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1. De Leon v.

CA The order of exclusion (or inclusion) is not a final order; that it is interlocutory in the sense that it did not
settle once and for all the title to the subject lots; that the prevailing rule is that for the purpose of
Teresita De Leon was appointed administratrix of the estate of Rafael Nicolas in an Intestate Estate determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate
proceeding. Rafael and Salud Nicolas were parents of 5 children including petitioner Teresita, and court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final
private respondent Ramon. decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties.
Ramon Nicolas, an oppositor applicant in the intestate proceedings, filed a Motion for Collation, The issue of collation was not yet justiciable at that early stage of the testate proceeding. It is not
claiming that their father had given real properties to his children by gratuitous title and that Teresita as necessary to mention in the order of exclusion the controversial matter of collation.
administratrix failed to include in the inventory of the estate of the decedent. Ramon was required by the
RTC to: (1) to submit pertinent documents relative to the transfer of the properties from the registered
owners during their lifetime for proper determination of the court if such properties should be collated, 2.
and; (2) set it for hearing with notice to the present registered owners to show cause why their properties
may not be included in the collation of properties. RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
The RTC issued an order enumerating the properties to be collated to the estate and ordered the FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
Administratrix to include the same in the collation in the probate proceedings.
De Leon filed an MR alleging that the properties subject of the order were already titled in their names DECISION
years ago and that titles may not be collaterally attacked in a motion for collation (DENIED). De Leon
filed an MR on the order of denial. The RTC in its order stated that Ramon should prove whether the YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
properties disposed of by Rafael was gratuitous or for valuable consideration. Subsequently, RTC
removed De Leon as administratrix on the ground of conflict of interest considering her claim. Deleon
filed an MR (DENIED) then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the
prayer for a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction claiming that the respondent former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages.
judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion, and:
1. They were not given the opportunity to appeal inspite of the pendency of the notice of appeal On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles,
2. The order did not include whether the properties are still part of the estate or should be
California, U.S.A. 7
excluded from the inventory/estate.
The CA found no grave abuse of discretion and ruled that the inclusion of the properties had already
He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to
become final for failure of petitioners to appeal from the order of collation, while the removal of petitioner
as administratrix is timely appealed. his death on December 18, 1992.

ISSUE (On petition for review on certiorari): Whether of not the order of the RTC was final
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of
Held: No. A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding,can only pass upon questions of Felicisimos estate.
title provisionally. The patent reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that
questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property,
can only be settled in a separate action. Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent
was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the
A probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage,
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and
parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid
there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of
parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title administration be issued to her.
because the probate court cannot do so.
The questioned Order was erroneously referred to as an order of collation both by the RTC and the
appellate court. For all intents and purposes, said Order is a mere order including the subject properties
in the inventory of the estate of the decedent.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a administration was properly filed in Makati City.
cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been
filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of
death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of
she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for
married to Merry Lee. determining the residence as contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the
dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two [In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
motions to dismiss. respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time
of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements 45
thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992
public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also
Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds children to him at his
Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San
her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol,
Romillo, Jr. 14 Sta. Cruz, Laguna."

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration
Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa.
marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality
Family Code. and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial
jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers on the No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar
manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration,
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may
and June 20, 25 1995, respectively. validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized
on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering
that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
ISSUES: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration.

HELD: DOCTRINE:

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "Residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
"place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case
refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases,
"residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to and affirmed the RTC resolution.
which when absent, one has the intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under sebastians contention that joesph and teresa failed to establish that they are legitimate hers of jose, and
the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual thus of their grandfather joaquin and the certificates of title of subject property indicate or titlling joaquin
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he married to carded which is conclusive proof of ownership, thus not subject to collateral attack.
resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his
on the other hand, eduardo alleged that CA erroneously settled joaquins estate together with the estates
residence in one place and domicile in another. of lucia,jesus, jose, mercedes, gloria and milagros in one proceeding. they said the estate of milagros
shall not be distributed, since a proceeding was already conducted in another court for the probate of
3. Agtarap vs agtarap milagros will, thus violating the rule on precedence of testate over intestate proceedings. and also, that
the RTC as acting special or limited jurisdiction shall not determine the questions of ownership which
Probate courts: jurisdiction belongs to general jurisdiction.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate court, relates issue RTC as intestate court has jurisdiction to resolve ownership of real properties?
only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased
persons, but does not extend to the determination of question of ownership that arise during the CA settlement of joaquin estate together with the estates of the others heirs is correct?
proceeding.
legitimacy of joseph and teresa?
The jurisdiction of a probate extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution
eduardos petion granted
of the state, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the
inventory is conjugal or exclusively property of the deceased spouse. sebatian petion denied.
Exception; as justified by expediency and convenience. Case remanded to RTC for further settlement of Joaquins estate. RTC has jurisdiction to resolve
ownership of the real properties.
first, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the o Gen Rule: Jurisdiction of trial court, either as probate or intestate court, relates only to matters having
final determination of ownership in a separate action. to do with probate of will and or settlement of estate of deceased persons and does not extend to
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.
second, if the interested parties are all hers to the estate, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court is competent Exceptions, as justified by expediency and convenience:
to resolve issues on ownership.
Probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the question of inclusion
its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral tot the settlement and distribution of or exclusion, from inventory of a piece of property w/o prejudice to final determination in a separate
the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory action
is conjugal or exclusively property of the deceased spouse.
If interested parties are all heirs or question is one of collation/advancement or parties consent to the
Facts assumption of of jurisdiction by the court and the rights of 3P are not impaired
Descendant joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements. during his lifetime he contracted two Estate is settled and distributed among heirs only after payment of debts of the estate, funeral charges
marriages. the first wife is lucia who died at 1924 with three children namely, jesus, milagros and jose. admin expenses, allowance to th widow, and inheritance tax. Records show these were not complied
the second wife is carded, with three children, eduardo, sebastian and mercedes. with in 1965.
Sebastian did not present evidence to support averments to exclude Joseph and Teresa as heirs.
the son of edwardo or (grandson in second wife) filed petition for settlement of joaquin;s intestate estate. CA disposition related only to the estate of Joaquin.
the RTC issued resolution appointing eduardo as administrator. issuing order of partition on once
23,2000 which ruled that the blyk of estate property were acquired during the existence of 2nd Sec 1 Rule 90: RTC granted jurisdiction to determine lawful heirs of Joaquin as well as respective shares
marriage, with TCTs titling that joaquin married to carded. in the payment of obligations
The inclusion of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes and Gloria was merely a necessary consequence of the
settlement of Joaquins estate, they being his legal heirs.
eduardo, sebastian and opositora joseph and teresa the children of jose filed their respective motion for
reconsiderations.
The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration of eduaro and sebastians and granted joseph and 4. Suntay IIIvs. Cojuangco-Suntay, 683 SCRA, October 2012
teresa. declaring that the real properties belonged to conjugal partnership of joaquin and lucia and G.R. No. 183053 October 10, 2012
directed the October partition to reflect the anew and correct share of heirs.
eduardo and sebastian appealed to CA before RTC for petition for review. the CA dismissed the appeals
EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner, On 13 November 2000, Federico died.
vs.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent
ISSUE: Whether or not Isabel and Emilio III can be a co-administrators of the estate of Isabel
Cojuanco-Suntay.
FACTS:
HELD: NO
The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was survived
by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled does not ipso
including herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all facto entitle an interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs
by Federicos and Cristinas only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents. nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set forth in Section 6, Rule
78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal
The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from infancy by the spouses consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as
Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings, Margarita and Emilio II, administrator. Given Isabels unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedents legitimate
lived with their mother Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation of Isabels parents, Emilio I and Isabel grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of
Cojuangco. Isabels parents, along with her paternal grandparents, were involved in domestic relations the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the
cases, including a case for parricide filed by Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was eventually Court and depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the case.
acquitted.
In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the protracted litigation, is the
On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent Isabel have a deep aversion for each other.1awp++i1 To
petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristinas estate docketed as Special our mind, it becomes highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to work as co-administrators of their
Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that: (1) as the surviving grandmothers estate. The allegations of Emilio III, the testimony of Federico and the other witnesses for
spouse of the decedent, he should be appointed administrator of the decedents estate; (2) as part Federico and Emilio III that Isabel and her siblings were estranged from their grandparents further drive
owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by the decedent, he must be accorded preference in the home the point that Emilio III bears hostility towards Isabel. More importantly, it appears detrimental to
administration thereof; (3) Isabel and her siblings had been alienated from their grandparents for more the decedents estate to appoint a co-administrator (Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of
than thirty (30) years; (4) the enumeration of heirs in the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the some kind or hostility to those, such as herein respondent Isabel, immediately interested in the said
other children of his son, Emilio III and Nenita; (5) even before the death of his wife, Federico had estate.
administered their conjugal properties, and thus, is better situated to protect the integrity of the
decedents estate; (6) the probable value of the estate as stated in the petition was grossly overstated; 6.
and (7) Isabels allegation that some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue. The Estate of Hilario Ruiz and Edmond Ruiz vs. CA, Heirs of Hilario Ruiz (Ruizs)

Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabels petition for letters of administration on the ground that Isabel
had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter Facts
as a result of Isabels parents marriage being declared null and void. However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco- Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Petitioner Edmond Ruiz, his
Suntay, we categorically declared that Isabel and her siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters, private
as opposed to a void marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. The
children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of their legitimate grandmother, the decedent, testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz
Cristina. executor of his estate. When Hilario died, the cash component of his estate were distributed among his
heirs named in the will but for some unknown reason the will was never been probated.

Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedents estate on his Thus, four years later after the decedents death, Respondent Maria Pilar Montes filed before the trail
court a petition to probate the will. This was opposed by Edmond on the ground that the will was
behalf in the event letters of administration issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed an
executed under undue influence. Nevertheless, he withdrew his opposition and the will was
Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfathers opposition, alleging that Federico, subsequently probated. One of the properties in the will a house and lot which was bequeath to
or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of Catheryn, Candicem and Maria was leased out by the petitioner to third persons. Hence, the probate
the decedent, Cristina. court ordered Edmond to deposit the rent of the lease to the branch clerk of court. During the pendency
of the proceeding, petitioner moved to release the rent payments deposited before the clerk or court.
Respondent on the other hand, oppose the said motion and concurrently filed "Motion for Release of order releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance distribution of the estate which is
Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will." Montes allowed only under the following conditions set forth in Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.
prayed for the release of the said rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline
and for the distribution of the testator's properties in accordance to the holographic will. In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1) after
all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have
The probate court denied the motion for release petitioner's motion for release of funds but granted been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in
respondent Montes' motion in view of petitioner's lack of opposition. It thus ordered the release of the a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the court
rent payments to the decedent's three granddaughters. It further ordered the delivery of the titles to and directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.
possession of the properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the
filing of a bond of P50,000.00. Petitioner assails the order of the probate court to the Court of Appeals. In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property and the
The CA however, dismissed the petition and sustained the probate court. Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first
publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of "notice" to creditors, not payment of
debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had
not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be
Issues paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or
1. Whether the probate court err in the grant of allowance for support to the grandchildren of the make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the
decedent? inheritance. Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had not yet been
inventoried and appraised.
2. Whether it has authority to release the titles to certain heirs?
3. Whether it erred to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will?
Held
3. Yes. The petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right to take
Held possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of an executor or administrator
1. Yes. Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute
deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of
court, such allowance as are provided by law. administration,"

Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the widow and the minor or incapacitated children of the When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of court, he had been
deceased the right to receive allowances for support during the settlement of estate proceedings. He previously granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair and maintenance expenses on the
contends that the testator's three granddaughters do not qualify for an allowance because they are not properties of the estate, and payment of the real estate taxes thereon. But petitioner moved again for the
incapacitated and are no longer minors but of legal age, married and gainfully employed. In addition, the release of additional funds for the same reasons he previously cited. It was correct for the probate court
provision expressly states "children" of the deceased which excludes the latter's grandchildren. to require him to submit an accounting of the necessary expenses for administration before releasing any
further money in his favor.
It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the "minor or
incapacitated" children of the deceased. Article 188 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited with it only a portion of the one-
law in force at the time of the testator's death, provides that during the liquidation of the conjugal year rental income from the Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not deposit its succeeding rents after
partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful renewal of the lease. Neither did he render an accounting of such funds.
employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate. The law is rooted on the fact Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is merely
that the right and duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. As executor, he is a mere
majority. trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent's duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and
estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend it to the possess all his parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and
deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. It was error, therefore, for the appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his
appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which
testator pending settlement of his estate. are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.
7.

Held Union Bank Vs Santibanez

2. No. Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the bequeathed [ Claims Against the Estate]
properties to private respondents six months after the date of first publication of notice to creditors. An Facts:On May 31, 1980, FCCC and Efraim M. Santibaez entered into a loan agreemenn the
amount ofP128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit
Ford Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the embraced in the will.In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibaez, left a holographic will which
FCCC.On December 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement.It was intended contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:
to pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford Tractor and 1 unit Howard Rotamotor .
Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said amount in favor of the (e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise, shall
FCCC. Aside from such promissory note, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and
loan.Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Subsequently in March 1981, Florence, my children.
testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City.On April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision
heirs, was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the decedent. During the pendency of embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he was
the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibaez Ariola, executed making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject
a Joint Agreement dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint
possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid,
Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of
respectively taken by them. their late fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the
between FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the
others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank. probate courts approval is tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow. Every
Demand letters for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a
Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a Complainfor sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, transaction. Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial
Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil Case No. 18909. partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of
Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was in its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to
the United States and there was no information on his address or the date of his return to the determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent. In the instant case, there is no showing that the
Philippines. Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola. signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it was executed, the
probate of the will was still pending before the court and the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of
On December 7, 1988, Ariola filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves
her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors who
brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable may have a valid claim against the estate of the deceased.
to the petitioner under the joint agreement.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the
decedent is binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as
parties thereto have agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use the above-
Issue: a) whether or not the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; described chattel and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as
b) whether or not the heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp. The assumption of liability was
conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take possession and use of their
c) whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the deceased. respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the partition, and that
they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. The
partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows
Held: At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory
or list of properties to be administered. The said court is primarily concerned with the administration, The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a
liquidation and distribution of the estate. creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will
has been probated: Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred; exceptions. All claims for
money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for
probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by forever, except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or
will may be rendered nugatory. The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences an
upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set
law prescribes for the validity of a will. forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the
court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action; and if final
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties
judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto rendered by the Court of Appeals. In
balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before the court in the validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and
administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value. Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting
The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate in the probate court is mandatory. Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992. For
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseos estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the
8.
conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Pias City. The petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals.
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON vs MA. LOURDES BELEN G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013, PEREZ, J.

ISSUES:
FACTS:

1. Whether or not the court of appeals gravely erred in affirming that Eliseo Quiazon was a
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed
resident of Las Pias and therefore, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed
by herein respondents who are Eliseos common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by
with the RTC of Las Pias
herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by
her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
2. Whether or not the CA overlooked the fact that Elise Quiazon has not shown any interest in
the petition for letters of administration.
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.

HELD:
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes
Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las
Pias City. In her Petition, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and 1. NO.
born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal
capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseos marriage to Amelia by Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a
claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latters marriage decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:
with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, attached to the Petition for
Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at
it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
worth P2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in
Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late fathers estate. which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration. The petitioners asserted that as other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
shown by his Death Certificate, Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City, at the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
settlement of decedents estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Pias City. In (Emphasis supplied).
addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal
bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseos estate. The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Pias City, thereby application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseos last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses word
hearsay. "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. In other
words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one
and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing (b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the
more than a persons actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and creditors, of the decedent;
consistency.
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
The Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the
settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Pias City. It is evident from the records that (d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For
this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city. But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.

2. NO An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is such that they are entitled to
issuance of letters of administration, thus: share in the estate as distributees.

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseos estate, is deemed
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her
administration shall be granted: filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedents
estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; of the estate are satisfied. Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his natural
children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, DOCTRINES:
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of
request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses word
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve; "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an
person as the court may select. heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the
phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is such that they are entitled to
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be share in the estate as distributees.
filed by an interested person, thus:

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration must be
filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

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