Legal Ethics 16 Cases Full Text G Corton

G.
CORTON LEGAL ETHICS
CASE 1
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 138884 June 6, 2002
RODOLFO DE LEON, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ESTELITA and AVELINO
BATUNGBACAL, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. It seeks to annul and set aside the resolution1 dated January 13, 1999 of the
Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 57989, denying petitioners motion (a) to dismiss
the appeals of private respondents, and (b) to suspend the period to file appellees brief.
Also assailed is the CA resolution2 dated April 19, 1999, denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On March 11, 1996, petitioner Rodolfo de Leon filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Bataan, Branch 3, a complaint3for a sum of money plus damages, with a prayer for
preliminary attachment, against herein private respondents Avelino and Estelita
Batungbacal. The complaint averred that private respondent Estelita Batungbacal
executed a promissory note4 in favor of herein petitioner for her P500,000 loan with
stipulated interest at 5 percent monthly. The loan and interest remained unpaid allegedly
because the check issued by Estelita was dishonored. Private respondents filed an
answer with counterclaim. Estelita admitted the loan obligation, but Avelino denied liability
on the ground that his wife was not the designated administrator and therefore had no
authority to bind the conjugal partnership. Avelino further averred that his wife contracted
the debt without his knowledge and consent.
Based on Estelitas admission, petitioner filed a motion for partial judgment against
Estelita, which the trial court granted in an order5 dated May 14, 1996:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings is hereby granted
in accordance with Sec. 4 of Rule 36, Rules of Court. As prayed for, judgment is
hereby rendered against Estelita Q. Batungbacal, ordering her to pay plaintiff
Rodolfo de Leon the principal amount of the loan obligation of P500,000.00 plus
the stipulated interest which has accrued thereon at 5% per month since May 1995
Page 1 of 151
G. CORTON LEGAL ETHICS
until now, plus interest at the legal rate on said accrued interest from date of judicial
demand until the obligation is fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Counsel for private respondent spouses received a copy of the partial judgment on May
21, 1996, but no appeal was taken therefrom. Thus, petitioner filed a motion for execution
of said judgment on June 6, 1996. Counsel for private respondents was furnished a copy
of the motion on the same date. As private respondents interposed no objection, a writ of
execution was correspondingly issued. The sheriff then proceeded to execute the writ
and partially satisfied the judgment award against the paraphernal property of Estelita
and the conjugal properties of the private respondents with due notice to the latter and
their counsel. Again, private respondents interposed no objection.
Pre-trial was held and trial proceeded on two main issues: (1) whether the loan was
secured with the knowledge and consent of the husband and whether the same
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership; and (2) whether the capital of the
husband would be liable if the conjugal assets or the paraphernal property of the wife
were insufficient to satisfy the loan obligation. On June 2, 1997, the trial court rendered
judgment6 ordering private respondent Avelino Batungbacal to pay the amount of the loan
plus interest and other amounts in accordance with Article 121 of the Family Code.
Counsel for private respondent spouses received a copy of the decision on June 6, 1997.
Avelino through counsel, filed a notice of appeal7 on June 19, 1997. In a notice of
appearance8 dated June 25, 1997 bearing the conformity solely of Estelita, a new counsel
appeared in collaboration with the counsel of record for the private respondents. On the
same date, Estelita through said new counsel, served a notice that she is appealing both
decisions promulgated on May 14, 1996, and June 2, 1997, to the Court of Appeals.
However, the trial court, in an order9 dated July 7, 1997 denied the notice of appeal10 filed
by Estelita on the ground that said notice was filed beyond the reglementary period to
appeal.
Private respondents appeal was docketed with the respondent Court of Appeals as CA-
G.R. CV No. 57989. Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion to Dismiss
the Appeal with Motion to Suspend period to file Appellees Brief11 on October 21, 1998.
Petitioner based his motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) that the statement of
the case as well as the statement of the facts in the appellants brief do not have page
references to the record, and that the authorities relied upon in the arguments are not
cited by the page of the report at which the case begins and the page of the report on
which the citation is found; (2) that no copy of the appealed decision of the lower court
was attached to the appellants brief, in violation of the Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals; (3) that private respondents furnished only one copy of the appellants brief to
the petitioner, also in violation of the Rules of Court; (4) that the decision promulgated
against Estelita on May 14, 1996 is no longer appealable; and (5) that the notice of appeal
filed on June 25, 1996 by Estelita concerning the decision of the trial court against Avelino
was filed beyond the reglementary period to appeal.12 The motion also prayed that the
Page 2 of 151
period for filing the appellees brief be suspended in view of the pendency of the motion
to dismiss.13
Private respondents, in their opposition,14 insisted that the statements of the case as well
as the statement of facts in their brief contained page references to the record, and that
Estelita had seasonably filed her appeal. Private respondent spouses also stated that
they had filed an Amended Appellants Brief15 on November 27, 1998 and that two copies
thereof had been served on petitioner together with copies of the trial courts decisions.
On January 13, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution16 denying
petitioners motion to dismiss and virtually admitting the Amended Appellants Brief as
follows:
As submitted by appellants, they adopted pertinent portions of the appealed

Decision in the Statement of the Case, indicated specific pages in the appealed
decision where the quoted portions are found. In the bottom of page 2 of the brief,
is the quoted portions of the decision, referring to pages 1 and 2 thereof. On page
3 of the brief is the dispositive portion, taken on page 11 of the decision. The rest
of the narration in the Statement of the Case are the specific dates of the pleadings,
orders, and portions of the decision citing the page references where they are
found.
Two (2) copies of the Amended Brief were served upon appellee with the appealed
Decision attached as Annex "A", and "B".
Appellant Estellita Batungbacal explained that her appeal was filed on time. She
cited Guevarra, et. al. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., L-49017 and 49024, that a
partial judgment may be appealed only together with the judgment in the main
case. She personally received a copy of the main Decision, dated June 2, 1997 on
June 10, 1997, and filed her notice of appeal dated June 25, 1995 (sic) sent by
registered mail on even date, per Registry Receipt No. 2618, attached as Annex
"C" hereof, thereby showing that the notice of appeal was filed within 15 days from
receipt of the Decision appealed from. At any rate, the merit of appellees
contention that appellant Estellita Batungbacal can no longer appeal from the
decision may be resolved after the case is considered ready for study and report.
WHEREFORE, the motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED, and appellee is required

to file his appellees brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
On January 22, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 of the aforesaid
resolution but said motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in a resolution18 dated April
19, 1999, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:
Page 3 of 151
The resolution promulgated on January 13, 1999 required appellee to file his
appellees brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt of that resolution, or up to
March 4, 1999. Up to this date no appellees brief has been submitted.
WHEREFORE, the appeal by appellants is deemed submitted for decision without

the benefit of appellees brief, and the records of this case is hereby transmitted to
the Raffle Committee, for re-raffle, for study and report.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition19 wherein petitioner contends that
respondent Court of Appeals acted:
(1) WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL OF PRIVATE

RESPONDENT ESTELITA BATUNGBACAL;
(2) WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN DISREGARD OF THE

EXPRESS MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS OF THE RULES AS WELL AS
AGAINST SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT DENIED THE PETITIONERS
MOTION TO DISMISS THE APPEAL OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT
SPOUSES;
(3) WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN GRAVE VIOLATION OF DUE

PROCESS OF LAW IN ADMITTING THE AMENDED APPELLANTS BRIEF
FILED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND IN REQUIRING THE PETITIONER
AS APPELLEE TO FILE HIS APPELLEES BRIEF;
(4) WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN IT RESOLVED TO HAVE THE

APPEAL OF THE APPELLANT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DEEMED
SUBMITTED FOR DECISION WITHOUT BENEFIT OF APPELLEES BRIEF.20
Simply put, the following are the issues presented before this Court for resolution: (1)
whether or not the appellate court erred in taking cognizance of the appeal; and (2)
whether or not the appellate court erred or committed grave abuse of discretion when it
considered the appeal as submitted for decision without petitioners brief.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the decisions of the trial court in Civil Case No.
6480 promulgated on May 14, 1996 and June 2, 1997 had become final and executory
as to private respondent Estelita Batungbacal. This is because Estelita never appealed
the partial judgment promulgated on May 14, 1996. In fact, there has been a partial
execution of said judgment with notice to and without objection from private respondent
spouses. As regards the decision dated June 2, 1997, petitioner contends that the same
had become final for failure to file the notice of appeal within 15 days, counted from the
time counsel of record for private respondent spouses received a copy on June 6, 1997
and not from the time Estelita received a copy on June 10, 1997. Petitioner points to
Section 2 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court and argues that since the trial court never
Page 4 of 151
ordered that service of the judgment be made upon Estelita, she was not entitled to
service of the judgment. The fact that she received a copy of the judgment separately
from her counsel cannot prejudice the legal consequences arising out of prior receipt of
copy of the decision by her counsel. It was thus clear error for the Court of Appeals to
accept Estelitas argument that the reglementary period commenced not from receipt of
a copy of the decision by counsel of record but from the time she received a copy of the
decision. The appeal having been filed out of time, the Court of Appeals did not have
jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of Estelita.
Petitioner also assails the appellants brief for certain formal defects. As pointed out in his
motion to dismiss filed before the public respondent, there are no page references to the
record in the statements of the case and of the facts in the appellants brief submitted by
private respondents. Petitioner asserts that while there are many pleadings and orders
mentioned in said statements, only the decision dated June 2, 1997 is cited, and the
citation is limited only to the particular page or pages in said decision where the citation
or quotation is taken, without any reference to the pages in the record where the decision
can be found. Neither is there reference to the pages in the record where the particular
cited or quoted portions of the decision can be found.
Petitioner likewise alleges that the authorities relied upon in the appellants brief of private
respondents are also not cited by the page on which the citation is found, as required in
Sec. 13 (f) of Rule 44 of the Rules of Court. Page references to the record are also
required in Section 13, paragraphs (c), (d) and (f) of Rule 44 and absence thereof is a
ground for dismissal of the appeal, pursuant to Sec. 1 (f) of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner also harps on the failure of private respondents to furnish petitioner with two
copies of the original appellants brief, to submit proof of service of two copies of the brief
on the appellee, and to furnish the petitioner with two copies of the amended appellants
brief as required by the Rules of Court. Additionally, petitioner asserts that the failure of
private respondents to append copies of the appealed decisions to their appellants brief
constitutes a violation of the Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals and is likewise a
ground for dismissal under Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
Lastly, petitioner contends that the virtual admission into the record by the respondent
court of the amended appellants brief of the private respondents under the resolution
dated January 13, 1999 and its corresponding action to require the petitioner to respond
thereto, constitute grave abuse of discretion and blatant disregard of due process of law
because the amended brief was filed without leave of court.
Private respondents, for their part, argue that the resolutions being assailed by petitioner
are interlocutory in character because the Court of Appeals still has to decide the appeal
on the merits; hence, certiorari does not lie in his favor. Private respondents allege that
petitioner has another adequate and speedy remedy, i.e., to file his brief raising all issues
before the Court of Appeals. Once the appeal is resolved on the merits, all proper issues
may be elevated to the Supreme Court. An order denying a motion to dismiss being
merely interlocutory, it cannot be the basis of a petition for certiorari. The proper remedy
is to appeal in due course after the case is decided on the merits.
Page 5 of 151
We find the petition devoid of merit.
On the first issue, we find that the Court of Appeals did not act without jurisdiction in
entertaining the appeal filed by private respondent Estelita Batungbacal. Contrary to
petitioners apparent position, the judgments rendered by the trial court in this case are
not several judgments under the Rules of Court so that there would be multiple periods
of finality.
A several judgment is proper only when the liability of each party is clearly separable and
distinct from that of his co-parties, such that the claims against each of them could have
been the subject of separate suits, and judgment for or against one of them will not
necessarily affect the other.21 Where a common cause of action exists against the
defendants, as in actions against solidary debtors, a several judgment is not proper. In
this case, private respondents are sued together under a common cause of action and
are sought to be held liable as solidary debtors for a loan contracted by Estelita. This is
the clear import of the allegation in the complaint that the proceeds of the loan benefited
the conjugal partnership.
Thus, between the two judgments rendered by the trial court, there could only be one
judgment that finally disposes of the case on the merits. Receipt of notice of this final
judgment marks the point when the reglementary period is to begin running. In this case,
that judgment is the decision22 rendered by the trial court on June 2, 1997 and it is only
from the date of notice of this decision that the reglementary period began to run. The
partial judgment dated May 14, 1996 was rendered only with respect to one issue in the
case and is not the final and appealable order or judgment that finally disposes of the
case on the merits.23 It must, therefore, only be appealed together with the decision dated
June 2, 1997.
A final order is that which gives an end to the litigation.24 When the order or judgment
does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be done upon the merits,
it is merely interlocutory.25 Quite obviously, the partial judgment ordering Estelita to pay
petitioner is an interlocutory order because it leaves other things for the trial court to do
and does not decide with finality the rights and obligations of the parties. Specifically, at
the time the partial judgment was rendered, there remained other issues including
whether the husband Avelino had any liability under Article 121 of the Family Code.
However, as the partial judgment disposed of one of the issues involved in the case, it is
to be taken in conjunction with the decision dated June 2, 1997. Together, these two
issuances form one integrated decision.
The question now is when the period to appeal should actually commence, from June 6,
1997, as petitioner contends; or from June 10, 1997, as private respondent Estelita
Batungbacal claims? We hold that the period began to run on June 6, 1997 when counsel
for private respondents received a copy of the decision dated June 2, 1997. When a party
is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must be made upon
said attorney and notice to the client and to any other lawyer, not the counsel of record,
is not notice in law.26 The exception to this rule is when service upon the party himself
Page 6 of 151
has been ordered by the court.27 In this case, it does not appear that there was any
substitution of counsel or that service upon private respondent Estelita Batungbacal had
been specifically ordered by the trial court; hence, the counsel of record for the private
respondents is presumed to be their counsel on appeal and the only one authorized to
receive court processes. Notice of the judgment upon such counsel, therefore, was notice
to the clients for all legal intents and purposes.
Private respondents appeal had been taken within the reglementary period since Avelino
Batungbacal had filed a notice of appeal on June 19, 1997 or 13 days from their counsels
receipt of the decision on June 6, 1997. Respondent spouses having been jointly sued
under a common cause of action, an appeal made by the husband inures to the benefit
of the wife. The notice of appeal filed by Estelita was a superfluity, the appeal having been
perfected earlier by her husband.
We come now to petitioners contention that the appellants brief suffers from fatal defects.
Worth stressing, the grounds for dismissal of an appeal under Section 1 of Rule 5028 of
the Rules of Court are discretionary upon the Court of Appeals. This can be seen from
the very wording of the Rules which uses the word may instead of shall. This Court has
held in Philippine National Bank vs. Philippine Milling Co., Inc.29 that Rule 50, Section 1
which provides specific grounds for dismissal of appeal manifestly "confers a power and
does not impose a duty." "What is more, it is directory, not mandatory."30 With the
exception of Sec. 1(b), the grounds for the dismissal of an appeal are directory and not
mandatory, and it is not the ministerial duty of the court to dismiss the appeal.31 The
discretion, however, must be a sound one to be exercised in accordance with the tenets
of justice and fair play having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case.32
The Court of Appeals rightly exercised its discretion when, in denying petitioners motion
to dismiss, it ruled that the citations contained in the appellants brief were in substantial
compliance with the rules. Where the citations found in the appellants brief could
sufficiently enable the appellate court to locate expeditiously the portions of the record
referred to, there is substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 13(c) and
(d), Rule 46 of the Rules of Court. Such determination was properly within the appellate
courts discretion. Nothing in the records indicate that it was exercised capriciously,
whimsically, or with a view of permitting injury upon a party litigant. For the same reasons,
we hold that the respondent Court of Appeals also did not err when it did not dismiss the
appeal based on the allegation that appellants brief failed to comply with the internal rules
of said court.
However, the Court of Appeals erred in requiring petitioner to file the appellees brief in
response to the amended appellants brief. Note that the amended brief was filed without
the proper motion for leave to do so and corresponding order from the respondent court.
Even more significant, it was filed beyond the extensions of time granted to appellants.
The discretion in accepting late briefs conferred upon respondent court which this Court
applied in the cases of Maqui vs. CA33 and Vda. de Haberer vs. CA,34 finds no application
under the present circumstances because, unlike in these two cases, here no valid reason
Page 7 of 151
was advanced for the late filing of the amended brief. While the amended brief35 might
contain no substantial and prejudicial changes, it was error for the respondent court to
accept the amended brief as filed and then require petitioner to file appellees brief
because admittedly the amended brief was filed beyond August 31, 1998, the last period
of extension granted to private respondents.
On the second issue, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in considering the appeal submitted for decision. The proper remedy in case of
denial of the motion to dismiss is to file the appellees brief and proceed with the appeal.
Instead, petitioner opted to file a motion for reconsideration which, unfortunately, was pro
forma. All the grounds raised therein have been discussed in the first resolution of the
respondent Court of Appeals. There is no new ground raised that might warrant reversal
of the resolution. A cursory perusal of the motion would readily show that it was a
near verbatim repetition of the grounds stated in the motion to dismiss; hence, the filing
of the motion for reconsideration did not suspend the period for filing the appellees brief.
Petitioner was therefore properly deemed to have waived his right to file appellees brief.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The resolutions dated January 13, 1999 and April
19, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 57989 are AFFIRMED, and the Court
of Appeals is ordered to proceed with the appeal and decide the case with dispatch. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, De Leon, Jr., and Corona, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 CA Rollo, pp. 116-117.
2 Id. at 135-136.
3 Rollo, pp. 31-38.

4 Id. at 39.
5 Id. at 48-49.
6 Id. at 54-64.
7 Id. at 65.
8 Id. at 66.
Page 8 of 151
9 Id. at 68.
10 Id. at 67.
11 Supra, note 1 at 57-63.
12 Id. at 57-59, 62.
13 Id. at 63.
14 Id. at 92-93.
15 Id. at 81-91.
16 Id. at 116-117.
17 Id. at 121-125.
18 Id. at 135-136.
20 Id. at 5.
21 F. Regalado, I REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 375 (6th ed. 1997).

22 Supra, note 6.
23 See Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
24 Investments, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-60036, 147 SCRA 334, 340 (1987),
citing PLDT Employees' Union vs. PLDT Co. Free Tel. Workers' Union, G.R. No.
L-8138, 97 Phil. 424, 426 (1955).
25 PLDT Employees' Union vs. PLDT Co. Free Tel. Workers' Union, id. at 426-427.
26Bernardo vs. CA (Special Sixth Division), G.R. No. 106153, 275 SCRA 413, 423-
424 (1997), citingChainani vs. Tancinco, G.R. No. L-4782, 90 Phil. 862, 864
(1952).
27 Rule 13, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
28 RULE 50 - DISMISSAL OF APPEAL.
Page 9 of 151
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. An appeal may be dismissed by the

Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following
grounds:
(a) Failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that the appeal was
taken within the period fixed by these Rules;
(b) Failure to file the notice of appeal or the record on appeal within the
period prescribed by these Rules;
(c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as
provided in section 5 of Rule 40 and section 4 of Rule 41;
(d) Unauthorized alterations, omissions or additions in the approved record

on appeal as provided in section 4 of Rule 44;
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies
of his brief or memorandum within the time provided by these Rules;
(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellants brief, or of

page references to the record as required in section 13, paragraphs (a), (c),
(d) and (f) of Rule 44;
(g) Failure of the appellant to take the necessary steps for the correction or
completion of the record within the time limited by the court in its order;
(h) Failure of the appellant to appear at the preliminary conference under

Rule 48 or to comply with orders, circulars, or directives of the court without
justifiable cause; and
(i) The fact that the order or judgment appealed from is not appealable. (1a)
29 G.R. No. L-27005, 26 SCRA 712, 715 (1969).
30 Ibid.
31 See Maqui vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-41609, 69 SCRA 368, 374 (1976).
32Vda. De Haberer vs. CA, G.R. Nos. L-42699 to L-42709, 104 SCRA 534, 544
(1981).
33 Supra, note 31.
34 Supra, note 32.
Page 10 of 151
CASE 2

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B. M. No. 1154 June 8, 2004
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE

HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA
BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe
while the other has been rendered moot by a supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) aPetition1 to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the
2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a
member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the
2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and
15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious
Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001,
when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front
of media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face
of Melendrez wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is
not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows
Page 11 of 151
that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Courts R E S O L U T I O N2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed

his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer,3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against
him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised
him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case
would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their
former professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually
arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as "closed and terminated."
Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve
moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications
really contained the word "Attorney" as they were, according to him, typed by the office
clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the
charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his
petition to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that
only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor
a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending.
Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is
still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral
character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should
not be taken lightly by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act
of concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:
It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of
him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known.
Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective
reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such
conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good
moral character includes at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him
also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
Page 12 of 151
states that "a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement
or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to
the bar."5
As regards Melings use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the
explanation of Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar,
there was no valid reason why he signed as "attorney" whoever may have typed
the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact
is, he is signing his communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing fully well
that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the
unauthorized use of the appellation "attorney" may render a person liable for
indirect contempt of court.6
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyers
Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations.
Further, it recommended that Melings membership in the Sharia Bar be suspended until
further orders from the Court.7
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did
not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to
prevent Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and
academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate
sanctions upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be
acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not a matter of right but
merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who
are also known to possess good moral character.8 The requirement of good moral
character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.9
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or she "has not been charged with
any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or
administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of,
any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge
against him/her." Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that
he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment,
done under oath at that.
Page 13 of 151
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is

satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the applicant.10 The nature of whatever
cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is
endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of
such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately
proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of
the applicant.
Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against
him speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture
of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not entitled
to its use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,11 the Court had the occasion to
discuss the impropriety of the use of the title "Attorney" by members of the Sharia Bar
who are not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive
clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Sharia District in Marawi City, used the title "Attorney" in
several correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract entered into by
him in his private capacity. The Court declared that:
persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine
Bar, hence, may only practice law before Sharia courts. While one who has been
admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar,
may both be considered "counselors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice
in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title "attorney" is
reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law
and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they
only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.12
The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case.
The solemn task of administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be
part of service therein, from the highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be
competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and
integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary
and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his
application to take the Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions before the
Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the
practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate

sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar. Accordingly,
the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED
until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as
Page 14 of 151
the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing
the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for
having become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Sharia Courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-

Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 2-25, with Annexes.
2 Id. at 27.
3 Id. at 28-32.
5Id. at 35-36, citing Bar Matter 1209, Petition to take the Lawyers Oath of Caesar
Distrito and Royong v. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859.
6Id. at 36-37, citing Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court and Bar
Matter 1209, supra.
7 Id. at 38.
8 Tan v. Sabandal, Bar Matter No. 44, February 24, 1992, 206 SCRA 473.
9 Leda v. Tabang, Adm. Case No. 2505, February 21, 1992, 206 SCRA 395.
10See In Re: Victorio D. Lanuevo, Adm. Cases No. 1162-1164, 29 August 1975,
66 SCRA 245, 281.
11 A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997, 268 SCRA 628.
12 Id. at 638-639.
Page 15 of 151
CASE 3

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines
Patent Office, respondent.
Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de
Castro for respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and
injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent
Office.
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had
scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are
qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said
examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said
office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other
persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said
examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding
similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has
passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the
Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines
Patent Office, and that consequently, the cat of the respondent Director requiring
members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an examination given
by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice before
said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of
applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.
Page 16 of 151
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the
prosecution of patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but
includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so
that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not
only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and
technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; .
. . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial
body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle
cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more
of an application of scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application of
provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with
Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which similar
to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the United States Patent Office
has also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by respondent. . . .
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America
authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to
who practice before the United States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly
authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have
been holding tests or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required
qualification to practice before the Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time
that the right of the Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the bar,
has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful
thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission
to the practice of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good
standing may practice law anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-
judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to whether
or not appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of
patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
social proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating
an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
Page 17 of 151
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis
supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work

performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings
in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of
the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at
all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In
re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc.
vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their
applications for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in
patent cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office
involves the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still,
all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other
laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in
accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves the
interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence
of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. For
instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable
if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says that
an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others
in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor named in any printed
publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one year before the
application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines
for more than one year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides
that the right to patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal
representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a
patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any
person may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is
authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the
requirements of a petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of
Page 18 of 151
hearing of the petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case the
said cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three
years from the day the patent was granted, any person patent on several grounds, such
as, if the patented invention is not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale,
or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the
demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an adequate extent
and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on
reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached by him to the license, purchase
or use of the patented article or working of the patented process or machine of production,
the establishment of a new trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent
or invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety.
All these things involve the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and procedure.
They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the bar has
been prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and
decisions of the Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct
evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a
proceeding to cancel a patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to
any other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final
order or decision of the director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the
Patent Office and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved
exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the
appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists,
engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions
and acts of the Head of the Patent Office.
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues,

interferences, and extensions, exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are
public records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated copies
to any person, on payment of the legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis
supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to
the granting and delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the
patent is new and whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his action in
awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In passing on an application the
commissioner should decide not only questions of law, but also questions of fact,
as whether there has been a prior public use or sale of the article invented. . . . (60
C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).
Page 19 of 151
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is

reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training,
should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or
other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or
necessary, may require that members of the bar practising before him enlist the
assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers and documents,
such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be
patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel
of land on behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and technical description of
said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require
persons desiring to practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even
if they are already members of the bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act
No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent
Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which he (respondent)
has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions of said
Rules of Practice:
Registration of attorneys and agents. A register of an attorneys and a register

agents are kept in the Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons
recognized as entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office in the
preparation and prosecution of applicants for patent. Registration in the Patent
Office under the provisions of these rules shall only entitle the person registered
to practice before the Patent Office.
(a) Attorney at law. Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice
before any United States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the
United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with the provisions of
these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his
name entered on the register of attorneys.
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to practice and

register unless he shall apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a
prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested
information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the
Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute and
possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to
enable him to render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise
competent to advise and assist him in the presentation and prosecution of their
application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may
determine whether a person seeking to have his name placed upon either of the
registers has the qualifications specified, satisfactory proof of good moral character
and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters must
Page 20 of 151
be submitted and an examination which is held from time to time must be taken
and passed. The taking of an examination may be waived in the case of any person
who has served for three years in the examining corps of the Patent Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States
Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which
reads as follows:
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of

Commerce may prescribe rules and regulations governing the recognition of
agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other parties before
his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being
recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, that they shall show
they are of good moral character and in good repute, are possessed of the
necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other persons
valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or
other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other
business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and
opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular
case from further practice before his office any person, agent or attorney shown to
be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to
comply with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in
any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective applicant,
or other person having immediate or prospective applicant, or other person having
immediate or prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or by
advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly
recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of
the person so refused recognition or so suspended by the district court of the
United States for the District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such
proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to
the provisions of law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and
regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice before him should submit to and
pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes
of comparison:
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. The Director subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not
inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions
of the United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine
the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S.
Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that they
possess the necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and
Page 21 of 151
advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form of a test
or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on
this important point. Our attention has not been called to any express provision of our
Patent Law, giving such authority to determine the qualifications of persons allowed to
practice before the Patent Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to
prescribe forms and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to
secure the harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the service and to
carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau.
Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of
the Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the
provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon
recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules
and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the code. We
understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureau of
Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern
the transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of
law giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on
examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office,
then there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are more or less
complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,
assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc.,
as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practising before
them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an
examination to qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar
authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their
profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office
involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent
Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts
involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so
much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the
Supreme Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent
Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an
examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice
before the Patent Office. No costs.
Page 22 of 151
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ.,concur.
Footnotes
1 In re: Albino Cunanan, 50 Off. Gaz. m, 1617, prom. March 18, 1954.
Page 23 of 151
CASE 4

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio

Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of
said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on
replaced by counsel de parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by City
Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance as private
prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of Justice. The condition of his
appearance as such, was that every time he would appear at the trial of the case, he
would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any
payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was
questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs. Blanco,
et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed
to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by
operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that
the JP Court in entertaining the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation
of the above ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality
of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit
Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32,
Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys
from practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP
Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that
he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to
the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment
on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:
Page 24 of 151
The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the
offended party of the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted
with the criminal action. The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in
the case and be represented by a legal counsel because of her interest in the civil
liability of the accused.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the
peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City
Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of
the offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid for his services or
that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of
San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of
crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the
prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos are handled by the Office of
the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no
possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City
Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other
hand, as already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a right to
be represented by an agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which
was impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule
may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private
prosecutor in this criminal case as an agent or a friend of the offended party.
WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of
Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private
prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.
The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.1wph1.t
Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced,
and which we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his
confused interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules),
which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the
office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or
give professional advice to clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as
private prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We believe that the
isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the
meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance,
for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In
other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42
LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted
Page 25 of 151
as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and
demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647).
The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of
engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor
General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented
himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that
his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a
source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission
by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the
case at bar, who is a relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be,
as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant..
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
Page 26 of 151
CASE 5

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only
legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a
profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and

six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and,
at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of
a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective
position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis
supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973
Constitution which similarly provides:
Page 27 of 151
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and

eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time
of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis
supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice

of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of

legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in
the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice
to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law
by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and
fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's
Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and
Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be
in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,

firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings
pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board,
body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act
or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law,
or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-
177) stated:
Page 28 of 151
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work

performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice
on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection
with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by
the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in
the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and
drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953
ed.] , p. 665-666, citingIn re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A.
139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new
lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms
as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the

profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind
usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and
he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a
Page 29 of 151
practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell,
155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is
to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice
law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the
use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a
liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a

manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to
make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the

members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the
qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be
Members of the Philippine Bar" I am quoting from the
provision "who have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members

of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we
would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications
regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual
practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as
long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal
knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are
qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners,
even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions

and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the
practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
Page 30 of 151
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by

a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that
is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA,
although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will
involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed
in COA now would have the necessary qualifications in
accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our
provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the
answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that

this is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the
Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be
certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members
of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous
with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice,
it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly
understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering
legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners."
Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of
the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and
the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the
experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do.
(Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p.
Page 31 of 151
593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank &
Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne,
128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function
known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be
too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly
familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most
lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice
without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate
and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self
perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not
reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer,
once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even
today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who
principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the
informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most
cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the
planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed]
that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be
effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number
of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal
institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers
in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their
specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from
one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as
representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the
relatively rare types a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much
else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional
lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And
increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective
for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained
in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient
features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of
Page 32 of 151
prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the
client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that
work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government
legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are
emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of
practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary

transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional
groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an

accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law
research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate
legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency
planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures
in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the

sorting and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major
trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of
action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute
danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure
must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein
a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to
test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects
flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in

predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate
finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention
in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a
cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those

trained primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to
multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for handling
such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate
degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal
Page 33 of 151
policy level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the

concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently
engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would

require the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to

as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big
money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not
explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of
attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type
of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all
their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel
only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles
the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may
include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as
corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and
other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange
Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with
the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the
legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These
include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated
from the action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the
work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to
see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is
sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of
the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a

multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law
Page 34 of 151
field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of

companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived
by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most
cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the
younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business
Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of
finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein,
to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one
who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who
surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989,
p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm,"
so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method
of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities
Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management
issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types
of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of
particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of
the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a

shared area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's
role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process,
including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a
corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is
being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly
collaborate not only with public entities but with each other often with
those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the

corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a
new role as a stakeholder in some cases participating in the organization
and operations of governance through participation on boards and other
Page 35 of 151
decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing

legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies

toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other
countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative
efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous.
(Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate

Counsel comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all
kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary
groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable
factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising
their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders,
promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such
external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal
group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer

vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current
research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors

are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an
effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and
pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback
loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts
of systematic problems physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system
dynamics principles more accessible to managers including corporate
counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions

involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it
can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation
Page 36 of 151
settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio
of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can

be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All
integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation
support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation
case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function,
concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that

comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ
from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such
legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being
considered and made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are

undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach.
It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and
organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global,
interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not
adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The

general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant
subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility
for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global
operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure,
creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping
internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is
not enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him
a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even
if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working
knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only
the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation.
"Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
Page 37 of 151
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more
than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their
work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law
territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the
lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding
and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989,
p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the

position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod

as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same
day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of

Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for
certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment
of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying
his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-
1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and
Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries
negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon
returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief
executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate,
and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election
law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the
field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the
Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under
privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for
and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land
reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee
Page 38 of 151
on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the
Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a
member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and

which is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise
during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there
are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and
an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the
contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven,
"Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff
Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11).
(Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays

down the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of
any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental
parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of
closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring
program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and
legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper,
entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted
by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development
of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by
the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis
supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely

renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in
legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a
sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an
economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they
should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent
counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support
personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts,
an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321).
( Emphasis supplied)
Page 39 of 151
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the

set of terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for
a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement
must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state
the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an
obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that
principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan
agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international
affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they
are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and
serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and
4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly
the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-
negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the
Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed

by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only
condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the
ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom
which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission,
171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all
the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no
alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment
on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position.
It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice.
To do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the
appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary
power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
Page 40 of 151
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis

supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4)
stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3)
issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent
appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v.
Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-
Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President

with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall
hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last
Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case
shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his
definition of the practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law
practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law,
which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent
framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition
would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or
three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year
for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written
opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because
the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice
of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my
statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being
defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations,
most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means,
are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact
that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising
law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without
first becoming lawyers.
Page 41 of 151
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President
of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter,
I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the
President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be
entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on
Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the
exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon
a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there
is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less
a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would
warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President,

may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in
effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S.
Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible
that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth
life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked
Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on
condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
Page 42 of 151
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron
rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This
blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside
herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on
his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow
from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the
agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the
result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the
challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of
his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by
error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits
nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
Page 43 of 151
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at
bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the
sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod
from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his
constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent
the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to
finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the
Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that
respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced

that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not
been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because,

ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the
constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including
the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction
of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v.
Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn
and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman.
Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
(10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and
complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of
knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual,repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice"
law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks
of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public
accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an
accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a
corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation
or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2
Page 44 of 151
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or

customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it
is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42
LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the
public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs.
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a

Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a
particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually

holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when
one sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the
general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes
the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation
with the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all
courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).

customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it
is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented

himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and
that his professional services are available to the public for compensation,
as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People
v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of
documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
"practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics,
1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B.
901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law
(Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290
N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law.
(Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for

legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law".
(Martin supra)
Page 45 of 151
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes

the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer
undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no
attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or
articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession
or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or

not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least
ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of
law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY

FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records,
I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice
of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment
as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be
latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal
documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions
or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become
engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As
observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in theactive and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod

as not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
Page 46 of 151
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just
the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course
respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the
respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving.
Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts,
not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still
be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the
appointing authority to choosebetween two claimants to the same office who both
possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not
be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for
lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an
appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an
appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less
than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not
the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first
place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may
have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the
qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in
the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to
be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some
law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor
could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely
"to become involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is
another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such
business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and
regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern
society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government
regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the
definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered
a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or
consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws
regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of
Page 47 of 151
livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey
the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the
"performance of any acts ... in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of
law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers
perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as
a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected
with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose
income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with
pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the
Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which
areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a
practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his
resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-
at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was
acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in
the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers
and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his
activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual
practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of
his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I
must regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a
qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms.
Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged
in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave
but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not
practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to
grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he
viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
Page 48 of 151
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have
no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically
and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications
in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background,
experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His
integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is
compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has
never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to
say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to
the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a
requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also
for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or
Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business
corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with
no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that
in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years."
The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular,
not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or
extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed
participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one
is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with
intent and attention during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to
the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except
for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his
father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because
he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of
Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not
a member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar

examinations in 1961 consist of the following:
Page 49 of 151
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of

Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry Department;

Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and
Middle East, International Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e.,

Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation,
Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital Development

Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup

Attempt Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the

following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
Page 50 of 151
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent
Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and
participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in
its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working
for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the
oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate

"engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of
endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian
reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary
layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident
of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the
law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business
executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman,
market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert
that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten
years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with
litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving
of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or
knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal
Page 51 of 151
effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully
determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77
N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards
State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of

what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as
"Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and
customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of
service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice
or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as
being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v.
People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v.
Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be
activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually,
frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather

evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the
parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent.
He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many
times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years
of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more
than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall
making the statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a
large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what was
said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a
practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to
the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he
answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further
for an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties
where he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about
everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he

has a lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate
transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds,
mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged
Page 52 of 151
in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that
connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or

employed by another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of
a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in
legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law,
and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the
single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be
an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law
Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an
officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in
such court on the retainerof clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are
(1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of
his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to
the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ...
His rights are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit.
"Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to
do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a
succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or
repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a
profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v.
Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a
succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109
[1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to
fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services.
... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a

required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and
issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually

holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when
Page 53 of 151
general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or

is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v.
Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his
legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated
activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the
practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in
the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities
which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated
transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign
corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing
business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or
occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing
business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of
appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to
qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or
Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman
has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the
public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of

discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent
Separate Opinions
Page 54 of 151
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the
result; it does not appear to me that there has been an adequate showing that the
challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of
his stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by
error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently merits
nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at
bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the
sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod
from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his
constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent
the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties concerned were the Court to
finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the
Petition then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that
respondent Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced

that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not
been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because,

ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the
constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of COMELEC, including
the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years." (Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction
of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v.
Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn
and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional
boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman.
Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
(10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and
complied with.
Page 55 of 151
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of
knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual,repeated or customary action. 1 To "practice"
law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or
profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks
of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A certified public
accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an
accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a
corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation
or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva: 2

customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it
is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42
LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the
public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs.
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a

Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative of whether a
particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually

holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when
general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes

is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented

himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and
that his professional services are available to the public for compensation,
as a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People
v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for services such as preparation of
Page 56 of 151
documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
"practice of law" (Ernani Pao, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics,
1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B.
901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law
(Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290
N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law.
(Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for

legal knowledge, training and experience is within the term "practice of law".
(Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes

the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer
undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no
attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or
articles, he cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his profession
or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30). 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or

not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least
ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of
law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY

FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records,
I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice
of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment
as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be
latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the drafting of legal
documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions
or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become
engaged in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As
observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva: 4
Page 57 of 151
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in theactive and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public for
a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said
services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod

as not qualified for the position of COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just
the same. There are certain points on which I must differ with him while of course
respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the
respondent simply because his nomination has been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from resolving.
Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts,
not the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still
be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the
appointing authority to choosebetween two claimants to the same office who both
possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not
be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for
lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why we cannot disqualified an
appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an
appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been found acceptable by no less
than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not
the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first
place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may
have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the
qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in
the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to
be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the application of some
law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor
could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely
"to become involved in litigation."
Page 58 of 151
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is
another business and he interprets and applies some law only as an incident of such
business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and
regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern
society, there is hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government
regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the
definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered
a practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or
consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws
regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of
livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of law because he must obey
the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the
"performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice
of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm,
such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as
a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected
with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose
income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with
pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten years as required by the
Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which
areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a
practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed in his
resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an attorney-
at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was
acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in
the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers
and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his
activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual
practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many other positions worthy of
his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I
must regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
Page 59 of 151
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a
qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms.
Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged
in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave
but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not
practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to
grave abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind on how he
viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a
constitutional Commission on Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the
qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have
no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically
and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications
in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management, educational background,
experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His
integrity and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is
compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has
never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of the bar but to
say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to
the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a
requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also
for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or
Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a business
corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with
no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private practice, except that
in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years."
The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular,
not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or
extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed
participation in something which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one
is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with
intent and attention during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to
the Commission on Appointments, the latter has not been engaged in the practice of law
Page 60 of 151
for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except
for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his
father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been extremely limited because
he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the University of
Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not
a member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar

examinations in 1961 consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of

Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group Economist, Industry Department;

Operations, Latin American Department; Division Chief, South Asia and
Middle East, International Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various companies, i.e.,

Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum Corporation,
Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group President, Fil-Capital Development

Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief Executive Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup

Attempt Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the

following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
Page 61 of 151
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent
Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain degree of commitment and
participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in
its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working
for him. Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the
oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate

"engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal knowledge in various fields of
endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian
reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary
layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. Every resident
of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the
law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business
executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman,
Page 62 of 151
market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these people honestly assert
that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten
years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with
litigation but also services rendered out of court, and it includes the giving
of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or
knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal
effect of which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully
determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77
N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards
State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of

what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law" has been defined as
"Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and
customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of
service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such advice
or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as
being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v.
People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v.
Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be
activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be performed, habitually,
frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather

evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever prepared contracts for the
parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent.
He answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many
times he had prepared contracts for the parties during the twenty-one years
of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more
than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall
making the statement to several parties that he had prepared contracts in a
large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what was
said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a
practice of preparing deeds, mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to
Page 63 of 151
the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he
answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further
for an answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties
where he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have done about
everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he

has a lawful right to do any legal work in connection with real-estate
transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds,
mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged
in these practices over the years and has charged for his services in that
connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or

employed by another to act in his stead; an agent; more especially, one of
a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in
legal proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law,
and non-professional agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the
single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be
an attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law
Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law, says Webster, is an
officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in
such court on the retainerof clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are
(1) to be true to the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of
his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to
the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ...
His rights are to be justly compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit.
"Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to
do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a
succession of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or
repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a
profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v.
Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a
succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109
[1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
Page 64 of 151
exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to
fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services.
... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a

required component of the meaning of practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and
issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually

holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14
SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when
general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or

is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v.
Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his
legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated
activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission to the
practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in
the Fact-Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities
which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be likened to isolated
transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign
corporations as doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing
business also should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or
occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing
business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of
appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional
Commission may possess the background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to
qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or
Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman
has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The Constitution charges the
public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.
Page 65 of 151
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of

discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent
Footnotes
1 Webster's 3rd New International Dictionary.
2 14 SCRA 109
3 Commission on Appointments' Memorandum dated 25 June 1991 RE:

WHAT CONSTITUTES PRACTICE OF LAW, pp. 6-7.
4 14 SCRA 109.
Page 66 of 151
CASE 6

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,

vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist
from issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of
annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or
entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law
profession other than those allowed by law."
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC,

INC. 8:30 am 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
Page 67 of 151
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce

through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during
office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems,

Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa.
Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.
Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr.

US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251; 522-
2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are

champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the said advertisements,
hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisement at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but
in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the use of modern
computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that the
services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these services should be
allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of
Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein,
we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association
(PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle
(WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6)
Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position papers
on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily
responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court
takes note with appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services
offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of
Page 68 of 151
law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper
and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers
adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them
on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to

distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal
services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are
essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that
document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of
basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies
like birth, marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents
like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with
respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its
position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view espoused by
respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal
services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to

respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly
advertising the same through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this

Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking highly
unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4
xxx xxx xxx
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders
legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the
public, the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent
is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so,
Page 69 of 151
as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the
advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced,

first of all, to the very name being used by respondent "The Legal Clinic,
Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of
legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical
services for medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic"
connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements

subject of the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all
the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by members of
the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in
question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as
a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes whatever doubt may still
remain as to the nature of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal

support services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as any
lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes unnecessary
to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services,"
as the respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no
room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal services are
being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of

acts contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in

question are only meant to inform the general public of the services being
offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam divorce,
and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only
one instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner

is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as
follows:
Page 70 of 151
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent

union between a man and woman entered into accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is
the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the

message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences
of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to
Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves
to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be
considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where certain defects in
Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright
malpractice.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities

aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as

that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor
vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to address
those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage,"
makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable
social institution," which is how the Family Code describes marriage,
obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this particular
advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy,
which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a marriage
license.
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be

concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the
advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest.
Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply
because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place
where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services"

respondent offers do not constitute legal services as commonly understood,
the advertisements in question give the impression that respondent
corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as
Page 71 of 151
earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of
an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar themselves are
encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to law,
morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and
demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing

the publication of the advertisements in question, or any other
advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should
be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it
presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the
public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research,
electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms,
investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit
the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged.
However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar
encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit
such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better
performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who by
reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field
cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit
them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession
of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a
lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using a
typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or
tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection of
members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection of the
public. Technological development in the profession may be encouraged
without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all

of its services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to
members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering
technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task
of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to the
public in general and which should be made available exclusively to
members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require further
proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.
Page 72 of 151
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought

to be prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or induce
celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal
and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from
simply disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be
required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal under
Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal
opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which course
of action to take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer without
subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed

exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer
that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody

should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without
such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any
adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice
in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession,
but before allowance of such practice may be considered, the corporation's
Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each and every
provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of
Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but
engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through
experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably,
respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name
"The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated
services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the
regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is
merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's own
commercial advertisement which announces a certainAtty. Don
Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all
indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and
rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that
the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes
drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as
to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter to
Page 73 of 151
look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984
ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law,
and such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing
competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device
by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public
and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for
deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance
for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of
practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the
Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members
to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses
its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to
court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish
to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is
a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the
law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are
acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues

stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also

misleading and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the
Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its unauthorized practice of law
and for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that
it merely renders "legal support services" to answers, litigants and the
general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s)
of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its
advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show
that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of court.
Page 74 of 151
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons

and Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces,
annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption;
Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, immigration
problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and such other related
laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid

law, the legal principles and procedures related thereto, the legal advices
based thereon and which activities call for legal training, knowledge and
experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the
activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and
laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount

consideration should be given to the protection of the general public from
the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may be
engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year

course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course
and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer
qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to

the administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of
study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with
the general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to
establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at
present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this
Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect the general
public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general
public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the
dangers which may be brought about by advertising of legal services. While
it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of
Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case
that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity
staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the
general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services without
being qualified to offer such services. 8
Page 75 of 151
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however,

seems to give the impression that information regarding validity of
marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions,
declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in
essence, legal matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services.
The Respondent's name The Legal Clinic, Inc. does not help matters.
It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal
problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed,
staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that
there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in
any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic,
Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its

President and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on
the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the
aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit
cases for the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited
law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility of
lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to

solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the Legal
Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which
is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one
has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly
fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only
by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an agency for
said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the
trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable
people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their particular
needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter
of the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit
the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so that such act
could become justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret
marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it
is not so, are highly reprehensible.
Page 76 of 151
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go
about having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be
attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is none,
except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also
against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the
public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our
Code of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that
solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is
unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify permanent elimination
from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as
management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers
or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In
the same vein, however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming
it can be engaged in independently of the practice of law) involves
knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of
unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can

render effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes
and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course
of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the
consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that
knowledge as a factor in determining what measures he shall
recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not
only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that
most men have considerable acquaintance with broad
features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law accurate
or inaccurate moulds our conduct not only when we are
acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers,
liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise
knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or
profession. A good example is the architect, who must be
familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes,
factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans
and specification in harmony with the law. This is not
practicing law.
Page 77 of 151
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire

tower, replies that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial
relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he
recommends, a decision of the National Labor Relations
Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not,
provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or
information, and the legal question is subordinate and
incidental to a major non-legal problem.
It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land

to engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect
to the building code and the like, then an architect who
performed this function would probably be considered to be
trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys.
Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been pre-empted
by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow of
the lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The most
important body of the industrial relations experts are the
officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of
them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it
has been the practice for some years to delegate special
responsibility in employee matters to a management group
chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such matter,
and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently,
consultants like the defendants have the same service that
the larger employers get from their own specialized staff.
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a

recognized profession for which appropriate courses are
offered by our leading universities. The court should be very
cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established
method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the
considerable class of men who customarily perform a certain
function have no right to do so, or that the technical education
given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in their
business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should

consider his work for any particular client or customer, as a
whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to
advise as to the law defining his client's obligations to his
employees, to guide his client's obligations to his employees,
to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of
course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the
Page 78 of 151
fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are

along economic and psychological lines. The law only
provides the frame within which he must work, just as the
zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of
building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or
information defendant may give, does not transform his
activities into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a
minor feature of his work, he performed services which are
customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be
practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program,
he drew employees' wills.
Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of

the employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the
practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and
may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under
discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the
employment whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here,
however, there may be an exception where the business turns
on a question of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by
brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land
depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of
the negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the
dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion,
then it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment.
Or if a controversy between an employer and his men grows
from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is
quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need not
reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not
presented by the proofs.
Defendant also appears to represent the employer before

administrative agencies of the federal government, especially
before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board.
An agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an
authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The State of
New Jersey is without power to interfere with such
determination or to forbid representation before the agency by
one whom the agency admits. The rules of the National Labor
Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person,
or by counsel, or by other representative. Rules and
Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here
means a licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a
lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do
Page 79 of 151
whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions

purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in
Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful
calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the
practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal

problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the
bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client
as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of
Professional Responsibility succintly states the rule of conduct:
Rule 15.08 A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation

concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether
he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding
services (See Annex "A" Petition). Services on routine, straightforward
marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements with
a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the
problem is as complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on
the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then what
may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as the
Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence,
annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely
giving informational materials may not constitute of law. The business is
similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the
subject and determines on the subject and determines by himself what
courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving

information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the particular
Page 80 of 151
problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute
unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which

publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law
is amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the
principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a
particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect
this. . . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these
two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the
forms should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of
law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted
texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no
personal contact or relationship with a particular individual.
Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so
necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE
ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE THE
REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR
PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book
assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and
does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly
the defendant's publication does not purport to give personal
advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or
readily identified person in a particular situation in their
publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did
not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There being
no legal impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit,
there was no proper basis for the injunction against defendant
maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons
seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation
agreement any printed material or writings relating to
matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of
modification of the judgment against defendant having an
interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on
divorce and against his having any personal contact with any
prospective purchaser. The record does fully support,
however, the finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the
kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal
contacts concerning particular problems which might arise in
the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted
matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies
and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents
(The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct
constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to
the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to
Page 81 of 151
specific problems of particular individuals in connection with a

divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement
sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS
2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-
diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not controverted, however, that if the
services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would constitute
practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that
a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the
impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage.
With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of marriages (See
Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second

paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph)
fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal support
services", and not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent
for the proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we
note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction
and interpretation. The courts have laid down general principles and doctrines explaining
the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law
is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice
law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice
and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights
are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three
principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform
them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for
clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine rights of
life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law. 14
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When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the
practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and
then takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court,
is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal status and
rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One
who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for
it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases,
we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of

legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in
the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice
to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and
Trust Co. v. Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be
in the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,

firms, associations or corporations as to their right under the law, or appears
in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body,
committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity, performs any act
or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law,
or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel.
Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-
177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court;
it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
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conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters or estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work

performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to
proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice
on a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection
with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by
the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in
the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and
drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973
ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313,
quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A.
139, 144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court.
Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive
findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the activities of
respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be
seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own
description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by

trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic,
non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern
information technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission
Page 84 of 151
and reproduction of information and communication, such as computerized

legal research; encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings
prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering;
locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and
assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional services from government
or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or business
registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining
documentation like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving
information about laws of other countries that they may find useful, like
foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory
to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve
representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer
systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law offices,
corporate legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in
dispensing or administering legal services. 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve
mechanical and technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and
programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research
aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen
and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more
apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all the respondent
corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop
there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will
necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her
on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is
what its advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge
and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of
law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does
not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not
limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January

13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled
"Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations
of respondent corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic,
with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue
in Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as
complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales
and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields
can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and
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criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These
specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and
attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the
medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the
services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start
by analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask you how
you contracted what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they
observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And
once the problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our
specialists.
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-
up treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes.
"Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be
taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the
interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again,
kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-confine. It's just like
a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with
accordingly. "If you had a rich relative who died and named you her sole
heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer
you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears
which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the
state for the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist in taxation
would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if there were other
heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who
knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather
evidence to support the case. 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling.
What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the
services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions
against the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in
this proceeding.
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported
facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-
shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from
simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these
services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive
functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22
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It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent
which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly
qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an
individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to
practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish
to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is
limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and
various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful
business except for members of the bar who have complied with all the conditions
required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice law
who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study, have
been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science
entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of
their clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of
law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted to the bar
is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the
public from being advised and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable
persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the
United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be
adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware
that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral
adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent,

there are schools and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal
education, while there are none in the Philippines. 28As the concept of the "paralegals" or
"legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines also evolved to
protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by
the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant
Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal
assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own
code of professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and
the American Paralegal Association. 29
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In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may
be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly
licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of
another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and
extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney
cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the
unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of
law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of
their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to
practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only
true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not
supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the mass
media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the
adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics
had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional
employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is
engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest
involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents.
A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill
as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against
advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental
postulate that the that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director
of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of
respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute
improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation

by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen
solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his
talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and
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not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to
and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple
of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the
temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible,
even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be
forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27,
Code of Ethics.).
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a
lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which
must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to
a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public
attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and
proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the
profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define
the extent to which they may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories,
namely, those which are expressly allowed and those which are necessarily implied from
the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent
with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and
informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of
the lawyer's name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone
numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and
admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other
educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships;
legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other
reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written
consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be
a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is
published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list
the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure
the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
Page 89 of 151
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain
only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with,
address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a
simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is
not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not
under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which
respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged
by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same
definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned
exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly
invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not
applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in
said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation
or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to
be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or
impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of
Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains
a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and
until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an
exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be
made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise,
the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the
decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television
commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these
characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial
systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would
only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal
profession whose integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the
community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such
negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional
Page 90 of 151
conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem
formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary

action, to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the
prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member
of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s
for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we
are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not
within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is merely
administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly
determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of
our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice
of law in this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising,
cannot be subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the
alleged support services.
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and
province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo
warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and basis for the
grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof. That spin-
off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such action as may
be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any
advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes
"A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated
herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action
in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur
# Footnotes
Page 91 of 151
1 Rollo, 5. A facsimile of the scales of justice is printed together with and on

the left side of "The Legal Clinic, Inc." in both advertisements which were
published in a newspaper of general circulation.
2 433 U.S. 350, 53 L Ed 2d 810, 97 S Ct. 2691.
3 Resolution dated January 15, 1991, Rollo, 60; Resolution dated

December 10, 1991, Rollo, 328.
4 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Basilio H. Alo, IBP Director for Legal
Affairs, 1, 10; Rollo, 209, 218.
5 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Jose A. Grapilon, Chairman, Committee

on Bar Discipline, and Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico, 16-18, 27-29, Rollo 414-
416, 425-427.
6 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Rafael D. Abiera, Jr., Chairman,

Committee on Lawyers' Rights and Legal Ethics, and Atty. Arturo M. del
Rosario, President, 5-6; Rollo, 241-242.
7 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lorenzo Sumulong, President, and Atty.

Mariano M. Magsalin, Vice-President, 2, 4-5; Rollo, 93, 95-96.
8 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los Reyes, 1-2; Rollo, 105-
106.
9 Memorandum prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los Reyes, 10-11; Rollo,

370-371.
10 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Leticia E. Sablan, Officer-in-Charge,

WLAP Free Legal Aid Clinic, 1-2; Rollo, 169-170.
11 Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lily C. Limpe, President, and Atty.

Barbara Anne C. Migallos, 8-12, 23-24; Rollo, 139-143, 154-155.
12 Annotation: 111 ALR 23.
13 Howton vs. Morrow, 269 Ky. 1.
14 West Virginia State Bar vs. Earley, 109 S.E. 2d 420, 144 W.Va. 504;
Rhode Island Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R.I.) 179 A. 139,
144.
15 People vs. Castleman, 88 Colo. 229.
16 Depew, et al. vs. Witchita Assn. of Credit Men., Inc., 142 Kan. 403.
Page 92 of 151
17 Fitchette vs. Taylor, 94 ALR 356.
18 Mandelaum vs. Gilbert and Barker Mfg. Co., 290 NYS 46218.
19 201 SCRA 210 (1991).
20 Comment of Respondent, 3; Rollo, 15.
21 Rollo, 130-131.
22 Memorandum of U.P. WILOCI, 12-13; Rollo, 372-373.
23 Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court.
24 Phil. Ass'n. of Free Labor Unions, et al. vs. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar

Co., et al., 42 SCRA 302 (1971).
25 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, 863, 864.
26 Mounier vs. Regcinh, 170 So. 567.
27 Lowell Bar Ass'n. vs. Loeb. 52 N.E. 2d 27, 315 Mass. 176; 7 C.J.S.,
Attorney and Client 64, 865.
28 Comment of Respondent, 2; Rollo, 14.
29 Position Paper, U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), 11-12, citing

Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism, 214-224, West Publishing Co. (1974)
and Shayne, The Paralegal Profession, Oceana Publications, 1977,
Appendix II and III; Rollo, 116-117.
30 Illustrations:
(a) A law student who has successfully completed his third year of the
regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized
law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme
Court (Rule 138-A, Rules of Court);
(b) An official or other person appointed or designated in accordance with

law to appear for the Government of the Philippines in a case in which the
government has an interest (Sec. 33, Rule 138,id.);
(c) An agent or friend who aids a party-litigant in a municipal court for the
purpose of conducting the litigation (Sec. 34, Rule 138, id.);
Page 93 of 151
(d) A person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and
ability, who is appointed counsel de oficio to defend the accused in localities
where members of the bar are not available (Sec. 4, Rule 116, id.);
(e) Persons registered or specially recognized to practice in the Philippine

Patent Office (now known as the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer) in trademark, service mark and trade name cases
(Rule 23, Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases);
(f) A non-lawyer who may appear before the National Labor Relations
Commission or any Labor Arbiter only if (1) he represents himself as a party
to the case; (2) he represents an organization or its members, provided that
he shall be made to present written proof that he is properly authorized; or
(3) he is duly-accredited members of any legal aid office duly recognized by
the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases
referred thereto by the latter (New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor
Relations Commission);
(g) An agent, not an attorney, representing the lot owner or claimant in a

case falling under the Cadastral Act (Sec. 9, Act No. 2259); and
(h) Notaries public for municipalities where completion and passing the
studies of law in a reputable university or school of law is deemed sufficient
qualification for appointment (Sec. 233, Administrative Code of 1917).
See Rollo, 144-145.
31 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, 866; Johnstown Coal and Coke Co. of New
York vs. U.S., 102 Ct. Cl. 285.
32 Florida Bar vs. Brumbaugth, 355 So. 2d 1186.
33 Canon 3, Code of Professional Responsibility.
34 Rule 3.01, id.
35 Rule 3.04, id.
36 Canon 27, Canons of Professional Ethics.
37 People vs. Smith, 93 Am. St. Rep. 206.
38 74 Phil. 579 (1944).
39 The advertisement in said case was as follows: "Marriage license

promptly secured thru our assistance and the annoyance of delay or
Page 94 of 151
publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties.

Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.".
40 Agpalo, Legal Ethics, Fourth Edition (1989), 79-80.
41 Op. cit., 80.
43 * * * Missing * * * .
44 Op. cit., 81, citing A.B.A. Op. 11 (May 11, 1927); A.B.A. Op. 24 (Jan. 24,
1930); A.B.A. Ops. 53 (Dec. 14, 1931), 123 (Dec. 14, 1934), (July 12, 1941),
241 (Feb. 21, 1942), 284 (Aug. 1951); and 286 (Sept. 25, 1952). .
45 Supra, Fn 2.
46 Id., 810, 825.
47 Position Paper of the Philippine Bar Association, 12, citing the American
Bar Association Journal, January, 1989, p. 60; Rollo, 248.
48 In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 (1929); The Director of Religious Affairs vs.

Bayot, supra, Fn 38.
49 U.S. vs. Ney and Bosque, 8 Phil. 146 (1907); People vs. Luna, 102 Phil.
968 (1958).
50 Secs. 2 and 3, Rule 66, Rules of Court, in relation to Sec. 6(1), P.D. No.
902-A and Sec. 121, Corporation Code.
Page 95 of 151
CASE 7

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
CBD Case No. 176 January 20, 1995
SALLY D. BONGALONTA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO and ALFONSO M.
MARTIJA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
MELO, J.:
In a sworn letter-complaint dated February 15, 1995, addressed to the Commission on

Bar Discipline, National Grievance Investigation Office, Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
complainant Sally Bongalonta charged Pablito M. Castillo and Alfonso M. Martija,
members of the Philippine Bar, with unjust and unethical conduct, to wit: representing
conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or satisfaction of a
judgment which complainant might obtain.
The letter-complaint stated that complainant filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Criminal Case No. 7635-55, for estafa, against the Sps. Luisa and Solomer Abuel. She
also filed, a separate civil action Civil Case No. 56934, where she was able to obtain a
writ of preliminary attachment and by virtue thereof, a piece of real property situated in
Pasig, Rizal and registered in the name of the Sps. Abuel under TCT No. 38374 was
attached. Atty. Pablito Castillo was the counsel of the Sps. Abuel in the aforesaid criminal
and civil cases.
During the pendency of these cases, one Gregorio Lantin filed civil Case No. 58650 for
collection of a sum of money based on a promissory note, also with the Pasig Regional
Trial Court, against the Sps. Abuel. In the said case Gregorio Lantin was represented by
Atty. Alfonso Martija. In this case, the Sps. Abuel were declared in default for their failure
to file the necessary responsive pleading and evidence ex-parte was received against
them followed by a judgment by default rendered in favor of Gregorio Lantin. A writ of
Page 96 of 151
execution was, in due time, issued and the same property previously attached by
complainant was levied upon.
It is further alleged that in all the pleadings filed in these three (3) aforementioned cases,
Atty. Pablito Castillo and Atty. Alfonso Martija placed the same address, the same PTR
and the same IBP receipt number to wit" Permanent Light Center, No. 7, 21st Avenue,
Cubao, Quezon City, PTR No. 629411 dated 11-5-89 IBP No. 246722 dated 1-12-88.
Thus, complainant concluded that civil Case No. 58650 filed by Gregorio Lantin was
merely a part of the scheme of the Sps. Abuel to frustrate the satisfaction of the money
judgment which complainant might obtain in Civil Case No. 56934.
After hearing, the IBP Board of Governors issued it Resolution with the following findings
and recommendations:
Among the several documentary exhibits submitted by Bongalonta and

attached to the records is a xerox copy of TCT No. 38374, which Bongalonta
and the respondents admitted to be a faithful reproduction of the original.
And it clearly appears under the Memorandum of Encumbrances on aid
TCT that the Notice of Levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband was
registered and annotated in said title of February 7, 1989, whereas, that in
favor of Gregorio Lantin, on October 18, 1989. Needless to state, the notice
of levy in favor of Bongalonta and her husband is a superior lien on the said
registered property of the Abuel spouses over that of Gregorio Lantin.
Consequently, the charge against the two respondents (i.e. representing

conflicting interests and abetting a scheme to frustrate the execution or
satisfaction of a judgment which Bongalonta and her husband might obtain
against the Abuel spouses) has no leg to stand on.
However, as to the fact that indeed the two respondents placed in their
appearances and in their pleadings the same IBP No. "246722 dated
1-12-88", respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo deserves to be SUSPENDED
for using, apparently thru his negligence, the IBP official receipt number of
respondent Atty. Alfonso M. Martija. According to the records of the IBP
National Office, Atty. Castillo paid P1,040.00 as his delinquent and current
membership dues, on February 20, 1990, under IBP O.R. No. 2900538,
after Bongalonta filed her complaint with the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline.
The explanation of Atty. Castillo's Cashier-Secretary by the name of Ester

Fraginal who alleged in her affidavit dated March 4, 1993, that it was all her
fault in placing the IBP official receipt number pertaining to Atty. Alfonso M.
Martija in the appearance and pleadings Atty. Castillo and in failing to pay
in due time the IBP membership dues of her employer, deserves scant
consideration, for it is the bounded duty and obligation of every lawyer to
Page 97 of 151
see to it that he pays his IBP membership dues on time, especially when he
practices before the courts, as required by the Supreme Court.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Pablito M. Castillo

be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months for
using the IBP Official Receipt No. of his co-respondent Atty. Alfonso M.
Martija.
The complaint against Atty. Martija is hereby DISMISSED for lack of

evidence. (pp. 2-4, Resolution)
The Court agrees with the foregoing findings and recommendations. It is well to stress
again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those
who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law
for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of
honesty and candor. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from
the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the
fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. for this reason, he is required to swear to do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Pablito M. Castillo guilty committing a falsehood

in violation of his lawyer's oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court
Resolved to SUSPEND him from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a
warning that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the
imposition of a more severe penalty. A copy of the Resolution shall be spread on the
personal record of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Page 98 of 151
CASE 8

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-

TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C.
ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other
individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan
on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe
physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university
fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea
bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the
lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the
trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused
individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation
with the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June
1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation
was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation
officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to
Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal
conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar
Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the
Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
Page 99 of 151
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the
attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro
T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994.
We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time
of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then,
Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission
to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to

everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good
moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified. 2 The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is
stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as
having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent

to the applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina,
and of which he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court,
includes all the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is
something more than an absence of bad character. It is the good name
which the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through
association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself
as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such
character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least
resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is
right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently
proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as
counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's
fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient
ofunbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's
property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of
the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of
justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx 4
In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926)

191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
Page 100 of 151

It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations
to deviate from the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of
circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For these reasons the
wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high
moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar
examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination
to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission to
practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the
conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the
moral character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to the
bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and
prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his
profession, and has established himself therein, a far more difficult situation
is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment
and for the recalling and annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan: 6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as
in the right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege
granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in
intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an
absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has
been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit
from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the
profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to
remain in it.
Re Rouss: 7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair

private and professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an
unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past offense: an examination into
character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they
may not only protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to
assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or
assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required to be of
good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court, which
they are, may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law,
and it is of the highest possible consequence that both those who have not
such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen
Page 101 of 151

therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the

administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of
greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice
are concerned, than the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.]
288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no

person to the practice of the law unless he covered an upright
moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is
more important, if anything, to the public and to the proper
administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning
may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the
threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances
are that his character will remain bad, and that he will become
a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling a
curse instead of a benefit to his community a Quirk, a
Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin. 9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those
seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly
broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his

admission to practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the

California Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character
unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts which would be cause for
his disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is
broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court
may receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's character as
respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse
admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts
declared to be causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek
admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct
expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a
Page 102 of 151

general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with
inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal
system as we know it. 12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of
the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely
accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the
death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on
the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed
to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had,
by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them
that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray
dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon
Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally
irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then
possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court
is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has
purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress
that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated
not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also,
and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the
attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration,
evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may
consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who
have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for
a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by
Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the
senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the
community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show
that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the
ancient and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof,
brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of
Raul Camaligan.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Page 103 of 151

Bellosillo, J. is on leave.
Footnotes
1 There is some indication that clerical error attended the grant of

permission to take the 1993 Bar Examinations. The En Banc Resolution of
this Court dated 24 August 1993 entitled "Re: Applications to Take the 1993
Bar Examinations," stated on page 2 thereof:
"The Court further Resolved to ALLOW the following

candidates with dismissed charges or complaints, to take the
1993 Bar Examinations:
xxx xxx xxx
3349. Al C. Argosino
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
In fact, applicant Argosino had been convicted and sentenced and then
paroled.
2 G.A. Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics (1949), at p. 13; In Re Parazo,

82 Phil. 230, 242 (1948), reiterated in Tan v. Sabandal, 206 SCRA 473, 481
(1992).
3 131 S.E. 661 (1926).
4 131 S.E. at 663.
5 69 Idaho 297, 206 P2d 528 (1949).
6 314 Mass 544, 50 NE 2d 785 (1943).
7 221 NY 81, 116 NE 782 (1917).
8 43 Mich 289, 5 NW 309 (1880).
Page 104 of 151

9 In Re Farmer, supra at 663.
10 15 Cal 2d 71, 98 P2d 489 (1940).
11 174 Cal 467, 163 P 657 (1917).
12 See generally, Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc. (En Banc), 223 SCRA 378, 409
(1993).
Page 105 of 151

CASE 9

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
July 30, 1979
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME

"SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO."
LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G.
HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN,
JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H.
CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ,
ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG,
ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN,petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE

USE OF THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA &
REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN
MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO
DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:+.wph!1
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of Atty.
Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty.
Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to
continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away.
In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under a firm
name which includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil
Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it provides in the last paragraph
that: t.hqw
Page 106 of 151

The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the

partnership name, or the name of a deceased partner as part thereof, shall
not of itself make the individual property of the deceased partner liable for
any debts contracted by such person or partnership. 1
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature

has authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in such
firm name, of the name of a deceased partner; 2 the legislative authorization given to
those engaged in the practice of accountancy a profession requiring the same degree
of trust and confidence in respect of clients as that implicit in the relationship of attorney
and client to acquire and use a trade name, strongly indicates that there is no
fundamental policy that is offended by the continued use by a firm of professionals of a
firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where such firm name
has acquired the characteristics of a "trade name." 3
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the
name of a deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares
that: t.hqw
... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when
permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that
no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. ... 4
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their respective

deceased partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general circulation for
several days; the stationeries now being used by them carry new letterheads indicating
the years when their respective deceased partners were connected with the firm;
petitioners will notify all leading national and international law directories of the fact of
their respective deceased partners' deaths. 5
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a

professional firm's name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in
the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily
Identifies the individual members of the firm. 7
6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships
has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal
profession of most countries in the world. 8
The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this Court in
1953 when a law firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of including in its
firm name that of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was resolved with this
Court advising the firm to desist from including in their firm designation the name of C. D.
Johnston, who has long been dead."
Page 107 of 151

The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-11964,
entitled Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of
Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the
Court, in a Resolution of April 15, 1957, stated that it "would like to be informed why the
name of Perkins is still being used although Atty. E. A. Perkins is already dead." In a
Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins and Ponce Enrile, raising
substantially the same arguments as those now being raised by petitioners, prayed that
the continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: t.hqw
After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso Ponce

Enrile and Associates for their continued use of the name of the deceased
E. G. Perkins, the Court found no reason to depart from the policy it adopted
in June 1953 when it required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen
of Cebu City to desist from including in their firm designation, the name of
C. D. Johnston, deceased. The Court believes that, in view of the personal
and confidential nature of the relations between attorney and client, and the
high standards demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice
should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to the
possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the
name "PERKINS" from their firm name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by the
Court.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.
A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta,

Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnership
names of the names of deceased partners will run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil
Code which provides: t.hqw
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which may or
may not include the name of one or more of the partners.
Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in
the firm name, shall be subject to the liability, of a partner.
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must
either be those of living partners and. in the case of non-partners, should be living persons
who can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third
person from including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a
partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the old
members to the creditors of a firm particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon
34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits an agreement for the payment to the
Page 108 of 151

widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees
received from the future business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the
recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such payments will not represent
service or responsibility on the part of the recipient. " Accordingly, neither the widow nor
the heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death of their lawyer-
predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no corresponding liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law firms
of the names of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm
name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the
profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself
starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on
that old firm's reputation established by deceased partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by
petitioners, supra, the first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the
Code entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article primarily deals with the
exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of the individual property of
the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or partnership which continues
the business using the partnership name or the name of the deceased partner as part
thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to formal
reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to protect
rather than of aprofessional partnership, with no saleable good will but whose reputation
depends on the personal qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held
that a saleable goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot arise in a
professional partnership consisting of lawyers. 9t.hqw
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the

succeeding partners or parties have the right to carry on the business under
the old name, in the absence of a stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name
of a commercial partnership is a partnership asset inseparable from the
good will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, t.hqw
... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends or; the

individual skill of the members, such as partnerships of attorneys or
physicians, has no good win to be distributed as a firm asset on its
dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill and reputation may be,
especially where there is no provision in the partnership agreement relating
to good will as an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
Page 109 of 151

C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other
professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows
the use of a trade name in connection with the practice of accountancy. 10 t.hqw
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere

relationship or association for a particular purpose. ... It is not a partnership
formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding
property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that "the use of a nom de plume,
assumed or trade name in law practice is improper. 12
The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being applicable
to the practice of law from those pertaining to business is that the law is a
profession.
Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the

Legal Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5)
defines a profession as "a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common
calling in the spirit of public service, no less a public service because it
may incidentally be a means of livelihood."
xxx xxx xxx
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business

are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a byproduct, and in

which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of justice involving

thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and

unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. 13
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature of a
privilege or franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. 15 The right does not only presuppose in its
possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special
privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust." 16
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar
Association" in support of their petitions.
Page 110 of 151

It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of
a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice
is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should be taken that no
imposition or deception is practiced through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the
continued use of a deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law
partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, Identify the more active and/or more senior
members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of petitioners
and of other law firms in this country would show how their firm names have evolved and
changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership changed. t.hqw
The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the
partners designated by it is proper only where sustained by local custom
and not where by custom this purports to Identify the active members. ...
There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as to

the propriety of adding the name of a new partner and at the same time
retaining that of a deceased partner who was never a partner with the new
one. (H.S. Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied).
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name of a
deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search of legal
counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm
title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of a
deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because it
is sanctioned by custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which
petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme Court
sustained the use of the firm name Alexander & Green even if none of the present ten
partners of the firm bears either name because the practice was sanctioned by
custom and did not offend any statutory provision or legislative policy and was adopted
by agreement of the parties. The Court stated therein: t.hqw
The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and

offends no statutory provision or legislative policy. Canon 33 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics of both the American Bar Association and the New
York State Bar Association provides in part as follows: "The continued use
of the name of a deceased or former partner, when permissible by local
custom is not unethical, but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use." There is no question as to local
custom. Many firms in the city use the names of deceased members with
the approval of other attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The
Page 111 of 151

Appellate Division of the First Department has considered the matter and
reached The conclusion that such practice should not be prohibited.
(Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in
question. The use of the firm name herein is also sustainable by reason of
agreement between the partners. 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice.
Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly
observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. 19 Courts take no
judicial notice of custom. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of
evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice
unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other
fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite
to constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of
practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as
a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social custom. The former
can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with
the latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal
system. 22 When the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions
directing lawyers to desist from including the names of deceased partners in their firm
designation, it laid down a legal rule against which no custom or practice to the contrary,
even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil law which clearly ordains that
a partnership is dissolved by the death of any partner. 23 Custom which are contrary to
law, public order or public policy shall not be countenanced. 24
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of justice and
should not be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade." t.hqw
... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of public

service. A trade ... aims primarily at personal gain; a profession at the
exercise of powers beneficial to mankind. If, as in the era of wide free
opportunity, we think of free competitive self assertion as the highest good,
lawyer and grocer and farmer may seem to be freely competing with their
fellows in their calling in order each to acquire as much of the world's good
as he may within the allowed him by law. But the member of a profession
does not regard himself as in competition with his professional brethren. He
is not bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the products
of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn. There should be
no such thing as a lawyers' or physicians' strike. The best service of the
professional man is often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling
Page 112 of 151

equivalent and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his

profession even if done with no expectation of reward, This spirit of public
service in which the profession of law is and ought to be exercised is a
prerequisite of sound administration of justice according to law. The other
two elements of a profession, namely, organization and pursuit of a learned
art have their justification in that they secure and maintain that spirit. 25
In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the public
must bow to legal and ethical impediment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop the
names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names may,
however, be included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms
indicating the years during which they served as such.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur
Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the
Justices being of the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the undersigned did not
participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the law office of Sycip, Salazar,
Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip, and
Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of
the undersigned, and the most junior partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his
brother- in-law. For the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all
concerned, and not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be
included in the listing of individuals wtes
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez &
Castillo, in their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of that
firm name, notwithstanding the death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May
Page 113 of 151

he rest in peace). He was the founder of the firm which was originally known as the Sycip
Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De
Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed
to continue using the said firm name notwithstanding the death of two partners, former
Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976,
respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which
was established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm,
the name Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name of
a deceased partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also
invoked is the canon that the continued use by a law firm of the name of a deceased
partner, "when permissible by local custom, is not unethical" as long as "no imposition or
deception is practised through this use" (Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated
in the letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former
Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served as partners
should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their
deceased founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services
of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of
those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the
war by the law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder
of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the
firm name with an indication of the year when he died. No one complained that the
retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm name was illegal or unethical.
# Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of the
Justices being of the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the undersigned did not
participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the law office of Sycip, Salazar,
Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip, and
Page 114 of 151

Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of
the undersigned, and the most junior partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his
brother- in-law. For the record, the undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all
concerned, and not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be
included in the listing of individuals wtes
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez &
Castillo, in their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use of that
firm name, notwithstanding the death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May
he rest in peace). He was the founder of the firm which was originally known as the Sycip
Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De
Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed
to continue using the said firm name notwithstanding the death of two partners, former
Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976,
respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office which
was established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm,
the name Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the name of
a deceased partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions. Also
invoked is the canon that the continued use by a law firm of the name of a deceased
partner, "when permissible by local custom, is not unethical" as long as "no imposition or
deception is practised through this use" (Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be indicated
in the letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip, former
Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they served as partners
should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their
deceased founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal services
of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of
those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before the
war by the law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the founder
of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the
firm name with an indication of the year when he died. No one complained that the
retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm name was illegal or unethical.
Page 115 of 151

#Footnotest.hqw
1 See Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 5: see also Petition of Romulo, et

al., p. 3.
2 Citing Sec, 16-A, Public Act No. 3105, as amended by Commonwealth

Act No. 342; Sec. 39, Commonwealth Act No. 294; Sec. 23, Republic Act
No. 318; Sec. 39, Republic Act No. 184.
3 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 7-8.
4 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 8-10; Petition of Romulo, et al., pp. 3-

4.
5 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 13; Petition of Romulo, et al., p. 4.
6 Petition of Romulo, et al., p. 4.
7 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 11.
8 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 6-7 and pp. 16-18; Petition of Romulo.
et al., p, 5.
9 Seddal vs. Keating, 8 App. Div. 2d 44, 185 NYS 2d 630, affd 7 NY 2d 846,
196 NYS 2d 986, 164 NE 2d 860.
10 Section 16-A, Commonwealth Act No. 342.
11 In re Crawford's Estate, 184 NE 2d 779, 783.
12 H.S. Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953), p. 206; see also Canon 33, par. 2,
Canons of Professional Ethics.
13 H.S, Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953) pp. 4-5.
14 7 C.J.S. 708.
15 Am Jur 270.
16 In re Lavine, 41 P2d 161, all cited in Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics,
Fifth Ed., p. 8.
17 Canons 1 to 32 which were adopted by the American Bar Association in

1908 were also adopted by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. The
American Bar Association adopted Canons 33 to 45 in 1928, Canon 46 in
1933 and Canon 47 in 1937. On April 20, 1946, when Canons 33 to 47
Page 116 of 151

where already in effect, the Revised Constitution of the Philippine Bar

Association was approved and it provided that the Association "adopts and
makes its own the Code of Ethics of the American Bar Association." (Martin,
Legal and Judicial Ethics, Fifth Ed. p, 341).
18 33 N.Y.S. 2d 733, 734.
19 JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Philippine Civil Law. Fourth Ed., Vol.
I, p. 7
20 Article 12, Civil Code.
21 Patriarca vs. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).
22 Art. 8, Civil Code
23 Art. 1830, Civil Code.
24 Art. 11, Civil Code.
25 Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer From Antiquity To Modern Times, (1953),

pp. 9-10.
Page 117 of 151

CASE 10

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4663 May 30, 1951
FERDINAND E. MARCOS and MANUEL CONCORDIA, petitioners,

vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET
AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. L-4671 May 30, 1951
MANUEL A. CONCORDIA and FERDINAND E. MARCOS, petitioners,

vs.
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET
AL., respondents.
Petitioners in their own behalf.

Judge Advocate General Fred Ruiz Castro and Leonardo R. Lucena for respondents.
FERIA, J.:
These are two special civil actions of mandamus instituted by the same petitioners against
the respondents General Court-Martials composed each of different members or officers
of the Philippine Army, in which it is alleged that the respondents Military Tribunals
excluded unlawfully the petitioners from the enjoyment of their right to appear as counsel
for the accused prosecuted before said tribunals, to which the petitioners are entitled
because they are attorneys duly admitted to practice law in the Philippine Courts, on the
ground that they are disqualified or inhibited by section 17, Article 17 of the Constitution
to appear as counsel for said defendants. Said Section 17 reads as follows:
SEC. 17. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall directly or

indirectly be financially interested in any contract with the Government or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof, or in any franchise or special privilege
granted by the Congress during his term of office. He shall not appear as counsel
before the Electoral Tribunals or before any court in any civil case wherein the
Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or
Page 118 of 151
in any criminal case wherein an offer or employee of the Government is accused

of an offense committed in relation to his office. . . ..
The only question for this Court to determine in these two cases is whether the prohibition
contained in the above quoted section 17 of our Constitution is applicable to the
petitioners.
We are of the opinion and therefore hold that it is applicable, because the words "any
court" includes the General Court-Martial, and a court-martial case is a criminal case
within the meaning of the above quoted provisions of our Constitution.
It is obvious that the words "any court," used in prohibiting members of Congress to
appear as counsel "in any criminal case in which an officer or employee of the
Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office," refers, not only
to a civil, but also to a military court or a Court-Martial. Because, in construing a
Constitution, "it must be taken as established that where words are used which have both
a restricted and a general meaning, the general must prevail over the restricted unless
the nature of the subject matter of the context clearly indicates that the limited sense is
intended." (11 American Jurisprudence, pp. 680-682).
In the case of Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army,* 43 Off. Gaz., 855,
we did not hold that the word "court" in general used in our Constitution does not include
a Court-Martial; what we held is that the words "inferior courts" used in connection with
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to "review on appealcertiorari or writ of
error, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments of inferior courts in all
criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment," as provided
for in section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution, do not refer to Courts-Martial or Military
Courts.
Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, quoted by the petitioners and by this Court in
the case of Ramon Ruffy et al vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, supra, has to say
in this connection the following:
Notwithstanding that the court-martial is only an instrumentality of the executive

power having no relation or connection, in law, with the judicial establishments of
the country, it is yet, so far as it is a court at all, and within its field of action, as fully
a court of law and justice as is any civil tribunal. As a court of law, it is bound, like
any court, by the fundamental principles of law, and, in the absence of special
provision of the subject in the military code, it observes in general the rules of
evidence as adopted in the common-law courts. As a court of justice, it is required
by the terms of its statutory oath, (art. 84.) to adjudicate between the U.S. an the
accused "without partiality, favor, or affection," and according, not only to the laws
and customs of the service, but to its "conscience," i.e. its sense of substantial right
and justice unaffected by technicalities. In the words of the Attorney General, court-
martial are thus, "in the strictest sense courts of justice. (Winthrop's Military Law
and Precedents, Vol. 1 and 2, 2nd Ed., p. 54.)
Page 119 of 151

In re Bogart, 3 Fed. Cas., 796, 801, citing 6 Op. Attys. Gen. 425, with approval, the court
said:
In the language of Attorney General Cushing, a court-martial is a lawful tribunal

existing by the same authority that any other exists by, and the law military is a
branch of law as valid as any other, and it differs from the general law of the land
in authority only in this: that it applies to officers and soldiers of the army but not to
other members of the body politic, and that it is limited to breaches of military duty.
And in re Davison, 21 F. 618, 620, it was held:
That court-martial are lawful tribunals existing by the same authority as civil courts
of the United States, have the same plenary jurisdiction in offenses by the law
military as the latter courts have in controversies within their cognizance, and in
their special and more limited sphere are entitled to as untrammeled an exercise
of their powers.
And lastly, American Jurisprudence says:
SEC. 99. Representation by Counsel. It is the general rule that one accused of
the crime has the right to be represented before the court by counsel, and this is
expressly so declared by the statues controlling the procedure in court-martial. It
has been held that a constitutional provision extending that right to one accused in
any trial in any court whatever applies to a court-martial and gives the accused the
undeniable right to defend by counsel, and that a court-martial has no power to
refuse an attorney the right to appear before it if he is properly licensed to practice
in the courts of the state. (Citing the case of State ex rel Huffaker vs.Crosby, 24
Nev. 115, 50 Pac. 127; 36 American Jurisprudence 253)
The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of acquittal, rendered by a court-martial must
be approved by the reviewing authority before it can be executed (Article of War 46), does
not change or affect the character of a court-martial as a court. A judgment of the Court
of First Instance imposing death penalty must also be approved by the Supreme Court
before it can be executed.
That court-martial cases are criminal cases within the meaning of Section 17, Article VI,
of the Constitution is also evident, because the crimes and misdemeanors forbidden or
punished by the Articles of War are offenses against the Republic of the Philippines.
According to section 1, Rule 106, of the Rules of Court, a criminal action or case is one
which involves a wrong or injury done to the Republic, for the punishment of which the
offender is prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines; and pursuant to Article
of War 17, "the trial advocate of a general or special court-martial shall prosecute (the
accused) in the name of the People of the Philippines."
Winthtrop, in his well known work "Military Law and Precedents' says the following:
Page 120 of 151

In regard to the class of courts to which it belongs, it is lastly to be noted that the
court-martial is strictly a criminal court. It has no civil jurisdiction whatever; cannot
enforce a contract, collect a debt, or award damages in favor of an individual. . . .
Its judgment is a criminal sentence not a civil verdict; its proper function is to award
punishment upon the ascertainment of guilt. (Winthrop's Military Law and
Precedents, Vols. 1 & 2, 2nd Ed., p. 55.)
In N. Y. it was held that the term "criminal case," used in the clause, must be
allowed some meaning, and none can be conceived, other than a prosecution for
a criminal offense. Ex parte Carter. 66 S. W. 540, 544, 166 No. 604, 57 L.R.A. 654,
quoting People vs. Kelly, 24 N.Y. 74; Counselman vs. Hitchcock, 12 S. Ct. 195;
142 U.S. 547, L. Ed. 111o. (Words and Phrases, Vol. 10, p. 485.)
Besides, that a court-martial is a court, and the prosecution of an accused before it is a

criminal and not an administrative case, and therefore it would be, under certain
conditions, a bar to another prosecution of the defendant for the same offense, because
the latter would place the accused in jeopardy, is shown by the decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Grafton vs. United States, 206 U. S. 333; 51
Law. Ed., 1088, 1092, in which the following was held:
If a court-martial has jurisdiction to try an officer or soldier for a crime, its judgment
will be accorded the finality and conclusiveness as to the issues involved which
attend the judgment of a civil court in a case of which it may legally take
cognizance; and restricting our decision to the above question of double jeopardy,
we judge that, consistently with the above act of 1902, and for the reasons stated,
the plaintiff in error, a soldier in the Army, having been acquitted of the crime of
homicide, alleged to have been committed by him in the Philippines, by a military
court of competent jurisdiction, proceeding under the authority of the United States,
could not be subsequently tried for the same offense in a civil court exercising
authority in that territory.
Furthermore, taking into consideration the apparent intention or purpose of the framers
of our Constitution in enacting section 17, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution, it is
obvious that there exist the same if not more reason for prohibiting the appearance of
members of the Senate and the House of Representatives as counsel for the accused in
court-martial, as for inhibiting them to appear as such in civil courts, because the
independence of civil court's judges is guaranteed by our Constitution. Ubi eadem ibi
eadem lex.
Wherefore, as the petitioners are disqualified to appear as counsel for the accused in
court-martial, the respondents did not unlawfully exclude them from the enjoyment of any
right, and hence the petitions for mandamus in these two cases are denied with costs
against the petitioners.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Reyes, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
Page 121 of 151

MONTEMAYOR, J.:
I disqualify myself.
Footnotes
* 75 Phil., 875.
Page 122 of 151

CASE 11

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-51813-14 November 29, 1983
ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V.

LUCILA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court
of Paraaque, Metro Manila, and FISCAL LEODEGARIO C.
QUILATAN, respondents.
Froilan M. Bacungan and Alfredo F. Tadiar for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
RELOVA, J.: +.w ph!1
Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of respondent Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of the then
Municipal Court of Paraaque, Metro Manila, disallowing the appearances of petitioners Nelson B.
Malana and Robert V. Lucila as private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550, both
for less serious physical injuries, filed against Pat. Danilo San Antonio and Pat. Rodolfo Diaz,
respectively, as well as the Order, dated September 4, 1979, denying the motion for reconsideration
holding, among others, that "the fiscal's claim that appearances of friends of party-litigants should be
allowed only in places where there is a scarcity of legal practitioner, to be well founded. For, if we are
to allow non-members of the bar to appear in court and prosecute cases or defend litigants in the guise
of being friends of the litigants, then the requirement of membership in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the additional requirement of paying professional taxes for a lawyer to appear in court,
would be put to naught. " (p. 25, Rollo)
Records show that on April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal complaints
against Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical injuries, respectively,
and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 in the then Municipal Court of
Paraaque, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law students of the
U.P.assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid. Thus, in August 1979, petitioners
Malana and Lucila filed their separate appearances, as friends of complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan.
Herein respondent Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the appearances of said petitioners, and
respondent judge, in an Order dated August 16, 1979, sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed
Page 123 of 151

the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila, as private prosecutors in said criminal cases.
Likewise, on September 4, 1979, respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayers, among others, that the
Orders of respondent judge, dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979, be set aside as they are
in plain violation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and/or were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Upon motion, the Court, on November 8, 1979, issued a
temporary restraining order "enjoining respondent judge and all persons acting for and in his behalf
from conducting any proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 (People of the Philippines vs. Danilo
San Antonio) and 58559 (People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Diaz) of the Municipal Court of
Paraaque, Metro Manila on November 15, 1979 as scheduled or on any such dates as may be fixed
by said respondent judge.
Basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states: t.hqw
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar a party to an action is authorized to appear in court and
conduct his own case; and, in the inferior courts, the litigant may be aided by a friend or agent or by
an attorney. However, in the Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, he can be aided only
by an attorney.
On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that pursuant to Sections 4 and 15, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who is empowered to determine who shall be the private
prosecutor as was done by respondent fiscal when he objected to the appearances of petitioners
Malana and Lucila. Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provide: t.hqw
SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions. All criminal actions either
commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction
and control of the fiscal.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. Unless the offended
party has waived the civil action or expressly reserved the right to institute it separately
from the criminal action, and subject to the provisions of section 4 hereof, he may
intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.
And, they contend that the exercise by the offended party to intervene is subject to the direction and
control of the fiscal and that his appearance, no less than his active conduct of the case later on,
requires the prior approval of the fiscal.
We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that in the
municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent appointed by him
for the purpose. Thus, in the case of Laput vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, a law student was allowed to
represent the accused in a case pending before the then Municipal Court, the City Court of Manila,
who was charged for damages to property through reckless imprudence. "It is accordingly our view
Page 124 of 151
that error was committed in the municipal court in not allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent
or friend of Catalino Salas to aid the latter in conducting his defense." The permission of the fiscal is
not necessary for one to enter his appearance as private prosecutor. In the first place, the law does
not impose this condition. What the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the case personally is to
disallow the private prosecutor's participation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in the trial of the case.
On the other hand, if the fiscal desires the active participation of the private prosecutor, he can just
manifest to the court that the private prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the
case under his supervision and control. Further, We may add that if a non-lawyer can appear as
defense counsel or as friend of the accused in a case before the municipal trial court, with more reason
should he be allowed to appear as private prosecutor under the supervision and control of the trial
fiscal.
In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Paraaque, petitioner Cantimbuhan, as
the offended party, did not expressly waive the civil action nor reserve his right to institute it separately
and, therefore, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted in said criminal cases. Thus, said
complainant Romulo Cantimbuhan has personal interest in the success of the civil action and, in the
prosecution of the same, he cannot be deprived of his right to be assisted by a friend who is not a
lawyer.
WHEREFORE, the Orders issued by respondent judge dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979
which disallowed the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as friends of
party-litigant petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan. are hereby SET ASIDE and respondent judge is hereby
ordered to ALLOW the appearance and intervention of petitioners Malana and Lucila as friends of
Romulo Cantimbuhan. Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on November 8, 1979 is
LIFTED.
SO ORDERED. 1w ph1.t
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin and Gutierrez, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
Senior law students should study their lessons anti prepare for the bar. They have no business
appearing in court.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that it is "a party" who may conduct
his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose in the Court
of a Justice of the Peace. Romulo Cantimbuhan, as the complaining witness in Criminal Cases Nos.
58549 and 58550 of the then Municipal Court of Paraaque, Metro Manila, is not a "party" within the
meaning of the said Rule. The parties in a criminal case are the accused and the People. A
Page 125 of 151

complaining witness or an offended party only intervene in a criminal action in respect of the civil
liability. The case of Laput and Salas vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, is authority only in respect of the
accused, as a "party", in a criminal case.
Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, being the more specific provisions in respect of
criminal cases, should take precedence over Section 34, Rule 138 and should be controlling
(Bagatsing vs. Hon. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306 [1976]). Section 4 provides that all criminal actions shall
be prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal, while Section 15 specifically provides that
the offended party may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.
I vote, therefore, to uphold the Order of respondent Municipal Judge, dated August 16, 1979,
disallowing the appearances of petitioners as private prosecutors in the abovementioned criminal
cases. Orders set aside.
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin and Gutierrez, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
appearing in court.
cases. Orders set aside.
Page 126 of 151

De Castro, Teehankee, JJ., concur
Separate Opinions
appearing in court.
cases.
De Castro, Teehankee, JJ., concurs with the dissent of Assoc. Justice Herrera.
Page 127 of 151

CASE 12

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON.
ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on pure
questions of law, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May 3, 2002
promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137,
which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705;1 and the RTCs Order dated June 5,
2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this
Court.
The antecedents:
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of
Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his father,
Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private
prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En
Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as
an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the
prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be
his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear
as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in
conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence
over the ruling of the Court laid down inCantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.3
On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to
reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does
Page 128 of 151

not have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the
source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.
In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer
for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent and the
public respondent MeTC.
After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge from
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a
Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that
the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted
de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention of a private
prosecutor is not legally tenable.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner
argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And
last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the
appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even
without the supervision of a member of the bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner filed
a Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC seeking the reversal of the
March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to
Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome
of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioners Second Motion for
Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had already
denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.
On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns the
following errors:
I.
the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for the writ
of injunction of the herein petitioner despite petitioner having established the necessity of granting the
writ;
II.
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE

OF THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN
PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID
BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW;
Page 129 of 151

III.
THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT

DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE
RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE ON
THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;
IV.
THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY
REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND
BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE
OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTCS).4
This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the
issues reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.5
Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of Section 34,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law student practice
and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes
cognizance of herein petition.
The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an
agent or friend of a party litigant.
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules
of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of his father,
the private complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by
the law school.
Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd
year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's
clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation
in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent
indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the
direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by
the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must
be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:
Page 130 of 151

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity
without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct
his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the
aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the
supervision of a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to
"In the court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:8
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid
of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney
and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis
supplied)
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on
September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the
term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the
former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed,
while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party
litigant, may appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have
been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of appearance.
Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as private
prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioners
appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed,
irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by
virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant,
without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may
flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is
not possible.
It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In denying
the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no claim for civil
liability by the private complainant for damages, and that the records of the case do not provide for a
claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioners appearance as private prosecutor appears to be
legally untenable.
Page 131 of 151

Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage, violation
of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular representation.9 The basic rule
applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action.10
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the
civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is
deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene
to prosecute the civil aspect.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-
1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. >MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
Page 132 of 151
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Entitled, People of the Philippines v. Alberto Mina.
2 211 Phil. 373, 378 (1983).
3 Rollo, p. 26.
4 Rollo, pp. 7-9.
5United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, G.R. No. 163858, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 574, 593; Ark
Travel Express, Inc. v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 137010, August 29, 2003, 410 SCRA 148, 157.
6 273 SCRA xi.
7 Id. at xiii-xiv.
8 See Bulacan v. Torcino, G.R. No. L-44388, January 30, 1985, 134 SCRA 252, 257-258
9Sanchez v. Far East Bank and Trust Co., G.R. No. 155309, November 15, 2005, 475 SCRA
97, 111.
10 Chua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150793, November 19, 2004, 443 SCRA 259, 267-268.
Page 133 of 151

CASE 13

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1582 October 10, 1947
TEOFILO PAAR, petitioner,

vs.
FORTUNATO V. BORROMEO ET AL., respondents.
The petitioner in his own behalf.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Francisco
Carreon for respondents.
MORAN, C.J.:
Teofilo Paar is charge in Manila with treason before the People's Court, and prayed that
he be assisted in his defense by Andres R. Camasura who is not a member of the bar.
The People's Court denied the petition, hence, this action for mandamus.
Section 3 and 4 Rule 112 are as follows:
SEC. 3. Duty of court to inform defendant of his right to have attorney. If the
defendant appears without a attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is
his right to have attorney before being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires
the aid of attorney. If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must
assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for
procuring attorney.
SEC. 4. Who may be appointed attorney `de oficio'. The attorney so employed
or assigned must be a duty authorized member of the Bar. But in provinces where
duly authorized members of the bar are not available, the court may, in its
discretion, admit or assign a person, resident in the province and of good repute
for probity and ability, to aid the defendant in his defense, although the person so
admitted or assigned be not a duly authorized member of the Bar.
Section 29 and 31 of Rule 127 read:
Page 134 of 151

SEC. 29. Attorney for destitute litigants. "A superior court may assign an
attorney to render professional aid free of charge to any party in a case, if upon
investigation it appears that the party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney,
and that the services of counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and
to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney so assigned to
render the required service, unless he is excused there from by the court for
sufficient cause shown."
SEC. 31. By whom litigation conducted. In the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court
a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the
bar.lawphil.net
It is clear form these provisions that in Manila where there are many members of the bar,
defendants in the People's Court may be assisted only by members of the bar.
Petition denied, without costs.
Paras, Feria, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.
MORAN, C.J.:
I certify that Mr. Justice Pablo concurs in this decision.
Page 135 of 151

CASE 14

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 169517 March 14, 2006
ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA TAN and MALIYAWAO

PAGAYOKAN, Petitioners,
vs.
BENEDICTO M. BALAJADIA, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is an original petition1 for contempt filed by petitioners Rogelio Tan, Norma Tan
and Maliyawao Pagayokan against respondent Benedicto Balajadia.
Petitioners allege that on May 8, 2005, respondent filed a criminal case against them with
the Office of the City of Prosecutor of Baguio City for usurpation of authority, grave
coercion and violation of city tax ordinance due to the alleged illegal collection of parking
fees by petitioners from respondent. In paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit, respondent
asserted that he is a "practicing lawyer based in Baguio City with office address at Room
B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City."2 However, certifications issued
by the Office of the Bar Confidant3 and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines4 showed that
respondent has never been admitted to the Philippine Bar. Hence, petitioners claim that
respondent is liable for indirect contempt for misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.
In his Comment,5 respondent avers that the allegation in paragraph 5 of the complaint-
affidavit that he is a practicing lawyer was an honest mistake. He claims that the secretary
of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the subject complaint-affidavit which was patterned after
Atty. Aquinos complaint-affidavit.6 It appears that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a
complaint-affidavit against petitioners involving the same subject matter.
Respondent claims that two complaint-affidavits were drafted by the same secretary; one
for the May 5, 2005 parking incident at 10:00 oclock in the morning and another for the
parking incident on the same date but which occurred at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon.
Respondent insists that the complaint-affidavit regarding the 1:00 oclock parking incident
correctly alleged that he is "a businessman with office address at Room B-204, 2/F Lopez
Building, Session Road, Baguio City."7 However, the complaint-affidavit regarding the
Page 136 of 151

10:00 oclock parking incident, which is the subject of the instant petition, erroneously
referred to him as a practicing lawyer because Atty. Aquinos secretary copied verbatim
paragraph 5 of Atty. Aquinos complaint-affidavit. Hence, it was inadvertently alleged that
respondent is a "practicing lawyer based in Baguio City with office address at Room B-
207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City," which statement referred to the
person of Atty. Aquino and his law office address.
Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquinos secretary, executed an affidavit8 admitting the mistake in
the preparation of the complaint-affidavit. Respondent alleged that he did not read the
complaint-affidavit because he assumed that the two complaint-affidavits contained the
same allegations with respect to his occupation and office address. Respondent claims
that he had no intention of misrepresenting himself as a practicing lawyer.
In their Reply,9 petitioners reiterate that respondent should be made liable for indirect
contempt for having made untruthful statements in the complaint-affidavit and that he
cannot shift the blame to Atty. Aquinos secretary.
The sole issue for resolution is whether respondent is liable for indirect contempt.
Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon
within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a
person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxxx
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without

authority;
x x x x.
In several cases,10 we have ruled that the unauthorized practice of law by assuming to
be an attorney and acting as such without authority constitutes indirect contempt which
is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. The liability for the unauthorized practice
of law under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is in the nature of criminal
contempt and the acts are punished because they are an affront to the dignity and
authority of the court, and obstruct the orderly administration of justice. In determining
liability for criminal contempt, well-settled is the rule that intent is a necessary element,
and no one can be punished unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to
commit it.11
In the case at bar, a review of the records supports respondents claim that he never
intended to project himself as a lawyer to the public. It was a clear inadvertence on the
part of the secretary of Atty Aquino. The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the
Page 137 of 151

circumstances that gave rise to the mistake in the drafting of the complaint-affidavit
conforms to the documentary evidence on record. Taken together, these circumstances
show that the allegation in paragraph 5 of respondents complaint-affidavit was, indeed,
the result of inadvertence.
Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was
the result of inadvertence and cannot, by itself, establish intent as to make him liable for
indirect contempt. In the cases where we found a party liable for the unauthorized practice
of law, the party was guilty of some overt act like signing court pleadings on behalf of his
client;12 appearing before court hearings as an attorney;13 manifesting before the court
that he will practice law despite being previously denied admission to the bar;14 or
deliberately attempting to practice law and holding out himself as an attorney through
circulars with full knowledge that he is not licensed to do so.15
In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent acted as an
attorney or that he intended to practice law. Consequently, he cannot be made liable for
indirect contempt considering his lack of intent to illegally practice law.
However, while the evidence on record failed to prove respondents deliberate intent to
misrepresent himself as an attorney and act as such without authority, he is hereby
warned to be more careful and circumspect in his future actions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Respondent is WARNED to be more careful

and circumspect in his future actions.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Page 138 of 151

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 3-7.
2 Id. at 22.
3 Id. at 33.
4 Id. at 32.
5 Id. at 70-72.
6 Id. at 75.
7 Id. at 78.
8 Id. at 86.
9 Id. at 91-94.
10People v. Santocildes, Jr., 378 Phil. 943, 950 (1999); Re: Elmo S. Abad, 217
Phil. 431, 434 (1984); People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968, 975-978 (1958); United
States v. Ney, 8 Phil. 146, 148-149 (1907).
11 People v. Godoy, 312 Phil. 977, 999 (1995).
12 Re: Elmo S. Abad, supra note 10.
13 Id.
14 People v. De Luna, supra note 10.
15 United States v. Ney, supra note 10.
Page 139 of 151

CASE 15

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6483 August 31, 2007
NICOLAS O. TAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. AMADEO E. BALON, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On July 13, 2004, Nicolas O. Tan filed a complaint against Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr. for
misappropriation of funds and issuance of bum checks.
Tan alleged that he engaged the services of Atty. Balon relative to the returned checks
issued to the former by Jose G. Guisande. Atty. Balon sent demand letters to Guisande
but thereafter failed to inform Tan about the status of the same. Tan alleged that as a
fellow Rotarian, he regularly met Atty. Balon but the latter said nothing about the case.
Tan thus engaged the services of another lawyer, Atty. Romualdo Jubay, who filed an
estafa case against Guisande. During the proceedings, Guisandes counsel informed Tan
and Atty. Jubay that out of the P96,085.00 originally owed, P60,000.00 was already
collected by Atty. Balon.
When confronted by Tan, Atty. Balon admitted that he collected the amount of P60,000.00
from Guisande. He then proposed to Tan that 20% of the P60,000.00 or P12,000.00 be
applied as attorneys fees. He offered to pay the remaining balance of P48,000.00 with
interest of 6% from September 29, 1999 to January 13, 2003 by issuing two postdated
checks. However, the two checks issued by Atty. Balon bounced for reason "account
closed" when presented for payment.
Upon being informed of the dishonor, Atty. Balon offered to settle his obligations by
depositing cash in Tans account. However, he was only able to deposit a total amount
of P20,000.00. Despite several demands, Atty. Balon failed to fully settle his obligations.
Thus, Tan filed the instant complaint.
Page 140 of 151

In his Comment, Atty. Balon alleged that he had fully paid his obligations; that on several
occasions, he rendered legal services to Tan for free; that the administrative complaint
was intended to harass him and to stop him from filing a collection case for unpaid legal
services against Tan.
On December 8, 2004, we referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation. The IBP held a mandatory conference and conducted a hearing
on August 24, 2005. During the hearing, Atty. Balon admitted that he was not able to fully
pay his obligations to Tan.1 The parties were then directed to submit their respective
position papers on or before September 12, 2005.
Complainant submitted his position paper. Respondent, however, submitted a "Motion to

Suspend the Period to File Position Paper and to Defer the Submission of the Case for
Resolution and With Motion to Set Case for Trial and/or Reception of Evidence." In the
same Motion, particularly paragraph 6 thereof, respondent claimed that "the IBP has no
jurisdiction over the complaint as it concerns a contract of loan, rather than a fiduciary
transaction of lawyer-client relationship." The IBP granted the motion and scheduled the
hearing on December 6, 2005.
Subsequently, however, the Investigating Commissioner learned that respondent had

been disbarred by the Court in Lemoine v. Balon, Jr.2 on October 28, 2003, or even prior
to the institution of the instant complaint. Thus, the IBP deemed the proceedings closed
and terminated for lack of disciplinary jurisdiction over respondent in view of his prior
disbarment. At the same time, it ordered respondent to show cause why he should not be
cited for contempt for failing to inform the IBP of his disbarment and for continuing to
represent that he is still a member of the Bar.
In his explanation, respondent alleged that he assumed the IBP knew of his disbarment;
that his disbarment attained finality only on April 12, 2005; and that he intended to discuss
his disbarment in the position paper he is yet to submit to the IBP.
Unsatisfied with the explanation, the IBP recommended that respondent be cited for
contempt for continuing to practice law despite his disbarment.
On March 7, 2007, we required the parties to manifest whether they are willing to submit
the case for resolution. However, on May 4, 2007, complainant filed an Affidavit of
Desistance claiming that the filing of the instant case was a product of misunderstanding
and misapprehension of facts; and that he and the respondent had cleared their
differences and reconciled their accounting records. Consequently, he is no longer
interested in pursuing the complaint.
On the other hand, respondent filed on May 8, 2007 a Manifestation and Motion claiming
that considering complainants Affidavit of Desistance, it would be "prudent" for the
Supreme Court to refer the matter back to the IBP.
Page 141 of 151

In Lemoine v. Balon, Jr., respondent was found unfit to remain as a member of the Bar
after committing malpractice, deceit, and gross misconduct. He received the check
corresponding to his clients insurance claim, falsified the check and made it payable to
himself, encashed the same and appropriated the proceeds. The Court found his acts so
appalling and his character grossly flawed that it ruled in this wise:
Specifically with respect to above-quoted provision of Canon 16 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, the Filipino lawyers principal source of ethical rules, which
Canon 16 bears on the principal complaint of complainant, a lawyer must hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client that he may come to possess. This commandment
entails certain specific acts to be done by a lawyer such as rendering an accounting of all
money or property received for or from the client as well as delivery of the funds or
property to the client when due or upon demand. Respondent breached this Canon when
after he received the proceeds of complainants insurance claim, he did not report it to
complainant, who had a given address in Makati, or to his co-attorney-in-fact Garcia who
was his contact with respect to complainant.
In fact, long after respondent received the December 23, 1998 check for P525,000.00 he,
by his letter of March 26, 1999 to Garcia, had even the temerity to state that the claim
was still pending and recommend "acceptance of the 50% offer . . . which is P350,000.00
pesos." His explanation that he prepared and sent this letter on Garcias express request
is nauseating. A lawyer, like respondent, would not and should not commit prevarication,
documented at that, on the mere request of a friend.
By respondents failure to promptly account for the funds he received and held for the
benefit of his client, he committed professional misconduct. Such misconduct is
reprehensible at a greater degree, for it was obviously done on purpose through the
employment of deceit to the prejudice of complainant who was kept in the dark about the
release of the check, until he himself discovered the same, and has to date been deprived
of the use of the proceeds thereof.
A lawyer who practices or utilizes deceit in his dealings with his client not only violates his
duty of fidelity, loyalty and devotion to the clients cause but also degrades himself and
besmirches the fair name of an honorable profession.
That respondent had a lien on complainants funds for his attorneys fees did not relieve
him of his duty to account for it. The lawyers continuing exercise of his retaining lien
presupposes that the client agrees with the amount of attorneys fees to be charged. In
case of disagreement or when the client contests that amount for being unconscionable,
however, the lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment
of his fees. He can file, if he still deems it desirable, the necessary action or proper motion
with the proper court to fix the amount of such fees.
In respondents case, he never had the slightest attempt to bring the matter of his
compensation for judicial determination so that his and complainants sharp disagreement
thereon could have been put to an end. Instead, respondent stubbornly and in bad faith
Page 142 of 151

held on to complainants funds with the obvious aim of forcing complainant to agree to
the amount of attorneys fees sought. This is an appalling abuse by respondent of the
exercise of an attorneys retaining lien which by no means is an absolute right and cannot
at all justify inordinate delay in the delivery of money and property to his client when due
or upon demand.
Respondent was, before receiving the check, proposing a 25% attorneys fees. After he
received the check and after complainant had discovered its release to him, he was
already asking for 50%, objection to which complainant communicated to him. Why
respondent had to doubly increase his fees after the lapse of about one year when all the
while he has been in custody of the proceeds of the check defies comprehension. At any
rate, it smacks of opportunism, to say the least.
As for respondents claim in his June 2001 Supplement to his Counter-Affidavit that he
had on several occasions from May 1999 to October 1999 already delivered a total
of P233,000.00 out of the insurance proceeds to Garcia in trust for complainant, this does
not persuade, for it is bereft of any written memorandum thereof. It is difficult to believe
that a lawyer like respondent could have entrusted such total amount of money to Garcia
without documenting it, especially at a time when, as respondent alleged, he and Garcia
were not in good terms. Not only that. As stated earlier, respondents Counter-Affidavit
of February 18, 2000 and his December 7, 1999 letter to complainant unequivocally
contained his express admission that the total amount of P525,000.00 was in his custody.
Such illogical, futile attempt to exculpate himself only aggravates his misconduct.
Respondents claim discredited, the affidavits of Leonardo and Roxas who, acting
allegedly for him, purportedly gave Garcia some amounts forming part of the P233,000.00
are thus highly suspect and merit no consideration.
The proven ancillary charges against respondent reinforce the gravity of his professional
misconduct.
The intercalation of respondents name to the Chinabank check that was

issued payable solely in favor ofcomplainant as twice certified by Metropolitan Insurance
is clearly a brazen act of falsification of a commercial document which respondent
resorted to in order to encash the check.
Respondents threat in his December 7, 1999 letter to expose complainant to possible

sanctions from certain government agencies with which he bragged to have a "good
network" reflects lack of character, self-respect, and justness.
It bears noting that for close to five long years respondent has been in possession of
complainants funds in the amount of over half a million pesos. The deceptions and lies
that he peddled to conceal, until its discovery by complainant after about a year, his
receipt of the funds and his tenacious custody thereof in a grossly oppressive manner
point to his lack of good moral character. Worse, by respondents turnaround in his
Supplement to his Counter-Affidavit that he already delivered to complainants friend
Garcia the amount of P233,000.00 which, so respondent claims, is all that complainant is
Page 143 of 151

entitled to, he in effect has declared that he has nothing more to turn over to complainant.
Such incredible position is tantamount to a refusal to remit complainants funds, and gives
rise to the conclusion that he has misappropriated them.1awphi1
In fine, by respondents questioned acts, he has shown that he is no longer fit to remain
a member of the noble profession that is the law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., is found GUILTY of malpractice,

deceit and gross misconduct in the practice of his profession as a lawyer and he is hereby
DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the
Roll of Attorneys and to inform all courts and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines of this
Decision.
Respondent is ordered to turn over to complainant, Daniel Lemoine, the amount

of P525,000.00 within thirty (30) days from notice, without prejudice to whatever judicial
action he may take to recover his attorneys fees and purported expenses incurred in
securing the release thereof from Metropolitan Insurance.
SO ORDERED.
It appears that after the chastisement he received from the Court and despite having been
stripped of the privilege to practice law, respondent was unrepentant and unmoved as he
continued to commit falsehood and dishonest acts.
In the instant case, respondent collected the money intended for his client without
informing the latter of such receipt. Worse, he used the amount for personal purposes. It
was almost four years from the time he received the money that his client knew of the
collection. Although respondent offered to pay the amount, he was not able to fully pay
the same. He even had the temerity to allege in his comment that he has fully paid the
amount only to admit during the hearing conducted by the IBP that he only paid a portion
thereof. Moreover, the checks he issued to Tan as payment bounced for insufficiency of
funds.
Notwithstanding his disbarment on October 28, 2003, he continued to represent himself

as a lawyer, not only before the IBP but also before this Court. In the Motion for Extension
dated October 5, 2004, respondent signed his name under "Balon Law Office" and
appended his PTR, IBP and Roll numbers.3 He also signed as Notary Public in the
Affidavit of Service of Sally I. Leonardo.4
In his Comment dated October 21, 2004, respondent prayed in the alternative that the
case be referred to the IBP5despite his prior disbarment. Again he signed his name below
"Balon Law Office"6 and as Notary Public in the Affidavit of Service.7
In the Rejoinder dated December 15, 2004, respondent reiterated his prayer that the case
be referred to the IBP for investigation8 despite knowledge of IBPs lack of jurisdiction in
Page 144 of 151

view of his prior disbarment. He again appended his name under "Balon Law Office"
together with his Roll number.9
There is no merit in respondents contention that he continued to represent himself as a

lawyer because the disbarment became final only on April 12, 2005. Good faith and fair
dealing require him to disclose his disbarment. Instead, he continued to sign the pleadings
as a lawyer and as notary public.
Moreover, we note that even after the disbarment became final on April 12, 2005,
respondent continued to represent himself as a lawyer. During the IBP hearing on August
24, 2005, he deliberately failed to mention his prior disbarment. In the Motion to Suspend
the Period to File Position Paper and to Defer the Submission of the Case for Resolution
and With Motion to Set Case for Trial and/or Reception of Evidence dated September 9,
2005, although he did not append the title "Attorney" to his name, yet he affixed his PTR,
IBP and Roll numbers under his signature. The same is true with the Urgent Motion for
Postponement dated November 23, 2005. This notwithstanding the Courts Decision on
October 28, 2003 to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
As a former lawyer, respondent should know that the IBPs jurisdiction is limited to the
members of the Bar. In fact, in the Motion to Suspend the Period to File Position Paper
and to Defer Submission of the Case for Resolution dated September 9, 2005,
respondent alleged that the IBP has no jurisdiction over the instant complaint because it
allegedly concerns a contract of loan, and not a fiduciary transaction between a lawyer
and his client. However, after the IBP found out his duplicity and referred the case back
to this Court, and after the complainant submitted his Affidavit of Desistance, respondent
still has the temerity to say that "it would be prudent for the Honorable Court, if the same
will also be referred to the IBP for appropriate action x x x."
Respondent is making a mockery of the proceedings as well as of the authority of the IBP
and the Court. After claiming that the IBP has no jurisdiction over the complaint, he now
alleges that it would be prudent for this Court to refer back the case as well as the
complainants affidavit of desistance to the IBP.
In Lemoine v. Balon, Jr., respondent was found guilty of grave misconduct for
misappropriating the funds of his client. In the instant case, respondent committed the
same reprehensible act. In addition, he continued to represent himself as a lawyer despite
his prior disbarment, and committed contumacious acts before the IBP and the Court.
Such utter disregard of this Courts authority must not be countenanced.
It has been held that contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of
the court, such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into
disrespect.10 It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts order
but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law
into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration of justice.11
Page 145 of 151

Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides that a person may be punished for
indirect contempt for:
xxxx
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings
of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or

degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without

authority;
xxxx
The same Rule further provides that a person may be punished for indirect contempt after
a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment
thereon and to be heard by himself or counsel. In the instant case, respondent was
ordered to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for not disclosing his prior
disbarment and for continuing to represent himself as a lawyer. He submitted an
explanation but we find the same unsatisfactory.
Thus, respondent was properly accorded his right to due process. The essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence
one may have in support of ones defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal
arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be
heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process.12
A person adjudged guilty of indirect contempt may be punished by a fine not

exceeding P30,000.00 or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both.13 Under the
circumstances prevailing in the instant case, we find the fine in the maximum amount
of P30,000.00 as appropriate.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Amadeo E. Balon, Jr. is found guilty of INDIRECT

CONTEMPT and is ordered to pay a FINE of P30,000.00 payable in full within a non-
extendible period of five days from receipt of this Resolution, and strongly warned to
refrain from any further attempts to make a mockery of judicial processes and that
commission of the same or similar act will merit a more severe sanction. Failure to pay
the fine within the given period will subject respondent to imprisonment until full
compliance.
SO ORDERED.
Page 146 of 151

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA

ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
NACHURA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 30.
2 A.C. No. 5829, 414 SCRA 511.
3 Rollo, p. 17.
4 Id. at 18.
Page 147 of 151

5 Id. at 22.
6 Id. at 23.
7 Id. at 26.
8 Id. at 36.
9 Id.
10 Abad v. Somera, G.R. No. 82216, July 2, 1990, 187 SCRA 75, 84-85.
11 Id. at 85.
12Mutuc v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 48108, September 26, 1990, 190 SCRA
43, 49.
13 RULES OF COURT, Rule 71, Sec. 7.
Page 148 of 151

CASE 16

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 35 September 30, 1949
In re Attorney FELIX P. DAVID, petitioner.
Felix P. David in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Angelo Bautista and Solicitor Estrella
Abad Santos for the Government.
REYES, J.:
The respondent, Felix P. David, a member of a Philippine Bar, is charged with the
malpractice for misappropriating funds entrusted to him by his client, the complainant
Briccio S. Henson. Respondent having answered denying the charge, the complaint was
referred to the Solicitor General for investigation. After the investigation the Solicitor
General rendered his report finding the respondent guilty of professional misconduct and
recommending disciplinary action. The Solicitor General reports the following facts to
have been conclusively established:
. . . that on February 15, 1947, respondent obtained P840 from his client Briccio
Henson to be applied to the payment of inheritance and real estate taxes due from
the estate of Esteban Henson for 1945, 1946 and 1947 (p. 3, t. s. n.), for which he
signed a receipt (Annex 'A'; p. 3, t. s. n.). On several occasions, complainant asked
the respondent to show him the official tax receipt evidencing the payment of said
taxes, to which the latter answered that he had already paid them, but the receipts
were left with his friend in San Fernando. Respondent promised to give the receipt
later. Complainant waited patiently for it but it was never delivered. After the
respondent had failed to deliver the receipt, complainant became suspicious and
inquired from the provincial treasurer of Pampanga about the matter. Said official
gave the information that the taxes were never paid. Consequently, complainant
requested the respondent to refund the money given him for the payment of said
taxes (p. 7, t. s. n., OSG), but he failed to do so. Respondent made several
promises to return the money which he never complied. Neither had he done
anything to transfer the titles of the land in the name of the heirs of Esteban Henson
up to the present (p. 9, t. s. n.). In view of this failure of the respondent, the
complainant was ultimately forced to pay the taxes out of his own pocket (p. 8,
t.s.n.).
Page 149 of 151

Required to answer the complaint formulated by the Solicitor General on the basis of his
report, respondent failed to do so. And despite due notice he likewise failed to appear at
the hearing before this Court. Indeed, we note from the Solicitor General's report that
respondent, instead of welcoming every opportunity for hearing, seems to have wanted
to avoid it. On this point the report says:
At the hearing held on May 26, 1948, both parties appeared and the complainant
had testified, the hearing was set for continuance the following day. Both parties
agreed in the presence of the investigator to postpone said hearing for June 5,
1948. On June 5, 1948, complainant appeared, but respondent did not show up,
so to give the respondent a chance, the investigator postponed the continuation of
the hearing to June 17. Both parties were duly subpoenaed (attached to the
records). On June 15th, respondent sent a letter (attached to the records) to
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, asking that the hearing be
postponed to June 25, 1948. According to the request, both parties were again
duly subpoenaed for June 25, 1948 (attached to the record). In the subpoena sent
to respondent, his attention was invited to Rule 127, section 28, of the Rules of
Court, which provides that if he fails to appear and answer the charge, the Solicitor
in charge will proceed to hear the case ex parte. In spite of this, on the morning of
June 25, he again sent another letter (attached to the records) to Assistant Solicitor
General Kapunan, asking that the hearing be transferred to July 7, or 8, 1948. In
order that the respondent be given all the chances to defend himself, his request
was granted. In the subpoena sent him setting the hearing for July 8, 1948, as
requested, the following remark was stated:
Failure on your part to appear will cause the investigator to proceed with the
investigation and to file the corresponding recommendation to the Supreme Court.
No further postponement will be entertained.
It is worthwhile mentioning that every time the case was set for hearing the
complainant made his appearance.
On the morning of July 8, 1948, both parties appeared; respondent made a formal
request in person to the investigator asking that the hearing be postponed to 2
o'clock p.m. of the same day. Out of consideration to him, even to the discomfiture
of complainant, respondent's request was again granted. But contrary to his
assurance, the respondent again failed to appear.
There is no question that respondent received from complainant the sum of P840
for the specific purpose of applying the same to the payment of taxes due from the
estate which he was engaged to settle. The receipt which he issued for said
amount as well as for the sum of P110 and a sack of rice paid to him for his
expenses and fee reads as follows: . . .
February 15, 1947.
Page 150 of 151

Received from Mr. Briccio S. Henson the sum of eight hundred and forty
(P840) pesos to be paid as follows:
P210 -Inheritance tax of the heirs of the late Don

Esteban Henson.
P630 -Land taxes for 1945-1947.
Failure on my part to deliver to him the official receipts corresponding to the

above mentioned amount, I promise to return to him the whole amount of
P840 not later than April 16, 1947 without any obligation on his part.
A separate amount of one hundred and ten (P110) pesos and a sack of rice
was paid to me for my expenses and fee.
(Sgd.) Atty. FELIX DAVID.
Respondent did not care to testify. But through his unverified answer, he would make it
appear that he was entitled to and had been promised a legal fee for his services and
that, as this promise was not complied with, he "saw it fit to withhold said amount (the
P840 for taxes) until he is paid." This explanation is obviously an afterthought and clearly
unfounded. For the established fact is that respondent at first made complainant believe
that the sum in question had already been applied by him to the payment of taxes, and,
as testified to by complainant, for the little that respondent was able to do in connection
with the case entrusted to him, he has already received his fee as shown by the above-
copied receipt. The conclusion is therefore irresistible that respondent misappropriated
the money of his client. This makes him guilty of unprofessional conduct.
In view of the gravity of the misconduct committed, the respondent Felix P. David is
hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years from the date
this decision become final, without prejudice to a more severe action if the sum
misappropriated is not refunded within one month from the same date.
Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, and Torres,
JJ., concur.
Page 151 of 151

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 138884 June 6, 2002

RODOLFO DE LEON, petitioner,

The antecedent facts are as follows:

As submitted by appellants, they adopted pertinent portions of the appealed

WHEREFORE, the motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED, and appellee is required

WHEREFORE, the appeal by appellants is deemed submitted for decision without

(1) WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ENTERTAINING THE APPEAL OF PRIVATE

(2) WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN DISREGARD OF THE

(3) WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN GRAVE VIOLATION OF DUE

(4) WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN IT RESOLVED TO HAVE THE

We find the petition devoid of merit.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, De Leon, Jr., and Corona, JJ., concur.

3 Rollo, pp. 31-38.

21 F. Regalado, I REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 375 (6th ed. 1997).

Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. An appeal may be dismissed by the

(d) Unauthorized alterations, omissions or additions in the approved record

(f) Absence of specific assignment of errors in the appellants brief, or of

(h) Failure of the appellant to appear at the preliminary conference under

Republic of the Philippines

B. M. No. 1154 June 8, 2004

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE

The antecedents follow.

Pursuant to this Courts R E S O L U T I O N2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed

In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate

Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work

. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues,

The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is

Registration of attorneys and agents. A register of an attorneys and a register

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Requirement for registration. No person will be admitted to practice and

The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio

The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.

The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.1wph1.t

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a