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The Changing Role of Dialogue in the International Relations of Southeast Asia
Author(s): KIM HYUNG JONG and LEE POH PING

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 51, No. 5 (September/October 2011), pp. 953-970
Published by: University of California Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2011.51.5.953
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KIM HYUNG JONG AND LEE POH PING
The Changing Role of Dialogue in the International

Relations of Southeast Asia
ABSTRACT
ASEANs dialogue mechanism has been evolving from consensus-seeking to strategic

means, to use the Habermas distinction. This consensus norm was maintained during
the Cold War because of rapport among ASEAN leaders and the presence of an
external threat. However, ASEAN expansion to 10 countries, the emergence of non-
traditional threats to security, and democratization have weakened this norm.
K E Y W O R D S : ASEAN, consensus, dialogue, norm, strategic
IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS of Southeast Asia, the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has long occupied center stage, drawing
both praise and criticism. On the one hand, it has been praised for its ability
to resolve many issues without resort to military force, and to develop a
common identity. On the other hand, it has been criticized for ineffective-
ness in dealing with many important problems such as the Asian financial
crisis of and non-traditional threats to security. Whatever the praise
and criticism, it is likely that ASEAN will continue to play a significant role
in the international relations of Southeast Asia.
KIM HYUNG JONG, a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Malaya, is a lecturer in the Department
of Southeast Asian Studies, University of Malaya. He is the author or co-author of several schol-
arly articles and the author of a book, Regional Integration in Southeast Asia (). His research
interests are on ASEAN and East Asian regionalism. LEE POH PING is Senior Research Fellow
in the Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya. He is the author or co-author of over
scholarly articles and monographs, and author or co-editor of four books, including Chinese
Society in Nineteenth Century Singapore () and The Emerging East Asian Community
(). His research focuses on the influence of China and Japan on Malaysia, and the East
Asian community. This paper was originally presented at the Millennium Conference on Octo-
ber , , in London. It has been revised for this journal. Emails: <khjsea@gmail.com>,
<pohpinglee@yahoo.com>.
Asian Survey, Vol. , Number , pp. . ISSN -, electronic ISSN -X. by

the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission
to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Presss Rights and
Permissions website, http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: AS.....
953
954 A S I A N S U R V E Y 5 1 : 5
The reason for its significance lies in its dialogue mechanism. And such
is the importance of this dialogue mechanism to ASEAN that, while dia-
logue is normally seen as a modus operandi, a way of doing things or a pro-
cess, it has become in the ASEAN case a constitutive norm, one that is a
function of the unique identities of, and relations among, the ASEAN
countries.
This article considers the role and nature of dialogue in the interna-
tional relations of Southeast Asia by focusing on ASEAN. The paper
argues that as a result of certain developments ASEAN dialogue has
evolved from a constitutive norm to a strategic means. In other words,
the ASEAN dialogue is increasingly shifting from an approach where con-
sensus is assumed, to one where decision by consensus is getting less
effective and more rational. The developments driving this shift are the
expansion of ASEAN from six nations to , the process of democratization,
and the emergence of non-traditional threats to security. These developments
have led to increasing asymmetry within ASEAN in terms of identity, in-
terests, and motives, an asymmetry that makes for difficulty in achieving
consensus.
This paper is divided into three parts. The first involves a discussion of
Habermass concepts of dialogue as a strategic means and as a communica-
tive process. This is followed by an attempt to identify the norms of
ASEAN. The second part gives some background to dialogue in Southeast
Asia. It goes on to show how dialogue as a constitutive norm developed
in ASEAN. The third section focuses on the changing dialogue in ASEAN.
It shows how, because of the developments mentioned, the consensus
mechanism is breaking down. This is seen in the increased diversity of
ASEAN and ASEAN actions over the Southeast Asia haze problem,1 the
Myanmar problem, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) pan-
demic, and terrorism. Also considered are the modifications to the consen-
sus mechanism attempted by ASEAN: an ASEAN(N)-X approach;2 the
creation of the ASEAN Charter; and if all else fails, referral to an outside
body like the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
. The haze is an environmental hazard caused by the burning of logged forests and plantation
crops in Indonesia. Smoke arising from such burning spreads to neighboring (ASEAN) countries.
. The states (N) can proceed without the approval of those who disagree (X). This formula
had been adopted in the ASEAN Charter.
K I M A N D L E E / S H I F T I N G A S E A N D I A L O G U E 955
ON DISCUSSION
Habermas, Strategic Means, and the Communicative Process
Jrgen Habermas, the German philosopher, has made a distinction between

dialogue as a strategic means and dialogue as a communicative process.3 The
former consists of a process whereby one seeks to influence the behavior of
another by means of the threat of sanctions or the prospect of gratifica-
tion.4 It suggests that the definition of national interest is not that flexible
in the dialogue process,5 and that such dialogue involves a rational process,
not dissimilar to arguing and bargaining6 to arrive at a decision. By con-
trast, the latter, through the communicative use of language, aims to reach
mutual understanding and consensus among the parties in the dialogue.7
This connotes that a cooperative process and agreement reached may not
be rationally motivated. For Habermas, communicative action is aimed at
obtaining consent for a decision, not at a decision brought about by strate-
gic compromise.8
This paper on ASEAN dialogue is based on this Habermas distinction, but
one thing has to be mentioned: consensus in ASEAN is assumed, although as
stated earlier, consensus is something to be achieved through communicative
action. This assumed consensus in the ASEAN case is necessitated by the
fear that uncontrolled dialogue can lead to intervention in the domestic
affairs of member states, something that the ASEAN states devoutly wish
to avoid. Assumed consensus, therefore, seeks to attain the goal of avoiding
. Jrgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (London: Heinneman,
); and idem, Theory of Communicative Action, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge: Polity Press,
). Cited in K. M. Fierke, Dialogues of Manoeuvre and Entanglement: Nato, Russia, and the
Ceecs, Millennium: Journal of International Studies : (), p. .
. Roy Hornsby, It is Nigh Impossible to Think of the Ethical or Moral Consciousness Out-
side of the Sphere of Language (I.E., Communication): A Discussion in Relation to the Work of
Jrgen Habermas, <http://www.royby.com/philosophy/pages/ethics.html>, accessed September
, .
. Thomas Risse, Let's Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics, International Orga-
nization : (), p. .
. Harald Mller, Arguing, Bargaining, and All That: Communicative Action, Rationalist
Theory, and the Logic of Appropriateness in International Relations, European Journal of Interna-
tional Relations : ().
. Fierke, Dialogues of Manoeuvre and Entanglement, p. .
. Jrgen Habermas, Remarks on the Theory of Communicative Action, in Social Action, eds.
Gottfried Seebass and Raimo Toumela (Amsterdam: D. Reidel, ), p. . Cited in James Johnson,
Habermas on Strategic and Communicative Action, Political Theory : (), pp. .
956 A S I A N S U R V E Y 5 1 : 5
evils9 (i.e., such intervention) that are likely to be rejected by all parties. This
has made ASEAN dialogue unique: dialogue is not only a modus operandi
but has evolved into a constitutive norm.
ASEAN Norms
Norms are generally understood as standards of appropriate behavior for

actors with a given identity.10 They can be further divided into regulative
and constitutive norms.11 The former consist, in the main, of rules and
principles that order and constrain behavior, while the latter are a direct
reflection of the actors identity and self-understanding. Constitutive norms
create the possibility of engaging in conduct of a certain kind12conduct
here suggesting predisposition of the actors to seek consensusand, unlike
regulative norms, which have causal effects, they specify what counts as that
activity.13 Thus, dialogue as a constitutive norm is inherently inclusive, pur-
poseful, and prescriptive.
However, defining and measuring ASEAN norms is a challenging task,
given that ASEAN is not very institutionalized and is very informal. A nota-
ble attempt has been made by one scholar of ASEAN, Amitav Acharya,14
who crystallized the norms as follows: () non-interference in the internal
affairs of member states, () non-use of force in the settlement of disputes,
() the pursuit of regional autonomy, and () the practice of the ASEAN
Way.15 The first three are relatively uncontroversial, but the fourth, the
ASEAN Way, is the subject of much argument. Understandably so, as it
. Jrgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (Malden, Mass.: Polity, ), p. .

. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change, International Organization : ().
. Ibid., p. .
. Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision
Making in Law and in Life (New York: Oxford University Press, ), p. . Cited in John
Duffield, What Are International Institutions? International Studies Review : (), p. .
. John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the
Social Constructivist Challenge, International Organization : (), p. .
. See Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the
Problems of Regional Order (London: Routledge, ); idem, Do Norms And Identity Matter?
Community and Power in Southeast Asia's Regional Order, Pacific Review : (); idem,
How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian
Regionalism, International Organization : (); and idem, Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and
Power in Asian Regionalism (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies [ISEAS], ).
. Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, pp. .
refers more to a process than to an abstract principle, such as the first three,
and hence is subject to argument as to how it should be practiced.
BACKGROUND TO DIALOGUE AND ASEAN NORMS
Dialogue and Southeast Asia
The ASEAN emphasis on dialogue has its background in the history and
tradition of Southeast Asia. In much of the literature on the regions inter-
national relations, the term dialogue has been used interchangeably with
terms such as communication and consultation.16 Communication
has been much in evidence, particularly in politics. Thus, the traditional
Southeast Asian mandala system (where circles of kingdom existed without
clear territorial boundaries) puts a premium on the ability of the paramount
ruler to manage personal relations with the chiefs of the many peripheral
political centers. Because the paramount ruler cannot always resort to force,
he has much practice in consensus seeking.17
As to consultation and consensus, their practice assumes the existence
of commonality among participants, of a feeling of We as against the
Others. While it may be arguable whether Southeast Asians had the We
feeling before the Western impact (there probably was some in areas where
Malay was spoken), it is undoubted that close contacts with the colonial
powers during colonial rule resulted in this persistent distinction of We
against the Others. It needs to be pointed out that this distinction is not
only phenomenological but also epistemological. Southeast Asians accepted
this distinction that their erstwhile colonial masters had conceived, as evi-
denced by many Southeast Asian academic writings.
In addition to consensus, there is consultation. While there is no exact
equivalent of dialogue in the Malay language, the traditional Malay practice
of mushawarah (consultation) and mufakat (consensus) comes close. Indeed,
many have described the practice of the ASEAN Way as drawing its inspira-
tion from this traditional Malay practice. Mufakat is consensus that can be
. Shaun Narine, ASEAN and the ARF: The Limits of the ASEAN Way, Asian Survey
: ().
. Oliver William Wolters, Culture, History, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives, in
ASEAN Identity, Development and Culture, eds. R. P. Anand and Purificacion V. Quisumbing
(Manila: University of the Philippines Law Center, ), pp. .
958 A S I A N S U R V E Y 5 1 : 5
reached through a process of mushawarah. Mushawarah is practiced among

friends and neighbors but not with opponents.18 Although it is based on
groups with common kinship, neighborhood, and a sense of community,
mufakat in such groups cannot be taken for granted in deliberations. Arriving
at a consensus involves the adjustment of each others viewpoints. In the
process, the majority does not impose its view on the minority. Long and
intensive discussions are often necessary, in which personalities and leader-
ship play a key role.19 The process is dynamic rather than static. Disagree-
ments often exist but are not openly displayed. Mushawarah is practiced in
such a way that consensus is assumed.
The Development of Dialogue as a Constitutive Norm in ASEAN
The founders of ASEAN in made the decision not to make their orga-
nization too institutionalized. By keeping it as informal as possible, they put
the emphasis on arriving at decisions through consensus. As noted, they
were in a way inspired by mushawarah and mufakat. The decision to have
an assumed consensus that whatever decisions were made would not involve
interference in the internal affairs of a member state was essentially dictated
by the fact that the member states were not at that time what can be called
secure states.
First, the year was not too distant from the time most of these
states obtained their independence. Many were still in the process of nation
building, battling with domestic communist movements and striving to cre-
ate unity among the diverse populations in their midst. Added to this was
the fact that there were unsettled territorial problems among ASEAN states,
the most notable of which was the Filipino claim to Sabah. Moreover, the
confrontation between two of the founder states, Malaysia and Indonesia,
had just ended, and these two needed time to heal their wounds. Because
of these factors, the ASEAN states rejected the risk of having their political
energies distracted by having to cope with interference in their internal
. Mufakat and darah (kinship or blood ties) are fundamental principles of Malay social orga-
nization along with kesayangan (love for all close relations). See John Clammer, Values and Devel-
opment in Southeast Asia (Kelana Jaya, Malaysia: Pelanduk, ), p. .
. Pushpa Thambipillai and J. Saravanamuttu, ASEAN Negotiations: Two Insights (Singapore:
ISEAS, ), p. .
affairs by fellow member states, as could eventuate from too formal an

institution.
Although dialogue in ASEAN is an ongoing process, it became a consti-
tutive norm as the result of a set of conditions during the Cold War period,
as the practice of consensus developed. Despite the professed informality,
there was some indirect suggestion of outlining the need for consensus in
an official document, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in
.20 The TAC declared as its major principles mutual respect for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, non-interference in the
internal affairs of one another, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means,
and the renunciation of the use or threat of the use of force. These choices
imply that consensus had become a norm, because consensus through con-
sultation suggests mutual respect, and mutual respect means that any criti-
cism that evolves into interference would not be accepted. Agreements made
in this consensus process were based on the idea of a common denominator
that can coordinate the varying interests of ASEAN members. In practice,
adherence to the minimal common denominator means that major meet-
ings were normally held after matters had been agreed, thus ensuring easy
accord.21
In addition to the avoidance of sensitive issues, several other conditions
or events contributed to the development and maintenance of dialogue as
a constitutive norm in ASEAN. Crucial among these are the political lon-
gevity of many early ASEAN leaders; frequent contacts between the politi-
cal leaders and administrative officers in ASEAN; and the success in the
ASEAN practice of this norm on two important occasionsthe Bali Summit
in and the united stand against the Vietnamese invasion and occupa-
tion of Cambodia in . Although political leaders come and go, many of
the leaders of ASEAN in the s and s were characterized by their
political longevity for much of the latter half of the Cold War, and in some
cases beyond. These leaders were Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore (in power
. The foregoing provision of this Chapter shall not apply to a dispute unless all the parties to
the dispute agree to their application to that dispute. However, this shall not preclude the other
High Contracting Parties not party to the dispute from offering all possible assistance to settle
the said dispute. Parties to the dispute should be well disposed towards such offers of assistance.
See ASEAN, The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, February , ,
<http://www.asean.org/.htm>, accessed August , .
. Bilson Kurus, Agreeing to Disagree: The Political Reality of ASEAN Economic Coopera-
tion, Asian Affairs: An American Review : ().
960 A S I A N S U R V E Y 5 1 : 5
); Suharto of Indonesia (); Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia

(); Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines (); and Sultan
Hassaniah Bolkiah of Brunei (present). These were leaders of practically
all the original ASEAN states except for Thailand. By virtue of their long tenure
and their many meetings, they were able to overcome whatever differences of
opinion might have existed over ASEAN matters, and even to develop rapport,
as between Lee Kuan Yew and Suharto. The ASEAN feeling among these
leaders was reinforced by the administrative officers who developed close con-
tacts with each other. They met often on golf courses and in other pleasant
places, and often boasted that they could contact each other by simply picking
up the phone.
This is not to say that ASEAN was a grouping where differences were
always resolved in a quasi-family way. As a matter of fact, the above argu-
ments notwithstanding, the level of trust among the leaders and their states
was often not as great as one would expect in a family. Sometimes differ-
ences were resolved only because the consequences of not doing so could
render ASEAN irrelevant or break it up. An example of the former was
the response of ASEAN to the economic and strategic challenges of the first
half of the s. These challenges consisted of the economic recession in
, and the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in , which raised the spec-
ter of a strategic vacuum in Southeast Asia. There was anxiety then that
ASEAN might not be able to respond effectively to these challenges as a
collective group. However, the realization dawned on the leaders that they
had to hang together, or else they would hang separately. This realization
allowed them to demonstrate an impressive solidarity to face these chal-
lenges. That solidarity was manifested in the summit of ASEAN Heads of
State in Bali, Indonesia, in . From that point, people around the world
began to take ASEAN seriously as a collective group.
An example of the latter risk, breakup, can be seen in the ASEAN
response to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in . That invasion
and subsequent occupation had the potential to sunder ASEAN by gener-
ating a difference of opinion on which of the worlds then two communist
giants was the long-term threat to Southeast Asia. Indonesia and Malaysia
believed it was China; Thailand and Singapore argued it was Russia. If
the first position became dominant, ASEAN would have to go soft on
Vietnam because a strong Vietnam could act as a buffer against China
in Southeast Asia. If the latter, then the Vietnamese occupation had to
be opposed because Vietnam was then seen to be an agent of Russia. But

such was the desire of all the ASEAN states to remain intact as a group
that they came up with a common position opposing the Vietnamese
occupation. The reason given was that Thailand was the front-line state,
that is, it shared a long border with Cambodia and was hence most threat-
ened. Its position had to be respected. Despite the great strain on the
consensus approach both examples imposed, ASEAN managed to keep
that approach intact.
In the s the informal consensus approach took a slightly more formal
turn with the establishment of the ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), a network of think tanks found in indivi-
dual ASEAN states. The ASEAN-ISIS are not part of the government but
are nevertheless closely linked and trusted by their respective governments.
They perform two useful functions. First, they are a link between the gov-
ernment (often called the Track One group) and the more socially engaged
part of the population such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
often dubbed the Track Three group. The ASEAN-ISIS themselves are
known as Track Two.
Second, the ASEAN-ISIS use their dialogue channel to discuss sensitive
issues that could not be handled by the formal governmental process. Gov-
ernment officials from the various ASEAN states participate in the Track
Two dialogue in their personal capacity. They can get a sense of what is
politically possible in addition to receiving new ideas and results of academic
research. The efforts of the ASEAN-ISIS did bring about some success. Its
proposal for the formation of a forum to discuss security issues in Asia led
to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in .22 The ASEAN-ISIS also
played a very useful role in the issue of ASEAN expansion. For instance,
when Cambodia approached ASEAN for membership, there was no suitable
official channel to consider the request. In response, the Cambodian leader,
Prince Norodom Sihanouk, established the countrys own think tank, the
Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP), to participate in
the ASEAN-ISIS. Thus, Cambodia could present its case in a dialogue that
would be heard in official circles.23
. Julius Caesar Parreas, ASEAN and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Pacific Review
: ().
. Interview with H. R. H. Prince Norodom Sirivudh, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, April , .
962 A S I A N S U R V E Y 5 1 : 5
It has to be said that although the ASEAN-ISIS are reasonably successful

in handling sensitive issues, their record with NGOs is more mixed: often
they tend to choose NGOs that are not too radical to hold dialogue with
governments.
THE CHANGING DIALOGUE WITHIN ASEAN
If ASEAN achieved reasonable success with its consensus approach, that

success largely derived from two things: First, it was a relatively small, gener-
ally cohesive grouping before its expansion to members in . Second,
the Cold War engendered regional solidarity against the threat of communism.
Even then, suggestions were bruited on the need for modification to suit the
circumstances.24 The Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free
Zone in hinted that there should be some modification of the consensus
approach. For example, Article on the Establishment of the Commission
for the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and Article on the Execu-
tive Committee both allowed for a decision by a two-thirds majority of the
members present if consensus failed. The treaty also allows for referral of
unresolved issues to the ICJ.
But recent developments have made it difficult for ASEAN to continue
maintaining dialogue as a constitutive norm. Increasingly, ASEAN is looking
to dialogue as a strategic means. The reasons are the divergence of identity
brought about by the expansion of membership, the emergence of non-
traditional security issues, and democratization in certain ASEAN countries.
ASEAN Expansion and Generational Change
The ASEAN expansion to member countries symbolized the organiza-

tion as being truly representative of Southeast Asia.25 This was something
ASEAN had always aspired to. Indeed, when it began as an organization
of five states in , it declared its membership open to countries of
Southeast Asia. But, as Acharya correctly points out, this expansion has
. Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, Regional Organization and Stability in the ASEAN Region, in

Durable Stability in Southeast Asia, eds. Kusuma Snitwongse and Sukhumbhand Paribatra (Singapore:
ISEAS, ), p. .
. Amitav Acharya, The Quest for Identity: International Relations of Southeat Asia (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, ).
made ASEAN much more diverse in terms of politics, economics, and culture.
Political systems, for example, range from the single-party systems of Laos
and Vietnam to the constitutional monarchies of Thailand and Malaysia.
The economic gap is indeed great, with Singapore, the richest country in terms
of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (measured in purchasing power
parity terms), being about times wealthier than Cambodia, the poorest. In
the case of religion, the new members differ from the old members. Buddhism
is widely practiced in Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, while Islam
is a religion of the majority of the population of Indonesia and Malaysia. To
add to this diversity, the Philippines is mainly Christian.
All these factors make it hard to socialize new members into the practice
of consensus of the older members of ASEAN. Indeed, the new members,
before their admission, were used to dealing strategically with ASEAN; this
can be seen in the Cambodian crisis of the late s, when Indonesia held
an informal dialogue with Vietnam aimed at resolving the crisis because
Jakarta had strategic concerns over the Chinese role in Southeast Asia.26
Such an attitude among the newer members still persisted, as a Vietnamese
academic interviewed by one of the authors suggested that the new mem-
bers saw their entry into ASEAN as a strategic means to overcome isolation
from the world, not so much to participate in a grouping of We against the
Others.27
Further working against the consensual approach is the fact that many of
the officials of the older member states, because they are of a new genera-
tion, lack the closeness of the previous generation. Compounding this is
the fact that many of the new generation of officials were educated in the
West and often prefer the Western style of negotiation rather than the
ASEAN Way.
The Ineffectiveness of the Consensus Approach
Examples of the ineffectiveness of the consensus approach can be found in

the ASEAN response to the issues of the regional haze threat, Myanmar, the
SARS pandemic, and international terrorism. ASEAN action, or lack of
. Juwono Sudarsono, The Limits of Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia, in The nd

ASEAN Reader, eds. Sharon Siddique and Sree Kumar (Singapore: ISEAS, ), p. .
. Interview with Prof. Dr. Pham Quang Minh by Kim Hyung Jong, Hanoi, December ,
.
964 A S I A N S U R V E Y 5 1 : 5
action, over the haze is an example of both the breakdown of the consensus
process and the influence of the democratization process. The haze, spread-
ing smoke from Indonesia to neighboring countries, has become a perennial
problem. The affected ASEAN countries, in particular Malaysia and Singapore,
consider this a threat to their tourism industries and to the health of their
populations.
Needing to tackle this, ASEAN in set up a Regional Haze Action
Plan with the aim of establishing operational procedures for monitoring
land and forest fires. Yet, the plan revealed the failure of consensus: the
clearly conflicting interests of the parties could not be reconciled. Instead,
Indonesia, from where the haze originated, was pressured by the other coun-
tries in a non-ASEAN Way to do something about the hazard. Singapore
unilaterally tried to bring the matter to public attention by providing satel-
lite images of the fires in Indonesia via the Internet.28 Indonesian resistance
to ASEAN pressure became clearer in when ASEAN signed the
ASEAN Trans-boundary Haze Agreement, reaffirming among member
countries a determination to fight the haze. Being a legal document, it
required ratification by all members, but the Indonesian Parliament refused.
Instead, the Indonesians tried to use the issue as a bargaining chip. They
argued that the affected neighboring countries were not blameless because
some of their companies participated in the illegal logging in Indonesia.
Moreover, the affected countries benefitted from the illegal logging because
they were the import market for its products.29 Therefore, the Indonesians
argued, these countries should do something to discourage such imports.30
This is an example of the democratization process affecting the consen-
sus process. The present ASEAN political leaders, unlike the previous
generation, cannot make decisions among themselves without being sub-
jected to democratic pressures, whether these pressures emanate from
NGOs or the public. In the Indonesian case, the pressure came in the
form of the Parliament, which said No despite public apologies by
. Alan Collins, Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional, and Global Issues (Singapore:
ISEAS, ), pp. .
. Ahmad Pathoni, Indonesia Lawmakers Set to Reject ASEAN Haze Pact, Jakarta Post,
March , .
. Simon S. C. Tay, Blowing Smoke: Regional Cooperation, Indonesian Democracy, and the
Haze, in Hard Choices: Security, Democracy, and Regionalism in Southeast Asia, ed. Donald K.
Emmerson (Singapore: ISEAS, ), p. .
President Suharto in and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in

over the haze.
A similar case of the breakdown of consensus, and the democratization
process working against ASEAN norms (in this case the cherished non-
interference) is Myanmar (Burma). Myanmar has a particularly bad record
of human rights violations that have spurred strident criticisms from Western
countries. Increasingly, many ASEAN countries have become critical as well,
even if such violations do not technically directly affect them. This contrasts
with the response over the haze and, as discussed below, SARS and terrorism.
But there has been no unity in the ASEAN response. Consider two examples,
the response to the Cyclone Nargis tragedy of and the suppression
of dissent by the Myanmar government.
Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar on May , , subsequently killing
, people and leaving , missing. While the Myanmar govern-
ment denied access to foreign aid agencies (only allowing emergency relief
by an ASEAN-U.N.-Myanmar Tripartite Core Group that was criticized
for a very slow response), the countrys officials still expected ASEAN by
itself to respond more effectively. This was especially so because ASEAN
had agreed on mechanisms for the management of natural disasters, one
of which was the ASEAN Humanitarian Assistance Center (ASCPA) set
up in . In , ASEAN had signed the Agreement on Disaster Man-
agement and Disaster Response. But then there were demonstrations in
by the Burmese people against their repressive government; these were
brutally put down.
Both events greatly diminished the standing of Myanmar in ASEAN
eyes. Loud voices were raised, particularly from Indonesia, the Philippines,
and Thailand, calling for the suspension of Myanmar membership in
ASEAN. But again there was no agreement as the divergent interests of
the members were manifested. The Thai government, despite pressures
from human rights groups, was reluctant to agree to this suspension for
its immediate neighbor. Thailand and Myanmar face bilateral issues such
as territorial disputes, illegal immigration, human and drug trafficking, in
addition to a long history of antagonism. Nonetheless, the Thais felt sus-
pension of Myanmar would not serve Thai interests.
Two other possible approaches faltered. The first was the idea of an
ASEAN troika, a group of three comprising ASEAN foreign ministers, who
are the past, present, and future chairs of the ASEAN Standing Committee,
966 A S I A N S U R V E Y 5 1 : 5
to resolve such issues. Nor did the notion of multilateral diplomatic dia-
logue similar to the Six-Party Talks on North Korea31 make much headway.
ASEAN members were still reluctant to interfere in Myanmars internal
affairs, a stance that also reflected the Myanmar regimes objections. Instead
of a joint ASEAN response, Indonesian President Yudhoyono proposed a so-
called Jakarta Initiative on Myanmar, creating a group comprising China,
India, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam to seek a solution through dialogue
as well as sending a special envoy to Myanmar.32 Again, this did not amount
to much.
Addressing pandemic diseases like SARS and the HN influenza that hit
the ASEAN region in the first decade of the st century requires urgent
policy coordination and the exchange of information among members.
Given the acute and contagious nature of such epidemics, what is needed
for countermeasures from ASEAN are decisions based on technical and
scientific discussions. Many ASEAN states realized this would not succeed
under the traditional mechanism of consultation and consensus. Instead,
affected member states resorted to unilateral forced quarantines, the culling
of animal stocks, and even curbs on entry to their counties by certain
nationalities. Despite such unilateral measures, the ASEAN states came to
realize that regional collaboration, even with countries outside ASEAN,
and long-term preventive measures were essential to tackle the diseases.
To coordinate measures for controlling SARS, the health ministers of
ASEAN joined with their counterparts from the Northeast Asian countries
to hold a special meeting in Kuala Lumpur in April . The same month
ASEAN leaders met with Chinese officials, who pledged to provide RMB
million (US$. million) to a special fund to fight SARS.33 The handling
of such diseases is likely to push ASEAN toward more institutionalization,34
thereby impairing decision making by consensus.
. Jrgen Haacke, ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a Regional Initiative?
Contemporary Southeast Asia : (), p. .
. Ibid., p. .
. ASEAN, Joint Statement of the Special ASEAN-China Leaders Meeting on the Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), April , , <http://www.aseansec.org/.htm>,
accessed July , .
. Mely Caballero-Anthony, Non-traditional Security in Asia: The Many Faces of Securitisation,
in Andrew F. Cooper, Christopher W. Hughes, and Philippe De Lombaerde, eds., Regionalisation and
Global Governance: The Taming of Globalisation? Routledge/Warwick Studies in Globalisation (London:
Routledge, ), pp. ; Mely Caballero-Anthony, Non-traditional Security and Infectious Diseases
Terrorism had affected some countries in ASEAN even before September ,

. Malaysia, for example, had accused some of its citizens, many of whom
were connected to the opposition party PAS (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, Pan-
Malaysian Islamic Party), of having links with region-wide terrorist groups such
as Jemaah Islamiah (Islamic Congregation). But ever since a series of terror
attacks in Indonesia in and , Indonesia and Malaysia, although
predominantly Muslim countries, have perceived the religious motivation of
the terrorists differently. Each blames the other. Malaysia criticized Indonesia
for its permissive attitude toward Islamic militants, while Indonesia accused
Malaysia of harboring terrorists.35
What collective response by ASEAN there was to terrorism has been limited
to a declaration, the Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism.36 But
it was not coherent and lacked practical counter-terrorist measures. Instead,
many counter-terrorist measures have been taken in close cooperation with
non-ASEAN countries, in particular the U.S. In , ASEAN and the U.S.
signed a counter-terrorism agreement to strengthen intelligence sharing and
improve border patrols, while calling upon signatories to freeze the assets of
terrorist groups.37 This put the ASEAN countries in a dilemma. On the one
hand, effective measures against terrorism required cooperation with an outside
power such as the U.S. On the other hand, this goes against the core ASEAN
principle of regional resilience, which is that ASEAN should resolve its
problems without outside interference. As outside involvement may be needed,
ASEAN, in order to offset potential U.S. dominance in the region, proposed
other partners, in particular, China. China for its part proposed regular East
Asian ministerial meetings to discuss efforts at international crime control
and counter-terrorism measures. It suggested a counter-terrorism pact between
ASEAN Plus Three and the U.S.38 All these developments suggest that
in ASEAN: Going Beyond the Rhetoric of Securitization to Deeper Institutionalization, Pacific Review
: ().
. Malaysiakini, August , , <http://www.malaysiakini.com>.
. See ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, November , ,
<http://www.aseansec.org/.htm>, accessed July , .
. It is called, the ASEAN-United States of America Joint Declaration for Cooperation to
Combat International Terrorism, August , , <http://www.aseansec.org/.htm>, accessed
July , .
. Amitav Acharya, Southeast Asian Security after September , Asia Pacific Foundation
Canada, Foreign Policy Dialogue Series (), pp. .
968 A S I A N S U R V E Y 5 1 : 5
ASEAN demonstrated greater political will in effecting external agreements

than in internal consensus making.
Modifications of the Consensus Process
As suggested earlier, there had been a hint of possible modification in the

consensus process even as early as the s, when a two-thirds majority
in decision making was suggested in the pact on the nuclear-free zone. As
it became clear that this consensus process was increasingly difficult to
maintain, the approach was dropped in some cases. One was over the matter
of sovereignty. ASEAN countries valued the consensus process because it
did not allow interference in their internal affairs, including over unsettled
borders. And because there were few formal agreements on the demarcation
of boundaries, informal discussions rather than strict implementation of law
characterized ASEAN attempts to resolve border problems.
But the informal process is no longer working, as we can see from
recent examples: the Indonesian-Malaysian dispute over the Sipadan and
Ligitan Islands and the Malaysian-Singaporean competing territorial
claims over the island, sometimes called Pedra Branca or Pulau Batu
Puteh, where the Horsburgh Lighthouse is situated. At the ICJ, Malaysia
won the former dispute with Indonesia and lost the latter one to Singapore.
Also, bringing a recent series of disputes over territorial problems to an inde-
pendent adjudicator acceptable to both sides is inconsistent with ASEAN
tradition. Still, with growing nationalism among its members, it is likely
that more territorial disputes will be settled outside the informal ASEAN
process.
A second modification lies in the ASEAN(N)-X approach. ASEAN eco-
nomic cooperation has for long advanced at a slow pace because of the great
gap in wealth among the ASEAN nations and the competing industrial
structures of the organization. It is often hard to get agreements. Even when
there is ASEAN-wide agreement such as an ASEAN Free Trade Agreement
(AFTA) or ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), such accords are very
general, and their implementation can be stymied on the national level.
Such a general approach, coupled with resistance on a national level, was
tolerated in an era with little economic globalization. But with globaliza-
tions rise, many ASEAN countries realized that economic cooperation can-
not be forever based on the consensus principle. Hence, ASEAN leaders
decided that on matters pertaining to economics, ASEAN can proceed

without consensus by adopting the formula of ASEAN(N)-X.
The third modification of the ASEAN practice of consensus seeking is
the ASEAN Charter finally adopted in Singapore by the ASEAN heads of
state. But there was resistance to this modification, especially when human
rights were involved, because some of the more democratic members such as
the Philippines and Indonesia wanted a clear mechanism for enforcement,
whereas Myanmar understandably objected. Myanmar succeeded in its
objection by invoking the ASEAN tradition of consensus.39 This has been
the standard argument of ASEAN nation-states that expect a negative deci-
sion. And this fed into the fears of the biggest ASEAN country, Indonesia,
that a non-consensual approach such as majority voting could leave it out-
voted by the rest.40 In the end, countries such as Indonesia and Myanmar
were satisfied that the ASEAN Charter would not allow for the dropping of
consensus seeking when their vital interests were involved.
Quite apart from the fact that ASEAN needed a legal basis for its existence,
thus signifying a departure from its cherished informality, the ASEAN Char-
ter that was finally adopted left open the possibility that decisions could be
made on a non-consensual basis. This is because it gave the ASEAN Summit
the power of being the final decision maker, without any specific instructions
that its decisions should be based on consensus. The charter states that in the
event of a serious breach of the charter or non compliance, the matter shall
be referred to the ASEAN Summit for decision. This led Abdullah Ahmad
Badawi, the prime minister of Malaysia when the charter was adopted, to hint
at the possibility of a departure from consensus. The charter, he said, does
not provide for specific sanctions for charter breaches or non-compliance.
But this does not mean there will be none.41
CONCLUSION
Although the process of consensus making in ASEAN may have drawn

its inspiration from the Malay traditions of mufakat and mushawarah, its
. Aung Bwa, The Jewel in My Crown, in The Making of the ASEAN Charter, eds. Tommy
Koh, Rosario G. Manalo, and Walter Woon (Hackensack, N. J.: World Scientific, ), p. .
. Dian Triansyah Djani, A Long Journey, in ibid., p. .
. Keynote speech by Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, then prime minister of Malaysia, at the nd
Asia Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, .
970 A S I A N S U R V E Y 5 1 : 5
successful practice was spawned by a certain set of conditions during the

Cold War period. The first and foremost was the deep desire of the
original founders that ASEAN should not interfere in the internal affairs
of member states, as a consequence of which the organization was kept as
loose as possible, all the more to make the consensus process easier. Also,
the political longevity of early ASEAN leaders enabled a certain rapport to
develop among some of them. This facilitated the consensus process. Third,
the fact that ASEAN was able to maintain its unity in the face of two great
challenges reinforced the belief that the consensus process can work. The
first was the American withdrawal from Vietnam, which raised the specter
of a strategic vacuum that could threaten the security of ASEAN nations.
The second was the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, which caused a split
in strategic perceptions of the long-term threat to Southeast Asia, whether it
be Russia or China. Indeed, such is the adherence to consensus making in
ASEAN dialogue that it has become an ASEAN norm, a constitutive norm:
consensus is not only a process in decision making but it is assumed that the
process must come to a consensus.
But as the set of conditions increasingly disappears, strains in the consensus
become more evident. This is seen when the ASEAN dialogue tends more
toward the use of what Habermas calls a strategic means to achieve a decision.
It is in essence a process that is non-consensual and more rational. This shift
has been brought about by new circumstances: ASEANs expansion to
countries, the emergence of non-traditional threats to security, and democra-
tization. The first diluted ASEAN unity. The second, because the threats are
not confined to one country but directly affect other members, weakens the
argument against non-interference. The third proclaims the ethicality of such
intervention, especially when human rights violations are involved. It is clear
that unless ASEAN can make progress toward greater unity, its dialogue
mechanism will increasingly move away from consensus making toward stra-
tegic calculation.

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The Changing Role of Dialogue in the International Relations of Southeast Asia

Author(s): KIM HYUNG JONG and LEE POH PING

The Changing Role of Dialogue in the International

ASEANs dialogue mechanism has been evolving from consensus-seeking to strategic

K E Y W O R D S : ASEAN, consensus, dialogue, norm, strategic

IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS of Southeast Asia, the Association of

Asian Survey, Vol. , Number , pp. . ISSN -, electronic ISSN -X. by

Habermas, Strategic Means, and the Communicative Process

Jrgen Habermas, the German philosopher, has made a distinction between

Norms are generally understood as standards of appropriate behavior for

. Jrgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (Malden, Mass.: Polity, ), p. .

BACKGROUND TO DIALOGUE AND ASEAN NORMS

Dialogue and Southeast Asia

reached through a process of mushawarah. Mushawarah is practiced among

The Development of Dialogue as a Constitutive Norm in ASEAN

affairs by fellow member states, as could eventuate from too formal an

); Suharto of Indonesia (); Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia

be opposed because Vietnam was then seen to be an agent of Russia. But

It has to be said that although the ASEAN-ISIS are reasonably successful

THE CHANGING DIALOGUE WITHIN ASEAN

If ASEAN achieved reasonable success with its consensus approach, that

ASEAN Expansion and Generational Change

The ASEAN expansion to member countries symbolized the organiza-

. Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, Regional Organization and Stability in the ASEAN Region, in

The Ineffectiveness of the Consensus Approach

Examples of the ineffectiveness of the consensus approach can be found in

. Juwono Sudarsono, The Limits of Conflict Resolution in Southeast Asia, in The nd

President Suharto in and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in

Terrorism had affected some countries in ASEAN even before September ,

ASEAN demonstrated greater political will in effecting external agreements

Modifications of the Consensus Process

As suggested earlier, there had been a hint of possible modification in the

decided that on matters pertaining to economics, ASEAN can proceed

Although the process of consensus making in ASEAN may have drawn

successful practice was spawned by a certain set of conditions during the

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