fact that the buyer is a total stranger is of no moment. In real life,
pushers, especially small quantity or retail pushers, sell their prohibited wares to customers, be they strangers or not, who have
the price of the drug. 19
The supposed irreconcilable inconsistency pointed out by appellants regarding the weight of the "shabu" purchased, as testified
to and as submitted in evidence, is too minor to militate against the credibility of the prosecution witness. The "shabu" submitted
in evidence was properly identified in court by the examining forensic chemist and by the poseur-buyer to be the same "shabu"
seized from appellants and submitted to the former for examination in connection with this case. The discrepancy in weight is
explained by the fact that what was expected and believed to have been purchased by the poseur-buyer was one-half (1/2) gram
of "shabu". The fact that what was delivered is of lesser weight cannot be taken against her.
The poseur-buyer was not in a position to determine the actual weight of the drug delivered by appellants, as can be gleaned
from her testimony:
Q Now you mentioned also earlier Madam witness that you were shabu (sic) and placed in plastic
transparent. Now also you stated you gave P500.00 to Elvie. Now why P500.00 Madam witness?
A Because that is the price that Aling Nene asked for 1/2 gram.
Q At that point do you know how much shabu you received from Aling Nene?
A I presumed it was half gram.
Q Though you are not sure whether you received also 1/2 grams (sic)?
A. No, sir. 20
Even appellant's allegation that the apprehending officers asked them for money, being an imputation which can be contrived
with facility, is not entitled to credence. They utterly failed to substantiate the same. The Court has noted that this is the usual
defense in the prosecution of drug cases. Yet, if indeed there was any attempted or consummated extortion, appellants could and
should have come forward with the proper charges against the culprits. 21
Appellants further maintain that the trial court's finding of conspiracy is without basis. We disagree.
Appellants Irene Simbulan and Elvira Sugui were obviously partners in the sale of "shabu". The prosecution was able to establish
that both of them were present at the place and time when the buy-bust operation took place. It was Simbulan who handed the
drug to the poseur-buyer while it was Sugui who accepted the payment. The aforementioned acts show concerted action and
unity of purpose towards the attainment of a common criminal objective and which ineluctably signify and warrant a conclusion on
the existence of a conspiracy.
Conspiracy may be inferred from the coordinated movements of the co-conspirators. 22 There need not be direct evidence of the
existence and details of the conspiracy. Like the guilt of the individual offender, the existence of conspiracy and a conspirator's
participation may be established through circumstantial evidence. 23
The fact of sale of the regulated drug in the morning of September 14, 1988 was admitted by appellant Simbulan, although she
denied ownership of the same. As we have heretofore ruled, ownership and possession are not indispensable elements of this
crime. The mere act of selling or even acting as broker in the sale of marijuana and other prohibited drugs consummates the
crime. 24
With regard to appellant Sugui, it was admitted that the marked money was found in her possession. However, she denied that
she was present at the time of the sales and claimed that the marked money was given to her by Simbulan as payment for a wrist
watch and that the same was delivered to her inside her house. We find her protestations of innocence unworthy of belief.
Firstly, in her testimony, Simbulan unwittingly admitted that Elvira (or Elvie) Sugui was in the house where she was staying at the
time when the buy-bust operation took place, thus:"
Q Do you remember where were you on Sept. 14, 1988 in the morning of that day?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you?
A I was at home.
Q What were you doing at that time?
A I was cooking.
Q Do you remember who were there in your house during that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who?
A My nieces and my nephews. Erlinda Sugui, Elvie Sugui and Rico Flores. (Emphasis
supplied.) 22
Secondly, the version of the defense that the poseur-buyer left after the sale, and then later returned together with other
NARCOM agents to make an arrest, is illogical and absurd. In a buy-bust operation, drug dealers are apprehended in flagrante
delicto, not in a disjointed manner or sequence as appellants would portray.
Thirdly, appellants did not impute, much less prove, any ill motive on the part of the NARCOM agents that would impel them to
involve appellants in a serious criminal charge. There is nothing in the records of the case suggesting that the testimonies of the
NARCOM agents were motivated by any reason other than their mission to curb drug abuse. 26 Hence, the prosecution's
narration, of facts and identification of the accused-appellants should be given weight.
On the foregoing disquisition and considerations, we find that the trial court acted correctly in finding both appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. However, the dispositive portion of its decision imposes the penalty of "life
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua." Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, provides for the penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00. We are, therefore, constrained to call attention once
again to the fact that life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua are not the same. Reclusion perpetua, as understood in the
Revised Penal Code, has its own legal connotation, effects and accessory penalties which are not applicable to life imprisonment
provided for by the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 which is a special law. 27 For the imposition of the correct penalty, therefore,
the reference to reclusion perpetua in said judgment of the trial court should be and is hereby deleted. WHEREFORE, subject to
the foregoing modification, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

People vs. Balluda 318 S 503

This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated January 13, 1994, of Branch 33 of the Regional Trial Court, Bauang, La Union, in
Criminal Case No. 1217-BG finding Mateo Baludda y Suoy guilty of a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, as
amended,[2] and sentencing him thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Mateo Baludda y Suoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Violation of Sec. 4, Art. II of R.A. 6425, as amended and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life Imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P20,000.00.
The court hereby orders the confiscation and forfeiture of the 30 kilos and 400 grams of dried marijuana leaves and the Clerk of
Court of this Court is likewise ordered to destroy by burning the said marijuana leaves without delay.
SO ORDERED.[3]

Filed on January 7, 1991, by 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Joven F. Costales, the Information indicting appellant
alleges:
That on or about the 25th day of September, 1990, in the Municipality of Bagulin, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any justifiable cause or authority by law, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession,
control and custody thirty two (32) kilos of dried marijuana leaves valued at FOURTEEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
(P14,400.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency whom (sic) they are transporting and/or delivering to any drug manufacturers which is
a violation hereof.
CONTRARY TO SECTION 4, ART. II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.[4]

With the appellant pleading not guilty upon arraignment on February 7, 1991, trial ensued.[5]

The version of the prosecution as summarized by the Solicitor General, runs thus:
In the morning of September 24, 1990, C1C Mauro Camat was at Sitio Dangdangla, Barangay Cardis, Bagulin, La Union
together with other members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), a regular unit of the Philippine National
Police composed of civilian volunteers, when they received information about people passing by the area carrying huge
quantities of marijuana (tsn, Aug. 15, 1991, pp. 13-16). The CAFGU units Commanding Officer, First Lieutenant Manuel de Vera,
immediately ordered Camat and his companions to patrol the area (Ibid., p. 17).
The following day, September 25, 1990, Camat and his companions encountered appellant together with Maximo Baludda,
Domingo Atebew and Ben Baristo carrying sacks on their backs. The encounter with appellant and his companions took place in
a forested area on the mountain of Sitio Dangdangla and it was noticed that the sacks they were carrying were bulging (Ibid., pp.
18-19).
About five (5) meters away from appellant and his companions, Camat halted them (appellant and his companions) and
introduced themselves as CAFGUs. However, upon being told that the CAFGU unit merely wanted to see what was in the sacks
they were carrying, appellant and his companions ran away except for Maximo Baludda who stayed behind (Ibid., p. 22).
Camat fired two (2) warning shots into the air with his Armalite rifle while another member of the CAFGU unit fired directly at
appellant who was hit on his left shoulder and left foot (Ibid., p. 22-23).
Although Ben Baristo and Domingo Atebew were able to elude arrest, appellant and Maximo Baludda were apprehended (Ibid.,
pp. 31-32). The sacks carried by appellant and his companions were opened and found to contain marijuana leaves (Ibid., p. 34).
Sometime after the apprehension of appellant and Maximo Baludda, Ben Baristo surrendered to the police and was
subsequently charged for violation of Republic Act 6425 (Ibid., p. 32).
Alberto Bancasen (sic), another member of the CAFGU unit that apprehended appellant and Maximo Baludda, corroborated the
testimony of prosecution witness Mauro Camat in all its material points (tsn, Oct. 8, 1992, pp. 6-33).
Prosecution witness Teresa Ann Cid, a Forensic Chemist connected with the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory
Service, Region I, testified that on September 27, 1990, she conducted a laboratory examination on samples taken from the
alleged marijuana leaves contained in the three (3) sacks recovered from appellant and his companions (Exhibits A, B and C)
and found them positive for marijuana (Exhibit H; tsn, July 16, 1992, pp. 13-16).[6]

The defense theorized as follows:

1. That on September 25, 1990, the accused-appellant, Mateo Baludda, Maximo Baludda, Ben Baristo and Domingo Atebew
were walking on a mountainous pathway at Ay-ayasakin, Dangdangla, Bagulin, La Union carrying sacks containing undetermined
items. While walking on a single file thereat two shots rang out from the opposite direction hitting Mateo Baludda (Appellant) and
felled (sic) him to the ground. Domingo Atebew was able to escape and withdrew to where they came from (sic). Maximo
Baludda and Ben Baristo were left with Mateo lying wounded on the place of incident. After the shooting, the gunwielders
surfaced and searched the sacks the four were carrying moments before. The gunwielders turned out to be Alberto Bacasen,
CAFGU members. Ben Baristo was allowed to go home to inform the fate of Mateo that same evening while Maximo was left to
attend to the wounded Mateo. At around 9:00 a.m. the following day September 26, Mateos neighbors arrived to where Mateo
and Maximo stayed waiting for help. At about the same hour, Mauro Camat and some CAFGUs also arrived. They helped the
civilian neighbors of Mateo who carried him and along with Maximo and the sacks containing marijuanas to the PC Headquarters
in the afternoon of the same day to Bagulin, La Union then brought to the PC Provincial Headquarters for disposition and
investigation.
2. That on January 7, 1991, the four accused were charged under SECTION 4 of R.A. 6425 as amended on the strength of the
complaint of the PC arresting team.
3. Meanwhile, also, Mateo Baludda filed a complaint of frustrated murder and robbery against Alberto Bacasen and Camilo
Bacasen who shot him on that same incidence before the Provincial Fiscal of La Union.[7]

On January 13, 1994, after trial, the lower court upheld the Peoples version, on the basis of which it handed down the
judgment of conviction appealed from. Appellant contends that the trial court erred:

I: IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, MATEO BALUDDA TOOK PART IN THE ALLEGED SALE OR TRANSPORT
OF THE SUBJECT MARIJUANA;

II: IN FINDING THAT THE ARREST WAS LAWFUL AND THAT THE SEARCH WAS A MERE INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST;

III: IN NOT HOLDING THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, MATEO BALUDDA WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.[8]

Under the Rules of Evidence, it is disputably presumed that things which a person possesses or over which he exercises
acts of ownership, are owned by him.[9] In U.S. vs. Bandoc,[10] the Court ruled that the finding of a dangerous drug in the house
or within the premises of the house of the accused is prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi and is enough to
convict in the absence of a satisfactory explanation.[11] The constitutional presumption of innocence will not apply as long as
there is some logical connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the inference of one fact from
proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate. The burden of evidence is thus shifted on the
possessor of the dangerous drug to explain absence of animus possidendi.[12]

In the case under consideration, it is not disputed that appellant was apprehended while carrying a sack containing
marijuana. Consequently, to warrant his acquittal, he must show that his act was innocent and done without intent to possess, i.e.
without knowledge that what he possessed was a prohibited drug.[13]

Appellant theorized that he merely acceded to the request of Maximo Baludda, his uncle, to carry the sack without knowing
that it contained marijuana. As ratiocinated below, it is contrary to human experience that a man, 32 years of age, would readily
agree to carry the load of his uncle, without even knowing the place where to deliver such load, and without asking, while
negotiating a forested area, how far is their destination and how long it would take them to reach the place, especially so because
when they were apprehended at around 5:00 in the afternoon, they had already been walking for around three (3) hours. Indeed,
the tale of appellant, too trite and hackneyed to be believed, does not suffice to overcome the prima facie evidence of appellants
awareness of his possession of prohibited drugs.[14] Worse still for appellant is the undeniable fact that he and his companions,
except Maximo Baludda, fled towards different directions after the police authorities announced their presence. If appellant had
nothing to do with the transporting of subject prohibited drugs, or if he really had no knowledge that the sack he carried contained
marijuana, there would have been no cause for him to flee. If he had to run at all, it would have been more consistent with his
protestation of innocence if he ran towards, and not away from, the police officers.[15]Obviously, what appellant did removed any
shred of doubt over his guilt; exemplifying the biblical adage: The wicked flee when no man pursueth: but the righteous are as
bold as a lion.

Well-settled is the rule that the trial court, which has the distinct advantage of observing closely the demeanor and
deportment of witnesses on the stand as well as the manner they testify, can better determine than anyone else if the witness is
telling the truth or not. It is in an ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies and unless, as so repeatedly said, it has obviously
discarded or missed certain facts of substance and significance that would have altered the judgment or result, an assessment of
credibility made by the trial court should deserve approbation by the appellate court.[16]

After scrutinizing the records on hand, the Court discerns no ground for disregarding what the lower court found.

So also, appellant berates the trustworthiness of witnesses Mauro Camat and Alberto Bacasen, branding their testimonies
as inconsistent. Appellant points to the alleged inconsistencies, to wit:(1) Mauro Camat testified that a sack of marijuana was
recovered from the person of appellant, while Alberto Bacasen declared that the same sack was recovered three and a half (3
1/2) meters away from appellant;[17] (2) Mauro Camat on direct examination, said that the sack carried by appellant was a pink
sack, but on cross-examination, he declared that he could not remember the color of the said sack;[18] (3) Alberto Bacasen
testified that on the night of the incident, the CAFGU unit slept at Sitio Dangsangla but Camat testified that they proceeded to
their detachment at Cardis, Bagulin, La Union;[19] (4) Alberto Bacasen claimed to have shot appellant because he (appellant)
tried to attack him with a knife while Camat testified that they shot appellant because he tried to run away despite warning shots.
[20] The Court is not impressed with appellants submission. Tenable is the stance of the Solicitor General that the contradictions
and inconsistencies imputed on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses refer to minor details and do not impair the main
thrust of their testimonies that they caught appellant, together with several others, carrying a sack which turned out to contain
marijuana. Verily, these inconsistencies are not of a nature that would impair the credibility of subject witnesses as they do not in
actuality, touch upon the basic aspects of the who, the how and the when of the crime committed. On the contrary, the minor
discrepancies in the testimonies of the said witnesses are but natural and would even enhance their credibility, being indicative of
unrehearsed and honest responses.[21]
 Appellant argues that he cannot be convicted under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 because he was neither selling,
delivering nor transporting prohibited drugs at the time he was apprehended.

In People vs. Jones,[22] the Court defined transport as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act to mean: to carry or convey
from one place to another.[23] Thus, in People vs. Leangsiri,[24] it was held that the appellants who were on their way out of the
hotel carrying a suitcase containing heroine, were in the act of conveying the heroine to an unknown destination their act was
part of the process of transporting a dangerous drug.[25]

Clearly, therefore, the appellant who was then, together with three others, negotiating the forested area of Sitio Bangdangla,
La Union, carrying a sack containing marijuana, was at that point transporting a prohibited drug in violation of Section 4, Article II
of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.

Finally, the legality of the warrantless search and arrest in the case under scrutiny is beyond question. It bears stressing that
appellant was caught transporting a prohibited drug in flagrante delicto. Consequently, a peace officer or any private person, for
that matter, may, without warrant, arrest a person when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; and the person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. Hence, the warrantless search
in this case, being an incident to a lawful arrest, is in itself lawful.[26]

Republic Act No. 7659, amending the Dangerous Drugs Law, now provides that if the quantity of drugs involved in any of the
punishable acts is more than any of the amounts specified in the law, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death must be
imposed. Considering that the marijuana sued upon weighed more than 750 grams, the maximum specified quantity for
marijuana, appellant would ordinarily be meted that penalty. An amendatory law, however, may only be applied retroactively if
beneficial or favorable to appellant. In this case, it would not be favorable to him so that the Court has to impose the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua. But appellant has to suffer the accessories of such penalty, as well as the fine prescribed therefor
by R.A. No. 7659. Thus, appellant must still suffer the penalty imposed on him below. WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from
is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the appellant.

RULE 132 SECTION 3 RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF A WITNESS (IN RELATION TO THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION)

People vs. Salveron 228 S 92

To better understand the antecedents of this case, we go back to May 22, 1981, when Gloria de Felipe was allegedly robbed and
raped by Raul Salveron, Jesus Dalida, Mauricio Dumangas and several other unidentified persons.
During their trial in 1982, Raul Salveron was shot to death inside a bus by a passenger who escaped and has not been arrested
to date. A few weeks later, Jesus Dalida was killed in his house under mysterious circumstances that have yet to be unraveled.
Mauricio Dumangas was luckier: he too was attacked with apparent intent to kill but survived to accuse his attackers.
They were, according to him, Rosibal de Felipe, the husband of Gloria de Felipe, Marianito Billones, Jr., and Jessie Vito, who
were all eventually charged with frustrated homicide.
It was during the pendency of this case that Rosibal de Felipe was himself gunned down, on March 26, 1986, in Barangay
Dolores, Municipality of Balasan, Iloilo. The killing was mounted to the herein appellant, Henry Slaveron, son of the late Raul
Salveron, in an information for murder filed against him and Federico Sadava. 1 This is the case now before the Court.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Victoriano Gregorio as its star witness. He declared that at about 6:00 o'clock in the
evening of said date, he went to see Rosibal at his house but was told by his wife that he was not there. On his way back,
Gregorio met Henry Salveron and Federico Sadava at the foot of the bridge in Barangay Dolores and asked them what they were
doing there. Salveron said they were waiting for somebody. Gregorio proceeded on his way and, halfway through the bridge, met
Rosibal, who was riding on a motorcycle. They talked about some cattle for sale and agreed to meet at the town of Estancia the
following day. Gregorio reached the other end of the bridge when he heard gunshots. He ran for fear of his life but after a while
stopped and looked back, in time to see Henry Salveron standing at the bridge with a long firearm. Gregorio then sped back to
Rosibal's house, but by another route, to inform Gloria that her husband had been shot. 2
Rosibal was already dead when Gloria reached him. The autopsy revealed that he had died due to gunshot wounds in the head,
body, arm and thigh caused by a high-powered firearm. 3
Captain Nicanorito Gomez, station commander of the Integrated National Police branch at Balasan, testified that after conducting
an investigation of the killing, he and his men went out to look for Salveron and Sadava and were informed that they had gone to
Camansi, Anilao, Iloilo, about 100 kilometers away. The team proceeded to this place and there found the two, who willingly went
with them to the PC headquarters at Camp Delgado, Iloilo City. 4There, the suspects were subjected to a paraffin test by Zenaida
Sinfuego, a forensic chemist, who said she found them both positive for gunpowder residue. 5
The defense pleaded alibi. According to Salveron his uncle Romeo Salveron fetched him on March 21, 1986, so he could work at
his farm in the town of Anilao as the latter was no longer able to do so because he was sick of tuberculosis. He started plowing
the following morning at 6:00 o'clock and ended at 9:00, after which he and his uncle went hunting with a licensed .22 caliber
rifle. 6
Salveron added that on March 27, 1986, after asking his uncle's permission, he went to fetch Federico Sadava from Cabanatuan
to help him with the farm. They returned to Anilao at half past 1:00 in the afternoon and immediately started plowing the field.
Afterwards, they went hunting with the same rifle Salveron and his uncle had used earlier. 7
It was on March 28, 1986, while they were resting in his uncle's house, that they were picked up by Captain Gomez and his men
and taken to Camp Delgado.
After assessing the evidence of the parties, Judge Ricardo P. Galvez of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City acquitted Federico
Sadava for lack of evidence of conspiracy but found Henry Salveron guilty as charged. In a well-written decision, he sentenced
Salveron to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and all accessory penalties, to indemnify the victim's heir in the sum of
P50,000.00 and to pay the costs. 8
The appellant objects to this judgment. He argues in his brief that the trial court erred in assuming that he had a motive in killing
Rosibal de Felipe; that he fled to Anilao after the killing; and that the nitrate burns pointed to his guilt.
Salveron misses the point completely. The assumptions he protests are merely corroborative of the principal evidence of the
prosecution, which is the testimony of Gregorio.
Gregorio saw Salveron with a rifle seconds after gunshots rang out. Rosibal de Felipe was dead on the ground. There was no
other conclusion but that Salveron had killed Rosibal.
The nitrate burns on Salveron's hands only affirmed that conclusion. The claim that he had gone hunting was too pat for the trial
judge, who understandably felt that the story had been concocted to explain the nitrate burns. The paraffin test did not violate the
appellant's right against self-incrimination as it involved only an examination of a part of his body. As Justice Holmes said in Holt
v. United States: 9
[T]he prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use
of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence
when it may be material.
The alibi itself, although corroborated by Romeo Salveron and Elvira Barredo, was not convincing enough in the face of the
positive identification by Gregorio of Salveron as the killer. That identification proved that Salveron went to Anilao not before but
after the killing of Rosibal. Besides, Salveron would have the court believe that he deliberately left his wife and children, as well
as his mother, simply to assist his ailing uncle. The record shows that the uncle did not really need his nephew because he had
from six to ten hired laborers who were then helping him. 10
The assumed motive of Salveron to avenge the killing of his father merely strengthened the finding of the trial judge that the
appellant was guilty of killing Rosibal. We are not persuaded by the argument of the defense that Salveron would have reacted
earlier to his father's murder if his purpose was revenge. Vengeance may take its time aborning; four years may not be long
enough to appease the vengeful heart. In any event, we have repeatedly held that proof of motive is not essential where the
culprit has been positively identified, as in the case at bar. 11
The fact that Gregorio was not in the list of witnesses that was attached to the information was satisfactorily explained by the
prosecution. The record shows that the criminal complaint filed with the municipal court on March 29, 1986 did not include
Gregorio among the witnesses because his sworn statement was taken only on April 1, 1986, and it was this list that was merely
copied when the information was prepared by the provincial prosecutor. At any rate, the omission did not disqualify Gregorio from
testifying later because, as we said in People v. Pacabes: 12
We have held in a long line of decisions that the prosecution is allowed to call witnesses other than those named
in the complaint and information. While the accused in a criminal prosecution is entitled to know the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, it does not mean that he entitled to know in advance the names of all the
witnesses for the prosecution. The success of the prosecution might be endangered if such right be granted to an
accused for the known witnesses might be subjected to pressure or coerced not to testify. The time for the
accused to know all the witnesses against him is when they take the witness stand.
The trial court convicted Salveron of murder but did not explain how it was qualified by evident premeditation or treachery as
alleged in the information. The allegation was simply accepted without proof. This Court itself has gone over the records and finds
that neither of these circumstances attended the commission of the crime.
The prosecution has not established the essential elements of evident premeditation, to wit: a) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime; b) an overt act showing that the culprit had clung to his determination to commit the crime; and
c) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution of the crime as to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. 13 In fact, no evidence whatsoever of any of these elements was presented by the People.
Like evident premeditation, treachery cannot be merely presumed, and certainly not from the environmental facts of the particular
case before us. While it may be argued that Salveron ambushed Rosibal on his way home, there is absolutely no positive
evidence of this conjecture. On the other hand, it may also be supposed that, because he was riding on his motorcycle, Rosibal
could have used the vehicle to avert the attack upon him or even ram his attacker or at least deflect his fire. We resolve the doubt
in favor of the accused. We hold that there was no treachery because it has not been shown that Salveron employed means,
methods or forms calculated to insure the execution of the killing without risk to himself arising from the defense the victim might
have made. 14
In the absence of either of the alleged qualifying circumstances, we must find that the crime committed by Salveron was merely
homicide and not murder. Homicide is punishable with reclusion temporal; 15 in this case in its medium period, there being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstance. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty is reduced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from prision mayor as minimum and reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum.
We hope that the bloody trail of vendetta that began with the alleged robbery and rape of Gloria de Felipe will end with the killing
of her husband, Rosibal de Felipe in the case we here decide. Whatever retribution is warranted upon the guilty in this tangled
web of vengeance upon vengeance must be decreed, not by those who feel they have been wronged, but by the law itself
through the processes of the courts.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED and the appellant is hereby declared guilty not of murder but of homicide, for
which he is sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of 10 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He shall also indemnify the heirs of Rosibal de Felipe in the sum of P50,000.00 and pay the
costs.

People vs. Malimit 264 S 167 (supra: object evidence)

RULE 132 SECTION 4 ORDER IN THE EXAMINATION OF AN INDIVIDUAL

WITNESS

Bachrach Motors Co. Inc. vs. CIR 86 S 27

In 1958 the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. and/or the "Bachrach Transportation Co., Inc.", now petitioner in this case, was in the
transportation business and operated what was then known as the "Rural Transit". In that year the Rural Transit Employees
Association went on strike and the dispute between the management and the union reached the Court of Industrial Relations for
compulsory arbitration. The case was docketed as Case No. 22- IPA entitled: Rural Transit Employees Association vs. Bachrach
Motor Co., and Bachrach
Transportation Co. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR for short) immediately issued an order on August 7, 1958 by which the
strikers were ordered to return to work and the management to take them back under the terms and conditions existing before
the dispute arose. 1
While this labor dispute was pending with the CIR Bachrach filed a "Petition for Authority to discharge driver Maximo Jacob from
the service", dated July 24, 1961. The reasons given for the petition were alleged violations of the Motor Vehicle Law by Maximo
Jacob resulting in damage to property and injuries to third parties, the latest of which occurred on June 9, 1961 resulting in the
"total destruction of bus 170" of the company.
An "Answer and Counter-Petition" was filed in behalf of Maximo Jacob by the Rural Transit Employees Association whereby it
denied the charges and alleged that the June 9, 1961 accident was due to a mechanical defect of the bus which was beyond the
control of the driver Jacob, hence, the latter's suspension from the service was not justified.
The petition of Bachrach docketed as Case No. 22-IPA (11) was heard on January 23, 1963, during which petitioner presented its
one and only witness, Mr. Joseph Kaplin, general manager of Rural Transit, and various documents marked as Exhibits "1" to "8-
F" inclusive. After Mr. Kaplin, concluded his direct testimony, with agreement of the parties, the hearing was scheduled for
another date for purposes of cross-examination of the witness. The case was reset on various dates but Mr. Kaplin failed to
appear because he had left for abroad.
Sometime on March 8 1965, the employee's association filed a motion praying that:
(a) the testimony of Mr. Joseph Kaplin be stricken from the records
(b) the petition of the Company for authority to dismiss Maximo Jacob from the service be denied: and
(c) the Company be ordered to reinstate Maximo Jacob immediately with backwages from June 9, 1961 up to the
date of his actual reinstatement. 2
In an order dated March 1, 1966, the CIR through then Presiding Judge Arsenio I. Martinez dismissed the company's petition,
lifted the suspension of driver Jacob, and ordered his reinstatement with backwages from the date of his suspension up to his
actual reinstatement. 3
Bachrach's motion for reconsideration 4 having been denied 5, it filed the instant Petition for certiorari on June 15, 1966 which in
the Court's Resolution of July 18,1966 was given due course. 6
The following errors are now assigned by petitioner, viz: 7
I: The respondent court erred in dismissing the petition of the herein petitioner, after ordering the testimony of
Joseph Kaplin to be stricken off the record, notwithstanding the fact that the service records of Maximo Jacob,
upon the basis of which his dismissal could be justified were admitted by it.
 II: The respondent court erred in not admitting the petitioner's exhibits unqualifiedly and in admitting them "for
whatever worth they may have" only to disregard them entirely thereafter on the alleged ground that "the contents
of the same were not proven.
III: The respondent court erred in not ordering the dismissal of Maximo Jacob.
IV: The respondent court erred in granting the respondent union's counter-petition without reception of evidence,
especially after it earlier dismissed the petitioner's petition on the technical ground that Joseph Kaplin was not
cross-examined by the respondent union.
V: The respondent court erred in granting backwages to Maximo Jacob from the date of his suspension up to
actual reinstatement without evidence to prove that he has exercised reasonable diligence to secure other
employment during the time of his alleged suspension.
VI: The respondent court erred in not holding that the union has the burden to prove that Maximo Jacob is
entitled to backwages.
VII: The respondent court erred in not holding that, if at all, Maximo Jacob is only entitled to three months
backwages according to the Sta. Cecilia Sawmill case.
1. Respondent court did not err in ordering the dismissal of Bachrach's petition to discharge Maximo Jacob. Petitioner presented
only one witness, Joseph Kaplin to prove its case against driver Jacob. The witness failed however to appear at the scheduled
hearings for his cross-examination for the simple reason that he left for abroad. Having been deprived, without fault on its part, of
its right to cross-examine Kaplin, respondent association was entitled to have the direct testimony of the witness stricken off the
record.
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil
in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is fundamental right which
is part of due process. (Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et al., 1975, 62 SCRA 258)
In Ortigas Jr. v. Luftansa German Airlines, 1975, defendant's witness failed to appear at the continuation of hearing during which
the witness was to be cross-examined by plaintiff's counsel. The trial court denied defendant's motion for postponement and
ordered the unfinished testimony of the witness Lazzari stricken off the record. In sustaining said order, this Court held inter alia:
Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly cross-
examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse
party. But when cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the
party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent.
The right of a party to cross-examine the witness of his adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in civil cases, no
less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. The express recognition of such right of the accused in the
Constitution does not render the right thereto of parties in civil cases less constitutionally based, for it is an
indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law. ... Until such cross-examination has
been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not, therefore, be allowed
to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the case. (64 SCRA 610, 636- 637;
emphasis supplied)
Parenthetically, the situation in Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et al., supra, was different. There, the
witness, Atty. Morabe, had finished his direct testimony and he was ready and available for cross-examination. Motions for
postponement of the cross-examination were made however by the adverse counsel from time to time until one day Atty. Morabe
succumbed to a fatal heart attack without the cross-examination having been accomplished. On motion of the respondents
the Court of Industrial Relations ordered the testimony of Atty. Morabe deleted from the record. On a petition for certiorari by
Savory Luncheonette, this Court set aside the order and held that by their own actuations, respondents were considered to have
impliedly waived and thereupon lost their right to cross-examine the witness, for such a right may be forfeited by a party litigant
through his own conduct. Petitioner contends however that it was ready to present another witness, Mrs. Ursula Silva, to Identify
the documents, Exhibits "1" to "8-F", but it did not proceed to call the witness for the reason that during the hearing of January 16,
1965, respondent's counsel, Atty. Santiago, manifested that he was admitting the signatures of Joseph Kaplin on the aforesaid
documents. 8 However true that may be, what Atty. Santiago admitted merely was the signature of Mr. Kaplin and not the truth
of the contents of the documents. 9 The opposing party was still entitled to cross-examine the witness on the matters written on
Exhibits "1" to "8-F" especially if they adversely affected the substantial rights of the party against whom they were being
presented, namely, driver Maximo Jacob. When Atty. Santiago admitted that the signature appearing in Exhibits "1" to "8-F" was
that of witness Kaplin, the counsel of petitioner then, Atty. Joven Enrile, should have inquired if the party was admitting likewise
the veracity of the contents of the documents; not having done so, petitioner must now suffer the consequences. Exhibits "1" to
"8-F" were admitted by respondent court only for "whatever they may be worth." Evaluating them, however, it did not consider
said documents, and rightly so, as competent proof of the truthfulness of their contents without the supporting testimony of
witness Kaplin. As stated in the order under review "(N)o other witness was presented by respondent company (now petitioner) to
testify on the intrinsic value of those exhibits"; consequently, they are hearsay. Inasmuch as the testimony of Joseph Kaplin is
stricken off the record and the contents of Exhibits "1" to "8-F" are hearsay, and there is no other evidence which substantiates
the charges against Maximo Jacob, the dismissal of the company's petition to discharge Jacob from its service is in order.
2. No error was committed when the CIR, without receiving evidence, granted relief to private respondent herein on its counter-
petition.
At the time Bachrach filed its petition to discharge Maximo Jacob, there was a pending labor dispute in the CIR between the
company and the employee's union. The CIR ordered the strikers to return to work. The company in the meantime suspended its
driver Maximo Jacob after the alleged June 9, 1961 accident. 10
Considering the dismissal of Bachrach's petition to discharge Maximo Jacob, the lifting of the latter's suspension and his
reinstatement in the service were but a necessary consequence thereof. For obvious reasons, the relief could be granted without
need of evidence. The onus probandi was on the company, now petitioner, to justify the suspension of Jacob and his eventual
separation from the service. Having failed to discharge that burden, there were no valid grounds for it to keep its employee away
from his work.
3. On the matter of backwages, We agree with petitioner's counsel that the judicial trend is to fix a reasonable period for the
payment of backwages, the philosophy being to avoid protracted delay in post-judgment hearings to prove or disprove earnings
of the worker elsewhere during the period he had not been reinstated to his employment." 11Following this principle, We hold that
payment of backwages for a period of three (3) years is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of the case.
WHEREFORE, We hereby render judgment affirming the order of respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated March 1, 1966,
now under review, with the sole modification that petitioner shall pay its driver Maximo Jacob three (3) years backwages at the
rate of the last salary received before he was suspended, without qualification and deduction. With costs against petitioner. Order
modified.

People vs. Padero 226 S 810

FACTS:
In a complaint filed on 21 January 1992 with Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of Bais City, Negros Oriental and docketed
therein Criminal Case No. 741-B, Jocelyn Cadelia, a sixteen-year-old lass and a resident of sitio Amalao, barangay Tagpo of
Bais City, charged Henry Padero, her uncle-in-law, with the crime of rape committed. A plea of not guilty having been entered by
the accused. The prosecution presented as its witnesses complainant Jocelyn Cadelia and Cherryl Palacios for its evidence in
chief, and Clara Cadelia, Rev. Lemuel Felecio, and Damiana Cadelia on rebuttal. The accused took the witness stand in his
defense and presented Loreta Samane, Elsa Garcia, Macrina Padero, and Marietta Padero as his witnesses.

Despite the positive testimony of the accused which squarely traversed the complainant's version of force or intimidation by
stating that he and the complainant had an intimate relationship, with the latter as the more aggressive partner, and that their first
sexual encounter in August of 1991 was followed by fifteen more encounters at the same place during week-ends when the
complainant was alone, all of which were new facts, the complainant was never recalled to the witness stand to rebut these
obviously damaging revelations of the accused. The trial court convicted the accused giving full faith and credit to the version of
the complainant who it said testified "with sincerity, honesty and candidness and with answers direct to the point, in a logical and
straightforward manner, and free from inconsistencies." The accused seasonably appealed from the judgment.

ISSUE:
Whether the act of the prosecution of not recalling the private complainant to rebut the testimonies of the accused engenders
doubt as to the credibility of said private complainant?

RULING:
Yes. The function of the rebuttal evidence is to explain, repel, counteract, or disprove the evidence of the adversary. Its office is
"to meet the new facts put in by the opponent in his case in reply" and is "necessary only because, on a plea in denial, new
subordinate evidential facts have been offered, or because, on an affirmative plea, its substantive facts have been put forward, or
because, on any issue whatever, facts discrediting the proponent's witnesses have been offered." While the presentation of
rebuttal evidence is discretionary with the prosecution in a criminal action, in the instant case, the overwhelming import of the
new facts disclosed by the accused which have a damaging effect on the complainant's version made it imperative for the
prosecution to present rebuttal evidence. Relegating the complainant to the background and presenting other witnesses to rebut
minor or trivial matters brought out in the evidence in chief for the defense engender serious doubts on the integrity of her story.

RULE 132 SECTION 10 LEADING AND MISLEADING QUESTIONS

People vs. Caparas 111 S 68

Before Us are two separate motions for reconsideration of Our decision dated February 20, 1980 convicting the two abovenamed
appellants, one filed by their counsel of record in behalf of both of them; the other, filed by a new counsel of Caparas only in his
behalf.
The motion for reconsideration, filed by appellants' counsel of record, seeks the re- examination of the decision insofar as it
rejects the plea of self-defense of appellant Diamsay. As in the appellants' brief, appellant Diamsay in his present motion for
reconsideration failed to prove the justifying circumstance with clear and convincing evidence. As he had himself admitted to be
the actual killer, the burden of proof is shifted to him to establish all the facts necessary to prove his plea of self defense. The
motion for reconsideration, insofar as Diamsay is concerned, has nothing new with which to discharge this burden, and must
consequently be denied.
As regards appellant Caparas, the motions for reconsideration seek the review of the testimonies of the two principal witnesses,
Laureano Salvador and Lydia Posadas, upon which said appellant was convicted, on ground of conspiracy between him and
Diamsay. Caparas points out some facts and circumstances which are alleged to impair the credibility of the aforesaid witnesses
and thereby leaves the fact of conspiracy unproven beyond reasonable doubt as it should be.
Thus, Caparas points out that Laureano's testimony was extracted through leading questions, and he quotes:
Q Do you know the purpose of A Regarding the landholding which he said
Carlos Gregorio in coming to would be given to me. He said there is
your house? already one.
A Yes, sir. Q And what did you answer when this was
said to you by Eufemio Caparas?
Q What was his purpose?
A I said, 'if there is, I give thanks', but he
A Regarding the landholding I
said that the land he was giving me had
was farming and his help I
some trouble.
requested.
Q And what did you say?
Q Did you go to any place with
Carlos Gregorio after that? A I said' that seems hard',but he said,'that
is easy'.
A Yes, sir.
Q What else transpired?
Q Where?
A I asked him what he meant by easy and
A To his house.
he said 'it is easy under this condition', and
Q You are referring to the house I asked him what condition, and he said
of Carlos Gregorio? you kill him.
A Yes, sir. Q During all that time, who were present
inside that house?
xxx xxx xxx
A Tisio Diamsay.
Q When you arrived at the
house of Carlos Gregorio, who Q Who else?
were with you?
A Eufemio Caparas, sir.
A Carlos Gregorio, sir.
Q Anybody else?
Q Who were the persons, ff any,
A Carting Gregorio, sir.
that you have seen at the house
of Carlos Gregorio? Q And you?
A Eufemio Caparas and A I was present.
Diamsay, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, in the vernacular, in Tagalog
Q Now, when you arrived in that Language that you have been testifying,
house, what happened? you said, 'Patayin n'yo, means plural, do
you know to whom this word 'n'yo' referred
A We talked regarding the
to?
landholding, sir.
A He was ordering me, Carling, and Tisio
Q You said, 'we' to whom are
Diamsay,sir.
you referring?
Q Ordering to what?
A Eufemio Caparas, sir.
A To kill.
Q What did you talk about that
landholding? Q To kill Simeon Paez?
A Yes, sir.
We are constrained to agree that the testimony of Laureano on the supposed conspiracy was elicited by means of leading
questions, the probative value of which, according to accepted legal authorities, is thus diminished or lessened.
The probative value of a witness' testimony is very much lessened where it is obtained by leading questions
which are so put that the witness merely assents to or dissents from a statement or assertion of an examining
consul put with such vocal inflection as to be question. 1
Appellant Caparas also points out several inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimonies of the two witnesses. While this
Court has constantly adhered to the rule that conclusions of the trial court on the matter of evaluations of the truth of declarations
of witnesses and their credibility carry great weight and command favorable considerations, 2 the instant case cannot come
under this rule for, as pointed out in the motion for reconsideration, the judge who rendered the decision was not the judge who
heard the testimonies and observed the de or of witnesses Laureano Salvador and Lydia Posadas. 3 This being the case, and
considering the gravity of the crime charged, their testimonies must be subjected to a strict scrutiny to leave no room for doubt as
to the guilt of Caparas whose complicity was based only on conspiracy which, according to settled doctrine, must be shown to
exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself. 4
After a careful and conscientious review of the evidence, We are now convinced that the testimonies of the two aforementioned
petitioned witnesses were accorded more than what they deserve by way of credence and veracity. Doubts as to the truth of their
testimonies assail the mind of the Court, occasioned by many improbabilities in their testimonies, and in the case of Lydia, by
direct contradiction by his own sister, Priscilla Posadas.
To begin with Laureano Salvador, it is not without significance that he was not listed in the information to be among the
prosecution witnesses. Only during the trial on June 2, 1973, and after more than two years after the commission of the crime,
that he surfaced and testified on what he allegedly knew about the crime. From his testimony, it would appear that he did not
inform the authorities nor his relatives what he knew about the crime, and that it was only to Pablo Paez that he told his story
about the crime, but only after almost two years after its commission. This fact in itself is contrary to human experience because
the natural reaction of one who has knowledge of the crime is to reveal it to the authorities, except only if he is the author thereof.
Indeed, as held in People vs. Basuel, 5 the silence of the witnesses for about two years detracts from their trustworthiness.
This witness, of course, explained that his silence was due to his fear for his life, for which reason he went into hiding in Dupax
Nueva Viscaya, where he allegedly worked at Diplong Sawmill. We cannot, however, give credence to this explanation, since
counsel for appellant was not given the opportunity to cross examine Salvador Laureano on this matter. It appears that this
witness testified that while hiding in Dupax he worked in "Diplong Sawmill." But upon investigation by counsel for appellant, it was
found out that there is no Diplong Sawmill and because of this, counsel for appellant moved to cross examine further the witness.
But said witness failed to appear in the hearing despite summons, until the court, after a third failure to appear, issued an order
for his arrest. When the said witness finally appeared, counsel for appellant requested to postpone the cross examination on a
very valid ground that he had another case which was earlier scheduled on the same date. The trial court, however, refused to
postpone the cross examination. This, in Our opinion, is a prejudicial error on the part of the trial court, which should have
granted the postponement. As it is, his testimony cannot but create some doubts in Our mind, specially as on his own admission,
he never went to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal to inform the government prosecutors that he would be a witness in this case.
In the case of People vs. Maisug, 6 this Court held that the conduct such as shown by the witness is unnatural and contrary to
ordinary experience. Lawyers do not usually present witnesses without informing themselves regarding the facts that they would
prove by the testimonies they would present in court.
The other witness, Lydia Posadas, a sister-in-law of the deceased had to wait for four (4) days after the shooting, and about two
(2) weeks after she allegedly overheard the supposed conspiracy, to execute a joint statement with her sister, Priscilla, before the
Provincial Fiscal. It defies one's credulity that both of them, especially Lydia, who is a sister-in-law of the deceased would not
immediately expose Caparas as the man behind the perpetration of the crime. This stultified silence casts grave doubts as to
their veracity. 7 These doubts deepen when she testified that she did not reveal even to her husband the plot to kill his brother.
The reason given by the lower court is that her father-in-law to whom she told of Caparas' plan to liquidate the deceased advised
her not to inform anybody, as Atty. Pedro Paez would arrive on February 6, 1971 to settle the conflict. The explanation is not
persuasive. No wife who heard of a plot to kill her brother-in-law would not tell her husband of such a dreadful plan. Her
explanation why she did not tell her husband is simply preposterous. Upon being told of the plot, anyone, especially a father,
would not let even a day pass before taking measures to avert the plot against his son's life. Lydia Posadas testified that she
heard the plot on January 27, 1971. To wait until February 6, 1971 to reveal it to the authorities would be taking so much risk, not
dictated by the gravity of the events that cried for instant action to prevent its occurrence.
Aside from the inherent incredibility, as shown above, of Lydia's testimony, it was directly contradicted by her sister, Priscilla, who
denied having gone to the haystack with her sister, Lydia, on January 27, 1971. Priscilla declared that she executed the sworn
statement which tended to implicate Caparas because she and her sister were instructed to do so by Pedro Paez who from all
indications exerted moral ascendancy over them as they were staying with the family of Pedro Paez. And being then only 17
years old, she did not realize the serious implications of what she had done.
In Our decision subject of the present motion for reconsideration, We brushed aside Priscilla Posadas' testimony, stating:
... Lydia Posadas declared in Court on July 14, 1973 while Priscilla Posadas took the stand on March 27, 1974.
Between these dates, as the cliche goes, much water has gone under the bridge. There is every possibility for
overtures to have taken place by way of saving appellant Caparas at least, who is after all, closely related to the
victim and the Paezes, from complicity. For if the two sisters were made to jointly execute a false affidavit by
Pedro Paez, Priscilla could at least have been prevailed upon not to take the stand just so her sister Lydia would
not be unmasked as a liar. If she took the stand as a defense witness, it must have been because the Paezes,
realizing what a terrible fate would befall a close relative, appellant Caparas, who could have soothed their
aggrieved feelings with more than just an empty supplication for pity, were induced to save Caparas from the
grave punishment that he would suffer for the serious offense with which he was charged.
We realize the foregoing ratiocination goes more into the realm of conjecture than reality, upon consideration of the fact that as
the records show, the prosecution through a private prosecutor, presented rebuttal evidence to disprove the evidence given by
Priscilla Posadas, thus negating what this Court surmised was the reason for Priscilla's testimony so favorable to appellant
Caparas. It may be because the Solicitor General made no attempt to explain the damaging testimony of Priscilia, from the
prosecution standpoint, that the Court was pushed to doing it, and regrettably so, for as just stated it did so with no better than
mere speculation and surmise.
Why Pedro Paez involved the two sisters at the time the joint affidavit was executed was probably because Laureano was still in
hiding and Pedro Paez thought that conviction of Caparas would be more sure if two witnesses could corroborate each other.
Moreover, Pedro Paez's letter dated June 23, 1980 addressed to the President of the Philippines and forwarded to this Court by
his office requesting for early resolution of this case and another letter dated June 17, 1981 praying for execution of the decision
of this Court in this case show no pity on Pedro Paez's part Lo want appellant Caparas saved from punishment, contrary to this
Court's mere surmise.
The trial court also inferred conspiracy from its finding that appellant Caparas, in ordering the killing of the deceased, was
motivated by resentment against the deceased as a result of a conflict between them over proprietary rights involving a portion of
agricultural land: and that the gun used in killing the deceased was owned by Caparas.
While conspiracy may be established by circumstantial evidence provided that it is competent and convincing, in the instant case,
the evidence with which to link Caparas in a conspiracy with Diamsay to kill the deceased does not rest on solid ground. The
records do not show that Caparas harbors intense resentment against the Paezes as to go to the extent of liquidating them. On
the contrary, it was the Paezes who had all the reason to be angry with Caparas who, according to them, was defrauding them of
their rightful rights. In the case of Diamsay , he apparently acted on his own. Diamsay hated the Paezes because of the latter's
"insulting attitude" toward him, as may be gleaned from the decision of the trial court when it states:
When Simeon Paez ,was about to have the same land planted, Diamsay stopped the planters. This angered the
former causing him to utter slanderous remarks against Diamsay. Pedro Paez also resented the actuations of
Diamsay in (sic) stopping of the land.
As regards the finding that the gun used by Diamsay in killing Simeon Paez was owned by Caparas, this is easily explained by
the fact that as overseer of Caparas, Diamsay was authorized to carry the gun. Pedro Paez himself admitted that when he was
still the overseer of Caparas, he also used to carry a gun given him by Caparas.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, We cannot but entertain doubts as to the veracity of the testimonies of the two witnesses
which alone provided the basis for the finding of ,conspiracy against Caparas. These doubts now disturb the mind of the Court as
to his culpability, and must accordingly be resolved in favor of appellant Caparas it being preferably to acquit a guilty person
rather than convict all; innocent one. 8
WHEREFORE, the decision of February 20, 1980 is hereby affirmed with respect to appellant Diamsay, but reversed with respect
to appellant Caparas who is hereby acquitted, on ground of reasonable doubt, of the crime charged. With costs de oficio as to
appellant Caparas.